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THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR RWANDA
CASE No. ICTR-98-44-T
IN TRIAL CHAMBER No. 3
Before: Judge Dennis C.M. Byron, Presiding
Judge G. Gustave Kam
Judge Vagn Joensen
Registrar: Mr. Adama Dieng
Date Filed: 28 December 2009
THE PROSECUTOR
v.
JOSEPH NZIRORERA
JOSEPH NZIRORERA’S ALMOST FINAL PRE-DEFENCE BRIEF
VOLUME 3: NATIONAL EVENTS
________________________________________________________________________
The Office of the Prosecutor:
Mr. Don Webster
Mr. Saidou N’Dow
Mr. Takeh Sendze
Defence Counsel:
Mr. Peter Robinson
Mr. Patrick Nimy Mayidika Ngimbi
Counsel for Co-Accused:
Ms. Dior Diagne Mbaye and Mr. Felix Sow for Edouard Karemera
Ms. Chantal Hounkpatin and Mr. Frederick Weyl for Mathieu Ngirumpatse
2
III. National Events
Introduction 004
A. Post-April 1994 Events Charged in the Indictment 005
1. Meeting of 7 April 1994 with Colonel Bagosora 005
2. Formation of Interim Government on 8 April 1994 008
3. Orders and Control over Interahamwe 015
4. Meetings with Interahamwe at Diplomat Hotel 028
5. Distribution of Weapons on 9-12 April 1994 034
6. Killings in Kabeza 043
7. Meeting of Prefets on 11 April 1994 046
8. 19 April 1994 Speech of Sindikubwabo in Butare 048
9. 27 April 1994 Instructions from Prime Minister 053
10. Meeting in late April at Kigali Prefecture Office 055
11. Civil Defence Program 064
12. Rapes and Sexual Assaults 068
B. Pre-April 1994 Events Charged in the Indictment 071
1. The Joint Criminal Enterprise 071
2. Formation and Expansion of the Interahamwe 074
3. Military Training of the Interahamwe 076
4. Distribution of Weapons to Interahamwe 084
5. Lists of Tutsis to be Killed 096
6. Fundraising Meeting at Hotel Rebero 099
7. 23 October 1993 MDR Rally at Nyamirambo Stadium 101
8. 7 November 1993 MRND Rally at Nyamirambo Stadium 104
9. 16 January 1994 MRND Rally at Nyamirambo Stadium 105
10. Establishment of RTLM 109
C. Post-April 1994 Events Admitted Outside of the Indictment 110
1. Assassination of President Habyarimana 110
2. Security Meetings at Kigali Prefecture Office 113
3. 12 April 1994 Incitement at Nyabugogo Roadblock 118
4. April 1994 MRND/Interahamwe Communiques 121
5. Witness HH in Murambi 123
6. Efforts to Evacuate Refugees fromMiile Collines 125
D. Pre-April 1994 Events Admitted Outside of the Indictment 126
1. MRND Meetings with Kigali Conseillers 126
2. MRND Rally at Rwamagana 130
3. January 1994 Allegations by Jean-Pierre Turatsinze 131
4. Sabotage of the Arusha Accords 142
5. Cooperation with Military Plan to Exterminate Tutsis 149
3
E. Other Facts Relating to the Credibility of National Witnesses 152
1. March 1992 Events in Bugesera 152
2. 28 May 1992 MRND March and Rally 154
3. MRND/CDR Coalition 157
4. 15 November 1992 MRND Rally in Ruhengeri 159
5. 22 November 1992 Mugesera Speech at Kabaya 163
6. Ahmed Mbonyunkiza 169
7. Witness G 173
8. Witness UB 175
9. Witness T 179
10. Witness ALG 179
11. Witness HH 180
12. Witness AWE 185
13. Witness AWD 186
14. Witness AJY 191
Conclusion 192
4
I.
INTRODUCTION
1. The prosecution’s case against Joseph Nzirorera includes allegations of his
involvement in a nationwide joint criminal enterprise whose objective was to exterminate
the Tutsis. Mr. Nzirorera never had any such objective, and in fact tried to stop the
massacres, as demonstrated by the prosecution’s own evidence.
2. Like its case on Ruhengeri events, the prosecution’s case on national events is
dependent on the credibility of a collection of liars drawn from the ranks of prisoners,
fugitives, and persons whose testimony was bought by the prosecution through the
payments of hundreds of thousands of dollars.
3. In his defence case, Mr. Nziorera will systematically refute the prosecution’s
allegations, and, although having no burden or obligation to do so, will demonstrate that
he is not guilty of the charges brought against him.1
1 Mr. Nzirorera is filing this ―almost‖ Final Brief at this time to assist the Trial Chamber and parties in
preparing for and following his evidence on the National events, which will commence on or about 1
February 2010. However, he is unable to file a final brief because of pending motions which will affect the
evidence of national events.
5
II.
NATIONAL EVENTS
A. Post 6 April 1994 events charged in the Indictment
1. Meeting of 7 April 1994 with Colonel Bagosora
a. Indictment
28.1 The various participants in the conspiracy, including Édouard
KAREMERA, Mathieu NGIRUMPATSE, and Joseph NZIRORERA,
convened in meetings with Théoneste BAGOSORA at the Ministry of
Defense on morning of 7 April 1994.
b. Prosecution evidence
i. Exhibits from Theoneste Bagosora
4. In a handwritten letter dated 8 August 1994, submitted by Luc de Timmerman,
Colonel Theoneste Bagosora recounted how on the evening of 6 April 1994, he had met
with SRSG Booh Booh and General Dallaire at Booh Booh’s residence. Booh Booh
suggested that they ask the MRND to propose a candidate to replace President
Habyarimana. After meeting with SRSG Booh Booh, he had called Mathieu
Ngirumpatse and asked him to meet at the Ministry of Defence at 7 a.m. on the morning
of 7 April 1994.2
5. According to Bagosora, on the morning of 7 April 1994, the MRND executive
committee came to the Ministry of Defence and said they could not present a candidate at
this time and that they were not able to gather the party Congress to present a candidate.3
ii. Testimony from Bagosora trial
6. Mathieu Ngirumpatse’s testimony in the Bagosora trial provided the following
information on the events of 6-7 April 1994:
7. On 6 April 1994, at about 8:30 p.m., he received a telephone call from Enoch
Ruhigira telling him that the President’s plane had been shot down. After midnight, he
2 P258 at p. 1 3 P258 at p. 2
6
received a telephone call from Colonel Bagosora saying that he wanted to meet the
MRND leadership the following morning and that he would send an escort.4
8. Ngirumpatse telephoned Karemera and Nzirorera and they agreed to attend the
meeting. He telephoned Kabagema, who said that his neighborhood was surrounded by
RPF and he could not attend.5
9. The next morning at 7 a.m., the three MRND leaders met with Colonel
Bagosora and General Ndindiliyimana. Bagosora said that he had met with Booh Booh
the previous evening and Booh Booh had asked him to contact the leadership of the
MRND in order to choose a new chairman to replace President Habyarimana.6
10. Ngirumpatse said that the choice for the president of the republic was not
under the jurisdiction of the executive committee, but, rather, within the purview of the
national congress and that they were unable to bring together the 400-odd congress
participants in Kigali on account of the security conditions in the country.7 Karemera and
Nzirorera spoke and supported that position.8
11. The meeting ended at about 8:30 a.m. The three MRND leaders remained at
the Ministry of Defence until about 10 a.m. when their escort arrived. Ngirumpatse and
Karemera returned to their homes, while Nzirorera remained in town. His house was
located near CND and it was not safe for him to return home.9
12. Joseph Nzirorera’s testimony in the Bagosora trial provided the following
information about the events of 6-7 April 1994:
13. On the night of the 6th to the 7th of April, a short while after 1 a.m., he
received a phone call from Mathieu Ngirumpatse, who said that he had just received a
phone call from Colonel Théoneste Bagosora requesting that the executive steering
committee of the MRND, meet in the defence ministry early in the morning of the 7th of
April at 7 a.m.10
14. His residence in Kigali is located near the CND building which, at the time,
was housing the RPF battalion. Between six o'clock and 6:30, a military escort came to
4 Exhibit #P61 @ 52 5 Exhibit #P61 @ 53 6 Exhibit #P61 @ 56 7 Exhibit #P61 @ 56 8 Exhibit #P61 @ 57 9 Exhibit #P61 @ 57-58 10 Exhibit #P69 @ 69
7
his home and took him to the defence ministry.11
15. Bagosora took the floor and said that during the night he had had discussions
with the special representative of the United Nations secretary-general, Dr. Jacques
Roger Booh-Booh. They had discussion on the situation which had just occurred with
the death of President Habyarimana. He suggested that the MRND had to designate a
president of the republic to replace President Habyarimana. 12
16. Ngirumpatse said it was not within the purview of the MRND executive
committee to designate the candidate for the post of president. In order for such an action
to be taken, it was necessary to bring together a national congress of the MRND, which
was not feasible at that time given the security situation.13
iii. Minutes of Meeting
17. During the prosecution case, the Trial Chamber admitted a document which
purports to be minutes of the meeting of 7 April 1994 between Colonel Bagosora and
General Ndindiliyimana and the MRND leaders.14
These minutes were authored by
Witness 35.
18. According to the minutes, the MRND leaders declined to designate a
successor to President Habyarimana, citing party rules.
iv. Inferences from Prosecution Evidence
19. All of the prosecution evidence is unanimous that the three accused declined
to nominate someone to replace President Habyarimana on the morning of 7 April 1994.
If the accused were members of a joint criminal enterprise with Bagosora and other
military leaders, as alleged in the indictment, one would have expected that they would
have gone along with the request of their alleged fellow members of the enterprise, and
indeed, even taken power for one of them.
c. Defence Evidence
20. Edouard Karemera testified that he met with Ngirumpatse, Nzirorera,
Bagosora, and General Ndindiliyimana at the Ministry of Defence on the morning of 7
11 Exhibit #P69 @ 70 12 Exhibit #P69 @ 70-71 13 Exhibit #P69 @ 70-71 14 Exhibit #P294
8
April 1994. Epiphane Hanyurwimana was not present.15
Bagosora told them that Special
Representative Jacques Roger Booh Booh had suggested that the MRND name a new
President.16
Mathieu responded that they would have to convene a party Congress to do
that, and Karemera and Nzirorera agreed.17
21. Joseph Nzirorera will confirm the version of the meeting he provided when
he testified in the Bagosora trial.
22. Colonel Theoneste Bagosora will testify that the MRND leaders attended the
meeting on 7 April 1994 in his office and that MRND declined his request that they
designate a replacement for President Habyarimana.
23. Jacques Roger Booh Booh will testify that he urged Colonel Bagosora on the
night of 6 April 1994 to contact the MRND and have them nominate a replacement for
President Habyarimana.
24. Witness 35 will testify that he attended the meeting on the morning of 7 April
1994 between Colonel Bagosora and the MRND leaders. His conclusion from that
meeting and subsequent close involvement with military and civilian leaders was that
there was no plan to exterminate the Tutsis, the leaders were against the killings, and
tried to stop them, but did not have sufficient control over those who were killing to do
so.
2. Formation of the Interim Government on 8 April 1994
a. Indictment
28. The assassinations of President Juvénal HABYARIMANA and Army
Chief of Staff Déogratias NSABIMANA on the evening of 6 April 1994
created a crisis of leadership for Rwandan civilian and military authorities.
When Théoneste BAGOSORA was unable to take control through
structures of authority in the Ministry of Defense or the FAR, extremist
elements in the military and the MRND and ―Hutu Power‖ political
parties, including Édouard KAREMERA, Mathieu NGIRUMPATSE,
and Joseph NZIRORERA agreed among themselves to impose an
interim civilian government to fill the power vacuum. Édouard
KAREMERA, Mathieu NGIRUMPATSE, Joseph NZIRORERA, Col.
Théoneste BAGOSORA, Donat MUREGO, Frodouald KARAMIRA,
Hyacinthe Rafiki NSENGIYUMVA agreed amongst themselves and with
15 Transcript of 28 May 2009 @ 3 16 Transcript of 28 May 2009 @ 5 17 Transcript of 28 May 2009 @ 9
9
other leading members of the MRND and ―Hutu Power‖ opposition parties
to assemble the Interim Government of 8 April 1994 with the intention of
using the apparatus and resources of the state, and the legitimacy of state
authority, to execute the destruction of Rwanda’s Tutsi population.
28.1 …They met again on the morning and afternoon of 8 April 1994, by which
time Presidential Guard soldiers loyal to Col. Théoneste BAGOSORA,
and subject to his effective control, had already killed Prime Minister
Agathe UWILINGIYIMANA, Parti Social-Démocrate party chairman
Frederick NZAMURAMBAHO, Parti Libéral party chairman Landouald
NDASINGWA, Constitutional Court President Joseph
KAVARUGANDA, all of who would otherwise have assumed control of
the government or whose participation would have been required to
constitute a new civilian authority under the terms of the Broad Based
Transitional Government anticipated by the Arusha Accords or the 1991
Constitution, facts known to all members of the conspiracy by the
afternoon of 7 April 1994.
b. Prosecution Evidence
i. Witness GOB
25. Witness GOB testified that the accused violated the Arusha Accords when
nominating Theodore Sindikubwabo to be President. Witness GOB initially testified that
it was clearly provided that the President of the MRND should replace the President in
case of a vacancy.18
Witness GOB later apologized for his error when he recognized that
Article 48 of the Arusha Accords provided for the President of the Transitional Assembly
to initially replace the President.19
26. Witness GOB testified that there was no transitional national assembly on 7
April 1994.20
However, the person who was supposed to become speaker of the
Transitional National Assembly was Felicien Ngango of the PSD party. The person to
become President of the Supreme Court was Joseph Kavaruganda. Both were killed soon
after the crash of President Habyarimana’s plane, along with Prime Minister Agate
Uwilingiyimana.21
ii. Exhibits from Theoneste Bagosora
18 Transcript of 23 October 2007 @ 4 19 Transcript of 24 October 2007 @ 29; Exhibit DNG-85 20 Transcript of 25 October 2007 @ 68 21 Transcript of 25 October 2007 @ 55-56
10
27. In a handwritten letter dated 8 August 1994, submitted by Luc de
Timmerman, Colonel Theoneste Bagosora recounted that on the morning of 8 April 1994,
the political party leaders met at the Ministry of Defence beginning at 8 a.m. and
continuing all day. At 5 p.m. they went to the ESM and presented the result of their work
to the crisis committee.22
iii. Testimony from Bagosora trial
28. Mathieu Ngirumpatse’s testimony in the Bagosora trial provided the following
information on the events of 8 April 1994:
29. He learned of the death of the Prime Minister on the radio after he returned
home on the 7th.23
30. That evening, he received a call from a military officer saying that he was
sending an escort for them to meet again at the Ministry of Defence the next morning.24
31. The next morning on 8 April 1994, when they returned to MINADEF,
Bagosora told them that the Crisis Committee was of the opinion that the politicians had
to get together and try to solve the problem of the political vacuum.25
The MRND said
that they would need the other parties to be present, and Bagosora said that he would look
for them.26
32. While waiting at MINADEF for the representatives of the other political
parties to arrive, the three MRND leaders discussed the legal and institutional framework
for how to proceed. They decided that they should follow the 1991 Constitution since the
33. The Arusha Accords did not provide for the situation of the president’s death
before the transitional institutions were put in place.27
34. The 1991 Constitution provided that the President of the CND would replace
the President until a new head of state could be elected.28
The three MRND leaders went
to speak to Theodore Sindikubwabo, the President of the CND, to see if he would agree
22 P258 at p. 3 23 Exhibit #P62 @ 54 24 Exhibit #P61 @ 58 25 Exhibit #P61 @ 59-60 26 Exhibit #P61 @ 60 27 Exhibit #P61 @ 61 28 Exhibit #P61 @ 61-62
11
to become President. He agreed.29
The three MRND leaders then returned to
MINADEF at around 11 a.m.30
35. The representatives of the other political parties had arrived and the MRND
leaders began a discussion with them. They split into two groups to draft a text for the
new government and to draft a speech for the President.31
36. The political party leaders decided to draft a new protocol to supplement the
protocol of the 5 political parties of July 1993.32
However, they needed representatives
from the PSD party.33
37. Those present were Karamira and Murego from MDR, Mugenzi from PL,
Celestin Kabanda and others from PDC.34
Colonel Bagosora was able to bring the PSD
representatives later in the afternoon, Francois Ndungutse and Hyacinthe Rafiki.35
38. The MDR was invited to nominate a Prime Minister and they went and looked
for Jean Kambanda. The MRND decided to retain their current ministers. The other
parties also nominated their choices for ministers.36
39. The political party leaders agreed upon three missions for the new
government: (1) restore security of persons and property; (2) negotiate with the RPF to
establish transitional institutions; and (3) alleviate the misery of famine-stricken and
displaced persons.37
40. The political party leaders then proceeded to the ESM and briefed the Crisis
Committee on what they had decided.38
At the ESM, Sindikubwabo and Kambanda were
present, as was General Dallaire.39
Ngirumpatse briefed the Crisis Committee on the
outcome of the meetings of political party leaders. No one protested about the
composition of the government or said that it was not legally constituted.40
41. Joseph Nzirorera’s testimony in the Bagosora trial provided the following
29 Exhibit #P61 @ 63-64 30 Exhibit #P61 @ 64 31 Exhibit #P61 @ 64 32 Exhibit #P61 @ 66 33 Exhibit #P61 @ 67 34 Exhibit #P61 @ 64-65 35 Exhibit #P61 @ 68 36 Exhibit #P61 @ 69 37 Exhibit #P61 @ 70 38 Exhibit #P61 @ 70 39 Exhibit #P61 @ 72-73 40 Exhibit #P61 @ 73
12
information on the events of 8 April 1994:
42. On the morning of 8 April, the three members of the executive committee
returned to MINADEF. Bagosora said it was the opinion of UNAMIR, as well as the
military crisis committee, that political parties had to put in place a government to run the
political affairs of the country. So it was recommended that political parties had to get
together so as to set up a government, which government had to continue running the
normal affairs of state. The MRND leaders requested Bagosora to locate the leaders of
the other political parties which were represented in the transitional government.41
43. After Bagosora left, the three MRND leaders discussed what to do. They
realized that the Arusha Accords did not provide for the replacement of the President
before the setting up of the transitional institutions. There was also no transitional
assembly to submit the names of two candidates to. So they fell back on the 1991
Constitution, which provided for the President of the CND to become acting President for
90 days.42
44. They went to see the CND President Sindikubwabo at his residence. He
agreed to become President. When they returned to MINADEF, the representatives of
the MDR, PL, and PDC parties were already there.43
They insisted that Bagosora fetch
the PSD representatives. They arrived later in the afternoon. Then the political leaders
split into two working groups—one to draft and amended protocol and one to draft the
speeches to be made.44
45. Afterwards, they all went to the ESM to meet with the military crisis
committee and to tell them that the politicians had found a solution to the problem that
they had raised. He did not remember any non-Rwandans being present. No one
objected to the agreement they had reached.45
iv. UN documents
41 Exhibit #P69 @ 72 42 Exhibit #P69 @ 72-74 43 Exhibit #P69 @ 74 44 Exhibit #P69 @ 75 45 Exhibit #P69 @ 76
13
46. On 7 April 1994, Kofi Annan reported that Dallaire and Booh Booh have said
on the phone that they are trying to get an interim government established to help restore
authority.46
47. On 25 May 1994, United Nations Legal Advisor Ralph Zacklin provided an
opinion that the Interim Government had been lawfully established.47
v. Minutes of Meeting
48. During the prosecution case, the Trial Chamber admitted, a document which
purports to be minutes of a meeting of 8 April 1994 between the military Crisis
Committee and leaders of the political parties.48
These minutes were authored by
Witness 35.
49. The minutes reflect that Mathieu Ngirumpatse explained the steps the political
party leaders took to form an interim government, and then each party presented its
Ministers. Nzirorera did not speak during this meeting.
vi. Inferences from Prosecution Evidence
50. It should be noted that the prosecution presented no evidence or document to
show that the Interim Government was established with ―the intention of using the
apparatus and resources of the state, and the legitimacy of state authority, to execute the
destruction of Rwanda’s Tutsi population,‖ as it alleged in paragraph 28 of the
indictment.
c. Defence Evidence
51. Edouard Karemera testified that on 8 April 1994, they decided to set up an
interim government and asked Theodore Sindikubwabo to be acting President. They
believed that this was a legal procedure in light of the fact that the Arusha Accords had
not yet taken effect and that the RPF had assassinated the President.49
52. Joseph Nzirorera will confirm the version of the events of 8 April 1994 that
he provided when he testified in the Bagosora trial. He will further testify that he
believed that resort to the 1991 Constitution was the appropriate course in selecting a
46 Exhibit DNZ-405 47 Exhibit DNZ-425 48 Exhibit #P297 49 Transcript of 19 May 2009 @ 24
14
replacement for President Habyarimana. He will also testify that there was no intention to
form a government to create an apparatus to destroy the Tutsis.
53. Justin Mugenzi will testify about the meetings of political party leaders at
MINADEF and then at ESM on 8 April 1994. He will further testify that he believed that
resort to the 1991 Constitution was the appropriate course in selecting a replacement for
President Habyarimana. He will also testify that there was no intention to form a
government to create an apparatus to destroy the Tutsis.
54. Agnes Ntamabyaliro, the Minister of Justice and a member of the PL party,
whose testimony in the Bizimungu et al trial was admitted into evidence pursuant to Rule
92 bis, testified that on 8 April she was invited to a meeting of political parties in the
early afternoon at the staff headquarters..50
Representatives from every party in the
government attended the meeting. The representatives expressed sadness at the death of
two heads of state and were told that even ordinary citizens were being killed.51
They
believed that government soldiers became enraged by the death of the president and went
on a killing spree. The representatives at the meeting decided to form a government to
re-establish order based on the coalition government agreement of April 1992.52
55. The representatives at the meeting determined to continue to consult with the
RPF so that hostilities could cease. The minister of defence was outside of the country at
the time. The representatives developed a three point program: (1) restore peace and
security; (2) continue negotiations with RPF so that the Arusha peace agreements could
be implemented; and (3) fight famine in the country.53
56. Emmanuel Ndindabahizi, the Minister of Finance and a member of the PSD
party, whose testimony in the Bizimungu et al trial was admitted into evidence pursuant
to Rule 92 bis, testified that the Interim Government was formed based on political
parties and not on ethnicity.54
For example, the MRND reappointed all its ministers, it did
not replace any. The PSD replaced 2 ministers, one who had died in February and the
other who had been killed in April.55
50 Exhibit DNZ-512; Transcript of 21 August 2008 @ 37 51 Exhibit DNZ-512; Transcript of 21 August 2008 @ 38 52 Exhibit DNZ-512; Transcript of 21 August 2008 @ 38; Transcript of 21 August 2008 @ 39 53 Exhibit DNZ-512; Transcript of 21 August 2008 @ 40 54 Exhibit DNZ-513; Transcript of 3 May 2007 @ 47 55 Exhibit DNZ-513; Transcript of 3 May 2007 @ 48
15
57. Colonel Theoneste Bagosora will testify about the events of 8 April 1994,
how he facilitated the transportation of political party leaders to MINADEF, and about
the meeting with the Crisis Committee in the afternoon. He will also testify that there
was no intention to form a government to create an apparatus to destroy the Tutsis, and
that he had nothing to do with the killings of the Prime Minister, President of the
Constitutional Court, or leaders of the PL and PSD parties.
58. Colonel Tharcisse Renzaho will testify that he attended the meeting between
the political party leaders and the Crisis Committee on 8 April 1994. He will also testify
that there was no intention to form a government to create an apparatus to destroy the
Tutsis.
59. Witness 35 will testify that as an Army officer, he attended meetings between
military and civilian authorities and it was evident that the accused, military leaders, and
members of the Interim Government were not in favor of the killings and wanted to stop
them, but were unable to.
60. While expert testimony on the legality of the appointment of President
Sindikubwabo is not considered necessary, the Trial Chamber may wish to refer to
Joseph Nzirorera’s Memorandum on the Applicability of the Arusha Accords to the
Replacement of President Habyarimana (29 October 2007) and determine for itself
whether the solution chosen by the MRND leaders was legally sound.
3. Orders to and Control Over Interahamwe
a. Indictment
37. Over the weekend of 8 – 10 April 1994 soldiers and militiamen set up
roadblocks in Kigali and checked the identity cards of passers-by and
killed most of those who were identified as Tutsi. Édouard
KAREMERA, Mathieu NGIRUMPATSE, and Joseph NZIRORERA
exercised control over Interahamwe at the roadblocks and were aware of
the killings, as demonstrated by their directions to militiamen to stop the
killings temporarily when international journalists present in Kigali began
to issue reports on the widespread killing that criticized the government.
41. By 12 April 1994 soldiers and militiamen responding to orders and
instigations of attacks from national leaders of the MRND and highly
placed government officials, including Édouard KAREMERA, Mathieu
NGIRUMPATSE, and Joseph NZIRORERA, had killed thousands of
16
civilians in Kigali and throughout Rwanda. The victims were primarily of
Tutsi ethnic or racial identification but also included persons deemed to be
political opponents to ―Hutu Power‖.
b. Prosecution evidence
i. Witness G
61. Witness G testified that he knew of no orders or instigations to attack Tutsis
by the accused. Witness T never told him who gave the order for the Interahamwe to kill
Tutsis.56
He does not know who ordered the roadblocks to be established after the death
of the President.57
He has no information that Nzirorera ordered the Interahamwe to kill
Tutsis.58
62. Witness G did not know who gave them the Interahamwe orders to kill. He,
himself, was not instructed to join the Interahamwe in killing Tutsis.59
63. After 6 April, the Interahamwe changed and instead of the youth of the
MRND, it came to mean the youth of all the parties opposing the RPF. People from all
parties were mixed together at roadblocks and were known as Interahamwe.60
64. In his opinion, the government and party leaders could have given orders to
the soldiers to stop the killings and removed the roadblocks and that if they had done so,
the killings would have stopped.61
Later on, he observed that the leaders incited the
killings in their speeches.62
65. In his opinion, the three accused had the power to stop the massacres. They
could have agreed with the Army to stop the killings. But instead they sent people into
the prefectures to encourage the killing.63
66. He believed that the persons in control of the Interahamwe in Kigali at this
time were [Bernard Maniragaba, Joseph Serugendo, Jean Pierre Sebanetsi, and Ephrem
Nkezabera]. He believes that the person in control of them was Nzirorera.64
56 Transcript of 18 October 2005@ 26 57 Transcript of 18 October 2005@ 21 58 Transcript of 18 October 2005@ 24 59 Transcript of 18 October 2005@ 24 60 Transcript of 18 October 2005@ 28 61 Transcript of 11 October 2005 @ 61 62 Transcript of 11 October 2005 @ 61 63 Transcript of 13 October 2005 @ 7 64 Transcript of 28 October 2005 @ 21-22
17
67. Joseph Setiba was very powerful during the period after 6 April.65
After 6
April, there was no rule of law. It was the rule of the jungle—it was mayhem. People
like Joseph Setiba became so powerful that members of the Interahamwe National
Committee could not give orders to him. This was also true in the Army, where, after 6
April, a corporal could give orders to a Colonel, depending on what region you were
from. In civilian administration, a conseiller could give orders to a bourgmestre. There
was no authority.66
ii. Witness UB
68. Witness UB testified that he never ordered anyone to kill Tutsis, nor was he
ordered by the bourgmestre or prefet to kill Tutsis.67
He was never ordered by the
MRND Chairman in his commune to kill Tutsis68
, nor by the MRND Chairman for the
prefecture.69
He was never given an order by any of the three accused.70
69. On 7 April, he observed soldiers and Interahamwe manning roadblocks. There
was no official order to erect the roadblocks—they were used to roadblocks since 1990.71
He did not receive any orders to erect roadblocks. He did not hear any of the three
accused order the erection of roadblocks.72
He did not receive information that they had
ordered the erection of roadblocks.73
70. In his opinion, the MRND was controlling the Interahamwe at national level.
Such control extended to the lowest levels of the party, cellule and secteur level.74
71. He saw Georges Rutaganda, who was national vice-president of the
Interahamwe, visiting the various roadblocks. In his opinion, Rutaganda reported to
Mathieu. Maniragaba was reporting to Nzirorera. Nzirorera would report to Mathieu.
These people were under that office's control. He, therefore, assumed they were acting
on the orders of that same office.75
65 Transcript of 19 October 2005@ 22 66 Transcript of 19 October 2005@ 23 67 Transcript of 6 March 2006@ 6 68 Transcript of 6 March 2006@ 7-8 69 Transcript of 6 March 2006@ 9 70 Transcript of 6 March 2006@ 11 71 Transcript of 27 February 2006@ 20 72 Transcript of 6 March 2006@ 22 73 Transcript of 6 March 2006@ 23 74 Transcript of 6 March 2006 @ 10 75 Transcript of 6 March 2006 @ 22-23
18
72. The people who were at the roadblocks were Interahamwe leaders in
Kigali-ville, so that, in his opinion, the Interahamwe were being controlled by the
members of the MRND executive committee.76
73. As of 10-11 April 1994, the person in charge of the Interahamwe was Robert
Kajuga, but, in his opinion, the real person responsible for the MRND party was Mathieu
Ngirumpatse.77
iii. Witness T
74. After hearing of the death of the President on the night of 6 April, Witness T
testified that he attempted unsuccessfully to call members of the national Interahamwe
committee and Ngirumpatse.78
On 8 April, [Bernard Maniragaba] came to his house and
they went out to various roadblocks in Kigali.79
Prior to that, he did not know that the
Interahamwe were manning roadblocks.80
Witness T observed dead bodies at some of
the roadblocks.81
They had been killed by Interahamwe, soldiers, and members of the
population.82
75. After 6 April, the term Interahamwe came to include members of youth wings
of other parties and members of the population, even Tutsis who appeared at the
roadblocks to demonstrate they were not on the side of the enemy.83
76. It was a reflex in Rwanda to set up roadblocks whenever there was a
demonstration, riot, or some element of disorder, and this had happened prior to 1994 as
well.84
He does not know who ordered the Interahamwe to establish or man roadblocks
in April 1994.85
[Bernard Maniragaba] never told him who had ordered the roadblocks
to be established.86
76 Transcript of 27 February 2006 @ 24-25 77 Transcript of 27 February 2006 @ 63 78 Transcript of 24 May 2006 @ 49 79 Transcript of 24 May 2006 @ 53-54 80 Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 3 81 Transcript of 24 May 2006 @ 54-55 82 Transcript of 24 May 2006 @ 55 83 Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 5 84 Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 4 85 Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 4 86 Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 4
19
77. After the assassination of the President, people became crazy and mad. There
was an atmosphere of fear and tension when Witness T went out on 8 April.87
It
appeared to him that the killings resulted both from orders from some authorities and a
spontaneous reaction by members of the population.88
78. Witness T knows of no orders by any of the three accused to kill Tutsis. He
himself never gave orders to kill Tutsi. He does not know who the authorities were who
gave the order to kill Tutsi.89
79. The National Committee of the Interahamwe did not have effective control
over someone like Joseph Setiba after 6 April.90
80. After 6 April, the National Committee of the Interahamwe did not have the
material ability to stop the killings.91
81. Following the death of President Habyarimana, there was no longer any
authority in control over the situation in Kigali.92
82. The national political bureau of the MRND was not able to design, plan, and
conduct the extermination of Tutsis.93
The MRND did not create and organize the
Interahamwe for the purpose of exterminating the Tutsi.94
83. In his opinion, the national committee was in charge of the Interahamwe
during this period as was the MRND party.95
Ngirumpatse always had effective control
of the Interahamwe. Nzirorera had, to a lesser extent, ongoing contact with the
Interahamwe. Karemera and Kabagema were escorted to MRND meetings by
Interahamwe and had control over them to that extent, in his opinion.96
84. From the way Ngirumpatse complained about the Interahamwe being out of
control and killing Tutsi, it was consistent with the fact that the MRND leaders had not
ordered the Interahamwe to kill Tutsis.97
87 Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 6 88 Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 6 89 Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 7 90 Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 20 91 Transcript of 31 May 2006 @ 11 92 Transcript of 1 June 2006 @ 22 93 Transcript of 1 June 2006 @ 47 94 Transcript of 1 June 2006 @ 47 95 Transcript of 24 May 2006 @ 58 96 Transcript of 24 May 2006 @ 59 97 Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 16
20
85. Beginning on 8 April, the government was constantly giving out the message
on the radio for people to stop the killing.98
However, the RPF intensified its bombings
in the high density neighborhoods in Kigali on the 10th and 11
th and a mass exodus of
people began.99
86. The main activity of the Interahamwe during the period after 6 April was to
support the soldiers. There were no meetings of the national Interahamwe committee, no
instructions communicated by the MRND executive committee—the umbilical cord had
been severed.100
87. After the assassination of President Habyarimana there was no longer any
authority in control of the situation in Kigali.101
88. In his opinion, the three accused had de facto and de jure control over the
Interahamwe.102
After 6 April, all those who were opposed to the RPF were referred to
as Interahamwe.103
The MRND executive committee did not have control over those
various persons.104
89. In his opinion, those who controlled the Interahamwe za MRND after 6 April
were Ngirumpatse, Karemera, Kabagema, and Nzirorera.105
In Kigali city, those in charge
of the roadblocks were primarily Interahamwe za MRND.106
iv. Witness ALG
90. Witness ALG testified that in his capacity of an official of the government of
Rwanda, he never ordered anyone to be killed, nor did he receive such an order. In his
capacity as a member of the MRND prefectural committee for Kigali ville, he never
ordered anyone to be killed, nor did he receive such an order.107
98 Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 26 99 Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 49 100 Transcript of 31 May 2006 @ 6 101 Transcript of 1 June 2006 @ 22 102 Transcript of 26 May 2006 @ 28 103 Transcript of 1 June 2006 @ 47 104 Transcript of 1 June 2006 @ 47-48 105 Transcript of 5 June 2006 @ 20 106 Transcript of 7 June 2006 @ 30 107 Transcript of 2 November 2006 @ 50
21
91. The people at the roadblocks behaved like madmen. They behaved like
people who had totally lost their minds and any remnant of humanity.108
The situation
was chaos. There was total impunity.109
92. After 6 April, the term ―Interahamwe‖ came to include MRND youth, as well
as the youth of the power wings of the other political parties.110
It was a jungle and the
authorities had no influence.111
93. It was the leaders of the MRND at the national level who gave the
Interahamwe authorization to set up roadblocks after the death of the President.112
He
was told this by the bourgmestre of Kacyiru commune when Witness ALG arrived at the
commune office.113
94. According to what Witness ALG was told by the bourgmestre of Kacyiru, the
MRND leaders had met with Colonel Bagosora on 7 April 1994. They had then met with
the Interahamwe leaders on 10 or 11 April and conveyed instructions for the
Interahamwe to erect and maintain roadblocks in conjunction with soldiers and organize
patrols to prevent the Inkotanyi from attacking the town.114
Witness ALG did not know
upon whose instructions the Interahamwe had started erecting and manning roadblocks as
of 7 April, but claimed that the Interahamwe could not operate with out the approval of
the MRND leaders.115
95. Witness ALG claimed that Andre Nzabanterura told him in prison between
1999 and 2002 but could not recall whether he had told him about the meeting during
which MRND officials gave instructions.116
96. Ngirumpatse addressed the members of the national bureau of the
Interahamwe and requested them to set up roadblocks so as to fight the enemy and
comply with the orders of soldiers.117
In addition to this meeting he held with the
Interahamwe on the 7th or 8
th, Ngirumpatse also wrote a letter requesting the Interahamwe
108 Transcript of 26 October 2006 @ 60-61 109 Transcript of 7 November 2006 @ 51 110 Transcript of 27 October 2006 @ 9 111 Transcript of 31 October 2006 @ 27 112 Transcript of 26 October 2006 @ 61 113 Transcript of 26 October 2006 @ 62 114 Transcript of 6 November 2006 @ 23 115 Transcript of 6 November 2006 @ 23 116 Transcript of 6 November 2006 @ 24 117 Transcript of 26 October 2006 @ 63
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to comply with the orders of soldiers.118
Witness ALG was told about the letter by
Bernard Maniragaba and Joseph Setiba,119
and Jean Habyarimana.120
They saw this letter
on the morning of 8 April 1994. It was addressed to Robert Kajuga.121
97. Witness ALG indicated that Maniragaba had been the first to tell him about
the letter, sometime in late April or early May in the prefecture office. Witness ALG had
asked him who had authorized the roadblocks and Maniragaba had answered that
Ngirumpatse had written a letter asking the Interahamwe to cooperate with soldiers.122
98. Witness ALG spoke to Jean Habyarimana in prison between 2000 and 2002.
Habyarimana told Witness ALG he had learned of that letter from Interahamwe, but had
not seen the letter.123
99. Setiba said that Kajuga had the letter in his hand on the forenoon of 8 April
1994 when Kajuga came to Gitikinyoni.124
Setiba gave Witness ALG this information
between 2001 and 2003 when they were in prison together.125
100. Witness ALG agreed with the assessment of UNAMIR on 14 April 1994 that
the Interim government was unable to control the behavior of the soldiers, Interahamwe,
or the population.126
101. On 19 April 1994, UNAMIR reported that the government is yet to be in full
control of the situation. And in paragraph 3, they report that the RPF troops continue to
infiltrate into the city of Kigali, and that the troops carried out rescue operations in the
area of Nyamirambo overnight to extricate over a hundred of their sympathisers.127
Witness ALG confirmed that the government was not in control of the situation at that
time.128
v. Witness HH
118 Transcript of 26 October 2006 @ 64 119 Transcript of 26 October 2006 @ 65; Transcript of 31 October 2006 @ 33 120 Transcript of 31 October 2006 @ 33 121 Transcript of 31 October 2006 @ 34 122 Transcript of 6 November 2006 @ 25 123 Transcript of 6 November 2006 @ 26 124 Transcript of 31 October 2006 @ 34 125 Transcript of 6 November 2006 @ 25 126 Transcript of 6 November 2006 @ 34; Exhibit DNZ-230 127 Transcript of 6 November 2006 @ 57; Exhibit DNZ-233 128 Transcript of 6 November 2006 @ 57
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102. Witness HH testified that on 8 April, Interahamwe leaders Kajuga,
Maniragaba, Twahirwa, Aloys Ngirabatware came to his bar. Kajuga gave a paper to
Lieutenant Miruho who was in charge of the platoon in the area. The letter said that the
Interahamwe should work with the soldiers to flush out the enemy. He did not read the
letter, but saw that it was signed by Ngirumpatse. Kajuga said the letter was from
Ngirumpatse.129
103. Georges Rutaganda was also present with the group that came to his bar on
the morning of 8 April. The majority of the National Committee of the Interahamwe was
there. Witness HH believes that Ephrem Nkezabera was there as well.130
104. The group went to look at areas where roadblocks other than the one which
had been set up by the gendarmes could be erected. Maniragaba and Kajuga instructed
that other roadblocks be set up. Witness HH was with Asumani at the time.131
Four
additional roadblocks were set up in his area.132
Kajuga also instructed them to look for
able-bodied men to undergo weapons training.133
Kajuga was dressed in a military shirt
and jeans. On that date, he told Witness HH that no one should wear the Interahamwe
uniform anymore.134
vi. Jean Bosco Twahirwa
105. Witness Jean Bosco Twahirwa produced a letter for OTP purportedly
handwritten by Mathieu Ngirumpatse dated 8 April instructing the Interahamwe to work
alongside the Army and to maintain roadblocks.135
He denied telling OTP that he had
testified at the trial of Laurent Munyakazi in Kigali or that during the course of the trial
there had been testimony concerning connections between Ngirumpatse and roadblocks
in Kigali during the genocide.136
He never told OTP that a letter signed by Ngirumpatse
had been entered into evidence during Munyakazi’s trial.137
129 Transcript of 9 November 2006 @ 9 130 Transcript of 20 November 2006 @ 13 131 Transcript of 9 November 2006 @ 10; Transcript of 20 November 2006 @ 15 132 Transcript of 9 November 2006 @ 12 133 Transcript of 9 November 2006 @ 11 134 Transcript of 9 November 2006 @ 37 135 Exhibit DNG-50 136 Transcript of 26 June 2007 @ 6-7 137 Transcript of 26 June 2007 @ 8
24
106. Twahirwa claimed to have obtained the forged letters as follows: While
attending the pronouncement of the judgement in Munyakazi’s trial, Twahirwa met a
young man and asked him how he might obtain documents from the trial that proved
Munyakazi was complicit with Ngirumpatse. The young man said he had copies of those
documents. Twahirwa said he would reward him if he could obtain copies of those
documents.138
He later met up with the man, they went to an Intenet café and sent the
documents to the OTP.139
He knew the man as Eric Makizare, who lived in a house
owned by Ntanturo in Kanombe, not far from President Habyarimana’s former
residence.140
vii. Witness AWE
107. Witness AWE testified that during the night of 6 April, after the plane of
President Habyarimana was shot down, he heard shots all night.141
The Interahamwe
erected roadblocks that night.142
He noticed that roadblocks were erected by the
Interahamwe in Gitega and Gakinjiro, both on the Nyamirambo road before 9 April.143
Witness AWE also observed corpses in front of George Rutaganda’s residence before 9
April.144
In his opinion, the Interahamwe would not have erected roadblocks unless
being instructed to do so by the MRND leaders, Ngirumpatse, Nzirorera, and
Karemera.145
108. Witness AWE attended a meeting at the Kigali prefecture office on 9 April.
Prefet Renzaho said the Inkotanyi had left the CND and were in the process of killing the
local population and were trying to invade in the town.146
Renzaho said they should erect
roadblocks and that he would give them weapons to be distributed to members of the
population.147
Renzaho told them that the decision to erect roadblocks had been taken in
conjunction with Ngirumpatse, Nzirorera, and Karemera.148
138Transcript of 26 June 2007 @ 9 139 Transcript of 26 June 2007 @ 10 140 Transcript of 26 June 2007 @ 19-20 141 Transcript of 4 July 2007@25 142 Transcript of 4 July 2007@24 143 Transcript of 4 July 2007@24 144 Transcript of 4 July 2007@25 145 Transcript of 4 July 2007@25-26 146 Transcript of 4 July 2007@26 147 Transcript of 4 July 2007@27 148 Transcript of 4 July 2007@27
25
viii. documentary evidence
109. Pursuant to Article 60 of the MRND statutes, the most an MRND national
official could do, in disciplining an MRND member, would be to expel the member after
other disciplinary measures had failed to produce the desired affect.149
110. In a cable from Kofi Annan to the Secretary General, on 7 April 1994, it is
reported that ―SRSG and FC inform that there is no authority in control at this moment in
Kigali.‖150
111. On 9 April 1994, Kofi Annan reported to the Secretary General that the
Interim Government did not appear to have any authority and that the RPF was refusing
to negotiate with the Interim Government.151
112. On 10 April, the five political parties, including the MRND, issued a
communiqué which was broadcast on Radio Rwanda and RTLM calling for restoration of
security regardless of a person’s ethnic origin, party membership, or region. They urged
the authorities to put an end to the massacres and punish those who broke the law.152
113. In a radio interview on 10 April 1994, Mathieu Ngirumpatse said that no
political party had asked its members to engage in killings. He asked MRND members,
especially the youth, to refrain from criminal activity and to help restore security. He
said that those who are attacking us are the Inkotanyi, not the ordinary citizen in his
house on the hill.153
114. It was the assessment of UNAMIR on 14 April 1994 that the Interim
government was unable to control the behavior of the soldiers, Interahamwe, or the
population.154
115. On 18 April 1994, SRSG Booh Booh reported that there was currently a
vacuum in the political leadership of the country. And he noted that, "What is equally
baffling is the complete disappearance of the leaders of the political parties. And,
presumably, they too have left the city or are in hiding the city.‖155
149 Exhibit #DNG-2, Article 60 150 Exhibit DNG-15 @ para. 6 151 Exhibit DNZ-226 152 Transcript of 18 October 2005@ 45; Exhibit #DNZ-21 153 Exhibit #DNZ-22 154 Exhibit DNZ-230 155 Exhibit DNZ-232
26
116. On 19 April 1994, UNAMIR reported that the government is yet to be in full
control of the situation. And in paragraph 3, they report that the RPF troops continue to
infiltrate into the city of Kigali, and that the troops carried out rescue operations in the
area of Nyamirambo overnight to extricate over a hundred of their sympathisers.156
c. Defence evidence
117. Karemera witness Jean Marie Vianney Ndagijimana testified that no
Minister, the Prime Minister, and not even the President, could have put a stop to the
massacres at that time.157
Even Robert Kajuga, the President of the Interahamwe, could
not control the Interahamwe from murdering members of his family. This is testimony to
the fact that many members of the government and members of the MRND were
powerless.158
The MRND leaders had no ability to stop the massacres.159
118. Karemera Witness XQL, a member of the MRND prefectural committee
from Ruhengeri, testified that the MRND did not have the same control over those
youths.160
After the death of the President, there was a chaotic situation. All the aimless
youth in the country gathered within the Interahamwe and the situation became
uncontrollable.161
119. Karemera Witness CWL, a national leader of the MDR party, testified that
there was a lack of authority in the country after 6 April. If the government had the
means to assure security, the massacres never would have happened.162
120. Karemera witness Ildephonse Munyeshyaka, a former Ambassador and
MDR party member, testified that during the events following the assassination of
President Habyarimana, there was chaos in the country and the authorities did not have
the power to control it.163
121. Karemera witness Jean Marie Vianney Nkezabera, an MDR party leader
in Kigali, testified that in 1993 and 1994, the Interahamwe started getting out of the
156 Exhibit DNZ-233 157 Transcript of 11 July 2008 @ 21 158 Transcript of 11 July 2008 @ 26 159 Transcript of 11 July 2008 @ 27 160 Transcript of 5 May 2008 @ 24 161 Transcript of 6 May 2008 @ 21 162 Transcript of 7 May 2008 @ 27 (CS) 163 Transcript of 7 May 2008 @ 67
27
control of the MRND party leadership.164
After 6 April 1994, the country became
uncontrollable.165
122. Joseph Nzirorera will testify that the MRND never ordered or instigated the
killings of Tutsi and political opponents. The accused did not have control over those
Interahamwe who were at the roadblocks and that he did not attend any meetings with
Interahamwe until10 April 1994, and that meeting was for the purpose of trying to stop
the killing.
123. George Rutaganda will testify that he was never at Witness HH’s bar on 8
April and knows nothing of any letter written by Mathieu Ngirumpatse. He will further
testify that he was not touring roadblocks on 7-10 April 1994. He will further testify that
Robert Kajuga was not able to move from Uwigiro Village on 8 April 1994 and could not
have gone to Witness HH’s bar. Neither the national committee nor the MRND leaders
were in control of the Interahamwe at the roadblocks.
124. Witness 31 will testify that he was an officer of the National Committee of
the Interahamwe and that he never received or issued orders for Interahamwe to man the
roadblocks. Neither the national committee nor the MRND leaders were in control of the
Interahamwe at the roadblocks.
125. Justin Mugenzi, Eliezer Niyitegeka, Augustin Ngirabtaware, and Andre
Ntagerura will testify that the MRND leaders were unable to exercise control over the
Interahamwe after 6 April 1994.
