the jurisdiction of the hegelian monarch - nancy

8/14/2019 The Jurisdiction of the Hegelian Monarch - Nancy

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The Jurisdictionf /theHegelian /Monarch / byean-luc ancyz

A begin with a preliminaryemark:Hegel should not beconsidered ere nhissingularity,r as one xamplef a politi-cal philosophermongothers.n thequestion hat lift romhim, addressmyselfn factto a limiting ointof politicalphilosophyn general nd ofphilosophical olitics, limitingpoint owhichHegel,forreasonswhich re not unrelated ohis inalpositionnphilosophyfinal nall senses ftheword),gives pecialrelief nd sharpness. do not meansimply hatHegel brings his imiting ointto light nsofar s he repre-sents a closing-offand an opening-up of philosophy.meanalso,and moreprecisely,hat his amepoint ppears,although ifferently,ntheStatesmanfPlato,for xample, ntheSovereignf Hobbes or ofRousseau, nd that treappearswith tsproblemsnthe sovereigntyfBataille.The analysisI shallproposeshouldengagewith ll theanalyses huspro-grammed.The general orm f thequestionposedon thispoint s thefollowing: ow do things tand withrespect o the minimalarticulationetween he uridical nd thepoliticalwhichs thearticulation f the effectuationf the law (droit) not of itsexecution r of itsapplication s a practical r material ro-cess,but of thedecision hichmakes the law effective? hisdecision s itself n act oflaw,but t s not n the orderof thegeneralityfthe aw, t nheresnthe orderof theparticular-ityof itsemploymentI adopt here the terms f the SocialContract,n, 1). This employmentowever s nothing therthan that of the social institutions such, if thisrequires


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482 SOCIAL RESEARCHnecessarilynd originally omething ike a right droit)right nderstood erenotas an instrumentf tsregulationbut as thatbywhich hesocial nstitutionecognizestself rsymbolizes tself eflexivelythat s to say, nstitutestself).The politicalrticulates ith heuridical tthispoint s thelatter'sperativemplication.ut sincethe aw s suchonly s itdeclares nd decides tself ffectivelys the effectiveaw ofsuch and such a collectivity,he juridical articulatestselfequallywell tthispoint o thepolitical,s to tsown nstitutingcondition:double articulationfwhich ne could show hat tis that,n Rousseau, fthe overeignnd oftheprince.t is ingeneral hearticulationftheudgment hatdecides s to thelaw,ofthe udgment hatpronouncesegitimacys such andwhoseproblematic,s we shallhave topoint ut,perhapsgoesbeyond he habitualframeworkf the so-called decisionistproblematic).his udgments theparticularudgment f thegeneralityf a law(droit),nd the generaludgmentof theparticularityf a law and invirtue fthis,n Kantian erms,theperhapsunrealizableynthesisf a determiningudgmentand a reflectiveudgment).Sincetheterm jurisdictionontainshe motiff thedecla-ration hatdecidesand,in its modern ense,themotif f theeffective owerof the law (of the law or of the powerofjudgmentn one districtr another), shallcall this rticula-tionpoliticalurisdiction.And so I cometo theurisdictionf theHegelianmonarch.I willnotdwellon thegeneral cheme,which swellknownand up to a pointestablished,whichcharacterizes egel'sPhilosophyfRights thethoughtfthetotalitariantate tself,in that t s thethoughtfthe socialtotalitys an organismras theorganic haracterfthe ife ftheSubject,whichs themindof the people, which n its turnis the culmination,according o history,f the self-consciousnessf theworldmind #347). t is in thisway hat theState s theactualityfthe ethical dea (#257),and thatone might ay (althoughoverlooking,tmust e admitted,omedifficultieshat emain


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THE HEGELIAN MONARCH 483on a closer xamination)hat he State s the final ruth f thetotal ystemf subjectivity.One could in anycase appeal totheend of the Remark t#552of theEncyclopedia:hilosophyexistsn the end only s theState, s that tatethatdevelopsthe truth f theProtestanteligion.)Butin pronouncinghat ruths theState, ne has notyetsaidanything.t is stillnecessaryodetermine he content fthis ruth,hat s tosay, ftheState s such.Hegeldeterminesthis, n the most radicalfashion, n opposition o the Stateconceived s the administrationfrelations etweenndividu-als, that s to say,to civil ociety:Ifthe tate sconfused ith ivilociety,nd f ts pecificnd slaid down s the ecurityndprotectionfpropertyndper-sonalfreedom,hen he nterestsf he ndividualss suchbecomethe ultimate nd of their ssociation,nd itfollows hatmem-bership f theState s something ptional.But the State'srela-

tion o the ndividualsquitedifferentrom his. incethe Stateis mindobjectified,t is onlyas one of itsmembers hat theindividual imself asobjectivity,enuine ndividuality,nd anethical ife.Union as such s thetruecontent nd aim,and theindividual's estinys the living f a universalife #258; thetranslations Knox's modifiedn one or twopoints).A number of other texts onfirm heimportanceof thisoppo-sition, in particular the marginal notes in the sections onproperty.That union as such die Vereinigungls solche should betheveritable ontent f the Statemeansthat he Stateeffectstherelation,t does notpoliceor regulatet.The effectuationoftherelation s true ubjectivity,hus ubjectivitys the truthof the State. That is, the truthof the subjectivitys notindividualitywith tsneeds, ts nterests,nd itsrights buttherelation etweenndividualitiess therelation o theSpiritand therelation f theSpirit o the self.

In a sense,and all otherdifferencesside, nothing lsedetermines he zoonpolitikon, an's political animality rnaturalness orAristotle:hecommerce fethical iscourse,which aims at the city's livingwell, a living-together-


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484 SOCIAL RESEARCHaccording-to-the-goodndependentlyf needs and interests.Union s suchdenotesthe excessof thespecific ature f thezoon olitikon,ts excesswith espect o the socialorganizationofrelationshatbenefithepartners,nd finallyhe effectua-tionof the relationtself s absolutelynexcessofany regula-tion of relations.As opposed to or as absolutely ivergingfrom policing f society,union as such definespolitics sthe immanent?we shall see to whatdegree)transcendenceof thecollectiveife.We shouldkeep clearlybeforeus thisfundamental eter-mination, hich s here, urely,hat f the total tate, hat s,ofsubjectivitys an organism hat ranscends ocialorganiza-tion,but which s nonetheless,nd simultaneously,n its na-ture as effectuationf the relation nd in itsdescriptionstranscendence,he locus of an inevitable uestion Can wesimply ot take ntoaccount omethingike a requirementoeffect he relation?sn'tthat, n thecontrary,n ultimate ndcrucial uestion, otonly as man's astquestion, ut, takingitfarthertill, he astquestion fbeing, o twistnly lightlyone ofBataille's hrases1)nd the ocusof a singularomplica-tion n Hegeliantheorytself.Thiscomplicationsthat fthetheoryfthemonarch. hisistrue,nthefirst lace,for reason s formallyimple s it sapodictic: f the State s truth, he truth f thistruth s themonarch.ndeed,themonarchs,toquoteonly fewphrases,thesummit nd the base of everything#278),the abso-lutely ecisivemoment f the whole #279),and the exis-tence fsovereigntys thepersonalityfthewhole,within herealityhat onformso itsconcept #279).The monarchsthetruththereality)fthetruth f theState;he is, therefore,the truth f the trueend, that s, of union as such. Oragain,the oneness nd uniqueness f the monarch the con-ceptof which s above all determinedythemonos makethetruth funion, he inoftheVereinigung,nd thus he ffective

1Cf. Le Collegede sociologie, . 533.


