Securing Europe throughCounter-Terrorism: Impact,Legitimacy and Effectiveness

THE IMPACT, LEGITIMACYAND EFFECTIVENESS OF

EU COUNTER-TERRORISMSECILE Consortium, led by Professor Fiona de Londras (Durham University)

1. Executive Summary2. About SECILE3. Methodology4. Key Findings from the Stocktaking Exercise: Scale of EU Counter-Terrorism5. Key Findings from the Stocktaking Exercise: Disciplinary Perspectives

5.1 Understanding Impact5.2 Understanding Legitimacy5.3 Understanding Effectiveness

6. Insights from the Case Studies6.1 European Arrest Warrant

Perspectives of Operational End Users:Impact of the European Arrest WarrantPerspectives of Operational End Users:Effectiveness of the European Arrest WarrantPerspectives of Operational End Users:Legitimacy of the European Arrest WarrantCivil Society PerspectivesPolicy-Maker Perspectives

6.2 EU Border Control DatabasesPerspectives of Operational End Users:Impact of EU Border Control DatabasesPerspectives of Operational End Users:Effectiveness of EU Border Control DatabasesPerspectives of Operational End Users:Legitimacy of EU Border Control DatabasesCivil Society PerspectivesPolicy-Maker Perspectives

6.3 Counter-Terrorist FinancingPerspectives of Operational End Users:Impact of Counter-Terrorist Finance Law and PolicyPerspectives of Operational End Users:Effectiveness of Counter-Terrorist Finance Law and PolicyPerspectives of Operational End Users:Legitimacy of Counter-Terrorist Finance Law and PolicyCivil Society PerspectivesPolicy-Maker Perspectives

7. Insights from Policy-Makers7.1 Impact7.2 Legitimacy7.3 Effectiveness

8. Impact, Legitimacy and Effectiveness: Conclusions8.1 Understanding Impact8.2 Understanding Legitimacy8.3 Understanding Effectiveness

9. Proposals for reformProposal 1: Enhance the Assessment of Rights-Related ImpactProposal 2: Enhance Democratic OversightProposal 3: Enhance TransparencyProposal 4: ‘Close the Loop’ by Systematising Review

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Table of Contents:

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This report presents the key findings from theSECILE project for those engaged in the design,drafting, implementation, review and study of EUcounter-terrorism. SECILE is a major, collaborativeproject part-funded by the FP7 programme whichaims to explore the meaning of ‘impact’,‘legitimacy’ and ‘effectiveness’ in the context of EUcounter-terrorism, to make key recommendationsfor reform, and to undertake empirically-informedwork on three fields of EU activity that weredeveloped under the banner of ‘counter-terrorism’(the European Arrest Warrant, databases used inborder surveillance, and measures for the disruptionof counter-terrorism finance).

The key findings from the SECILE project areoutlined in condensed form in this report with theparticular needs of policy-makers, operational endusers, and researchers in mind. Links and referencesto fuller reports are provided throughout.

The key findings outlined in this report are:

1. Since 2001, the EU has been very active incounter-terrorism, having produced 239counter-terrorism measures between Autumn2001 and Summer 2013, 88 of which are ‘legallybinding’.

2. Ex ante impact assessments in the field ofcounter-terrorism appear to prioritisequantifiable predicted impacts (such aseconomic impacts) over societal impacts,including negative impacts on human rights.

3. Over the past ten years the European Parliamenthas often been marginalised in respect of themaking and oversight of EU counter-terrorism,raising concerns as to the democratic legitimacyof such measures.

4. EU counter-terrorist measures are rarelysubjected to formal ex post facto review. Wheresuch review occurs it sometimes appears toexhibit a bias towards quantifiable impacts over

societal impacts and to be heavily influenced byoperational perspectives.

5. The lack of systematic, participatory, evaluativereview of EU counter-terrorist measuresundermines their legitimacy, as well as stymyingefforts to understand their impact and assesstheir effectiveness.

6. In some cases, measures that were introducedunder the ‘counter-terrorism’ umbrella (egEuropean Arrest Warrant) are not perceived of asprimarily ‘counter-terrorist’ by those who useand apply them, reflecting the fact that many ofthese measures have multiple applications anda complex provenance.

The report makes a number of keyrecommendations for reform, building on theresearch undertaken in the SECILE project.

First, it recommends that the assessment ofrights-related impact be enhanced at both the exante and ex post facto stages. In order to achievethis, it recommends giving more appropriateweight to the views and estimations of specialistactors with responsibility for rights assessment inthe European Union, as well as civil society actors,and a caution about over-weighting quantitativedata over qualitative assessments. Relatedly,participation in impact assessment ought to beenhanced with as diverse a range of stakeholdersas possible being involved. In this respect, keystakeholders must extend beyond industry andsecurity experts to include civil society andspecialist agencies with rights-related ambits,although participation need not necessarily be thesame at ex ante and ex post facto stages.

Second, it recommends enhanced democraticoversight of EU counter-terrorism with a greaterrole being played by the European Parliament inboth the making and the oversight of counter-terrorist measures and policy. This may requiresome organisational adjustments within the

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1. Executive Summary

European Parliament, including empowering acommittee of the Parliament to receive classifiedinformation.

Third, it recommends that transparency aroundthe making, implementation, impact andeffectiveness of EU counter-terrorism be enhanced,albeit in a manner that takes the challenges of thesecurity context into account.

Fourthly, the report recommends that, in thecase of all EU counter-terrorism, systematic reviewought to be introduced in order to ‘close the loop’.

Ensuring systematic and evaluative review of themaking, operation and impact of counter-terrorismis key to understanding its impact, enhancing itslegitimacy, and assessing its effectiveness. All suchreviews ought to critically assess the impact andeffectiveness of the measures, taking theperspectives of a wide range of stakeholders onboard. They ought to be regular, participatory,public (to the extent possible and bearing in mindthe challenges of transparency in the securitycontext), and capable of bringing about policy, legal,practical and political reorientation by providing arigorous evidence base for policy (re)evaluation.

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SECILE (Securing European through Counter-Terrorism: Impact, Legitimacy and Effectiveness) isan FP7-funded, collaborative project the resultsfrom which are presented in full on the projectwebsite: www.secile.eu

SECILE combines research partners withacademic, military, judicial, practical and industryexpertise. Led by Professor Fiona de Londras inDurham University (UK), the consortium consistsof the Centre for Irish and European Security, King’sCollege London, the National Maritime College ofIreland, the Peace Research Institute Oslo,Statewatch, and the Supreme Court of Latvia.

The main goal of SECILE was to provide anempirically-informed, multi-stakeholder under-standing of how the impact, legitimacy andeffectiveness of European counter-terrorismmeasures might best be measured and understood.In the fulfillment of this objective the projectplaced particular emphasis on gathering andunderstanding practical experiences ofimplementing and assessing these measures.

SECILE met these objectives by:

• Cataloguing counter-terrorism legislationintroduced at EU level since September 2001 inorder to provide a comprehensive record of thedegree to which the EU is engaged in counter-terrorism, mapping the potential scope of theproject and the field.�

• Producing a comparative report on thetransposition of EU measures in member statesin order to record the differing transpositionmechanisms and assess whether, throughtransposition, the measures promulgated at EU-level might be imposed inconsistently across theUnion with a view to assessing uniformity.

• Identifying whether there are any mechanismswithin the EU laws and policies themselves thatare intended to measure the impact, legitimacyand effectiveness.

• Rigorously deriving an understanding of the stateof the art in legal, societal, operational anddemocratic terms on measuring andconceptualising the impact, legitimacy andeffectiveness of counter-terrorism measuresgenerally and in the EU specifically.

• Systematically considering the impact of selectedmeasures in the EU and extracting understandingsof current gaps in knowledge and perspectives bymeans of in-depth case studies.

• Engaging stakeholders and undertaking widedissemination of research results in order toincrease awareness among relevant EU anddomestic actors of key insights on the impact,legitimacy and effectiveness of EU counter-terrorism.

2. About SECILE

The SECILE project was carried out in three mainphases.

Phase 1 was a stocktaking phase. This comprised,firstly, the preparation by Ben Hayes and ChrisJones of Statewatch of a comprehensive catalogueof EU counter-terrorism measures adopted since11th September 2001 in order to determine thecurrent legal status of counter-terrorist lawgenerated at EU level. In addition, Hayes and Jonesprepared a report on the transposition of the 88-EU counter-terrorism measures requiringtransposition, a report on how the EU assesses theimpact, legitimacy and effectiveness of its counter-terrorism laws, and a case study of the EU’s DataRetention Directive to illustrate the general findingsin this work-package.

The second element of the stock-taking phasewas the assessment of paradigmatic under-

standings of impact, legitimacy and effectivenessin legal, operational, societal and democratic terms.In this respect four reports were prepared. MédericMartin-Maze of the Peace Research Institute Oslo(PRIO) prepared a report on the concepts ofimpact, legitimacy and effectiveness from a societalperspective. Fiona de Londras and Josephine Doodyof Durham University and Erika Downing of theNational Maritime College of Ireland explored theoperational challenges and perspectives in counter-terrorism. Yulia Chistyakova of Durham Universityconsidered impact, legitimacy and effectiveness inrelation to both theory and in the practice ofdemocratic institutions within the EU memberstates. Mathias Vermeulen, Daniel Deering andSadhbh McCarthy of the Centre for Irish andEuropean Security considered the ways in whichlaw understands the concepts of impact, legitimacyand effectiveness in counter-terrorism.

