1

Between Technocratic Rationality and Democratic Governance.

The Importance of Political Consensus in Mexico1

Rogelio Hernández Rodríguez El Colegio de México

One of the neglected aspects about the discussion on democratic

governance is that of the social tensions generated among young democracies as

a consequence of the poor economic results derived to a great extent from the

implementation of efficient policies to control public expenditure, budget deficits,

and inflation, but that have been incapable of generating social development and

benefits. Progress on the political arena, and more specifically, on electoral

competition, although it ensures equity and transparency of results, and even

more, that such progress may be confirmed through political alternation, is not only

deemed as secondary but, as in the case of Mexico, may turn into conflict because

elections have become a means to challenge economic policies, and particularly

the so-called development models which must eventually generate social welfare.

Governance problems may seem to stem from a mistaken economic policy

(the so-called and strongly criticized neo-liberalism) aimed basically at

implementing a financial discipline. However, and putting aside the specialized

discussions on the actual alternatives of economic policies, the problem lies in an

insufficient or non-existing communication between the government authority and

society to generate a political consensus in such a point of contention as economic

decisions. To the extent that international economics is dominated by criteria on

the control and efficiency of resources, which are limited by definition, social

tensions would seem only a consequence of implementing its policies, and not an

essential failure of social intermediation. The value-oriented discussion on neo-

1 Paper presented at 23rd World Congress of Political Science organized by International Political Science

Association (IPSA). Montreal, Canada, July 19-24, 2014.

2

liberalism emphasizes policies and their consequences, and puts aside an element

which was central during last century's 80s and 90s: the mechanisms that allowed

to create a political consensus precisely around economic decisions in the

democratic industrialized countries. For some authors neo-corporativism was a

privileged social resource that not only communicated society, but also allowed its

direct participation organized for taking government decisions which, in the short

term, supported a political consensus on the daily operation of the government.

This issue is particularly relevant in young democracies because the tight

electoral competition has converged with a stringent implementation of economic

measures which have failed to result in social development and welfare. These

policies have been implemented consistently in Mexico since the 80s by a

technocracy well-known by its degree of specialization and which has dominated

public finances, and even controlled the government regardless of the political

party that had won the federal elections. The lack of an efficient social

intermediation becomes critical as this technocracy has shown to have no

ideological or party commitments and that, on the contrary, is convinced that its

rationality must continue to guide economic decisions. The mere fact that such

technocracy has driven the domestic economy under both PRI and PAN

administrations reveals that democracy, as proven competition and alternation,

faces a serious challenge to its social intermediation system. This paper intends to

show the characteristics of the Mexican technocracy, its development, and survival

during the political transition, as well as the intermediation faults which have

hindered communication between society and government authorities for the

design and implementation of economic measures. A Mexican feature is that this

intermediation existed in the past but was discarded during the democratic

transition process due to its close political links to PRI. The rationality

characterizing this elite does not allow for the communication with society or

considers the approval of its measures, which has led to an extreme politicization

of economic decisions by the political parties.

3

Technocratic Rationality

Technocracy is characterized by a particular form of reasoning and

decision-making, not by the areas in which their members are trained. For this

elite, the determining factor is having a specialized, scientific, or technical

knowledge that is applied rationally to solve problems, or generally, to get specific

results. Any measure that is adopted must be based on objective, verifiable

elements, and not on assessments or group interests. This type of reasoning

pertains by definition to pure and applied sciences, but it has been adopted for

decades by the economic thought which moreover considers that it is a science

using quantifiable tools and methodologies.2 To its main advocates economics has

become in a subject that must seek for empirically verifiable results, and to this end

it has to design measures and programs to attain objectively those results. The

basic relationship in this line of thought is that established between the means and

the goals, that is to say a rational, instrumental, and technical search for the

indispensable means which lead to specific solutions.