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THE HEGELIAN MONARCH 485achievement f therelation,nd the immanence f its tran-scendence.We cannotthereforexaminethe HegelianStatewithoutexamining hemonarch, hat s, without tanding side, forthe moment, romthe questioncommentatorsonsiderofgreater importance, hat of the State-as-government,heState-as-apparatus,heState-as-its-functionaries,n short, heState-as-machine,rrather,heState-as-organism,n the enseof a collective rganism.This gestureof reading s furthersupported y certain tems n the commentaries,n Fleisch-mann,forexample,or E. Weil,as wellas byB. Bourgeois'sstudy.2 his gesture equires urthermorehatwe isolate ndneglect, or moment,hatpartof ideological liding utofthespeculatives suchthatthe theory f themonarch, er-tainly, uton one planeonly,requires. The phrase clumsyideological liding s Adorno's,from hethird f hisEtudessurHegel;* s ithappens, hephrase ncontextccompaniesnodd sliding n Adorno'sownpart,which uts offhisquota-tions fromHegel's text at the very momentof Hegel'sspeculativedeductionof the monarch while the excisedquotation s used in Hegel's favor n the first f thetudes.)In this espect,t s enoughtokeeptoE. Weil'sprinciplebutmorefaithfullyhanhe doeshimself):. . . theHegelianthesis[ofthemonarch] eserves o be judged on theplane that tclaims s itsown,thatof reason. 4Finally,he ast onditionfwe areto answer orrectlyo theinternal ecessities f thesystem: otso muchto seekin theHegelianmonarchy form f constitution,venwereit thebest thiswould stillbe monarchyn its narrow ense, as#273has it,and here theanalysis proposediffersnprinci-ple from hat fBourgeois, lthough hetwoconverge), s to

2Eugne Fleishmann,La Science niverselleu la logique eHegel (Paris: Pion, 1968);Eric Weil,Hegel etla philosophieu droit Paris: PUF, 1979); Bernard Bourgeois, LePrince hglien, in Hegel et la philosophieu droit Paris: Vrin, 1978).3Theodor W. Adorno, Troistudes urHegel (Paris: Pavot, 1979).4Eric Weil,Hegel et l'tat Paris: Vrin, 1974), p. 60.


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486 SOCIAL RESEARCHseek the truth f all constitutions,he truth f thepoliticalssuch. (A preciseexamination f Hegel's earlythinking npoliticswouldsupport his:thefirstnklingsf thetheory fthemonarch re at leastvisible s of 1802.)

TheMonarch heWhole fthe tateThe necessityfthe monarch ollows rom heveryneces-sity,hemost bsolute nd compellinghere s,ofsubjectivity,or ofSpirit.#278puts tas follows:. . . initstruth,ubjectiv-ity xists nlyas subject,nd personalitynlyas person. hespirit'sogic s theachievementfthe abstractionfsubjectiv-ity n and as the concreteness f theexistence f thesubject.The subject xists s an empirical ubject, s that erson.TheState annot xist avethroughnd in suchan existence.Werecognizen thisnecessityhe bsolutenecessityfthesystemand of theprocessof theSpirit n general, henecessityortheconceptto be achieved, ccording, orexample,to thisphrasefrom heend of thePhenomenology:. . . theconcept sthenecessitynd theblossomingf the Dasein thathas sub-stance s itsessence nd exists or tself. t is to this bsoluteand ontological onstraint, hich imultaneouslynvolves helogicof theconcept, he manifestationfspirit,nd whatonemightall, nmany enses, hephysicsr thephysiologyf theIdea, that hevery ingular osition nd complicationf themonarch orrespond.This monarchs thusreallyneither hesubstance, or thefinality,orthefoundation f theState;nor is he either tsrightor its power. But he is all that at once insofar s he isabsolutely-butnly-theat once f ll that.He is thecopresenceofthe elements f the Stateand of the moments f its Idea(institutions,owers, nd persons), s this rganic opresence

itself,hat s tosay, s an effectiveresence, heDa-sein f thepolitical, f theessenceof thepolitical xistingn and as thiszoon.Thus he is inno fashion concentrationfpowershe is


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THE HEGELIAN MONARCH 487not n absolutemonarch),till ess a personalpower he is nota despot).Distinct romthe people (insofar s it is a truepeople according o itsspirit) s well as from he legislativeandgovernmentalowers, e is and isonly thesynthesisftheState, hat s tosay, tsorganicityxisting/ortself,electedoutof itself,utonomizedthat s to say, utonomizingtself)and existing s such. The monarch, t thatrate, s less thesupremendividualntheState han hesuperiorndividualftheState, r theState tself s individualityand this ndivid-uality, s such,is not so muchsuperior in the sense of ahierarchyf powers, f functions,r of rights) o the otherindividualitiess it s superior ventoanything hich,n theState, reates hierarchicaluperioritynd subordinate ela-tions.Hegel can write n #284:

. . . only he ouncilsr the ndividualsomposinghem an beresponsible.he verymajestyf themonarch,nsofars thesupremeecisiveubjectivity,s placed bove ll responsibilityfor he ffairsftheState overnment.This aboveresponsibilityfpowerdesignates superioritysoabsolute soseparatethat t sreally fanother ature romthesuperiorityf command r of administration.ccordingto a logicwhich s perhapsstill hatof sovereigntynowthemonarch s the existence of sovereignty;f. #278), thesupremacy thisword s a doubletof sovereignty )f themonarch sbeyond hesystemfsupremacy,r ofsuperiorityingeneral. f the monarch s the summit #273), t s not asthetopof an edifice,s the ast tone f a pyramid,utas theperfectionfthe edifice ealizedfor tselfhe wouldbe thennottheplacing f the ast toneofthepyramid,ut the formor thenature fthat tone,which s itself pyramid,nd theonly yramidnthewholepyramid. .). If, s#279puts t, sov-

ereigntyxists nlyas subjectivity,hat s to say,as an au-todtermination ith no foundation nd an ultimate le-ment fdecision and if subjectivityxists nly s subject,


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488 SOCIAL RESEARCHthenthesovereigns beyond overeigntytself, otthroughsomenew uperiorityutthroughhe ncarnationf that erysovereignty.The monarch s thus the whole of the State its all atonce as somethingxtra, hat s to say,as someonewhosepersonalunity ccomplishes hat of the State. (Everythingsends us back thusto the axiomthatunityn general s per-sonal, nd that heperson s unitary.) he monarchs a maninaddition, ho s notto be numberedwith ther ndividualsbut whoon thecontraryausestheir nion oexist s a unity.The monarch s theaccomplishmentf therelationshipas arelationshipo itself.The problematic hich mergesnhim s thus essa politicalproblematic han the problematic f the existenceof thepolitical s such,theproblematicf the individuationf thezoonpolitikons such. #279 makesthis clear: a society,community,family,s concrete s itcan be,does not haveapersonalityxceptas an abstractmoment ; n thecontrary,thepersonalityftheState srealonly f t s a singleperson.The existence f thezoon s theexistence fa zoon and thisdetermination ouldnotbe, in theend, strange oAristotle;whatbelongs nly oHegel,on theotherhand,orthe modernage, is theassignationf thezoeas subjectiveife).And thisnecessitythat f existencen general, hat f theexistentialityfexistencewhichmeans hat, recisely,here snoexistenceingeneral recovers r redoubles henecessityoftheconcept,which s to effect hepassageto existence,oconceive tself s existence nd to engender tself s an exis-tent, hat s tosay,necessarilys a certainxistent,s the thisof a natural xistence, ays#280.This necessitys nothingelse thantheone established ytheontological roof, s thesame section ays, henecessityf the passagefrom heab-solute oncept obeing. And since, t leastaccording o oneof thesidesof thesystematiconsiderationftherelationshipbetween he State nd religion,ethicalife s thedivine piritinsofar s it resides n the consciousness f self, n the con-