Ben Hayes & Chris JonesCatalogue of EU Counter-Terrorism MeasuresAdopted since 11 September 2001

Ben Hayes & Chris JonesReport on the Transposition of EU Counter-Terrorism Measures

Ben Hayes & Chris JonesReport on how the EU assesses the impact,legitimacy and effectiveness of its counter-terrorism laws

Ben Hayes & Chris JonesThe EU Data Retention Directive: A Case Studyof the legitimacy and effectiveness of EUcounter-terrorism policy

Fiona de Londras, Josephine Doody, SigneZalkalne, Janis SupeCross-Disciplinary Perspectives on Impact,Legitimacy and Effectiveness in the Content ofEU Counter-Terrorism

Mathias Vermeulen, Sadhbh McCarthy,Daniel DeeringReport on Legal Understandings of Impact,Legitimacy and Effectiveness in Counter-Terrorism

Fiona de Londras, Josephine Doody, ErikaDowningReport on Operational Perspectives on Impact,Legitimacy and Effectiveness in Counter-Terrorism

Yulia ChistyakovaDemocratic Perspectives on Impact,Legitimacy and Effectiveness in the Counter-Terrorism Context

Méderic Martin-MazéReport on Societal Understandings of Impact,Legitimacy and Effectiveness in the Counter-Terrorism Context

3. Methodology

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Bringing these reports together, Fiona deLondras and Josephine Doody of DurhamUniversity and Janis Supe and Signe Zalkalne of theSupreme Court of Latvia identified the cross-disciplinary perspectives of impact, legitimacy andeffectiveness building on the insights of theoperational, legal, democratic and societalperspective reports.

Phase 2 was an empirical phase. This comprised,firstly, of three case studies undertaken primarilyby the research team at King’s College London: theEuropean Arrest Warrant, EU border controldatabases, and counter-terrorist financing. Thisincluded three focus groups with law enforcementofficers and other end users involved in theimplementation of these measures across Europe.

The findings of those focus groups and theirbroader implications are outlined in three reportsco-authored by Cian C. Murphy, Aldo ZammitBorda, and Lucy Hoyte. In addition, the PeaceResearch Institute Oslo, assisted by DurhamUniversity, held a focus group with a small sampleof civil society actors from across Europe to discussthese same measures. The results of this focusgroup and their broader implications are outlinedin a report by Rozemarijn Van der Hilst. Finally inthis phase, the research team at Durham Universityundertook ten semi-structured interviews with keypolicy-makers on these counter-terrorismmeasures as well as on EU counter-terrorism in abroader sense. The results of these interviews andtheir broader implications are outlined in a reportby Fiona de Londras & Josephine Doody.

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Rozemarijn Van der HilstCivil Society Perspectives on the Impact,Legitimacy and Effectiveness of EuropeanCounter Terrorism Measures

Cian C. Murphy, Aldo Zammit Borda, LucaHoyteLaw Enforcement Officers’ Perspectives onImpact, Legitimacy and Effectiveness of EUBorder Control Databases

Fiona de Londras & Josephine DoodyPolicy-Maker Perspective on Impact,Legitimacy and Effectiveness in EU Counter-Terrorism

Cian C. Murphy, Aldo Zammit Borda, LucaHoyteCounter-Terrorism Finance Operatives’Perspectives on Impact, Legitimacy andEffectiveness of EU Counter-Terrorism FinanceLaw and Policy

Cian C. Murphy, Aldo Zammit Borda, LucaHoyteProsecutors' and Government Officials'Perspectives on the Impact, Legitimacy andEffectiveness of the European Arrest Warrant

The final stage, a synthesis stage, brought theresults of the stock-taking and empirical phasestogether to identify broader lessons, implicationsfor EU counter-terrorism, conceptualisations of thekey concepts, and proposals for reform. Theseproposals are outlined in this report, and this phase

of the work will also lead to the publication of anedited collection (Fiona de Londras & JosephineDoody (eds), The Impact, Legitimacy andEffectiveness of EU Counter-Terrorism (2015;Routledge), forthcoming).

INSTRUMENT PURPOSE, IMPACTQUANTITY(+DRAFTS)

Action plansand strategydocuments

Sets the EU counter-terrorism agenda through legislativeand/or operational programmes that represent a politicalcommitment on the part of EU member states, institutionsand agencies to develop and implement specific policies,

legal measures or frameworks for cooperation.

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Regulations Legal acts that apply directly without requiring nationallaws to implement them (though states are free to

transpose as long as effect is same). All EU institutions,member states and individuals must comply with

Regulations.

25(+13)

Directives Legal acts that are binding on the member states in termsof the results to be achieved but leave to the discretion ofnational authorities the methods by which these results

may be achieved.

15(+8)

FrameworkDecisions

Legally binding acts used exclusively in the fields of policeand judicial co-operation in criminal justice matters

between 1999 and 2009. Similar in effect to Directivesinsofar as they require member states to achieve particularresults without dictating the means of achieving those

results.

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Decisions Legally binding acts that may have “general application” (inwhich case all member states must take steps to comply) or

be directed at specific addressees (meaning only thosesubject to the Decision must comply).

25(+4)

A core element of SECILE’s work was to undertake acomprehensive stocktaking exercise in respect of EUcounter-terrorism. This work, undertaken by Ben

Hayes and Chris Jones, found that between 2001 and2013 the EU had introduced 239 counter-terrorismmeasures, 88 of which were ‘binding law’. 1.

1. Ben Hayes & Chris Jones, Catalogue of EU Counter-Terrorism Measures (SECILE Consortium, 2013)

4. Key Findings from the Stocktaking Exercise:Scale of EU Counter-Terrorism

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Joint Actions Legally binding instruments under the Common Foreign andSecurity Policy that provide for the deployment of financialand/or human resources to achieve a specific objective. Mayalso lay down basic rules on how such initiatives should be

implemented.

1

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INSTRUMENT PURPOSE, IMPACTQUANTITY(+DRAFTS)

CommonPositions

Legally binding agreements between the member states onthe position to be taken with regard to international

matters such as strategic relations with third countries,negotiating positions in international fora or the domestic(EU) interpretation of international laws and conventions.

3

Recommendations Not legally binding but representative of a politicalcommitment on the part of EU institutions/bodies or

member states toward specific conduct or outline the goalsof a common policy.

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Resolutions Not legally binding but used to signify political agreementto act in a given area.

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Conclusions Not legally binding but used exclusively by the EU Councilto set the policy agenda by signifying political agreementamong the member states as to the type, nature or content

of specific measures.

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InternationalAgreements

Legal effect varies according to the type and nature of theagreement. In the area of counter-terrorism EU treatieshave been establish framework for member state police,

judicial and customs cooperation with the USA as well as toprovide a legal basis for the transfer of personal data from

the EU to third states.

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TOTAL 239(+25)

An analysis of how the question of impact isfolded into the process of making, maintaining andassessing these measures then followed.2. Thisanalysis found that while ex ante impactassessment by the Commission is becoming moresystematic, the concentration given to rights-related considerations can be unsatisfactory. It alsoraised a concern that such impact assessmentsmight be read as effectively ‘selling’ a policy ratherthan clearly outlining the relative impactimplications of a variety of policy options.Significant concern was, thus, raised about theextent to which such ex ante impact assessmentsundertaken by the Commission effectively take

account of societal impact, particularly relating torights. While advisory bodies’ involvement at theex ante phase can bring rights-related issues moreeffectively to the fore, their reports and opinionsdo not bind the political and policy-making processand the research found that it is not always clearthat they have a discernible effect on decision-making.

Furthermore, where policies have been pursuedthrough the introduction of legally bindingcounter-terrorism measures, this analysis foundthat the ex post facto reviews - where they happen- tend to be heavily operational in their focus, so

2. Ben Hayes & Chris Jones, Report on How the EU Assesses the Impact, Legitimacy and Effectiveness of its Counter-TerrorismLaws (SECILE Consortium, 2013).

that societal impact remains under-explored. Thisis when these reviews take place at all: although 59of the 88 legally binding measures contain reviewclauses, these reviews rarely take place in practice.Where they do - whether by the Commission, the

Council or an externally contracted agent - theytend to focus on transposition and implementationin a relatively formal sense, rather than to considerthe operation and impact of the measures in theround.

3. Ben Hayes & Chris Jones, Report on How the EU Assesses the Impact, Legitimacy and Effectiveness of its Counter-TerrorismLaws (SECILE Consortium, 2013).).

90

80

70

60

50

40

30

20

10

0

YES

POST-LEGISLATIVE ASSESMENT PROCEDURES

CommissionReview

CouncilReview

Expert/ContractorReview

NO

Beyond these formal reviews, measures aresometimes also subjected to peer review wherestates engage in a system of shared review,reflection and learning as to the operation of EUcounter-terrorism measures, but this review is alsoheavily operational in its perspective. Similarly,although to a somewhat lesser extent, the reportsof the Counter-Terrorism Coordinator were foundto be substantively oriented towards assessing the‘state of play’ and the operation of measures andnot on the societal and rights-related impacts ofEU counter-terrorism measures.

Thus, while there are various actors and stagesof impact review in the EU counter-terrorismcontext, this stocktaking exercise suggested thatthese reviews appear to have a particularoperational orientation and/or focus on technical

questions of transposition and implementation sothat, apart from analyses by entities establishedwith a specific rights-relation remit, questionsrelating to the societal impact of counter-terroristmeasures, and particularly to implications forrights, risk being marginalised and under-considered.