126. Witness 29 will testify that the MRND leaders were unable to exercise
control over the Interahamwe after 6 April 1994. He never heard about or saw a letter
from Ngirumpatse to the Interahamwe in April 1994 and never told Witness ALG about
such a letter.
127. Tharcisse Renzaho will testify that the MRND leaders were unable to
exercise control over the Interahamwe after 6 April 1994. He never told the conseillers
that the accused had been consulted concerning erection of the roadblocks.
128. Paul Rusesabagina, who followed the events closely from theMiile Collines
Hotel, will testify that the authorities did not have control over the Interahamwe.
164 Transcript of 13 May 2008 @ 26 165 Transcript of 13 May 2008 @ 27
28
129. Seraphin Twahirwa will testify, if allowed, that he never heard about or
saw a letter from Ngirumpatse to the Interahamwe in April 1994. He was never at
Witness HH’s bar on 8 April 1994.
130. Jacques Roger Booh Booh will testify that it was his impression that there
was no authority in Kigali during the first days of the genocide capable of controlling
those who were killing at the roadblocks.
131. Agnes Ntamabyaliro, Minister of Justice in the Interim Government, in
testimony in the Bizimungu et al case admitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis, testified that the
interim government did what it could do stop the killing, but it was powerless.166
The
interim government took many forms of action to try and stop the killing but was unable
to do so.167
132. Emmanuel Ndindabahizi, Minister of Finance in the Interim Government,
whose testimony was admitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis, testified the Interim government
asked the population and authorities to calm people down. The instructions were so that
people would be told that they were brothers and sisters and should not kill each other.
The government needed a strong force to confront those attacking others.168
The Interim
Government had the political will but not the resources to stop the killing of civilians.
The government was weak, it was chased from Kigali, Gitarama and Muramba and did
not receive cooperation from the RPF, UNAMIR or the international community so the
government was not capable of doing anything. It was a ghost of a government and was
incapable of protecting the population.169
c. Other information
133. In the Bagosora et al case, the Trial Chamber found that eventually, civilians
involved in the killings in Rwanda from 7 April were commonly referred to as
Interahamwe even if they were not specifically members of the MRND youth wing.170
4. Meetings at Hotel Diplomat with Interahamwe
a. Indictment
166 Exhibit DNZ-512; Transcript of 28 August 2008 @ 27 167 Exhibit DNZ-512; Transcript of 28 August 2008 @ 29 168 Exhibit DNZ-513; Transcript of 2 May 2007 @ 23 169 Exhibit DNZ-513; Transcript of 2 May 2007 @ 24 170 Prosecutor v Bagosora et al, No. ICTR-98-41-T, Judgement (18 December 2008) at para. 459
29
38. On or about 10 April 1994 Édouard KAREMERA, Mathieu
NGIRUMPATSE, and Joseph NZIRORERA convened a meeting with
the national leadership of the Interahamwe at the Hôtel des Diplomates
that included participation from the recently appointed Interim
Government ministers. Mathieu NGIRUMPATSE ordered and
instigated the Interahamwe leaders to control their men and to invoke the
authority of the Interim Government to organize the removal corpses from
the streets. The campaign was deemed one of ―pacification‖, though
essentially, and practically, it was a means of exerting control and
direction over Interahamwe militias so that the killings would be focused
on the most important targets first, the Tutsi intellectuals, and so that the
killings would proceed with greater discretion, and in fact was a means to
aid and abet the killing.
b. Prosecution evidence
i. Witness G
134. Witness G testified that on the morning of 10 April, [Bernard Maniragaba]
came to the house of Witness T and said that the government wanted to task the
Interahamwe with a mission through Nzirorera and wanted to see the members of the
Interahamwe committee.171
Along with [Jean Pierre Sebanetsi] and [Joseph Serugendo],
they went to the Hotel des Diplomat for the meeting with Nzirorera.172
[Eugene
Mbrushimana] also attended the meeting, but withdrew because he had other things to
do.173
135. When they arrived at the hotel, they met Nzirorera, Karemera, and Justin
Mugenzi.174
He also saw Tutsi businessmen and families who had taken refuge in the
Hotel Diplomat.175
Nzirorera said that he had been given a mission by the government to
see ―his‖ Interahamwe and to ask them to stop the killings and to collect the dead bodies
which were along the roads.176
He said the Ministry of Public Works would send lorries
the next day to take the bodies to mass graves. This was necessary because the
171 Transcript of 18 October 2005@ 28 172 Transcript of 11 October 2005 @ 56 173 Transcript of 11 October 2005 @ 57 174 Transcript of 11 October 2005 @ 56 175 Transcript of 18 October 2005@ 29 176 Transcript of 18 October 2005@ 30
30
international community was getting concerned and the dead bodies had to be gotten rid
of.177
136. The international community had been already present in Kigali long before
10 April through UNAMIR. The removal of the bodies may well have been for a
sanitary or health reason.178
137. The members of the Interahamwe accepted to go around to the secteurs and
tell the people to stop the killing. They asked for a military escort and Nzirorera said that
the soldiers who were his own bodyguards would accompany them on this mission.179
They thereupon went to various secteurs and told the people that the government had
asked them to stop the killings and bring the bodies to the roads for collection.180
People
in general received the message well, but said they required firearms.181
They were not
asked to dismantle any roadblocks.182
138.At Bilyogo and Nyamirambo secteurs, [Bernard Maniragaba] told the people
that the government had given them the mission to stop the massacres and bring up the
dead bodies. The people seemed to agree.183
At Nyakabanda secteur, one of them spoke
and the people accepted to stop the killing. At Kimisagara secteur, [Bernard
Maniragaba] spoke and the people eventually agreed to stop the killings. At Gatsata
secteur [Ephrem Nkezabera] spoke and the people agreed to stop the killings.184
They
met Colonel Muberuka there, who said that the Army had not been able to stop the
killings.185
At Muhima secteur [Jean Pierre Sebanetsi] spoke and the people agreed to
stop the killings. Then they went to Gikondo where [Bernard Maniragaba] spoke and
the people accepted to stop the killings.186
139. They returned to the Hotel des Diplomat around 6 or 6:30 p.m.187
They
again met with Nzirorera, Karemera, and Mugenzi. They reported that the mission had
177 Transcript of 11 October 2005 @ 57 178 Transcript of 18 October 2005@ 31 179 Transcript of 11 October 2005 @ 57 180 Transcript of 11 October 2005 @ 59 181 Transcript of 11 October 2005 @ 59 182 Transcript of 11 October 2005 @ 59-60 183 Transcript of 18 October 2005@ 33 184 Transcript of 18 October 2005@ 34 185 Transcript of 18 October 2005@ 35 186 Transcript of 18 October 2005@ 35 187 Transcript of 11 October 2005 @ 58
31
been successful and that the people had welcomed the request, but were asking for
firearms.188
The people in the secteurs were asking for weapons so that they could
defend themselves against the RPF.189
They also said there were many dead bodies on the
streets. Karemera and Mugenzi expressed joy at the large number of deaths. There was
no reaction to the request for weapons.190
ii. Witness T
140. Witness T testified that on 10 April, members of the national Interahamwe
committee were called to the Hotel Diplomat by Ngirumpatse, Nzirorera, Karemera, and
Mugenzi. They explained the absence of the other committee members. Ngirumpatse
upbraided them for not being able to control their men and told them to do all they could
to stop the killing at the roadblocks. They said it was causing the Interim government
problems with the international community. The message was to do everything possible
to stop the massacres.191
They told them that we should tell those who reject the message
that the government will exercise its control and whoever disobeys the government’s
instructions will subject themselves to sanctions.192
141. Mugenzi complained that they were attacking women and children while
important Tutsi like Evariste Sisi had escaped to the Milles des Collines.193
He asked #8
to insure that the family of his sister was evacuated.194
142. From the way Ngirumpatse complained about the Interahamwe being out of
control and killing Tutsi, it was consistent with the fact that the MRND leaders had not
ordered the Interahamwe to kill Tutsis.195
143. When [Bernard Maniragaba] came to Witness T’s house that morning, he
said that the national committee of the MRND was seeking to meet the members of the
national Interahamwe committee. They were unable to reach the other members of the
188 Transcript of 18 October 2005@ 36 189 Transcript of 18 October 2005@ 37 190 Transcript of 11 October 2005 @ 60; Transcript of 18 October 2005@ 37 191 Transcript of 24 May 2006 @ 59; Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 14 192 Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 14-15 193 Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 14 194 Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 15 195 Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 16
32
committee, so [Nkezabera, Maniragaba, Serugendo, Sebanetsi, and Niyitegeka]
proceeded to the Hotel Diplomat.196
144. They were told to take an armed escort and deliver this message around
Kigali. They were told to tell the people to make the corpses available for collection by
public works trucks. Those members of the committee who attended this meeting were
[Mbarushimana, Nkezabera, Maniragaba, Serugendo, Sebanetsi, and Niyitegeka].197
145. The MRND instructed him to tell the Interahamwe to stop the killings, to
pick up the corpses to ensure public hygiene, and that checks would be made and people
who did not obey this order would be subject to sanctions.198
Members of the Interim
government would come by in the future and make sure these instructions were complied
with.199
146. The pacification tour began on the morning of the next day, 11 April. They
went to Gitega, Bilyogo, Nyamirambo, Nyakabanda, Kimisagara, Gitikinyoni, Muhima,
Nyabugogo, and Gatsata secteurs.200
They faithfully delivered the message requested of
them by the MRND leaders.201
The reaction of the Interahamwe was one of surprise that
the government wanted them to stop defending themselves against the RPF. The
members of the committee explained that those who did not heed this message would
have to answer for it. Practically everywhere we went, they asked for weapons to defend
themselves.202
147. The people were asking for weapons to defend themselves against the
RPF.203
He personally found the requests to be legitimate and justified, although
recognized the possibility that the arms could be used for settling of scores or excesses.204
148. They encountered resistence from Rose Karushara in Kimasagara secteur
and at Gitikinyoni secteur where Joseph Setiba was in charge.205
They had to brandish
threats to bring him to reason. He does not know of any orders given by the Interahamwe
196 Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 12 197 Transcript of 24 May 2006 @ 60; Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 15 198 Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 16 199 Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 17 200 Transcript of 24 May 2006 @ 60 201 Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 19 202 Transcript of 24 May 2006 @ 61; Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 19 203 Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 22 204 Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 23 205 Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 19
33
committee to Setiba.206
A Hutu man named Minega was killed at the Gitikinyoni
roadblock.207
149. They encountered Colonel Muberuka of the Rwandan Army in Gatsata
secteur. He was trying to establish order and supported their pacification mission.208
150. In the afternoon of 11 April, between 1 and 2:30, the members of the
committee reported back to Ngirumpatse, Nzirorera, and Karemera at the Diplomat
Hotel. They told us to carry on in the balance of the afternoon.209
The committee
reported that people were asking for arms.210
They responded that the committee should
tell the population that the government would consider their complaints and meet their
demands. However, the RPF continued to increase the military pressure and the message
was not getting through to the population.211
151. Beginning on 8 April, the government was constantly giving out the message
on the radio for people to stop the killing.212
However, the RPF intensified its bombings
in the high density neighborhoods in Kigali on the 10th and 11
th and a mass exodus of
people began.213
152. Despite these difficulties, (Maniragaba, Nkezabera, and Niyitegeka]
continued the mission on the morning of 12 April. They were beginning to panic as they
saw the large number of people leaving Kigali.214
They themselves began to be afraid
given the intensity of the RPF attack and the fleeing of the population.215
However, much
to their surprise, when they arrived at the Diplomat Hotel at around 2 p.m., they found
that the Interim government had fled Kigali.216
They felt betrayed.217
b. Defence evidence
153. Edouard Karemera testified that on 10 April 1994, he was at the Diplomat
Hotel and saw that Ngirumpatse, Nzirorera, and Mugenzi were meeting with some
206 Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 20 207 Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 20 208 Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 21 209 Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 22 210 Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 22 211 Transcript of 24 May 2006 @ 62 212 Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 26 213 Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 49 214 Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 49 215 Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 50 216 Transcript of 24 May 2006 @ 64 217 Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 50
34
leaders of the Interahamwe. However he was busy drafting a communiqué and did not
participate in that meeting.218
154. Joseph Nzirorera will testify that he called a meeting with the leaders of the
national Interahamwe committee and urged them to go to the secteurs and try to stop the
killing.
155. Witness 31 will testify that while at the Hotel Diplomat he ran into Bernard
Maniragaba, Dieudonne Niyitigeka, Ephrem Nkezabera, and Jean Pierre Sebanesti. They
told him that they had been given a mission to try to bring calm to the secteurs and they
were traveling around with a radio and military jeep on a pacification mission. The men
had no weapons, but the soldiers with them were armed. He was not aware of any
meetings concerning distribution of weapons to Interahamwe.
156. Justin Mugenzi will testify that he attended a meeting between Ngirumpatse
and Nzirorera and some members of the national Interahamwe committee. The MRND
leaders told the Interahamwe leaders to go to the secteurs and try to get the Interahamwe
to stop the killing. Mugenzi did not express any joy at the number of people killed.
157. Emmanuel Ndindabahizi, Minister of Finance in the Interim Government,
whose testimony in the Bizimungu et al case was admitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis,
testified that at a meeting of the cabinet on 9 or 10 April, the authorities and the political
parties were asked to do everything possible to stop the killings. The parties, not only the
MRND, were asked to discipline their youth wings.219
5. Distribution of Weapons on 9-12 April 1994
a. Indictment
39. Even as they attempted to control the killings at roadblocks, Mathieu
NGIRUMPATSE and Joseph NZIRORERA made arrangements with
Théoneste BAGOSORA to obtain firearms from the Ministry of Defense
and caused such weapons to be distributed to militiamen in Kigali,
intending that they be used to attack and kill the Tutsi population.
b. Prosecution evidence
i. Witness T
218 Transcript of 19 May 2009 @ 22 219 Exhibit DNZ-513; Transcript of 2 May 2006 @ 10
35
158. Witness T testified that the people were asking for weapons to defend
themselves against the RPF.220
He personally found the requests to be legitimate and
justified, although recognized the possibility that the arms could be used for settling of
scores or excesses.221
159. Witness T testified that when they arrived at the Diplomat on 12 April, they
encountered Nzirorera, who said that he was leaving himself. The members of the
committee explained to him that the people needed weapons and that their own
credibility would be in great danger if they were not provided. Nzirorera said he would
see what he could do and asked them to call him at 4 p.m.222
160. Witness T called Nzirorera at his house at about 3:30.223
[Bernard
Maniragaba] also called him. Nzirorera told them that he had submitted their problem to
Colonel Bagosora and that they should meet Bagosora at 6 p.m. at the Hotel Diplomat.224
161. Witness T testified that they met Bagosora who arranged for them to pick up
weapons that evening from the presidential guard camp at the President’s residence in
Kiyovu. They received about 100 guns and ammunition. They distributed these weapons
at the same roadblocks the next day.225
When the weapons were distributed, they
recorded the identification of those who had received arms so that they would not be used
for banditry after the war.226
162. Robert Kajuga joined them at the place where they picked up the weapons at
about 7:30 p.m.227
The intention in distributing these weapons was not to exterminate
the Tutsi, but to fight the RPF. However, unfortunately, many Rwandan Tutsi were
victims.228
163. Witness T testified that he never heard anything about a distribution of
weapons outside of the Hotel Diplomat on 10 April to the Interahamwe, as claimed by
220 Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 22 221 Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 23 222 Transcript of 24 May 2006 @ 65; Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 51 223 Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 51 224 Transcript of 24 May 2006 @ 65; Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 51 225 Transcript of 24 May 2006 @ 65 226 Transcript of 31 May 2006 @ 2 227 Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 58 228 Transcript of 31 May 2006 @ 2
36
Witnesses UB, ALG, and HH. Witness T was with Bernard Maniragaba from the time
they arrived at the Diplomat until the end of the day when he left him in Gitega.229
ii. Witness G
164. Witness G testified that he was told by [Ephrem Nkezabera] that on 13 April,
the Interahamwe were given weapons from Nzirorera, who had made an arrangement
with Bagosora.230
iii. Witness UB
165. Witness UB testified that on 10 April he was told by his younger brother,
who was an Interahamwe, that soldiers had distributed weapons to Interahamwe in front
of the Hotel Diplomat in the presence of the chief of the Interahamwe for Kigali
prefecture, and Bernard Maniragaba. The Minister of Youth addressed the Interahamwe
and said that the weapons were being distributed on the orders of Ngirumpatse and
Karemera who had agreed with the general staff of the Army that the weapons be
distributed.231
The Minister of Youth was Callixte Nzabonimana.232
The guns issued to
the Interahamwe were used to kill Tutsi.233
166. He was told this at his brother at his house around 3 p.m. Only the two of
them were present. His brother was an Interahamwe leader in the cellule. He had a
firearm on this occasion, but had not had one previously.234
His brother told him that
Callixte Nzabonimana had addressed the group and said that Ngirumpatse and Nzirorera
had other duties and could not be present, but had discussed the distribution of weapons
with members of the army and the decision had been taken to distribute weapons to the
Interahamwe.235
(However, in April 2004, he had told the Office of the Prosecutor that
his brother had said Ngirumpatse, Nzirorera, and Karemera were present when the
weapons were distributed at the Diplomat Hotel.)236
229 Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 18 230 Transcript of 12 October 2005 @ 11; Transcript of 27 October 2005 @ 18 231 Transcript of 27 February 2006@ 44 232 Transcript of 27 February 2006@ 53 233 Transcript of 27 February 2006@ 61 234 Transcript of 6 March 2006@ 45 235 Transcript of 6 March 2006@ 45-46 236 Transcript of 6 March 2006@ 47; Exhibit #DNZ97
37
167. He denied being present at the Diplomat Hotel when the weapons were
distributed.237
However, in the Pre-Trial Brief, the prosecution alleged that he was
personally present.238
168. His brother told him that Bernard Maniragaba and Georges Rutaganda had
been present at the Diplomat Hotel on 10 April when the weapons were distributed.239
He had no knowledge that members of the Interahamwe National Committee had gone
around to ask the people to stop killing, including in his secteur. No one informed him.
Had that happened the killings would have stopped.240
iv. Witness ALG
169. Witness ALG testified that he was told about a meeting which occurred on
the 10th or 11
th of April 1994 at the Hotel Diplomat. He was told about this meeting by
the former Bourgmestre of Kacyiru, Pierre Claver Nyilinkwaya, the conseillers of
Bilyogo and Nyarugenge secteurs, and some Interahamwe who attended that meeting
including Bernard Maniragaba, Joseph Setiba, Jean Nepomuscene Bazimenyera, and
conseiller Odette Nyirabagenzi.241
170. He does not know whether Bourgmestre Nyilinkwaya attended that
meeting.242
Karekezi was not in attendance at the meeting.243
Gabriel Mbyaliyehe was
also present with Karekezi and told him about the meeting.244
171. Joseph Setiba told him about this meeting in prison in the years 2000-2002.
He had not attended the meeting either.245
172. Bernard Maniragaba told him of the meeting in May 1994, but he was in a
rush when they had the conversation. Maniragaba had attended the meeting chaired by
Ngirumpatse at the Diplomat Hotel on 10 April.246
237 Transcript of 6 March 2006@ 47 238 Transcript of 6 March 2006@ 48; Pre-Trial brief @ paras. 89, 125 239 Transcript of 6 March 2006@ 54 240 Transcript of 6 March 2006@ 54 241 Transcript of 27 October 2006 @ 4 242 Transcript of 2 November 2006 @ 62 243 Transcript of 2 November 2006 @ 64 244 Transcript of 2 November 2006 @ 65 245 Transcript of 2 November 2006 @ 66 246 Transcript of 2 November 2006 @ 67
38
173.Odette Nyirabagenzi told him about the meetings on 10 April 1994 at the
Diplomat after a prefecture security council meeting in April 1994. Witness ALG could
not recall whether she had attended the meetings.247
174. According to the information received by Witness ALG, Ngirumpatse
chaired the meeting in the presence of Nzirorera. Ngirumpatse told the Interahamwe that
it was necessary to support the Army and that they should man roadblocks to prevent
Inkotanyi infiltration and ensure security within Kigali.248
This was the only meeting that
he is aware of that was convened and chaired by Ngirumpatse.249
175. Witness ALG never heard that there was a meeting at the Diplomat Hotel on
10 April 1994 in which members of the Interahamwe committee were instructed by
Ngirumpatse and Nzirorera to go around to the roadblocks and tell the Interahamwe to
stop the killing.250
176. Witness ALG was also told of another meeting involving Colonel Bagosora,
Ministers, and other persons.251
Setiba told him in 2000-2002 in prison that he had
attended a meeting on 10 or 11 April at the Diplomat Hotel chaired by Bagosora.
Dallaire had been in attendance at the outset of the meeting. Callixte Nzabonimana and
Gaspard Gahigi were also present. Setiba also said that he had seen the three accused in
the vicinity of the Diplomat Hotel at the time of this meeting.252
177. Witness ALG was told by Setiba that after Dallaire left, weapons were
distributed to the Interahamwe from a military truck in the presence of Bagosora,
Nzabonimana, and Gahigi.253
178. Witness ALG was told in prison by an Interahamwe leader named Jean
Nepomuscene Biziyaremye in 2001-2003 that he had attended the meeting chaired by
Bagosora in which weapons had been distributed to the Interahamwe. He said that the
purpose of that meeting chaired by Bagosora and attended by Dallaire was to discuss the
evacuation of the children from the Gisimba orphanage. The evacuation was turned
247 Transcript of 2 November 2006 @ 69-70 248 Transcript of 27 October 2006 @ 5 249 Transcript of 31 October 2006 @ 33 250 Transcript of 2 November 2006 @ 62 251 Transcript of 27 October 2006 @ 5 252 Transcript of 2 November 2006 @ 66 253 Transcript of 2 November 2006 @ 67
39
down by the Interahamwe. Weapons were distributed to the Interahamwe after Dallaire
left.254
179. UNAMIR records indicate that a meeting was held between UNAMIR and
the Interahamwe to discuss the evacuation of the orphans from Gisimba on 16 and 17
May 1994.255
180. When he was questioned by the Rwandan prosecutor on 14 December 1999,
Witness ALG said he did not know who had distributed firearms.256
He said that he was
not ready to tell the entire truth at that time.257
181. In his handwritten explanation of his activities during the war, submitted to
Rwandan authorities on 21 February 2000, Witness ALG said that he did not know how
the people manning the roadblock had obtained weapons.258
He claimed that he was
speaking of his knowledge as of the time he left his home on 12 April 1994.259
When
shown another passage in the statement in which he had stated that ―that is what I know
or what I heard about the distribution of firearms in Nyarugenge commune‖, Witness
ALG claimed that he had not recalled the information about weapons distribution at the
Diplomat Hotel at that time.260
182. The first time Witness ALG mentioned this meeting to any authority was
after he had been housed with Witness UB in Arusha in April and May 2004.261
v. Witness HH
183. A few days after the meeting on the 8th
, he was told by his deputy, Gervais,
that he had attended a meeting at the Diplomat Hotel with Nzirorera and had been asked
to come back for a meeting the following day.262
The meeting was of Interahamwe
presidents and Nzirorera, Twahirwa, and Maniragaba were present.263
At the meeting,
they had been told that people should denounce the enemy wherever they were hiding
254 Transcript of 2 November 2006 @ 68-69 255 Exhibit DNZ-182 256 Exhibit DNG-27 257 Transcript of 6 November 2006 @ 16 258 Exhibit DNG-29 259 Transcript of 6 November 2006 @ 19-20 260 Transcript of 6 November 2006 @ 20, 22 261 Transcript of 7 November 2006@ 48 262 Transcript of 9 November 2006 @ 13 263 Transcript of 9 November 2006 @ 14
40
and cooperate with the Rwandan Army. They were told that a larger meeting with
Dallaire and the power wings would be held the next day.264
184. However, on cross-examination, Witness HH claimed that he had not been
told by Gervais that Dallaire was to attend the meeting the next day.265
185. He attended a meeting at the Hotel Diplomat. Bagosora and Maniragaba
were there, as well as Interahamwe Presidents. Dallaire’s Deputy chaired the meeting.
The language of the meeting was French. We were told that it was necessary to
dismantle the roadblocks for the passage of the orphans at Gisimba. People said that
other orphanages should be evacuated as well.266
UNAMIR’s request to evacuate the
orphans from Gisimba was turned down.267
186. The Deputy of Dallaire who was in attendance was of Belgian nationality.268
187. Witness HH arrived at the Diplomat Hotel before midday. He was with
Assumani and Ndayisenga, who was from his secteur.269
He does not know an
Interahamwe named Jean Berchmans Biziyaremye.270
Among the Interahamwe leaders
present at this meeting were Kajuga, Maniragaba, Nkezabera, Ruhumuliza, Rutaganda,
and Andre Nzabanterura.271
188. The meeting took place in a meeting room on the ground floor of the
Diplomat Hotel. Callixte Nzabonimana and Gahigi, an RTLM employee, were
present.272
Witness HH claimed to have seen Nzirorera standing with other cabinet
members upstairs on the balcony. The meeting took place the day before the Interim
Government left for Gitarama.273
189, At the meeting at the Diplomat Hotel, which was attended by officials from
the other parties, it was agreed that the youth wings would follow the instructions of
Interahamwe leaders.274
264 Transcript of 9 November 2006 @ 14 265 Transcript of 20 November 2006 @ 23 266 Transcript of 9 November 2006 @ 13 267 Transcript of 9 November 2006 @ 16 268 Transcript of 20 November 2006 @ 26 269 Transcript of 20 November 2006 @ 24 270 Transcript of 20 November 2006 @ 25 271 Transcript of 20 November 2006 @ 25-26 272 Transcript of 9 November 2006 @ 14-15 273 Transcript of 9 November 2006 @ 15 274 Transcript of 9 November 2006 @ 36
41
190. After UNAMIR representatives left, weapons were distributed outside the
hotel. A truck arrived and soldiers handed the weapons to Robert Kajuga, who
distributed them to Interahamwe Presidents pursuant to a list which had been drawn up
by Kajuga, Maniragaba, and Ngirabatware when they had gone around to the roadblocks
on 8 April.275
191. Witness HH denied saying to the investigator for OTP in November 2004
that Bagosora had given Kajuga the list of people who were to receive weapons.276
192. Callixte Nzabonimana and Gahigi were closely monitoring the distribution
and Maniragaba was going upstairs, where Witness HH believed that he was making
reports.277
The Interahamwe Presidents were instructed to consult with the conseillers to
see how to distribute the guns to the various roadblocks in the secteurs. The distribution
was on the basis of roadblocks per secteur.278
vii. Witness AWD
193. Witness AWD testified that he was told by Interahamwe and by conseiller
Zacharias Minani that around 10 or 11 April, Colonel Bagosora held a meeting at the
Hotel Diplomat in the company of MRND leaders and it was decided to have the
conseillers distribute weapons to trusted young men so they could use them to kill the
Tutsi.279
194. Actually, Minani had told him that he had attended a meeting of conseillers
at the Kigali prefecture office and at that meeting it had been said that Colonel Bagosora
and senior leaders of the MRND had decided in a meeting at the Hotel Diplomat that
members of the public should be given firearms for purposes of protecting themselves.
Corporal Mushi was present at the Presidential Guard camp when Minani told him
that.280
195. Andre Nzabanterura also told him about the meeting at the Hotel Diplomat
with Bagosora.281
b. Defence evidence
275 Transcript of 9 November 2006 @ 16; Transcript of 14 November 2006 @ 6 (CS) 276 Transcript of 20 November 2006 @ 29 277 Transcript of 9 November 2006 @ 17 278 Transcript of 9 November 2006 @ 17 279 Transcript of 10 October 2007 @ 34-35 280 Transcript of 12 November 2007 @ 22-23 281 Transcript of 12 November 2007 @ 23
42
196. Joseph Nzirorera will testify that he did not make arrangements for
weapons to be distributed to the Interahamwe, as claimed by Witness T, and in fact had
already left Kigali at the time Witness T claims to have called him on the telephone. He
will also testify that will testify that he had no knowledge of or participation in the
distribution of weapons to Interahamwe at the Diplomat Hotel.
197. Theoneste Bagosora will testify that he was not aware of nor did he
participate in any distribution of weapons at the Diplomat Hotel. He will also testify that
Nzirorera never made any arrangements with him for distribution of weapons to
Interahamwe.
198. Witness 31 will testify that he was present at the Diplomat Hotel in April
1994, but was not aware of any meetings concerning distribution of weapons to
Interahamwe.
199. Georges Rutaganda and Seraphin Twahirwa will testify that they were
not aware of nor did they participate in any distribution of weapons at the Diplomat
Hotel.
200. Dieudonne Ndayisenga, whose written statement was admitted pursuant to
Rule 92 bis, refuted the testimony of Witness HH that he accompanied Joseph Setiba to a
meeting of the Interahamwe at the Hotel des Diplomat in Kigali around 10 or 11 April
1994. In fact, he never went to the Hotel Diplomat in April 1994 and never accompanied
Setiba there. He had no knowledge whatsoever of any meeting of the Interahamwe being
held at the Hotel des Diplomat on 10 or 11 April 1994.282
201. Paul Rusesabagina, the Manager of the Diplomat Hotel, will testify that he
was present during these days and would have been aware if such a distribution of
weapons had taken place. It didn’t.
202. Colonel Ephrem Setako, Solange Ajakaneza, David Biramahire and
Witnesses 44 and 45 will testify that Joseph Nzirorera left Kigali with them around 2
p.m. on 12 April 1994 and therefore could not have made or received telephone calls with
Witness T in the late afternoon to arrange for the distribution of weapons.
282 Exhibit DNZ-617
43
6. Killings in Kabeza
a. Indictment
63.2 On a date unknown between 7 – 12 April 1994 Joseph NZIRORERA
prepared, aided and abetted or committed killings of Tutsis in Remera,
Kigali-ville préfecture, by providing information about certain Tutsis that
were in hiding to a leader of the Interahamwe militias and by providing a
vehicle, provisions, and instructions to the Interahamwe so that those
persons could be forced out of hiding and killed. Among those killed were
Aloys KAREKEZI, his wife, and son.
b. Prosecution Evidence
i. Witness AJY
203. Witness AJY testified that after the death of the President, he was in
Nzirorera’s home near the German Embassy in Kiyovu. A person came from Kabeza
with a list of Tutsi and handed it to Nzirorera. Other Interahamwes there read the list.
Then, soldiers arrived. Nzirorera ordered him to take a Land Rover and transport the
soldiers. They went to Mount Kigali where they picked up between 12-15 boxes of
ammunition. He took the boxes back to Nzirorera’s home.283
He could not name any of
the soldiers who accompanied him to Mount Kigali to obtain the ammunition.284
204. Witness AJY testified on cross examination that the Interahamwe with the
list from Kabeza came on the same day as he went to Kabeza, on not on the day that he
went to Mount Kigali.285
205. The next morning was a Sunday. 286
Nzirorera arrived at the property
between 9 and 10 a.m.287
Witness AJY was standing outside the window of Nzirorera’s
office and he overheard him call Robert Kajuga and say ―I need you.‖288
Kajuga arrived
a short time later, around 8 or 9 a.m., accompanied by several Interahamwe. Witness
AJY could not recall any of their names.289
283 Transcript of 12 November 2007 @ 68 284 Transcript of 13 November 2007 @ 50 285 Transcript of 13 November 2007 @ 50 286 Transcript of 12 November 2007 @ 69 287 Transcript of 13 November 2007 @ 51 288 Transcript of 13 November 2007 @ 52 289 Transcript of 14 November 2007 @ 5-6
44
206. Nzirorera gave Kajuga the list of Tutsi who had taken refuge in Kabeza.
Nzirorera told Witness AJY to take the Diahatsu and go with Kajuga.290
207. The ammunition was loaded onto the vehicle and they drove through
Nyabugogo picking up Interahamwe and distributing the ammunition to them. Kajuga
was sitting in the front cabin with him. There were between 50-60 Interahamwe in the
vehicle. When they got to Kabeza, they pulled people out of their houses and killed them
in front of Witness AJY. He saw them kill Aloys Karekezi, his wife Nyirabagame and
their child and left the bodies there.291
208. On the way back, one of the Interahamwes was shot and killed. They went
to Nzirorera’s home and he congratulated Witness AJY. Witness AJY told him
everything went well.292
209. At Nzirorera’s house, he met Justin Mugenzi’s driver named Kanyota.
Casimir Bizimungu’s vehicle was also there. Bagosora was there. Kanyota told him the
government was going to move. He looked through the window and saw Bagosora,
Bizimungu, and Mugenzi.293
210. Witness AJY claimed to have spent 7-8 hours with Robert Kajuga on that
day. However, the prosecution reported that he was shown a video containing Kajuga’s
image and he failed to recognize him.294
Witness AJY said this was a ―pure fabrication‖
and that he saw Kajuga in the video, but told OTP he did not recognize anyone in the
video because he was tired and they had not approached him at the proper time.295
211. However, in a statement in May 2001, Witness AJY claimed that around this
very same day, 10 April 1994, he was at a roadblock in front of the Rubavu
bourgmestre’s house.296
212. In the Bikindi judgement, the Trial Chamber found that Witness AJY was not
a credible witness.297
ii. Witness G
290 Transcript of 12 November 2007 @ 69 291 Transcript of 12 November 2007 @70 292 Transcript of 12 November 2007 @ 70 293 Transcript of 12 November 2007 @ 72 294 Transcript of 14 November 2007 @ 2; Exhibit #DNZ-378 295 Transcript of 14 November 2007 @ 4 296 Transcript of 13 November 2007 @ 31; Exhibit #DNZ-374 297 Prosecutor v Bikindi, No. ICTR-01-72-T, Judgement and Sentence (2 December 2008) at paras. 160-61
45
213. Witness G testified that Robert Kajuga was not among the members of the
Interahamwe National Committee who were able to come to the Hotel Diplomat on 10
April 1994 to meet with the MRND leaders and participate in the tour of secteurs to try to
stop the killing.298
214. Mr. Nzirorera sought to elicit testimony from Witness G, which he had given
in the Setako trial, that Robert Kajuga was not in Kigali during the period 7-12 April
1994. However, the Trial Chamber refused to allow Mr. Nzirorera to elicit this
testimony.299
iii. Witness T
215. Witness T testified that Robert Kajuga was not among the members of the
Interahamwe National Committee who were able to come to the Hotel Diplomat on 10
April 1994 to meet with the MRND leaders and participate in the tour of secteurs to try to
stop the killing. They had been unable to reach him.300
They first saw him on the
evening of 12 April.301
c. Defence Evidence
216. Joseph Nzirorera will testify that he did not have a house near the German
Embassy in 1994, never saw Robert Kajuga after 6 April 1994, had nothing to do with
killings in Kabeza, and that he never knew Witness AJY.
217. Justin Mugenzi will testify that he was never at any house with Joseph
Nzirorera in Kigali after 6 April 1994 and had no driver named Kanyota.
218. Casimir Bizimungu and Colonel Theoneste Bagosora will testify that they
were never at any house with Joseph Nzirorera in Kigali after 6 April 1994.
219. Georges Rutaganda will testify that Robert Kajuga was in hiding prior to 12
April 1994 and could not have come to Kiyovu between 6 and 12 April as claimed by
Witness AJY.
298 Transcript of 11 October 2005 @ 56, 57 299 Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s Motion to Modify Conditions of Recall of Prosecution Witness G (5
November 2009); Oral Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s Motion to Vary Witness List to Add Witness G
(Transcript of 9 November 2009@ 1-2) 300 Transcript of 24 May 2006 @ 60 301 Transcript of 30 May 2006 @ 58
46
220. Aloys Zirarushya, the father of Witness AJY, will testify, if allowed, that
his son was in Gisenyi and not Kigali during the days following the assassination of
President Habyarimana, and that his son never told him that he worked for Joseph
Nzirorera.
221. Innocent Twagiramungu was present during the events in Kabeza in early
April 1994, including the killing of Aloys Karekezi and his family, and will testify that
Robert Kajuga was not in the area during those events.
222. Colonel Ephrem Setako, Solange Ajakaneza, Flora Kalisa, and Aurora
Uwase will testify that Nzirorera stayed at the Setako residence after 6 April 1994 and
that Nzirorera did not have a house near the German Embassy.
7. Meeting of Prefets on 11 April 1994
a. Indictment
40. On or about 11 April 1994 Édouard KAREMERA, Mathieu
NGIRUMPATSE, and Joseph NZIRORERA participated in a meeting
at the Hôtel des Diplomates in Kigali attended by members of the Interim
Government and most préfets. The purpose of the meeting was to
mobilize the territorial administration. During this meeting, the préfets in
attendance made reports on the ―security‖ situation in their respective
regions. Butare and Gitarama préfectures were labeled inactive because
the killings of Tutsi had not begun on a massive scale.
b. Prosecution Evidence
i. Witness Fidele Uwizeye
223. Witness Fidele Uwizeye testified that on 11 April, he attended a meeting of
prefets at the Hotel Diplomat in Kigali.302
There were about 30 Ministers and Prefets in
attendance as well as President Sindukubabwo. He does not recall political party leaders
being present.303
224. On 11 April, after a meeting with prefets, Prime Minister Kambanda
announced that prosecutors had been requested to resume their work and punish those
responsible for troubles and disorder. Prefets, bourgmestres, and heads of departments
had been urged to call meetings to calm the population. The population should be
302 Transcript of 19 July 2007 @ 18 303 Transcript of 19 July 2007 @ 27
47
instructed that the attack by the RPF is not an excuse to incite one another. No one ethnic
group should exclude the other from the country.304
225. Kambanda asked the prefets to ensure that the people avoided ethnic
segregation, assisted their neighbors, and only roadblocks authorized by the prefet should
be set up.305
226. At the meeting, the Ministers were introduced and the prefets spoke of the
situation in their prefectures. The Prime Minister then read from a prepared speech in
which he told them the program of the Interim Government. Prime Minister Kambanda
noted that the prefet of Butare was absent with no good reason and that he would pay
dearly for that. There were no questions and the meeting ended quickly because shells
were falling nearby.306
c. Defence evidence
227. Joseph Nzirorera will testify that he did not attend the meeting of Prefets on
11 April 1994.
228. Justin Mugenzi, Augustin Ngirabatware, and Eliezer Niyitegeka will
testify that Kambanda never said that the Prefet of Butare would pay dearly for being
absent nor was it said that the prefectures of Butare and Gitarama were labeled inactive.
229. Emmanuel Ndindabahizi, Minister of Finance in the Interim Government,
whose prior testimony in the Bizimungu et al case was admitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis,
testified that at the meeting of Prefets on 11 April, the prime minister spoke about the
objectives of the government to the préfets. It was said that the government had 3
objectives: to restore security to the country, negotiations with the RPF for the formation
of the government and to address the problems of famine.307
230. The speech also requested that the ministry of justice and the prosecutors
start functioning so that those responsible for disturbances could be punished and security
could be restored to Kigali.308
The speech also asked the préfets to remind the people that
Rwanda belonged to all of them and not to take divisions between the 3 ethnic groups.309
304 Transcript of 26 July 2007 @ 25-26, 29; Exhibit #DNZ-23 305 Transcript of 26 July 2007 @ 26,29; Exhibit DNZ-23 306 Transcript of 19 July 2007 @ 28 307 Exhibit DNZ-513; Transcript of 30 April 2007 @ 38 308 Exhibit DNZ-513; Transcript of 30 April 2007 @ 55 309 Exhibit DNZ-513; Transcript of 30 April 2007 @ 58
48
The prime minister wanted to ensure that because the attacks were coming from the RPF
which was mostly Tutsi, the population did not use that as an excuse to attack Tutsis.
Some people were seeking revenge against the enemy, the RPF, but the prime minister
was trying to caution against abuse.310
231. In this speech, the prime minister also asked everyone to come to each
other’s mutual assistance. To help their wounded neighbors irrespective of ethnicity and
to rebuild the burned down houses. This speech was keeping with the government
objectives of restoring peace and security inside the country.311
At this meeting, the prime
minister never encouraged a program of revenge for the president’s death. Also at this
meeting, préfet Renzaho never talked of a program of civil defence to kill accomplices or
RPF Tutsis.312
The government was asking the population and authorities to calm people
down. The instructions were so that people would be told that they were brothers and
sisters and should not kill each other.313
232. This is consistent with the reporting of the speech over Radio Rwanda. On
11 April, after a meeting with prefets, Prime Minister Kambanda announced that
prosecutors had been requested to resume their work and punish those responsible for
troubles and disorder.314
Prefets, bourgmestres, and heads of departments had been urged
to call meetings to calm the population. The population should be instructed that the
attack by the RPF is not an excuse to incite one another. No one ethnic group should
exclude the other from the country.315
8. 19 April 1994 Speech of Sindikubwabo in Butare
a. Indictment
48. On or about 19 April 1994, Interim President SINDIKUBWABO
addressed a public rally in Butare préfecture and encouraged those that did
not adopt the government program to ―step aside‖. Thereafter, killings of
Tutsi civilians started or accelerated in Butare. The rally was also the
occasion on which the Interim Government publicly deposed the only
310 Exhibit DNZ-513; Transcript of 30 April 2007 @ 59 311 Exhibit DNZ-513; Transcript of 30 April 2007 @ 60 312 Exhibit DNZ-513; Transcript of 30 April 2007 @ 68 313 Exhibit DNZ-513; Transcript of 2 May 2007 @ 23 314 Exhibit #DNZ-23 315 Exhibit #DNZ-23
49
Tutsi préfet in Rwanda, Jean-Baptiste HABYALIMANA of Butare, a
member of the Parti Libéral, and replaced him by Sylvain NSABIMANA.
b. Prosecution evidence
i. Ahmed Mbonyunkiza
233. Mbonyunkiza testified that he heard the 19 April 1994 speech of President
Sindikubwabo in Butare over the radio.316
President Sindikubwabo incited the population
to kill Tutsis.317
The text of President Sindikubwabo speech, as broadcast over Radio
Rwanda, was admitted into evidence.318
ii. Witness G
234. Witness G testified that after the speech of President Sindikubwabo at the
swearing-in of Prefet Sylvain Nsabimana on 19 April 1994, the killings began in
Butare.319
He did not see any of the accused at that swearing-in.320
235. He was aware that President Sindikubwabo was interviewed in Bukavu in
late 1994 and said that he did not use the word ―work‖ to mean people should kill, but
that they should resume their normal activities.321
236. On 19 April 1994, at the same meeting in Butare, Prime Minister Kambanda
made a speech in which he said that they had asked the political party leaders to try to
stop the killing by their members. The political party leaders responded. He again asked
the population to avoid violence based on ethnic factors. He called upon the
bourgmestres to make sure the population does not turn against one another and bear in
mind that we are fighting against the RPF.322
He was not encouraging the population to
kill Tutsis when he spoke in Butare on 19 April.323
237. Witness G testified that on his second trip to Kigali, he met Casimir
Bizimungu at the bar near the house of [Bernard Maniragaba]. Bizimungu asked what
had been going on in Butare and he told him of the killings there. Bizimungu said that
the government had decided to send a high level delegation to Butare (President and
316 Transcript of 23 September 2005 @ 3 317 Transcript of 23 September 2005 @ 6 318 Exhibit #P15 319 Transcript of 12 October 2005 @ 8 320 Transcript of 28 October 2005 @ 19 321 Transcript of 19 October 2005@ 26; Exhibit #DNZ-30 322 Transcript of 19 October 2005@ 28; Exhibit #DNZ-31 323 Transcript of 19 October 2005@ 28
50
Prime Minister) so Butare would not be spared. He was satisfied that the killings had
occurred there.324
He told the Interahamwe that the government appreciated what they
were doing and asked them to carry on.325
This was during the first fortnight in May.326
iii. Witness UB
238. On 19 April, President Sindikubwabo made a speech in Butare which he
heard over the radio. The speech invited the people to continue the killing.327
He did not
hear any of the speeches of President Sindikubwabo in which he urged the population to
stop the killing.328
He also did not hear the MRND communiqués asking that the killing
be stopped.329
239. When President Sindikubwabo returned to Butare on the 24th of April, at
Gisagara sous-prefecture, he told the population that nobody should aggress his
neighbour, that everybody was responsible for the peace of his neighbour, and that those
who don't should be brought to the authorities, and that unknown roadblocks were not
accepted and were for criminals.330
240. On 27 April, President Sindikubwabo again returned to Butare and chaired a
meeting of the prefectural security council. He said that he had returned to see if the
instructions he had given earlier had been understood. He said that he had received
reports and seen, himself, when travelling the road between Gitarama and Butare, that
security was not yet restored in the area; and want to know why; was it perhaps the
population had misunderstood his directives. He announced that the security council of
Butare had decided that from today anyone caught killing or looting should be
immediately arrested and brought before the relevant authority and dealt with
accordingly, and that the prosecutor was asked to resume tomorrow and file processes so
that all criminals could be punished quickly.331
241. On 17 May in Cyangugu, President Sindikubwabo made a speech in which
he condemned some people in some communes who are still committing acts that aim to
324 Transcript of 12 October 2005 @ 16 325 Transcript of 13 October 2005 @ 7 326 Transcript of 12 October 2005 @ 8 327 Transcript of 28 February 2006@ 27-28 328 Transcript of 7 March 2006@ 23 329 Transcript of 7 March 2006@ 24 330 Transcript of 7 March 2006@ 32-33; Exhibit #DNZ79 331 Transcript of 7 March 2006@ 36-37; Exhibit #DNZ80
51
break the law and government regulations. The President asked all the préfets of all the
préfectures of Rwanda to report to him on the security situation in their respective
préfectures. He stated that people who break the law will be punished according to the
law. President Sindikubwabo recalled to the people who took part in the Cyangugu
meeting that the enemy of Rwanda was the RPF-Inkotanyi.332
iv. Witness ALG
242. Witness ALG testified that he heard excerpts of President Sindikubwabo’s
speech in Butare on 19 April 1994 on the radio. He understood that Sindikubwabo was
calling upon the people to kill Tutsi.333
However, he acknowledged that he might have
also heard the speech of Prime Minister Kambanda at the same ceremony in which he
said that the government had asked the political party leaders to stop the killing by their
members, and the political party leaders had responded, he again asked the population to
avoid violence based on ethnic factors, and he called upon the bourgmestres to make sure
that the population does not turn against one another and to bear in mind that it's the RPF
that we are fighting against.334
243. Witness ALG claimed he did not hear the speech of President Sindikubwabo
when he returned to Butare on 24 April 1994 at Gisagara sous prefecture335
or on 27 April 1994 when he returned to Butare for a security council meeting.336
v. Witness GOB
244. On 19 April 1994 in Butare, President Sindikubwabo and Prime Minister
Kambanda called upon the population to exterminate the Tutsis. Therefore, he concluded
that Sindikubwabo and Kambanda’s appointments were designed to get the population of
Butare to kill the Tutsis.337
c. Defence Evidence
245. Joseph Nzirorera will testify that he did not attend the ceremony in Butare
on 19 April 1994 and had no advance notice or influence on the speech of President
Sindikubwabo.
332 Transcript of 7 March 2006@ 39; Exhibit #DNZ81 333 Transcript of 27 October 2006 @ 11 334 Transcript of 6 November 2006 @ 63; Exhibit DNZ-31 335 Transcript of 6 November 2006 @ 63; Exhibit DNZ-79 336 Transcript of 6 November 2006 @ 63-64; Exhibit DNZ-80 337 Transcript of 23 October 2007 @ 3
52
246. Justin Mugenzi, Eliezer Niyitegeka, and Pauline Nyiramasuhuko will
testify they were present during the President’s speech and did not understand him to be
calling for the population to attack the Tutsis.