If measures are to be free from any assessment, particularly political ones,

then the benchmark of results is the efficiency to attain goals. This premise

involves two relevant implications. The first one is that public administration as a

whole, but mainly its financial sector, is to be oriented towards efficiency

understood as the outcome of this rational relation, and the second one is that the

legitimacy of its actions and decisions is not subject to social or political

considerations, but to a technical procedure, to the same efficiency by which it

designed the measures that must hypothetically give results. The opinion,

perception, and judgments formulated by social groups are not relevant for the

2 Frank Fisher, Technocracy and the Politics of Expertise, Sage, Newbury Park, 1990; Sarah Babb, Managing

Mexico. Economists from Nationalism to Neoliberalism, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 2001.

4

technocracy, as it thought that no one but them possesses the specialized

knowledge to understand decisions. What is important for technocracy is peer

professional recognition, those able to understand and value the adopted

measures. It is easy to see that technocracy does not consider necessary to

communicate with society which, on the contrary, is the natural beneficiary of its

measures. The technocracy dominating finances understands them as the main

resource that governments have to keep the economy healthy, and therefore

capable of starting programs that will sooner or later benefit society.

The importance gained by technocracy has been a direct outcome of the

prevailing economic problems, which in their first and most delicate stages were

caused by politicians who, according to the technocracy, handled public finances

irresponsibly. The years of economic expansion that characterized the 70s and

which a decade later led several countries to a serious crisis were the result of

policies using public expenditure to attain electoral and party objectives, and

overlooking financial discipline.3 A severe crisis in Mexico and the discredit of Luis

Echeverría and José López Portillo’s administrations (1970-1982) were a

determining factor for a new generation within the elite to reach positions of

political power. Until the 70s economists and the financial authorities themselves,

although gaining significant professional strength, were also subject to the political

orientation of the administrations that were looking for social welfare and, mainly,

political stability. Naturally, this strategy, very successful in the 50s and 60s,

gradually made the State and public expenditure the main force behind economic

growth.4 In the early 80s a new generation trained in the Secretariat of Treasury

and Bank of Mexico (Central Bank) reached the Presidency of Mexico and held

power significantly up to the year 2000 when the PRI lost the presidential

3 Rudiger Dornbusch and Sebastian Edwards (eds.), The Macroeconomics of Populism in Latin America,

University of Chicago Press, Chicago Ill., 1991, and Francisco Gil Díaz, “Mexico´s Path from Stability to Inflation”, in Arnold C. Harberger (ed.), World Economic Growth, Institute for Contemporary Studies, San Francisco Cal., 1984. The last reference is particularly important because Díaz worked in the Secretariat of Treasury since 70’s, was a subsecretary of Income during Salinas administration and finally was secretary of this institution with the Vicente Fox government, the first panista period. 4 Enrique Cárdenas, La política económica en México, 1950-1994. El Colegio de México-Fondo de Cultura

Económica, México, D.F., 1996.

5

elections.5

Miguel de la Madrid took with him a group of officials with long careers in the

public administration, but trained in the financial areas. In fact, De la Madrid himself

had worked in the Secretariat of Treasury and Bank of Mexico and he formed the

presidential cabinet with his friends and former colleagues. The reason to have

such a uniform group of officials was due to the need not only to implement an

economic rectification program based on a strict financial discipline, but also to

displace the old PRI elite characterized by its wide political experience, but also

directly responsible for the economic crisis. The new president discarded the

traditional practice of the prior sexennial terms of appointing secretaries with

knowledge and expertise in each area of the public administration. De la Madrid,

convinced that having a common goal was crucial, designated financial experts in

virtually all government areas.

With him a radical transformation of the goals and practices of the federal

public administration took place. Since then the economy has become the focus of

attention and development of the administrations, and given the severity of the

crisis, a tight control of public finances and particularly in the allocation of

expenditure was put in place. Social tasks were deemed as secondary and

subordinated to budget control which led to ignoring the social cost, the

demonstrations, and the effects that might take place in the political stability. As the

project involved a deep correction both of the economic policies and of the public

administration itself, the new group displaced the old political elite from all decision-

making positions, and as it had been done before, it controlled the presidential

succession so that Miguel de la Madrid was succeeded by another professional

with the same profile. Such purpose was successfully met, because both Carlos

Salinas and Ernesto Zedillo followed in his footsteps and strengthened the

economic model.