Hayes and Jones also undertook an analysis ofhow the question of legitimacy is dealt with in theprocesses of making, maintaining and assessingthese measures.3. As well as concerns as to reviewoutlined above, a key legitimacy consideration raisedrelates to process. This stocktaking exercise foundthat the involvement of the European Parliamenthas not always been substantive in respect of EUcounter-terrorism measures; a finding that must becontextualised by the pre-Lisbon constitutional

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arrangement vis-à-vis the Parliament. Prior to theLisbon Treaty coming into effect, many EU counter-terrorism measures were adopted under the ‘ThirdPillar’ in relation to which the Parliament had alimited role. Of the 88 legally binding counter-terrorist measures identified as having been adoptedbetween 2001 and 2013, the report finds that 70were the subject of deliberations in European

Parliament, although in 44 of these cases thedeliberation took place at consultation phase only.Co-decision had taken place in relation to only 23measures. This lack of involvement of the EuropeanParliament is exacerbated by the relatively closednature of much counter-terrorist decision-making,notwithstanding the EU’s general commitment tomore open policy-making processes.

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Thus, overall the stocktaking exercise identifieda number of critical concerns relating toeffectiveness. First, one third of the legally bindingcounter-terrorism measures introduced since 2001did not include any provisions for review. Inaddition, there was a failure to produce or publisha quarter of the reviews that were mandated bythe remaining legislation. This is notwithstandingthe fact that transposition is carefully monitored,suggesting a concern with implementation ratherthan effectiveness or a conflation ofimplementation and effectiveness. Furthermore,throughout the evaluation processes that have

been carried out, much greater weight appears tohave been ascribed to the needs and assessmentsof law enforcement and security agencies than theviews of other “stakeholders” within the EU. Finally,the “full and detailed evaluation” of EU counter-terrorism policy requested by the EuropeanParliament in 2011 is long overdue. The majority ofthe EU’s counter-terrorism legislation has not beensubjected to the kind of scrutiny that should beexpected of laws that can have such a significantimpact upon individuals and public and privateinstitutions.

25

20

15

10

5

0

Total Number Consultation Co-decision Own-initiative Non-legislativeenactment

Resolution ontopical subject

ASSESSMENT OF LEGISLATION BY THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENTBY TYPE OF PROCEDURE

FrameworkDecisions

Agreements CommonPositions

Decisions Directives JointActions

Regulations

5.1 Understanding Impact

In his report on societal impact, Méderic Martin-Mazé defines impact in a general sense as being ‘theeffect yielded by a specific measure’,4 emphasisingthat in understanding such effects one must becognisant of the unevenness of impact across bothsocietal groups and societal values. This generalconcept of impact makes it clear that acomprehensive understanding of a measure’ssocietal impact requires a multi-layered approachthat identifies and takes into account its effectsacross a number of different referents. The firstimportant referent from the perspective of societalimpact, then, is who is experiencing the effect. Asecond referent identified from the societalperspective is that of societal values. Here, again,the impact may appear different depending onwhich societal value is taken as the referent. Ameasure might, for example, be identified asincreasing security but simultaneously increasinglevels of state surveillance. This emphasises that inorder for a measure’s societal impact to beappreciated a second referent must be taken intoaccount: what is being affected. Measuring societalimpact is, thus, a complex matter that requires anappreciation of the effects of the counter-terrorismmeasure on both a range of societal groups and allrelevant societal values.

In their report on the legal perspective, MathiasVermeulen, Daniel Deering and Sadhbh McCarthydefine impact as the negative effect of a counter-

terrorism measure on the protection of legallyenshrined rights.5 The relevant referent in an impactassessment is law itself, which can be understoodin three different dimensions: the law as it appliesto suspected terrorists directly affected by themeasure, the law as it applies to all others, and theRule of Law in a more general and intangible sense.Vermeulen et. al. draw a distinction between thedirect and indirect impact of counter-terroristmeasures, meaning the effect of the measure on thelegal status of those upon whom it is applied (directimpact) and its effect beyond that (indirect impact).As regards the first dimension it is clear thatcounter-terrorist measures can have direct impactson suspected terrorists by, for example, providingthat they are to be subjected to a restrictivemeasure without what would normally beconsidered to be due process or an adversarial trialprocess. An additional indirect effect arises fromwhat Fenwick and Phillipson6 deem the ‘covertderogation’ from human rights norms and deLondras7 terms a general ‘downward calibration’ oflegal protections. This reflects a general reduction inthe level of rights protection including for those notsuspected of involvement in counter-terrorism as aresult of the counter-terrorist malaise, which canresult in courts and political actors accepting thatsecurity concerns require an adjustment in our‘normal’ standards of legal protection. As a generalmatter, it is accepted that counter-terrorismmeasures have legal impacts, manifested in theexistence of a legally defined period of emergencyin which ‘normalcy’ is suspended in order for the

4. Méderic Martin- Mazé, Report on Societal Understandings of Impact, Legitimacy and Effectiveness in the Counter-TerrorismContext (SECILE Consortium, 2013), pg.5 http://secile.eu/societal-perspectives

5. Mathias Vermeulen, Daniel Deering & Sadhbh McCarthy(with research assistance from Carolin Möller), Report on LegalUnderstandings of Impact, Legitimacy and Effectiveness in Counter-Terrorism (SECILE Consortium, 2013)http://secile.eu/report- legal-understandings

6. Helen Fenwick and Gavin Phillipson (2011) 'Covert derogations and judicial deference: redefining liberty and due processrights in counterterrorism law and beyond', McGill law journal, 56 (4), pp. 863-918.

7. Fiona de Londras (2011) Detention in the 'War on Terror': Can Human Rights Fight Back? (Cambridge: Cambridge UniversityPress).

8. Fionnuala Ni Aolain and Oren Gross (2006) Law in Times of Crisis: Emergency Powers in Theory and Practice (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press). See chapters 1 and 5.

5. Key Findings from the Stocktaking Exercise:Disciplinary Perspectives

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state to take actions that would otherwise violateconstitutional and/or human rights standards,8 theso-called ‘emergency/normalcy dichotomy’. In bothcases the question asked by law is not whetherthere are any impacts at all, but whether thoseimpacts are permissible in terms of what the lawregards to be acceptable levels of interference withthe status quo ante as measured by legal doctrinessuch as proportionality, the margin of appreciationand so on.

In her report on the democratic perspective, YuliaChistyakova considers that the impact of counter-terrorism can be understood as its effect ondemocracy, understood as the democratic principlesof the relevant political system, governance practiceand the demos.9 It is clear that the democraticperspective conceptualises impact across threereferents: the relevant political system, practices ofgovernance, and the demos itself. In the case of EUcounter-terrorism, the relevant political system isthe European Union itself. The EU’s democraticprinciples are those identified in the Treaty of theEuropean Union, namely the indivisible, universalvalues of human dignity, freedom, equality andsolidarity based on the principles of democracy andthe rule of law.10 The report makes it clear thatunderstanding impact by reference to democraticprinciples requires an assessment of both theimpact of the measures in question on themaintenance of these principles and the impact ofa climate of counter-terrorism on our understandingof the content of and a commitment to theseprinciples. In this respect, it must be recalled thatrecourse to the exceptionalism debate and theprioritisation of security over liberty can lead to areframing of democracy and radical adjustment inour understanding of its core content. As well as

impacting on our understanding of and adherenceto core democratic principles, a further impact ofcounter-terrorism from the democratic perspectivecan manifest itself in governance practices. Theseinclude the practice by which measures areintroduced, debated, justified and assessed. As notedby Sjursen,11 and cited in the report,12 the extensiveuse of flexibility mechanisms and the employmentof secrecy and urgency procedures associated withthe adoption of CT measures tend to create greaterdistance, or ‘remove’ policies and processes fromcitizens’ influence. As a result, decision-makingbecomes less transparent and accountable and thelink between the measures and democraticauthorisation less tangible. The third referent froma democratic perspective is impact on the demositself, particularly in relation to the restrictions oncivil liberties and human rights and the unevendistribution of those restrictions across societalgroups and, indeed, civil society organisations.

In their report on the operational perspective, deLondras, Doody and Downing argue that impactmight be understood as the effect thatoperationalisation of counter-terrorist measures(understood as a process by which abstract orimprecise commitments, principles, measures andpolicies are translated into ‘on the ground’ action)has on the operational framework.13 In each ofthese areas impacts can be uneven, positive ornegative. From an operational perspective, theimpact of EU counter-terrorism may be national ortransnational. In both respects, impact might beunderstood as the effect that operationalisation hason the operational framework, on roles, and onresources. At a national level the impact ofoperationalisation for the operationalisinginstitution may, then, be empirically measurable

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9. Yulia Chistyakova, Report on Democratic Understandings of Impact, Legitimacy and Effectiveness in the Counter-TerrorismContext (SECILE Consortium, 2013) <http://secile.eu/democratic-perspectives>10. Article 6(1) of the TEU recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of theEuropean Union of 7 December 2000. The preamble states that ‘the Union is founded on the indivisible, universal values ofhuman dignity, freedom, equality and solidarity; it is based on the principles of democracy and the rule of law’.11. Helene Sjursen (2011) ‘Not so intergovernmental after all? On democracy and integration in European Foreign and SecurityPolicy’, Journal of European Public Policy, 18(8),pp. 1078-1095.12. Yulia Chistyakova, supra note 6, p. 21.13. Fiona de Londras, Josephine Doody & Lt. Cdr. Erika Downing, Report on Operational Perspectives on Impact, Legitimacy andEffectiveness in Counter-Terrorism (SECILE Consortium, 2013) <http://secile.eu/report-on-operational-perspectives>

inasmuch as a cost may be calculable.Operationalisation can also create impact at theEuropean level, which might again be understood interms of operational frameworks, roles andresources. The operationalisation of EU counter-terrorism law and policy may require leadership

from one of more EU agencies and lead to thecreation of new institutions or offices. It may alsobring about either harmonisation or fragmentationof frameworks and systems used for particularpurposes within the EU.