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THE HEGELIAN MONARCH 489sciousness f a peopleor of the individualswhocompose t(Encyclopedia,552), t is possible o saythatthe existence fthe monarch tems rom heontological roofboth ccordingto a montage in series and accordingto a montage inparallel bothbeing essentiallyuthorized ytheexpressionof #280: thesamepassage from the conceptto beingdasselbemschlagen:t s not a passagebut rather conversion,a metamorphosisnd a precipitation).Thus the monarch xecutesthe Umschlagenf the Statewithinxistence,he conversion f union s such ntotheunityofa realperson.Now tmightwellbe that heproblematicfthe Umschlagenn existence, f the concreteexecution, snothinglse, na determinations old as philosophy,han hevery roblematicf thepolitical. s the Platonic cience ftheKairosStatesman05 c-d),or, nAristotle,s the architectonicscience ofpraxis, r again,withRousseau,as the discoursewhich s a political ct (Social Contract,ntroduction), hephilosophyf thepolitical lways llies tself rincipally ithlogicof effectuation,f Verwirklichung.he conceptof thepoliticals at least lsothat f the concrete ffectuationf itsessence and perhaps, fthe content f thisessence,as thetrue Good or the ethical Idea, is itselfnothingpolitical,perhaps hen heconcept f thepoliticals ustthat feffectu-ation and thus, f theeffectuationf thephilosophical).t isthis lso,forexample, hat heeighth f the Theses nFeuer-bachsaysor evokes n itsway: All social life is essentiallypractical. he problemof the political n this sense is notdetermined romthe political s a pointof departure, utfrom heproblem r rather hemetaphysicalequisite f exis-tence. he essenceof thepolitical onsistsn this ense of theexistence fthe ogos r of thesubstance fhumanityin theexistence f union s such. f political hilosophys theprob-lemof a science, t is always questionof theproblem f ascience feffectuationnd oftheeffectuationfthis cience.A science fthe transcendenceftheconcept n its existence(seealso#27,28,29,and 337 Rem.ofxhe hilosophyfRight).


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490 SOCIAL RESEARCHThe Monarchn No Way ymbolic

The monarch, s this eal person, s thus thetruth f theunion because he is its existence.Now the union must beenvisagedn twoways:1.As to ts ontent,heunion houldbe the ccomplishmentoftherelationwhichsessential otheperson ngeneral theparticular ersonfindshimselfssentiallyn relationwith n-otherparticularity, 182).Nowthepersonandwe rememberthat hemonarch,ven morethan subject,s a person)s notsimply hesubject,t s thesingularityhichknows tself san absolutelyreewill Encyclopedia,448), nd which s suchisessentiallynrelationo the being f otherpersons nd totheirrecognitionibid.,#490,491). Thus the person s stilland finally he singularityf the subject accordingto thepeople,r rather hedivisionnto ingularitiesf theefficacyfa people which,nthisway, s not divided utrather ffec-tuated),forthe people is the substancewhichknows tselffree ibid.,#514).For all thesereasons, heaccomplishmentof the relation fpersons s nothing ther hanthe effectua-tion, n theparticularitynd in the relation ssential o it,ofrighttselfnd ingeneral,frights defined s theDaseinoffreewill vouloiribre), hroughwhich, s Hegel clarifiest,rightmustbe takennot ustas uridicalright, ut as englob-ing the presence theDasein) of all the determinationsffreedom ibid.,#486). Now the totalityf these determi-nations sfound ntherelation ffreewillvolontibre) ofreewill, r in thepeople as such.The monarch, eingthe existence f theunion as suchofthepeople, s thevery resence, heDaseinofright ormoreexactlyhe is the presentationn existence f the effectivepresence f freewill ndof tsrecognition.e doesnot peratethispresence,which n the relation etweenpersons nd inthemind f thepeople s already fficacious,uthepresentst.To accomplishherelationoffreedoms,ffreedom) oesnotmeantoperfectt,tocompletelyinisht,but toincarnatehe


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THE HEGELIAN MONARCH 491perfectionhatit is in itself.The monarch s, to make itredundant,hepresent xistence fright.Or: his existencesnot,by tself,nypropertyr quality fright, utonly andabsolutelyinsum ts cceity.he ecceity or existences pureposition,s dasein is no right, utthebeing-there,ere, nperson, f right, r again itsDarstellung.Now theproperdeterminationf right s precisely,s theDasein ffreewill,not implytheunity frationalwill nd ofsingularwill, utthe effectiveand efficient)ositingf thisunity:

the awdasGesetz)s the ontentfthis ruth)ositedgesetzt)orthe onsciousnessf ntelligenceith eterminations a powerhaving alidityibid.,#485).Rightsbyts ssencen effectiveositingjust s it s theempiri-cal existence.. of freedom onscious f itself Phil.Right,#30]).The efficacyf right s in sum theright f right,tssensible eclarationo the intelligence,nd the exercise f itslegitimate ower.Rights right ecided and posited.Positing(dieSetzung)s uris-diction.The efficacyfunion s thuspositing,cceitysGesetz(t)-seinof the urisdictionf freedom. he monarch oes not ncar-nate the union to furnisht n some fashionwithflesh nd avisage.He incarnates t because union as such is right ndright s such is the Da-sein of right s a generalformoffreedom the atter onstitutingegitimacynitselfweshouldof course dwell at some othertimeon the nature of thisfreedom).Thus,and with espect o thecontent f theunionorof theState, heexistence f themonarch s ustified otonlybytheontologicalroof ppliedorpursued s far s theSpirit fthepeople,but also by the ontological etermination hichre-quiresofright s righttsfactuality,heecceity fitsurisdic-tion.We thus touchfor the first imeon a singularity hich sperhaps he mostdeterminingingularityf the existence f


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492 SOCIAL RESEARCHthe monarch: t is thathis incarnations in no waya repre-sentation, figuration, symbolization.t is hard to under-standhowE. Weil,for xample, anwrite n several ccasionsthatthe monarch represents heuniversal, r sovereignty,etc. Precisely, he monarch s what he is that is to say,existsonlybecause a necessity, niquebutpolymorphic,e-quiresthat herepresentationoth of thepeople and of therighthouldbe, n theprincipleftheState, onebeyond ndtranscendedn effectiveresence. n no waydoes theHege-lianmonarch avea symbolicole.At thesametimehe has nopower with ne exception,n importantne,as we shall ee),andespecially ot ny bsolute ower buthe s (anddoesnotsymbolize) he absolutepositionf power,the might f thepeopleand of rightwithno other ontent han tsefficacyand this contentmakesthe essence of right, or concreterights the absolutenecessityf thespirit marginalnoteto#28),or again, ccording o anothernote nthe samesection,and in a formula f a dizzying adicality: ethicalityethicit)has a right existence. he monarch, hen,does not sym-bolize, n themostgeneral enseof theterm.On thecontrary,he opens perhapsthequestionof a symbolization,aughtbe-tween Greekmeaningnd, etus say, Lacanianmeaning ftheterm,whichwouldbe thesymbolizationf thepeopleandof therightorof one in theother) a questionnwhich hisacceptance, nigmaticor hemoment,fsymbolizationoulddesignate othingther han heefficacyf he elations such.Letus concludeon thisfirstspect thatof thecontent fthe union,and hence of the content f the personof themonarch: etween simple,mmediate resence nd a repre-sentation,hemonarch osesthequestion f an absolutethatis tosay, f a puttingside, n individuation)fcopresence ssuch, r ofreciprocal resence, r oftherelation a questionwhich snothingther,nfact, han hequestion fthe ubject,ifthesubjectsnotfirstfall thesubject-of-representation,sthesupport-of-the-idea-or-of-the-imagethat s to say,of thesecond representation),ut is first f all the subjectof a