This project was strictly followed, but at a high cost: serious political conflicts

5 Isabelle Rousseau, México, ¿Una revolución silenciosa?, El Colegio de México, México, 2001, and Rogelio

Hernández Rodríguez, "La división de la élite política mexicana", in México: auge, crisis y ajuste, FCE, Lecturas del Trimestre Económico, no. 73, México, 1992.

6

that in addition to the democratic change process, transformed the country. From

1980 to 2000 a series of events that the Mexican system had overcome since the

turn of the century took place, such as political assassinations, or the rising of a

guerilla, not seen since the 70s. The strategy of estranging politicians from power

led to one of the most serious conflicts within the dominant elite. The persistence of

Miguel de la Madrid in controlling succession to ensure Carlos Salinas to be

selected gave rise to the most important internal dissidence that fractured the PRI,

and resulted in the creation of the National Democratic Front in 1988, that soon

after became the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) as the main left-to-

center political option.

The contrast between economic discipline and political conflicts will be a

defining characteristic of the technocratic elite.6 This is all the more outstanding,

because such elite, although trained during the years of PRI dominance never

showed an allegiance to this party, or to any other, for that matter. Since the 80s,

loyal to its principle of specialized, objective, and non-partisan knowledge, it has

kept itself free from any ideological or party ties. The best evidence of this is that

once the PRI was defeated in 2000 technocracy continued handling uninterruptedly

the public finances. During the two administrations of the PAN (2000-2012) both

the Secretariat of Treasury and Bank of Mexico were led by prominent technocrats

educated during the 80s and 90s, when De la Madrid, Salinas, and Zedillo ruled

the country.7 Moreover, during the second PAN administration led by Felipe

Calderón technocracy extended to other areas of the public administration, such as

communications and energy.8 Its continuous presence in conducting finances with

a full independence from the ruling party has made possible the stability of the

6 This statement is applicable to several experiences, especially to Latin American countries, practically at

the same time. Philip Oxhorn and Pamela K. Starr (eds.), Markets and Democracy in Latin America. Conflict or Convergence? Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Col., 1999; Joan Nelson, (ed.), Economic Crisis and Policy Choice. The Politics of Adjustment in the Third World, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1990, Joan Nelson (ed.), Intricate Links: Democratization and Market Reforms in Latin America and Eastern Europe, Washington: Transaction Publishers, 1994. 7 They were Francisco Gil Díaz, Agustín Cartens and José Antonio Meade.

8 The firsts secretaries of Communications and Energy were Luis Téllez and Georgina Kessel, both of them

economists trained in the Secretariat of Treasury since the 80’s, during the Salinas and Zedillo’s

7

Mexican economy, without any major crisis as in the past, but not generating either

the expected growth. In truth, this technocratic elite has indeed stabilized the

economy, but at the same time has failed to recover economic growth, and even

less so created the social satisfiers that may be distributed among the population.

Results have been poor as regards the economy, and extremely dangerous

politically.

As shown in Table 1, Mexico’s economic growth has clearly two periods.

The first one, from 1940 to 1982, has an average growth rate of 6% annual, and

the second one, the last two decades of the XXth century, is barely above 2%. The

next figure is even more revealing as it shows a steep decline from 1982 to 1988,

corresponding to De la Madrid’s administration, which although sees a recovery

from the administration of Carlos Salinas, has never climbed again. The figure

shows that this poor performance of the economy is not associated to the change

of party in the federal administration, but to the continuing control of the finances

by technocracy. It is true that PAN administrations have comparatively the worst

economic results (barely below De la Madrid's government), but they follow the

same pattern started in the 80s. A constant along this period is not a party identity,

but the presence of technocracy and its control over the economic policies.

The recent electoral results confirm this hypothesis. In 2012 new

presidential elections took place, and as in the previous ones, the competition

among the political parties was intense. This time the PRI managed to rebound

from its former failures and won not only over the PAN, ruling since 2000, but also

the PRD and its popular candidate. Regardless of the political importance of PRI’s

comeback, the relevant aspect for this paper is that this victory has not resulted in

a withdrawal of technocracy, and even less so in a modification of its basic criteria.