14. Méderic Martin- Mazé, Report on Societal Understandings of Impact, Legitimacy and Effectiveness in the Counter-TerrorismContext (SECILE Consortium, 2013), http://secile.eu/societal-perspectives15. Ibid, pg. 7. 16.Mathias Vermeulen, Daniel Deering & Sadhbh McCarthy(with research assistance from Carolin Möller), Report on LegalUnderstandings of Impact, Legitimacy and Effectiveness in Counter-Terrorism (SECILE Consortium, 2013)http://secile.eu/report- legal-understandings17.Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ‘political legitimacy’: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legitimacy/

5.2 Understanding Legitimacy

In his report on societal impact, Méderic Martin-Mazé argues that the concepts of legitimacy andeffectiveness are difficult to disentangle from asocietal perspective.14 This is because of the strongrelationship between (perceived) effectiveness and(perceived) legitimacy. From a societal perspective,the focus is on the concept of effective legitimacyexplained within this report as ‘a bi-faceted concept,where the input of procedural validation meets theoutput of effective results’ (measured by a results-based evaluation).15 In other words, a measuredeveloped through an acceptable policy-makingprocess that achieves results is legitimized. It hasgained effective legitimacy. Thus, from a societalperspective legitimacy as a concept is heavilydependent on effectiveness as (alleged or perceived)effectiveness is a key mechanism for legitimation;

the more effective a measure is said to be the morelegitimate it may be perceived as being.

In their report on the legal perspective, MathiasVermeulen, Daniel Deering and Sadhbh McCarthyoutline two general concepts of legitimacy:descriptive legitimacy and normative legitimacy.16

Descriptive legitimacy refers to ‘people's beliefsabout political authority and, sometimes, politicalobligations’. The normative concept of legitimacyrefers to ‘some benchmark of acceptability orjustification of political power or authority and –possibly – obligation’.17 From this a distinctionbetween lawfulness and legitimacy can be drawn,recognising that a measure might be lawful butconsidered illegitimate. The report draws on workby de Londras, who identifies four factors that candetermine the legitimacy of a counter-terrorismmeasure: the existence of a public justificatory

• Impact relates to the effect or consequencea counter terrorism measure has.

• Impact must be understood in relation torelevant referents.

• Impact can be positive or negative; thesame measure can have both positive andnegative impacts across different referents.

• Impact can be direct or indirect. • Impact can be temporally-variable, changingin extent and nature depending on context

(e.g. whether in a period of emergency ornormalcy).

• In order for impact to be comprehensivelyunderstood, direct and indirect impactsshould be measured against multiplereferents, which in turn should includesocietal groups, institutions, societal valuesand principles (such as democratic principlesand the Rule of Law).

Bringing all of these perspectives together, the project reachedthe following conclusions:

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deliberation, non-discrimination, meaningfulreview, and temporal limitation of a givenmeasure.18

In her report on the democratic perspective,Yulia Chistyakova distinguishes between outputand input legitimacy, consisting of the effectiveprotection of EU citizens against terrorism, on theone hand, and the equal participation of citizens inthe legislative decision-making process on theother.19 Output legitimacy here is Hobbesian in itsperspective, considering a state’s security measuresto be legitimate when they can be seen to beeffective in providing individual and collectivesecurity. Input legitimacy, more liberal in itsapproach, relates to procedural criteria orrequirements for determining the popular will,including majoritarianism, citizen representationand the representation of interest groups andnetworks. A third criterion of democratic legitimacyadvocated by Schmidt20 is ‘throughput’ legitimacyjudged in terms of the efficacy, accountability andtransparency of the EU’s governance processesalong with their inclusiveness and openness toconsultation with the people.

In their report, de Londras et. al. note thatoperational perspectives on legitimacy21 may beconnected to both process (or input) and outputlegitimacy. In terms of process legitimacy, theextent to which the creation of an EU counter-terrorist law or policy that must then beoperationalised has been generated in appreciationof an existing need—as opposed to as a politicalmatter—is likely to be taken into account when itslegitimacy is being assessed by an operationalisingentity. This is at least partially because, where thepolicy is created for political rather thanoperational reasons, it is likely to be especiallyvague in its nature requiring substantial innovationand resource allocation by European and/ornational authorities in order for operationalisationto take place. In other words, the degree to whichthe operationalising process of translation isonerous may be influenced by the process by whichthe measure or policy was generated. In contrast,regardless of the process by which the measure ofpolicy was generated there is likely to be a concernwith output legitimacy which, in turn, may addressthe workability of the measures required orobligations imposed. This is arguably connected to

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18.Fiona de Londras (2011) ‘Can counter-terrorist internment ever be legitimate?’, Human Rights Quarterly, 33 (3), pp. 593-619.19.Yulia Chistyakova, Report on Democratic Understandings of Impact, Legitimacy and Effectiveness in the Counter-TerrorismContext (SECILE Consortium, 2013) http://secile.eu/democratic-perspectives20.Vivien Schmidt (2013), ‘Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited: Input, Output and “Throughput”’Political Studies 61(1), pp 2-22.21.Fiona de Londras, Josephine Doody & Lt. Cdr. Erika Downing, Report on Operational Perspectives on Impact, Legitimacy andEffectiveness in Counter-Terrorism (SECILE Consortium, 2013) http://secile.eu/report-on-operational-perspectives

• Legitimacy is a nebulous term that can besaid to comprise of numerous differentstrands including input legitimacy, processlegitimacy, output legitimacy, outcomelegitimacy, effective legitimacy, descriptivelegitimacy and normative legitimacy.

• There is a close relationship betweeneffectiveness and legitimacy in the counter-terrorist context, as measures that areperceived as effective are likely to enjoy

enhanced perceived legitimacy. • Processes of legitimation in the counter-terrorist context can include thedeployment of narratives such as those ofexceptionalism, balance and trade-off.

• Procedural and substantive mechanisms -such as sunset clauses - may be employedin an attempt to enhance legitimacy,including in politico-legal processes.

Bringing all of these perspectives together, the cross-disciplinary report reachedthe following conclusions:

22.Méderic Martin- Mazé, Report on Societal Understandings of Impact, Legitimacy and Effectiveness in the Counter-TerrorismContext, pg. 5(SECILE Consortium, 2013) http://secile.eu/societal-perspectives23. Ibid, pg. 22.24. Ibid, pg. 24.25. Ibid.26. Ibid.27. Mathias Vermeulen, Daniel Deering & Sadhbh McCarthy(with research assistance from Carolin Möller), Report on LegalUnderstandings of Impact, Legitimacy and Effectiveness in Counter-Terrorism (SECILE Consortium, 2013)http://secile.eu/report- legal-understandings

the extent to which the measure(s) answer generaloperational needs such as clarity of obligation, non-duplication, incentivisation of cooperation andcoordination, and information sharing, which inturn may be enhanced by ensuring theparticipation of operational actors in the process ofgenerating the measure/policy/output in the first

place. Thus, legitimacy might be understood asreferring to the workability of themeasure/policy/obligation when seen from theperspective of the entity or entities required tooperationalise it, where the extent to whichoperational needs are addressed is taken intoaccount.

5.3 Understanding Effectiveness

In his report on societal effectiveness, MédericMartin-Mazé defines effectiveness by reference tothe extent to which a measure’s results align withthose that were expected.22 Effectiveness isdetermined by whether the measures ‘actuallymake a difference’,23 and from a societalperspective a measure’s effectiveness can bepositive or negative (i.e. a measure can be counter-productive). Experience shows that ex post factoevaluations tend to focus on outputs rather thanon impact per se so that the so-called effectivenessanalysis risks excluding key societal indicators.Furthermore, societal representations of theeffectiveness of counter-terrorist measures areheavily influenced by three key arguments,prominent in politico-legal discourse: the exceptionargument, the metaphor of a balance betweensecurity and liberty, and the trade-off model. Thesearguments frame societal perceptions ofeffectiveness and thus present a further challengeto rigorous analysis. The societal approachproposes a move to analysing effectiveness acrossan output-outcome-impact trichotomy. Accordingto this, output-effectiveness ‘investigates thefeatures characteristic of a given counter-terroristframework’.24 The adoption of a measure inresponse to a threat would be considered anoutput. Outcome-effectiveness ‘brings under

examination the compatibility of that which isdelivered by the policy framework with theprovisions that are built into its design’.25 Finally,impact-effectiveness ‘tackles this issue pertainingto the behaviour of the targeted audience’.26

As outlined by Vermeulen et. al. in their legalreport,27 effectiveness is not usually something thatlegal analyses take into particular account (incontradistinction to necessity, proportionality andlegality). Rather, effectiveness might be understoodin terms of the production of an intended result,such as expedition of the prosecution of suspectedterrorists or the freezing of suspected terrorists’assets. Although, as outlined in detail in the report,the ECtHR does not usually expressly assess theeffectiveness of impugned counter-terroristmeasures, it does consider whether a measure is‘necessary in a democratic society’ and/or limitedto that which is ‘strictly required by the exigenciesof the situation’; an assessment that mightimplicitly take effectiveness into account. However,as the report outlines in some detail, the ECtHRtends to take a quite deferential approach (inrespect of both national courts and nationalgovernments) in cases relating to counter-terrorism.