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THE HEGELIAN MONARCH 493presentation-to-itselfhichnecessarily asses throughthepresentationf a selfto a self through elation s such.It is thequestion f thisrelationwhich ies at the heartofthesecondaspectunder whichunion shouldbe considered:2. Union as such should in effect e envisagedas to itsform, r as to its modality.In otherwords,norderto understandhe existentialnityof the monarch s itaccomplishesherelation, e would haveto be able to understandwhat s the case withthe relationitself. eing or modalityof the relation s such shouldbeable to be questioned eforetsabsorption,tsreabsorption,tssolution r its relief n the monarch's ubjectivityfor thatalone wouldpermitus to discernthe beingor the specificmodality f this subjectivity,hich s a subjectivitys theexistence f an individual ubject, ut whose substancemustpreciselyotbe thesubstancef this ndividual,utrather hecontents ftherelationtself.Atthesametime, n interroga-tion about the relationwouldnecessarilye an interrogationabouttheessence of right and of freedom.)Now we shall have to observe hat,nmanyways, heques-tion of relationposes a limit-question,ndicated verywherebut never ooked at for tself yHegel at leastneverwithoutpresupposinghe resolution f the relation n an arche-teleo-logicalunity. his resolutiononstituteshereforehepresup-posedcondition fthe monarch.However, hedeterminationofthe monarch spreciselyhat lsowhichmakes hispresup-position ome forth nd renders t problematic.uch is thedouble hypothesiso guide us in our work and whichalsomarks ff heultimatedgeof ncertitude,fvacillation,venof transgression,f philosophicalhought bout thepoliticalin general.(A remark sinorderbeforeweenvisage hequestion f therelation: o the extent hat hePhilosophyfRight laces tselfin theSystem, leaveaside,forthis uestion, he text f thePhenomenologybout thestruggle f self-consciousnesses,ndabout the dialectic f the master nd the slave. For many


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494 SOCIAL RESEARCHreasons itherknown r to be looked nto, hePhenomenologydoes not it ntotheSystems such. t is no accidentf, t thesametime,his text n relation resupposests resolutionessor otherwisehan theSystem oes. And if n addition or atthe same time thepoliticals not the element f thecomple-tionof thePhenomenologyfSpirit.We maycome backto thisquestion.For the timebeingit is the logicorderedby orfor the Statewhich houldguideus.)I shall envisagethreesuccessivemodes of access to thequestion f the relation:1.Taking hings,s far s possible,nterms earest o thoseof thePhenomenology,hefirst lementswhich ouldbring herelation o our attention ould be butin theEncyclopediathe element fthestrugglef consciousnessesorand in theprocessof recognition hich onstituteshem s such. I willrecall n a word howthisrecognition,n order to be thatoffreedom of myexistence s freedom impliesthe riskofdeath,but how,because the deathof the othersuppressesrecognitiontthe sametime,ifemanifestsrequirementustas essential s freedom,nd thestrugglendsbytherelationbetweenmaster nd slave.Thisrelations immediately,nd inconformityithwhatproduced t, tself community,hich sthat of need and of theconcern o satisfyt (Encyclopedia,#431-434).

One mightupposethat hiswouldbe an entrynto hefirstlevelof social nstitution.n a sense this s notuntrue butthenwe see thatwe wouldnotbe enteringtexcept ccordingtoa modeofrelation:a) resolvednfavor fa single ubjec-tivity;b) whosecommunity,s a communityf need, is notthatof freedom.We will not get the Stateout of this and moreoverweknow hat he State s ofa differentssencefrom ivil ociety(but it is not on the otherhand possibleto considerthemaster-slaveommunitys a civil ociety,f tbelongs roperlyonly othemodernworld, s the addition o#182puts t;themaster-slaveommunitys neither Statenora civil ociety,t


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THE HEGELIAN MONARCH 495has notyetor not really ny urisdiction). ven more,as aprinciple f spiritual ubstance nd subsistencef society ssuch,the State mustprecedecivil ociety s an independentreality ibid,).The relationof freedomsmustprecede thecommunityf need. We would be thereforentitled o seek,evenin place of the relation otyetstabilizedn dominationand need,that s, n the ighttself,heprinciple f the State.As we know, hePhilosophyf Rightndicatesnothing f thekind: thestruggle orrecognition,r relation s struggle,seven absentfromt.The dialectic f the master nd the slaveonly oncerns,ays#57, he tageofconsciousness,otthat ftheobjective pirit.Thus the relation f domination s onlynaturalibid.),whichstosayessentially onpolitical.hisveryrelation,whichputsat stake herecognitionnd the affirma-tion ffreedom,ees tselfrepressed, f may o put t, ntothestatus f thenatural nd unreal point fview, utsideof which rbeyondwhich ights already resent, rom hestartibid.).This already ondenses hedifficulty:fitselftforbids s to know how one accedes o the right exceptasindicatedn a marginal ote to the samesection#57): Theidea of freedom s genuinelyctualonlyas the State.But the reason for thisputting side of the struggle sclearlyndicated,n theSysteminthe sections f theEncyclo-pediato which have referred),n the veryplace thatweshould concentratepon: in theplace of thefight. he Re-mark o #433says:Thefightor ecognitionnd the ubmissiono a masters thephenomenonithinhichhe iving-in-commonfmenwasborn,as a beginningf tates.iolence,hich,nthis henomenon,s afoundation,s notfor ll that foundationfright,lthoughtconstituteshenecessarynd ustified omentn thepassagewhich oesfromhe tate f consciousnessrownedndesireand nsingularityo the tate funiversalelf-consciousness.tis the xteriorrphenomenaleginningfStates, ottheirub-stantial rinciple.The struggles thusseparatedfromthe principle f theState nd ofright or, s violence,t s only heunleashing f