On the contrary, both the Secretariat of Treasury and Bank of Mexico have

nationally and internationally recognized experts in public finance, and as it did

occur during Calderón’s PAN administration, the elite has extended to other areas

most significantly now to diplomacy and international relations. José Antonio

administrations. Rogelio Hernández Rodríguez, “¿Aprende a gobernar la oposición? Los gabinetes presidenciales del PAN, 2000-2010”, Foro Internacional, no. 203, enero-marzo de 2011.

8

Meade was designated as Secretary of Foreign Affairs, with a long career in the

Secretariat of Treasury. He led this institution from 2011 to 2012, after being

Secretary of the Energy in 2011. Meade not only confirms that technocracy has no

ideological ties which obstructs it to cooperate with PAN or PRI administrations,

and it also shows that its influence has reached one of the most distant areas of

economy, that is, diplomacy. His appointment reveals that the new PRI

government is convinced that the economic policies must be reinforced and now

be oriented to world trade. The presence of a renowned expert in finance leading

this Secretariat indicates that both diplomacy and foreign affairs will be, if not

determined, strongly influenced by the economic logic prevailing in today’s world.

Technocracy will almost surely be at the forefront of the financial areas, and

although it no longer holds the Presidency, as in 1982 and 2000, economy has

become the focus of the government. As it has been a constant since the 80s,

finance, budget control, and the strict relation between revenues and public

expenditure have determined the performance of administrations. Under the

premise that economic balance is indispensable, the governments have

subordinated their policies to a macroeconomic stability. Results, however,

continue to be poor, as the GDP for 2013, the first year of the new PRI

administration, was barely 1.3%, and during 2014’s first quarter it was 1.8%.9

Although Enrique Peña Nieto's government is still a long way to go these figures do

not foresee a substantial improvement of the Mexican economy.

The key point is that without development, social policies will still be

deficient, and the government will not convince the public about its efficiency. So

far technocracy has been unsuccessful in proving that its measures and

procedures are necessary. But perhaps even more importantly, it has not tried to

be convincing beyond the general statements about the necessity of economic

stability. At the end of the day, there is a huge chasm between, on the one hand

the government's performance, its purposes and policies, and on the other the

perception of society. Without mechanisms for society to have any say in

9 INEGI and Secretariat of Treasury, 2013-2014.

9

government actions, the only way to express their discontent is through elections. It

is not a coincidence that since 2000 when the PAN was successful in harnessing

opposition to the PRI, the following two presidential elections showed a strong

confrontation in which two different projects for the nation have been face to face,

and not political party programs.

In 2006 polarization reached high levels, as the electorate discarded the PRI

as an option and directed its preferences to the PAN and PRD, located at the

extreme ideological positions of right and left. At the center of the dispute was the

economic model which the PAN and its candidate proposed to continue, and that

Andrés Manuel López Obrador, candidate of the left party, held responsible for the

poverty and a steep fall in social welfare. The results of the elections showed

clearly that the country was divided almost exactly in two and that a minimum

difference (0.6% of votes) could decide Mexico's future. Although six years later

the electoral dispute was not as fierce as the previous one, once again the

economic model was at the forefront of the discussion with the same candidate

and the same approach. The difference was only the emphasis made by PRI’s

candidate on the project to be followed, this time at least less formally, focused on

a possible growth and no longer on economic control. In reality, however, the new

government has not changed at all the basic structure of its economic policies.

The rigidity of the model goes along with the conviction of the technocratic

elite of its own expertise which has permitted the design of the economic

measures, and its firm idea that if such model is implemented growth will be

possible. Clearly, a technocratic legitimation principle: the efficiency with which it is

applied to politics. Technocracy has advocated the marginalization of politics and

of what for decades it had as its main goal: handling social conflict. Not only has

politics has been displaced as a useful tool for social coexistence, but also the

main resource created by the political system to approach society, corporatism.

Technocracy itself destroyed this form of intermediation with the argument that it

was an instrument of control of the old PRI elite that eliminated citizen participation.