From a democratic perspective, effectiveness isalso connected with the extent to which measures

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achieve their intended effects.28 Thus, Chistyakovanotes that effectiveness is closely connected withoutput legitimacy, inasmuch as that which is seento be ‘working’ is perceived as having enhancedlegitimacy. However, effectiveness is problematicas a concept within EU counter-terrorism from ademocratic perspective for a number of reasons.Firstly, the effective measurement of counter-terrorist measures’ effectiveness is frustrated by alack of information sharing within and across theEU inasmuch as European agencies are heavilyreliant on information and capacities that remainlargely within the domestic domain of memberstates. Secondly, EU counter-terrorism measurescan have what Schneider et. al. term ‘second-order’effects that are often overlooked.29 For example, CTefforts might divert public spending away fromother activities, including security-oriented ones, orresult in changed foreign policy priorities orpractices. Where these second-order effects areoverlooked it is difficult to tell whether counter-terrorism measures are actually effective. It is not

clear whether the measures achieve their aims orwhether they have perhaps led to transference orsubstitution effects.

In their report de Londras et al note that froman operational perspective effectiveness appears tobe connected with the extent to which theobjective that was to be achieved by means ofintroducing the measure or policy has actually beenachieved.30 Effectiveness here seems, thus, to be anon-abstract matter; rather it is measurable.However, this requires that a clear rationale for themeasure or policy in question ought to have beenoutlined; one the satisfaction of which can in factbe assessed in a meaningful way. In addition, itrequires there to be a way of measuring thiseffectiveness, most likely by means of a monitoringmechanism. Thus, from an operational perspectiveeffectiveness might be understood as thesatisfaction at operational level(s) of the originalobjectives that were to be achieved by theintroduction of the EU policy or measure.

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28. Yulia Chistyakova, Report on Democratic Understandings of Impact, Legitimacy and Effectiveness in the Counter-TerrorismContext (SECILE Consortium, 2013) http://secile.eu/democratic-perspectives29. Friedrich Schneider, Tilman Brück and Daniel Meierrieks, (2010) ‘The Economics of Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: A Survey(Part II)’, CESifo Working Paper Series No 3012 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1590148.30. Fiona de Londras, Josephine Doody & Lt. Cdr. Erika Downing, Report on Operational Perspectives on Impact, Legitimacy andEffectiveness in Counter-Terrorism (SECILE Consortium, 2013) http://secile.eu/report-on-operational-perspectives

• Across all surveyed fields effectivenessrelates broadly to the extent to which ameasure achieves its intended outcomes.

• Assessing and understanding effectivenessrequires clear identification of a measure’sintended outcomes.

• Measuring or assessing effectiveness fromsocietal, legal and democratic perspectivesposes particular challenges because ofinformation deficits and/or monopolisation,a failure to take second order effects intoaccount, the conflation of compliance witheffectiveness within official monitoringmechanisms, and institutional limitations.

• Effectiveness may be more susceptible tomeasurement from an operationalperspective where the intended outcomesare clearly defined.

• Operationally, effectiveness relates to theextent to which an objective has actuallybeen achieved and is measurable throughmonitoring mechanisms.

• There is a clear connection betweeneffectiveness and outcome legitimacy,inasmuch as measures that are seen to beeffective are likely to be perceived as havingenhanced legitimacy from an outcomeperspective.

Bringing all of these perspectives together, the cross-disciplinary report reached thefollowing conclusions:

As part of SECILE case studies were undertakenin relation to three areas of EU-led activity thatwere introduced under the rubric of ‘counteringterrorism’. These are the European Arrest Warrant,border control databases, and measures to disruptcounter-terrorist financing. Although thesemeasures and areas of activity are not all terrorism-

specific, they were all introduced in relation tostated counter-terrorist goals and activities. Thecase studies involved engagement with operationalend users (i.e. those who implement relevantmeasures in practice), policy-makers, and civilsociety representatives.

31. Cian C. Murphy, Aldo Zammit Borda & Lucy Hoyte, Prosecutor and Government Officials Perspectives on Impact, Legitimacyand Effectiveness of the European Arrest Warrant (SECILE Consortium, 2014) http://secile.eu/operational-perspectives-eu-counter-terrorism-action/

6. Insights from the Case Studies

6.1 European Arrest Warrant

Perspectives of Operational End Users: Impactof the European Arrest Warrant

The views of prosecutors and governmentofficials who participated in SECILE in respect ofthe European Arrest Warrant are presented in fullin the report Prosecutors’ and GovernmentOfficials’F Perspectives on Impact, Legitimacy andEffectiveness of the European Arrest Warrant.31

Prosecutors and government officials whoparticipated in the focus group on the EuropeanArrest Warrant (EAW) shared the view that theEAW had a positive impact on criminal justice co-operation in general and their discussionhighlighted the broader effect of the measurefollowing the events of September 11 2001.Participants emphasised that the EAW is notprimarily a counter-terrorism measure but anecessary corollary of the free movement ofindividuals within the European Union. Participantsagreed that the European Arrest Warrantpotentially had a (negative) impact in thedisplacement of crime.

Perspectives of Operational End Users:Effectiveness of the European Arrest Warrant

Prosecutors and government officials whoparticipated in the focus group on the EuropeanArrest Warrant (EAW) discussed the challenges tothe effectiveness of this measure, particularlysafeguards for those who are subject to EAW

requests and refusal to execute EAW requests onhuman rights grounds. Some participantsdemonstrated skepticism around the idea ofrequests being challenged in court on human rightsgrounds. Participants recognised that the EAW bothrequires mutual recognition based on mutual trustand contributes to such mutual recognition andtrust. Effectiveness was considered in terms ofwhether a speedy surrender was possible andparticipants largely agreed that the EAW is aneffective measure contributing to the process ofbringing suspects to trial. Participants in thisdiscussion linked effectiveness to the concept oflegitimacy.

Perspectives of Operational End Users:Legitimacy of the European Arrest Warrant

Prosecutors and government officials whoparticipated in the focus group on the EuropeanArrest Warrant (EAW) identified the existence of anappropriate legal framework as the starting pointto measuring legitimacy. Participants considered anumber of themes in relation to assessinglegitimacy, particularly legal, rational (in accordancewith a rational or reasonable policy goal), and sociallegitimacy, whilst recognising that legality alone isnot sufficient to ensure legitimacy. Participantsnoted the importance of considering how thosewho are subject to the system view the measureas a means of assessing social legitimacy. The needfor proportionality in enforcement was alsorecognised as an important element in ensuringoverall legitimacy

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Civil Society Perspectives

Civil society participants were generally lessenthusiastic about the EAW than were operationalend users. The civil society participants discussedthe need for more quantitative data on theapplication of the European Arrest Warrant in orderto understand its practical impact but noted thatrelying only on ‘figures’ in measuring impact wouldexclude important societal elements of an impactassessment. Participants explored positive impactin the context of the measure facilitating states inarresting an individual who has crossed an EUborder. Civil society focus group participants feltthe effectiveness of this measure might also beconsidered in light of the practical harmonisationof rules and legislation across member states.Participants also discussed the need to consider acost-benefit analysis of the measure to determinewhether it is effective, which assessment should beundertaken in a manner that includes discussionswith stakeholders. Participants identified timing,procedure and motivation as important issueswhen assessing the legitimacy of the EAW. In thisrespect, participants raised concerns as to thetiming of the measure’s final introduction followingevents such as 11 September 2001, which gave riseto the perception that it was motivated by theattacks, even though the proposal for the EAWpredated ‘9/11’. Thus, the process by which themeasure was introduced and an understanding of

driving forces behind it were recognised as beingimportant to legitimacy. It was also noted that theways in which a measure is used, and transparencyin relation to it usage, might influence perceptionsof its legitimacy.

Policy-Maker Perspectives

From the ten policy-makers and high-leveloperational actors in European institutionsinterviewed for SECILE, the impression of theEuropean Arrest Warrant was largely positive inrelation to the measure’s original policy objectives.It was recognised that the measure has succeededin speeding up extradition between Member States,thus addressing delays in extradition which hadpreviously been a cause for concern. The EuropeanArrest Warrant was also recognised as contributingto the development of a European judicial spaceand better coordination between member states.One interviewee noted that figures on the use ofEuropean Arrest Warrant system made aquantitative analysis of the effectiveness of themeasure relatively straightforward although acautionary note was sounded by anotherinterviewee as to the usefulness of statisticalanalysis when measuring effectiveness. Whilstpolicy-makers and operational actors recognisedthe contribution of the European Arrest Warrant tocross-state joint exercises it was noted that areview of the measure’s operation may be timely.

6.2 EU Border Control Databases

Perspectives of Operational End Users: Impactof EU Border Control Databases

The views of law enforcement officers whoparticipated in SECILE in respect of border controldatabases are presented in full in LawEnforcement Officers’ Perspectives on Impact,Legitimacy and Effectiveness of EU Border ControlDatabases.32 Law enforcement officers whoparticipated in the focus group on EU bordercontrol databases generally considered that EU

border control databases made Europe moresecure and aided law enforcement officers incarrying out their roles, although they were notsufficient on their own. A number of participantsraised concerns as to deployment of the correctdatabases, training, and the increasing complexityof databases: factors that might undermine theirpositive impact on European security. A numberof participants represented these databases asbeing a corollary of the free movement of people;a view that was shared by at least one policy-maker (see below).

