The Interaction between Science and Philosophy by Yehuda ElkanaReview by: Timothy LenoirIsis, Vol. 67, No. 4 (Dec., 1976), pp. 621-622Published by: The University of Chicago Press on behalf of The History of Science SocietyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/230569 .

Accessed: 08/05/2014 19:36

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact support@jstor.org.

.

The University of Chicago Press and The History of Science Society are collaborating with JSTOR to digitize,preserve and extend access to Isis.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 169.229.32.137 on Thu, 8 May 2014 19:36:40 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

BOOK REVIEWS-ISIS, 67 . 4 * 239 (1976) 621

spite its utility, it thus represents a lost opportunity to make a truly significant contribution. Since the Air Force of all the services may be viewed as archetypal of the military-academic-governmental-indus- trial complex, a more comprehensive and imaginative guide was certainly possible.

Insufficient topical continuity and nar- row conceptual scope, as evidenced in part by the scarcity of references to business firms, undermine an otherwise admirable beginning. The work appears to be the victim of undue haste. The important rela- tionship of military aviation to society de- mands a serious exploration of the his- toriographic problems of Air Force history.

As a preliminary effort this guide un- deniably makes a valuable contribution. Subsequent editions can be more valuable if a thoughtful commentary on the needs and opportunities in the historiography of Air Force history accompany the work and inform its design.

PAUL W. CLARK

United States Embassy London, England

a PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Yehuda Elkana (Editor). The Interaction between Science and Philosophy. (The Van Leer Jerusalem Foundation Series.) xvii + 481 pp. Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: The Hu- manities Press, 1974. $17.50.

This volume, which is a festschrift for Shmuel Sambursky, assumes from the out- set that there is an important interaction between philosophy and science. Perhaps the most interesting contribution it makes in discussing that relationship is the attack on the legitimacy of the internal-external distinction in the historiography of science. This is expressed most clearly in Imre Lakatos' paper, "History and its Rational Reconstructions," and the discussions sur- rounding it.

Lakatos argues that where one draws the line between external and internal history depends upon one's definition of "ratio- nality," all the irrational aspects of science being the subject matter of external history. The basis of every scientific methodology is a definition of rationality, and accord- ingly every theory of scientific methodology

has as its counterpart an historiography of science. "All methodologies serve as the basis for a rational reconstruction of history and can be criticized by criticizing the rational historical reconstructions to which they lead," says Lakatos. The history of science is therefore a testing ground for theories of scientific methodology.

Lakatos defines rationality in terms of scientific research programs which have a "hard core" and a "positive heuristic." The hard core contains a metaphysical view of the structure of the world, while the positive heuristic provides the basis for theoretical growth and defines problems for research. As long as the positive heuristic is strong- that is, as long as theoretical development anticipates empirical results-the research program is characterized by a progressive problem shift. In this context "rationality" consists in developing a theory and testing it. Since no theory, according to Lakatos, ever provides a complete explanation of nature, anomalies are expected to emerge, but it is not irrational to overlook them as long as the heuristic is progressive. In fact, Lakatos describes the change of focus from expansion of theoretical and empiri- cal results to anomalies as a "degenerating problemshift." Thus where many historians see the adherence to a theory in the face of anomalies as attributable to external, irrational factors, Lakatos sees it as com- pletely rational, and he explains this behav- ior by developments internal to the research program.

What remains external for Lakatos? The answer is provided by what he understands by "methodology." For him methodology is a set of criteria to be used in deciding the validity or even rationality of a finished product; it is not to be understood as the procedure which a scientist or group of scientists use in arriving at results. Thus sociopsychological factors which enter into the process of discovery are irrational and hence external.