10

Corporatism and Social Intermediation

As Schmitter pointed out in his classic essay, corporatism is a social

organization system, but also and foremost, an intermediation system between the

different sectors of society organized according to their interests, and the State,

materialized in the governmental administration as regards public policies.10

Schmitter’s proposal admitted that social and political control functions might be

privileged relegating communication to a secondary place, which, as seen in

Mexico, could become an instrument of manipulation by the political party in power.

As shown in specialized studies,11 corporatism was essentially a control, at the

service of the PRI, of unions and society, as well as a control of the electoral

process which would in the end undermine its own survival. Corporatism, however,

also accomplished its intermediation task which, in practice, was the main platform

of the State’s social activities and a source of its legitimization.

The outstanding economic and social development sustained by Mexico

since 1940 which extended to the late 60s privileged the creation of capital, but it

also generated enough social benefits to raise the living standards of the

population.12 It was due to such sustained development that, as seen in table 1,

Mexico posted an annual growth of nearly 7% and it managed to start outstanding

educational, medical attention, housing, wage, etc., policies, a characteristic of

those administrations. However, the Mexican State would channel those benefits

through corporate organizations, thus legitimizing leaders and allowing them to

manipulate their members politically and during the elections. On this basis the

Welfare State was developed in Mexico, but in its case the approach was

paternalistic.

This relationship was functional for both parts: for leaders and corporations,

as it guaranteed them power, and for the PRI and the system, because it gave

10

Philippe Schmitter, "Still the Century of Corporativism?", The Review of Politics, no. 1, January 1974. 11

Ilán Bizberg, “Auge y decadencia del corporativismo”, in Ilán Bizberg and Lorenzo Meyer (comps.), Una historia contemporánea de México, t. 1, Océano, México, 2003. 12

René Villarreal, El desequilibrio externo en la industrialización de México, 1929-1975, FCE, México, 1976.

11

them political support and a tool to keep the country’s stability. The weak point of

this system, however, was that it depended entirely on economic development to

generate benefits and distribute them. As it can be foreseeable when the model

went bankrupt in the early 70s corporatism lost its role as intermediary, and with

the growing social unrest that mechanism turned increasingly to a control model.

These years show a quick deterioration of the economy and social conditions

which gradually led to a demand of more democracy through electoral competition.

Political analysts have now a clear agreement that political change in Mexico had

the electoral system as its main way of expression.13 This had the advantage of

keeping the process within political civility, so that with the political alternation

stability and social coexistence were not jeopardized, but on the contrast, there

was no other participation option than political parties and voting.

One of the main goals of technocracy was dispensing with corporations from

the political arena and from the ruling party itself. De la Madrid and Salinas’

administrations ended paternalism to unions by allowing a greater flexibility in

worker-employer relations, so that the market and productivity determined

negotiations. Without a direct support to union leaders, the control of union

members was soon lost. This economic and labor strategy was supplemented with

a political one. After his challenged presidential election, Carlos Salinas launched

an internal reform of the PRI mainly oriented to elimination corporations from the

party's control.14 The strategy in both cases has as its premise the control of

leaders, the close relation of corporations with the PRI and its increasingly

challenged electoral role, and as it was apparent in the 1988’s elections, less and

less efficient. Although the official idea was to discard an obstacle to productivity by

leading unions to conduct negotiations according to market conditions, the main

motivation was political, because Salinas reproached corporations affiliated to the

PRI for not having backed his candidature. Corporatism had to be eliminated for

13

Mauricio Merino, La transición votada. FCE, México, 2003. 14

Ilán Bizberg, op. cit., and Rogelio Hernández Rodríguez, “The Partido Revolucionario Institucional", in Mónica Serrano (ed.), Governing Mexico: Political Parties and Elections, London, ILAS, University of London, 1998.

12

the new elite, so that citizens had a direct contact with politics.