247. Agnes Ntamabyaliro, Minister of Justice in the Interim Government, whose
testimony in the Bizimungu et al case was admitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis, testified that
he purpose of Sindikuwabo’s statement about everyone being his brother’s keeper was to
mobilize the people of Rwanda to respect each other’s rights and be guardian angels for
each other. The purpose of Sindikuwabo’s speech was not to whip up ethnic hatred,
rather it was asking people to respect each other’s rights and restore peace in the
country.338
When he said ―fighting the enemy on the front,‖ he meant that if anyone
wanted to fight an enemy, he should go to the war front and fight along with the
soldiers.339
He was discouraging people from attacking their neighbors.340
248. In President Sindkibuwabo’s 19 April speech in Butare, when he used the
word ―Nyirantibindeba‖ there was no ethnic meaning to the word. In his speech he was
not referring to a particular préfet but was making a more general statement.341
His use
of the word ―Nyirantibindeba‖ was not a reference to Tutsis.342
When he said ―getting rid
of them‖ he meant disciplining those government workers who do not want to carry out
the duties assigned to them.343
He did not mean killing Tutsis.344
When he used the word
―gukora,‖ referring to work, he was not talking about killing Tutsis.345
The words
―Kwiga imbunda,‖ mean someone tried to use guns and have no ethnic meaning.346
Sindikuwabo could have used specific words if he had wanted to refer to Tutsis.347
The
word ―mugenzi,‖ as used in the 19 May speech, did not have an ethnic meaning.348
The
338 Exhibit DNZ-512; Transcript of 22 August 2008 @ 21 339 Exhibit DNZ-512; Transcript of 22 August 2008 @ 21 340 Exhibit DNZ-512; Transcript of 22 August 2008 @ 22 341 Exhibit DNZ-512; Transcript of 22 August 2008 @ 31 342 Exhibit DNZ-512; Transcript of 22 August 2008 @ 31-32 343 Exhibit DNZ-512; Transcript of 22 August 2008 @ 32 344 Exhibit DNZ-512; Transcript of 22 August 2008 @ 33 345 Exhibit DNZ-512; Transcript of 22 August 2008 @ 34 346 Exhibit DNZ-512; Transcript of 22 August 2008 @ 34-35 347 Exhibit DNZ-512; Transcript of 22 August 2008 @ 36 348 Exhibit DNZ-512; Transcript of 22 August 2008 @ 36
53
meaning of his Butare speech was the same as his Kibuye speech.349
There was nothing
in the speech referring to killing people or ethnic groups.350
249. Emmanuel Ndindabahizi, Minister of Finance in the Interim Government,
whose testimony in the Bizimungu et al case was admitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis,
testified that On 19 April 1994, the President of Rwanda went to Butare and gave a
speech there. He did not hear the president’s speech.351
It was rumored that this speech
was the cause of the massacres in Butare because after this speech Butare was set on fire
and a blood bath. When he was in exile in Bukavu (September or October 1994), he
talked with Sindikubwabo who said the speech was misinterpreted.352
The president said
he asked the inhabitants of Butare to help one another but that people said the president
called on them to kill each other. The president said he was saying the same thing.353
The
president said those who misinterpreted his speech has the opinion the massacres were
triggered by his speech but the massacres had started even before the speech.354
250. Casimir Bizimungu will testify that he never met Witness G in
Maniragaba’s bar and never made the statements attributed to him.
9. 27 April 1994 Instructions to Prefets from Prime Minister
a. Indictment
51. On 27 April 1994 the conseils des ministres again addressed the ―civil
defense‖. By letter of the same date Prime Minister Jean KAMBANDA
issued ―Instructions to restore security in the country‖, also addressed to
All Préfets, reiterating the Interim Government policy of making all
citizens responsible for ―unmasking the enemy and its accomplices‖ and
ordered or authorized the setting up of roadblocks, knowing that the
roadblocks were being used to identify the Tutsi and their ―accomplices‖
for the purpose of killing them. The conseil des ministres convened
again on 29 and 30 April.
b. Prosecution evidence
i. Witness ALG
349 Exhibit DNZ-512; Transcript of 22 August 2008 @ 37 350 Exhibit DNZ-512; Transcript of 22 August 2008 @ 37 351 Exhibit DNZ-513; Transcript of 3 May 2007 @ 18 352 Exhibit DNZ-513; Transcript of 3 May 2007 @ 19 353 Exhibit DNZ-513; Transcript of 3 May 2007 @ 20 354 Exhibit DNZ-513; Transcript of 3 May 2007 @ 21
54
251. On 27 April 1994, the Prime Minister issued instructions to all prefets on
restoring security in the country. The authorities were requested to organise security
meetings in which concrete measures should be taken to deal with the security problems
in those préfectures., and to call on the assistance of representatives of the political
parties, the religious denominations, and the representatives of the central administration
of the country and the national army in order to help reinforce security.355
252. The Prime Minister went on to state that ―the enemy who attacked Rwanda is
well known. It is the RPF Inkotanyi. You are, therefore, requested to explain to the
people that they must avoid anything that would bring about violence among them on the
pretext of ethnic groups, regions, denominations, political parties, hatred, et cetera,
because violence within the population constitutes a breach for the enemy. Nevertheless,
the population must remain watchful in order to unmask the enemy and his accomplices
and hand them over to the authorities and to get the national army to assist them where
the authorities are incapable of doing that.‖356
253. The Prime Minister’s instructions also included, ―The authorities were
requested, with the assistance of the army, when possible, to identify places where
officially recognised roadblocks should be set up and to set up a system in which rounds
would continue to be done in order to prevent the enemy from infiltrating and that those
who were on the roadblocks and those who were doing those rounds shall not commit
acts of violence against innocent population.‖357
254. In the letter, Prime Minister Kambanda indicated that all acts of violence,
looting, and all criminal acts have to stop immediately, and that is why the national army,
the public prosecution, and other judicial authorities have to punish severely any person
who will be found guilty of those acts.358
255. Prime Minister Kambanda, in the letter, used the word ―gukora‖ to request
that the population resume their work. Witness ALG acknowledged that the word, in this
context, did not mean to kill, but to go back to their normal occupations.359
c. Defence evidence
355 Transcript of 7 November 2006 @ 10; Exhibit DNZ-183 356 Transcript of 7 November 2006 @ 11; Exhibit DNZ-183 357 Transcript of 7 November 2006 @ 12; Exhibit DNZ-183 358 Transcript of 7 November 2006 @ 12; Exhibit DNZ-183 359 Transcript of 7 November 2006 @ 14; Exhibit DNZ-183
55
256. Joseph Nzirorera will testify that he had nothing to do with the Prime
Minister’s instructions to the prefets and was unaware of them until they were publicized
in the media.
257. Justin Mugenzi, Andre Ntagerura, Casimir Bizimungu, Eliezer
Niyitegeka, Augustin Ngirabatware, and Pauline Nyiramasuhuko will testify that the
instructions to the prefets were discussed at cabinet meetings and that they were intended
to help end the massacres, not promote them.
10. Meeting in late April at Kigali Prefecture Office
a. Indictment
32.3 On or about 30 April 1994 at a meeting of the conseil de sécurité at the
Kigali-ville préfecture office, Joseph NZIRORERA publicly thanked the
Interahamwe of Kigali for the good work that they were doing and offered
them money for the purchase of beer. Tharcisse RENZAHO and Laurent
SEMANZA, among others, also participated in the meeting. All
participants were aware that Interahamwe in Kigali were systematically
killing Tutsi residents at roadblocks and in neighborhood patrols. When a
participant at the meeting asked for an explanation of who the enemy was,
Joseph NZIRORERA responded that ―a Hutu who joined the RPF is our
fool, while a Tutsi who joined the MRND is now the enemy of the
country‖, concluding that ―a Tutsi is the enemy of Rwanda.‖ Such
remarks were intended to, and had the consequence of, inciting attacks
upon all Tutsi.
b. Prosecution evidence
i. Witness UB
258. Witness UB testified that between the 28th and 30
th of April, Nzirorera
chaired a meeting at which the Interahamwe from Kigali prefecture were invited.360
The
meeting occurred on the same day as the attack at the Anglican church in his secteur.361
Witness UB attended, as did about 40 people, mostly Interahamwes.362
The meeting was
held in the morning. Nzirorera congratulated the Interahamwe for fighting the enemy.363
259. At the Ndindiliyimana trial, Witness UB testified that there had been a
meeting at the prefecture on the day of the attack at the Anglican church but that he had
360 Transcript of 28 February 2006@ 25 361 Transcript of 7 March 2006@ 50 362 Exhibit #DNZ86 363 Transcript of 28 February 2006@ 29; Transcript of 8 March 2006@ 16
56
been unable to attend.364
When confronted with this testimony, Witness UB claimed that
he only spent 15-30 minutes at this meeting and left that place at 9:30.365
260. On another day in the Ndindiliyimana trial, Witness UB recounted his
activities on the day of the attack of the Anglican church, indicating that he had spoken
with the prefet and reported the matter to him. He made no mention of attending a
meeting with Nziorera on that day.366
261. During his first statement made to the Office of the Prosecutor on 28
November 1997, he said that ―"On 30 April 1994, at around 8 o'clock a.m., the Anglican
pastor for my secteur telephoned my home and informed me that the soldiers and the
Interahamwe had entered his church by force, looking for Tutsis among the refugees, no
doubt to kill them. I personally went to see the préfet at 9 o'clock a.m. to report to him
what was going on at the Anglican church. The préfet said he was going to call the
general headquarters and have the soldiers dispatched to provide security for the
refugees. I returned home at 11 o'clock a.m." He made no mention of seeing Nzirorera
that day.367
262. Mr. Nzirorera filed a notice of alibi on 12 July 2005 in which he stated that
on 30 April 1994, he was in Mukingo commune and listed six witnesses who would
support his alibi.368
Despite his insistence in his statement to the OTP in 1997 that the
meeting took place on 30 April 1994, when he testified after the filing of the alibi notice,
Witness UB claimed that he could not recall the date upon which the meeting took place,
but only that it was at the end of April.369
263. Witness UB claimed not to have been invited to the meeting, but that it was a
meeting of the prefectural security committee which included all conseillers.370
When he
arrived at the prefecture office, the meeting was already underway. The prefet was
364 Transcript of 7 March 2006@ 52; Exhibit #DNZ84 365 Transcript of 7 March 2006@ 57 366 Transcript of 7 March 2006@ 59-60; Exhibit #DNZ85 367 Transcript of 7 March 2006@ 62; Exhibit #DNZ96 368 Joseph Nzirorera’s Notice of Alibi (12 July 2005) at para. 2 369 Transcript of 28 February 2006@ 25 370 Transcript of 7 March 2006@ 62-63
57
speaking about security.371
Prefet Renzaho introduced Nzirorera and remained in the
meeting for as long as Witness UB was there.372
264. It was not unusual for a political party to be given permission to hold a
meeting at the prefecture office. The MDR had also done it when the welcomed
Kambanda.373
265. Witness UB asked Nzirorera a question whether it is the Tutsi who is a
member of the MRND or the Hutu who is working with the RPF, which of the two is
Rwanda's enemy? Nzirorera said, "The Tutsi in the MRND remains a Tutsi, whereas the
Hutu serving the RPF is an imbecile."374
This was the same question Witness UB had
asked Prefet Renzaho at the security council meeting of 16 April and Nzirorera gave him
the same answer. Witness UB was not happy with the answer so he left the meeting
before it ended.375
266. Witness UB claimed that Nzirorera gave 100,000 RWF to the Interahamwe
to celebrate and purchase drinks.376
He gave the money to Suedi Ndayitabi. Nzirorera
said the Interahamwe could requisition vehicles from MAGERWA.377
267. Witness UB claimed that he had discussed the matter of the attack at the
Anglican church with the prefet over the telephone so he did not discuss it with him in
person at the prefecture office.378
However, when confronted with his statements to the
Office of the Prosecutor and testimony at the Ndindiliyimana trial that he discussed the
matter with the prefet at the prefecture office, he claimed that he had discussed the matter
at the prefecture office with the prefet. However, he could not explain how he had done
so given that he arrived after the meeting was in progress, left before it concluded, and
the prefet had remained in the meeting during the entire time.379
268. Witness UB claimed that although he was aware of the problem of the
Interahamwe threatening the people at the Anglican church in his secteur on that
371 Transcript of 8 March 2006@ 15 372 Transcript of 8 March 2006@ 16 373 Transcript of 7 March 2006@ 51 374 Transcript of 8 March 2006@ 17 375 Transcript of 8 March 2006@ 17 376 Transcript of 28 February 2006@ 29-30; Transcript of 8 March 2006@ 17 377 Transcript of 28 February 2006@ 30 378 Transcript of 8 March 2006@ 18 379 Transcript of 8 March 2006@ 19
58
morning, when he found himself in a meeting with the prefet, military officials,
Interahamwe, and others, instead of raising the problem, he asked the same question of
Nzirorera that he had asked of Renzaho two weeks earlier—who was the enemy.380
ii. Witness ALG
269. Witness ALG testified that on 28 April 1994, Nzirorera came to the Kigali
ville prefecture office and chaired a meeting of Interahamwe leaders at a national level.
To show his support and thank them for having provided efficient support for the Army
at the front, he gave Sued Ndayitabi 100,000 RWF.381
270. Witness ALG placed the meeting a few days before the 30 April 1994
meeting he attended at which an official had been replaced.382
He had not been invited to
the meeting. There were many attendees, including the conseillers.383
The meeting began
around 9 a.m. and was held in the corridor of the prefecture office. The Prefet opened the
meeting.384
271. Prefet Renzaho said that he particularly requested from MRND officials that
they play a part in restoring peace within the town, and also in combating the enemy so
that they would attend victory.385
Nzirorera thanked the authorities of Kigali-ville
préfecture for the efforts they have been making towards fighting the enemy. He thanked
the Interahamwe for their conduct, be it at the roadblocks or in the frontlines. He said
they had the backing of the MRND. And that if ever they needed any assistance, then
they were to seek the assistance of the soldiers with whom they were working together or
the préfet.386
272. Witness ALG left the meeting after Nzirorera spoke.387
273. Among those in attendance were the Prefet, Nzirorera and Laurent Semanza.
He did not recall if General Kabiligi was there.388
Sued Ndayitabi, Pecos Ngerageze389
,
380 Transcript of 8 March 2006@ 20 381 Transcript of 26 October 2006 @ 58 382 Transcript of 7 November 2006 @ 15 383 Transcript of 7 November 2006 @ 17 384 Transcript of 7 November 2006 @ 18 385 Transcript of 7 November 2006 @ 24 386 Transcript of 7 November 2006 @ 25 387 Transcript of 7 November 2006 @ 25 388 Transcript of 7 November 2006 @ 18-19; Exhibit DNZ-184 389 Transcript of 7 November 2006 @ 20; Exhibit DNZ-185
59
Hadji Gitosa, Bernard Maniragaba,390
were present from the Interahamwe. Jean Baptiste
Butera, Euphrasie Kamatamu, and Rose Karushara were also present from the
prefecture.391
Major Bivamvagara and Major Nyanuhimba also attended.392
274. Witness ALG attended this meeting, but had to leave the meeting room
before the money was handed over. Some of the conseillers of Nyarugenge commune
told him about the handing over of the money when he came back to the prefecture
office. He does not recall their names. They were happy and said that Nzirorera was a
true man.393
The conseillers who gave him that information were Gabriel Mbyaliyehe
and Amri Karekezi.394
275. Witness ALG was also told after the meeting that during the meeting the
Interahamwe had been complaining about not having enough weapons, and the Prefet and
Nzirorera said they would do their best to find rifles for them, as well as foodstuffs.395
He was told by the bourgmestre of Kacyiru commune that Nzirorera had given 100,000
RWF to Sued Ndayitabi to show his support for the Interahamwe leadership.396
276. Witness ALG made no mention of this meeting when he listed meetings of
the security council which he had attended in his statement of February 2000,397
in his
interview of October 2002 with OTP when he described meetings chaired by Prefet
Renzaho at the prefecture,398
or in his confession of March 2004 where he charged
Nzirorera with responsibility for the genocide and discussed meetings at the prefecture.399
277. The first time Witness ALG mentioned this meeting to any authority was
after he had been housed with Witness UB in Arusha in April and May 2004.400
iii. Witness HH
390 Transcript of 7 November 2006 @ 21; Exhibit DNZ-185 391 Transcript of 7 November 2006 @ 22; Exhibit DNZ-185 392 Transcript of 7 November 2006 @ 25; Exhibit DNZ-186 393 Transcript of 26 October 2006 @ 58; Transcript of 7 November 2006 @ 26 394 Transcript of 7 November 2006 @ 27 395 Transcript of 7 November 2006 @ 26 396 Transcript of 7 November 2006 @ 26 397 Transcript of 7 November 2006 @ 27; Exhibit DNG-29 398 Transcript of 7 November 2006 @ 27; Exhibit DNG-31 399 Transcript of 7 November 2006 @ 29; Exhibit DNG-37 400 Transcript of 7 November 2006@ 48
60
278. Witness HH testified that he did not attend any meeting at the prefecture
office in which Nzirorera spoke at the end of April. He heard people speaking about that
meeting at the prison.401
iv. Witness AWE
279. Witness AWE testified that on about 28-30 April 1994402
, Witness AWE
attended a meeting at the Kigali prefecture office at which Kigali Interahamwe and
MRND conseillers were present. Renzaho chaired the meeting. Nzirorera spoke in the
course of the meeting and thanked the Interahamwe and congratulated them for having
worked well. He gave 100,000 RWF to one of the Interahamwe and told him to buy beer
because they were courageous and should carry on what they were doing. In the course
of that meeting, the conseillers reported on the number of people killed in their secteurs,
predominantly by Interahamwe. Witness AWE reported 100-120 people killed in his
secteur.403
280. Witness AWE had been invited to the meeting by the prefet. The conseiller,
Interahamwe leaders, political party leaders, and soldiers attended.404
Witness AWE
claimed that the meeting was held in the prefecture meeting room, but conceded that
Tutsi refugees were using the room at the time. He claimed that perhaps they had to
leave during the day so meetings could be held there.405
281. Among the people in attendance was Laurent Semanza, wearing a
camouflage uniform, Interahamwe leaders Felicien Munyezamu, Gatabazi,Ngerageze,
Maniragaba, Ndayitabi and Georges Rutaganda,406
bourgmestre Jean Bizimana, Jean
Baptiste Butera, conseiller Amri Karekezi, Odette Nyirabagenzi, Rose Karushara,
Magerwa (who replaced Stany) and Gregoire Nyirimanzi. Jean Habyarimana was not
present.407
282. The meeting started between 2 and 2:30 p.m.408
He is certain it was in the
afternoon.409
Prefet Renzaho opened the meeting, then Jean Baptiste Butera spoke about
401 Transcript of 20 November 2006 @ 10-11 402 Transcript of 4 July 2007@32 403 Transcript of 4 July 2007@30-31 404 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 54 405 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 55 406 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 55 407 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 56 408 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 56
61
the situation in Gikondo secteur, where he was acting for the conseiller. The conseiller
then spoke, and then Nzirorera spoke. He could not say whether this was a security
council meeting or another type of meeting.410
283. Witness AWE had no recollection of the Interahamwe complaining at this
meeting that they did not have enough weapons or a discussion of the Interahamwe
requisitioning vehicles from Magerwa. He recalled that Amri Karekezi asked a question
of Nzirorera, but did not recall what the question was.411
284. Witness AWE claimed that Nzirorera took money out of his pocket and
gave it to Interahamwe leader Suedi Ndayitabi, saying that he is giving the money for the
Interahamwe to buy drinks because they had shown they were brave men and urged them
to continue in that manner.412
285. Witness AWE claimed that the meeting took place at the end of April,
although he had earlier said it was between the end of April and middle of May, and
could not situate this meeting with respect to any other events which were occurring at
the same time.413
c. Defence Evidence
286. Jean Baptiste Butera, the Director of Political and Administrative Affairs
for Kigali ville prefecture, testified that Joseph Nzirorera never attended any meetings at
the prefecture office during April 1994, and that to say that Nzirorera attended a meeting
at the prefecture office when he was also present is a fabrication.414
287. Joseph Nzirorera will testify that he never attended this meeting.
288. Laurent Semanza and General Gratien Kabiligi will testify that they never
attended this meeting.
289. Tharcisse Renzaho will testify that this meeting never took place.
290.Witness 29 and Francois Karera, , persons who Witness UB claimed
attended this meeting will testify that they never attended or heard of such a meeting.
409 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 57 410 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 57-58 411 Transcript of 10 July 2007 @ 3 412 Transcript of 10 July 2007 @ 4 413 Transcript of 10 July 2007 @ 2 414 Transcript of 7 April 2008 @ 23-24
62
291. Stanislas Mbonyimana was conseiller of Gitega secteur in January 1990. In
a written statement admitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis, he refuted the testimony of Witness
AWE that he had attended a meeting at the end of April or beginning of May 1994 at the
Kigali prefecture office at which Joseph Nzirorera was present. In fact, he was in the
hospital since late March 1994 and it was impossible for him to have attended this
meeting.415
292. Emmanuel Nyamuhimba was Chief of the Kigali urban police in 1994. In
a written statement admitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis, he refuted the testimony of Witness
ALG that he was present at a meeting at the Kigali prefecture office in late April 1994 at
which Joseph Nzirorera attended and at which the prefet of Kigali, conseillers, and
Interahamwe were present. He had no knowledge of this meeting.416
293. Majaliwa Bizimana, who was acting conseiller of Gitega in April 1994, in a
written statement ordered admitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis, refuted the testimony of
Witness UB that he attended a meeting at the Kigali ville prefecture office at the end of
April in which Joseph Nzirorera spoke.417
He never attended nor heard of any meeting at
the Kigali prefecture office where Joseph Nzirorera was present.418
294. Celestin Sezibera was the conseiller of Nyamirambo commune in April
1994. In a written statement ordered admitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis, he refuted the
testimony of Witness UB that he had attended a meeting at the Kigali ville prefecture
office at the end of April in which Joseph Nzirorera spoke.419
He never attended nor
heard of any meeting at the Kigali prefecture office where Joseph Nzirorera was
present.420
295. Aloys Simpunga was the Director of Social and Cultural Affairs for Kigali
prefecture in 1994. In a written statement ordered admitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis, he
refuted the testimony of Witness UB that he had attended a meeting at the Kigali ville
415 Exhibit DNZ-618 416 Exhibit DNZ-649 417 Transcript of 7 March 2006@65; Exhibit #DNZ86 418 Exhibit DNZ- ; Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s Motion to Admit Statements of Aloys Simpunga and
Gerard Kayumba and on Reconsideration of Decision on Admission of Written Statements and Witness Testimony (20 October 2009) at para. 13 419 Transcript of 7 March 2006@65; Exhibit #DNZ86 420 Exhibit DNZ- ; Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s Motion to Admit Statements of Aloys Simpunga and
Gerard Kayumba and on Reconsideration of Decision on Admission of Written Statements and Witness
Testimony (20 October 2009) at para. 13
63
prefecture office at the end of April in which Joseph Nzirorera spoke.421
He never
attended nor heard of any meeting at the Kigali prefecture office where Joseph Nzirorera
was present.422
296. Jean Berchamans Imananibishaka aka Sukari, also refuted the testimony
of Witness UB that he had attended a meeting at the Kigali ville prefecture office at the
end of April in which Joseph Nzirorera spoke.423
He never attended nor heard of any
meeting at the Kigali prefecture office where Joseph Nzirorera was present.424
297. Witness 34 and Pascal Mutuyeyezu will testify that they were the
bodyguard and driver of Witness UB and that no meeting with Nzirorera took place at
PVK.
298. Georges Rutaganda, who attended according to Witness AWE, will testify
that he never attended or heard of such a meeting.
299. Dick Prudence Munyeshuli, investigator for Joseph Nzirorera, will testify
as to his investigation of the whereabouts of those persons named as having attended the
meeting by prosecution witnesses. Every person named by the prosecution’s witnesses
from Kigali prison, UB, ALG, and AWE, who could be located, has refuted the existence
of the meeting.
d. Evidence which the defence wished to present
300. Fabien Bunani was one of the Directors of Kigali Ville prefecture. Witness
UB testified that Mr. Bunani was present at a meeting at the prefecture office at the end
of April 1994 at which Mr. Nzirorera addressed the Kigali conseillers and Interahamwe
and praised the efforts of the Interahamwe.425
Mr. Bunani would have testified that he
never attended any meeting with Nzirorera at the Kigali ville prefecture office in April
1994. However, the Trial Chamber denied Mr. Nzirorera’s motion to subpoena him.426
421 Transcript of 7 March 2006@65; Exhibit #DNZ86 422 Exhibit DNZ- ; Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s Motion to Admit Statements of Aloys Simpunga and
Gerard Kayumba and on Reconsideration of Decision on Admission of Written Statements and Witness
Testimony (20 October 2009) at para. 13 423 Transcript of 7 March 2006@65; Exhibit #DNZ86 424 Exhibit DNZ- ; Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s Motion to Admit Statements of Aloys Simpunga and Gerard Kayumba and on Reconsideration of Decision on Admission of Written Statements and Witness
Testimony (20 October 2009) at para. 13 425 Transcript of 7 March 2006 @ 65; Exhibit DNZ-86 (#2) 426 Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s Motions to Subpoena Fabien Bunani, Eugene Mbarushimana, and
Pascal Ntawumenyumunsi (29 January 2009)
64
11. Civil Defence program
a. Indictment
36. Édouard KAREMERA, Mathieu NGIRUMPATSE, and Joseph
NZIRORERA planned and executed a state-endorsed program of
―civilian self defense‖ whereby officials in the territorial administration
[préfets, bourgmestres and conseillers] and officials in the MRND
political party recruited civilians, usually local Hutu youth, and
consolidated them with political party ―youth wing‖ militias under the
authority of retired military officers and reservists. In so doing all named
accused collaborated with segments of the military and enlisted the
resources and logistics of the Ministry of Defense and the Forces Armées
Rwandaises and structures of authority in the territorial administration,
governed by the Ministry of the Interior, to distribute firearms to political
party ―youth wing‖ militias and to legitimize and control the setting up of
roadblocks and the tracking and killing of civilians at such roadblocks.
Furthermore, this ―civilian self defense‖ corps was deployed in armed
patrols to identify, search out and kill the Tutsi population.
b. Prosecution evidence
i. Witness G
301. Witness G testified that when he returned to Kigali on 22 April 1994,
Witness G was told by [Ephrem Nkezabera] that the killings had stopped in Kigali and
that the Interahamwe were now being sent to the war front. He observed that the
Interahamwe were now participating in the war efforts. Many Interahamwe were now
wearing military uniforms.427
302. The interviews of Robert Kajuga in mid-May 1994 in which he said that the
Interahamwe were fighting alongside the Army was consistent with what he observed in
Kigali.428
303. Witness G testified that on his third trip to Kigali in late May, 1994, he
attended a meeting at the Ministry of Defence with Colonel Gasake, who had been placed
in charge of the civil defence. Gasake wanted to see how to utilize the Interahamwe in
the civil defence program. The meeting was interrupted when the RPF began bombing
the area.429
ii. Witness UB
427 Transcript of 19 October 2005@ 38 428 Transcript of 19 October 2005@ 40; Exhibits #DNZ-36 and 37 429 Transcript of 12 October 2005 @ 17
65
304. Witness UB testified that at a security council meeting held on 16 April,
Prefet Renzaho told them that the military authorities had decided to create a civil
defence program and that retired soldiers were to be put in charge of the program. The
Interahamwe made up the civil defence program. However, they continued killing
Tutsis.430
iii. Witness T
305. Witness T testified that the civil defence was an initiative considered in 1992
or earlier by the government after the RPF changed its tactics and launched a guerilla
war, targeting the civilian population. However, the government rejected the proposal to
arm the population in 1992 in an action that surprised many people.431
306. Witness T testified that in mid-May 1994, there was a meeting of the various
youth wings with Colonel Gasake to incorporate the youth wings into the civil defence.432
iv. Witness ALG
307. Witness ALG acknowledged that the idea of civil defence was a legitimate
idea to combat the attacks and infiltration by the RPF, but it did not do what it was
supposed to do.433
308. In mid-April 1994, Prefet Renzaho convened a meeting in which he
announced that the government had decided to set up a civil defence organ in each
prefecture. The Prefet was accompanied by Major Bivamvagara, who headed the civil
defence in Kigali ville prefecture, and a lieutenant who was his assistant.434
309. Renzaho said that the youth would be trained to ensure security within Kigali
and that weapons would be distributed to those persons. Renzaho said that the
roadblocks had to be manned and patrols had to be carried out, and the population had to
participate in that endeavor.435
The purpose of the civil defence program was to protect
the population of Kigali from attacks by the Inkotanyi.436
430 Transcript of 28 February 2006@ 23 431 Exhibit DK-6; Transcript of 2 June 2006 @ 4 432 Transcript of 26 May 2006 @ 20 433 Transcript of 2 November 2006 @ 32 434 Transcript of 27 October 2006 @ 6 435 Transcript of 27 October 2006 @ 6 436 Transcript of 27 October 2006 @ 7
66
310. Witness ALG did not hear the speeches or broadcast of this meeting where
Prefet Renzaho condemned acts of violence committed by the youth and other members
of the population and said that the killings should be stopped as soon as possible. And he
said that if someone commits such acts, he should be shot. That is the way you will end
such acts.437
311. The civil defence program was a program of the Interim Government, not the
MRND. However, the MRND was represented in the Interim Government by the
President, Minister of Defence and Minister of Interior.438
Witness ALG wrongly
claimed that Karemera was the Minister of Interior in mid-April 1994 when the civil
defence was established.439
v. Witness GK
312. Witness GK, a bourgmestre from Kibuye, agreed that a civil defence
program was necessary to train members of the population to defend themselves, but that
it was extremely difficult to manage that program given the prevailing circumstances.440
vi. Witness FH
313. Witness FH, a bourgmestre from Gitarama, testified that the civil defence in
theory was something good, but in application it was really bad because people ultimately
began killing one another.441
The civil defence program was a government program, not
a matter for the MRND. Any citizen, irrespective of political affiliation, was part of it.442
vii. Fidele Uwizeye
314. In a radio broadcast in June 1994, Prefet Uwizeye said that the government
has not spared any efforts. The government received a large number of firearms, some of
which have been distributed to the youth and to refugees, and have included them in the
civil defence program. He hoped the quantity of weapons will increase in the days
ahead.443
315. The civil defence was set up sometime after the meeting of 18 April.
Uwizeye has no evidence of any role played by the political parties in the organization of
437 Transcript of 6 November 2006 @ 68; Exhibit DNZ-83 438 Transcript of 27 October 2006 @ 6 439 Transcript of 1 November 2006 @ 38; cf. indictment @ para. 1 440 Transcript of 11 December 2006 @ 44 441 Transcript of 12 July 2007 @ 28 442 Transcript of 12 July 2007 @ 29 443 Transcript of 18 July 2007 @ 37; Exhibit DNZ-317
67
the civil defence.444
The Interahamwe were the first to be incorporated into the civil
defence because they had already been trained and had arms.445
viii. documentary evidence
316. On 20 April 1994, Edouard Karemera wrote a report of a mission he
undertook with Minister of Defence Augustin Bizimana to assess the military and
political situation in Ruhengeri and Gisenyi prefectures. He notes that thousands of
young people are presently undergoing training in Bigogwe and Ruhengeri and that they
will need weapons. They recommended training and weapons be made available to the
youth in all prefectures.446
317. On 22 April 1994, Prefet Renzaho addressed a meeting of bourgmestres
broadcast over Radio Rwanda and introduced an officer as head of the civil defence in
Kigali. He condemned acts of violence committed by youth and other members of the
population and said the killing should be stopped as soon as possible. He said, ―If
someone commits such acts, he should be shot. This is the way you will end such
acts.‖447
318. On 23 April 1994, UNAMIR reported that RGF troops appeared to be taking
over control of some of the roadblocks in the city previously controlled by the militia.448
319. On 10 May 1994, MRND Vice-President Edouard Karemera issued an
invitation to the MRND political bureau members to attend a meeting at Murambi on
Tuesday, 12 May 1994 to discuss the operation of the Interim Government and the civil
defence project.449
320. On 25 May 1994, Minister of Interior Edouard Karemera issued instructions
to the prefets on the implementation of the civil defence program.450
c. Defence evidence
321. Joseph Nzirorera will testify that he had nothing to do with the civil
defence program implemented by the Interim Government. He saw it as a way to
444 Transcript of 20 July 2007 @ 22 445 Transcript of 20 July 2007 @ 22 446 P199 447 Transcript of 7 March 2006@ 42-43,46-47; Exhibit #DNZ83 448 Transcript of 6 November 2006 @ 73; Exhibit DNZ-235 449 Exhibit #P221 450 Exhibit #P59
68
mobilize the youth to help fight the RPF and not intended to be used for the
extermination of Tutsis.
322. Ministers Andre Ntagerura, Justin Mugenzi, Casimir Bizimungu,
Augustin Ngirabatware, Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, and Eliezer Niyitegeka will testify
that they saw the civil defence program as a way to mobilize the youth to help fight the
RPF and not intended to be used for the extermination of Tutsis.
323. Faustin Twagiramungu, the former President of the MDR party and Prime
Minister-designate under the Arusha Accords, whose testimony in the Ntakirutimana
case was admitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis, testified that a civil defence programme was
initially started as a reaction to the events of January 1993. The phrase ―civil defence‖
basically meant arming the civilian population. At some point between 1993 and 1994
there was a plan in place to arm the civilian population in order to defend the country
against infiltrators.451
324. Witness 29 will testify that he saw the civil defence program as a way to
mobilize the youth to help fight the RPF and not intended to be used for the
extermination of Tutsis.
325. Tharcisse Renzaho will testify that the civil defence program was proposed,
but not implemented in Kigali before the death of President Habyarimana. After
Habyarimana’s death, it was a way to mobilize the youth to help fight the RPF and not
intended to be used for the extermination of Tutsis.
326. Gratien Kabiligi, Theoneste Bagosora, and Anatole Nsengiyumva will
testify that from the military’s perspective, the civil defence program was necessary to
enhance the ability of the Army to fight the RPF.
12. Rapes and Sexual Assaults
a. Indictment
66. In Ruhengeri préfecture during early-mid April 1994, Kigali-ville
préfecture during April 1994, Butare préfecture during mid-late April
1994, Kibuye préfecture during May – June 1994, and Gitarama
préfecture during April and May 1994, and throughout Rwanda,
Interahamwe and militiamen raped and sexually assaulted Tutsi women
and girls throughout Rwanda, causing them serious bodily or mental harm.
451
Exhibit DNZ-514; Transcript of 5 February 2002 @ 16-18
69
Such serious bodily or mental harm inflicted upon Tutsi women and girls
was intended to destroy the capacity of persons of Tutsi ethnic or racial
identity to sustain themselves physically or psychologically as a group, or
to reproduce themselves as a group. Édouard KAREMERA, Mathieu
NGIRUMPATSE, and Joseph NZIRORERA were aware that rape was
the natural and foreseeable consequence of the execution of the joint
criminal enterprise and knowingly and willfully participated in that
enterprise.
68. As part of these widespread or systematic attacks, Interahamwe and other
militiamen raped Tutsi women and girls in Ruhengeri préfecture during
early-mid April 1994, Kigali-ville préfecture during April 1994, Butare
préfecture during mid-late April 1994, Kibuye préfecture during May –
June 1994, and Gitarama préfecture during April and May 1994.
69. These rapes were the natural and foreseeable consequence of the object of
the joint criminal enterprise to destroy the Tutsi as a group. Édouard
KAREMERA, Mathieu NGIRUMPATSE, and Joseph NZIRORERA
were aware that rape was the natural and foreseeable consequence of the
execution of the joint criminal enterprise and knowingly and willfully
participated in that enterprise.
70. Rape against Tutsi women between 6 April 1994 and 17 July 1994 was so
widespread and so systematic that Édouard KAREMERA, Mathieu
NGIRUMPATSE, and Joseph NZIRORERA knew or had reason to
know that Interahamwe and other militiamen were about to commit these
crimes or that they had committed them. The accused had the material
capacity to halt or prevent the rapes, or to punish or sanction those that
committed these crimes, but failed to take the necessary and reasonable
measures to prevent the rapes or to punish the perpetrators.
b. Prosecution evidence
i. Witness G
327. Witness G was never aware of any instructions by MRND leaders, publicly
or privately, that Tutsi women should be sexually assaulted.452
ii. Witness UB
328. Witness UB testified that he was aware of a rape of a woman by soldiers
between 15 and 20 April in his secteur. He reported this incident to the prefet.453
A
soldier tried to rape a young girl in his secteur, but he prevented it.454
Another woman in
452 Transcript of 18 October 2005@ 21 453 Transcript of 28 February 2006@ 11 454 Transcript of 28 February 2006@ 18
70
his secteur was raped by an Interahamwe.455
Another 16 year old girl was raped in his
secteur and a girl taken from his secteur to Nyakabanda and raped and killed by
Interahamwe.456
It was impossible for leaders not to be aware that rapes were being
committed.457
However, he has no information that his reports of these sexual assaults
were ever forwarded to the MRND executive committee.458
Nor was he aware of any
orders to rape by the executive committee.459
iii. Witness T
329. The sexual relations which occurred with Tutsi women at the Petit Kigali
were consensual between people who had known each other a long time.460
There were
no rapes at the Petit Kigali.461
There were rapes all across Rwanda, in areas controlled by
the government and the RPF—this happens throughout the world whenever there is
war.462
There was no instruction by the MRND to the Interahamwe to commit rape.463
iv. Rule 92 bis witnesses
330. The prosecution has introduced the statements of 16 witnesses to rape in
various parts of Rwanda pursuant to Rule 92 bis.
c. Defence evidence
331. Joseph Nzirorera will testify that it is indeed regrettable that rapes took
place during the catastrophic events in Rwanda after the assassination of President
Habyarimana. However, he never ordered any rapes or desired that they occur. He was
not aware of any rapes by any persons under his effective control. Since he never
planned to exterminate Tutsis, it was not forseeable to him that rapes would occur as part
of such a plan.
332. Witness 31 and Georges Rutaganda will testify that there were no orders
or instructions to Interahamwe to rape.
455 Transcript of 28 February 2006@ 20 456 Transcript of 28 February 2006@ 21 457 Transcript of 28 February 2006@ 18 458 Transcript of 7 March 2006@ 48 459 Transcript of 7 March 2006@ 48 460 Transcript of 26 May 2006 @ 18-19 461 Transcript of 26 May 2006 @ 19 462 Transcript of 26 May 2006 @ 19 463 Transcript of 31 May 2006 @ 7
71
B. Pre 6 April 1994 events charged in the Indictment
1. The Joint Criminal Enterprise
a. Indictment
6. This joint criminal enterprise came into existence before January 1994 and
continued until at least July 1994. Participants in this joint criminal
enterprise included Édouard KAREMERA, Mathieu NGIRUMPATSE,
and Joseph NZIRORERA and the following individuals and classes of
persons:
(i) military authorities, including Augustin BIZIMANA, Minister of
Defense; Col. Théoneste BAGOSORA, Directeur de cabinet in the
Ministry of Defense; Lt. Col. Anatole NSENGIYUMVA, commandant de
secteur in Gisenyi; Col. Tharcisse RENZAHO, préfet of Kigali-ville;
Augustin BIZIMUNGU, Army Chief of Staff, and Augustin
NDINDILIYIMANA, Chief of Staff of the Gendarmerie; Protais
MPIRANYA, Commander of the Presidential Guard Battalion; Aloys
NTABAKUZE, Commander of the Para-Commando Battalion; François-
Xavier NZUWONEMEYE, Commander of the Reconnaissance Battalion;
Innocent SAGAHUTU, Second-in-command of the Reconnaissance
Battalion; Col. Anatole GASAKE, National Coordinator of the Civil
Defense Program; Col. Ephrem SETAKO; Lt. Boniface HASENGINEZA,
commandant de bataillon in Ruhengeri; Lt. Samuel IMANISHIMWE, a
commander in Cyangugu.
(ii) political authorities at the national and regional level, including
Theodore SINDIKUBWABO, Interim President; Jean KAMBANDA,
Prime Minister; Callixte NZABONIMANA, Minister of Youth and
Sports; Pauline NYIRAMASUHUKO, Minister of Family and Gender;
Eliézer NIYITEGEKA, Minister of Information; Justin MUGENZI,
Minister of Commerce; Casimir BIZIMUNGU, Minister of Health; and
Jerôme-Clément BICAMUMPAKA, Minister of Foreign Affairs; André
NTAGERURA, Minister of Transportation; André RWAMAKUBA,
Minister of Primary and Secondary Education; Agnès
NTAMABYALIRO, Minister of Justice; Emmanuel NDINDABAHIZI,
Minister of Finance; Callixte KALIMANZIRA, Directeur de cabinet in
the Ministry of the Interior ; Clément KAYISHEMA, préfet of Kibuye;
Sylvain NSABIMANA, préfet of Butare; Emmanuel BAGAMBIKI, préfet
of Cyangugu; Juvenal KAJELIJELI, bourgmestre of Mukingo; and
Laurent SEMANZA, bourgmestre of Bicumbi; Marc MPOZAMBEZI,
bourgmestre of Rubavu; Charles SIKUBWABO, bourgmestre of
Gishyita; Aloys NDIMBATI, bourgmestre of Gisovu; Sylvestre
GACUMBITSI, bourgmestre of Rusumo; Jean-Baptiste GATETE,
72
bourgmestre of Murambi; Jean Paul AKAYESU, bourgmestre of Taba;
Mika MUHIMANA, conseiller of Gishyita;
(iii) influential businessmen, Akazu, and political party leaders
affiliated with “Hutu Power” including Jean Bosco BARAYAGWIZA, a
leader of the CDR political party; Ferdinand NAHIMANA, an academic;
Félicien KABUGA, a businessman; Obed RUZINDANA, a businessman;
Protais ZIGIRANYIRAZO, a businessman; Hassan NGEZE, a journalist;
Froudouald KARAMIRA, a national leader of ―Hutu Power‖ associated
with the MDR party; Donat MUREGO, a national leader of ―Hutu
Power‖ associated with the MDR party; Hyacinthe NSENGIYUMVA
RAFIKI, a national leader of ―Hutu Power‖ associated with the PSD party;
Francois NDUNGUTSE, a national leader of ―Hutu Power‖ associated
with the PSD party; Gerard NTAKIRUTIMANA, a medical doctor; Alfred
MUSEMA, Director of the Gisovu Tea Factory; Michel BAGARAGAZA,
the head of OCIR-Thé; Esdras BAHEZA, a businessman; Jean Baptiste
NYABUSORE, Director of ISAE; Jean Damascene NIYOYITA,
President of the MRND for Mukingo commune; Assiel NDISETSE,
conseiller of Busogo secteur;
(iv) leaders of the Interahamwe and Impuzaumpagambi political party
“youth wing” militias and the “civil defense” program including
Robert KAJUGA, national president of the MRND-Interahamwe; Georges
RUTAGANDA, first vice-president of the MRND-Interahamwe; Bernard
MANIRAGABA, an Interahamwe leader in Kigali; Yusuf MUNYAKAZI,
an Interahamwe leader in Cyangugu; Col. Aloys SIMBA, leader of the
―civil defense‖ in Gikongoro; Col. Alphonse NTEZIRYAYO, préfet and
leader of the ―civil defense‖ in Butare; Col. RWAGAFILITIA, leader of
the ―civil defense‖ in Kibungo; Bernard MUNYAGISHARI, President of
the Interahamwe in Gisenyi; Maj. Jean Damascene UKULIKIYEYEZU,
leader of the ―civil defense‖ in Gitarama; and Omar SERUSHAGO, an
Interahamwe leader in Gisenyi;
The Prosecutor is unable to specifically identify each and every participant
in the joint criminal enterprise. This is the best information available at
this time.
b. Prosecution evidence
333. The prosecution failed to bring a single witness who claimed to have been a
member of the alleged joint criminal enterprise.
c. Defence evidence
73
334. Edouard Karemera testified that he was never involved in any conspiracy
with Joseph Nzirorera or anyone else to exterminate the Tutsi.464
335. Karemera witnesses Jean Paul Akayesu465
and Witness LOL466
testified
that they were not members of any joint criminal enterprise to exterminate the Tutsis.
336. Joseph Nzirorera will testify that he was not a member of any joint criminal
enterprise to exterminate the Tutsis.
337. Theoneste Bagosora, Anatole Nsengiyumva, Tharcisse Renzaho,
Augustin Bizimungu, Aloys Ntabakuze, Ephrem Setako, Samuel Imanishimwe,
Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, Eliezer Niyitegeka, Justin Mugenzi, Augustin
Ngirabatware, Casimir Bizimungu, Juvenal Kajelijeli, Laurent Semanza, Jean
Baptiste Gatete, Ferdinand Nahimana, Protais Zigiranyirazo, Michel Bagaragaza,
and George Rutaganda will testify that they were not members of any joint criminal
enterprise to exterminate the Tutsis.
338. Jean Damascene Niyoyita467
and Assiel Ndisetse468
testified that they were
not members of any joint criminal enterprise to exterminate Tutsis.
339. Witness DE9-7469
, Agnes Ntamabyaliro470
, and Emmanuel
Ndindabahizi,471
whose testimony in the Ndindiliyimana et al trial was admitted
pursuant to Rule 92 bis, testified that they were not members of any joint criminal
enterprise to exterminate the Tutsis. Ntamabyaliro testified that as Minister of Justice she
sought to find ways to stop the killings that were taking place.472
The Prosecutor’s office
and courts were faced with security problems and staff shortages. It was very difficult for
the Prosecutor’s office and judges in Kigali town to operate because the staff faced
security threats and the killing was most severe in that area.473
464 Transcript of 21 May 2009 @ 4 465 Transcript of 14 May 2008 @ 20,24 466 Transcript of 8 July 2008 @ 49 467 Transcript of 19 November 2009 @ 19-21 468 Transcript of 24 November 2009 @ 6-7 469 Exhibit DNZ-688; Transcript of 5 June 2007 @ 70 470 Exhibit DNZ-512; Transcript of 28 August 2008 @ 29 471 Exhibit DNZ-513; Transcript of 2 May 2007 @ 24 472 Exhibit DNZ-512; Transcript of 22 August 2008 @ 6 473 Exhibit DNZ-512; Transcript of 22 August 2008 @ 6
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340. Gerard Ntakirutimana474
and Alfred Musema475
, whose testimony at their
own trials were admitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis, testified that they were not members of
any joint criminal enterprise to exterminate the Tutsis.