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496 SOCIAL RESEARCHdesireplunged nits ingularity,ndwhich herefore oes notknow tself s freedomn relationwith freedom.However,thisviolence s a phenomenon f principle, necessaryndjustifiedone. But nothing s said about this ustification,nothings said of thestrange ight f this ightlesstatewhichleads toright.Nothingssaidabouttheurisdictionf violencewhere ightwould begin xternally,ndas ifbytheoppositeof right.Nothing s said either boutthe link,here,of thephenomenon o theprinciple, orabout theprocessof pas-sage from losed singularityo universal onsciousness. utthis s because, n a completelyeneralfashion,xteriorityssuch could neverfurnish principle orthe State. Thus,forexample, heEncyclopedia,544: To represento onself heinstitutionf the State as a pure Constitution-conceived-through-the-understanding,hat s tosay, s themechanismfan equilibrium etween orces nternallyxternal o one an-other, oes against he fundamentaldea ofwhat State s. )In violence,xteriorityust husbe a phenomenon f aninteriorityf principle etweenonsciousnesses,f a presup-posedsubjectivity-in-common.he question f the relation sstruggle s thus skippedover as phenomenal. Whichamounts to saying that there is in some way no realphenomenologyf theState.But this s themomento recall hat t spreciselynwar hatthe State-subject,ith tsmonarch nd byitsmonarch,willneverthelessealize tself ompletely.he struggle f Stateswillbe the effectuationf the universal nteriorityf theWorldSpirit. verythingappensas ifthe leap beyond herelation s suchwere to producea finalresurgence f thisrelation and this time in the personal authority f themonarchwhocarriesnhisperson heright owar,theonlyright e reallyholds), n hisauthorityxercisingtself s vio-lence. (What, n thispresuppositionf a principlewithoutexterioritynd without iolence, s wellas in theresurgenceof war as a truth ftheState, s overlookedn the matter fdeath,which s what s at stake n the struggle? his death


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THE HEGELIAN MONARCH 497avoidedn thebeginning,nd glorifiedt the end?; cf. Phil.Right,#324-328.This is a question hatwillhave to be takenup elsewhere.)2. Now we can seek the true substantialrinciple f theState thus,of the relation. his principles the eople:

The substancehich nowstselfree,nd nwhich he bsoluteduty-to-bes no lessbeing,asefficacys thespiritf a people(Encyclopedia, 514).The people is thus thetrue element f ethical ife and itsreality. san addition o#156ofthePhilosophyfRightmakesclear,we cannot ake he ndividual s a starting oint, or hatwouldbe a point f viewdevoidofspirit, hicheadsonly oa collection. he ethical dea has thus tsreality ccording othe relation.But it is quitedifficultor impossible to findwhat he relation s peopleoraccording o thepeople s. If infact t s a question fthe ethical ubstance f thepeople,wefind t lreadyosited nddisposed fas a custom as theSittewhere ittlichkeitppears (Phil.Right,#151),and it is in thesameway hatwe shallfind achpeoplepositingheconstitu-tion orrespondingo thenature ndthedegreeof culture fthe self-consciousnessf thispeople (#274).And if it is aquestion ftheformationfthepeople tself, ewillfind nlythis, n #181:The extensionf thefamily,s itspassagento notherrinci-ple, s, n existence,ometimeshepeacefulxtensionf thefamilynto people into nation, hich as as a resultnaturalommonrigin,ometimeshe ombinationf familialcollectivitieshich avebeendispersed, combinationhichcan be either heeffectf the dominationf a master,r avoluntarynion roughtbout hroughhe ink fneeds ndofmutual elp nsatisfyinghem.The threepossibilitiesndicatednevercorrespond o thesubstantialrinciple fright: ithernature, rdomination,rneed (besides nd in addition, he firstnd peaceful possi-bilityontravenes,or tspart, henecessityf phenomenal


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498 SOCIAL RESEARCHviolence n the beginning f States). n otherwords,thequestion ftheorigin f socialitys socialityf rights care-fully voided or bypassed.In the FirstPhilosophyf theSpirit fJena, Hegel pre-sented heexplicit evelopmentfthepassagefrom hefam-ily othespirit fa people:thesingular otalityf thefamily,as singular,s only n idealtotality,nd as suchsuppressed;texistsonlyas a possibletotality,ot foritself, nd so it isalways eadyfordeath ndhas renouncedtself seethetexteditedbyG. Planty-Bonjour,ressesUniversitairese France,p. 144). The suppression f singularities,n the contrary,accomplisheshe act of becoming neself n another,whereuniversal onsciousness merges,the absolute ethicalsub-stance r spirit f a people.Now,on the one hand, nthe textitself, he suppression f familial ingularitys indiscerniblefrom hesuppressionfindividualingularitynthefight orrecognition,nd there s a perpetualhesitation etweenpresuppositionnd an engenderingf the relationunless amore nterestingypothesisit is understood hatthe fightforrecognitionakesplacein the bosomof thefamily, hichhoweverwouldnonethelesseave in place a model in someways Oedipal, whichwouldconfront s manyproblems sthat fFreud).And on theotherhand,thepeople,appearinglike heuniversalityfethicality,oesnotpermitheuniversalsingularityf thespirit f a peopletobe determinedwhichsneverthelessssential o theconceptwe are examining.It is true hat t the sameepoch, ntheSystemfEthical ife,the ethical dea, which had alreadyfor its concept theabsolutebeing-oneof individualities see p. 110 of theTaminiauxtranslation,ublishedby Payot),had for intui-tion an absolutepeople. ndividualityhen ppearedas theexteriormultiplicityf the concept, ubsumingntuitionsinterior.n theseconditions,hefirstmoment f ethical ifewas determined according o the relation, n Hegel's ownterms.But the relationnly designated stateof imperfectunification, hoseperfectiona unitymadeup of intuition


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THE HEGELIAN MONARCH 499and of theconcept, o be understood hus as beyond sub-sumption f intuition tilldispersed n the individualitiesnrelation was supposedto be democracy,theexhibition fthe absolutereality f ethical ife n everyone p. 199).We see thenthatour difficultyasalreadypresent,n thepresuppositionf thepeopleas intuition,hat s to say, n thepresuppositionand in theintention)f a presentationf therelation s union.But we also see that,npassing rom emoc-racyto monarchy, egel did not only swerve, r regress,politically: e also sharpened he pointof the mostdifficultquestion. By designatingthe concrete existence of themonarch s thepersonof thepeople, Hegel finallynscribesintuitionn the element f intuition,f sensible resentation.The monarchs or makes he exhibition hichdemocracywassupposedto be. But also he makesmorevisible,f dareput it thus, hemysteryf the incarnation f relation.3. We mustnowturn oward n element, r toward mo-ment never yet mentioned, ut to which the narrow ifobscure imbricationf thefamilyn thepeoplewas to lead.(That imbricationan lead to a confusion r an even moreobscure ndecision,when we read in #156: the ethical ub-stance .. is therealspirit f a familynda people :this andhasno recognizabletatus.) his element s love. The relationof which hefights thephenomenon as love as its substan-tialcontent.#535of theEncyclopediaays tclearly:The States,consciousf tself,he thicalubstancetheunionoftheprinciplef the amilynd that fcivilociety;his ameunitywhichs in thefamilys the sentimentf love s theessence f theState,which t the sametime, hanks o thesecond rincipleftheknowingnd self-activeill, eceivesheformf a knownniversality.. .