Technocracy attacked corporatism with the same decision it had fought

traditional politicians. Indeed, it ended electoral corporatism, union members’

manipulation at the service of the PRI, but it also canceled its intermediation role of

the past. It is absolutely truth that the system used corporatism with political aims,

but it was also useful to keep an efficient communication with the best organized

groups of society. Technocracy dissolved the electoral dependency of corporatism,

but it took with it intermediation, and at the same time it was incapable of creating a

similar system to restore communication. There were undoubtedly political

motivations, but it is possible to identify the rationalist argument of justifying actions

merely by their efficiency. Under this assumption, the government and even less

the State are not required to explain or negotiate; results are sufficient and these

stem from a rational implementation of measures. Society and political parties did

not object either such measures, because they agreed that corporatism was one

more tool of the PRI to continue holding power. To PRI’s opposition corporatism

was a means of union and electoral manipulation that favored the party's power,

the continuation of authoritarian practices, and ensured a lack of democracy. For

different reasons both technocracy and the political opposition agreed that

corporatism should come to an end.

Corporatism and Governance

Schmitter’s proposal on corporatism was received better in Latin America

than in the developed countries, despite the fact that the author advanced his

societal version to pluralistic countries. Whereas in Latin America corporatism

seemed to adapt completely to control variations, in the developed world open

participation in social organizations, and in free political parties and elections made

corporatism not very attractive to political analysts. However, since the late 70s

some experts, notably Gerhard Lehmbruch, stressed the central role that

corporatism had not only an efficient means of social intermediation, but also as a

source of political consensus by allowing the participation of certain interest groups

13

to create and develop public policies.15

What Lehmbruch called neo-corporatism or liberal corporatism, was a

system that in addition to intermediate interests (as defined by Schmitter) served

as a direct action mechanism for strong organizations, particularly of workers and

entrepreneurs, to establish frequent negotiations with government authorities,

specially those in charge of formulating the economic policies. Their participation

was not limited to negotiate measures, but to design and even implement them, so

that as they were developed in the society they already had the approval of the

main stakeholders. By reducing the possibility of rejection by society a political

consensus was created legitimizing the daily actions of governments, something

that is impossible of creating by elections. Consensus did not replaced the political

legitimization process, which belonged to political parties and elections, but rather

supplemented such process.

With a rather orthodox approach, the author claimed that democracy as a

procedure only guaranteed the participation of citizens in electing rulers, but did not

allow citizens to take part in the regular operation of the government, the decisions

of which, particularly those related to the economy, are polemical by definition

because they have a differential impact on society. For Lehmbruch neo-

corporatism was the most efficient resource for society to overcome the limitations

of a democracy confined to elections, and take an active role in governments.16

On that basis a series of other studies would be developed to prove the

close between a strong corporatism, economic growth, and democracy. According

to the studies made by Crepaz and Lijphart,17 which comprise the main developed

countries of Western Europe and North America, democracy turned out to be more

15

Gerhard Lembruch, "Liberal Corporatism and Party Government", Comparative Political Studies, no. 1, April 1977, and "Concertation and the Structure of Corporatist Networks", in John H. Goldthorpe (ed.), Order and Conflict in Contemporary Capitalism, Claredon Paperbacks, Oxford, USA, 1988. 16

Gerhard Lehmbruch and Philippe C. Schmitter (eds.), Patterns of Corporatist Policy-Making, Sage, London, 1982; Suzanne Berger (ed.), Organizing Interests in Western Europe: Pluralism, Corporatism, and the Transformation of Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981, and Philippe C. Schmitter and Gerhard Lehmbruch (eds.),Trends Toward Corporatist Intermediation, Sage, Beverly Hills, California, 1979. 17

Arend Lijphart and Markus M. L. Crepaz, “Corporatism and Consensus Democracy in Eighteen Countries: Conceptual and Empirical Linkages”, British Journal of Political Science, no. 2, April 1991, and Markus M. L. Crepaz, "Corporatism in Decline?”, Comparative Political Studies, no. 2, July 1992.