341. Faustin Twagiramungu, President of the MDR party, whose testimony in
the Ntakirutimana trial was admitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis, will testify that as Prime
Minister designate, had there been a plan for extermination of Tutsis, he would have
known of it. There was no such plan.476
342. Witness LE-1, the former Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Army, whose
testimony in the Bagosora et al trial was admitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis, testified that
he was not aware of any plan for the extermination of Tutsis.477
343. Colonel Luc Marchal, the commander of the Belgian contingent of
UNAMIR, whose testimony in the Bagosora et al trial was admitted pursuant to Rule 92
bis, testified that he does not believe that there was a plan to exterminate Tutsis.478
c. Other information
344. In the Bagosora et al case, the Trial Chamber found that the prosecution had
not proven beyond reasonable doubt that the only reasonable inference to be drawn from
the evidence is that the four Accused conspired amongst themselves or with others to
commit genocide before it unfolded from 7 April 1994.479
Those accused are each named
in the joint criminal enterprise charged in this case.
2. Formation and Expansion of the Interahamwe
a. Indictment
24.1 Sometime during 1992 Mathieu NGIRUMPATSE initiated or supported
the proposal that the MRND should establish a ―youth wing‖ that would
be called the Interahamwe. This MRND ―youth wing‖ would compete
with rival ―youth wings‖ of opposition political parties to recruit members
for the MRND. Over time, the MRND-Interahamwe ―youth wing‖
attracted and incorporated unemployed, delinquent youth that often
engaged in illegal activity under the auspices of ―multi-party politics‖ and
kibuhoza.
474 Exhibit DNZ-522 475 Exhibit DNZ-523 476 Exhibit DNZ-514; Transcript of 4 February 2002 @ 156-159; 246-247 477 Exhibit DNZ-519; Transcript of 20 October 2005 @ 10 478 Exhibit DNZ-520; Transcript of 30 November 2006 @ 32 479 Prosecutor v Bagosora et al, No. ICTR-98-41-T, Judgement (18 December 2008) at para. 14
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24.2 In July 1993 Mathieu NGIRUMPATSE became the national President of
the MRND political party. During a MRND national congress held
sometime around June or July 1993 the MRND Central Committee, at that
time including Édouard KAREMERA, Mathieu NGIRUMPATSE, and
Joseph NZIRORERA, authorized and founded MRND-Interahamwe
committees at the prefectural level throughout Rwanda, bringing the
MRND ―youth wing‖ squarely under the control of the MRND prefectural
chairmen, who themselves were subject to the authority of the MRND
Steering Committee.
b. Prosecution evidence
i. Ahmed Mbonyunkiza
345. Ahmed Mbonyunkiza testified that when the JMRND was created in
September 1991, President Habyarimana desired that it collaborate with the youths of
other parties without racial, religious, or ethnic discrimination.480
ii. Witness G
346. Witness G, an officer of the National Committee of the Interahamwe, who
was present at its inception, testified that when the Interahamwe was formed, there was
never any intention that anyone in this group would kill. When it was formed, people in
the Interahamwe did not hold anti-Tutsi views.481
The meetings were held in a building
owned by a Tutsi. The President of the Interahamwe was a Tutsi, one of the officers was
married to a Tutsi, and three of the officers had Tutsi mothers.482
Members of all ethnic
groups were welcome in the Interahamwe.483
iii. Witness UB
347. Witness UB testified that when the Interahamwe were created, other parties
had already set up youth wings to protect their members.484
The Interahamwe was
established to ensure the protection of MRND members and to sensitize the population
on the MRND ideals.485
When the Interahamwe was established, its founders were
traders, government employees, and otherwise honest and law-abiding citizens.486
iv. Witness T
480 Transcript of 29 September 2005 @ 28 481 Transcript of 14 October 2005 2005 @ 12 482 Transcript of 14 October 2005 2005 @ 12-13 483 Transcript of 21 October 2005 @ 34 484 Transcript of 1 March 2006@ 30 485 Transcript of 22 February 2006 @ 29; Transcript of 23 February 2006@ 22 486 Transcript of 1 March 2006@ 31
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348. Witness T testified that the objective of creating the Interahamwe was to
bring new blood into the MRND and renovate and restructure the party in the multiparty
system.487
Witness T testified that the MRND did not create and organize the
Interahamwe for the purpose of exterminating the Tutsi.488
Witness T testified that when
there was recruitment into the Interahamwe from the prefectures, it was not with the
intent to form an army to exterminate Tutsis.489
v. Witness AWD
349. Witness AWD testified that the word ―Interahamwe‖ means people who
work together. The organization began for animation and entertainment but changed
after youth wings of other parties began antagonizing MRND members and it became
necessary to defend the interests of their own party.490
vi. Documentary Evidence
350. The decision to expand the Interahamwe to the prefectures was made at the
April 1992 MRND Congress.491
c. Defence Evidence
351. The bona fide reasons for establishing the Interahamwe in 1991 and
extending it to the prefectures in 1992 has already been established by the prosecution’s
witnesses. Mr. Nzirorera will leave it to the defence of the co-accused to further address
this issue, since he was not involved.
352. Joseph Nzirorera will testify that when the Interahamwe were first formed
in Kigali in 1991, he held no position within the MRND. When the decision was taken to
expand the Interahamwe to the prefectures in the Congress of April 1992, Joseph
Nzirorera was one of the many members of that Congress, but had no executive position
within MRND.
3. Military Training of Interahamwe
a. Indictment
24.3 Starting in 1993 Mathieu NGIRUMPATSE and other national leaders of
the MRND political party agreed among themselves, and with civilian
487 Transcript of 22 May 2006 @ 32 488 Transcript of 26 May 2006 @ 29; Transcript of 1 June 2006 @ 47 489 Transcript of 26 May 2006 @ 29 490 Transcript of 10 October 2007 @ 14-15 491 Transcript of 14 October 2005 @ 30; Exhibit DNZ-6
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authorities in the territorial administration and military authorities in the
Ministry of Defense and the FAR, to provide military training and arms to
Interahamwe militias, and to stockpile firearms from the Ministry of
Defense for later distribution to Interahamwe militias, intending that
Interahamwe militias would be deployed to kill and harm Rwanda’s Tutsi
population.
24.4 In this regard Édouard KAREMERA, Mathieu NGIRUMPATSE, and
Joseph NZIRORERA were aware of, and complicit in, decisions taken
by Minister of Defense Augustin BIZIMANA and Ministry of Defense
Directeur de cabinet Théoneste BAGOSORA and certain FAR military
officers to provide military training to the Interahamwe militias in military
camps in Kigali, Byumba, Gisenyi and Ruhengeri, notably at Gabiro,
Mukamira and Bigogwe camps and in neighboring forests, including
Gishwati in Gisenyi and Akagera in Umutara.
b. Prosecution Evidence
i. Ahmed Mbonyunkiza
353. Ahmed Mbonyunkiza testified that at the third Interahamwe meeting in
February 1992, it was explained that before one could obtain an Interahamwe
membership card, it was necessary to undergo military training.492
ii. Witness G
354. Witness G testified that there was no military training of Interahamwe in
1992 and it was not necessary to undergo military training in order to be a member of the
Interahamwe.493
355. Military training of Interahamwe began in the second half of 1993. The
purpose was to ensure protection of MRND officials.494
He had no knowledge of any
plan to train Interahamwe to kill Tutsis.495
356. This took place before the distribution of the weapons.496
In 1993,
Ngirumpatse offered the MDR power wing to have their youths undergo military
training, but they declined.497
492 Transcript of 3 October 2005 @ 24 493 Transcript of 14 October 2005 2005 @ 19 494 Transcript of 17 October 2005 @ 28 495 Transcript of 17 October 2005 @ 28 496 Transcript of 10 October 2005 @ 63 497 Transcript of 10 October 2005 @ 64
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357. During an MRND rally at Nyamirambo Stadium on 16 January 1994,
Ngirumpatse denied that the MRND was distributing weapons or carrying out military
training.498
The MRND leaders were afraid of being assassinated with the RPF battalion
in Kigali, which is why they took Interahamwe as guards.499
iii. Witness UB
358. Witness UB testified that military training of Interahamwe did not take place
in 1992. It was not necessary to undergo military training to join the Interahamwe.500
359. In 1993, the Interahamwe were sent to military camps such as Gabiro and
Gako camps for military training.501
He understood afterwards that the MRND leaders
were training the Interahamwe to prepare for massacres.502
The training began after the
1993 MRND Congress,503
and lasted through 1993.504
Interahamwe leaders at the
sectoral level selected those to go for training, which lasted about a month.505
360. His first conversation with Turatsinze about the weapons was in June 1993 at
Turatsinze’s mother’s house. No one else was present. Turatsinze confirmed that the
Interahamwe had distributed weapons to some of its members in Witness UB’s secteur.506
He also confirmed that the Interahamwe had already undergone military training.507
iv. Witness T
361. Witness T testified that it was not necessary in 1992 to undergo military
training to join the Interahamwe.508
362. The Interahamwe began to undergo military training in the second half of
1993. This was arranged between the MRND leadership and the Ministry of Defence.
#1 and #6 of the Interahamwe committee were involved in the military training.509
The
training was promoted by Ngirumpatse for the purpose of assisting the Army in
498 Transcript of 11 October 2005 @ 39 499 Transcript of 18 October 2005@ 11 500 Transcript of 1 March 2006@ 34-35 501 Transcript of 23 February 2006@ 36 502 Transcript of 23 February 2006@ 36 503 Transcript of 23 February 2006@ 37 504 Transcript of 24 February 2006@ 10 505 Transcript of 23 February 2006@ 39 506 Transcript of 2 March 2006@ 33 507 Transcript of 2 March 2006@ 34 508 Transcript of 26 May 2006 @ 38 509 Transcript of 24 May 2006 @ 16-17
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legitimate self-defence. The youth wings of opposition parties were being trained by the
RPF.510
The security concerns heightened after the 8 February 1993 attack by the RPF.511
363. When the Interahamwe were given military training, it was not with the
intent that they be used to exterminate Tutsis. It was for self-defence against the RPF.512
364. He received firearms training at the building where the MRND had its
offices owned by Felicien Kabuga. He did not see stocks of weapons stored at any
MRND offices.513
The Interahamwe were trained in Rwandan Army camps in Mutara,
Bugesera, and Bigogwe camps for a period of 2-3 weeks.514
The training was to fight
against the RPF and RPF infiltrators and accomplices.515
It was expected that fighting
would break out again after the RPF battalion arrived in Kigali, given the numerous
violations of cease fires by the RPF in the past.516
365. In his speech at Nyamirambo stadium on 16 January 1994, Ngirumpatse
could not be expected to state that the Interahamwe were receiving military training,
since such training was a secret.517
366. Witness T believes the FAX of 11 January 1994 is a manipulation. The
figure of 1700 Interahamwe having been trained is an overestimate—probably double the
actual figure.518
367. The decisions to expand the Interahamwe to the prefectures, to give them
military training, and to distribute weapons to them could not have been made without
the approval of President Habyarimana.519
iv. Witness ALG
368. Witness ALG testified that it was not necessary for persons to undergo
military training to join the Interahamwe.520
510 Transcript of 24 May 2006 @ 17 511 Transcript of 24 May 2006 @ 19 512 Transcript of 26 May 2006 @ 30 513 Transcript of 24 May 2006 @ 23 514 Transcript of 24 May 2006 @ 25-26 515 Transcript of 24 May 2006 @ 25-26 516 Transcript of 24 May 2006 @ 29 517 Transcript of 24 May 2006 @ 32 518 Transcript of 24 May 2006 @ 32-33; Transcript of 29 May 2006 @ 51 519 Transcript of 26 May 2006 @ 33 520 Transcript of 2 November 2006 @ 23
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369. In March 1993, Witness ALG was informed by Prefet Renzaho that the
Interahamwe were undergoing military training.521
Renzaho informed the senior officials
within the communes and secteurs.522
When he was informed by Renzaho, he was in
Renzaho’s office with conseillers Gabriel Mbyareyehe and Amri Karekezi.523
Other
persons who were informed of the military training at this time by Renzaho included
Bourgmestre Pierre Claver Nyilikwaya of Kacyiru commune.524
370. However, in the annex to his confession of 8 March 2004, Witness ALG said
that he did not know about the military training until later when he was in prison.525
He
claimed that he didn’t want to directly incriminate Prefet Renzaho at the time.526
Then,
he claimed that he forgot about the meeting with Renzaho when he was writing the annex
to his confession.527
371. (Significantly, Witness UB made no mention of attending such a meeting in
his testimony).
372. The purpose was to train the Interahamwe to support the Army and to defend
Kigali if the RPF was to attack.528
The training was a secret, so the opposition parties
would not complain.529
As of January 1994, two groups had already been trained.530
v. Witness HH
373. Witness HH learned of military training of the Interahamwe in 1993 when he
attended a meeting at the Kabuga building presided over by Ngirumpatse. Ngirumpatse
explained that it was necessary that young people be sent for military training because the
Inkotanyi had infiltrated the country.531
The secteur presidents were asked to select some
young people they trusted to undergo the training, which was to be a secret.532
521 Transcript of 26 October 2006 @ 47 522 Transcript of 26 October 2006 @ 47 523 Transcript of 2 November 2006 @ 33 524 Transcript of 2 November 2006 @ 33 525 Exhibit DNG-37 526 Transcript of 2 November 2006 @ 35 527 Transcript of 2 November 2006 @ 38 528 Transcript of 2 November 2006 @ 38 529 Transcript of 26 October 2006 @ 48 530 Transcript of 26 October 2006 @ 56 531 Transcript of 8 November 2006 @ 48 532 Transcript of 8 November 2006 @ 49
81
374. He subsequently underwent some military training in the Kabuga building533
This was during the time when Ngirumpatse was Secretary General.534
The purpose of
the training was to protect MRND officials. It was said that the RPF had infiltrated the
country with the design to eliminate certain MRND party members.535
375. He sent other people for training at military camps.536
He saw 2-300 young
people boarding busses for training at military camps on one occasion.537
It was said that
it was necessary to train lots of young people who, when necessary, would support
members of the army, because the enemy had infiltrated the country. That was being said
before the RPF battalion arrived into the country.538
vi. Frank Claeys
376. Frank Claeys testified that Jean Pierre Turatsinze said that he was
responsible for training the Interahamwe. He did not say he was a top level trainer or that
the Interahamwe were an armed militia. Those were General Dallaire’s words in the 11
January 1994 cable.539
377. Turatsinze said that the Interahamwe had trained 1700 men in RGF military
camps outside the capital. They were scattered in groups of 40 throughout Kigali. Since
UNAMIR deployed, he had trained 300 men in three week training sessions at RGF
camps. Turatsinze was very convincing and appeared to be familiar with military terms.
He claimed to have been trained in Egypt.540
378. Claeys testified that the information they did have from other sources related
to military training and distribution of weapons to Interahamwe. They did not have any
other information concerning the extermination of Tutsis.541
vii. Witness AWE
379. Witness AWE was approached in late 1992 or early 1993 by Felicien
Munyezamu, the President of the Interahamwe in his secteur. Munyezamu showed him a
533 Transcript of 8 November 2006 @ 49 534 Transcript of 16 November 2006 @ 16 535 Transcript of 16 November 2006 @ 16 536 Transcript of 8 November 2006 @ 51 537 Transcript of 8 November 2006 @ 52 538 Transcript of 16 November 2006 @ 17 539 Transcript of 21 November 2006 @ 54 540 Transcript of 21 November 2006 @ 64; Exhibit DNZ-15 @ para. 5 541 Transcript of 28 November 2006 @ 60
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circular addressed to all conseillers of secteurs requesting certificates of good conduct for
12 young people from his secteur. Munyezamu told him that young Hutus were being
sought, although that was not mentioned in the letter. He confirmed on the sheet of paper
with the list of the men that they were of good conduct.542
380. A short time later, he observed those 12 men boarding an ONATRACOM
bus. He later learned that they went to Gabiro for military training, which lasted for three
months.543
381. During the third meeting, Nzirorera said that the Interahamwe had completed
their training and that they had been given firearms and grenades which they could use if
MRND was attacked or if the town was attacked by Inkotanyi. Ngirumpatse and
Karemera were also present at this meeting.544
The same people who attended the first
meeting were present for the third meeting.545
382. In his OTP statement of 2004, Witness AWE attributed those statements to
Ngirumpatse.546
In further cross examination, he said that it was Ngirumpatse who had
addressed this meeting, not Nzirorera.547
383. At a meeting at the Kabuga building between May and August 1993, Joseph
Nzirorera informed him that the Interahamwe were returning from a training session in
Gabiro.548
viii. Witness AWD
384. Military training of Interahamwe began after the assassination of Burundian
President Ndadaye. They were trained in Gabiro and Bigogwe and several locations in
Kigali. 700 Interahamwe were selected from Kigali town. They went for training for one
month and returned at the end of December. When they came back, they had weapons
and said they had been trained by Colonel Nkundiye. They said the RPF at the CND
would not be able to resist them.549
542 Transcript of 3 July 2007 @ 22-23 543 Transcript of 3 July 2007 @ 23 544 Transcript of 4 July 2007@18; Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 27 545 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 27 546 Transcript of 4 July 2007@64 547 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 27 548 Transcript of 3 July 2007 @ 24 549 Transcript of 10 October 2007 @ 22-23
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385. Witness AWD first became aware of military training of the Interahamwe in
early 1993. He observed Interahamwe undergoing training at the Presidential Guard
camp in Kimihurura.550
ix. Witness GOB
386. The Interahamwe underwent training since 1992. They started training in the
Kabuga building in Kigali and later were trained at military camps in Mount Kigali,
Mount Jali, Gako, and Mutara. The Interahamwe who received training told him about
it.551
387. Between March and April 1992, he was told about the training when buying
drinks for Andre Nzabanterura (Interahamwe President in Kimihurura secteur), Claude
Nshimiye, and Emmanuel, son of Segahondo. They told me they had just returned from
Gako camp. They said they had been trained by EMI, a special group of gendarmes.
They had been taught to handle weapons and military cords.552
388.The Interahamwe were trained by reservist soldiers and Presidential Guard,
including Sgt. Sebitabi, who was President of Interahamwe in Kimisagara secteur, and
Corporal Miyaya in Rugenge secteur.553
x. documentary evidence
389. In a handwritten letter dated 13 February 1993 to President Habyarimana,
Mathieu Ngirumpatse said that the political bureau had called for the setting up of
defence groups among the displaced persons and in the prefectures under threat. He says,
―In my opinion the young people should be trained urgently (secretly, of course).‖554
c. Defence evidence
390. Joseph Nzirorera will testify that he had no knowledge of military training
of Interahamwe before the death of President Habyarimana.
550 Transcript of 9 November 2007 @ 20 551 Transcript of 22 October 2007 @ 29 552 Transcript of 22 October 2007 @ 30 553 Transcript of 22 October 2007 @ 31 554 Exhibit P27
84
4. Distribution of Weapons to Interahamwe
a. Indictment
24.5 In furtherance of this conspiracy Mathieu NGIRUMPATSE ordered,
facilitated or assisted the distributions of weapons to Interahamwe during
1993 and in early 1994 and also ordered or assisted the concealing of
stockpiled firearms so that they would not be removed pursuant to the
KWSA [Kigali Weapons Secure Area], a disarmament initiative launched
by UNAMIR, intending that such weapons would later be distributed to
MRND-Interahamwe.
b. Prosecution evidence
i. Witness G
391. The distribution of weapons was also for the purpose of protecting MRND
officials. He was not aware of any steps taken by the Interahamwe for the importation of
machetes. He was not aware of any plan for the Interahamwe to use traditional weapons
to kill Tutsi.555
With the arrival of the RPF battalion, the MRND officials needed
protection.556
392. In the second half of 1993, the Interahamwe received 800 firearms from the
Ministry of Defence.557
400 of them were given to President Robert Kajuga, who
distributed the majority of them to Interahamwe leaders in various secteurs in Kigali.558
400 of them went to Emmanuel Turatsinze, who worked at MRND and was a go-between
between Ngirumpatse and Kajuga.559
393. Turatsinze was an MRND driver.560
He was not all that honest, since he had
stolen weapons from MRND and sold them to FRODEBU.561
He disappeared after the
sale of these weapons between October and December 1993 and was not seen again.562
394. When UNAMIR arrived and enforced a weapons ban, Ngirumpatse
convened a meeting of the Interahamwe committee and told them to hide the weapons.
Subsequently, Ngirumpatse would be tipped off by General Ndindiliyimana when
555 Transcript of 17 October 2005 @ 28 556 Transcript of 17 October 2005 @ 29 557 Transcript of 10 October 2005 @ 59; Transcript of 11 October 2005 @ 19 558 Transcript of 10 October 2005 @ 60 559 Transcript of 11 October 2005 @ 22-23 560 Transcript of 17 October 2005 @ 53 561 Transcript of 17 October 2005 @ 53 562 Transcript of 17 October 2005 @ 53-54; Transcript of 18 October 2005 @ 2
85
UNAMIR would be conducting weapons searches and he would inform the
Interahamwe.563
395. There was a distribution of weapons before this by Colonel Bagosora to
people in the communities of the north to be used for protection against RPF attacks.564
396. During an MRND rally at Nyamirambo Stadium on 16 January 1994,
Ngirumpatse denied that the MRND was distributing weapons or carrying out military
training.565
The MRND leaders were afraid of being assassinated with the RPF battalion
in Kigali, which is why they took Interahamwe as guards.566
ii. Witness UB
397. Witness UB testified that Jean Pierre Turatsinze received 600 weapons
before 1994 from the Chief of Staff of the Army.567
Turatsinze told him this himself. He
was treasurer and coordinator of Interahamwe at the national level. The guns were stored
at the public works department, where President Habyarimana’s brother in law was in
charge. Then they were moved to Kimihurura to the residence of Kubwimana from Taba
commune. They were for distribution to Interahamwe.568
The MRND moved the
weapons so they would not be discovered by UNAMIR.569
Turatsinze did not tell him
who had ordered that the weapons be moved, but he could not have done so without
approval of his superiors in the MRND executive committee.570
398. His first conversation with Turatsinze about the weapons was in June 1993 at
Turatsinze’s mother’s house. No one else was present. Turatsinze confirmed that the
Interahamwe had distributed weapons to some of its members in Witness UB’s secteur.571
He also confirmed that the Interahamwe had already undergone military training.572
399. His second conversation with Turatsinze took place in July 1993 at the
secteural office. Again they were alone. Turatsinze said that the Interahamwe were now
in a strong position. They did not discuss the distribution of weapons or the military
563 Transcript of 11 October 2005 @ 20 564 Transcript of 13 October 2005 @ 6 565 Transcript of 11 October 2005 @ 39 566 Transcript of 18 October 2005@ 11 567 Transcript of 24 February 2006@ 12 568 Transcript of 24 February 2006@ 14 569 Transcript of 24 February 2006@ 15 570 Transcript of 24 February 2006@ 20 571 Transcript of 2 March 2006@ 33 572 Transcript of 2 March 2006@ 34
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training.573
In August 1993, he was told by Turtasinze that the weapons had been stored
at the Roads Department led by Alphonse Ntilivamunda and then at a building owned by
Silas Kubwimana.574
400. He was later told by Jean Habyarimana in October or November 1993 that
Turatsinze had sold some 480 of the weapons to FRODEBU and that this had caused
friction between Ngirumpatse and Nzirorera.575
iii. Witness T
401. Turatsinze and #1 of the Interahamwe committee distributed arms to
Interahamwe in around December 1993.576
402. At the end of December, 1992, or early January, 1993, Witness T received a
firearm from Turatsinze. At the end of January or beginning of February, Turatsinze
requested the firearm back, saying that he was being accused of not having distributed the
arms.577
The distribution of arms was coordinated between Ngirumpatse and Nzirorera
and the commanders of the Army, and the guns came from the Rwandan Army.578
Turatsinze left for Tanzania sometime later.579
403. He did not see stocks of weapons stored at any MRND offices.580
404. Ngirumpatse said that any Interahamwe caught by UNAMIR with a weapon
could not count on the support of the MRND.581
iv. Witness HH
405. Witness HH testified that Turatsinze brought firearms to the home of Silas
Kubwimana. Kubwimana wanted the guns moved that day.582
Turatsinze assured him in
Witness HH’s presence that he had received authorization to distribute them.583
It also
appeared from their discussion that Nzirorera had discussed it with the Army Chief of
573 Transcript of 2 March 2006@ 36 574 Transcript of 2 March 2006@ 38 575 Transcript of 2 March 2006@ 39-40 576 Transcript of 24 May 2006 @ 21 577 Transcript of 24 May 2006 @ 22 578 Transcript of 24 May 2006 @ 22-23 579 Transcript of 24 May 2006 @ 35 580 Transcript of 24 May 2006 @ 23 581 Transcript of 24 May 2006 @ 30 582 Transcript of 8 November 2006 @ 52 583 Transcript of 8 November 2006 @ 53
87
Staff Deogratias Nsabimana and that these firearms had been taken from the warehouse
where UNAMIR had stored them.584
406. The firearms were distributed to the Presidents of all of the secteurs in Kigali
except one, Andre Nzabanterura, who received the firearms much later.585
480 guns were
distributed.586
The firearms were old ones, and were distributed without magazines.587
Two days after they completed distributing the firearms, Witness HH and Turatsinze met
with Nzirorera, who authorized the MRND accountant, Francois, to give Witness HH an
allowance for the work.588
407. The purpose of the distribution of weapons was to protect MRND militants
from possible assault from infiltrators and RPF soldiers.589
People were saying that with
the installation of the RPF battalion at the CND, hostilities may resume.590
408. About three weeks to a month after the distribution of the firearms,
Turatsinze asked for the firearms back.591
As of 11 January 1994, there had already been
talk about Turatsinze having sold the firearms to FRODEBU.592
409. Turatsinze informed him that he had taken back the firearms he had
distributed to the Interahamwe and sold them to FRODEBU. Therefore, he was not
trusted.593
Some firearms were stored at MRND party headquarters. UNAMIR searched
the MRND party headquarters, but did not find them. Rutaganda collected these
weapons from party headquarters after the death of President Habyarimana and
distributed them to Interahamwe to go and loot Magerwa.594
410. Turatsinze disappeared in late February.595
The distribution of firearms had
taken place between the death of the President of Burundi and the arrival of the RPF
battalion in Kigali.596
584 Transcript of 8 November 2006 @ 54 585 Transcript of 8 November 2006 @ 54 586 Transcript of 8 November 2006 @ 55 587 Transcript of 17 November 2006 @ 13 588 Transcript of 8 November 2006 @ 55 589 Transcript of 8 November 2006 @ 56 590 Transcript of 8 November 2006 @ 56 591 Transcript of 17 November 2006 @ 14 592 Transcript of 17 November 2006 @ 16 593 Transcript of 9 November 2006 @ 7 594 Transcript of 9 November 2006 @ 7 595 Transcript of 8 November 2006 @ 55 596 Transcript of 8 November 2006 @ 56
88
v. Frank Claeys
411. Frank Claeys testified that Turatsinze said that he could provide the location
of a major weapons cache with at least 135 weapons and that he had already distributed
110 weapons, including 35 with ammunition and can give details on their location. He
was ready to go to the arms cache that night if he could be guaranteed protection for
himself, his wife, and four children. He wanted safe haven in an embassy and then
political asylum in another country.597
412. The second time he met Turatsinze was on the evening of 12 January 1994.
Turatsinze explained that he was late for the meeting because he had been with the
MRND President who had urged Turatsinze to accelerate the distribution of weapons.598
413. Turatsinze explained that he had already distributed weapons to the 25
secteur commanders, but that they had not distributed them to the lower levels. That
would require an order from him. He also could order that the weapons be returned to
him.599
414. Turatsinze said he distributed weapons in his own car, a white sedan, as well
as six minibuses belonging to the MRND or vehicles of the security services of the
Army.600
He said that the weapons were moved every 5 or 6 days. He also said that
grenades had been distributed a long time ago and that up to 60 Interahamwe per secteur
should have 2-3 grenades each.601
415. At the end of the meeting on 12 January, Turatsinze offered to prove his
reliability by showing UNAMIR weapons which were stored at MRND headquarters.602
Claeys and Deme drove Turatsinze to the party headquarters. Claeys waited in the car
while Turatsinze took Deme inside. When Deme returned, he said that he had seen 50
weapons in canvas bags with sealed boxes of ammunition in a shed on the property.603
416. Turatsinze did not tell them on 10 January that the weapons were stored at
the MRND headquarters.604
He told them there were 135 weapons on 10 January, and
597 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 2 598 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 8 599 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 9; Exhibit P42 @ para. 4 600 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 9; Exhibit P42 @ para. 4 601 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 10; Exhibit P42 @ para. 4 602 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 11 603 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 11-12; Exhibit P42 @ para. 8 604 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 23
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when he showed them the weapons on 12 January at the MRND headquarters, Captain
Deme observed about 50. Turatsinze did not distribute any weapons between 10 and 12
January. Therefore it is possible that the 135 weapons were stored at some place other
than the MRND headquarters.605
417. Turatsinze had the ability to move weapons around, and had offered to move
some of the weapons from his home to the MRND headquarters if UNAMIR was going
to stage a raid there.606
418. Turatsinze told Claeys that he was able to order the return of previously-
distributed weapons to him. Turatsinze never told Claeys that on 11 January 1994, he
had issued a communiqué over RTLM calling for an urgent meeting of the Interahamwe
secteur Presidents to be held at MRND headquarters in Kimihurura.607
419, For all Claeys knows, Turatsinze could have put the weapons at the MRND
headquarters on the evening of 12 January before showing them to UNAMIR.608
Claeys
never determined that Ngirumpatse or Nzirorera were aware of the presence of weapons
at MRND headquarters.609
420. On 12 January, Turatsinze offered to provide them the next evening with
license numbers of vehicles used for arms distribution and a few of the sites where arms
caches are located.610
421. On the evening of 13 January, he and Deme again met with Turatsinze.611
He provided them with three license numbers of cars used to transport weapons.
Turatsinze offered to move some weapons from his home to the MRND offices to
increase the number of weapons there if they mounted an operation there.612
422. Turatsinze said that most of the weapons he had were brand new. He said
that only a few of the weapons he had distributed had magazines or ammunition and
605 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 23-24 606 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 24; Exhibit P44 607 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 24,30; Exhibit DNZ-242 608 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 30 609 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 31 610 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 12; Exhibit P42 @ para. 10 611 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 19 612 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 21; Exhibit P44
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those distributed to the lower cells had no magazines.613
He said that the weapons
distribution had begun about a month before (December).614
423. Turatsinze said he had a list of around 2000 Interahamwe, but he never
provided or showed that list. He did show them three places where he said weapons were
stored.615
However, Claeys did not see weapons at these locations.616
424. Turatsinze also told them on 20 January that he had distributed 9 of the
weapons in a blue Pajero belonging to Prefet Renzaho.617
425. Claeys met with Turatsinze on 10 February. Turatsinze told him how he and
the Chief of Staff of the Gendarmerie had secured the return of a weapon seized from an
Interahamwe.618
UNAMIR never attempted to verify this information with the chief of
staff, although Colonel Marchal was in daily contact with him.619
vi. Jean Bosco Twahirwa
426. Twahirwa testified that he often saw Mathieu Ngirumpatse at Establishment
Rwandais, as he was the company’s lawyer. He was never part of a conversation
between Ngirumpatse and Bandali, but on one occasion, as Ngirumpatse was leaving, he
overheard Ngirumpatse ask Bandali, ―What is the status of the order?‖620
Bandali
answered that he was waiting for the outcome or follow up.621
427. Twahirwa came to know that Establishment Rwandais was involved in the
importation of arms when one day he took a fellow employee, Dudule Rahamatali, to the
airport in his company Land Rover. When they arrived at the airport, Dudule pointed out
a plane where it was written ―Romanian Airlines‖. He said that the plane transported
arms, which were unloaded at night.622
428. Twahirwa asked Dudule how he knew. Dudule told him that there were
crates on which it was written ―spare parts‖ and one day one of the crates had fallen to
the ground and split, whereupon Dudule observed that there were weapons inside.
613 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 21 614 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 22; 615 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 23 616 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 24 617 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 26 618 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 32 619 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 75 620 Transcript of 25 June 2007 @ 11 621 Transcript of 26 June 2007 @ 3 622 Transcript of 25 June 2007 @ 20-21
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Dudule showed Twahirwa a document where weapons were listed as spare parts, and
asked Twahirwa to keep it a secret.623
429. Twahirwa said that he saw the crates at about 2 p.m.624
When confronted
with his prior statement that the weapons arrived in the evening at 10 p.m. and were
distributed the next morning625
, Twahirwa explained that Dudule told him that they had
already taken some of the crates away, and those that remained would be taken away the
following night.626
430. Dudule secretly gave him a copy of the cargo manifest for the shipment. It
was written that they were spare parts from Romania.627
He kept the document until the
war broke out, but left it at home when he fled to the Mille Collines.628
He never
provided a copy of the document to RPF Captain Karamba.629
431. The plane was a large cargo plane. Twahirwa could only read the words
―Romanian Airlines‖ on the plane.630
When confronted with the fact that the national
airline of Romania was called ―TAROM‖, Twahirwa said he may have been mistaken
about what was written on the plane.631
432. Twahirwa alternately claimed that the manifest said ―spare parts from
Romania‖632
and that he never said that the manifest listed that the cargo was from
Romania.633
433. Dudule was like a special assistant to Bandali. This incident occurred
towards the end of 1993. Twahirwa saw the crates when he dropped Dudule off at the
airport. They were about 20 meters away.634
There were about 10 wooden crates of
approximately 4 cubic meters and the words ―spare parts Establishment Rwandais‖ were
written on them.635
623 Transcript of 25 June 2007 @ 21 624 Transcript of 2 July 2007 @ 8 625 Exhibit DNZ-306 626 Transcript of 2 July 2007 @ 9 627 Transcript of 28 June 2007 @ 23 628 Transcript of 28 June 2007 @ 28 629 Transcript of 28 June 2007 @ 28 630 Transcript of 28 June 2007 @ 30; Transcript of 2 July 2007 @ 16 631 Transcript of 2 July 2007 @ 17; Exhibit DNZ-304 632 Transcript of 28 June 2007 @ 23 633 Transcript of 2 July 2007 @ 19 634 Transcript of 25 June 2007 @ 21 635 Transcript of 25 June 2007 @ 22
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434. The crates were 1.8 to 2 meters tall, 1.8 to 2 meters long and 1.2 to 1.5
meters wide.636
435. Twahirwa testified that he observed the crates prior to the assassination of
President Ndadaye of Burundi.637
In one of his previous statements, he had said that it
occurred after the death of Ndadaye.638
He later agreed that it was in fact after the death
of Ndadaye.639
436. Twahirwa’s OTP statement of 2 September 1998, which he signed, faithfully
recorded what he said to the investigators. He did not say he had seen the crates at the
airport because he was not asked any question in that regard.640
437. Dudule told him that the weapons were imported on the orders of
Ngirumpatse and Bosco Sezirahiga, who ran a transport company called TAC. Dudule
had been given the task of unloading and distributing the weapons, but never said he had
participated in ordering them. No one else was present when Dudule told him about the
importation.641
438. Twahirwa testified that Dudule never told him which among Ngirumpatse,
Bandali, and Sezirahiga had ordered the weapons and which had financed the purchase of
the weapons.642
However, in his signed statement of 2 September 1998, he had said that
Ngirumpatse placed the orders and Bandali and Sezirahiga provided the funds.643
439. Dudule told him that he would take the crates to Kimihurura to
Ndindiliyimana’s house and the arms would subsequently be distributed to the
Interahamwe in Gitikinyoni, Muhima, and elsewhere, particularly at Habyarimana’s sister
Godlieve’s house. Those are the only persons he mentioned.644
440. Twahirwa said that Dudule said that the weapons were given to Seraphin
Rwabukumba and President Habyarimana’s sister, Godlieve, who was a nun. Godlieve
lived in Kanombe near the house of the President.645
636 Transcript of 2 July 2007 @ 23-24 637 Transcript of 28 June 2007 @ 16 638 Transcript of 28 June 2007 @ 17 639 Transcript of 28 June 2007 @ 21 640 Transcript of 26 June 2007 @ 56 641 Transcript of 25 June 2007 @ 22 642 Transcript of 2 July 2007 @ 20 643 Transcript of 2 July 2007 @ 21; Exhibit DNZ-306 644 Transcript of 25 June 2007 @ 24 645 Transcript of 2 July 2007 @ 24
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441. Twahirwa testified that Dudule told him the weapons were transported by
Establishment Rwandais drivers in the company’s lorry.646
However, in his signed
statement of September 1998, Twahirwa said that the weapons were transported by
Mathieu’s driver, Gerard Rutayigirwa.647
In a later interview, he said that he couldn’t say
whether Mathieu’s driver transported the weapons.648
442. Twahirwa testified that he only knew of one time when weapons were
imported by Establishment Rwandais and that he only heard Ngirumpatse and Bandali
refer to ―the order‖ on one occasion.649
He denied the statement attributed to him in his
February 2004 OTP interview that ―I heard Mathieu Ngirumpatse discussing the matter
with Bandali in his office on at least three occasions and that is why I think the
consignments came at least three times.‖650
443. Twahirwa never reported the importation of weapons to UNAMIR, the RPF,
or the leaders of the PL party.651
He never mentioned seeing the weapons himself in his
statements of September 1998 and interviews of June 2003 and February 2004, and
claimed that he was not asked the right questions.652
444. After the war, around the end of May 1994, Twahirwa guided RPF soldiers
to the house of Seraphin Rwabukumba in Rwakibu. He observed what appeared to be the
same crates he had seen at the airport in which it was written ―spare parts Establishment
Rwandais‖. Inside, he saw light weapons such as Kalashnikovs.653
He saw four crates of
broken down firearms—parts of firearms.654
One crate was open and there were still
quite a few firearms inside. The other three crates were closed.655
Twahirwa later
testified that the crates were open and ―it wasn’t the soldiers or myself who opened the
646 Transcript of 2 July 2007 @ 21 647 Transcript of 2 July 2007 @ 22; Exhibit DNZ-306 648 Transcript of 2 July 2007 @ 22-23; Exhibit DNZ-303 649 Transcript of 2 July 2007 @ 13 650 Transcript of 2 July 2007 @ 15; Exhibit DNZ-303 651 Transcript of 2 July 2007 @ 25 652 Transcript of 2 July 2007 @ 27; Exhibits DNZ-303, 306, 307 653 Transcript of 25 June 2007 @ 25 654 Transcript of 26 June 2007 @ 55 655 Transcript of 26 June 2007 @ 55
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crates‖.656
The only person he could name who was present was an RPF soldier by the
name of Karasinga.657
445. Dudule Rahamatali was killed during the genocide.658
vii. Witness AWE
446. Witness AWE testified that Jean Habyarimana told him, in a group of
people, that in 1993 MRND ordered weapons from Europe and that some of the weapons
had been delivered to the Interahamwe.659
This could only have been done with the
approval of Ngirumpatse.660
The conversation with Jean Habyarimana took place in
2004.661
In his statement of 2004, he claimed that Habyarimana told him that weapons
were distributed to the Interahamwe on the same day that the RPF battalion arrived at the
CND.662
447. On cross examination, Witness AWE claimed that the conversation was only
between him and Jean Habyarimana and no one else was present when Habyarimana told
him that, although in the prison many people can overhear.663
viii. Witness AWD
448. Witness AWD testified that Turatsinze was charged with taking weapons
hidden at the public works department, then moved to Kubwimana’s. He took them to
Cyangugu and sold the weapons to some people in Nyangoma. In fact he had decived the
MRND party and subsequently fled.664
Turatsinze sold the weapons to the Burundians.665
449. Witness AWD claimed that Nzirorera was in charge of the Public Works
Ministry at this time.666
c. Defence evidence
450. Joseph Nzirorera will testify that he was not aware of the distribution of
weapons to Interahamwe.
656 Transcript of 2 July 2007 @ 9 657 Transcript of 2 July 2007 @ 26 658 Transcript of 25 June 2007 @ 26 659 Transcript of 4 July 2007@18 660 Transcript of 4 July 2007@20-21 661 Transcript of 5 July 2007 @ 4 662 Transcript of 5 July 2007 @ 6 663 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 39 664 Transcript of 10 October 2007 @ 27 665 Transcript of 9 November 2007 @ 26 666 Transcript of 9 November 2007 @ 26
95
451. Georges Rutaganda will testify that he became aware of the distribution of
weapons after the fact and that he did not distribute weapons to Interahamwe either
before or after the death of President Habyarimana.
452. Witness 29 will testify that he was not aware of the distribution of weapons
to Interahamwe until after the death of President Habyarimana and could therefore not
have told Witness UB about it in 1993. He also knew nothing about importation of
weapons from Romania and never told Witness AWE about that.
453. Alphonse Ntilivamunda will testify that he was not aware of weapons being
stored at Road Department facilities.
454. Abdulmohamed Bandali and Jean Bosco Sezirahiga will testify that the
testimony of their involvement in importation of weapons is completely false.
455. Karemera Witness ETK, who worked in the Department of Air Operations
for Air Rwanda at the Kanombe Aiport in Kigali until April 1994, had no knowledge of a
Romanian airline ever servicing Kigali airport.667
456. Seraphin Rwabukumba and Sister Godlieve Barushwanubusa will testify
that they never were aware of importation of weapons from Romania and never stored
such weapons at their residences.
457. Tharcisse Renzaho will testify that Turatsinze never used his vehicle for
any purpose, let alone distribute weapons.
458. Seraphin Twahirwa will testify that he never distributed weapons to
Interahamwe before the death of President Habyarimana.
459. Witness ALL-42, whose testimony from the Bagosora et al trial was
admitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis, testified that Turatsinze was collaborating with the RPF
at the time he provided the information to UNAMIR.668
460. Colonel Luc Marchal, whose testimony from the Bagosora et al case was
admitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis, testified that he began to have doubts about the
credibility of information or the informant, Jean Pierre, in 2005 based on various
objective elements that became public.669
Marchal testified that he could not exclude the
hypothesis that the introduction of an informant, Jean-Pierre, to UNAMIR was a
667 Transcript of 11 November 2008 @ 35 668 Exhibit DNZ-517; Transcript of 9 November 2006 @ 1-3 669 Exhibit DNZ-520; Transcript of 30 November 2006 @ 32
96
manipulation by Faustin Twagiramungu, an open opponent of Habyarimana, to embarrass
President Habyarimana or the hypothesis that Jean-Pierre was an agent of the RPF and
that his revelations to UNAMIR were a manipulation by the RPF to embarrass President
Habyarimana.670
465. Witness 22a, a former UNAMIR officer, will testify as to the observation of
weapons at the MRND headquarters by UNAMIR and the circumstances surrounding the
information ptovided to UNAMIR by Jean-Pierre Turatsinze.
5. Lists of Tutsis to be killed
a. Indictment
24.7 During late 1993 and early 1994, Mathieu NGIRUMPATSE chaired
meetings of the National Committee of the Interahamwe in Kigali. At
these meetings, Mathieu NGIRUMPATSE, in concert with other
Interahamwe leaders, prepared lists of persons to be killed and planned a
killing campaign against Tutsis and moderate Hutus.
b. Prosecution evidence
i. Witness G
466. Witness G, the treasurer of the National Committee of the Interahamwe, was
not aware of the preparation of lists of persons to be killed, or of any campaign to kill
Tutsis and moderate Hutus.671
ii. Witness UB
467. Witness UB testified that in 1994, he was informed by the responsibles of his
cellule that the Interahamwe were creating lists of Tutsi families in his secteur.672
The
Interahamwe at cellule level made lists of Tutsi and transmitted the results to superior
bodies, up to the executive committee of the MRND.673
The census was necessary
because the bourgmestres and conseillers who were MRND members were sufficiently
independent of the MRND that they would not provide the party with access to records of
670 Exhibit DNZ-520; Transcript of 30 November 2006 @ 32 671 Transcript of 18 October 2005 @ 5; Exhibit #DNZ-15B 672 Transcript of 2 March 2006@ 43-44; Exhibit #DNZ63 673 Transcript of 24 February 2006@ 10-11
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ethnic identity.674
When the killing began in April 1994, soldiers went around with lists
of people to kill.675
iii. Witness T
468. Witness T was unaware of any lists of Tutsis compiled by Interahamwe.676
iv. Witness HH
469. Witness HH testified that at the instruction of Turatsinze, the Presidents of
the Interahamwe at secteur level compiled lists of Tutsis who had sent their children to be
trained by RPF or those Tutsis who said things against our party.677
Turatsinze
forwarded the lists to the Secretary General of the MRND.678
Lists had been drawn up
containing the names of wanted people. And those were the people who were flushed out
and killed after 6 April.679
470. They were first asked to compile these lists at the end of 1992. Turatsinze
gave the instructions at meetings of the Kigali secteur Interahamwe presidents.680
The
lists included Tutsi who held meetings at night, had sent their children to be trained by
RPF, and those who gave money.681
Not all Tutsis were on the list, and he was never
asked to register all Tutsis in Kigali. There were also Hutus on the list who were opposed
to MRND.682
While he believed the lists were forwarded to Nzirorera, he never
personally observed this.683
v. Frank Claeys
471. Colonel Frank Claeys testified that Jean Pierre Turatsinze said that since
UNAMIR’s mandate, he had been ordered to make an inventory of the houses of all Tutsi
in Kigali. The inventory was still in process and therefore he could not give a copy to
UNAMIR. Turatsinze said he suspects it is for their extermination. He also said his
personnel could kill up to 1000 Tutsis in 20 minutes.684
674 Transcript of 2 March 2006@ 45 675 Transcript of 24 February 2006@ 11 676 Transcript of 7 June 2006 @ 19 677 Transcript of 8 November 2006 @ 60 678 Transcript of 8 November 2006 @ 60 679 Transcript of 9 November 2006 @ 13 680 Transcript of 17 November 2006 @ 18-19 681 Transcript of 17 November 2006 @ 19 682 Transcript of 17 November 2006 @ 20 683 Transcript of 17 November 2006 @ 21 684 Transcript of 21 November 2006 @ 65; Exhibit DNZ-15 @ para. 6
98
472. Claeys had no information concerning the existence of such lists prior to
meeting Turatsinze or after meeting Turatsinze.685
Turatsinze told them that he
―suspects‖ the lists are for the extermination of Tutsis. He had apparently never been
explicitly told this explicitly by MRND leaders.686
Turatsinze had apparently never
been instructed to train Interahamwe to exterminate Tutsis.687
Turatsinze never told
Claeys that Interahamwe had been trained in such things as how to approach houses in
the middle of the night, how to enter locked premises, or how to neutralize the head of
the household.688
473. Turatsinze never showed UNAMIR these lists. They asked him for these
lists at every meeting, and Turatsinze always responded, ―Where is my security?‖689
vi. Witness AWE
474. Witness AWE testified that at a meeting at the Kabuga building in August
1993. Nzirorera said that they had to draw up lists of Inkotanyi accomplices and give
them to an MRND employee who was performing that duty on a regular basis. Witness
AWE could not name the employee. He did not comply with the request to compile
lists.690
475. Those in attendance at the meetings included Amri Karekezi, Jean
Habyarimana, Jacques Rusirare, Gabriel Mbaryehe, Kandekwe, Stany Mbonimana,
Francois Gahigi, Odette Nyaribagenzi, Euphasie Kamatumu, and Celestin Sezibera.691
c. Defence Evidence
476. Joseph Nzirorera will testify that he was not aware of any lists of Tutsis
compiled by MRND or the Interahamwe.
477. Georges Rutaganda, Witness 31, and Seraphin Twahirwa, will testify
that they were not aware of any lists of Tutsis compiled by MRND or the Interahamwe.