32. Cian C. Murphy, Aldo Zammit Borda & Lucy Hoyte, Law Enforcement Officers Perspectives on Impact, Legitimacy andEffectiveness of EU Border Control Databases (SECILE Consortium, 2014) http://secile.eu/operational-perspectives-eu-counter-terrorism-action/

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Perspectives of Operational End Users:Effectiveness of EU Border Control Databases

Law enforcement officers who participated in thefocus group on EU border control databases haddiffering opinions on the effectiveness of thesedatabases. In terms of effectiveness, participantsstressed the need to make clear what databases onewas talking about as there is a wide array of publicand private databases that might be accessible tolaw enforcement. Building on this, participants notedthat the range of databases was expanding,introducing increasing complexity. Training andexperience in using databases were, thus, stressed askey to their effectiveness. Although training andexperience were identified as key factors in theeffectiveness of such databases, a number ofparticipants also stressed the importance ofinformation sharing in this respect. Without theexchange of information between nationalauthorities databases of this kind might not containthe data required for them to be effective, howeverchallenges of trust were raised as significant barriersto the sharing of information through databases.Not only might insufficient information-sharingundermine effectiveness but so too, someparticipants noted, can the sharing of ‘irrelevant’information by national authorities. Overall,participants tended to opine that databases weremore effective in countering organized crime thanterrorism per se.

Perspectives of Operational End Users:Legitimacy of EU Border Control Databases

Law enforcement officers who participated in thefocus group on EU border control databasesconsidered legitimacy across the three themes oflawfulness, transparency and rights. Their discussionfocused on the legitimacy of border controldatabases in particular, and not on border controlper se. In terms of lawfulness, participants noted thatlegality is key to legitimacy, but went on to say that‘mere’ lawfulness is not sufficient. In addition, someparticipants raised questions about the implicationsof the development of SIS II for lawfulness andespecially compliance with human rights given theincreased sophistication of this database in terms ofthe data that is entered into it. Participants also

noted that control over and transparency about howdatabases are used are important from theperspective of lawfulness and legitimacy.Transparency was an important element of thediscussion of legitimacy, with some participantsnoting that more external controls (from thejudiciary, NGOs and so on) might enhancetransparency and, thus, legitimacy. Participantsdisagreed as to whether data protection law strikesthe right balance between rights protection and lawenforcement’s need to access data.

Civil Society Perspectives

Civil society focus group participants identifiedthree key elements of impact in respect of bordercontrol databases: focus, political agendas andfundamental rights. Some participants felt that inorder to measure the impact of border controldatabases it was necessary to determine the focusof the measurement rather than looking at bordercontrol as a whole. Thus, for example, impact mightbe considered in relation to activities such as theexchange of data or how it is used in this context.Some participants noted that instead of looking atparticular measures, impact could be considered bylooking at the different aims of border control as ageneral matter. Participants also suggested thatimpact could be measured by reference to privacy.The participants stressed that when consideringimpact attention ought to be given to whether thedatabases are being used for functions beyond theiroriginal rationale, which might be positive ornegative from an impact perspective. Interestingly,civil society participants generally felt thateffectiveness is of limited relevance in the contextof border control: it was felt that such measureswould continue to be applied whether effective ornot, largely for political reasons. Civil society focusgroup participants considered the procedure used tochange databases and expressed concern about thelegitimacy and impact implications of suchapparently ‘technical’ amendments.

Policy-Maker Perspectives

Of the ten policy-makers and high-leveloperational actors in European institutionsinterviewed for SECILE, a small number directly

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33. Cian C. Murphy, Aldo Zammit Borda & Lucy Hoyte, Counter-Terrorist Finance Operatives Perspectives on Impact, Legitimacyand Effectiveness of EU Counter-Terrorist Finance Law and Policy (SECILE Consortium, 2014) http://secile.eu/operational-perspectives-eu-counter-terrorism-action/

addressed the Schengen Information System (SIS)in relation to its policy implications, particularlyameliorating risks arising from the Schengen travelarea and providing a supplementary tool todomestic systems. Interviewees noted that the SISis not perceived as a counter-terrorist measure.

One interviewee noted that it is relatively easy todetermine the effectiveness of the SIS due to thepractical structure of the system but a number ofpolicy-makers and operational actors felt thediscretionary nature of entering information in thesystem raised questions of effectiveness.

6.3 Counter-Terrorist Financing

Perspectives of Operational End Users: Impactof Counter-Terrorist Finance Law and Policy

The views of counter-terrorist finance operativeswho participated in SECILE in respect of counter-terrorist finance law and policy are presented in fullin Counter-Terrorist Finance Operatives’Perspectives on Impact, Legitimacy andEffectiveness of EU Counter-Terrorist Finance Lawand Policy.33 Counter-terrorist finance operativeswho participated in the focus group on counter-terrorist finance law and policy noted the difficultyin determining the impact of counter-terroristfinance law and policy given the absence of a meansto measure the risk of terrorist financing and thecomplexity of the system. Participants felt thatcounter-terrorism measures in this area were morelikely to serve a disruptive function rather thanending terrorism per se. The participants were awareof the obligations on the financial service sector andacknowledged the need for a co-operativerelationship between the state and financial servicesector in order for such measures to be successful.A key consideration for participants was the extentof the US role in European policy.

Perspectives of Operational End Users:Effectiveness of Counter-Terrorist Finance Lawand Policy

Counter-terrorist finance operatives whoparticipated in the focus group on counter-terroristfinance law and policy felt that merging anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financepolicy might hinder the effectiveness of such apolicy in countering terrorism. Financial Intelligence

Units played a role in the participants’understanding of counter-terrorist finance law andpolicy and participants considered whether they areto be best understood as a financial intelligenceservice. Some participants noted the role of asset-freezing sanctions and the challenges ofeffectiveness, particularly in relation to a lack ofpolitical agreement as to which organisationsshould be blacklisted and the use of litigation tooppose such decisions. Participants disagreed onthe question of whether measures should aim forprosecution or prevention.

Perspectives of Operational End Users:Legitimacy of Counter-Terrorist Finance Lawand Policy

Counter-terrorist finance operatives whoparticipated in the focus group on counter-terroristfinance law and policy generally agreed thedisruption of the financing of terrorism waslegitimate because it has a ‘democratic basis’ in EUtreaties and in the need for the free movement ofcitizens. Legitimacy for many participants was linkedto the achievement of a measure’s goal, i.e. basedon the measure’s ability to prevent the financing ofterrorism. Participants considered a number ofthemes in relation to assessing legitimacy,particularly the formal legitimacy of EU treaties, theneed for transparency and outcome legitimacy.

Civil Society Perspectives

Participants in the civil society focus groupcharacterised the effectiveness of counter-terroristfinance law and policy as an indicator of a positiveimpact but participants also identified the negativeimpact of such systems on NGOs and their ability

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Cian C. Murphy, Aldo Zammit Borda, LucaHoyteLaw Enforcement Officers’ Perspectives onImpact, Legitimacy and Effectiveness of EUBorder Control Databases

Cian C. Murphy, Aldo Zammit Borda, LucaHoyteCounter-Terrorism Finance Operatives’Perspectives on Impact, Legitimacy andEffectiveness of EU Counter-Terrorism FinanceLaw and Policy

Cian C. Murphy, Aldo Zammit Borda, LucaHoyteProsecutors’ and Government Officials’Perspectives on Impact, Legitimacy andEffectiveness of the European Arrest Warrant

Rozemarijn Van der HilstCivil Society Perspective on the Impact,Legitimacy and Effectiveness of EuropeanCounter Terrorism Measures

Fiona de Londras & Josephine DoodyPolicy-Maker Perspective on Impact,Legitimacy and Effectiveness in EU Counter-Terrorism

to do their work due to financial regulationsemanating from this system. The dangers ofdiscrimination in the application of the system fordisruption of terrorist financing were explored andone participant noted the need to rely on ‘hardintelligence’ only in subjecting people to suchmeasures. Civil society focus group participantsviewed the effectiveness of counter-terroristfinance law and policy as relating to whether themeasures perform their intended function, althoughparticipants regarded this as being extremelydifficult to establish. Civil society focus groupparticipants considered legitimacy to be closelyconnected with proportionality and the degree‘democratic control’ over the measure. Themotivation for introducing the measures was also

considered important in relation to effectiveness bythe focus group participants.

Policy-Maker Perspectives

Of the ten policy-makers and high-leveloperational actors in European institutionsinterviewed for SECILE, a small number madereference to the EU’s counter-terrorist financialdisruption system in relation to the implications oflisting from a criminal law perspective and thepolicy implications of allowing a suspected terroristto be represented in the listing decision. Oneinterviewee noted the complicated nature ofinvestigations relating to terrorist financing.

As part of SECILE, ten semi-structuredinterviews were undertaken with key policy makersacross the EU institutions whose involvement in afocus group would have been inappropriate. These

participants are referred to in the following sectionsby participant numbers P1-P10. The key insightsfrom these interviews are as follows.