(I pass overthequestionswhich he wholeapparatushereindicatedmight aise,forexamplethe absenceof thepeople.Each presentationf the State'sprinciple eems to displace,deflect, r givethe lie to thepreceding ne.)Love is thus the true element the essence of the State,


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500 SOCIAL RESEARCHthusoftheunion. And it s this, s many exts onfirm,s iteffectuateshe existence f the selfbyanother as it effec-tuates herelation.t shouldbe shownhow t s thetexts ftheyoungHegel about ovewhich urnishhe truedescriptionftherelation,nd that urnisht ntermswhichmply r whichprogram political roblematic. shallcontentmyself erewith brief assagefrom he pirit fChristianity:There s notrueunion,no loveproperlyo called,exceptbetween ivingbeingsof equal power,who are thusentirelyivingfor oneanother. . . But love is also, in the same text, et overagainst bstract niversality:Theloveofmen, onceiveds havingoextendo allthose fwhomneknows othing,ith homnehasnorelationtall,this niversalove s aninsipidnvention.. . Thelove fone'sneighbors the oveofmenwithwhom veryonentersntorelation. beingwhichs thoughtannot e a beingwhichsloved.Thus themonarch ouldperfectly ellbe, once againas apresent, angible xistence,hetrueand uniquepossibilityfunion,the ocusof politicalove.To be sure,the oveof thekingwillnotbe evoked,for n a generalmanner oveas suchremainsn theorderofthe mmediacyffeeling,nd,as theadditionto #158 puts it: In the State,feelingdisappears,thereweareconscious funity s law;there hecontentmust

be rational nd known o us.(In the sameway, marginal oteto#157makes leartheoppositionftheState othefamily:To emerge rom aturalunity unity s onlypurified n the being-for-itselff twobeings :therelation f twobeingsdoes have theessenceoflove,but in being-for-itself,n the autonomousperson,thebeing-by-the-otherf love is purified Einigkeiteinigtich. . .]; there s thussomeimpurityn love.)Nonethelesstremains hat he known ationalityf theState s theAufhebungf theimmediate ruth f theunion,and thusof love.And if thisAufhebungs not,or is scarcely,designated s such whereas heprincipled ositing flove s


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THE HEGELIAN MONARCH 501without mbiguity),t is perhaps also for a reason at theopposite imit rom he one Hegel explicitlyroposes:not thereason fthe naturalmmediacyf thefeeling f ove,butthereasonofthe elusive xcessof mediationwhich s operativenlove. In fact, he text of the additionto #158 continuesrecapturingn sumthetone of theearlywritings:

The firstmomentn love s that do notwish o be a self-subsistentndindependentersonndthat,f were, henwould eel efectivend ncomplete.he secondmoments thatI findmyselfnanothererson,hat count or omethingnthe ther, hile he thern turn omes ocount or omethinginme.Love, herefore,s themost remendousontradiction;theunderstandingannot esolvet ince heresnothing orestubbornhan his oint f self-consciousnesshichsnegatedandwhich everthelessoughtopossesss affirmative.ove satonce hepropoundingndthe esolvingfthis ontradiction.Asa resolvingf t, ove s unityf an ethicalype.The most remendousontradictiontosaynothing f thefact that all contradictionsre tremendous or the under-standing,nd that here s thushere an excessofthegeneraltremendousnessf mediation)s mediationtself s the realmediationfrealpersons.Nowit s ust thismediationwhichthemonarch ffectuatess a person nd inhisperson.That iswhy, s #279and #281stress,hemonarchs not, nymore

than ove, ccessible ounderstanding. hat s accessible nlyto speculative eason, n themonarch,s immediacy ithoutfoundation, eingconcentratedn itselfbeyondwhichonecannot go (#281). But this concentrations that of theunion in the same way moreover s the concentrationnhimself fa personngeneral eally appensonlybymeansofhis existence-hrough-the-other.n themonarch,t s thisveryothernesswhich s concentrated,nified, nd presented. hemonarchstheobjectiveruth f ove, fthe State singeneraltheobjective ruth f union.Nevertheless,ovewhich s theAufhebungf theexteriorityof individuals hould itselfbe aufgehobenn the State. And


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502 SOCIAL RESEARCHwhat must thus be replaced releve) is not the replacement(releve)thatlove bringsabout, but ratherwhat in love makesthemomentopposed to the autonomous personality, hus themomentof thegiving-up-of-the-selfo the other: not theAuf-hebung, ut theAufgebung. ow far can an Aufhebungf theAufgebung, ow far may a replacementof the gift-of-selfethought s an assumptionof love, and fromwhatpointdoes itnot constitute n thecontrary pure and simple negationoflove,or a renunciationf love (whichwould be in some wayanappendage to the renunciation of death, or to the avoidanceof death of which we have spoken)? This is a question whoseclose investigationmust be reservedforanother occasion. Butit contains the principle of the conclusion which we shoulddraw from it here:The substantial truth of love for the State is posited, allthings onsidered,only ftwiceuggled: once because love hasno place in the State,and again because love is the tremen-dous contradiction. To which it is worth adding a thirdtrick : hatof relatingthe substance of love to the phenome-non of the fight,for if both pertainto the determinationofthe people, their relation and itsprocess should be presentedas such somethingfor which Hegel does not furnish theslightest ndication.In raisingthis ast difficulty, am simplybringingtogetherthe pieces of the general difficultywe have traversed: thepeople which is finally people only if it is a State (#349),and which is a finished State only if it has (or is ?) amonarch has the reality f a double relation,of struggle ndof love, which finds itself twice put aside from the properformation f the State, inasmuch as its two terms find them-selves distanced fromeach other, and inasmuch as each re-mains subjected to a modalityof nonunderstanding eitherbecause it is onlya phenomenon, or because it is the tre-mendous contradiction ), r as each is in some way referredback to the extreme imitof the conditions of the functioningand apprehension of the dialectic itself.


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THE HEGELIAN MONARCH 503TheMonarch Tremendousontradiction

The searchfor therelation s such thus eads to a tripleimpasse.But this earch lsoproves hat herelations at workeverywhere,nd thatthe truth f the monarch annotbeanythingtherthanthetruth f therelation.t is thathow-ever s the simultaneousesurgencefeverythinghich, on-cerningthe relation,has remainedunresolved as well asbeing he final xhibitionfeverythinghich, oncerningherelation, ad alwaysbeen supposedto be resolved lready.The impasse hus onsistsnthepresuppositionfthe solu-tionor of the resolutionf the relation: ut thispresupposi-tionbrings ut all themore, gainst n emptiness,hequestionofthe relation. he monarch omestofill his mptinesswithhis whole effectiveresence,with his body.But thisbody,whichmust otbe symbolic,lso remains inallylusive.It is certainly ot a matter,n these conditions, f re-proachingHegelwith n insufficiencynhisinterrogationftheoriginftherelation r oftheultimatend essential eingof the relation.For it is precisely he veryformof such aquestionwhichhas every ikelihood f beingfalsifiedn ad-vance, fthe elations not substantiatedbeingonlytherela-tion, ottheautonomyf itsterms r itssubjects and if therelation s perhapsnecessarily ithout eingand withoutri-gin.But it is ust thiswhichwouldhave to be recognized.Hegel,becausehe masks hequestionor the mpossibilityfthequestion, hows he mpasseof thephilosophicalolutionoftherelation,ndopensup at thesametime henecessityfthinkinghis elationwithoutrigin ndwithoutealizationna substantialnity.Which amountsto sayingthatthe monarchresolvesthetripledifficulty,ut in factconceals t,and thusrechannelsand exacerbatest until t arrives t hisownsingularity.The singularityfthemonarchs in fact hestrangesthatcan be imagined.He also,he perhaps boveall, s a tremen-dous contradiction.