478. Witness 29 will testify that he was not aware of any lists of Tutsis compiled
by MRND or the Interahamwe and never attended the meetings claimed by Witness
AWE.
685 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 2, 31 686 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 16 687 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 16 688 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 16 689 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 31 690 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 28 691 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 19-20
99
479. Francois Gahigi will testify that they never attended the meetings claimed
by Witness AWE.
480. Pierre Nsengiyumva and Ibrahim Nzarigezahe, responsables from
Bilyogo secteur, will testify that, contrary to the testimony of Witness UB, they never
compiled lists of Tutsis in their cellule.
481. Witness ALL-42, whose testimony from the Bagosora et al trial was
admitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis, testified that Turatsinze was collaborating with the RPF
at the time he provided the information to UNAMIR.692
482. Colonel Luc Marchal, whose testimony from the Bagosora et al case was
admitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis, testified that he began to have doubts about the
credibility of information or the informant, Jean Pierre, in 2005 based on various
objective elements that became public.693
Marchal testified that he could not exclude the
hypothesis that the introduction of an informant, Jean-Pierre, to UNAMIR was a
manipulation by Faustin Twagiramungu, an open opponent of Habyarimana, to embarrass
President Habyarimana or the hypothesis that Jean-Pierre was an agent of the RPF and
that his revelations to UNAMIR were a manipulation by the RPF to embarrass President
Habyarimana.694
483. Witness 22a, a former UNAMIR officer, will testify as to circumstances
surrounding the information ptovided to UNAMIR by Jean-Pierre Turatsinze. He was
never able to corroborate the allegation that lists of Tutsis were compiled.
6. Fundraising Meeting at Hotel Rebero
a. Indictment
24.8 Mathieu NGIRUMPATSE and Joseph NZIRORERA participated in fund-
raising activities for the Interahamwe. Particularly noteworthy are several
meetings organized under the auspices of the MRND political party to
arrange collections of money from businessmen and wealthy party
members. Several of such fundraising and celebratory banquets for the
Interahamwe took place at the Hotel L’Horizon Rebero in Kigali in
1993 and in 1994. Joseph NZIRORERA organized at least one such
gathering. Persons in attendance included President Juvénal
HABYARIMANA, Seraphin RWABUKUMBA, Augustin
NGIRABATWARE, Robert KAJUGA, among many other notable
692 Exhibit DNZ-517; Transcript of 9 November 2006 @ 1-3 693 Exhibit DNZ-520; Transcript of 30 November 2006 @ 32 694 Exhibit DNZ-520; Transcript of 30 November 2006 @ 32
100
MRND party-members, several of whom made congratulatory speeches.
The Prosecutor is unable to provide an exhaustive list of participants or to
specify the dates of the gatherings.
b. Prosecution evidence
i. Witness G
484. According to Witness G, in 1993, a fund raising event was organized by Jean
Pierre Habyarimana, the son of President Habyarimana at the Rebero Hotel for the
Interahamwe. 695
President Habyarimana donated 300,000 RWF. Joseph Nzirorera
pledged 300,000 RWF. The director of the Rwandan Commercial Bank pledged 200,000
RWF. Pasteur Musabe pledged about 500,000 RWF. Augustin Bizimungu and Augustin
Ngirabatware also pledged some amounts. Seraphin Rwabukumba pledged sound
equipment for the rallies.696
485. This event was held in the second half of 1993. It was the only time Witness
G attended such an event at the Rebero Hotel.697
The funds raised at the meeting were
for transportation and equipment at MRND rallies and purchase of MRND uniforms.
There was no expectation that funds would be used to help the Interahamwe purchase
weapons or exterminate Tutsis.698
ii. Witness T
486. Witness T testified that there was a fund raising event for the Interahamwe
around July 1993 at the Rebero Hotel. Nzirorera took the floor and pledged
RWF150,000 and said he would make further contributions.699
487. The Interahamwe obtained most of its funds from contributions from wealthy
MRND members, as did the youth wings of the other parties.700
The contributions to the
Interahamwe were not clandestine, but MRND members were proud to contribute. There
was no expectation that these funds would be used to exterminate Tutsi.701
iii. Witness AWD
695 Transcript of 17 October 2005 @ 36 696 Transcript of 11 October 2005 @ 4 697 Transcript of 17 October 2005 @ 29 698 Transcript of 17 October 2005 @ 33 699 Transcript of 24 May 2006 @ 24 700 Transcript of 29 May 2006 @ 15 701 Transcript of 29 May 2006 @ 15
101
488. Witness AWD testified that in February 1994, there was an outing at the
Rebero Hotel organized by President Habyarimana to raise money for the Interahamwe,
according to what his neighbors had told him.702
c. Defence Case
489. Joseph Nzirorera will testify that he was not aware of a fundraising event
for the Interahamwe held at the Hotel Rebero and that he did not attend. However, even
if he had attended, there was nothing wrong or criminal with supporting the Interahamwe
at that time.
490. Georges Rutaganda will testify that indeed a fund raising event was held at
the Rebero Hotel for Interahamwe. It was held before the 1993 MRND Congress. He
does not recall whether Nzirorera was present.
491. Michel Bagaragaza, Augustin Bizimungu, and Augustin Ngirabatware
will testify that they never attended a fund-raising event for the Interahamwe at the
Rebero Hotel.
7. 23 October 1993 MDR rally at Nyamirambo Stadium
a. Indictment
25.1 On or about 23 October 1993, in particular, Mathieu NGIRUMPATSE,
Jean-Bosco BARAYAGWIZA, among others, participated in a rally at
Nyamirambo stadium in Kigali where they made speeches that
characterized the Tusti as accomplices of ―the enemy‖. The rally included
animation and pageantry by Interahamwe.
b. Prosecution evidence
i. Ahmed Mbonyunkiza
492. Ahmed Mbonyunkiza testified to hearing the ―Hutu Power‖ speech of
Froudad Karamira at this meeting. He did not hear any speech by Mathieu Ngirumpatse
and does not know whether he was present.703
ii. Witness UB
493. Witness UB attended this rally. Mathieu Ngirumpatse was not present.704
However, he had encouraged MRND members to attend this demonstration.705
702 Transcript of 10 October 2007 @ 32 703 Transcript of 28 October 2005 @ 3
102
iii. Witness ALG
494. Witness ALG testified that on 23 October 1993, the MRND, MDR, CDR,
PSD and PL parties organized a rally and march in Nyamirambo stadium after the death
of the President of Burundi.706
Among the authorities present in the stadium were Jean
Habyarimana of MRND and Froudald Karamira of MDR.707
He does not believe that
Mathieu Ngirumpatse was present.708
iv. Witness AWD
495. Witness AWD testified that after the death of Ndadaye, the MRND held a
rally at Nyamirambo stadium and invited leaders of the other parties to call for unity of
Hutus. Witness AWD attended that rally. Justin Mugenzi spoke and said those who
were fighting against the Hutus were going to pay dearly. Froudald Karamira spoke
about the problems between the Hutus and Tutsis beginning in 1959 and he finished his
speech speaking of MDR Power and PL Power. The youth wings came together and
chanted songs to exterminate the Tutsis and looted and burnt shops belonging to
Tutsis.709
496. Edouard Karemera arrived late, and chastised Jean Habyarimana for not
sufficiently emphasizing the need for Hutu unity. Witness AWD was with the two of
them and heard the conversation. Ngirumpatse and Nzirorera were not there.710
Witness
AWD later testified that Karemera had not chastised Jean Habyarimana, but had told him
that on that day the theme was Hutu unity. Witness AWD could not explain why
Karemera would tell Habyarimana at the end of the meeting what the theme of the
meeting was. Witness AWD could not recall the names of any other persons who had
heard that conversation.711
497. Witness AWD claimed that this was the rally where Froudard Karamira
chanted the words ―Hutu Power‖ and where Justin Mugenzi had made a speech including
704 Transcript of 24 February 2006@ 4-5; Transcript of 3 March 2006@ 16 705 Transcript of 23 February 2006@ 55 706 Transcript of 26 October 2006 @ 42 707 Transcript of 26 October 2006 @ 45 708 Transcript of 26 October 2006 @ 46 709 Transcript of 10 October 2007 @ 23 710 Transcript of 10 October 2007 @ 24 711 Transcript of 9 November 2007 @ 22-23
103
―Woe unto those who attack the country.‖ He denied the fact that these speeches were
made at different rallies.712
v. Documentary evidence
498. The text of Froudald Karamira’s speech is in evidence.713
499. The MRND’s reaction to the assassination of President Ndadaye of Burundi
is also in evidence.
500. President Habyarimana made a speech broadcast on the radio in which he
called upon Rwandans to refrain from violence, and not to engage in ethnic or regional
intolerance. He declared a seven day period of mourning in Rwanda.714
501. Joseph Nzirorera authored a communiqué from the MRND party that was
broadcast on the radio calling upon Rwandans not to let the problems in Burundi
compromise peace in Rwanda.715
502. The Interahamwe had scheduled a march and rally to show support for the
people of Burundi, but the demonstration was cancelled so as to be careful not to attract
violence in the aftermath of President Ndadaye’s assassination.716
c. Defence evidence
503. Karemera witness Alain De Brouwer testified that he met Joseph Nzirorera
on two occasions in October 1993, just before and then after the death of President
Ndadaye in Belgium. He had conversations with Nzirorera, and realised that despite the
worst fears that had been caused by the military coup d'état, and by the inflow of refugees
to the south of Rwanda, the determination of Nzirorera, who was the new national
secretary of the MRND, to respect the Arusha Accords was still solid. He was still
determined to comply with the Arusha Accords despite everything.717
504. Karemera witness Jean Marie Vianney Nkezabera, Vice-Chairman of the
MDR party for Kigali-ville prefecture,718
testified that he organized the march on 23
October 1993 to Nyamirambo stadium after the death of President Ndadaye.719
The
712 Transcript of 9 November 2007 @ 20-21; Exhibits P5 and P14 713 Exhibit #P5, #P272 714 Exhibit #DNZ-121, Transcript of 29 May 2006 @ 30-32 715 Exhibit #DNZ-122; Transcript of 29 May 2006 @ 37 716 Exhibits #DNZ-119, #DNZ-120 717 Transcript of 28 April 2008 @ 43 718 Transcript of 8 May 2008 @ 44 719 Transcript of 8 May 2008 @ 57
104
prefet of Kigali only would give a permit for the march if the other political parties were
invited.720
The speech by Karamira in which he called for ―Hutu power‖ did not reflect
the policy of the MDR party, and he reminded the public that ethnicity had nothing to do
with democracy in his remarks before the rally ended.721
Jean Habyarimana represented
the MRND at that rally. Edouard Karemera, or any other national MRND leader, was not
there.722
It was not possible for Karemera to have arrived at the end of that rally and not
been noticed in the crowd.723
505. Edouard Karemera testified that he was not present at the 23 October 1993
rally at Nyamirambo stadium after the death of President Ndadaye.724
506. Joseph Nzirorera is not charged with anything in connection with this rally.
Indeed, he was in Belgium when it was held, and therefore did not attend.
507. Witness 29 will testify that none of the three accused attended this rally.
508. Tharcisse Renzaho will testify that none of the three accused attended this
rally.
8. 7 November 1993 MRND rally at Nyamirambo Stadium
a. Indictment
25.3 On several occasions in early November 1993, mid-January 1994, mid-
31.1 February 1994, and March 1994, Mathieu NGIRUMPATSE addressed
public gatherings or rallies at Nyamirambo Stadium in Kigali. The rallies
assembled leading politicians that espoused the cause of ―Hutu Power‖
and sometimes ended with chants of ―Tubatsembatsembe‖ [―Let us
exterminate them‖], referring to the Tutsi. Members of the Interahamwe
participated in the rallies.
b. Prosecution evidence
i. Witness G
509. Witness G attended the MRND rally on 7 November 1993. Joseph Nzirorera
made a speech in which he announced the results of elections which had recently been
held in the demilitarized zone. The MRND won the vast majority of the posts in Byumba
720 Transcript of 8 May 2008 @ 57-58 721 Transcript of 8 May 2008 @ 59 722 Transcript of 8 May 2008 @ 60-61 723 Transcript of 13 May 2008 @ 35 724 Transcript of 18 May 2009 @ 63
105
and Ruhengeri.725
He said that the opposition wanted the transition to go on forever, but
that MRND believed that elections should be held during the next 12 months so that the
country can be led by people who are elected. He made no reference in his speech to
targeting or extermination of Tutsis.726
510. Edouard Karemera spoke at the same rally about the need to compensate
people who had worked on the cellule committees. His speech made no reference to
attacks against or elimination of Tutsis.727
511. Mathieu Ngirumpatse also spoke. He said that he wished there would be no
more violence by the youth in Rwanda. He said that elections were necessary to defend
democracy and make sure what happened in Burundi did not happen in Rwanda.728
ii. Documentary evidence
512. In a UNAMIR report dated 9 November 1993, it was reported that ―the
MRND party held a rally yesterday, but all the rhetoric was aimed at supporting the
implementation of the peace process.‖729
c. Defence evidence
513. The texts of the speeches are in evidence as Exhibit DNZ-13, 50, and 51. It
is clear that the speeches were entirely proper and had nothing to do with extermination
of Tutsis. Mr. Nzirorera is not charged in this paragraph. Therefore, he has nothing to
defend concerning the meeting of 7 November 1993. Nevertheless, he and other
witnesses may refer to the meeting in the context of defending the overall allegation that
the accused incited MRND members to exterminate Tutsis.
9. 16 January 1994 MRND Rally at Nyamirambo Stadium
a. Indictment
25.3 On several occasions in early November 1993, mid-January 1994, mid-
31.1 February 1994, and March 1994, Mathieu NGIRUMPATSE addressed
public gatherings or rallies at Nyamirambo Stadium in Kigali. The rallies
assembled leading politicians that espoused the cause of ―Hutu Power‖
and sometimes ended with chants of ―Tubatsembatsembe‖ [―Let us
725 Transcript of 17 October 2005 @ 41 726 Transcript of 17 October 2005 @ 46-47; Exhibit #DNZ-50 727 Transcript of 17 October 2005 @ 49; Exhibit #DNZ-13; #IDNZ-7(E) 728 Transcript of 17 October 2005 @ 51; Exhibit #DNZ-51 729 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 44; Exhibit DNZ-208
106
exterminate them‖], referring to the Tutsi. Members of the Interahamwe
participated in the rallies.
b. Prosecution evidence
i. Witness G
514. Witness G testified that The radio broadcast of the 16 January 1994 speech
by Ngirumpatse contains no call to exterminate Tutsis.730
ii. Witness ALG
515. Witness ALG testified that he attended the MRND rally in Nyamirambo
Stadium on 16 January 1994. The rally was organized to inform the MRND members
that the MRND was criticizing the Arusha Accords power sharing provisions.731
Ngirumpatse and Karemera spoke along the same lines, stating that the MRND could not
recognize the RPF power, given that the RPF did not recognize the power of the majority
people which was acquired during the 1959 revolution.732
Justin Mugenzi also spoke
during this rally and said that those who did not recognize the 1959 revolution would
come to great misfortune.733
At the rally, the Interahamwe sang the song, ―Let us
Exterminate Them‖.734
iii. Witness AWD
516. Witness AWD testified that he attended an MRND rally in mid-January
where Ngirumpatse had invited the leaders of the power wings of the other parties.
Ngirumpatse spoke of the events of 1959 and demonstrated the evilness of the Tutsi. He
said that given the status of the negotiations, they could not accept that the Tutsis take
power so they could kill and massacre the Hutus. He said the Hutus needed to come
together to fight against the enemy of the country—the Tutsi.735
517. Ngirumpatse praised the Interahamwe, saying that the white people did not
like them but that they were brave and behaved well. He said if President Habyarimana
was killed like Ndadaye, we would not remain quiet. Witness AWD understood that
730 Exhibit #P-14 731 Transcript of 26 October 2006 @ 50 732 Transcript of 26 October 2006 @ 51 733 Transcript of 26 October 2006 @ 51 734 Transcript of 26 October 2006 @ 52 735 Transcript of 10 October 2007 @ 25
107
Ngirumpatse meant that the Tutsis would be exterminated.736
Witness AWD did not see
Nzirorera there.737
518. The transcript of Ngirumpatse’s speech broadcast on RTLM does not reflect
that Ngirumpatse spoke of the Tutsi at all. However, Witness AWD claimed that the
broadcast was only an excerpt of the speech and that the radio stations were careful not to
broadcast the inflammatory parts of speeches on the radio.738
iv. Documentary evidence
519. The texts of the speeches of the MRND rally on 16 January 1994, as
broadcast over the radio, are in evidence.
520. On 16 January 1994, Justin Mugenzi addressed the rally at Nyamirambo
stadium sponsored by the MRND. In his speech, he explained the divisions in the PL
party and criticized the Prime Minister for failing to accept the list from his faction. He
said the following:
―PL is therefore concerned about the sovereignty of the democratic power born
out of the 1959 revolution. Let it be understood one more time: It is written in the
Bible—Woe to them, woe to them, woe to them. To those who do what? Woe to those
who neglect the interest of the people, the interests for which Rwandans have fought so
hard, reducing them to nothing to please the Inkotanyi. Woe to them.‖739
521. The speech of Mathieu Ngirumpatse at the MRND rally of 16 January 1994
was also broadcast.740
Minister Andre Ntagerura also addressed this rally. He spoke of
the failure of the Prime Minister to convene a meeting of the Ministers. He said the 9
Ministers of the MRND were all Interahamwe and would remain Interahamwe.741
522. It was reported on Radio Rwanda that MRND Kigali ville President Jean
Habyarimana had addressed the 16 January 1994 rally and explained that the members of
the MRND came from all ethnic groups and from all regions of the country. He called
for cooperation with other political organizations.742
In his speech broadcast on RTLM,
736 Transcript of 10 October 2007 @ 25 737 Transcript of 10 October 2007 @ 38 738 Transcript of 12 November 2007 @ 53-55; Exhibit #P-14 739 P228 at pp. 13-18, quote at p. 16 740 P229, pp. 3-9 741 P229, pp. 16-20 742 P230, pg. 6
108
Habyarimana requested the Interahamwe to be disciplined and leave the rally without any
incidents.743
523. A part of the speech of Edouard Karemera at the 16 January 1994 rally was
broadcast on Radio Rwanda. He discussed the number of posts allocated to each party in
the BBTG.744
In his speech broadcast on RTLM, he praised Simon Bikindi, called for
elections, representation by the CDR in the BBTG, denied that the MRND was
controlling the power-wings of the MDR and PL, and CDR party, and said that the
MRND was ready to work with those designated to participate in the BBTG.745
524. On 17 January 1994, UNAMIR reported that the MRND had held a major
rally on the previous day. Security was provided by party members having no visible
arms.746
c. Defence evidence
525. Joseph Nzirorera will testify that he attended this rally, but did not make a
speech. The speeches at the MRND rally in January 1994 did not call for extermination
of Tutsi.
526. Andre Ntagerura, who made a speech at this rally, will testify that the
speeches at the MRND rally in January 1994 did not call for extermination of Tutsi.
527. Witness 29 will testify that the speeches at the MRND rally in January 1994
did not call for extermination of Tutsi.
528. Justin Mugenzi will testify that he made a speech at the MRND rally in
January 1994 and his speech did not call for extermination of Tutsi.
529. Agnes Ntamabyaliro, former Minister of Justice and PL Party member,
whose testimony from the Bizimungu et al trial was admitted into evidence pursuant to
Rule 92 bis, testified that she was not present at the 15 January 1994 meeting where
Mugenzi allegedly spoke.747
She heard parts of Mugenzi’s speech on the radio, but from
what she heard it was not an incitement to kill Tutsis.748
743 P231, pg 3 744 P230, pg. 6 745 P231, pp. 5-12 746 Exhibit DNZ-387 747 Exhibit DNZ-512; Transcript of 22 August 2008 @ 52 748 Exhibit DNZ-512; Transcript of 22 August 2008 @ 53
109
10. Establishment of RTLM
a. Indictment
30. Mathieu NGIRUMPATSE, among others, participated in the creation
and the financing of the RTLM radio station, which served as a vehicle for
disseminating their extremist ideology.
b. Prosecution evidence
i. Witness G
530. Witness G testified that persons purchased shares of RTLM Radio as an
investment. It was presented as a company that would make a profit. There was no
expectation that the radio station would be used to encourage the population to
exterminate Tutsis.749
ii. Witness T
531. Witness T testified that RTLM began broadcasting in July or August 1993.
It was a private company established by an initiative committee consisting of Nahimana,
Nzabagerageza, Barayagwiza, Nkezabera, and Serugendo. The committee invited the
public to buy shares in RTLM and a large number of people did so, including Nzirorera.
It was never intended that the RTLM be used to advocate the extermination of Tutsi.750
532. Because Radio Rwanda was controlled by the Ministry of Information, an
MDR Ministry, and Radio Muhabura was broadcasting RPF propaganda, there was a
desire on the part of those supporting President Habyarimana to have their voice heard as
well. In addition, it was thought that RTLM could be a profit-making venture.751
iii. Documentary evidence
533. The statutes of RTLM reveal that it was a private company owned by
persons purchasing shares as an investment.752
b. Defence evidence
534. Joseph Nzirorera is not charged with the creation or financing or RTLM.
He was one of those who purchased his shares as an investment. He will testify that he
749 Transcript of 17 October 2005 @ 37 750 Transcript of 29 May 2006 @ 19-20 751 Transcript of 29 May 2006 @ 21 752 Exhibit DNZ-11
110
did not have an extremist ideology, nor did he expect RTLM to have one when he
purchased his shares.
535. Ferdinand Nahimana will testify that RTLM was never intended to be used
to encourage or incite the extermination of Tutsis. Its purpose was to turn a profit, as
well as to serve as a means of supporting the Habyarimana regime in the wake of Radio
Rwanda’s control by the MDR party.
c. Other information
536. In the Bagosora et al case, the Trial Chamber found that Bagosora,
Nsengiyumva and Ntabakuze were among the 1,137 shareholders of RTLM. In particular,
Bagosora’s ownership interest appears significant since his 50 shares are amongst the
largest held by a single individual. But there is no evidence that ownership of these shares
gave the Accused any role in RTLM’s operation or in the shaping of its broadcasts.753
C. Post 6 April 1994 Events Not Charged in Indictment
1. Assassination of President Habyarimana
a. Prosecution evidence
i. Witness ZF
537. At approximately 8:45 in the morning of 7 April 1994, he intercepted a
message with the following text:
―We inform you that the mission of our reinforced squad was brilliantly successful
against the MRND/CDR and the FRODEBU/PALIPEHUTU. You have to know
that the chief of the country of the South died with his Minister of Plan and
Minister of Communication. In the main town, they are shooting in all the streets.
It seems that there are also arbitrary arrests in the main town. Remember not only
the Angola experience that we escaped fortunately and the experience in Liberia.
We continue to await the reaction of our friends of the country of the South to give
you new instructions. The Chief joined Kampala without any problem and the
communication within his services with our elements inside was achieved in the
best conditions and that with the aid of the Belgian community and the elements of
the Southern country helped us much for the success of our mission that was not
easy to realize. We thank sincerely all those who contributed to the success of the
mission of our reinforced squad. We especially congratulate the specialist
infiltrators in the main town for the reorganization of the squad. For each of your
secteurs, the reinforcement will come to you immediately. The Chief is ready to
support us strongly and promises to accompany us until the main town. It remains
to know if Bikomagu should agree to attack from the South and then we can meet
753 Prosecutor v Bagosora et al, No. ICTR-98-41-T, Judgement (18 December 2008) at para. 642
111
in the main town and then to put an end to the regime of terror in enemy country
and in the South. …courage and remain vigilant. Control the demilitarized zone
(all) before the enemy occupies it in the first minutes that the war resumes. The
Parapehutu elements have trainings in the enemy country in view to support the
government side, but that doesn’t increase anything to that Army which is reduced
without its Chief and its Chief of Staff. The Chief of Staff was very appreciated by
the troops. Courage our success is irreversible and you can give us an appointment
in the main town shortly.‖754
538. On the morning of 7 April, another message was intercepted which said:
"It is an unforgettable date for us, and even for our ethnic group. If the president of
the Republic is killed, we can say we are sure of victory. We have heard the voice
of Radio Rwanda saying that the tyrant and the president of Burundi have died
through an unfortunate accident. It is not easy for us; we cannot believe it. The
invincible who defied the evildoers and traitors... the invincible is dead. Briefly,
we congratulate the in depth forward action groups. Victory has given us the
advantage over the others; our morale is high."755
539. Another intercepted message said, "The meeting due to be held in Mulindi
today, 7th of April 1994, is cancelled. I thank you and congratulate you for yesterday's
operation. For the time being, the reward is due to you. All units must be on the alert;
the war is beginning." 756
540. Another intercepted conversation said:
"Assign you the mission to complete the project as have specified. The plan is
nearly accomplished. The guerrillas (Hutu) have failed, and the Bergeronette
(Tutsi) have won the game."757
A final message intercepted on 7 April said, "We
thought that the 6th of April 1994 plan was going on all right and within the
institutional framework provided. But the measures taken on the night of the 6th
by the authorities and the white person were normal arrangements, unfortunately,
the measures taken to avoid any failure were only partially implemented."758
ii. Witness G
541. Witness G testified that when he heard of the assassination, he thought the
RPF was responsible.759
iii. Witness UB
754 Exhibit DNZ-99; Transcript of 17 May 2006 @ 38 755 Exhibit DNZ-113; Transcript of 18 May 2006 @ 6 756 Exhibit DNZ-114; Transcript of 18 May 2006 @ 8-9 757 Exhibit DNZ-115; Transcript of 18 May 2006 @ 11 758 Exhibit DNZ-116 759 Transcript of 18 October 2005@ 18
112
542. Witness UB testified that it was said on the radio that the Inkotanyi had shot
down the plane of President Habyarimana.760
iv. Documentary evidence
543. On 7 May 1994, Prime Minister Kambanda sent a letter to UNAMIR
offering to cooperate concerning a Board of Inquiry on the crash of President
Habyarimana’s plane.761
c. Defence evidence
544. Karemera Witness LLK rejected the suggestion by the prosecution that the
CDR participated in the assassination of President Habyarimana because it believed him
to be a traitor and called for a coup d'état.762
545. Joseph Nzirorera will testify that he believed the RPF had shot down
President Habyarimana’s plane and had launched the war with help from the government
of Uganda.
546. Abdul Ruzibiza and Aloys Ruyenzi, former RPA soldiers, whose testimony
from the Bagosora et al and Zigiranyirazo trials have been admitted pursuant to Rule 92
bis, testified they were part of the RPA contingent in Kigali and were personally aware
that the RPF had assassinated Emmanuel Gapyisi, Felicien Gatabazi, and President
Habyarimana.763
547. Witness BRA-1, whose testimony in the Bagsora et al trial was admitted
pursuant to Rule 92 bis testified that he was an RPA solider stationed in Mulindi and had
knowledge that the RPF had assassinated Emmanuel Gapyisi, Felicien Gatabazi, and
President Habyarimana.764
548. Witness ALL-42, whose testimony from the Bagosora et al trial was
admitted into evidence pursuant to Rule 92 bis, testified that he was a former RPF official
and was aware that the RPF had assassinated Emmanuel Gapyisi, Felicien Gatabazi, and
President Habyarimana.765
760 Transcript of 6 March 2006@ 13 761 Exhibit DNZ-419 762 Transcript of 24 April 2008 @ 54-55 763 Exhibits DNZ-515, DNZ-516 764 Exhibit DNZ-518 765 Exhibit DNZ-517
113
549. Faustin Twagiramungu, whose testimony in the Ntakirutimana trial was
admitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis, testified that the shooting down of Habyarimana’s
airplane cannot be attributed to people in his own party, or so-called ―extremists‖ within
the MRND.766
The shooting can only be attributed to those who were engaged in a
power struggle with Habyarimana.767
He suspected that the RPF were responsible for the
crash.768
When he was part of Kagame’s government, he proposed to the cabinet that an
investigation be undertaken to determine how Habyarimana died.769
The response was
that he was a man who had died like any other man.770
2. Security Meetings at Kigali Prefecture Office
a. Prosecution evidence
i. Witness UB
550. Witness UB testified that on 10 April, he attended a meeting convened by the
prefet at the prefecture office. The bourgmestre of his commune and most conseillers
were present.771
Also present were soldiers and political party leaders.772
The meeting
began at about 9 am and continued to about 2 pm.773
Each conseiller reported on large
numbers of Tutsi being killed in his secteur.774
No one at the meeting called for the
killings to stop. Rather, we were told to evacuate the bodies.775
551. This was the first time he had been to the prefecture office since 6 April.776
He listed the persons present.777
552. On 14 April, he attended a prefecture security council meeting. Many
political party people attended. Conseillers reported that many women and children were
being killed.778
It was said that Kagame and Rwigema had left the country as small
766 Exhibit DNZ-514; Transcript of 4 February 2002 @ 145 767 Exhibit DNZ-514; Transcript of 4 February 2002 @ 145 768 Exhibit DNZ-514; Transcript of 4 February 2002 @ 144 769 Exhibit DNZ-514; Transcript of 5 February 2002 @ 37 770 Exhibit DNZ-514; Transcript of 5 February 2002 @ 37 771 Transcript of 27 February 2006@ 38 772 Transcript of 27 February 2006@ 40 773 Transcript of 6 March 2006 @ 30 774 Transcript of 27 February 2006@ 42 775 Transcript of 27 February 2006@ 41; Transcript of 6 March 2006@ 44 776 Transcript of 6 March 2006@ 29 777 Transcript of 6 March 2006@ 32-37, 40-43; Exhibit #DNZ76 778 Transcript of 28 February 2006@ 4
114
children and now they were coming back to fight the government.779
This was said by a
soldier.780
553. No order was ever given to the Interahamwe to leave the roadblocks and stop
killing. If such an order was given, the conseillers would have been informed so as to
execute that decision.781
At the meeting on 14 April, the conseillers were told to continue
putting the ethnic group of the person on any attestations that they were issuing to people
who had lost their identity cards.782
They were told that roadblocks should stay and that
people who were manning the roadblocks should get organized.783
554. In a broadcast on Radio Rwanda on 14 April 1994, Prefet Renzaho said that
there had been a meeting at the communal level and the secteur level, and it had been
agreed that they should organise meetings in their area to convince the population that
our country needs peace, needs tranquility, and that this is a major task of the
government of Prime Minister Kambanda."784
555. Renzaho also said in that broadcast that ―I would like to warn with my last
energy some unscrupulous groups noticed in some quarters and who continue to
perpetrate shameful acts. I want to tell you that instructions have been given to security
personnel so that whoever caught in such barbaric acts of looting or killing be punished
accordingly."785
556. Renzaho also said in that broadcast that:
―We held meetings with parties' representatives at préfecture and commune
levels. The meeting was fruitful as we agreed that those who worked closely with
the population should stand and do their best to explain to the population that it is
not those criminal acts which will help us to win the war. On the contrary, they
have to avoid them so that we may unite and fight against the common enemy
who attacked all of us inhabitants of this zone where we used to share everything.
It is not through killings we may solve the problem of Inyenzi, Inkotanyi. We
have to unite and fight that war and fight it quickly."786
557. The prefet also said in this broadcast that
779 Transcript of 28 February 2006@ 5 780 Transcript of 28 February 2006@ 9 781 Transcript of 28 February 2006@ 9 782 Transcript of 28 February 2006@ 10 783 Transcript of 7 March 2006@ 11 784 Transcript of 7 March 2006@ 12; Exhibit #DNZ78 785 Transcript of 7 March 2006@ 13; Exhibit #DNZ78 786 Transcript of 7 March 2006@ 14; Exhibit #DNZ78
115
―I then add that our country needs to have a good image. It is not -- during this
period when the international community is against us on this issue, it is not good
to continue to perpetrate unlawful acts. This affects seriously the credibility of
our government. The government is yours as it was appointed according to the
law and in a manner convenient to many. We need your assistance. You should
not overburden your government when it is facing a serious problem to explain
quickly to the international community what is happening here in this country and
to request the international community to intervene in the Rwandan problem so
that peace may be restored. If you don't do it, it will turn against you, as things
will not be right. So we beg assistance from all of you, and be reasonable enough
to understand that these detestable acts are not strengthening the government. On
the contrary, they are embarrassing it while it has its main agenda to work in order
to find a solution to this war. We will not find the solution alone; we will find the
solution with the international community and other friendly countries. So don't
discredit yourself, but assist your government so that it may achieve its agenda
without hindrances."787
558. The Prefet also said in that broadcast that instructions have been issued that
checkpoints on the road should be removed and those perpetrators of crimes should be
punished accordingly.788
Witness UB acknowledged that Prefet Renzaho gave those
instructions at the security council meeting of 14 April.789
559. Another security council meeting was held on 16 April. Prefet Renzaho told
them that the military authorities had decided to create a civil defence program and that
retired soldiers were to be put in charge of the program. The Interahamwe made up the
civil defence program. However, they continued killing Tutsis.790
The prefet said that
the Tutsis at the Milles des Collines should not be attacked to show the international
community that Tutsis were still alive.791
560. Prefet Renzaho said at the security meeting of 16 April that he had met with
MRND leaders and the chief of the General Staff that participants were to go to the
Ministry of Defence and receive arms.792
He had met that morning with Ngirumpatse on
787 Transcript of 7 March 2006@ 16-17; Exhibit #DNZ78 788 Transcript of 7 March 2006@ 16; Exhibit #DNZ78 789 Transcript of 7 March 2006@ 16 790 Transcript of 28 February 2006@ 23 791 Transcript of 28 February 2006@ 24 792 Transcript of 7 March 2006@ 19
116
behalf of the MRND.793
However, Ngirumpatse was in Gitarama on 16 April, having
moved with the government on 12 April.794
561. At the security council meeting on 16 April, he asked the Prefet about what
to do with Tutsis who were members of the MRND and Hutus who were members of the
RPF. The prefet said that Tutsi members of the MRND were the same Tutsi and Hutus
who had joined the RPF were brothers who had gone astray.795
562. After the security council meeting of 16 April, they went to the Ministry of
Defence where the conseillers were given 5 weapons each.796
Francois Karera received
weapons on behalf of the MRND.797
He was with Bernard Maniragaba and Suedi
Ndayatabi.798
Bourgmestre Bizimana was also present at the Ministry of Defence when
the weapons were distributed.799
ii. Witness ALG
563. Witness ALG testified that in almost all security council meetings at the
Kigali ville prefecture after 6 April, the Interahamwe were invited.800
In one such
meeting, the prefet ordered that all corpses be collected from the roads. Witness ALG
was present at the meeting when the Prefet said that.801
564. The security meetings held at the prefecture office were for the purpose of
maintaining security, not to perpetrate killings. At one of those meetings, the Prefet
instructed the conseillers to set up crisis committees comprised of upright citizens at the
secteur level. Witness ALG never heard it said that children should not be spared
because Kagame and Rwigema had left Rwanda as small children and now they are
coming back to fight the government.802
793 Transcript of 7 March 2006@ 20 794 Transcript of 7 March 2006@ 20-21 795 Transcript of 7 March 2006@ 21-22 796 Transcript of 28 February 2006@ 24 797 Transcript of 28 February 2006@ 25 798 Transcript of 7 March 2006@ 22 799 Transcript of 7 March 2006@ 22 800 Transcript of 26 October 2006 @ 66 801 Transcript of 26 October 2006 @ 66 802 Transcript of 6 November 2006 @ 34
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565. The security meetings were regularly attended by representatives of the
military, police, gendarmerie, civilian defence, political parties, and youth wings,
including the Interahamwe.803
566. Witness ALG claimed to have seen General Gatsinzi on two occasions at
security meetings at Kigali prefecture office in April 1994.804
He attended meetings at
which representatives of the Interahamwe were present.805
567. Witness ALG testified that he was not at the prefectural security meeting on
10 April 1994 as claimed by Witness UB.806
iii. Witness AWE
568. Witness AWE attended a meeting at the Kigali prefecture office on 9 April.
Prefet Renzaho said the Inkotanyi had left the CND and were in the process of killing the
local population and were trying to invade in the town.807
Renzaho said they should erect
roadblocks and that he would give them weapons to be distributed to members of the
population. We were given instructions according to which it was necessary to block the
road so that RPF troops should not cross. But after the roadblocks were erected, the
Interahamwe were summoned and asked to check ID cards of the Tutsi. The killing of
Tutsi had started.808
569. Renzaho told them that the decision to erect roadblocks had been taken in
conjunction with Ngirumpatse, Nzirorera, and Karemera.809
570. Renzaho told them to distribute the weapons to people manning the
roadblocks in order to prevent the Inkotanyi from entering the town.810
c. Defence evidence
571. Joseph Nzirorera will testify that the accused never consulted with or were
consulted by the prefet concerning roadblocks or other security measures in Kigali.
572. Tharcisse Renzaho will testify that the accused never consulted with or
were consulted by the prefet concerning roadblocks or other security measures in Kigali.
803 Transcript of 7 November 2006 @ 20 804 Transcript of 7 November 2006 @ 19 805 Transcript of 7 November 2006 @ 20 806 Transcript of 2 November 2006 @ 60-61; Exhibit DNZ-76 807 Transcript of 4 July 2007@26 808 Transcript of 4 July 2007@27 809 Transcript of 4 July 2007@27 810 Transcript of 4 July 2007@28
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He will also testify that the security meetings he held were for the purpose of stopping the
killing, not encouraging it.
573. Marcel Gatsinzi will testify that contrary to the testimony of Witnesses UB
and ALG, he did not attend any security meetings at the prefecture.
574. Francois Karera will testify that he never received or distributed weapons.
575. Witness 29 will testify that he did not attend any security meetings at the
prefecture with the conseillers. He will testify to his own efforts with Prefet Renzaho to
organize local political party leaders to stop the killing.
3. 12 April 1994 incitement at Nyabugogo roadblock
a. Prosecution evidence
i. Witness BDX
576. Witness BDX testified that on the day he left Kigali, he was driving the
vehicle of Mathias Nyagasaza.811
He drove the car to Colonel Elie Sagatwa ’s house with
Janvier Busugi as his passenger. They did not go inside Sagatwa ’s house, there were
people outside in their vehicles. At Sagatwa ’s house he observed Zigiranyirazo’s wife
Emma and Nzirorera.812
Francois Ngirabatware and Colonel Setako were also present.813
Witness BDX did not remember the people who were with Nzirorera.814
577. This was the same day that the government left Kigali.815
578. The people had come together and were looking for ways and means to leave
Kigali. Witness BDX was told that members of Nzirorera’s family were to leave. So he
approached Nzirorera and introduced himself. Nzirorera asked him his father’s name and
said his father was a fan of Nzirorera’s. Nzirorera asked Witness BDX if he had a
vehicle, and BDX said yes.816
579. Nzirorera agreed for Witness BDX to join his convoy and told him to take
two people in his vehicle with him.817
811 Transcript of 9 October 2007 @ 26 812 Transcript of 5 November 2007 @ 21 813 Transcript of 5 November 2007 @ 22 814 Transcript of 5 November 2007 @ 22 815 Transcript of 5 November 2007 @ 27 816 Transcript of 9 October 2007 @ 25 817 Transcript of 5 November 2007 @ 22
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580. Nzirorera asked if Witness BDX could take some people in his vehicle. He
gave Witness BDX a man who had just been appointed director of Uprovia and his wife
and child to take in his vehicle.818
581. Janvier Busugi stayed at Sagatwa ’s house when Witness BDX left for
Gisenyi. Busugi was with a soldier called Zaire, the son of Seyoboka, who was about 28-
30 years old. Busugi arrived in Gisenyi a few days later driving Sagatwa ’s white
Mercedes Benz and with ―Zaire‖ as his passenger.819
582. They left from Sagatwa’s house. Nzirorera was in a new green Mercedes.
They went by the national bank, the Burundi embassy, towards the Ministry of Finance
building where they encountered a roadblock manned by Interahamwe.820
Witness BDX
was third in line from Nzirorera’s vehicle.821
583. Witness BDX had a man in his car who was director or general manager of
OPROVIA, as well as his wife and child—a boy about 8-10 years old. He did not know
the man’s name.822
584. The convoy included the lead vehicle containing Colonel Setako and two
soldiers, a green Mercedes Jeep containing Nzirorera, the vehicle of Witness BDX, a
Pajero driven by Francois Ngirabatware with Emma as a passenger, and about two other
vehicles. He did not know who was with Nzirorera.823
585. They left and headed down Nyabugogo road and passed three roadblocks.
The first was at the Ministry of Finance building and the second was near the Kabuga
building. They passed through those roadblocks easily. At the third roadblock at the
Nyabugogo traffic light, the Interahamwe addressed Nzirorera as Mr. President and asked
him if he was leaving them with his soldiers. Nzirorera was bound to lift their spirits, so
he opened the door of his vehicle and stood up and spoke to them. He told the
Interahamwe he would send his soldiers back and asked them to be vigilant so that no
Inyenzi should escape.824
818 Transcript of 9 October 2007 @ 26 819 Transcript of 5 November 2007 @ 23, 29 820 Transcript of 9 October 2007 @ 26 821 Transcript of 9 October 2007 @ 36 822 Transcript of 5 November 2007 @ 23-24 823 Transcript of 5 November 2007 @ 24-25 824 Transcript of 9 October 2007 @ 37; Transcript of 5 November 2007 @ 26
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586. Witness BDX heard this from the driver’s side of his vehicle. There was one
vehicle in between his and Nzirorera’s cars.825
587. After crossing the roadblock at the Nyabugogo bridge, the soldiers went back
and they continued to Gitarama, encountering a roadblock at Kamonyi and then no other
roadblocks to Gitarama.826
At Gitarama, they stopped at a petrol station where many cars
of Interim Government members were parked. Witness BDX saw Ngirumpatse there.
Nzirorera’s convoy continued on towards Gisenyi. They stopped for drinks at Kabaya
and at the Mukamira junction he went to Gisenyi and Nzirorera went to his home in
Ruhengeri. Witness BDX does not recall what happened to the people in his vehicle, but
he proceeded from Mukamira to Gisenyi alone.827
588. When he arrived in Gisenyi, Witness BDX told his cousin, Jean Baptiste
Nemeyabahizi that he had travelled with Nzirorera’s convoy.828
c. Defence evidence
589. Joseph Nzirorera will testify that he never went to Colonel Sagatwa ’s
house after 6 April 1994, that Witness BDX was never part of his convoy, and that he
never addressed the Interahamwe at a roadblock.
590. Witness 41 will testify that Witness BDX and himself were never at Colonel
Sagatwa ’s house and did not travel to Gisenyi in Nzirorera’s convoy.
591. Witness 47 will testify that he did not travel as part of Nzirorera’s convoy,
as claimed by Witness BDX.
592. Jean Claude Seyoboka will testify that he traveled with Janvier Busugi and
Witness BDX from Kigali to Gisenyi and that they were not part of Nzirorera’s convoy.
593. Jean Baptiste Neyemabahizi will testify that upon arrival in Gisenyi,
Witness BDX told him he had come from Kigali with the sons of Mathias Nyagasaza.
He never said he had travelled with Nzirorera.
594. Witness 44, a former Director of Oprovia, will testify that he was part of
Nzirorera’s convoy from Kigali to Gisenyi and that he was not driven by Witness BDX.
825 Transcript of 5 November 2007 @ 26 826 Transcript of 9 October 2007 @ 37 827 Transcript of 9 October 2007 @ 38; Transcript of 5 November 2007 @ 27-28 828 Transcript of 5 November 2007 @ 29-30
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He had two children with him, a small girl and small boy. Nzirorera never addressed the
Interahamwe.
595. Witness 45 will testify that he was the one who drove the Oprovia director in
Nzirorera’s convoy. Witness BDX was not in the convoy. Nzirorera never addressed the
Interahamwe.
596. Witnesses Solange Ajakaneza and David Biramahire will testify that they
traveled in the convoy of Nzirorera from Kigali to Gisenyi and that he never addressed
the Interahamwe. They also never saw Witness BDX.
597. Colonel Ephrem Setako will testify that Nzirorera’s convoy, including
members of his family, left from his residence in Kiyovu and that they were never at
Colonel Sagatwa ’s house. He never saw Witness BDX.
4. April 1994 MRND/Interahamwe communiqués
a. Prosecution evidence
i. Witness G
598. On 23 April 1994, the MRND issued a communiqué signed by Nzirorera and
Karemera. They urged the members of the party and especially the youth not to allow the
RPF attack to be a pretext to mistreat innocent people who have nothing to do with the
war. They publicly denounced all criminals who pass themselves off as Interahamwe and
called upon the population to denounce the activities of all those who harmed their
neighbors. They asked Rwandans not to attack one another. Those who attack innocent
persons because of their ethnicity, whether MRND members or not, must be denounced.
We condemn their behavior and call for them to be punished by the authorities.829
599. On 25 April 1994, a communiqué was issued by the National Committee of
the Interahmwe. It asked members to end all violence, to take those suspected at
roadblocks to the authorities, to check documents at roadblocks in a disciplined manner,
and to assist humanitarian organizations with their work.830
600. On 27 April 1994, a communiqué was issued by the MRND signed by
Karemera. It once again denounced the killing and looting and asked Interahamwe to
829 Transcript of 19 October 2005@ 33; Exhibit #DNZ-33 830 Transcript of 19 October 2005@ 35-36; Exhibit #DNZ-34
122
arrest such individuals or point them out to the authorities. It called upon MRND
officials at the prefectural level to carry out these instructions immediately.831
ii. Witness UB
601. Witness UB testified that Jean Habyarimana told him that he had attended a
meeting of the MRND political bureau in Gitarama on 18 April and that a decision had
been taken to support the Interahamwe. Habyarimana said that he, himself, did not
support the activities of the Interahamwe.832
602. Witness UB claimed that the MRND never issued a communiqué or
broadcast condemning the activities of the Interahamwe.833
However, this was
contradicted by the broadcast of 10 April 1994 by Ngirumaptse and the communiqués
issued on 23 and 27 April 1994.834
iii. Witness T
603. Witness T testified that he was at Murambi on a daily basis from 18-24 April
1994. He saw Ngirumpatse and Nzirorera there between 18 and 20 April.835
He believes
that he heard the communiqué of the MRND dated 23 April 1994 calling for an end to the
killing.836
The national Interahamwe communiqué issued on 25 April 1994 by #1 and #3
was evidence of the fact that the committee as such could not function under the
circumstances and individuals had to take ad hoc actions as best they could.837
c. Defence evidence
604. Edouard Karemera testified that fter the cabinet meeting of the 22 April
1994, MRND Defence Minister Augustin Bizimana told him that the government wanted
the MRND to encourage its youth not to participate in the killings. Nzirorera, who was
not living at Murambi, was passing by. So they issued a communiqué asking the
Interahamwe to cooperate with the Army and not participate in the killings.838
831 Transcript of 19 October 2005@ 36; Exhibit #DNZ-35 832 Transcript of 28 February 2006@ 26 833 Transcript of 28 February 2006@ 27 834 Exhibits DNZ22, DNZ33, and DNZ35 835 Transcript of 26 May 2006 @ 11 836 Exhibit DNZ-33; Transcript of 31 May 2006 @ 8 837 Transcript of 31 May 2006 @ 10 838 Transcript of 19 May 2009 @ 56
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605. Karemera Witness XQL, a member of the MRND Prefectural committee
for Ruhengeri, testified that In April, she heard over Radio Rwanda that the MRND
executive committee called for peace and condemned the massacres.839
606. Joseph Nzirorera will testify about the decision to issue communiqués and
their content. Their intent was to encourage people to stop the killing.
607. Witness 29 will testify that he attended a meeting of the MRND political
bureau in Gitarama around 18 April 1994 and the decision was taken to encourage the
Interahamwe and others to stop the killing.
5. Witness HH in Murambi
a. Prosecution evidence
i. Witness HH
608. On 14 April 1994, Prefet Renzaho called for the dismantling of unauthorized
roadblocks, specifying those in the area controlled by Witness HH.840
On 15 April 1994,
at a meeting of the Council of Ministers in Murambi, it was recorded by Minister Pauline
Nyiramasuhuko that the problem of bandits like Witness HH coming to Gitarama was
discussed.841
609. Within a week after the government had left Kigali842
, he accompanied
Kajuga, Maniragaba, Rutaganda, Twahirwa, and Aloys Ngirabatware to Murambi.843
The delegation met with Ngirumpatse, Nzirorera, and Karemera. Ngirabatware and
Witness HH did not participate in the meeting.844
However, he greeted Ngirumpatse and
told him of the incident where the MP Kabageni had died at Butamwa .845
610. Although he testified that he did not participate in the meeting with the three
accused, in his statement of 30 March 2006, he claimed that he was in the hall during the
meeting and that Nzirorera and Karemera did not appear to show much interest in what
was said.846
839 Transcript of 5 May 2008 @ 26 840 Transcript of 20 November 2006 @ 36; Exhibit DNZ-78 841 Transcript of 20 November 2006 @ 37 842 Transcript of 9 November 2006 @ 27 843 Transcript of 9 November 2006 @ 23 844 Transcript of 9 November 2006 @ 24 845 Transcript of 9 November 2006 @ 24 846 Transcript of 20 November 2006 @ 50; Exhibit DNZ-203
124
611. The instructions given after the meeting were that we were to keep
denouncing and flushing out the enemy and also to support the Rwandan Army at the
front.847
612. He subsequently went to Murambi a second time where Kajuga, Maniragaba,
Twahirwa, Nkezabera, Rutaganda met with Ngirumpatse. He did not see Nzirorera or
Karemera on this occasion.848
This meeting was also before the speech of Sindikubwabo
in Butare.849
613. However, in his statement of November 2004, Witness HH said that
Nzirorera was also in the room during the meeting and that he saw Karemera in the
area.850
614. Witness HH believes that Maniragaba was going often to Murambi to report
to and get instructions from the MRND leaders. Maniragaba had some kind of authority
over other Interahamwe leaders.851
615. One time, Seraphin Twahirwa told him after returning from Gitarama that he
should find Interahamwe to go to help the Interahamwe in Bisesero, who were facing stiff
resistance from the Tutsi there. He said that Nzirorera had asked him to find people to
send there. The next day, Twahirwa told him that it was no longer necessary because
Yusuf Munyakazi’s Interahamwe from Cyangugu had gone there.852
b. Defence evidence
616. Joseph Nzirorera will testify that the meetings with Witness HH never took
place.
617. Georges Rutaganda and Seraphin Twahirwa will testify that the meetings
with Witness HH never took place. Twahirwa will also testify that Nzirorera never asked
him to send Interahamwe to Bisesero.
618. Witness 29, Pauline Nyiramasuhuko, Justin Mugenzi, Eliezer
Niyitegeka, Augustin Ngirabatware, and Casimir Bizimungu will testify that the
847 Transcript of 9 November 2006 @ 27 848 Transcript of 9 November 2006 @ 27 849 Transcript of 9 November 2006 @ 28 850 Transcript of 20 November 2006 @ 51-52; Exhibit DNG-44 851 Transcript of 9 November 2006 @ 28-29 852 Transcript of 9 November 2006 @ 34-35
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Interim Government discussed how to stop the crimes being committed by Witness HH
in Gitarama.
6. Efforts to Evacuate Tutsi Refugees from theMiile Collines
a. Prosecution evidence
i. Witness G
619. While in Kigali in late April 1994, Witness G attended a meeting with
Colonel Bagosora at the Hotel des Diplomat. Colonel Bagosora had convened a meeting
with the National Committee of the Interahamwe and the chiefs of the Interahamwe in the
secteurs. Colonel Bagosora said that it was necessary to have no more massacres now
because it was just war. The killings had stopped in Kigali. 853
He said that General
Dallaire wanted to meet them to try to solve the problem of evacuating the refugees from
the Mille des Collines hotel.854
Then General Dallaire arrived and they discussed
evacuating the people from the Mille des Collines as well as Hutus from the RPF
controlled areas.855
620. On 18 May 1994, Ngirumpatse spoke on the radio and urged the
Interahamwe to allow the people to be evacuated from the Hotel Milles des Collines.856
As a result, people were allowed to leave the Milles des Collines.857
ii. Witness T
621. He attended a meeting between the Interahamwe and General Dallaire on 24
April. They discussed dismantling roadblocks and allowing people from the Milles des
Collines hotel to leave Kigali, as well as the fate of Hutu trapped in Amahoro Stadium.858
[Kajuga, Maniragaba, Nkezabera, Sebanetsi, and Serugendo]attended from the national
Interahamwe committee.859
The meeting was opened by Colonel Bagosora, who
introduced General Dallaire.860
Bagosora said that under international law it was
required that there be free movement of citizens even in time of war, so people should be
853 Transcript of 19 October 2005@ 38 854 Transcript of 12 October 2005 @ 14 855 Transcript of 12 October 2005 @ 15 856 Transcript of 19 October 2005@ 41; Exhibit #DNZ-38 857 Transcript of 28 October 2005 @ 22 858 Transcript of 26 May 2006 @ 13 859 Transcript of 31 May 2006 @ 16 860 Transcript of 31 May 2006 @ 16
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free to go wherever they wished to.861
Witness T did not see General Bizimungu in
attendance at this meeting.862
622. The people at the Milles des Collines were able to leave around 23 May as a
result of negotiations. This was after the broadcast by Ngirumpatse on 18 May asking
that they be allowed to do so.863
However, the exchange of refugees only came about
after extensive negotiations among the Rwandan government, UNAMIR, and RPF.864
b. Defence evidence
623. Joseph Nzirorera will testify that he was not in Rwanda when the refugees
were evacuated from theMiile Collines hotel.
624. Georges Rutaganda will testify to his efforts to assist those who were
evacuated from theMiile Collines.
625. Theoneste Bagosora, Tharcisse Renzaho, and Augustin Bizimungu will
testify to their efforts to accomplish the evacuation of the refugees from theMiile Collines
Hotel.
626. Witness 22a will testify to the efforts to evacuate the refugees from theMiile
Collines and the assistance provided by Georges Rutaganda to rescue the people.
627. Paul Rusasabagina will testify to the circumstances of the refugees at
theMiile Collines hotel, their evacuation, and the lack of control over the Interahamwe by
authorities.
D. Pre-April 1994 Events Not Charged in the Indictment
1. MRND Meetings with Conseillers
a. Prosecution evidence
i. Witness AWE
628. Witness AWE testified that the first meeting at the Rubangura building was
held in late 1992.865
Witness AWE was summoned to the meeting by the bourgmestre,
but did not know which organ of the MRND the meeting was organized for. There were
approximately 50 participants. Ngirumpatse, Nzirorera, Karemera were the ones who sat
861 Transcript of 31 May 2006 @ 17 862 Transcript of 31 May 2006 @ 17 863 Transcript of 26 May 2006 @ 15 864 Transcript of 31 May 2006 @ 18-19 865 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 15
127
in the front and were in charge of the meeting, along with two others he does not
recall.866
629. The bourgmestre who invited him was Edouard Bakomera.867
When he was
informed that Jean Bizimana had become bourgmestre of Nyarugenge commune as of
April 1992 (before the meeting), Witness AWE said he may have been mistaken as to the
identity of the bourgmestre who summoned him to the meeting.868
630. According to Witness AWE, Nzirorera had certain skills as a leader and
therefore would have sat at the front even if he was not holding any post of the MRND at
the time.869
In late 1992, Joseph Nzirorera held no post with the MRND.
631. At the first meeting, Ngirumpatse said that the Inkotanyi who had attacked
the country was Rwanda’s enemy and that they should be vigilant and watch what the
Tutsis were doing. He said that the MRND was recruiting young people to be trained.
He also said, the conseillers, as leaders, should make premises available to the
Interahamwe to hold their meetings.870
632. During cross examination, Witness AWE denied that any mention had been
made of military training at this first meeting.871
633. Those in attendance at this meeting included Amri Karekezi, Jean
Habyarimana, Jacques Rusirare, Gabriel Byaliyehe , Kandekwe, Stany Mbonimana,
Francois Gahigi, Odette Nyaribagenzi, Euphasie Kamatumu, and Celestin Sezibera.872
634. At every meeting, it was said that the Inkotanyi had attacked and was the
enemy of the country. Anyone who started a meeting would always say that.873
It was
always said that the enemy was the Tutsi.874
635. During the second meeting, MRND leaders at the communal, secteur, and
cellule level were elected. Witness AWE was elected as deputy secretary. Nothing was
said apart from what was said before.875
Witness AWE never had to assume the
866 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 16-17 867 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 18 868 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 19 869 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 17 870 Transcript of 4 July 2007@16 871 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 21 872 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 19-20 873 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 22 874 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 24 875 Transcript of 4 July 2007@ 17
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functions of the secretary.876
Witness AWE was unaware of whether the position of
deputy secretary was listed in the MRND statutes.877
He denied telling the OTP that he
had been Vice-President of the political bureau.878
636. On cross examination, Witness AWE said that only the communal officials
were elected at this meeting, and discussions were held about holding the secteur and
cellule level elections at a later time. The elections were limited to the commune of
Nyarugenge.879
Witness AWE claimed that the communal elections were held before
those of the secteur and cellule, although the statutes required that those voting in the
communal elections be elected at the secteur and cellule level.880
637. Witness AWE testified that Francois Karera was elected President and
Hamadi Nshimiyimana was Vice President. He denied that Karera had not been
President of the MRND once he had been appointed sous-prefet of Kigali rural
prefecture.881
Karera and Nshimiyimana were present for the meetings after the first
one.882
638. Witness AWE said that Ngirumpatse presided over the meeting, and
Nzirorera and Karemera were in attendance. If Nzirorera held no position with the
MRND at that time, he was there as a friend of the party.883
639. Witness AWE was one of the signatories to the MRND statutes in 1991.
Article 36 does not provide for the position of Deputy Secretary at the communal level of
the MRND.884
640. Witness AWE listed the members of the MRND communal committee for
Nyarugenge as Francois Karera, Angeline Mukandutiye, Hamadi Nshimiyimana, Odette
Nyirabagenzi, Amri Karekezi, Thomas Ntawiha, himself, and Francis Kayogora.885
641. The MRND Committee for Nyarugenge commune met only once in 1992,
twice in 1993, and did not meet in 1994.886
876 Transcript of 5 July 2007 @ 13 877 Transcript of 5 July 2007 @ 14 878 Transcript of 5 July 2007 @ 15 879 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 25 880 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 26 881 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 26-27 882 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 32 883 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 25 884 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 12-13; Exhibit DNG-2 885 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 13
129
642. During the third meeting, it was said they should make premises available to
the Interahamwe to enable them to hold meetings and to assist them during rallies.
Nzirorera said that the Interahamwe had completed their training and that they had been
given firearms and grenades which they could use if MRND was attacked or if the town
was attacked by Inkotanyi. Ngirumpatse and Karemera were also present at this
meeting.887
The same people who attended the first meeting were present for the third
meeting.888
643. In his OTP statement of 2004, Witness AWE attributed those statements to
Ngirumpatse.889
In further cross examination, he said that it was Ngirumpatse who had
addressed this meeting, not Nzirorera.890
644. Witness AWE said he no longer attended any party rallies after July 1993
because his house had been destroyed by criminals and he was reconstructing his
house.891
645. At a meeting at the Kabuga building between May and August 1993, Joseph
Nzirorera informed him that the Interahamwe were returning from a training session in
Gabiro.892
The meeting was chaired by Ngirumpatse.893
Nzirorera said that the Inkotanyi
was getting closer to town. He asked them to watch all Inkotanyi coming into residences
of Tutsis, to make a report thereon, forward the report to Karemera or himself, or leave it
for them at the Kabuga building. It was at that time that they started watching the Tutsis
closely.894
The same people who had attended the meetings at the Rubangura building
attended this meeting.895
646. The meeting was held in August 1993. During that meeting, Nzirorera said
that they had to draw up lists of Inkotanyi accomplices and give them to an MRND
886 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 15 887 Transcript of 4 July 2007@18; Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 27 888 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 27 889 Transcript of 4 July 2007@64 890 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 27 891 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 39 892 Transcript of 3 July 2007 @ 24 893 Transcript of 4 July 2007@14 894 Transcript of 4 July 2007@15 895 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 29
130
employee who was performing that duty on a regular basis. Witness AWE could not
name the employee. He did not comply with the request to compile lists.896
ii. Witness UB
647. Despite the claim by Witness AWE that Witness UB was in attendance at all
these meetings, when Witness UB testified he made no mention whatsoever of having
attended such meetings.
b. Defence evidence
648. Joseph Nzirorera will testify that he had no involvement with national
MRND organs in 1992 and that no such meetings with the Kigali conseillers were ever
held.
649. Francois Karera, Francois Gahigi, and Witness 29, will testify that no
such meetings with the Kigali conseillers were ever held.
2. Rwamagana MRND rally
a. Prosecution evidence
i. Witness AWE
650. Between 1992 and 1993, before he had been asked to sign the good conduct
letter897
, Witness AWE had attended an MRND rally at Rwamagana. Between 1500-
2000 people attended. Ngirumpatse, Nzirorera, and Karemera were present.898
All three
spoke, but he recalled Ngirumpatse saying that the Inkotanyi were Inyenzi, they had
attacked the country and were approaching. They come and find their accomplices. He
said to be careful, avoid cooperating with them and not have contact with them, except
the Tutsi who were MRND members.899
They were also to be wary of MRND members
who were Tutsi.900
651. The Rwamagana meeting took place between the end of 1992 and early
1993.901
He did not recall what position Ngirumpatse or Karemera held at that time
896 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 28 897 Transcript of 4 July 2007@14 898 Transcript of 4 July 2007@10 899 Transcript of 4 July 2007@11 900 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 34 901 Transcript of 5 July 2007 @ 7
131
with the MRND.902
The meeting was held before he issued the good conduct
certificates.903
652. Witness AWE attended only one meeting at Rwamagana and knew of no
other MRND meeting held there.904
The only persons he could recall attending were
Gabriel Byaliyehe , Rose Karushara, and Odette Nyirabagenzi.905
653. In a broadcast on Radio Rwanda in February 1994, it was stated that an
MRND rally had been held in Rwamagana, but Mathieu Ngirumpatse was unable to
attend because he was meeting with the Special Representative of the UN Secretary
General.906
Speeches of Ferdinand Kabagema and Edouard Karemera were reported.
There were no references to Inyenzi or Tutsi.907
654. Witness AWE claimed that politicians’ speeches included the words Tutsi
and Inkotanyi in every three sentences, and that the person recording the speech made a
selection because they did not want the international community to know that they were
saying the Tutsi was the enemy.908
A person who did not delete such references from a
recording would be severely punished because the recording would be heard by the
international community.909
b. Defence evidence
655. Edouard Karemera testified that on 14 February 1994, there was an MRND
rally in Rwamagana. Karemera attended as well as Ferdinand Kabagema. Nzirorera and
Ngirumpatse did not attend.910
656. Joseph Nzirorera will testify that he never attended any MRND rally in
Rwamagana.
3. January 1994 Allegations by Jean Pierre Turatsinze
a. Prosecution evidence
i. Frank Claeys
902 Transcript of 5 July 2007 @ 11 903 Transcript of 5 July 2007 @ 8 904 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 33 905 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 33 906 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 35; Exhibit DNZ-311 907 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 36-37; Exhibit DNZ-311 908 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 37 909 Transcript of 9 July 2007 @ 38 910 Transcript of 21 May 2009 @ 19
132
657. On 9 January 1994, in a broadcast over Radio Rwanda, Anastase Gasana,
MDR Minister of Foreign Affairs announced that ―our political parties are also informed
of the lugubrious plan to physically eliminate the main opponents of the Habyarimana
regime, which plan is to be implemented by the 1,700 Interahamwe, who are the MRND
militia and who have been trained and armed for that purpose. They have just been
unleashed in all the neighbourhoods of Kigali city.‖ This figure of 1700 was the same
that Jean Pierre Turatsinze provided to UNAMIR on 10 January.911
658, On 10 January 1994, General Dallaire asked Claeys and Captain Amadou
Deme of Senegal to get in contact with Prime Minister Designate Faustin Twagiramungu,
who would put them in touch with someone who had information to give.912
They went
to the office of Twagiramungu, who provided them with the name and phone number of
the person to contact.913
659. Thus, the informant came to UNAMIR through the political opponents of the
MRND, rather than just reporting his information directly to a law enforcement
agency.914
660. They went back to UNAMIR headquarters and called the informant, whose
name was Jean Pierre Turatsinze. They arranged to meet that evening at the parking lot
of the Kigali Nights nightclub. They picked Turatsinze up that evening and drove him to
the Belgian contingent headquarters.915
661. Turatsinze never said there was any plan to kill Belgian soldiers. He only
speculated that this might have occurred if certain events had taken place. The Belgian
contingent of UNAMIR never took any special precautions based upon this
information.916
Claeys never heard of any plans to kill Belgian soldiers while he was in
Rwanda.917
662. Turatsinze later told Claeys that the MRND leaders had changed their
attitudes towards the Belgians and believed they were not bad-intended.918
In a meeting
911 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 17; Exhibit DNZ-204 912 Transcript of 21 November 2006 @ 47 913 Transcript of 21 November 2006 @ 47 914 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 19 915 Transcript of 21 November 2006 @ 48 916 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 35 917 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 39 918 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 35
133
with Booh Booh in early February, the MRND party leaders urged UNAMIR to proceed
with the recovery of illegal arms throughout the country so as to ensure a peaceful and
secure environment.919
Also in early February, General Dallaire reported a major change
in the attitude of authorities such as the MRND Minister of Defence, MRND Minister of
Interior, Army Chief of Staff, and Prefet of Kigali, who were now publicly calling for
confiscation of weapons by UNAMIR and the gendamerie.920
663. Claeys had never experienced any hostility towards him during his stay in
Kigali.921
664. The Belgian soldiers who were killed on 7 April 1994 were not killed by
Interahamwe.922
665. Turatsinze claimed to be a former member of the President. Claeys
understood he had been a member of the Presidential Guard, although Turatsinze did not
use the term ―Presidential Guard.‖923
He claimed to be paid 150,000 RWF per month as
a wage. It was a huge wage in Rwanda, amounting to around E 2,000.924
666. Turatsinze said he had a direct link to the President of the MRND, although
he did not give any detail about financial support.925
667. Turatsinze said that the Interahamwe had trained 1700 men in RGF military
camps outside the capital. They were scattered in groups of 40 throughout Kigali. Since
UNAMIR deployed, he had trained 300 men in three week training sessions at RGF
camps. Turatsinze was very convincing and appeared to be familiar with military terms.
He claimed to have been trained in Egypt.926
668. Turatsinze said that since UNAMIR’s mandate, he had been ordered to make
an inventory of the houses of all Tutsi in Kigali. The inventory was still in process and
therefore he could not give a copy to UNAMIR. Turatsinze said he suspects it is for their
extermination. He also said his personnel could kill up to 1000 Tutsis in 20 minutes.927
919 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 36; Exhibit DNZ-205 920 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 38; Exhibit DNZ-206 921 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 56; Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 39 922 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 39-40 923 Transcript of 21 November 2006 @ 60 924 Transcript of 21 November 2006 @ 61 925 Transcript of 21 November 2006 @ 62 926 Transcript of 21 November 2006 @ 64; Exhibit DNZ-15 @ para. 5 927 Transcript of 21 November 2006 @ 65; Exhibit DNZ-15 @ para. 6
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669. Claeys had no information concerning the existence of such lists prior to
meeting Turatsinze or after meeting Turatsinze.928
Turatsinze told them that he
―suspects‖ the lists are for the extermination of Tutsis. He had apparently never been
explicitly told this explicitly by MRND leaders.929
Turatsinze had apparently never been
instructed to train Interahamwe to exterminate Tutsis.930
Turatsinze never told Claeys
that Interahamwe had been trained in such things as how to approach houses in the
middle of the night, how to enter locked premises, or how to neutralize the head of the
household.931
670. Turatsinze never showed UNAMIR these lists. They asked him for these
lists at every meeting, and Turatsinze always responded, ―Where is my security?‖932
671. Claeys understood Turatsinze to be saying that since he had people in 40
sections of Kigali, they could be deployed to enter houses of Tutsi during the night and
kill 1000 in 20 minutes. Turatsinze said he did not want to be involved in killings of
innocent Tutsi.933
Claeys understood Turatsinze to say that President Habyarimana was
not aware of the numbers or activities that he had disclosed during the interview.934
672. After 6 April, Tutsis in Rwanda were not killed by trained Interahamwe with
firearms invading their houses at the rate of 1000 Tutsis in 20 minutes, but were killed by
a combination of youth wing members from Several parties, soldiers, and members of the
population at roadblocks, in their home, and at places of refuge.935
673. Turatsinze said that he could provide the location of a major weapons cache
with at least 135 weapons and that he had already distributed 110 weapons, including 35
with ammunition and can give details on their location. He was ready to go to the arms
cache that night if he could be guaranteed protection for himself, his wife, and four
children. He wanted safe haven in an embassy and then political asylum in another
country.936
928 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 2, 31 929 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 16 930 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 16 931 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 16 932 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 31 933 Transcript of 21 November 2006 @ 66 934 Transcript of 21 November 2006 @ 67; Exhibit DNZ-15 @ para. 7 935 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 40 936 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 2
135
674. Claeys was not aware that Turatsinze had sold a large number of weapons
earmarked for the Interahamwe to a Burundian organisation known as FRODEBU and
had pocketed the money.937
It is possible that this might explain why Turatsinze was
asking UNAMIR for protection and not for money.938
675. Dallaire stated that he had reservations of the suddenness of Turatsinze’s
change of heart to come clean with this information and could not fully exclude the
possibility of a trap and a set up.939
676. Claeys believed the information was too precise to be untrue, but it needed
some verification. The fax was sent to New York in the early morning hours of 11
January 1994. He was informed that New York did not give any authorization for any
action to recover weapons at the sites earmarked by the informant.940
The UN
headquarters, in their response, noted that there were inconsistencies in the information
provided by the informant.941
677. The information provided by Turatsinze was being treated with caution at all
levels of the UN.942
678. They never attempted to verify the information provided by Turtasinze
before forwarding it to UN headquarters.943
It was never subjected to rigorous
intelligence analysis because UNAMIR, as a Chapter Six UN mission, was not authorized
or equipped to conduct intelligence analysis.944
679. The second time he met Turatsinze was on the evening of 12 January 1994.
Turatsinze explained that he was late for the meeting because he had been with the
MRND President who had urged Turatsinze to accelerate the distribution of weapons.945
680. Turatsinze explained that he had already distributed weapons to the 25
secteur commanders, but that they had not distributed them to the lower levels. That
937 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 16 938 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 32 939 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 4; Exhibit DNZ-15 @ para. 11 940 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 5 941 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 23; Exhibit P39 942 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 23 943 Transcript of 23 November 2006 @ 10 944 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 43 945 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 8
136
would require an order from him. He also could order that the weapons be returned to
him.946
681. Turatsinze said he distributed weapons in his own car, a white sedan, as well
as six minibuses belonging to the MRND or vehicles of the security services of the
Army.947
He said that the weapons were moved every 5 or 6 days. He also said that
grenades had been distributed a long time ago and that up to 60 Interahamwe per secteur
should have 2-3 grenades each.948
682. At the end of the meeting on 12 January, Turatsinze offered to prove his
reliability by showing UNAMIR weapons which were stored at MRND headquarters.949
Claeys and Deme drove Turatsinze to the party headquarters. Claeys waited in the car
while Turatsinze took Deme inside. When Deme returned, he said that he had seen 50
weapons in canvas bags with sealed boxes of ammunition in a shed on the property.950
683. Turatsinze did not tell them on 10 January that the weapons were stored at
the MRND headquarters.951
He told them there were 135 weapons on 10 January, and
when he showed them the weapons on 12 January at the MRND headquarters, Captain
Deme observed about 50. Turatsinze did not distribute any weapons between 10 and 12
January. Therefore it is possible that the 135 weapons were stored at some place other
than the MRND headquarters.952
684. Turatsinze had the ability to move weapons around, and had offered to move
some of the weapons from his home to the MRND headquarters if UNAMIR was going
to stage a raid there.953
685. Turatsinze told Claeys that he was able to order the return of previously-
distributed weapons to him. Turatsinze never told Claeys that on 11 January 1994, he had
issued a communiqué over RTLM calling for an urgent meeting of the Interahamwe
secteur Presidents to be held at MRND headquarters in Kimihurura.954
946 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 9; Exhibit P42 @ para. 4 947 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 9; Exhibit P42 @ para. 4 948 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 10; Exhibit P42 @ para. 4 949 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 11 950 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 11-12; Exhibit P42 @ para. 8 951 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 23 952 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 23-24 953 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 24; Exhibit P44 954 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 24,30; Exhibit DNZ-242
137
686. For all Claeys knows, Turatsinze could have put the weapons at the MRND
headquarters on the evening of 12 January before showing them to UNAMIR.955
Claeys
never determined that Ngirumpatse or Nzirorera were aware of the presence of weapons
at MRND headquarters.956
687. On 12 January, Turatsinze offered to provide them the next evening with
license numbers of vehicles used for arms distribution and a few of the sites where arms
caches are located.957
688. On 13 January, in the afternoon, he attended a meeting between General
Dallaire and the President and Secretary General of the MRND.958
The meeting was tape
recorded, but the tape has not been located. At the meeting, Dallaire expressed his
concern of weapons being possessed outside military barracks. The MRND officials
denied knowledge of this.959
689. Claeys did not know that there had been a meeting the day before between
UNAMIR and the MRND leaders. For him it was the first time this concern was
expressed to these people.960
690. On the evening of 13 January, he and Deme again met with Turatsinze.961
He provided them with three license numbers of cars used to transport weapons.
Turatsinze offered to move some weapons from his home to the MRND offices to
increase the number of weapons there if they mounted an operation there.962
691. Turatsinze said that most of the weapons he had were brand new. He said
that only a few of the weapons he had distributed had magazines or ammunition and
those distributed to the lower cells had no magazines.963
He said that the weapons
distribution had begun about a month before (December).964
955 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 30 956 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 31 957 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 12; Exhibit P42 @ para. 10 958 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 12 959 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 17 960 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 17; Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 74 961 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 19 962 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 21; Exhibit P44 963 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 21 964 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 22;
138
692. Turatsinze said he had a list of around 2000 Interahamwe, but he never
provided or showed that list. He did show them three places where he said weapons were
stored.965
However, Claeys did not see weapons at these locations.966
693. Turatsinze said that the MRND leaders had videotaped the meeting with
General Dallaire and the meeting at UNAMIR the previous week. Claeys believed he
was referring to the meeting where Dallaire and Booh Booh had gone to the MRND
offices, and the meeting at which Claeys had been present. However, Claeys observed no
taping equipment at the meeting he attended with the MRND leaders.967
694. Turatsinze also told them on 20 January that he had distributed 9 of the
weapons in a blue Pajero belonging to Prefet Renzaho. He also warned that the
contractor of the works at CND, named Sebera, would be killed soon.968
UNAMIR took
no steps to warn Sebera and had no information that he was ever killed.969
695. Turatsinze also said that he had been told that a UNAMIR Colonel had
driven a bus of PL members to the CND on 5 January. To Claeys’ knowledge, nobody in
UNAMIR was involved in driving a bus with PL members to the CND.970
696. Turatsinze also said that UNAMIR had three microbuses on standby to
evacuate its Tutsi employees if necessary. Claeys was not aware of such measures ever
being prepared.971
697. Claeys met with Turatsinze on 10 February. Turatsinze told him how he and
the Chief of Staff of the Gendarmerie had secured the return of a weapon seized from an
Interahamwe.972
UNAMIR never attempted to verify this information with the chief of
staff, although Colonel Marchal was in daily contact with him.973
698. Turatsinze also spoke of an impending raid on the communal office at
Butamwa to recover a weapon seized from an Interahamwe. To Claeys knowledge, no
such raid ever took place.974
UNAMIR never warned the bourgmestre of Butamwa .975
965 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 23 966 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 24 967 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 25 968 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 26 969 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 74 970 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 28; Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 75 971 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 74 972 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 32 973 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 75 974 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 33; Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 75
139
699. Turatsinze also claimed that the Interahamwe were trained by Israelis in the
forests.976
Although Israel was a member of the UN, Claeys never confirmed that Israel
had ever trained people in Rwanda.977
Turatsinze also claimed that the Interahamwe
were responsible for the attack on RPF Major Karenzi.978
700. Turatsinze told him on 17 February that the French had been training
Zaireans in the Gishwati forest in Rwanda. Claeys never verified this with the French.979
701. Claeys was told by the RPF liason officer, Colonel Karenzi, that he
understood that UNAMIR was infiltrating the Interahamwe. From this, Claeys assumed
that perhaps Turatsinze had approached the RPF since UNAMIR had not been able to
provide him the guarantees he had sought.980
He believed that Turatsinze may have been
shopping his information to the RPF.981
702. The information they did have from other sources related to military training
and distribution of weapons to Interahamwe. They did not have any other information
concerning the extermination of Tutsis.982
ii. Witness G
703. Witness G testified that Jean Pierre Turatsinze was an MRND driver.983
He
was not all that honest, since he had stolen weapons from MRND and sold them to
FRODEBU.984
He disappeared after the sale of these weapons between October and
December 1993 and was not seen again.985
704. Contrary to what was said in the UNAMIR Coded Cable of 11 January 1994,
Turatsinze was never in charge of any MRND demonstrations.986
He knew of no plans of
the MRND to provoke a civil war with the RPF battalion, to assassinate opposition
leaders at the swearing-in of the transitional government, or to provoke and kill Belgian
975 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 75 976 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 33 977 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 75-76 978 Transcript of 22 November 2006 @ 34 979 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 76 980 Transcript of 23 November 2006 @ 47 981 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 23 982 Transcript of 28 November 2006 @ 60 983 Transcript of 17 October 2005 @ 53 984 Transcript of 17 October 2005 @ 53 985 Transcript of 17 October 2005 @ 53-54; Transcript of 18 October 2005 @ 2 986 Transcript of 18 October 2005 @ 4; Exhibit #DNZ-15B
140
soldiers.987
He was not paid 150,000 RWF per month by MRND, which was more than
the salary of a Minister or even perhaps the President of the Republic.988
He was also
unaware of any link between Turatsinze and the Chief of Staff of the Army.989
705. It was not true that the Interahamwe were to protect Kigali from the RPF.
They were trained only to protect MRND officials. There were no lists of Tutsis drawn
up by the Interahamwe, as claimed by Turatsinze. He was not aware of any training of
Interahamwe to kill up to 1000 Tutsis in 20 minutes.990
iii. Witness UB
706. Although he had several conversations with Turatsinze about distribution of
weapons, Turatsinze never told him of a plan to kill Belgian soldiers so that the Belgians
would withdraw from Rwanda.991
He was not aware that Turatsinze had worked in the
office of the Presidency.992
iv. Witness T
707. Witness T testified that the Interahamwe never received any instructions
from the MRND to provoke Belgian soldiers.993
708. Witness T believes the FAX of 11 January 1994 is a manipulation. The
figure of 1700 Interahamwe having been trained is an overestimate—probably double the
actual figure. And the claim that Tutsis could be killed at a rate of 1000 in 20 minutes
was ―too good to be true‖ and may well have been created after the April events, not on
11 January.994
709. Witness T was not aware that Turatsinze had ever worked for the presidency,
as claimed in the FAX. It was not possible that Turatsinze was being paid RWF150,000
per month to train Interahamwe.995
He was unaware of any order to register all Tutsis in
Kigali, or that 1000 Tutsis were to be killed in 20 minutes.996
Witness T was unaware of
987 Transcript of 18 October 2005 @ 4; Exhibit #DNZ-15B 988 Transcript of 18 October 2005 @ 5; Exhibit #DNZ-15B 989 Transcript of 18 October 2005 @ 5; Exhibit #DNZ-15B 990 Transcript of 18 October 2005 @ 5; Exhibit #DNZ-15B 991 Transcript of 2 March 2006@ 41 992 Transcript of 2 March 2006@ 41 993 Transcript of 29 May 2006 @ 45 994 Transcript of 24 May 2006 @ 32-33; Transcript of 29 May 2006 @ 51 995 Transcript of 29 May 2006 @ 52-53 996 Transcript of 29 May 2006 @ 53
141
any lists of Tutsis compiled by Interahamwe.997
Witness T never saw any weapons
stockpiled anywhere.998
v. Witness HH
710. Witness HH testified that Turatsinze never admitted to him that he was
involved in arms trafficking to FRODEBU. He simply said that others were saying that.
He later got the proof that he had in fact sold the weapons.999
This meant to him that
Turatsinze could not be trusted.1000
711. When recalled, Witness HH testified that he had heard allegations that Jean
Pierre Turatsinze was working for the RPF.These allegations were made by Aloys
Ngirabatware and Seraphin Twahirwa, who worked for the Interahamwe. In December
1993, Turatsinze himself said that he was being persecuted because it was suspected he
was working for the RPF.1001
b. Defence evidence
712. Joseph Nzirorera will testify to Turatsinze’s role in the MRND and the fact
that Turatsinze’s allegations were false. He will explain how he fired Turatsinze for
dishonesty.
713. Witness 29, Georges Rutaganda, Witness 31, Seraphin Twahirwa, and
Witness 36 will testify to Turatsinze’s role in the MRND and the fact that Turatsinze’s
allegations were false.
714. Witness 22a, a UNAMIR officer, will testify that the allegations made by
Jean Pierre Turatsinze were not credible.
715. Tharcisse Renzaho will testify that he never lent any vehicle to Turatsinze.
716. Witness ALL-42, whose testimony from the Bagosora et al trial was
admitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis, testified that Turatsinze was collaborating with the RPF
at the time he provided the information to UNAMIR.1002
717. Colonel Luc Marchal, whose testimony from the Bagosora et al case was
admitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis, testified that he began to have doubts about the
997 Transcript of 7 June 2006 @ 19 998 Transcript of 1 June 2006 @ 4 999 Transcript of 13 November 2006 @ 12 1000 Transcript of 13 November 2006 @ 13 1001 Transcript of 5 May 2009 @ 39 1002 Exhibit DNZ-517; Transcript of 9 November 2006 @ 1-3
142
credibility of information or the informant, Jean Pierre, in 2005 based on various
objective elements that became public.1003
Marchal testified that he could not exclude the
hypothesis that the introduction of an informant, Jean-Pierre, to UNAMIR was a
manipulation by Faustin Twagiramungu, an open opponent of Habyarimana, to embarrass
President Habyarimana or the hypothesis that Jean-Pierre was an agent of the RPF and
that his revelations to UNAMIR were a manipulation by the RPF to embarrass President
Habyarimana.1004
718. Faustin Twagiramungu, whose testimony from the Ntakirutimana case was
admitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis, testified that the informant had only mentioned that
there were hidden arms caches around the city, not that there was a plan to exterminate
the Tutsis.1005
c. Other information
719. The Trial Chamber in the Bagosora et al judgement concluded that:
―The evidence based on Jean-Pierre’s information is entirely second or third-
hand, and his whereabouts and the circumstances concerning his disappearance
are unknown. Notably, Witnesses A and BY, who were both well placed
Interahamwe officials, did not corroborate Jean-Pierre’s information about the
plan to kill Tutsis.1006
These concerns warrant considerable caution in relying on
this main aspect of Jean Pierre’s information.1007
4. Sabotage of the Arusha Accords
a. Prosecution evidence
i. Witness UB
720. Witness UB testified that at a rally at Nyamirambo stadium at the end of
1993, Ngirumpatse said that the MRND would never accept to share power with the Tutsi
saying that the Tutsi had obtained several seats in the government under the Arusha
Accords.1008
ii. Witness ALG
1003 Exhibit DNZ-520; Transcript of 30 November 2006 @ 32 1004 Exhibit DNZ-520; Transcript of 30 November 2006 @ 32 1005 Exhibit DNZ-514; Transcript of 5 February 2002 @ 6 1006 Witness A is Witness G in our case and Witness BY is Witness T in our case. 1007 Prosecutor v Bagosora et al, No. ICTR-98-41-T, Judgement (18 December 2008) at para. 519 1008 Transcript of 23 February 2006@ 46
143
721. At a rally at Nyamirambo stadium at the end of 1993, Ngirumpatse said that
the MRND would never accept to share power with the Tutsi saying that the Tutsi had
obtained several seats in the government under the Arusha Accords.1009
Ngirumpatse
never called for the elimination of the Tutsis.1010
iii. Witness GOB
722. At the MRND rally in Ruhengeri, President Habyarimana said that the
MRND would not accept the Arusha Accords.1011
The President himself said he was not
in agreement with the Arusha Accords. It was a scrap of paper that could not be
implemented.1012
Ngirumpatse also said the MRND would never accept the Arusha
Accords.1013
iv. Witness G
723. Witness G testified that in May, 1993, Emmanuel Gapyisi of the MDR party
was assassinated. Witness G has no knowledge of any involvement of the Interahamwe
in that killing.1014
724. In February, 1994, Felicien Gatabazi was assassinated. The Interahamwe
was blamed for this, but as far as Witness G knows, they were not responsible for
Gatabazi’s assassination. The next day, the CDR leader Martin Bucyana was killed. The
Interahamwe was not responsible for his death.1015
725. According to Witness G, President Habyarimana met with the National
Committee of the Interahamwe in January, 1994. He asked them to tell any contacts they
had in the Belgian and American Embassies that the MRND was not against the Arusha
Accords.1016
He found that President Habyarimana was in favor of peace and power
sharing according to the Arusha Accords. He said with peace the refugees who were
suffering would finally be able to go home.1017
There was no indication that President
Habyarimana favored the extermination of the Tutsis.1018
1009 Transcript of 23 February 2006@ 46 1010 Transcript of 3 March 2006@ 21 1011 Transcript of 22 October 2007 @ 43 1012 Transcript of 22 October 2007 @ 49 1013 Transcript of 22 October 2007 @ 49 1014 Transcript of 17 October 2005 @ 27 1015 Transcript of 18 October 2005@ 17-18 1016 Transcript of 18 October 2005@ 13 1017 Transcript of 18 October 2005@ 14 1018 Transcript of 18 October 2005@ 15
144
726. He had heard that Paul Kagame said on Radio Muhabura that if the Arusha
Accords were not implemented, they would be forced to accept them at gunpoint.1019
v. Witness T
727. Witness T testified that the Arusha Accords were signed in August 1993 and
were supported by President Habyarimana and the MRND.1020
728. The Interahamwe never received any instructions from the MRND to block
the implementation of the Arusha Accords, as the MRND supported those accords.1021
729. Witness T testified that the Interahamwe had nothing to do with the
assassination of MDR leader Emmanuel Gapyisi in May 1993. His family even
acknowledged this.1022
730. Witness T testified that the Interahamwe received no instructions to
assassinate Felicien Gatabazi in late February, 1994,1023
or Martin Bucyana.1024
731. In 1994, it was the RPF which was the obstacle to the setting up of
transitional institutions.1025
Article 61 of the Arusha Accords of 30 October 1992
provided that all political parties were to be represented in the transitional assembly if
they signed a code of ethics. There was no legitimate reason to exclude the CDR as of
March 1994.1026
vi. documentary evidence
732. On 9 July 1992, Enoch Ruhigira wrote to President Habyarimana conveying
the views of the Council of Ministers concerning the Arusha Accords which
recommended closer coordination between the Prime Minister and the President
concerning the government’s position in the Arusha negotiations.1027
733. On 30 October 1992, Enoch Ruhigira and Juvenal Renzaho wrote a
handwritten letter to President Habyarimana reporting the results of a reflection meeting
held by the MRND leaders, including Mathieu Ngirumpatse. The letter likewise reflected
1019 Transcript of 18 October 2005@ 10 1020 Transcript of 29 May 2006 @ 19 1021 Transcript of 29 May 2006 @ 44 1022 Transcript of 29 May 2006 @ 13 1023 Transcript of 29 May 2006 @ 56 1024 Transcript of 29 May 2006 @ 58 1025 Transcript of 1 June 2006 @ 13 1026 Transcript of 1 June 2006 @ 15-16 1027 Exhibit DNZ-427
145
the views that the government should be speaking with one voice in Arusha and the
Prime Minister and President should be in greater consultation.1028
734. The MRND’s position on the Arusha Accords was set forth on several
occasions. In an MRND aide-memoire dated 14 November 1992, Mathieu Ngirumpatse
objected to the opposition negotiating the Arusha Accords without consulting all parties,
and urged the government to investigate and make public the results of its investigation
on acts of insecurity, such as Bugesera. He also called for a timetable for early
elections.1029
735. At the 15 November 1992 Ruhengeri meeting, Ngirumpatse reiterated
MRND’s support for the Arusha negotiations, but said they had some points to discuss
concerning the composition of the national assembly. He expressed confidence that
when elections were held, MRND would win.1030
736.During the rally in Ruhengeri, Casimir Bizimungu spoke of the 400,000
people displaced by the war, 100,000 of whom were in Ruhengeri and asked people to
assist those persons.1031
He spoke in support of the Arusha Accords and called for
elections.1032
737. At that rally, President Habyarimana declared MRND’s support for the
Arusha negotiations and said it was false to say that the MRND did not support the
negotiations. He said that peace is not confined to a piece of paper, it is in one’s
heart.1033
738. In a memorandum dated 18 December 1992, the MRND said that the Arusha
Accords needed to be agreed to in consultation with all parties, not simply the opposition
and RPF. It accused the opposition of exceeding their mandate in the most recent
negotiations.1034
1028 Exhibit DNZ-428 1029 Exhibit DNZ-339 1030 Exhibit #DNZ-48-49 1031 Transcript of 14 October 2005 @ 46-47; Exhibit #DNZ-8 1032 Transcript of 14 October 2005 @ 47; Exhibit #DNZ-8 1033 Exhibit #DNZ-47 1034 Exhibit DNZ-340
146
739. In an MRND document entitled ―Contribution to the Arusha Accords‖ dated
21 December 1992, all of the concessions of the MRND to achieve peace were listed.
Proposals were made for an equitable sharing of power among the political parties.1035
740. On 30 December 1992, Enoch Ruhigira sent a letter to the Prime Minister
complaining on behalf of President Habyarimana that the Prime Minister and negotiators
at Arusha had taken certain positions without consulting the President.1036
741. On 11 January 1993, Enoch Ruhigira issued a communiqué in response to
statements by the Minister of Information concerning the Arusha negotiations.1037
742. On 18 January 1993, Ngirumpatse wrote to the Prime Minister complaining
that the negotiations in Arusha were being carried out without proper consultation and
consensus among the Ministers and with the President.1038
743. On 26 January 1993, Enoch Ruhigira sent a letter to the Prime Minister
setting forth the position of the President on various issues concerning the Arusha
negotiations.1039
744. In a speech dated 13 March 1993, President Habyarimana said that the
problems with the RPF could only be solved by negotiations. He said the government’s
commitment to the Arusha negotiations was unyielding. He condemned those in the
Army who resorted to violence and insisted that they be punished. He said that unity and
reconciliation, without prejudice or vengeance, was essential.1040
745. In a speech dated 23 March 1993, President Habyarimana once again
emphasized that the Arusha negotiations were the sole path for solving the problems of
the country, and condemned the RPF for renewing the war which had displaced 1 million
people in the country. He responded to the report of the International Commision on
Human Rights and said that they had mistakenly focused on ethnic problems. He
recognized that local populations had victimized innocent civilians and urged the the
perpetrators be punished. He called on the leaders of political parties to sensitize their
1035 Exhibit DNZ-341 1036 Exhibit DNZ-429 1037 Exhibit DNZ-430 1038 Exhibit #P216 1039 Exhibit DNZ-431 1040 Exhibit DNZ-342
147
youth wings to a spirit of tolerance and for the parties to work together to achieve peace
and reconciliation.1041
746. Among the acts Major Hock indicates in his report were attributed to the
Interahamwe was the 19 April 1993 assassination of Colonel Mayuya, the 8 May 1993
assassination of MDR official Emmanuel Gapyisi, demonstrating on 5 January 1994 at
the CND after the swearing-in ceremony, and an 8 January 1994 demonstration near
CND.1042
747. On 15 June 1993, Enoch Ruhigira sent a letter to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs on behalf of the President recalling him from Arusha for consultations.1043
748. On 28 November 1993, in an assessment made by UNAMIR, it was noted
that President Habyarimana and other leaders demonstrated a genuine readiness to
support the early implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement.1044
749. In a report of the Secretary General on 16 December 1993, it was noted that
there was political goodwill on behalf of the parties in Rwanda and it was their intention
to implement the Arusha Accords. He remarked that ―after Namibia and Cambodia,
Rwanda is on the way of becoming another success story of the United Nations
peacekeeping operations.‖1045
750. In Janaury 1994, Enoch Ruhigira sent a letter to the Prime Minister
concerning the President’s desire to swear in the Broad Based Transitional
Government.1046
751. In a communiqué dated 1 February 1994, the Interahamwe expressed its
support for the Arusha Accords and for unity amongst Rwandans. It announced that
persons were dressing in MRND uniforms and committing acts of violence and therefore
members should no longer wear the uniform.1047
1041 Exhibit DNZ-343 1042 Pages 7-8 1043 Exhibit DNZ-432 1044 Exhibit DNZ-384 1045 Transcript of 27 November 2006 @ 48-49; Exhibit DNZ-210 1046 Exhibit DNZ-433 1047 Transcript of 18 October 2005@ 16-17
148
752. On 16 March 1994, the Tanzanian Foreign Minister informed the UN that
President Habyarimana and the political parties did not appear to wish to implement the
Arusha Accords.1048
753. On 25 March 1994, UNAMIR reported that the RPF refused to appear at the
swearing-in. President Habyarimana said that the RPF refused to allow the CDR to be in
Parliament, even though they accepted the accord and fulfilled all the conditions.1049
754. On 26 March 1994, UNAMIR reported that the BBTG installation could not
take place due to the boycott of the RPF.1050
755. On 28 March 1994, UNAMIR reported that the impasse was now between
the RPF and the government over whether the CDR should be represented in the
Transitional Assembly. Booh Booh and the Ambassadors’ view is that CDR should be
allowed.1051
756. On 29 March 1994, Enoch Ruhigira sent a letter to Special Representative
Jacques Roger Booh Booh concerning President Habyarimana’s desire to swear in the
Broad Based Transitional Government.1052
b. Defence case
757. Karemera Witness XQL, a member of the MRND Ruhengeri prefectural
committee, testified that President Habyarimana did not speak against the Arusha
Accords, but supported it firmly.1053
758. Joseph Nzirorera will testify that the MRND supported the Arusha
Accords.
759. Witness 29, Francois Karera, Georges Rutaganda, Witness 31, Casimir
Bizimungu, Andre Ntagerura, and Pauline Nyiramasuhuko will testify that the
MRND supported the Arusha Accords.
760. Jacques Roger Booh Booh will testify about the various political parties’
support and obstructions of the Arusha Accords.
1048 Exhibit #P139 1049 Exhibit DNZ-399 1050 Exhibit DNZ-400 1051 Exhibit DNZ-401 1052 Exhibit DNZ-434 1053 Transcript of 5 May 2008 @ 31
149
761. Luc Marchal, the commander of the UNAMIR Belgian contingent, whose
testimony in the Bagosora et al trial was admitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis, testified that
he believed that President Habyarimana had the will to implement the Arusha
Accords.1054
762. Barabwiriza Runyinya, whose written statement was admitted pursuant to
Rule 92 bis, was appointed Advisor for Diplomatic Affairs in the Office of the President
of the Republic. Beginning in March 1993, he became involved in the negotiation and
implementation of the Arusha Accords and remained so involved until April 1994. In
this capacity, he became very familiar with the attitude of President Habyarimana
towards the Arusha Accords. President Habyarimana was truly willing to implement the
Arusha Accords. The MRND also supported the implementation of the Arusha
Accords.1055
763. Joshua Ruzibiza, Aloys Ruyenzi, Witness ALL-42, and Witness BRA-1,
RPF insiders whose testimony was admitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis, testified that the
RPF assassinated Emmanuel Gapyisi, Felicien Gatbazi, and President Habyarimana so
that the Arusha Accords would not be implemented.1056
5. Cooperation with Military to Plan Extermination of Tutsis
a. Prosecution evidence
i. Witness ZF
764. See allegations concerning Gisenyi events.
ii. Witness XBM
765. See allegations concerning Gisenyi events
iii. Documentary evidence
766. On 27 July 1992, Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva sent a memorandum
entitled ―Mood of the Military and Civilians‖ to the Army Chief of Staff and the
President.1057
In the memorandum, he indicates that many in the military are
apprehensive about the proposed merger between the RPF and RGF, and believe that the
1054 Exhibit DNZ-520; Transcript of 4 December 2006 @ 34 1055 Exhibit DNZ-619 1056 Exhibits DNZ-515, DNZ-516, DNZ-517, DNZ-518 1057 P197
150
practice of Kubohoza must be stopped. He proposes that the RPF be integrated into the
Army in proportion to the percentage of Tutsis in Rwanda (14%).
767. In a document dated 21 September 1992, Army Chief of Staff Deogratias
Nsabimana directed that a document entitled ―Definition of the Enemy‖ which had been
prepared by a commission of officers appointed in 1991, be disseminated to the troops.
The main enemy was defined as ―the Tutsi, inside and abroad, extremist and hungry for
power, who has never and not yet recognized the reality of the 1959 social revolution and
who wants to take power in Rwanda by all means including the use of armed force.‖1058
b. Defence evidence
768. Joseph Nzirorera will testify that he was not aware of any plan for the
extermination of Tutsis. After the multiparty system was inaugurated, military officers
did not participate in political party rallies.
769. Anatole Nsengiyumva, Theoneste Bagosora, Augustin Bizimungu,
Tharcisse Renzaho, and Gratien Kabiligi will testify that the Army had no plans to
exterminate Tutsis and did not participate in political party rallies.
770. Witness LE-1, whose testimony in the Bagosora et al case was admitted
pursuant to Rule 92 bis, is a former Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Army. He testified
that in December 1991 there was a meeting, chaired by the president, of unit commanders
and operational commanding officers of the army and gendarmerie in Kigali to consider
soldiers’ leave and chart the state of the war.1059
Colonel Muberuka raised the need to
clarify who the enemy was for the general public and international community.1060
The
meeting set up a committee to define the enemy, discuss the changing methods of the
enemy’s strategies and consider how to overcome the enemy.1061
Prior to the committee
being set up, the enemy was defined as armed Tutsi refugees coming from Uganda.1062
The witness spoke to the president about the findings of the committee on 9 June 1992.
The report indicated that only the Tutsi who had taken up arms to recapture power was
the enemy.1063
It did not suggest a plan by the military to eliminate Tutsis, rather it aimed
1058 P198 1059 Exhibit DNZ-519; Transcript of 20 October 2005 @ 5 1060 Exhibit DNZ-519; Transcript of 20 October 2005 @ 6 1061 Exhibit DNZ-519; Transcript of 20 October 2005 @ 7 1062 Exhibit DNZ-519; Transcript of 20 October 2005 @ 8 1063 Exhibit DNZ-519; Transcript of 20 October 2005 @ 51
151
to avoid confusion between the Tutsis from Uganda attacking the government and Tutsis
inside Rwanda who supported the government.1064
c. Other information
771. In the Bagosora et al judgement, the Trial Chamber held that:
It is common ground that defining the enemy is done by military authorities in
many countries. Based on such a definition, the armed forces may adapt its
strategies and order its resources. Consequently, the establishment of the Enemy
Commission on 4 December 1991 was not in itself unusual or illegitimate, in
particular in view of the fact that there had been hostilities on Rwandan territory
since the RPF invasion on 1 October 1990.1065
The Definition of the Enemy clause qualifies the term ―Tutsi‖ as the ―extremist‖
Tutsis, who are not acknowledging the realities of the 1959 revolution and wish to
―regain power ... by all possible means, including the use of weapons‖. The
Identification of the Enemy provision describes the enemy, in particular, by
certain enumerated acts, which in themselves have a connection to war (e.g.
taking up arms, carrying out propaganda and recruitment for the enemy, spying,
sabotage). Read in context, the Chamber does not agree with the Prosecution that
the definition implies that all Tutsis are extremists, wanting to regain power. The
Chamber has also noted the exception for political opponents who seek power
within the political system through peaceful means, both in the Definition clause
and the Identification clause. It is, however, aware that such disclaimers may
sometimes be more cosmetic than substantial.1066
It may be asked whether the way the ENI document is formulated, combining
both ethnicity and more direct language about the RPF, is an example of ―double
language‖, the real intention among its members being to target the Tutsis.
However, the composition of the Commission does not support such a view. Of
its 10 members, three of them, Bagosora, Ntabakuze and Nsengiyumva, have
been indicted by the Tribunal.1067
Among its members were persons generally
considered as moderate. Two later attained high positions in the post-1994
Rwandan government.1068
The Prosecution suggests that unlike the Accused, the
1064 Exhibit DNZ-519; Transcript of 20 October 2005 @ 10 1065 Prosecutor v Bagosora et al, No. ICTR-98-41-T, Judgement (18 December 2008) at para. 201 1066 Para. 203 1067 The Commission was composed of 10 members, of whom three are accused at the Tribunal, four are
deceased or reported missing, and three are at liberty: Colonel Théoneste Bagosora (accused), Colonel
Déogratias Nsabimana (deceased), Colonel Marcel Gatsinzi (at liberty), Colonel Pontien Hakizimana
(deceased), Colonel Félicien Muberuka (at liberty), Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva (accused), Major
Juvénal Bahufite (deceased), Major Augustin Cyiza (reported missing), Major Aloys Ntabakuze (accused) and Major Pierre Karangwa (at liberty). 1068 Colonel Gatsinzi is the current Rwandan Minister of Defence. Major Cyiza was a former Vice-
president of the Rwandan Supreme Court and human rights advocate of considerable standing, see
Bagosora Defence Exhibit 358 (Expert Report of Bernard Lugan), p. 92; Bagosora, T. 26 October 2005, pp.
52-54. See also Des Forges, T. 23 September 2002 pp. 103-106; T. 24 September 2002 pp. 2-3 (noting the
152
moderates distanced themselves from ethnic extremism after 1994. The evidence
does not support this view but indicates that they were perceived as moderates
also in 1994. It is therefore difficult to conclude that the ambiguous wording of
the ENI Document, with its admittedly prominent ethnic component, is sufficient
evidence of a conspiracy within the Commission around late 1991 to exterminate
the Tutsi ethnic group.
The Chamber does not find it established beyond reasonable doubt that Bagosora,
Ntabakuze and Nsengiyumva acted together in a conspiracy as members of the
Enemy Commission in December 1991, the aim being to exterminate the Tutsi
ethnic group. It reaches the same conclusion with respect to the publication of the
ENI Document in September 1992.
E. Other Facts Concerning Credibility of Prosecution Kigali Witnesses
772. Certain events which took place before Mr. Nzirorera joined the MRND
executive bureau, such as attacks in the Bugesera region, and MRND rallies in Kigali,
Ruhengeri, and Gisenyi prefectures, have been the subject of testimony by multiple
prosecution witnesses. While these events are not charged in the indictment, and do not
involve Mr. Nzirorera, the false testimony about them can be proven, and therefore are
relevant to show that the testimony of those prosecution witnesses are not credible.
1. March 1992 Events in Bugesera
a. Prosecution evidence
i. Witness AWD
773. Witness AWD claimed that the Interahamwe and soldiers attacked Tutsis in
Bugesera and about 100 people were killed. He knew about the participation of
Interahamwe because they would come back and brag about it. The Interahamwe also
went to Sharongi, attacked Tutsis, and drove people away, like Gasamagara and Venante
Kabagemi. The Interahamwe told him everything they had done when they met at the
MRND office. 1069
774. His information about participation of the Interahamwe in the Bugesera
attacks actually came from overhearing Jean Damascene Ryeze say so in a bar one night
when he was drunk. Witness AWD was with Jean Gasana.1070
The other person he spoke
to, Aminadab Buhake, the MRND President in Kicikuro commune, told him that the
complexity and dynamism of Rwandan politics, and the fact that many persons have followed somewhat
extraordinary career paths). 1069 Transcript of 10 October 2007 @ 16-17 1070 Transcript of 8 November 2007 @ 60
153
Interahamwe left his commune in large numbers to participate in the attacks. No one else
was present when they had this conversation.1071
ii. Witness GOB
775. Witness GOB also testified that the Interahamwe played a role in the killings
in Bugesera.1072
After it was said that the RPF had laid mines in the area, the
Interahamwe and members of the local population attacked the Tutsis, killing 165 people
and displacing some 750 others.1073
However, it was ourselves who had laid the mines in
order to make the residents of the area afraid.1074
776. Witness GOB acknowledged that he was not in Bugesera and his information
came from information concerning an international investigation that was conducted.1075
777. The testimony of Witness AWD and GOB was contradicted by other
prosecution witnesses:
iii. Witness G
778. Witness G testified that the Interahamwe were not involved in the killing of
Tutsis in Bugesera in 1992 as far as he knew.1076
In fact, the members of the National
Committee of the Interahamwe wrote a letter to Faustin Twagiramungu of the MDR
denying his allegations that they were involved in the Bugesera killings.1077
The
Interahamwe were not involved in attacking Tutsis in March 1992.1078
779. Mathieu Ngirumpatse was Minister of Justice during the Bugesera events in
March 1992 and many people were arrested and remained in jail when he left office.1079
780. In April 1992, the MRND Congress passed a resolution condemning the
killings in Bugesera and other places.1080
iv. Witness T
781. Witness T testified that the letter sent by the Interahamwe committee to
Faustin Twagiramungu in March 1992 was in response to his baseless claims that the
1071 Transcript of 8 November 2007 @ 60 1072 Transcript of 22 October 2007 @ 44 1073 Transcript of 22 October 2007 @ 44-45 1074 Transcript of 22 October 2007 @ 48 1075 Transcript of 25 October 2007 @ 47 1076 Transcript of 14 October 2005 @ 23 1077 Transcript of 14 October 2005 @ 25; Exhibit #DNZ-5 1078 Transcript of 14 October 2005 @ 27-28 1079 Transcript of 21 October 2005 @ 17 1080 Transcript of 14 October 2005 @ 31; Exhibit #DNZ-6
154
Interahamwe were responsible for the violence in Bugesera.1081
The contents of this
letter are true.1082
Investigations were carried out by the Ministry of Justice and it was
concluded that the Interahamwe were in no way connected with the acts of violence.1083
To the knowledge of Witness T, the Interahamwe had no involvement in the killings in
Bugesera in March 1992.1084
b. Defence evidence
782. Karemera Witness LOL testified that the perpetrators of the Bugesera
crimes were arrested with the support of Minister of Justice Mathieu Ngirumpatse.1085
783. Joseph Nzirorera will testify that he had no involvement with the MRND
national structures in March 1992 and has no knowledge of or responsibility for the
attacks in Bugesera.
784. Charles Nyandwi will testify that he was President of the MRND for Kigali
Rural prefecture at the time and conducted an investigation into the Bugesera attacks. He
found no evidence of involvement by Interahamwe.
785. Georges Rutaganda and Witness 31, officers of the National Committee of
Interahamwe, will testify that the Interahamwe were not involved in the attacks in
Bugesera.
2. 28 May 1992 MRND March and Rally
a. Prosecution evidence
i. Jean Bosco Twahirwa
786. Twahirwa testified that he observed an MRND demonstration on 28 May
1992 which began at the roundabout in Kigali town. He heard the demonstrators
chanting to exterminate the Tutsi and those who sympathise with them.1086
Twahirwa
later obtained a tape of this demonstration.1087
787. The recording of the MRND demonstration of 28 May 1992 provided by
Twahirwa does not show any anti-Tutsi statements or songs. It contains a speech by Jean
Habyarimana in which he requests the authorities to punish any individual who commits
1081 Transcript of 22 May 2006 @ 35 1082 Transcript of 26 May 2006 @ 43 1083 Transcript of 22 May 2006 @ 36 1084 Transcript of 26 May 2006 @ 40 1085 Transcript of 8 July 2008 @ 43-45 (CS) 1086 Transcript of 25 June 2007 @ 78-79 1087 Transcript of 25 June 2007 @ 80; Exhibit P91
155
an offence, whether he is from the MRND party or MDR.1088
He urged the MRND
members to be disciplined.1089
788. Mathieu Ngirumpatse said that the other parties wanted to destroy the
Interahamwe, despite his pleas for a meeting to stop the violence. He said that henceforth
the youth wing of the party would be called the JMRND-Interahamwe. The term
―Interahamwe‖ does not have an aggressive connotation—it denotes unity and harmony.
Ngirumpatse said that they had urged the Interahamwe to avoid acts of aggression, but
would not tolerate people forming gangs whose purpose is to attack Interahamwe.1090
789. Ngirumpatse urged people of Kigali to join the MRND and not to be forced
to join other parties.1091
He complained that Radio Rwanda had announced plans to
demobilize the soldiers in the Rwandan Army and says it would be inappropriate to
demobilize soldiers during the war.1092
790. Ngirumpatse noted that some political parties had gone to Brussels to
negotiate with the Inkotanyi and said no agreements entered into without the MRND’s
consent would be honored. Ngirumpatse said that the trouble caused by the political
parties and RPF was aimed at preventing elections from being held and that if elections
were held, the MRND would win.1093
791. At the end of the meeting, Kajuga asked the people to be disciplined as they
returned to their homes.1094
ii. Ahmed Mbonyunkiza
792. Mbonyunkiza testified that on 28 May 1992, an MRND demonstration was
held and Ngirumpatse spoke to the crowd at the roundabout in front of the Prime
Minister’s office.1095
The Interahamwe attacked opposition party members during this
demonstration and two people were killed.1096
During his speech, Ngirumpatse said that
1088 Exhibit P91 at page K0386778 1089 Exhibit P91 at page K0386779 1090 Exhibit P91 at page K0386781 1091 Exhibit P91 at page K0386781 1092 Exhibit P91 at page K0386782 1093 Exhibit P91 at page K0386782-83 1094 Exhibit P91 at page K0386783 1095 Transcript of 21 September 2005 @ 19 1096 Transcript of 21 September 2005 @ 19, Transcript of 22 September 2005 @ 35
156
he no longer wanted to hear of the JMRND and that the Interahamwe were to be the
youth wing of the MRND from that day forward.1097
793. After 28 May 1992, Ngirumpatse issued a communiqué in which he blamed
the other parties for the violence and misrepresented the events of that day.1098
794. Mbonyunkiza’s account of the demonstration of 28 May 1992, in which he
blamed MRND for the violence, is at odds with the official report made by the Prosecutor
of Kigali who concluded that the attacks were directed at the MRND, who had a lawful
permit for the demonstration.1099
He claimed that the letter was not accurate and that the
Prosecutor, Francis Xavier Nsanzuera, did not do his job properly.1100
795. The testimony of Twahirwa and Mbonyunkiza is also contradicted by other
prosecution witnesses:
iii. Witness G
796. Witness G testified that he attended the demonstration of 28 May 1992 and
observed that it was the members of the PL and other parties who attacked the
Interahamwe on that occasion. He heard the speech of Mathieu Ngirumpatse that day.
Ngirumpatse never said anything about exterminating Tutsis.1101
iv. Witness T
797. Witness T testified that at the MRND rally on Pentacost weekend in May,
1992, which was authorized by the prefet of Kigali, MRND members were attacked by
youth wings of the MDR and PL parties.1102
The opposition parties were destroying
property of MRND members who were attending the rally. The response by the MRND
members was legitimate self-defence.1103
v. Witness GOB
798. Witness GOB testified that on 28 May 1992, he attended an MRND rally to
protest a speech that had been delivered by Prime Minister Dismas Nsengiyaremye
concerning demobilization of soldiers and a speech by Justin Mugenzi of the PL party
against the MRND. The plan was to meet at the main Kigali roundabout and to take
1097 Transcript of 21 September 2005 @ 19 1098 Transcript of 22 September 2005 @ 35-36; Exhibit #P2 1099 Transcript of 24 October 2005 @ 47-48; Exhibit #DNZ-45 1100 Transcript of 24 October 2005 @ 48-49 1101 Transcript of 14 October 2005 2005 @ 42 1102 Transcript of 26 May 2006 @ 56 1103 Transcript of 7 June 2006 @ 7
157
down the flags at the PL and MDR headquarters. There was about 600 MRND members
who took part in this march and they smashed the windows of the party headquarters.1104
799. However, there was a confrontation with members of these parties and they
were unable to reach their headquarters. They went to the prime minister’s roundabout.
He was with Ngirumpatse, Karemera, and Nahimana.1105
The Interahamwe sang songs,
including ―Tubatsembatsembe‖, which meant ―let us exterminate them‖ and was directed
at MRND’s political enemies.1106
The enemy was anyone who did not work with or
collaborate with the MRND—the RPF, Tutsis, or political opponents.1107
800. At the roundabout in front of the Prime Minister’s office, it was said that
MRND did not agree with the opposition parties meeting with the RPF without MRND
being involved.1108
They called for Nsengiyaremye’s resignation because he had stated
in Gikongoro that soldiers would have to be demobilized when the two armies merged.
Ngirumpatse asked the MRND members to remain active and those who had left the
MRND to come back.1109
b. Defence evidence
801. Joseph Nzirorera will testify that he had nothing to do with the MRND
national organs at the time of this rally and that he did not attend.
802. Witness 29 and Augustin Ngirabatware will testify that they participated
in the 28 May 1992 rally and that it had nothing to do with Tutsis.
803. Georges Rutaganda will testify that he attended the 28 May 1992 rally and
that it had nothing to do with Tutsis.
3. MRND/CDR Coalition
a. Prosecution evidence
i. Witness UB
804. Witness UB testified that the MRND and CDR signed a coalition agreement
towards the end of 1993. After signing that agreement, they were like one party.1110
He
met Mathieu Ngirumpatse and told him that Tutsi members were leaving the MRND
1104 Transcript of 22 October 2007 @ 31 1105 Transcript of 22 October 2007 @ 32 1106 Transcript of 22 October 2007 @ 34-35 1107 Transcript of 22 October 2007 @ 35-36 1108 Transcript of 22 October 2007 @ 43 1109 Transcript of 22 October 2007 @ 43 1110 Transcript of 23 February 2006@ 43
158
because of its coalition with CDR. Ngirumpatse said that they preferred to be in a
coalition with the CDR than the Tutsis, with whom they did not share the same
opinion.1111
Ngirumpatse said that they deemed it useful to collaborate with the CDR and
Tutsis were free to leave the party. Those Tutsis who stayed would be protected.1112
805. This meeting took place in the Kabuga building while Ngirumpatse was still
Secretary General of the MRND. He went with Hamadi Nshimiyimana.1113
(In his
handwritten statement of 15 December 2004, he said he had met with Ngirumpatse in the
presence of Gabriel Mbyaliyehe and Jean Bizimana.)1114
806. After the signing of the coalition agreement, the MRND never condemned
the acts committed by the CDR and the CDR never condemned the acts committed by the
MRND.1115
In fact, the communiqués issued by the CDR showed that the criticized the
MRND and President Habyarimana on several occasions.1116
807. The coalition agreement was signed on 12 November 1992.1117
CDR
resigned from the coalition on 25 March 1993.1118
ii. Witness GOB
808. Witness GOB testified that there were extremists within the MRND and they
went and formed the CDR. The two parties worked like parent and child.1119
The CDR
said what the MRND could not say—that Hutus had to keep power.1120
iii. Witness T
809. Witness T testified that some Tutsi members of the MRND left the party
when it formed an alliance with the CDR. However, Ngirumpatse condemned some of
the language of the CDR party and the CDR subsequently left the alliance.1121
b. Defence evidence
1111 Transcript of 23 February 2006@ 44 1112 Transcript of 2 March 2006@ 48 1113 Transcript of 2 March 2006@ 46-47 1114 Transcript of 2 March 2006@ 49; Exhibit #P20 1115 Transcript of 23 February 2006@ 45 1116 Transcript of 2 March 2006@ 50-54; Exhibits DNZ65-69 1117 Transcript of 2 March 2006@ 46; Exhibit #DNZ64 1118 Transcript of 2 March 2006@ 54; Exhibit #DNZ70 1119 Transcript of 22 October 2007 @ 51 1120 Transcript of 22 October 2007 @ 52 1121 Transcript of 31 May 2006 @ 48
159
810. Karemera Witness LLK, an influential advisor to the CDR party, testified
that the CDR party was a completely independent party from the MRND.1122
The
MRND had nothing to do with the creation of the CDR party.1123
However, on 12
November 1992, it signed an agreement with MRND and some other parties to form an
Alliance for the Reenforcement of Democracy (―ARD‖).1124
The CDR withdrew from
the alliance on 23 March 1993.1125
The Interahamwe never carried out joint activities
with the youth of the CDR party.1126
811. On 9 March 1993, the CDR issued a communiqué calling for the resignation
of President Habyarimana and criticizing him over his handling of the Arusha
negotiations.1127
On 15 April 1993, the CDR sent a letter to President Habyarimana
accusing him of running a dictatorship.1128
812. Karemera Witness XQL, a member of the MRND prefectural committee
from Ruhengeri, testified that the CDR was not an offspring of the MRND. They entered
an alliance at a certain point in time, but then the CDR withdrew from the alliance.1129
813. Joseph Nzirorera will testify that he was not a part of the MRND national
organs when the decision was made to form an alliance with the CDR. He has no
knowledge of involvement of the MRND in the creation of the CDR.
4. 15 November 1992 MRND Rally in Ruhengeri
a. Prosecution evidence
i. Ahmed Mbonyunkiza
814. Mbonyunkiza testified that he heard the speech of President Habyarimana
during the MRND rally on 15 November 1992 on the radio.1130
According to him,
President Habyarimana personally committed himself during that speech to the
Interahamwe being equipped for the purpose of exterminating the Tutsi.1131
ii. Witness G
1122 Transcript of 22 April 2008 @ 13 1123 Transcript of 23 April 2008 @ 19 1124 Transcript of 22 April 2008 @ 25; Exhibit #DNZ-64 1125 Transcript of 22 April 2008 @ 26-27; Exhibit #DNZ-70 1126 Transcript of 23 April 2008 @ 19 1127 Transcript of 22 April 2008 @ 14; Exhibit #DNZ-66 1128 Transcript of 22 April 2008 @ 16-17; Exhibit #DNZ-67 1129 Transcript of 5 May 2008 @ 31 1130 Transcript of 22 September 2005 @ 45 1131 Transcript of 22 September 2005 @ 49; Transcript of 28 September 2005 @ 18
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815. Witness G testified that at the MRND rally held in Ruhengeri on 15
November 1992, President Habyarimana was accompanied by his wife, who was wearing
the MRND kitenge clothing. 1132
The Interahamwe also wore this clothing—they did not
have their own uniform.1133
The Interahamwe did not have a military or militia-like
uniform.1134
816. During the rally in Ruhengeri, Casimir Bizimungu spoke of the 400,000
people displaced by the war, 100,000 of whom were in Ruhengeri and asked people to
assist those persons.1135
He spoke in support of the Arusha Accords and called for
elections.1136
817. Robert Kajuga said that the Interahamwe had been falsely accused of killings
in Cyangugu. He complained about Radio Rwanda falsely accusing the Interahamwe in
events in Kigali. At that time, Radio Rwanda was under the Ministry of Information,
which was controlled by the MDR party.1137
Kajuga didn’t make any statements in
Ruhengeri calling for the elimination of the Tutsi. Since he was Tutsi himself, that was
impossible.1138
818. Mathieu Ngirumpatse complained that people who were attacking MRND
members were not being prosecuted.1139
He reiterated MRND’s support for the Arusha
negotiations, but said they had some points to discuss concerning the composition of the
national assembly. He expressed confidence that when elections were held, MRND
would win.1140
Ngirumpatse never said anything to encourage Interahamwe to kill
Tutsis.1141
819. President Habyarimana said that the opposition parties were afraid to hold
elections. MRND wanted the elections to be held as soon as possible. (Witness G
believed that if elections were held, MRND would have won.) President Habyarimana
urged investigations into the violence and not unsubstantiated allegations against the
1132 Transcript of 14 October 2005 2005 @ 23 1133 Transcript of 10 October 2005 @ 41; Exhibit #P-11 1134 Transcript of 14 October 2005 2005 @ 22 1135 Transcript of 14 October 2005 @ 46-47; Exhibit #DNZ-8 1136 Transcript of 14 October 2005 @ 47; Exhibit #DNZ-8 1137 Transcript of 17 October 2005 @ 4; Exhibit #DNZ-9 1138 Transcript of 17 October 2005 @ 4; Exhibit #DNZ-9 1139 Transcript of 17 October 2005 @ 18; Exhibit #DNZ-48,49 1140 Transcript of 17 October 2005 @ 18-19; Exhibit #DNZ-48-49 1141 Transcript of 17 October 2005 @ 20; Exhibit #DNZ 48-49
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Interahamwe. He mentioned several areas where the Interahamwe had been falsely
accused of violence, including Bugesera.1142
He urged the courts to do their work.1143
820. President Habyarimana declared MRND’s support for the Arusha
negotiations and said it was false to say that the MRND did not support the negotiations.
He said that peace is not confined to a piece of paper, it is in one’s heart.1144
He also
urged the MRND National Secretary along with businessmen to provide the MRND
clothing to the Interahamwe. He said that when it was time to campaign for election, he
would descend with the Interahamwe and campaign. There was never any suggestion
that he was asking the Interahamwe to kill Tutsis.1145
821. Witness G did not see Nzirorera at the Ruhengeri rally.1146
iii. Witness UB
822. In his speech in Ruhengeri on 15 November 1992, President Habyarimana
stated that the MRND and he personally supported the Arusha Accords.1147
Shortly after
that speech, the Prime Minister claimed that he had spoken in opposition to those accords
and dismissed them as a piece of tissue paper.1148
There was manipulation on all sides by
political parties.1149
iv. Witness T
823. President Habyarimana’s speech in Ruhengeri was immediately deformed by
the opposition parties who claimed that he was going to go down with his militia. In a
letter dated 17 November 1992, the Prime Minister castigated the President for his
speech, including his reference to the Arusha Accords as a scrap of paper.1150
The
opposition immediately misrepresented the content of Habyarimana’s speech.1151
v. Witness HH
824. He understood President Habyarimana to say at the rally in Ruhengeri in
November 1992 that the Interahamwe would descend to lead a campaign designed to
1142 Transcript of 17 October 2005 @ 25; Exhibit #DNZ-47 1143 Transcript of 17 October 2005 @ 26; Exhibit #DNZ-47 1144 Transcript of 17 October 2005 @ 26; Exhibit #DNZ-47 1145 Transcript of 17 October 2005 @ 27; Exhibit #DNZ-47 1146 Transcript of 14 October 2005 @ 47 1147 Transcript of 1 March 2006@ 52 1148 Transcript of 1 March 2006@ 54 1149 Transcript of 1 March 2006@ 58 1150 Transcript of 22 May 2006 @ 63, Exhibit P26 1151 Transcript of 29 May 2006 @ 6
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swell their membership ranks.1152
He claimed that Nzirorera was present at this rally and
gave a speech.1153
After viewing the videotape of the rally overnight, Witness HH
claimed that he had mistaken someone else for Nzirorera, and denied having testified that
Nzirorera had made a speech.1154
vi. Witness GOB
825. Witness GOB testified that he attended the MRND rally in Ruhengeri on 15
November 1992, arriving with Jacques Rusirare. He acknowledged that he did not
appear on the video of the rally when the members of the National Committee were
called out onto the field and introduced individually, but claimed that perhaps he arrived
after the introductions or that the video is not complete.1155
826. At the MRND rally in Ruhengeri, President Habyarimana said that the
MRND would not accept the Arusha Accords.1156
The President himself said he was not
in agreement with the Arusha Accords. It was a scrap of paper that could not be
implemented.1157
Ngirumpatse also said the MRND would never accept the Arusha
Accords.1158
827. When President Habyarimana used the term ―come down‖ with the
Interahamwe, opposition parties interpreted it to mean that the people of the north would
attack the people of the south. But we interpreted it as he would campaign with them for
election.1159
828. As of that time the Interahamwe had been involved in violent acts directed at
Tutsis and political opponents, particularly the PL party. They could not have carried out
these acts without the direction of MRND leadership.1160
b. Defence evidence
829. Karemera Witness XQL testified that she attended the 15 November 1992
MRND rally in Ruhengeri stadium. Joseph Nzirorera was not present.1161
On that
1152 Transcript of 8 November 2006 @ 46 1153 Transcript of 15 Nov 2006 @ 61,63 1154 Transcript of 16 November 2006 @ 2-3 1155 Transcript of 24 October 2007 @ 12; Exhibit P11 1156 Transcript of 22 October 2007 @ 43 1157 Transcript of 22 October 2007 @ 49 1158 Transcript of 22 October 2007 @ 49 1159 Transcript of 22 October 2007 @ 50 1160 Transcript of 22 October 2007 @ 51 1161 Transcript of 5 May 2008 @ 29
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occasion, President Habyarimana did not speak against the Arusha Accords, but
supported it firmly.1162
When he said he would descend with the Interahamwe, President
Habyarimana was referring to campaigning for election.1163
830. Joseph Nzirorera will testify that he was in Europe at the time of this rally
and did not attend.
831. Casimir Bizimungu will testify that the speeches at the Ruhengeri rally had
nothing to do with extermination of Tutsis.
832. George Rutaganda will testify that he attended the MRND rally in
Ruhengeri and understood the President to be referring to elections, not attacks on Tutsis.
5. 22 November 1992 Leon Mugesera Speech at Kabaya
a. Prosecution evidence
i. Witness UB
833. Witness UB heard excerpts of the speech of Leon Mugesera on 22 November
1992 broadcast on Radio Rwanda. The thrust of the speech was that the Tutsis were not
Rwandan citizens and that they should be sent back from whence they came via the
Nyabarongo River.1164
After the speech, the members of the MRND prefectural
committee for Kigali ville got together and criticized that speech. The committee
members went to see Mathieu Ngirumpatse and we told him that the speech had insulted
many Rwandans. Ngirumpatse said he had heard the speech in question but couldn’t do
anything about it.1165
834. He heard Mugesera’s speech broadcast on Radio Rwanda the same day or
the next day.1166
Other people heard it over RTLM.1167
However, RTLM was not in
existence in November 1992.1168
In the broadcast he heard, Mugesera was saying that the
Tutsis should be sent back by the shortest route—the Nyabarongo River.1169
Witness UB
1162 Transcript of 5 May 2008 @ 31 1163 Transcript of 6 May 2008 @ 23 1164 Transcript of 23 February 2006@ 25-26 1165 Transcript of 23 February 2006@ 26,28 1166 Transcript of 1 March 2006@ 59 1167 Transcript of 1 March 2006@ 59 1168 Transcript of 1 March 2006@ 59-60 1169 Transcript of 1 March 2006@ 61
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denied that the broadcast over Radio Rwanda did not include any reference to the Tutsis
or the Nyabarongo River.1170
835. Mugesera was a member of the MRND and if he made that speech, it meant
the MRND had been consulted.1171
However, he has no information that the MRND
officials approved the speech in advance.1172
Ngirumpatse also never condemned the
speech.1173
Directly after Mugesera’s speech, Tutsi began to be killed.1174
However, he
has no information as to any killings in Kabaya after the speech of Mugesera.1175
836. After the speech of Mugesera, an arrest warrant was issued for him on 6
December 1992.1176
At a meeting of the MRND political bureau on 7 December 1992, at
which Mathieu Ngirumpatse was not present, the members could not agree on whether to
condemn the speech of Mugesera.1177
It was Ngirumpatse’s duty to carry out that
decision.1178
837. He went to meet Ngirumpatse after Mugesera’s speech. The meeting was at
Ngirumpatse’s MRND office, although he could not recall which building it was in at the
time.1179
He was present with Jean Habyarimana, Gabriel Mbyaliyehe, and possibly Jean
Bizimana.1180
They expressed their concern over Mugesera’s speech. Ngirumpatse said
that the executive committee was aware of it and that they had studied the matter.1181
(However, in his handwritten statement of 15 December 2004, he made no mention of
this meeting with Ngirumpatse in November-December 1992)1182
ii. Witness T
838. Witness T testified that the speech by Leon Mugesera on 22 November 1992
was a call to murder Tutsis. An arrest warrant was issued for Mugesera and he managed
1170 Transcript of 2 March 2006@ 6-7; Exhibit IDNZ11, 12 1171 Transcript of 23 February 2006@28 1172 Transcript of 2 March 2006@ 12 1173 Transcript of 23 February 2006@28 1174 Transcript of 23 February 2006@29 1175 Transcript of 2 March 2006@ 11 1176 Transcript of 2 March 2006@ 12; Exhibit #DNZ60 1177 Transcript of 2 March 2006@ 14; Exhibit #DNZ61 1178 Transcript of 2 March 2006@ 15 1179 Transcript of 2 March 2006@ 16 1180 Transcript of 2 March 2006@ 17 1181 Transcript of 2 March 2006@ 20 1182 Transcript of 2 March 2006@ 22; Exhibit #P20
165
to escape with the help of some senior officers of the Rwandan Army.1183
Does not
believe that Mugesera’s speech was approved in advance by MRND leaders because after
the speech they abandoned him. The speech did not reflect the views of Ngirumpatse nor
the MRND party.1184
iii. Witness ALG
839. Witness ALG acknowledged that he had been mistaken in his letter to the
prosecution that Nzirorera was a member of the MRND National Executive Committee at
the time of the speech of Mugesera. In fact, Nzirorera was one of 44-55 members of the
MRND National Committee at the time.1185
840. Witness ALG acknowledged that he might have been mistaken when he
claimed that Leon Mugesera was working for the MRND Secretariat at the time he made
his speech.1186
841. After the speech by Leon Mugesera on 22 November 1992, some members
of the MRND prefectural committee for Kigali Ville urged the President Jean
Habyarimana to request that the national bureau of the MRND issue a communiqué
stating that the speech of Mugesera did not represent the views of the party.
Habyarimana told them that no decision had been taken by the national MRND.1187
842. Witness ALG testified that he had no recollection of attending a meeting
with Witness UB and Ngirumpatse in which they expressed concern over the speech of
Mugesera.1188
iv. Witness AWD
843. Witness AWD was not present in Kabaya when Leon Mugesera made his
speech, but Mugesera repeated the same speech at a rally in Gisenyi which Witness
AWD attended.1189
844. After the speech by Leon Mugesera, they complained to Jean Habyarimana,
who said that the matter had been discussed during a meeting, and they had to take things
as they stood. They then approached Ngirumpatse, who said that Mugesera was an
1183 Transcript of 22 May 2006 @ 64 1184 Transcript of 29 May 2006 @ 7 1185 Transcript of 2 November 2006 @ 19,25 1186 Transcript of 26 October 2006 @ 56; Transcript of 2 November 2006 @ 24 1187 Transcript of 1 November 2006 @ 8-9 1188 Transcript of 2 November 2006 @ 26 1189 Transcript of 7 November 2007 @ 39
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important member of the party and they needed to take the situation as it presented
itself.1190
845. Although he wasn’t present when Mugesera made his speech in Kabaya, he
was personally present when Mugesera made the same speech at Gisenyi stadium at
around the same time. However, he could not name any other person who was present in
Gisenyi when Mugesera made that speech.1191
v. Witness GOB
846. Witness GOB testified that he did not attend the speech of Leon Mugesera at
Kabaya but the RTLM and Radio Rwanda reported his remarks.1192
Members of the
MRND hid him so he was not able to be arrested.1193
847. Witness GOB said that information in the Isibo newspaper to the effect that
Mugesera had fled to Gisenyi and crossed to Goma was false.1194
He also could not
confirm Mugesera’s account to the Canadian authorities that he had hidden in the home
of his brother-in-law Marcel in Remera and then in Gisenyi at the residence of Dr. Jean
Baptiste Gatorano, who took him to the border where he crossed into Goma.1195
848. Witness GOB claimed that Leon Mugesera subsequently returned and was
appointed Chief of the Cabinet in the Ministry of Women and Family Affairs.1196
However, he later acknowledged that he held that post before he fled.1197
849. Witness GOB testified that he knew nothing about the MRND Kigali-ville
prefecture committee going to see Mathieu Ngirumpatse to complain about Mugesera’s
speech, as claimed by Witness UB.1198
850. On 29 November 1992, he was at Gitarama stadium with Ngirumpatse,
Banzi Wellars, Armandin Rugira, Callixte Nzabonimana, and Thomas Kigufi.1199
Juvenal Rugambarara was also present.1200
Witness GOB asked Ngirumpatse what he
1190 Transcript of 10 October 2007 @ 22 1191 Transcript of 9 November 2007 @ 3-6 1192 Transcript of 22 October 2007 @ 52-53 1193 Transcript of 22 October 2007 @ 55 1194 Transcript of 24 October 2007 @ 16-17; Exhibit DNG-84 1195 Transcript of 25 October 2007 @ 48; IDNZ-66 1196 Transcript of 24 October 2007 @ 17 1197 Transcript of 25 October 2007 @ 48 1198 Transcript of 25 October 2007 @ 49 1199 Transcript of 25 October 2007 @ 47 1200 Transcript of 25 October 2007 @ 47; Exhibit DNZ-353
167
thought of Mugesera’s speech. He replied that Mugesera was moving ahead of their plans
and had made his statement too early. Mugesera made a speech at that rally and said the
other parties were five headed devils.1201
vi. Documentary evidence
851. On 1 July 1994, the speech of Leon Mugesera given at Kabaya on 22
November 1992 was rebroadcast on RTLM. In the speech, Mugesera rails against the
MDR party for having sold out to the Inkotanyi, and calls for vigilence against people
who are working with the Inkotanyi to attack the country.1202
852. A video clip of Leon Mugesera speaking in Umaganda stadium is mislabeled
as the speech of 22 November 1992 in Kabaya.1203
b. Defence evidence
853. Joseph Nzirorera will testify that he was not part of the MRND national
organs at the time of the Mugesera speech and he was not present when it was made.
854. Leon Mugesera testified that sometime prior to July 1992, he gave a speech
at Umuganda Stadium in Gisenyi in which he criticized President Habyarimana and the
MRND Minister of Interior Faustin Munyaseza.1204
That was the speech depicted in the
video which is prosecution exhibit P257. That exhibit does not depict the speech he gave
in Kabaya.1205
855. After that speech, Ngirumpatse sent him a message to apologize to Minister
Munyaseza, which Mugesera refused to do.1206
Ngirumpatse also indicated that he did
not want Mugesera to make a speech at the 5 July 1992 party gathering in Kigali, as he
had been slated to do.1207
As a result, his relations with Mathieu Ngirumpatse were poor,
and they remained that way up to the time he gave his speech at Kabaya in November
1992.1208
856. When he attended the MRND meeting at Kabaya on 22 November 1992, he
had not planned on making a speech. Someone at the meeting suggested he make a short
1201 Transcript of 22 October 2007 @ 56 1202 P254 1203 P257 1204 Transcript of 21 April 2009 @ 17 1205 Transcript of 21 April 2009 @ 15 1206 Transcript of 21 April 2009 @ 19 1207 Transcript of 21 April 2009 @ 20 1208 Transcript of 21 April 2009 @ 21
168
statement so he could be known before the upcoming elections. So he jotted some notes
and took the floor.1209
He did not consult with any MRND national officials on what he
was going to say.1210
857. His speech at Kabaya was not broadcast over Radio Rwanda in the following
days. The report of the meeting that was broadcast made no mention of any remarks
directed at Tutsis.1211
He did not repeat the speech in Umuganda Stadium as claimed by
Witness AWD.1212
Contrary to the testimony of Witness GOB, he never made any
speech a week later at any MRND rally.1213
858. The MRND never assisted him to avoid arrest, as claimed by Witness
GOB.1214
.
859. Jean Marie-Vianney Higiro, whose written statement was admitted
pursuant to Rule 92 bis, was director of ORINFOR. ORINFOR had a practice of
recording all speeches made at political party rallies. The report of Mugesera’s speech
broadcast on Radio Rwanda by journalist Florent Kampayana, an MRND member, did
not contain Mugesera’s remarks about sending Tutsis back from whence they came via
the Nyabarongo River. RTLM was not in existence at that time.
860. When he learned of the contents of the tape of Mugesera’s speech, he called
Faustin Twagiramungu and briefed him as to the contents of Mugesera’s speech.
Twagiramungu asked him to make a copy. After he gave the copy to Twagiramungu, the
MDR disseminated the speech. The speech was also transcribed by the MDR and sent to
diplomats and disseminated around the world. This is how Leon Mugesera’s speech came
to be disseminated in Rwanda. Through 9 April 1994, when he left Rwanda, Radio
Rwanda had never broadcast Mugesera’s speech.1215
861. Witness 29 will testify that Witness UB and Witness ALG never asked him
to condemn the speech, they never discussed the speech with Ngirumpatse and no
resolution condemning the speech was adopted by the MRND at the Kigali prefecture
level.
1209 Transcript of 21 April 2009 @ 22 1210 Transcript of 21 April 2009 @ 23 1211 Transcript of 21 April 2009 @ 23; Exhibit DNZ-502 1212 Transcript of 21 April 2009 @ 23-24 1213 Transcript of 21 April 2009 @ 25 1214 Transcript of 21 April 2009 @ 25 1215 Exhibit DNZ-643
169
862. In addition to these common events, there is significant other evidence
showing that many of the prosecution witnesses lied about other facts during their
testimony.
6. Ahmed Mbonyunkiza
a. Prosecution evidence
i. Ahmed Mbonyunkiza
863. Mbonyunkiza testified that during the first two weeks of February, 1992 he
participated in the first of three MRND meetings held on Wednesday evenings at the
Rubangura building.1216
Mathieu Ngirumpatse, the President of MRND for Kigali-ville
prefecture, presided at the meeting and introduced the members of the National
Committee of the Interahamwe.1217
He said he was bringing the Interahamwe to build
awareness of the MRND party.1218
Their purpose was to organize meetings about
propaganda for the MRND, to protect MRND members and the party’s insignia from the
opposition parties, and to attack and protect themselves from the Inkotanyi.1219
Mbonyunkiza listed some 45 persons who he recalled being present at this meeting.1220
864. The next week, he attended the second meeting involving the Interahamwe.
The same people from the first meeting attended, with the addition of three others.1221
At
this meeting, Ngirumpatse said that the Tutsi who were members of the Inkotanyi and in
the opposition needed to be pursued and killed.1222
At this meeting, Simon Bikindi and
Sukari introduced a song they had composed about exterminating the Tutsi.1223
Samples
of clothing and axes were displayed at the meeting and it was decided that they should be
ordered for the Interahamwe members.1224
Membership cards were displayed, but it was
explained that before one could obtain a membership card, it was necessary to undergo
military training.1225
1216 Transcript of 20 September 2005 @ 45 1217 Transcript of 20 September 2005 @ 45; Transcript of 3 October 2005 @ 9 1218 Transcript of 20 September 2005 @ 45 1219 Transcript of 3 October 2005 @ 9-10 1220 Transcript of 3 October 2005 @ 4; Exhibit #DNZ-4 1221 Transcript of 3 October 2005 @ 14-15 1222 Transcript of 20 September 2005 @ 52; Transcript of 3 October 2005 @ 25 1223 Transcript of 20 September 2005 @ 55; Transcript of 3 October 2005 @ 22-23 1224 Transcript of 20 September 2005 @ 56; Transcript of 3 October 2005 @ 15 1225 Transcript of 3 October 2005 @ 24
170
865. The third meeting was held one week later. At this meeting, Desire Murenzi
had been replaced by Augustin Ngirabatware as honorary President of the
Interahamwe.1226
Ngirumpatse said that the time had come to implement the project of
hunting down the Inyenzi.1227
It was said that no one could attend subsequent meetings if
they did not have an Interahamwe membership card.1228
He decided not to join the
Interahamwe and did not attend any subsequent meetings.1229
866. By the time he left the third meeting in February 1992, Mbonyunkiza
acknowledged that it was clear to him that the MRND party was going to pursue a
program of killing Tutsis.1230
Yet he: (1) accepted a position at the Ministry of Justice
under Ngirumpatse in March 19921231
; (2) was still volunteering at the MRND office1232
and wearing an MRND cap when he was struck on the head on 7 May 19921233
; (3) went
to Mathieu Ngirumpatse while still bleeding and in need of medical attention1234
; and (3)
took a day off from work to march in the MRND rally of 28 May 1992.1235
867. Mbonyunkiza testified that he was elected Chairman of the JMRND, the
youth of the MRND party, on 19 December 1991.1236
868. Mbonyunkiza’s testimony was contradicted by a number of the prosecution’s
own witnesses:
ii. Witness G
869. Witness G, an officer of the National Interahamwe Committee, testified that
he did not know Ahmed Mbonyunkiza. He had no knowledge of a separate organization
from the Interahamwe known as the JMRND.1237
870. Witness G testified that the Interahamwe met on Wednesday evenings
beginning in November 1991. He attended these meetings regularly.1238
He went every
1226 Transcript of 20 September 2005 @ 59; Transcript of 3 October 2005 @ 35 1227 Transcript of 20 September 2005 @ 60 1228 Transcript of 21 September 2005 @ 10 1229 Transcript of 21 September 2005 @ 10 1230 Transcript of 3 October 2005 @ 37 1231 Transcript of 3 October 2005 @ 40 1232 Transcript of 3 October 2005 @ 40 1233 Transcript of 21 October 2005 @ 8 1234 Transcript of 21 October 2005 @ 8-9 1235 Transcript of 24 October 2005 @ 35 1236 Transcript of 20 September 2005 @ 34 1237 Transcript of 14 October 2005 2005 @ 16 1238 Transcript of 14 October 2005 2005 @ 16
171
week.1239
He would have attended at least three of four meetings in a given month.1240
He did not know Ahmed Mbonyunkiza. At weekly meetings in February, 1992, neither
Mathieu Ngirumpatse nor anyone else spoke of exterminating the Tutsi.1241
871. Witness G testified that at the Wednesday meetings, Simon Bikindi never
introduced a song about exterminating Tutsis.1242
He never saw Gaspard Uwizigara
attend any of the Interahamwe meetings, nor did he see anyone display an axe or offer to
supply large quantities of axes during the Interahamwe meetings. There was no military
training of Interahamwe in 1992 and it was not necessary to undergo military training in
order to be a member of the Interahamwe.1243
Desire Murenzi was never replaced by
Augustin Ngirabatware in the Interahamwe organization. He never heard of a plot to kill
Ahmed Mbonyunkiza.1244
iii. Witness UB
872. Witness UB testified that he was a member of the MRND Kigali ville
prefectural committee and that there was never an occasion when Ngirumpatse was
President of Kigali ville prefecture that he made statements calling for the extermination
of the Tutsi. Tutsis were even members of the Interahamwe at that time.1245
Ngirumpatse could not and did not make such a statement. Most members of MRND in
Kigali at that time were Tutsis.1246
The Interahamwe did not acquire axes at this time and
military training of Interahamwe did not take place in 1992. It was not necessary to
undergo military training to join the Interahamwe.1247
Witness UB was acquainted with
Ahmed Mbonyunkiza and knew he had left the MRND to join the PSD party, but knew
of no office he held with the MRND youth and no plot to kill him.1248
873. He attended regular meetings of the MRND prefectural committee for Kigali
ville in the building owned by Vedaste Rubangura on Wednesday evenings during the
1239 Transcript of 28 October 2005 @ 23 1240 Transcript of 14 October 2005 2005 @ 18 1241 Transcript of 14 October 2005 2005 @ 16 1242 Transcript of 14 October 2005 2005 @ 18 1243 Transcript of 14 October 2005 2005 @ 19 1244 Transcript of 14 October 2005 2005 @ 19 1245 Transcript of 1 March 2006@ 33 1246 Transcript of 1 March 2006@ 36 1247 Transcript of 1 March 2006@ 34-35 1248 Transcript of 1 March 2006@ 36
172
time that Mathieu Ngirumpatse was President of MRND for Kigali ville prefecture.1249
On one of these occasions, Ngirumpatse introduced Robert Kajuga and Jean Pierre
Turatsinze to the members of the prefectural committee.1250
Ahmed Mbonyunkiza could
not attend meetings of the MRND prefectural committee because he was not a
member.1251
iv. Witness T
874. Witness T regularly attended the Wednesday night meetings of the
Interahamwe committee.1252
He does not know Ahmed Mbonyunkiza.1253
He never
heard Ngirumpatse say at these meetings that the Tutsis needed to be pursued and killed.
He never observed Gaspard Ukwizagira display axes at the meetings. Bikindi never
attended the meetings and he never heard a song introduced at the meetings about
exterminating Tutsis. It was not necessary in 1992 to undergo military training to join the
Interahamwe. Augustin Ngirabatware was never appointed honorary President of the
Interahamwe. Witness T knew of no plot to kill Ahmed Mbonyunkiza.1254
v. Witness ALG
875. Witness ALG attended Wednesday night meetings of the MRND Kigali
prefecture committee in January and February 1992 at which Ngirumpatse had
introduced Kajuga and Turatsinze as leaders of the Interahamwe. Ngirumpatse did not
call for extermination of the Tutsis.1255
There was no discussion about the Interahamwe
acquiring axes. It was not necessary for persons to undergo military training to join the
Interahamwe. Witness ALG did not know Ahmed Mbonyunkiza and did not know of a
plot to kill him.1256
vi. Witness HH
876. Witness HH first attended meetings of the Interahamwe in May and June
1992. At this time, the consensus was for peace, unity, and development. There were no
1249 Transcript of 1 March 2006@ 32 1250 Transcript of 1 March 2006@ 33 1251 Transcript of 28 February 2006@ 35 1252 Transcript of 26 May 2006 @ 36 1253 Transcript of 26 May 2006 @ 37 1254 Transcript of 26 May 2006 @ 38 1255 Transcript of 2 November 2006 @ 22 1256 Transcript of 2 November 2006 @ 23
173
utterances or songs calling for the killing of the Tutsis, nor any talk of machetes or
axes.1257
vii. Witness AWD
877. Witness AWD, who was among those Mbonyunkiza listed, never attended
any meetings at the Rubangura building at which the Interahamwe were introduced.1258
He had never been in a meeting with the list of people who Ahmed Mbonyunkiza said he
had attended a meeting with.1259
He did not know Ahmed Mbonyunkiza. He never heard
that Augustin Ngirabatware had replaced Desiree Murenzi as honorary President of the
Interahamwe.1260
viii. Witness GOB
878. Witness GOB had never heard of Ahmed Mbonyunkiza and was not aware
of his ever being President of the JMRND.1261
b. Defence evidence
879. Joseph Nzirorera will testify that he was not a member of the MRND
executive bureau during 1992 nor attended any meetings with Interahamwe. There were
no calls to exterminate Tutsis at MRND private or public meetings, and that
Mbonyunkiza’s version of these meetings is pure fiction.
880. Witness 29, Witness 31, Simon Bikindi, , Jean Berchmans
Iminanibishaka, Francois Karera, Aloys Simba, Charles Nyandwi, Bernard
Habyarimana, Leon Habyarimana, Winnie Musabeyezu, and George Rutaganda,
who were listed as having attended the meetings, will testify that at no time was
extermination of the Tutsis contemplated or discussed.
7. Witness G
a. Prosecution evidence
i. Witness G
881. Witness G claimed that a parallel committee of the National Interahamwe
consisting of Bernard Maniragaba, Joseph Serugendo, Jean Pierre Sebanetsi, and Ephrem
1257 Transcript of 10 November 2006 @ 16 1258 Transcript of 8 November 2007 @ 53 1259 Transcript of 8 November 2007 @ 53: Exhibit DNZ-4 1260 Transcript of 8 November 2007 @ 54 1261 Transcript of 25 October 2007 @ 45
174
Nkezabera started doing things which the officers of the National Committee were not
aware of.1262
882. He testified Bernard Maniragaba, Jean Pierre Sebanetsi, Joseph Serugendo,
and Ephrem Nkezabera worked directly with the MRND secretariat headed by Nzirorera.
Maniragaba was related by marriage to Nzirorera. He claimed they called those people
the parallel committee.1263
883. However, he was not able to point to a single document verifying the
existence of this parallel committee.1264
He never transferred the bank account to anyone
else or authorized other people to sign.1265
He never submitted a letter of resignation.1266
He continued to sign Interahamwe public letters through January 1994.1267
Even after 6
April 1994, Robert Kajuga continued to issue communiqués and grant interviews as
President of the Interahamwe. Even Witness G signed a communiqué on 14 June 1994
asking the Interahamwe to return to Kigali with their weapons1268
and used his status as
Interahamwe National Committee member to get through roadblocks.1269
884. Witness G received $30,000 in cash as a result of his cooperation with the
prosecution.1270
In addition, the costs of relocating his family were paid.1271
He received
subsistence each month since September 1999,1272
as well as funds for education and
vocational training.1273
He has been granted permanent resident status in the country to
which he was relocated.1274
He has been provided with a new identity.1275
885. Witness ALL-42, an RPF insider whose testimony in the Bagosora et al trial
was admitted pursuant to Rule 92 bis, testified that Witness G was working on behalf of
the RPF.1276
1262 Transcript of 20 October 2005@ 31 (closed session) 1263 Transcript of 13 October 2005 @ 14 (closed session) 1264 Transcript of 20 October 2005@ 32 (closed session) 1265 Transcript of 20 October 2005@ 32 (closed session) 1266 Transcript of 20 October 2005@ 32 (closed session) 1267 Transcript of 20 October 2005@ 33 (closed session) 1268 Transcript of 20 October 2005@ 33 (closed session) 1269 Transcript of 20 October 2005@ 33 (closed session) 1270 Transcript of 20 October 2005@ 42 1271 Transcript of 20 October 2005@ 42 1272 Transcript of 20 October 2005@ 43 1273 Transcript of 20 October 2005@ 46 1274 Transcript of 20 October 2005@ 50 1275 Transcript of 20 October 2005@ 51 1276 Exhibit DNZ-517
175
886. A document provided by the prosecution in 2008 shows that hundreds of
thousands of dollars was paid for his benefit as a result of his cooperation with the
prosecution.1277
887. In the Bagosora et al case, the Trial Chamber concluded that that Witness G
(known as Witness A in that case), as a senior Interahamwe leader, had an interest in
minimising his own involvement and shifting blame to senior authorities.1278
ii. Witness T
888. Witness T testified that the claim that a parallel committee of the national
Interahamwe committee came into existence and usurped the functions of that committee,
particularly [Kajuga and Niyitegeka], is a fairy tale. No one in the national Interahamwe
committee was aware of such a thing.1279
Such an event would have been featured in the
newspapers of the opposition parties.1280
b. Defence evidence
889. Joseph Nzirorera will testify that he was unaware of any parallel committee
within the National Committee of the Interahamwe and that he never worked with certain
members of the committee to the exclusion of others.
890. Georges Rutaganda will testify that he was unaware of any parallel
committees within the National Committee of Interahamwe.
891. Witness 36 will testify that he was approached by Witness G and asked to
implicate MRND leaders in exchange for money.
8. Witness UB
a. Prosecution evidence
i. Witness UB
892. When Witness UB was questioned by Rwandan authorities in 1996, he lied
to them and said that he had not left his house on 7 April.1281
He also lied to them when
1277 Exhibit DNZ-467 1278 Prosecutor v Bagosora et al, No. ICTR-98-41-T, Judgement (18 December 2008) at para. 1544 1279 Transcript of 29 May 2006 @ 3 1280 Transcript of 29 May 2006 @ 4 1281 Transcript of 9 March 2006@ 11, 46; Exhibit #DNZ93
176
he said he had not gone to his secteur office until Sunday.1282
He said he was ready to tell
them anything to save his skin.1283
893. He went to trial in Rwanda and maintained his innocence. He claimed that
he was only an ordinary member of the MRND, when in fact he had been a member of
the MRND prefectoral and communal committees and the prefectural bureau, holding the
post of treasurer.1284
He also falsely told the Court that he had not left his home from the
4th
to 15th of April.
1285
894. A total of ten witnesses made allegations against him at his trial indicating
that he had been involved in the killing and in the distribution of weapons. He claims all
of them were lying.1286
The judges did not find him credible and convicted him.1287
895. Witness UB claimed never to have set foot at St. Andre Parish.1288
However,
Father Otto Meyer and three survivors of the events accused him of driving a truck in
which refugees were taken from the parish and shot on the road.1289
Witness UB denied
these allegations.1290
896. In 2004, a study of Muslim participation in the Rwandan genocide concluded
that ―everyone agrees that Karekezi participated with vigor, inciting from people from his
position as a local leader to participate, sometimes even leading the attacks. They claim
that even if he did not pull the trigger, he ordered others to."1291
897. In 2005, he was reported to have said in an interview with the Chicago
Tribune that ―didn't kill anyone with his own hands, but he sent others to do so.‖ Witness
UB denied making that statement.1292
898. In his case at the Appeals Court, his lawyers represented that he was
Tutsi.1293
1282 Transcript of 9 March 2006@ 46 1283 Transcript of 9 March 2006@ 46 (CS) 1284 Transcript of 10 March 2006@ 7 (CS); Exhibit #DNZ95 1285 Transcript of 10 March 2006@ 7 (CS); Exhibit #DNZ95 1286 Transcript of 10 March 2006@ 8-12; 15-18 (CS); Exhibit #DNZ95 1287 Transcript of 28 February 2006@ 43 1288 Transcript of 9 March 2006@ 49 (CS) 1289 Transcript of 9 March 2006@ 50-53 (CS); Exhibit #IDNZ13 1290 Transcript of 9 March 2006@ 49-51 1291 Transcript of 10 March 2006@ 19-20 (CS) 1292 Transcript of 10 March 2006@ 22 (CS); Exhibit #DNZ53 1293 Transcript of 28 February 2006@ 48, DNZ55; Transcript of 10 March 2006@ 18 (CS); Exhibit
#DNZ95
177
899. He claimed that Nzirorera was a member of the commission responsible for
renovating the MRND,1294
and was one of the personalities who conceived and wrote
down the statutes of the MRND1295
and to draft the MRND Constitution.1296
On cross
examination, Witness UB maintained, ―I never said Nzirorera was a member of any
committee or commission.‖1297
900. When confronted with verbatim tapes and transcripts of speeches by
Ngirumpatse or Renzaho, Witness UB frequently took the position that the material had
been altered by the defence in order to justify the fact that the contents proved the
opposite of his position.1298
901. Witness UB testified that in 1993, Ngirumpatse chaired an MRND meeting
in Murambi commune, Byumba prefecture. Gatete, the bourgmestre of Murambi and
member of the MRND national committee, spoke at this meeting.1299
It was near the end
of 1993, after the National Congress.1300
Jean Baptiste Gatete had been replaced as
bourgmestre in March 1993, but he still presided over this meeting.1301
Witness UB
could not name another individual who attended this rally other than himself,
Ngirumpatse, Gatete, and Kabagema.1302
902. At one point during his cross-examination, Witness UB said that
Ngirumpatse had given weapons to him and asked him to distribute them1303
—a
statement that he later disavowed, saying that no MRND authority had ever given him
weapons.1304
903. Witness UB accused former Prime Minister Pierre Celestin Rwigema of
distributing weapons.1305
1294 Transcript of 23 February 2006@ 20 1295 Transcript of 23 February 2006@ 20 1296 Transcript of 23 February 2006@ 21; Transcript of 28 February 2006@ 49 1297 Transcript of 28 February 2006@ 50 1298 Transcript of 6 March 2006@ 3; Transcript of 7 March 2006@ 12-13,27, 29, 30, 42; Transcript of 8
March 2006@ 38, 40-41 1299 Transcript of 28 February 2006@ 36 1300 Transcript of 23 February 2006@ 47 1301 Transcript of 2 March 2006@ 58 1302 Transcript of 3 March 2006@ 3 1303 Transcript of 10 March 2006@ 12 (CS) 1304 Transcript of 10 March 2006@ 14 (CS) 1305 Transcript of 9 March 2006@ 47-48; Exhibit #DNZ93, 94
178
904. In the second half of May, 1994, Witness UB traveled to Bugarama, in
Cyangugu prefecture, to see his family.1306
While there, he was told by Yusuf
Munyakazi that the Interahamwe had gone to Bisesero to attack the Tutsis at the request
of Mathieu Ngirumpatse, who had telephoned him.1307
He said Mathieu had also
telephoned Prefet Bakambiki to get help for the Interahamwe to travel to Bisesero.1308
905. Witness UB testified that on 2 July 1994, the bourgmestre of his commune
asked him to burn copies of his reports.1309
ii. Witness ALG
906. Witness ALG testified that he never instructed Witness UB or any
conseillers to burn their reports prior to going into exile,1310
and another conseiller,
Witness AWE, testified that he was never told by the bourgmestre to burn his reports.1311
iii. Witness HH
907. Witness HH testified that Witness UB played a role in prison Gacaca
proceedings in sensitizing prisoners and trying to convince them to confess.1312
b. Defence evidence
908. Karemera Witness LOL testified that he never spoke with Yusuf
Munyakazi about any order from Ngirumpatse that Interahamwe should be sent to
Bisesero.1313
909. Pierre Celestin Rwigema, former Prime Minister, will testify that he never
distributed weapons as alleged by Witness UB.
910. Witness 29 will testify that Witness UB was a leader of a group of people,
also including Witnesses ALG, HH, and AWE, who met frequently in Kigali prison and
sought to falsely accuse authorities in Arusha to obtain their own freedom.
911. Witness 34, a bodyguard of Witness UB, will testify that they never went to
Cyangugu and that Witness UB’s behavior during the genocide was not innocent as he
claimed.
1306 Transcript of 8 March 2006@ 47 1307 Transcript of 28 February 2006@ 31 1308 Transcript of 8 March 2006@ 47 1309 Transcript of 23 February 2006@ 8 1310 Transcript of 7 November 2006@ 35-36 1311 Transcript of 10 July 2007 @ 15 1312 Transcript of 20 November 2006 @ 9; Exhibit DNZ-199 1313 Transcript of 8 July 2008 @ 49
179
912. Jean Baptiste Gatete will testify that he never presided at any MRND
rallies in Murambi in 1993.
913. In the Renzaho case, the Trial Chamber found that the evidence of Witness
UB must be viewed with caution because of his conviction of crimes in Rwanda relating
to the genocide, the fact that Witnesses UB, ALG, and AWE were detained in the same
prison at the time of their testimony, and his interest in shifting blame for his actions onto
others and currying favor with Rwandan authorities.1314
9. Witness T
914. In the Bagosora et al case, the Trial Chamber concluded that that Witness T
(known as Witness BY in that case), as a senior Interahamwe leader, had an interest in
minimising his own involvement and shifting blame to senior authorities.1315
It also
concluded that Witness T was willing to mislead Tribunal officials when he perceived it
to be in his best interest.1316
10. Witness ALG
a. Prosecution evidence
i. Witness ALG
915. Witness ALG acknowledged that when he was first arrested, he did not say
everything, and tried to limit certain facts or events.1317
916. Witness ALG acknowledged that he talked to Amri Karekezi on several
occasions when they were detained at the same prison,1318
as well as Joseph Setiba.1319
He was in Arusha with Witness UB in April and May 2004 and they were able to
converse freely.1320
917. Witness ALG was provisionally released pending his trial on 26 July
2005.1321
His co-accused, a conseiller who had been discharged on 30 April 1994, has
never been provisionally released.1322
1314 Prosecutor v Renzaho, No. ICTR-97-31-T, Judgement (14 July 2009) at paras. 166,487 1315 Prosecutor v Bagosora et al, No. ICTR-98-41-T, Judgement (18 December 2008) at para. 1544 1316 Para. 1541 1317 Transcript of 27 October 2006 @ 33-34 1318 Transcript of 30 October 2006 @ 20 1319 Transcript of 30 October 2006 @ 50 1320 Transcript of 7 November 2006@ 47 1321 Transcript of 7 November 2006@ 39; Exhibit DNZ-189 1322 Transcript of 7 November 2006@ 50
180
ii. Witness HH
918. Witness HH testified that he never told Witness ALG in prison about the
incident on 8 April 1994 when Kajuga came to his bar,1323
meeting of Interahamwe at
Maniragaba’s bar, or the 10 April meeting at the Diplomat Hotel.1324
Witness ALG
followed the events at the prison closely, through Gacaca proceedings, but they never had
a face-to-face conversation.1325
Witness HH never told Witness ALG that Dallaire had
attended the meeting at the Hotel Diplomat on 11 April 1994.1326
b. Defence evidence
919. Witness 29 will testify that Witness ALG was among a group of people, also
including Witnesses UB, HH, and AWE, who met frequently in Kigali prison and sought
to falsely accuse authorities in Arusha to obtain their own freedom.
c. Other information
920. In the Renzaho case, the Trial Chamber found that the evidence of Witness
ALG must be viewed with caution because he was awaiting trial for crimes in Rwanda
relating to the genocide, the fact that Witnesses UB, ALG, and AWE were detained in the
same prison at the time of their testimony, and his interest in shifting blame for his
actions onto others and currying favor with Rwandan authorities.1327
11. Witness HH
a. Prosecution evidence
i. Witness HH
921. Witness HH testified that the President of the Interahamwe for Butare
prefecture was Munyagereke, Byumba prefecture was Jean Baptiste Gatete, Cyangugu
was Yusuf Munyakazi1328
, Gitarama was Silas Kubwimana, Gisenyi was Bernard
Munyagishari , Kibungo was Sylvain Mutabaruka, Ruhengeri was Baheza.1329
922. Witness HH initially claimed in his confession and his trial testimony that he
was appointed by Laurent Semanza to replace Turatsinze as President of the Interahamwe
1323 Transcript of 13 November 2006 @ 42; Transcript of 20 November 2006 @ 6 1324 Transcript of 20 November 2006 @ 6 1325 Transcript of 20 November 2006 @ 7; Exhibit DNZ-198 1326 Transcript of 20 November 2006 @ 30 1327 Prosecutor v Renzaho, No. ICTR-97-31-T, Judgement (14 July 2009) at paras. 322,487, 494,496,569 1328 Transcript of 8 November 2006 @ 32 1329 Transcript of 8 November 2006 @ 33
181
for Kigali Rural prefecture.1330
He later claimed that he was elected by the Interahamwe
commune Presidents to this post between June and September 1993 to replace Jean Pierre
Turatsinze, who had too many other duties.1331
He denied being appointed by Semanza,
saying that was a mistake.1332
Witness HH claimed that he was elected to be President of
the Interahamwe for his prefecture at the MRND headquarters in Kimihurura.1333
He
listed the people present during this election.1334
His opponent was the assistant
Bourgmestre of Ngenda commune.1335
After the election, he went to Ngenda commune
to be introduced as President of the Interahamwe. Ngirumpatse, Faustin Munyaseza, and
Semanza were present at that meeting, which was held at Bandora’s bar.1336
923. Witness HH also claimed to have gone to another commune to be
introduced, this time with Ngirumpatse, Karemera, Nzirorera, and Semanza after the
election of the new MRND National Officers in July 1993.1337
However, in his statement
to the prosecution in March 2006, he did not include Nzirorera in the list of people who
attended.1338
924. Rutaganda asked Witness HH to help two Tutsi girls cross the Nyabarongo
River. He gave Witness HH 100,000 RWF to give to people manning the roadblocks to
let the girls pass. Kajuga forbade Witness HH to help those girls. But since he had been
given money, he agreed to help. He was not allowed to pass the roadblock near the
central prison, and he returned the girls to Rutaganda and also returned his money.1339
He denied that the fact that Rutaganda had to pay him money demonstrated that the
National Committee did not have authority over him.1340
925. In his first statement to the Rwandan authorities on 7 May 1997, he falsely
denied having distributed firearms to Interahamwe or sending them for training
1330 Transcript of 8 November 2006 @ 31; Transcript of 21 November 2006 @ 4 (CS); Exhibit DNG-43 1331 Transcript of 10 November 2006 @ 21 1332 Transcript of 10 November 2006 @ 25 1333 Transcript of 15 Nov 2006 @ 51 (CS) 1334 Transcript of 15 Nov 2006 @ 51-54 (CS) 1335 Transcript of 15 Nov 2006 @ 52 (CS) 1336 Transcript of 15 Nov 2006 @ 55 (CS) 1337 Transcript of 15 Nov 2006 @ 56 (CS) 1338 Transcript of 15 Nov 2006 @ 56 (CS); Exhibit DNZ-203 1339 Transcript of 9 November 2006 @ 31-32 1340 Transcript of 20 November 2006 @ 40
182
sessions.1341
He also claimed that others falsely accused him of launching attacks in
Gitarama, when in fact he was the one who was lying.1342
926. When he was interviewed by the Office of the Prosecutor on 16 February
1998, he also lied to them and signed the statement representing that it was true.1343
The
same was true for his statement of 23 February 1998, another interview he had with
investigators around that time, 1344
a fourth interview where he falsely accused Generals
Gatsinzi and Rustaira of distributing weapons,1345
and a reconfirmation interview in 2003
with Prosecutor Webster.1346
927. He did not see any advantage to pleading guilty under the old law, but when
the law changed and he notice some people being released, he decided to plead guilty and
confess.1347
If the confession is considered sincere by the authorities, he might benefit
from a reduction of sentence. The confession must be complete.1348
928. His confession of 3 November 2004 was not complete, as he did not see it in
his interest at that time to provide all details. Therefore, while claiming to plead guilty to
possession of weapons, he acknowledged receiving a weapon from Lt. Miruho, but made
no mention of receiving weapons on 11 April 1994 at the Diplomat Hotel.1349
929. All of his statements made between 3 November 2004 and now are the truth.
All the statements he made before that date were not truthful.1350
He did not tell the
truth because he saw no interest in telling the truth before then.1351
930. The Gacaca document prepared in 2004 was done during a question and
answer session and should not be relied upon.1352
931. When he was asked if he left his neighborhood on the evening of 7 April, he
denied it.1353
He was then confronted with his statement to the OTP in which he indicated
1341 Transcript of 15 November 2006 @ 16-17 1342 Transcript of 15 November 2006 @ 17-19; Exhibit DNZ-192 1343 Transcript of 15 November 2006 @ 25; Exhibit DNZ-193 1344 Transcript of 15 November 2006 @ 28; Exhibits DNZ-194 & 195 1345 Transcript of 15 November 2006 @ 29,32; Exhibit DNZ-196 1346 Transcript of 15 November 2006 @ 39; Exhibit DNZ-197 1347 Transcript of 9 November 2006 @ 49 1348 Transcript of 9 November 2006 @ 56 1349 Transcript of 21 November 2006 @ 2-3; Exhibit DNG-43 1350 Transcript of 9 November 2006 @ 59 1351 Transcript of 9 November 2006 @ 60 1352 Transcript of 10 November 2006 @ 25 1353 Transcript of 17 November 2006 @ 25
183
that he had seen Francois Karera at the Kigali prefecture office on the evening of 7 April.
He attempted to avoid answering the question, claiming that he did not want to discuss
Karera’s matter.1354
Finally, he was ordered to answer the question by the President.1355
932. Witness HH then revealed that he had lied to the investigators from OTP at
the request of one Mutabazi, who had come to see him in prison on behalf of
Gakwangari, who was living in a house owned by Karera.1356
Mutabazi asked Witness
HH to corroborate the story he had told to OTP concerning Karera. He was providing
Witness HH with supplies and food in the prison.1357
Witness HH believed that Mutabazi
might give him something in recompense for corroborating his story.1358
933. Witness HH lied about seeing Karera at the Kigali prefecture office on the
night of 7 April, and about seeing Karera there again on the 9th and 10
th of April. He also
fabricated a story of how he had congratulated Karera on his appointment as Prefet of
Kigali Rural prefecture and how Karera had been called away for a meeting with Prefet
Renzaho.1359
934. Witness HH denied allegations made against him by numerous witnesses
who said he personally participated in killings in his area, and in Kigali Rural and
Gitarama prefectures in April 1994.1360
Witness HH had no knowledge of killings of
civilians by the RPF in Kigali in April 1994 and claimed that the former sous-prefet of
Kigali-Rural prefecture, Sekagina, had been in exile with him in Bukavu.1361
ii. Witness FH
935. Witness FH testified that killings were reported by Interahamwe led by
Joseph Setiba, including in the communes of Runda and Mugina—which Witness HH
had denied.1362
iii. Fidele Uwizeye
1354 Transcript of 17 November 2006 @ 25-26 1355 Transcript of 17 November 2006 @ 26; Exhibit DNZ-200 1356 Transcript of 17 November 2006 @ 27 1357 Transcript of 17 November 2006 @ 28 1358 Transcript of 17 November 2006 @ 31 1359 Transcript of 20 November 2006 @ 3; Exhibit DNZ-200 1360 Transcript of 20 November 2006 @ 19-21; 40-42 1361 Transcript of 20 November 2006 @ 48-49 1362 Transcript of 18 July 2007 @ 7-8
184
936. Witness Fidele Uwizeye testified that he was advised by the bourgmestre of
Runda that a group of Interahamwe led by Setiba had come to Runda to loot on the 8th
and then returned on the 9th and killed three people.
1363 The bourgmestre of Mugina
provided him with both an oral and written report that Setiba had led attacks in his
commune before 18 April—which Witness HH had denied.1364
iv. Witness GOB
937. Witness GOB testified that Witness HH never was President of the
Interahamwe at either the commune or prefecture level. He was president of the
Interahamwe only at the level of the secteur.1365
b. Defence evidence
938. Karemera Witness XQL testified that Esdras Baheza was never President
of the Interahamwe for Ruhengeri prefecture. He could not even be a member of the
Interahamwe due to his age.1366
939. Joseph Nzirorera will testify that he never attended any MRND events at
which Witness HH was introduced.
940. George Rutaganda will testify that there were no Interahamwe Presidents
outside of Kigali other than Bernard Munyagishari in Gisenyi, and that Witness HH was
never elected President for Kigali Rural Prefecture. He will also testify that the National
Committee of the Interahamwe had no control over Witness HH and he had to pay
Witness HH to let some family members cross his roadblock.
941. Laurent Semanza will testify that Witness HH was never elected President
for Kigali Rural Prefecture and never introduced to the population at any event.
942. Barabwiriza Runyinya whose written statement was admitted pursuant to
Rule 92 bis, stated that he was President of MRND for Butare. There was never an
Interahamwe organization established in Butare prefecture. Contrary to the testimony of
Witness HH, there was no Interahamwe President for Butare prefecture.1367
943. Justin Ugiyekera, whose written statement was admitted pursuant to Rule
92 bis, was the Assistant Bourgmestre of Ngenda commune, Kigali Rural commune,
1363 Transcript of 19 July 2007 @ 17; Transcript of 26 July 2007 @ 23 1364 Transcript of 26 July 2007 @ 23 1365 Transcript of 25 October 2007 @ 46 1366 Transcript of 5 May 2008 @ 30 1367 Exhibit DNZ-619
185
from 1990-94. He refuted the testimony of Witness HH that he participated in a meeting
which took place at the MRND offices in Kimihurura and that in the election of
interahamwe leaders at Kigali rural prefecture level organized in that meeting he
submitted a candidacy for the presidency. In fact, he never attended such a meeting and
did not even know where the office of MRND was in Kimihurura. He also has never
known the president of Interahamwe at Kigali rural prefecture level.1368
944. Witnesses Jean Damascene Niyoyita, President of the MRND in Mukingo
commune, refuted the testimony of Witness HH that Esdras Baheza was the President of
the Interahamwe in Rughengeri. He testified that no Interahamwe structure existed at the
prefecture level in Ruhengeri.1369
945. Charles Bandora will testify that there was no meeting at his bar in Ngenda
commune attended by Ngirumpatse and Faustin Munyaneza and Witness HH.
946. Witness 36, a member of the MRND prefectural committee for Kigali Rural
prefecture, will testify that Witness HH was never elected President of the Interahamwe
for that prefecture.
12. Witness AWE
a. Prosecution evidence
i. Witness AWE
947. After his arrest, Witness AWE was interrogated on 12 December 1996 by a
prosecutor in Kigali. He told him the killings didn’t begin in Cyahafi for three weeks
after the death of President Habyarimana. He meant to speak of Gakinjiro cellule, not
Cyahafi secteur.1370
948. Witness AWE has been detained at Kigali Central Prison and attended
Gacaca sessions at the prison on a monthly, and sometimes weekly basis.1371
He has
been detained there with Witnesses ALG and UB.1372
949. In his trial in Kora secteur, many people testified against Witness AWE and
the judges rejected his guilty plea because they did not believe he was truthful. He was
sentenced to life imprisonment.1373
1368 Exhibit DNZ-616 1369 Transcript of 19 November 2009 @ 3 1370 Transcript of 11 July 2007 @ 4 1371 Transcript of 4 July 2007@ 54 1372 Transcript of 4 July 2007@ 55
186
b. Defence evidence
950. Georges Rutaganda will testify that the claims made by Witness AWE of
his distribution of weapons, imprisonment of Tutsis, and meeting with Mathieu
Ngirumpatse in Cyahafi secteur are false.
951. Witness 29 will testify that Witness AWE is among the group of prisoners at
Kigali prison, including ALG, UB AWD, and HH, who decided to falsely accuse
authorities in Arusha in the hope of gaining their own freedom.
c. Other information
952. In the Renzaho case, the Trial Chamber found that the evidence of Witness
AWE must be viewed with caution because he was awaiting trial for crimes in Rwanda
relating to the genocide, the fact that Witnesses UB, ALG, and AWE were detained in the
same prison at the time of their testimony, and his interest in shifting blame for his
actions onto others and currying favor with Rwandan authorities.1374
13. Witness AWD
a. Prosecution evidence
i. Witness AWD
953. In January or February 1994, Interahamwe killed Francois Ndagijimana and
his family. Witness AWD submitted a report to the MRND office. Ngirumpatse warned
him not to interfere in matters regarding the Interahamwe.1375
954. Witness AWD made an oral report on this incident to Jean Habyarimana and
Mathieu Ngirumpatse, and also reported it to Lieutenant Mugabo of the gendarmerie
brigade.1376
Ngirumpatse summoned him to his law office and told him not to interfere
with the work of the Interahamwe. No one else was present for this conversation.1377
955. The Interahamwe also attacked two minibuses owned by Jean-Bosco
Twahirwa, who had joined the RPF. Witness AWD drew up a report on this matter for
Lt. Mugabo, the commander of the gendarmerie. He had the perpetrators arrested,
1373 Transcript of 11 July 2007 @ 13-14 1374 Prosecutor v Renzaho, No. ICTR-97-31-T, Judgement (14 July 2009) at paras.166,734 1375 Transcript of 10 October 2007 @ 29 1376 Transcript of 9 November 2007 @ 26-27 1377 Transcript of 9 November 2007 @ 28
187
including Andre Nzabanterura. Ngirumpatse summoned Witness AWD to his office and
once again warned him not to get involved in Interahamwe matters.1378
956. Witness AWD claimed that he had not submitted any written reports on the
Ndagijimana or Twahirwa incidents.1379
957. When cross examined, Witness AWD said he did not discuss the minibus
incident with Ngirumpatse. After these incidents, he said he no longer contacted MRND
authorities until April.1380
However, when confronted with his direct testimony, Witness
AWD testified that after the minibus incident, Ngirumpatse phoned him and summoned
him to his office once again. Ngirumpatse told him for a second time that he should not
meddle in the affairs of the Interahamwe.1381
958.No one else was present during this conversation about the minibuses with
Ngirumpatse. He did not tell anyone about it.1382
959. As of February 1994, there were still several Tutsis who remained members
of the MRND.1383
960. One day, in January 1994,1384
Ngirumpatse invited him to his home and
Karemera was present. They told him that the activities of the Interahamwe did not
concern him at all. They said that they were going to organize security zones with
Aminadab Buhake in charge of Kicukiro, Francois Karera in charge of Nyarugenge, and
Interahamwe and Presidential Guard in charge of Kacyiru.1385
Buhake was MRND
Chairman in Kicukiro and Karera MRND Chairman for Nyarugenge.1386
Ngirumpatse
said that the RPF at the CND could conquer the town and the Interahamwe who had been
trained at Mutara and elsewhere were needed for the security of the town so they could
exterminate the Tutsis in Kigali with no difficulty.1387
961. Ngirumpatse and Karemera were the only ones present in Ngirumpatse’s
home, although Witness AWD also believed that Ngirumpatse’s wife was present.
1378 Transcript of 10 October 2007 @ 30 1379 Transcript of 12 November 2007 @ 46 1380 Transcript of 9 November 2007 @ 29 1381 Transcript of 9 November 2007 @ 30; Transcript of 12 November 2007 @ 11 1382 Transcript of 12 November 2007 @ 11 1383 Transcript of 12 November 2007 @ 11 1384 Transcript of 10 October 2007 @ 39 1385 Transcript of 10 October 2007 @ 30-31 1386 Transcript of 10 October 2007 @ 32 1387 Transcript of 10 October 2007 @ 32
188
Witness AWD did not recall any prominent paintings or animal skins in Ngirumpatse’s
home.1388
962. Witness AWD testified that Karemera did not say anything during this
meeting.1389
However, he had told the Office of the Prosecutor in December 2004 that
Karemera had said that the Army and MRND were creating security zones and referred to
the fact that Witness AWD had denounced the Interahamwe to Lt. Mugabo.1390
In the
Rule 67(D) notice filed in September 2007, it was reported that he had told the prosecutor
that Karemera had said it was public knowledge he had denounced the Interahamwe to
Lt. Mugabo.1391
Witness AWD denied having said these things to the Office of the
Prosecutor.1392
963. However, on redirect examination, Witness AWD testified that Karemera
had said that it was not good that he was obstructing the work of the Interahamwe.1393
964. Witness AWD, in cross examination, also denied having said in direct
examination that he had been told that the MRND Presidents in the other communes of
Kigali would be in charge of security for their communes.1394
965. Witness AWD did not discuss the meeting at Ngirumpatse’s home with
anyone, including other members of the MRND committee for Kacyiru commune.1395
966. Witness AWD variously claimed that this meeting took place after the two
meetings at Ngirumpatse’s office1396
, between the two meetings1397
, or before the two
meetings, in early January 1994. 1398
967. In February 1994, there was an outing at the Rebero Hotel organized by
President Habyarimana to raise money for the Interahamwe, according to what his
neighbors had told him.1399
1388 Transcript of 12 November 2007 @ 12 1389 Transcript of 12 November 2007 @ 12 1390 Transcript of 12 November 2007 @ 13; Exhibit DNG-91 1391 Transcript of 12 November 2007 @ 13; Exhibit DNZ-376 1392 Transcript of 12 November 2007 @ 12-13 1393 Transcript of 12 November 2007 @ 34 1394 Compare Transcript of 12 November 2007 @ 14 with Transcript of 10 October 2007 @ 32 1395 Transcript of 12 November 2007 @ 15 1396 Transcript of 12 November 2007 @ 11 1397 Transcript of 12 November 2007 @ 15 1398 Transcript of 10 October 2007 @ 39; Transcript of 12 November 2007 @ 46 1399 Transcript of 10 October 2007 @ 32
189
968. Witness AWD claimed that after his meetings with Ngirumpatse in January
and February 1994, he no longer presented himself publicly as an official of the
MRND.1400
969. Witness AWD denied the allegations made by Gerard Kayumba in a letter to
the Kigali prosecutor dated 29 March 1994, which stated that at a security meeting in
Rugando cellule, Witness AWD had accused Kayumba of collaborating with the
Interahamwe and plotting to kill Nzirorera, saying it was a ―pure fabrication.‖1401
Kayumba still lives in Kimihurura.1402
970. Witness AWD has stated in his letters and submissions to Rwandan
authorities that after 6 April 1994, he was under threat by the Interahamwe headed by
Nzabanterura and that they wanted to kill him. However, when he travelled from
Gitarama to Gisenyi and Cyangugu, he traveled with an Interahamwe and a soldier, wore
a military uniform, and carried a firearm. When he saw Nzabanterura in Cyangugu as
they were leaving the country, they greeted each other.1403
971. The only person who was aware that Witness AWD had become a dissident
of the MRND is Jean Habyarimana, but he is unlikely to confirm that.1404
972. Witness AWD was the President of the Gacaca truth commission at Kigali
central prison and met every day since 2002 with other prisoners to consider the events of
the genocide.1405
He spent five years in prison together with Amri Karekezi, Jean
Bizimana, Joseph Setiba, and Michel Haragirimana.1406
Joseph Setiba was one of those
in charge of security at Kigali prison. He is now at home, awaiting Gacaca hearings.1407
973. Witness AWD has met the prosecutor whenever they requested to meet him
(on about 8 occasions), but refused to meet with counsel for Mr. Nzirorera.1408
He
claimed that counsel for Nzirorera had told other inmates, such as Jean Habyarimana, to
fabricate stories.1409
1400 Transcript of 12 November 2007 @ 17 1401 Transcript of 12 November 2007 @ 18-20; Exhibit #DNZ-370 1402 Transcript of 12 November 2007 @ 21 1403 Transcript of 12 November 2007 @ 24 1404 Transcript of 12 November 2007 @ 25 1405 Transcript of 7 November 2007 @10-11 1406 Transcript of 7 November 2007 @ 12-13 1407 Transcript of 7 November 2007 @ 14 1408 Transcript of 7 November 2007 @ 46 1409Transcript of 7 November 2007 @ 47
190
974. Witness AWD claimed that he was first approached by a man who asked him
to give him a statement for the defence. He asked Witness AWD to sign a statement, but
he refused.1410
Witness AWD denied that he had been asked about the allegations of
Ahmed Mbonyunkiza and his attendance at MRND meetings in early 1992 at which
members of the Interahamwe were introduced.1411
This meeting took place before the
WVSS had come and asked him if he was willing to meet counsel for Nzirorera.1412
The
man did not offer him any money.1413
975. Although Witness AWD claimed that the defence investigator for Nzirorera
never asked him about MRND meetings, in an interview with the Office of the
Prosecutor in February 2006, Witness AWD told them that the investigator had asked
him about MRND meetings concerning the establishment of the Interahamwe and
whether Nzirorera or Ngirumpatse were present.1414
On redirect examination, Witness
AWD again insisted that he had refused to meet Nzirorera’s investigator.1415
976. Witness AWD claimed that he had reported to the director of the Kigali
prison that counsel for Nzirorera was trying to meet him even though he was a
prosecution witness, and the Director called counsel for Nzirorera in Kigali while
Witness AWD was present.1416
However, later Witness AWD said that he did not know
who the Director called.1417
977. Witness AWD claimed that Jean Habyarimana sent Sukari to persuade him
to meet with counsel for Nzirorera.1418
Sukari wanted to convince Witness AWD to meet
with counsel for Nzirorera, but he refused. No one else was present during their
conversation. It took place before Witness AWD was contacted by WVSS.1419
978. According to Witness AWD, he was told by an Interahamwe from Cyahafi
known as Ninja that he had told counsel for Nzirorera that he could not come to Arusha
and tell lies. He claimed that counsel for Nzirorera had sent Jean Habyarimana to ask
1410 Transcript of 7 November 2007 @ 52-53 1411 Transcript of 7 November 2007 @ 54-55; Exhibit DNZ-361 1412 Transcript of 7 November 2007 @ 56 1413 Transcript of 7 November 2007 @ 54 1414 Transcript of 12 November 2007 @ 5; Exhibit DNZ-369 1415 Transcript of 12 November 2007 @ 38 1416 Transcript of 7 November 2007 @ 56 1417 Transcript of 8 November 2007 @ 6 1418 Transcript of 7 November 2007 @ 57 1419 Transcript of 8 November 2007 @ 3
191
Ninja to look for defence witnesses.1420
Sukari and Ninja were the only prisoners who
approached him.1421
979. In statements made after his arrest in 1997, as well as interviews in 1999-
2001 by the Prosecutor General’s office and a representative of the parquet, Witness
AWD maintained his innocence.1422
After the law was passed calling for reduced
sentences for those who pled guilty, Witness AWD decided to plead guilty in 2002 in a
bid to facilitate his own trial.1423
However, his only crime was to have held a post with
the MRND, he never abetted the people who were commiting crimes.1424
b. Defence evidence
980. Witness 29 will testify that he never approached Witness AWD on behalf of
Mr. Nzirorera or his counsel. He will testify that Witness AWD colluded with other
witnesses at Kigali Central Prison, such as UB, LAG, and AWE, to fabricate evidence
against those in Arusha.
981. Dick Prudence Munyeshuli will testify as to his interview with Witness
AWD in Kigali prison.
c. Evidence the Defence Wished to Bring
982. Gerard Kayumba submitted a statement in which he confirmed that,
contrary to the testimony of Witness AWD, the meeting described in his letter indeed
took place in March, 1994 and that it appeared to him that Witness AWD had been an
MRND militant to the end. However, the Trial Chamber declined to admit the
statement.1425
14. Witness AJY
983. In the Bikindi case, the Trial Chamber held that:
The Chamber views the testimony of Witness AJY with caution given the
witness’s criminal past. Discrepancies between the witness’s testimony and his
1420 Transcript of 8 November 2007 @ 4 1421 Transcript of 8 November 2007 @ 5 1422 Transcript of 8 November 2007 @ 35,38 1423 Transcript of 8 November 2007 @ 38 1424 Transcript of 8 November 2007 @ 39 1425 Decision on Joseph Nzirorera’s Motion to Admit Statements of Aloys Simpunga and Gerard Kayumba
and on Reconsideration of Decision on Admission of Written Statements and Witness Testimony (20
October 2009) at para. 11
192
prior statement to Tribunal investigators leaves the Chamber with some doubts as
to his credibility.1426
984. Noting inconsistencies between his testimony and his prior statements, as
well as with the testimony of other prosecution witnesses, the Trial Chamber declined to
believe the testimony of Witness AJY.1427
CONCLUSION
985. Joseph Nzirorera hopes that this Pre-Defence Brief will assist the Trial
Chamber in following the evidence of the national events during his defence case and in
understanding that he is not guilty of these charges.
1426 Prosecutor v Bikindi, No. ICTR-01-72-T, Judgement (8 December 2008) at para. 160 1427 Paras. 330-31, 335, 345-46
193
INDEX TO DEFENCE WITNESSES
Pages
22. Jacques Roger Booh Booh 8,28,148
22a. 96,99,126,141
23. Theoneste Bagosora 8,15,42,45,68,73,126,150
25. Casimir Bizimungu 45,53,55,68,124,148,163
26. Justin Mugenzi 14,27,34,45,47,52,55,68,73,108,124
27. Gratien Kabiligi 61,68,150
28. Laurent Semanza 61,73,184
29. 27,61,68,95,98,104,108,118,123,124,
130,141,148,157,168,173,178,180,
186,191
30. Georges Rutaganda 27,42,45,63,70,73,95,98,191,124,
126,141,148,154,157,163,173,175,
184,186
31. 25,34,42,70,98,141,148,154,173
32. Tharcisse Renzaho 15,27,61,68,73,95,104,117,126,141,
150
33. Francois Karera 61,118,130,148,173
34. 63,178
35. 8,15
36. 141,175,185
37. Paul Rusesabagina 27,42,126
39. Eliezer Niyitegeka 27,47,52,55,68,73
40. Pauline Nyiramasuhuko 52,55,68,73,124,148
41. 120
42. Ephrem Setako 42,46,121
43. Solange Ajakaneza 42,46,121
44. 42,120
45. 42,121
46. David Biramahire 42,121
47. 120
48. Aurore Uwase 46
49. Flora Kalisa 46
194
Rule 92 bis Witnesses who may Testify:
30. Aloys Simba 173
31. Charles Nyandwi 154,173
32. Bernard Habyarimana 173
33. Leon Habyarimana 173
34 Winnie Musabeyezu 173
38. Pierre Nsengiyumva 99
39. Ibrahim Nzarigezahe 99
40. Marcel Gatsinzi 118
41. Seraphin Twahirwa 28,42,95,98,124,141
43. Charles Bandora 185
45. Seraphin Rwabukumba 95
46. Godelieve Barushwanubusa 95
47. Francois Gahigi 99,130
49 Jean Claude Seyoboka 120
50. Aloys Zirarushya 46
51. Pierre Celestin Rwigema 178
52. Pascal Mutuyeyezu 63
53. Innocent Twagiramungu 46
55. Simon Bikindi 173
56. Jean Baptiste Gatete 73,179
57. Jean Baptiste Nemeyabahizi 120
59. Abdulmohamed Bandali 95
60. Jean Bosco Sezirahiga 95
62. Aloys Ntabakuze 73
63. Protais Zigiranyirazo 73
64. Samuel Imanishimwe 73