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7. Insights from Policy-Makers

7.1 Impact

The policy-makers emphasised the importanceof understanding the referent when assessingimpact. In this respect, a number of intervieweesapproached impact from the perspective of theindividual. This entailed a consideration of theimpact of counter-terrorist measures on theenjoyment of individual human rights. There was arecognition that individuals do not exist in avacuum but rather come together to formcommunities and societies and, thus, that impactcan be approached from this broader societal level.Considering impact at the societal level entailsexploring how counter-terrorist measures affectour democratic values, practices and principles. Inaddition to this, interviewees considered impactacross five categories: economic impact,operational/practical impact, impact on level ofsecurity, impact on operational actors, andpolitical/diplomatic impact. All participants noted

that one challenge of understanding and predictingimpact is that some impacts are quantifiable and‘measurable’ (for example economic impacts) whileothers are more qualitative and thus more difficultto assess and take account of. The assessment ofimpact can take place both ex ante and ex postfacto. While the ex ante assessment is intended togive a rigorous evidence base for political decisionsas to which counter-terrorist measures tointroduce, ex post facto assessments ideally havean evaluative function. Some interviewees raisedconcerns about the utility of considering impact ina pan-European way as impact will vary dependingon one’s starting point: on the existing legalframework, history and experience of each memberstate.. A further concern about understandingimpact that was raised related to poorcommunication within the policy-making process,which, it was said, might lead to a disconnectbetween the levels of strategy and operation,European and national.

7.2 Legitimacy

Interviewees identified three core componentsof legitimacy: legality, process and something thatextends beyond the law into the area of morals andethics. Firstly, legality (i.e. compatibility withprimary and secondary law) was identified as a sinequa non of legitimacy. In this respect the conceptof proportionality as a mechanism of consideringlawfulness was raised on a number of occasions: anumber of interviewees expressed the view thatdisproportionate measures would suffer from alegitimacy deficit. In respect of process,interviewees opined that how a law was adopted,who by, and under which processes were significantconsiderations. In this respect, attention was drawnto participation, deliberation, contestation,

reviewability, and learnability in the development,implementation and review phases. In terms ofdevelopment, interviewees considered necessity,proportionality and fairness to be related tolegitimacy, while levels of domesticimplementation were considered to be indicatorsof perceived legitimacy. Some participants raisedquestions of legitimacy in respect of very technicalimplementation and development modalities,which may not be exposed to the same publicdebate or rigour as the broader political policybeing pursued. Some interviewees also identifiedthe output of deploying a particular measure (e.g.a successful prosecution following use of aEuropean Arrest Warrant) as an indictor oflegitimacy.

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Going beyond legality and due process, there isa question of legitimacy in terms of moral andethical considerations, in relation to which anumber of interviewees discussed the tension thatcan exist between transparency and secrecy.Assessing where the balance between these valuesmight lie was considered to have legitimacyimplications. This reflects the fact that intervieweesidentified accountability, transparency,participation and democracy as core values thatare implicated in a discussion of legitimacy,although they acknowledged that particularchallenges might arise in the context of security. Inthis respect, things like classification of documentsin the EU, the role of courts, and the role ofindependent review were raised as ways ofpotentially addressing such challenges.

A key question that arose in the interviewsrelated to how legitimacy can be measured. It wasgenerally felt that legitimacy can be measured in

a legal sense by reference to the concepts ofnecessity and proportionality. In this respect, courtsmay ultimately make the decision as to actuallegitimacy considered from a legal perspective. Inaddition to legal assessments, interviewees notedthat there are a number of important stagesinvolved in ensuring the legitimacy of a legislativemeasure including proposal, consultation with awide range of stakeholders and impact assessment.Furthermore, as legitimacy was generallyconsidered to be ‘legality +’, understanding eachof these layers as being part of the process ofensuring legitimacy was seen as being important.What came across clearly in the interviews,however, is that regardless of the process,ultimately what determines the outcome of anyprocess relating to counter-terrorism is politicalwill: in the absence of a definitive legal decision asto ‘legitimacy’ (i.e. a court case), politicaljudgement determines proportionality, necessityand ultimately legitimacy.

7.3 Effectiveness

Objectives and purpose played a central role inthe interviewees’ conceptualisation ofeffectiveness, with interviewees generally equating‘achievement of objectives’ with effectiveness.However, some interviewees recognised thatobjectives may shift and that a measure might notachieve its original objective but prove to be quiteuseful in achieving another. In this context it wasconsidered that a measure might still beconsidered effective when considered against‘broader’ security-oriented and counter-terroristobjectives, although this may have implications forits legitimacy. Interviewees agreed that linkingeffectiveness with objective and purpose may besimplified way of approaching the concept andthat understanding, effectiveness might becomplicated by including other issues in theconsideration, such as weaknesses in the policy-making process, a deeper excavation of the actualpurpose of the measure in question, and thepossibility of unanticipated consequences.

Interviewees agreed that assessing theeffectiveness of a counter-terrorism measure can

be challenging as, in some cases at least,effectiveness may be indicated by a lack of terroristincidents, which may also be explicable by a rangeof other factors. In such circumstances,interviewees considered that it might be helpful toconsider other components of effectiveness and todifferentiate between perspectives (legal,operational, etc). From a legal perspective wemight consider effectiveness by reference to thecomprehensiveness of the governing legalframework relating to terrorism and counter-terrorism and the role that a particular measureplays within that system. Effectiveness within theoperational framework might be considered byreference to the ease and speed with which ameasure can be deployed in practice. From asocietal perspective we might consider theeffectiveness of a measure in terms of the widerimpact that it has on society and on particularcommunities within society. Making wider societallinks alerts us to the possibility that a measuremightbe effective in one way, but disruptive orharmful in others. Added to this complexity is thefact that effectiveness may change over time. Asone measure is effective, terrorists may innovateand identify new routes, opportunities and means.

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Fiona de Londras & Josephine DoodyPolicy-Maker Perspectives on Impact, Legitimacy and Effectiveness in EU Counter-Terrorism

The effectiveness of counter-terrorism measuresthus requires constant re-evaluation.

From a law enforcement perspective, statisticsmight be used to assess effectiveness. However,interviewees raised a number of concerns inrelation to the use of statistics alone to indicateeffectiveness, most particularly the manipulability

of statistics, the limited nature of statistics, and theimpossibility of capturing some disruptivesuccesses in statistical form. One intervieweesuggested that the most appropriate approachmight be to instigate broader process of evaluationincluding but going beyond statistical andquantitative enquiry.

8.1 Understanding Impact

Bringing together all of the research undertakenwithin SECILE, a number of key observations aboutunderstanding and measuring impact within thecontext of EU counter-terrorism can be drawn out.

First, impact can only be understood in relationto a referent: who or what does the measure havean impact on? In order to have a comprehensiveanalysis of the predicted or actual impact of ameasure, a range of referents is required. Theseinclude (i) societal groups, (ii) operational actors inthe counter-terrorist field, (iii) national andtransnational economies, (iv) politics includinginternational diplomacy, (v) law and legal systems(including legal procedure), (vi) overall security, and(vii) the security concern that the measure isdesigned to address. In respect of each of thesereferents consideration should be given to direct,indirect, national, transnational, positive andnegative impacts.

Impact analysis takes place at different stagesof the lifecycle of a measure, and it may not alwaysbe appropriate to apply the same analyticalapproaches at the ex ante stage as at the ex post

facto stage. Furthermore, it may be appropriate toconsult a more diverse set of stakeholders whenassessing actual impact than was the case whenassessing predicted impact. At the ex ante stage itmay be that certain experts and independent officeholders are consulted as proxies for societal groupsand interests, for example, that might then becapable of participating in a retrospective impactanalysis, thus ensuring a diverse range of views andperspectives. In addition, impact assessment oughtto be undertaken with a critical appreciation of thestrategic viewpoints and interests at play, includingpolitical and industry interests.

In the context of counter-terrorism in the EU,concerns are raised in the research about theprocesses of impact assessment in respect,specifically, of (a) the ex ante impact assessmentwhich appears at times to over privilege economicand operational perspectives over societal andrights-related ones; (b) the lack of systematic expost facto review and evaluation to consider the‘real’ impact of measures; (c) the somewhat limitednature of ‘legal’ analyses of impact when broadersocietal, political and security concerns are takeninto account.

8.2 Understanding Legitimacy

Bringing together all of the research undertakenwithin SECILE, a number of key observations aboutunderstanding and measuring legitimacy within thecontext of EU counter-terrorism can be drawn out.

First, legitimacy can be understood across anumber of different dimensions relating to process,content and practice. A comprehensive legitimacyanalysis would take all of these elements intoaccount, spanning the processes of making, applyingand reviewing counter-terrorism. Furthermore, anysuch legitimacy analysis would recognise that outputand outcome are not synonymous in EU counter-terrorism, i.e. that the ‘effectiveness’ of a measure

(considered further below) is not a proxy for thelegitimacy of the output of a process (i.e. themeasure itself).

In respect of making counter-terrorism law andpolicy, participation (including consultation) andaccountability were identified as key elements oflegitimacy. In this respect, participation involves notonly the potential for affected stakeholders andcommunities to engage with practices of law- andpolicy-making directly, but also their proxyparticipation through the involvement of democraticrepresentatives such as members of the EuropeanParliament. Serious concerns about themarginalisation of the Parliament before theimplementation of the Lisbon Treaty emerged in the

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8. Impact, Legitimacy and Effectiveness:Conclusions

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research. Furthermore, concerns about informationsharing in order to ensure meaningful participationand accountability were raised. Some particularlegitimacy concerns arose in respect of highlytechnical stages of the development orimplementation of policy, which might not besubjected to same levels of scrutiny or oversight asearlier, more policy-level stages in development,although this concern was not shared equally acrossresearch participants.