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504 SOCIAL RESEARCHA contradictionfposition, irst fall. The presuppositionof the union ofpersons eing hat fright,s soonas rightspresupposed accomplishedythepeople),theuris-dictionfthemonarch s only ts ormalmanifestationr presentation:and in fact,notonly s the monarch's wnpersonalitynsig-nificant it is a mistake o requireof a monarchobjectivequalities,he has onlyto say 'yes' and put the dots on the

i's addition o #280),buthis power s onlyformal:(Wecannot) aythat he monarchmay ctcapriciously.s amatterffact, e is boundbythe concrete ecisionsf hiscounselors,nd f he onstitutions stable ehasoften omoretodothan o ign isname. ut his ames mportant.t s thelastword eyond hicht s mpossibleogo additiono#279).The uris-dictionfthemonarch,n this ccount,sonly henaming fright, f theunion as right. But thisname is the

summit, otbecause t would anction ight it doesnothavethepowerfor his butbecause taccomplishest, ompletestas effectivendividual xistence. he name ofthe monarchsthe real Setzung f theGesetz. ut bythis account t is thusreally ight, he uridicalsanction f right.The scales mmediatelyipfrom he sideofpureformalitytoward ubstantialfficacy.he dotson the 's,thesignature,thename,and again themouth f themonarchwhosays Iwill #279)constitutend are thedecision hich, ven if itadds nothingto the contentof the rightof the people,transformshesaying fthe awand ofthe councils ntothedoing of a subjectivity.ut the decision tself s infinitelyundecidable: t adds nothing,nd it adds itself. he textof#279 s formidablymbiguous:

This ast eabsorbsllparticularityntots ingleelf,uts horttheweighingfpros ndconsbetween hicht ets tselfscil-lateperpetuallyowthisway ndnow hat,ndbysaying/will makestsdecisionndso inauguratesllactivitynd actu-ality.This I will, s many dditionsmake tclear, s the abstract


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THE HEGELIAN MONARCH 505andempty will Ilting, :679): themonarch ives tonly heconcretenessf hisspeech bouche). ut this peechsbythisfact oncretewill.This transformationf abstractwill ntoconcretewill s aperformativeperformation).he monarchs thesubject f theenunciation, hile hepeople thespirit fthepeople is thesubjectof the statementnonc). ut the statements noteffectivethat s tosay, t s not tated except n the enuncia-tion.Thisvery imple, utobviously ery ormidable,eneralconstraintulestheposition f themonarch.We mustrecog-nize in it thehomologous onstraintand perhapshomoge-neousone) which hetheoreticiansf decisionism tress nthe law (droit): he necessity orthe uridicalact in generalalwaysto containan ultimate esiduethatestablished, re-pared,writtenr deliberatedaw does notcontain, nd whichis theperformativef this aw,thedecisionthat aw shouldmakeright,hat t seffectivelyesetzt.he constraintf enun-ciation, s a general onstraintf theexistencefdiscourse,sjust preciselyheconstraintf uris-dictionthis onstraintfdiction eing, s we know, nscribed otonly n Roman aw,but nthe Romanconcept f aw as such).And this onstraint(whichmoreovers perhapsnot ust an isolated ase, thatofjuridicaldiscourse, utwhich n thecontrarymakesurisdic-tion ngeneral he constraintfevery iscourse, fthe wholeorder of discourse) lwaysrequires he existential ositof ajudex, f an uniqueindividualwhosaystheright,nd whoisnotuniquebecausehe takes hispower o himselfhe mustbelegitimated:he monarchs legitimatedytheConstitution),nor becausepeoplehave decidedtogive ttohim for hen twould be thisdecision, akenbyothers,whichwouldbe thereal decision,the paradoxicaldecisionof givingup one'spower odecide),for t s notproperlypeaking question fa power. But theudex suniquebecauseonly singlendivid-ual canspeak. he monarch sthe ndividual hathe is becausejurisdictions individual,thatis, because juris-dictions indivisi-ble. n this ense themonarch s thehypostasisf the ndivisi-


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506 SOCIAL RESEARCHble unity f the modern State as the FrenchRepublic one andindivisible had (self-)proclaimed it. The monarchmakes hevoice of the people, because the voice as such is unique, indi-visible, ncomparable,and because for that t should be distin-guished, givenspecial status,personified n thestrongest enseof the word.So much for the position and now for the being of themonarch:Insofar as he effectuates he solution of the relation,thedis-solution n the union as such of somethingwhose unitywill always have been presupposed, the monarch simplyef-fectuatesthe logic of subjectivity. nd it is indeed this logicwhich, n principle,hides or forbidsthe question of the rela-tion. There is no real problem of relation once therelation even thought of as the effectuationof a self inanother takesitsorigin n the movementof a selfwhichgoestoitsexterior n order toappropriatetself. nd it is indeed thislogic which intervenes n the truly nitial movement of thePhilosophyfRight s theprocessof the formation f the State.The originwhich we could not find n the fight,n love, orin the people, we now findin this other instance of relation,namely,the contract.The contract s the birthplaceof right nsofar as it is theexchange of property ccordingto the rule of a reappropria-tion, even a superappropriation of the property thusalienated:A personbydistinguishingimselfrom imselfelates imselfto anothererson,nd it sonly s owners hat hese wopersonsreally xist Dasein)for each other. Their implicitdentitysrealized hrough he transferencefpropertyrom ne to theother nconformityith commonwill nd without etrimentto therights f either.This is contract#40).(In a certainfashion,contract hus has the same form asthe fightand as love, the form of passage-into-or-through-the-other.But nevertheless t is here somethingelse otherthan the person which passes : it is his property through


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THE HEGELIAN MONARCH 507whichhoweverhe is as a person.And reciprocally;f thecontracts not n elementnthe trugglerin ove, t s that none and intheother here s anAufgebungf theself, o whichthe notionsof mutual consent and the maintenance frights re no longerpertinent.)We have here thebeginning f the relation f right andyetwe can also perfectly ell affirm hat heprinciple f theStatecannotbe here.For thedevelopmentf thecontract scarriedout in civilsociety.Now the Stateprecedesand ex-ceeds this, nd themonarch s thisexcess. The right f theState s lackingnitsmost learlyttested rigin.After ll,theprinciple f contracts opposed by itself o the essence ofmonarchytself, s Hegel had remarkedn 1802 in his TheScientific ays f Treatingaw:The form f uch n nferiorelations the ontractualne hasforcedtswaynto he bsolutemajestyf the thicalotality.nthe aseofthemonarchy,or xample,he bsoluteniversalityofthe enternd the neness fthe ndividualhereinsunder-stood,nowaccordingo a contractffull uthorizations arelationetweensupremeivilervantothe bstractionftheState, ow ccordingotherelationf an ordinaryontractsa matteretweenwo pecific artiesach ofwhom eeds heother,ndsoas a relationfquid proquo andbyrelationsfthis indwhich hollynthe phere f thefinite,he dea andthe bsolutemajestyf the thicalotalityredestroyed. . (tr.Knox, ennsylvania,p. 123-4).