14

stable and with better social and economic outcomes in those countries where

corporatism is stronger, and has a higher participation in public decisions. Thus,

the first positions were held by the Scandinavian countries followed by Belgium,

the Netherlands, and Austria, while in the last positions were the United Kingdom,

the United States, and Canada. Corporate participation has several degrees, from

a recognized and frequent negotiation to the incorporation of representatives of

organizations to executive bodies and parliaments. An extreme case is

Switzerland, where the political parties and corporations are tightly related to

regional communities and have a direct participation in the government.18

This kind of intermediation of course, and as pointed out by the authors and

particularly by Lehmbruch, responds to quite singular cultural and political

traditions that, although similar, do not produce the same practices, as shown by

the author when comparing Switzerland with the Netherlands and Belgium. It is

only natural that with this tradition behind the model cannot be replicated with the

same good results in other countries. However, it seems inescapable to

acknowledge that, on the one hand, organizing society according to common

interests is necessary, useful and does not necessarily lead to a State

manipulation, and on the other, there are countries with a certain degree of

organizational tradition which in the past streamlined the relations between the

State and society. In other words, despite the bad reputation and poor performance

of corporatism in many countries, it can be a highly efficient system to sustain

democracy. If, as it has been repeatedly said for at least one decade, democracies

are facing challenges to their governance derived, to a great extent, from rigidity

and poor economic results, negotiation becomes then essential.

Contrary to what it may be thought at first sight, this problem is not only

seen in young democracies, but it is increasingly taking its toll in the developed

world, as economies find more limitations. Corporatism has also captured the

attention in many international forums, including the main financial agencies and

18

Gerhard Lehmbruch, “Consociational Democracy and Corporatism in Switzerland”, Publius, no. 2, Spring 1993.

15

the United Nations.19 Governance has ceased to be an internal affair of countries,

and now involves relations between states. Regardless of the model intended to be

implemented (Beausang, for example, develops three different approaches), the

core variable in all of them is acknowledging that government institutions must

consider negotiations and transactions with the main social groups affected by their

decisions. If this dilemma has come to the attention of international organizations is

because the economy increasingly triggers social and political conflicts that cannot

be overlooked when government policies are designed. Economy cannot continue

being a matter exclusive of technocracy, of specialized knowledge which can only

be understood and accepted by peers.

Mexico is going through times of quite sensitive tensions. Democracy,

understood as a competition process, has progressed reasonable and reached a

considerable degree of institutionality, as seen in its two main consequences:

participation and political alternation. However, it seems to be not entirely

convincing, because the people expects more than just competition, more social

and economic benefits, as in the case of all young democracies, which in essence

do not depend on competition, but on the policies that governments are able

implement. Therefore, Lehmbruch's warning that it is essential to create

communication channels with the government authorities is worth considering.

The problem of the performance of young democracies does not lie, at least in

Mexico, in its institutions and electoral system. It resides in a lack of

communication of the government marginalized by a technocracy convinced of its

expertise and knowledge. Contrary to the idea favored since the 80s that politics

was evil and irresponsible, economic results, precisely those that should prove the

technocratic capacity, show that it is imperative to bring politics back, understood

as negotiation and conflict solution. Economy must be handled with specialized,

technical, and rational criteria, but one cannot cease permanently to consider its

social and political outcomes. If, as claimed by the experts, the economy has no

19

Francesca Beausang, Democratizing Global Governance: The Challenges of the World Social Forum,

UNESCO, Management of Social Transformations (MOST Program), Discussion Paper no. 59, 2002.

16

room for radical variations, at least it should design policies that involve the

participation and support of the main organized sectors of society. Technocracy

should admit that politics is necessary, that negotiations are required, and that

society expects benefits from its decisions. Politics and social intermediation could

be the solutions to the challenges to governance in those democracies with strong

financial technocracies.

Table 1 Mexico’s GDP Average Growth Rate 1934-2012

Administration Average Growth

Lázaro Cárdenas 1934-1940

4.52

Manuel Avila Camacho 1940-1946

6.15

Miguel Alemán Valdés 1946-1952

5.78

Adolfo Ruiz Cortines 1952-1958

6.42

Adolfo López Mateos 1958-1964

6.73

Gustavo Díaz Ordaz 1964-1970

6.75

Luis Echeverría Alvarez 1970-1976

6.16

José López Portillo 1976-1982

6.51

Miguel de la Madrid Hurtado 1982-1988

0.18

Carlos Salinas de Gortari 1988-1994

3.91

Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de León 1994-2000

3.39

Vicente Fox Quesada 2000-2006

2.03

Felipe Calderón Hinojosa 2006-2012

2.04

Source: INEGI, Mexico, historical series.

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