The research identified a lack of systematic reviewof the operation of EU counter-terrorism measures,which raised concerns as to legitimacy. This relatesto the fact that legitimacy may be temporallycontingent, reflecting the fact that a measure mightbe considered to be necessary and proportionate atone time but, as circumstances change, either thenegative impact of the measure might be greaterthan anticipated thus suggesting disproportionality,or the broader context may change in a manner that

otherwise calls the appropriateness of the measureinto question. Furthermore, measures designed toaddress one security concern may be applied in othercontexts, without an appropriate assessment ofimpact and effect having been undertaken ex ante.The lack of systematic processes of review to identifyany such adjustments or trends calls the legitimacyof these measures’ continuing application intoquestion.

At all levels of assessing legitimacy a tensionbetween transparency and security may arise,relating to classified documents, information andintelligence held by national authorities alone, andpolitical concerns. Enhancing the legitimacy of EUcounter-terrorism requires the design andimplementation of mechanisms of managing thesetensions in line with the principles of participationand accountability (including parliamentary oversightat European and, arguably, national level of theimplementation of EU counter-terrorism measures).

8.3 Understanding Effectiveness

Bringing together all of the research undertakenwithin SECILE, a number of key observations aboutunderstanding and measuring effectiveness within thecontext of EU counter-terrorism can be drawn out.

At its most basic, effectiveness can beunderstood in terms of the extent to whichobjectives for the measures in question have beenachieved. In the context of counter-terrorism thissimple conceptualisation is complicated by threefactors: (i) the fact that discrete measures are partof a broader system of counter-terrorism and mayhave both meta objectives (relating to securitygenerally) and specific objectives (relating to themeasure in particular), (ii) the fact that the meta-and specific objectives of a measure may not beclearly identified, and (iii) the possibility ofmeasures designed for one purpose being appliedto other issues or having unanticipated impacts inrelation to other areas. Furthermore, the perceivedeffectiveness of a measure is likely to bear somerelationship to the perspective, priorities andbroader purposes or aims of the person or entitymaking the assessment.

Given the temporally contingent nature ofmuch of counter-terrorism, bearing in mind shiftingthreats, opportunities and (geo) political realities,effectiveness ought to be reviewed and assessedon a relatively regular basis. In this respect, thelimitations of a purely statistical or quantitativeevaluation need to be borne in mind: statistics areneither exhaustive indicators of effectiveness nornecessarily objective. Furthermore, while a measuremight be effective in one sense (for example bydisrupting apparent routes of terrorist financing), itmight be ineffective in others (for example byintroducing inefficiencies in financial governance,incentivising adaptation and innovation by terroristorganisations, undermining social cohesion, orundermining fundamental rights).

The research undertaken within SECILE suggeststhat regular, systematic and evaluativeassessments of the effectiveness of EU counter-terrorism are frequently lacking suggesting, as aresult, that there is insufficient understanding ofthe extent to which the many and diversemeasures introduced since 2001 achieve the meta-objective of a more secure Europe when consideredin concert, or the specific objectives for which theywere introduced.

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9. Proposals for reform

Based on the insights gleaned from the researchin SECILE the following reforms for the betterunderstanding, measurement and analysis of theimpact, legitimacy and effectiveness of EU counter-terrorism are made.

PROPOSAL 1: Enhance the Assessment ofRights-Related Impact

The practice of the EU institutions at presentsuggests that while societal impact, includingrights-related impact, is recognised as part of theimpact assessment both ex ante and ex post facto,it is under-analysed and the process by which anassessment of the proportionality of proposedmeasures is reached is unclear. While it is extremelydifficult to predict rights-related impact withcertainty in advance of introducing a measure, moreattention should be given to the views andestimations of specialist actors with responsibilityfor rights assessments such as the EUDPS and FRAin preparing ex ante impact assessments. Wherethere is an ex post facto assessment the practicaloperation of the measure, assessed from a numberof different perspectives (including those of affectedcommunities), should be taken into account in orderto revisit, enrich and complicate the necessarilyspeculative ex ante assessment.

This relates to the importance of ensuringappropriate participation in impact assessment. Itis acknowledged that, in preparing ex ante impactassessments, the European Commission doesinvolve a range of stakeholders, including civilsociety actors. In addition, when proposals are beingconsidered in the European Parliament and itscommittees, external stakeholders such ascommunity groups, NGOs and academics may becalled upon to participate. In this respect it isessential that any ex post facto review in particularwould be designed in a manner that first reviewswhether the original stakeholders ought to beinvited to contribute again and, furthermore,

whether practice relating to the measure inquestion suggests that a broader consultationought to be engaged with (either by invitation orpublic consultation or both).

Participation is widely recognised as a keylegitimacy-indictor, however the particular natureof counter-terrorist decision-making is such thatmaximum participation may not be appropriate orpossible. This relates to transparency concernsconsidered below. However, even bearing this inmind, a greater degree of meaningful consultationwith key stakeholders is likely to increase theperceived legitimacy of EU counter-terrorism. In thisrespect, key stakeholders must extend beyondindustry and security experts but also include civilsociety and specialist agencies with rights-relatedambits, although participation need not necessarilybe the same at different levels of the decision-making process.

PROPOSAL 2: Enhance Democratic Oversight

A number of concerns about democraticoversight of EU counter-terrorism arose in theresearch and, while changes introduced by theLisbon Treaty will enhance parliamentaryengagement with counter-terrorism, the EuropeanParliament ought to be empowered to engage inmore effective and closer oversight in this field. Thisis especially so as a large amount of EU counter-terrorism takes place by means of non-legally-binding measures and initiatives in relation to whichgreater and more meaningful participation wouldbe welcomed in line with the EU’s generalcommitment to openness in decision-making. Inaddition, the oversight capacity of the EuropeanParliament would be enhanced through theestablishment of a security cleared committee toengage with national and European authorities inrespect of security-sensitive and classifiedinformation, where such a committee would workin accordance with international standards for

intelligence and security oversight as well as for theclassification of information.

PROPOSAL 3: Enhance Transparency

In order to achieve greater democraticaccountability, steps ought to be taken to ensuregreater transparency while bearing in mind thegenuine concerns that exist in relation to securityand secrecy. Transparency about processes ofpolicy-making, political decision-making, the extentand cost of EU counter-terrorism, its practicaloperation, and its implications for individual andsocietal rights and values is central to enhancing thelegitimacy of the EU’s counter-terrorism. However,transparency cannot be pursued to the extent thatsecurity-sensitive information becomes publicallyavailable thus jeopardising collective security. Thus,approaches to transparency ought to be bothinnovative and appropriate.

As well as reforming the system of classificationwithin the EU, consideration ought to be given tomeans of enhancing the transparency of policy-making in EU counter-terrorism. Although someelements of the decision-making process in EUcounter-terrorism may need to remain largelyundisclosed to the general public, in both these andother fields a layered approach to transparencymight be devised that enhances legitimacy. First,general policy-making ought to participatory andsubject to as open a method of decision-making aspossible. Second, decisions as to the degree ofpublicity that can safely be attributed to a particularprocess of devising a measure, protocol, legislativeproposal etc ought to be made by reference toobjective criteria relating to security risks associatedwith disclosure. Third, where a closed process isappropriate and required by reference to objectivelyassessed security concerns, alternative mechanismsof ensuring participation and transparency (such asbriefing security-cleared committees of theEuropean Parliament) ought to be embraced.Fourth, highly technical and technocratic stages ofdevelopment should be preceded by a generalpolicy-making process that embraces the principle

of transparency. In all cases, and especially wherepublicity has been limited, a transparent process ofex post facto review ought to be engaged in, albeitsubject to any necessary security limitations interms of the kinds and amounts of informationdisclosed to the general public

PROPOSAL 4: ‘Close the Loop’ bySystematising Review

Ensuring systematic and evaluative review of theoperation, making and impact of counter-terrorismis key to understanding its impact, enhancing itslegitimacy, and assessing its effectiveness. Thus, it isvital that the European Union would ‘close the loop’by ensuring review of EU counter-terrorism. Thisnecessitates compliance with review clauses thatare already contained in many such measures, butalso the instigation of systematic review across theEU in respect of the impact and effectiveness ofthese measures. This might be undertaken throughthe establishment of an independent reviewer ofEU counter-terrorism, or by means of review bycommittees of the European Parliament withappropriate levels of clearance (where appropriate),by enhanced engagement by national oversightauthorities with EU-level reviews, for example. Inaddition, it is essential that there would be a full,systematic albeit one-off review of EU counter-terrorism as called for by the European Parliamentin 2011 in order to assess the current state of EUcounter-terrorism as applied within and across themember states of the European Union.

Any review of EU counter-terrorism ought tocritically assess both the impact and effectivenessof these measures in order to enhance thelegitimacy of their continuing operation. Ifnecessity and proportionality are key elements oflegitimacy, and if legitimacy can be temporallybounded inasmuch as changing socio-politicalconditions may result in adjustments in necessityand proportionality analyses, then rigorous reviewof the operation of these measures is required.Such a review would, furthermore, allow for afactual assessment of impact to be undertaken so

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that a more concrete and less speculativeproportionality analysis can be undertaken than ispossible at the ex ante stage.

In order to be meaningful, such reviews ought tobe regular, participatory, public (to the extent

possible and bearing in mind the challenges oftransparency in the security context considered inrelation to legitimacy), and capable of bringingabout policy, legal, practical and politicalreorientation by providing a rigorous evidence basefor policy (re)evaluation.

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WWW.SECILE.EUSECILE: Securing Europe through Counter-Terrorism – Impact, Legitimacy & Effectiveness.

This project has received funding from the European Union Seventh Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement No.313195