Although not intended to be critical of Lakatos, the papers by Z. Bechler, E. Men- delsohn, and Y. Ne'eman call into question the demarcation between internal and ex- ternal history drawn by his model. Bechler, in discussing the reaction to Newton's theory of color, and Mendelsohn, in writing about nineteenth-century reductionist biol- ogy, both argue that the criteria for judging scientific results cannot be abstracted from the sociopolitical environment. Similarly,

This content downloaded from 169.229.32.137 on Thu, 8 May 2014 19:36:40 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

622 BOOK REVIEWS-ISIS, 67 * 4 * 239 (1976)

from Ne'eman's paper it emerges that Lenin's dialectical materialism served the Nagoya school of particle physics as a psychological aid to discovery and as the basis for a critique of science.

Examples such as these which indicate the impossibility of separating the context of justification from the psychology of discovery provide material for Elkana's critique of Lakatos. Though sympathizing with Lakatos' program, Elkana argues that there exists no real basis within the model for distinguishing between internal and external history. The problem emerges most clearly in the context of the positive heuristic. The development of a theory in a particular direction, in fact the whole mechanism behind the progressive prob- lem shift, which Lakatos leaves undis- cussed, depends on the deliberations of sci- entists either individually or collectively. According to Elkana there are always nu- merous possible "frontiers of science" occa- sioned by the positive heuristic. The selec- tion of "scientific research sites" is not determined by purely theoretical consider- ations but by what Elkana calls the "image of science" formed from the (rational) ob- jective state of knowledge as well as the web of beliefs and social and economic factors. Thus decisions concerning the di- rection of research are made not only with respect to the accepted basic concepts of science and norms of legitimate theorizing but also on the basis of what "the scientist thinks is the accepted limit of speculation in order to get advancement, grant-wise or position-wise, in the scientific communi- ty." By even the most liberal contemporary standards this second category is consid- ered an external, irrational influence on scientific development, but Elkana justifies his move by arguing that while such influ- ences are nonrational in the traditional sense, they are nevertheless cognitive ele- ments in the decision dynamic of a scientific research program. Thus by expanding Lakatos' definition of rationality to include the "image of science," Elkana obliterates the distinction between external and inter- nal history. Only factors regarding the institutional framework of science remain external in Elkana's model.

Gerald Holton's paper, which offers notes toward a psychobiographical study of Einstein, is perhaps the most exciting of all. Although Holton explicitly supports neither Lakatos' nor Elkana's view of scien-

tific development, one can perhaps regard his psychobiographical method as supply- ing the mechanism behind Elkana's "image of science." Like Elkana, Holton argues against a distinction between external and internal history. Themata, such as the con- tinuum versus the discrete or the mecha- nistic versus theistic world interpretations, which form the metaphysical hard core of Lakatos' research programs, find their ori- gins in sociological pressures and develop- mental psychology in Holton's model. His definition of scientific genius is in conso- nance with the mood expressed throughout this volume-that of a focus on the cogni- tive effects of sociopolitical and develop- mental pressures. Scientific genius, he tells us, is a mutual mapping of the mind and lifestyle of the scientist and of the laws of nature. Through a constellation of individ- ual and social factors conceptual structures are produced and sustained which in the case of the most innovative scientists are "partially" isomorphic with the structure of nature.

In attacking the dernarcation between internal and external history this volume strikes out in bold new directions which promise to establish a deep inner connec- tion between the history, sociology, and philosophy of science. The project rests on a redefinition of rationality which is only sketched here. It remains to be seen whether a strong epistemological founda- tion can be provided to withstand the attacks of those who want to separate the three fields.

TIMOTHY LENOIR

Program for History and Philosophy of Science

University of Notre Dame Notre Dame, Indiana 46556

Carl Kordig. The Justification of Scientific Change. (Synthese Library.) xiv + 119 pp., bibl. Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel; Atlan- tic Highlands, N. J.: Humanities Press, 1971. $11.

Carl Kordig seeks to mark off and occupy the middle ground between orthodox phi- losophy of science and its critics. Central to the orthodox position created by the postwar researches of Hempel, Carnap, Braithwaite, and Nagel are the following two theses: (1) there is a theory-neutral observation language within which experi-

This content downloaded from 169.229.32.137 on Thu, 8 May 2014 19:36:40 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions