the july 2012 latell report

5/26/2018 The July 2012 Latell Report

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The Latell Report July 2012

The Latell Report analyzes Cuba's contemporary domestic and foreign policy, and is published

periodically. It is distributed by the electronic information service of the Cuba Transition Proect

!CTP" at the #niversity of $iami's Institute for Cuban and Cuban%&merican tudies !ICC&".

Cubas Intelligence Machine

(ithin a fe) years of its inception in *+* the Castro brothers- foreign intelligence service rose

into the elite rans of the best in the )orld. Retired CI& officers I consulted as I )rote Castros

Secretsstand in a)e of ho) the Cubans )ere able to build up such e/ceptional clandestine

capabilities to run productive penetration operations against &merican targets and ingeniously

deceive the CI&. 0ne &gency officer admitted to me ruefully, 12oy did they do a ob on us.3

&nother said, 1They )ere better than us. In truth )e lost during much of the Cold (ar to the

Cubans.3

Current and former 42I officers agree. They share a grudging admiration for )hat until *+5+

)as no)n as the 6eneral 7irectorate of Intelligence, the 76I, and the ease )ith )hich it burro)ed

spies and moles and agents of influence into significant &merican institutions, including, according

to Cuban defectors I have intervie)ed, universities, the tate 7epartment and the Congress. 0ne

former 42I officer )ho traced Cuban intelligence told me, 1They outperformed us by any obective

measure.3

These &mericans )ere referring specifically to the 8uarter century of Cuban%&merican

intelligence ousting from *+* until the summer of *+59. It )as then, in the )aning years of the

Cold (ar, that 4lorentino&spillaga, a senior and highly decorated Cuban intelligence officer,

defected into &merican hands from his post as the 76I Center chief in 2ratislava, no) the capital oflovaia. :e is )idely acno)ledged to have been the most important defector ;among a

surprisingly large number%% to betray the Castros and their secret services.

&fter threats against his life by former colleagues, &spillaga no) lives obscurely )ith a ne)

identity. :e has made no public appearances or spoen on the record since the late *+5tre3 of Cuban

intelligence, according to still another e/perienced defector I intervie)ed.

2ut &spillaga-s decision to betray his former masters proved to be an historic turning point. :e


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e/posed double agents thought by the CI& to have been bona fide operatives )oring against Cuban

interests. $oles and spies )oring for the Castros and operating in the #nited tates )ere bared and

neutralized. Cuban operations ;including sophisticated medidasactivas;active measures, or covert

actions= )ere compromised.

In short, the virtually free ride the 76I had enoyed until &spillaga-s defection abruptly ended as

Cuba became a prime target for &merican counterintelligence, a respected )orld%class foe. :is

reporting enabled &mericans to better understand ;and more easily counter=aggressive Cuban

tradecraft. Covert Cuban operations abroad )ere temporarily hobbled, no)here more decisively than

in Latin &merica. &ccording to another defector )ho confided in me, more than *?< Cuban

operatives in the region )ere compromised and taen out of service after &spillaga began unreeling

his secrets.

6radually, in the years since his flight the intelligence )ars )aged across the 4lorida traits have

resulted in many notable &merican successes. 0nly four Cuban spies )ere arrested in the #nited

tates bet)een *+?+ and *++?. Then, since eptember *++5, about four dozen undercover Cuban

agents have been prosecuted or other)ise neutralized. $ore than thirty )ere members of the

spra)lingAvispa, or (asp, net)or. i/ other &mericans )oring for Cuban intelligence have also

been prosecuted successfully.

They include academics, &na $ontes ;the super Cuban mole in the 7efense Intelligence

&gency, an analyst )oring for the tate 7epartment-s intelligence bureau, and a high%level official

of the Immigration and @aturalization ervice. till others )ho )ittingly assisted Cuban intelligence

are no longer able to function as viable Cuban assets.

It )as, therefore, in the aftermath of &spillaga-s defection that the many advantages Cuban

intelligence had )ielded against &merican interests began decisively to diminish. Previously a

highly decorated Cuban intelligence operative, &spillaga became a genuine &merican hero.

AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA

7r. 2rian Latell, distinguished Cuba analyst and author of the boo,After Fidel: The Inside Story of

Castros Regime and Cubas Net !eader, is a enior Research &ssociate at ICC&. :e hasinformed &merican and foreign presidents, cabinet members, and legislators about Cuba and 4idel

Castro in a number of capacities. :e served in the early *++


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