(However, t is not clear if the primitive ontract f thePhilosophyf Rightproceedsfromneed; it proceedsratherfrom superiornecessity,hat f theconstitutionf identity;butHegeldoes notestablish superior ategoryfcontract.)If, n spiteofthis, he contracturnishesheorigin fright(evenifitwillbe once morerefused, gainstRousseau,as aprinciplef theState,n#258, nd infavor f themonarchy),it is that the contractbringsproperty nto play. In andthrough ropertyhesingular erson sconstituted,hat s, nrelationo himself. he moment receding hecontracts thisone:


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508 SOCIAL RESEARCHPossession Besitz)which is property-ownershipEigentum).Freedoms here the freedom fthe abstract ill ngeneral, r,eo ipso, he freedom f a singlepersonrelated nlyto himself(#40).Thus thepersonenters nto relationwith nother nly ndifferentiatingimself rom imself,nd isonlydifferentiatedfromhimselfnproperty,ywhichhe relates o somethings

his own. (Which passes throughtaking-possession, hoseanalysishouldbe developed,particularlyo show howHegelavoids ooking t itstraightn as a violence fappropriation,which s neverthelesseadablebetween he ines, nd how nasimilarway taking-possessions treated nder thepriorcon-sideration f a recognized ight f the originalowner[see#50],whereas t this tage herights still o beborn.The gapwhichwe constantlyind ppearshereas theabsenceof ar-ticulation etween aking-possessionnd thefight or domi-nation.)So it s notexactly roperty hich oundspersonality,ut tis ownership-of-selfhichfoundsevery appropriation, ywhich tobjectivizestself. he personalityftheperson on-sists n thepossibilityfrelating o oneselfbeforerelating oanythinglse (and,bythis ntermediary,o anyoneelse). Be-fore property and the contract, there is thus thedifferentiation-of-selff theperson:Personalityeginsnotwith hesubject'smeregeneral on-sciousnessfhimselfs anegoconcretelyeterminednsomewayor other, ut ratherwithhis consciousnessfhimself s acompletelybstractgo inwhich very oncrete estrictionndvalue s negated nd without alidity.n personality,herefore,knowledges knowledge f oneself s an object,butan objectraisedbythinkingo the evel fsimplenfinityndso an objectpurely elf-identical#35).

And the sentencewhich mmediatelyollows ssigns hismo-ment r thisprocess denticallyo individualsnd topeoples:Individuals nd nationshave no personalityntiltheyhaveachieved hispurethought. Thisthoughtwhich, owever,s


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THE HEGELIAN MONARCH 509the addition o this section hows, s also the thought f anunbearable ontradiction n the order of nature: for theperson s thehighest f man as well as the owest f hissingular nd as such despicablecontingency.he personisthuswhat bears hecontradictionftheperson. t is doubt-less alsowhat he monarch ears more han nyone.But thereagain,the contradiction,nbearableor tremendous, as al-readyresolved tselfn theidentityf theprinciple.)The differentiation-of-selfs theproductive ifferentiationof the Self as such and here t least it takesplace, in itsprinciple, y tself. nd it is thispersonality,he personalitypropero theSelf,which essentiallynvolves hecapacity orrights, s #36puts t.Here, nthebeginning, ightsonly herelation-to-self.nd thepeople is a self s muchas the ndi-vidual.The secret f thepeopleis the secret fthe Self.Thatis whythe originand the nature of the people remainedundiscovered and once discovered are indistinguishablefrom hoseof theperson.The relation othe ther,ifferenceas effectivexterioritynd the passage into the other,willnever in the long run be anything ut derived and sub-ordinate and this subordinationforeignhowever to theprofound ogic of self-consciousnessnthePhenomenology)permitsheAufgebungf the self nthe other o be containedor overlooked.

Bythis ccount, hemonarchccomplishesheSelf funion,he accomplishest sself and this ccomplishmentlsoswingsover into the absolutenonpropertyf the monarch,purematerial unctualityf a subjectwho s only hesubject fhissignatureand whothus,doubtless, nowshimselfs an ob-ject,notevenbeing s yet proprietorfanythingt all: thepen withwhichhe signsbelongsto theState), subject x-changeablewith nyother exceptthathisbirthmustdeter-minehim n the natural ineageof a family,s a hereditarymonarch, nd thatfurthermore,just because everyone scapableof beingtheking, tmustbe arranged hat t is noteveryone, ut a singleone . . . because in the Statethere s


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510 SOCIAL RESEARCHonly ne (sic:da im taate ur inerst) Ilting, . 678),butthisaccomplishmentccomplishes lso the absoluteproperty fthe State. On theone hand thissuperiorpropertyn whichmine must disappear: Abandonment Aufgeben) f theperson notto haveanyprivate ropertybut omethingor:someproperty)etter, ays note o#46, hus ndicatinghattheAufgebungsonlyrecognizednsofars itgives placeto abetter eappropriation. n the other hand and as thesummit f thisreappropriationthepersonof themonarch,inhissingularity,s the holderofthe real and ultimateowerof decision. t is in fact the monarch s an individualwhodecides he relation f the State-individualo the otherState-individuals,hat s tosay, f warand peace (cf.#320-329). nthis ase,his I will s not theform ut thetotal ubstance fjuris-diction. otonlydoes his mouth pen,but he himselfand notthecouncils r the assemblies decides.The logicofexistence, he logicof performance,nd the logicof unionfinally rriveat theirsynthesisn a logic of punctualandindivisibleecision. And it is doubtless n thispointthatacriticalnalysis f decisionism houldbe concentrated,ndof thepresuppositionf theindivisibilityt contains: n on-tological, emiological, erformative,nd existentialndivisi-bility.s the voice n general, nd thevoice ofsovereignuris-dictionn particular,efinitivelyndivisible,tomic?Would tnot be alreadydividedwhen t enunciatesitself]? he Hege-lian monarch llowsthenecessityf thesequestions o standoutbetter erhapsthandecisionistheories o, and preciselybywhathisbeing keepsas undecidedor uncertain. ut warputsan end to this ndecision.)

The Monarch eparaterom heTotalityIn thevery enter f thisrealizationftheState-Subjectslodged,however, s theontological ecessityf this realiza-tion, hesingularityfthemonarch,hat s to say,his detach-


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THE HEGELIAN MONARCH 511ment,his separation, isAbsonderung.t is as this ndividualthathe has value. Everything appens as if the monarchrealizedhimselfn theorder of sensible ertainty,f thethisthat stherichest ndthepoorest ertitudetthebeginningfthePhenomenology.lso the positionof the monarch, s aposition, everthelessscapesthe deductionwhichnecessitatesit.AsthePhenomenologyuts t: When nerequires fscience,as a crucialtest, test t could not survive, hat t deduce,construct,ind a priori or anywayone wantsto put it) acertain hing r a certainman so identified,t s only ustthattherequest aywhat hing r whatperson t s aiming t,butto say it is quite impossible. he Philosophyf Rightwhichrecalls, n presentinghe monarch, he immanent evelop-ment f philosophicalcience,#279)faces his crucial estwithout acing t: thismonarch,o called (X, Y, or Z), is thespirit f a peoplewho can producehim,byitsConstitutionand bythe egitimizingf a reigning amily;hespirit f the^peopleas suchshouldbe deduced or any wayone wants oput t) :we have seenwhat hiswas a question f.And if, ntheend, the Germanic eoples are designated#358,withtheJewish eople n counterpoints thepeopleof suffer-ing from he ossof theformer orld), othing etdenotesnit theefficacyf the true Constitutionto saynothing f thebarbarism f theseGermanic eoples s #359 vokes t).Butsuch sthe fundamentalonstraintf ogicput ntoplay nthepeople and in the monarch.The logicof theontological roof s in general uch that tdeducesthenecessityf an efficacy hoseexistencean onlyemerge t a distance rom hededuction,n thecontingencyof itsposition.And it is thisUmschlagenn existencewhichproduces t once boththemajestyf the monarch for, ays#281,he unites heungroundednatureof thewill, bsolutesubjectivity,o the ungroundednature of contingentxis-tence)and the fact hat, s the same section ays:themajestyfthemonarchsa topic or houghtfulreatmentbyphilosophylone, ince verymethod finquiry,ther han


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512 SOCIAL RESEARCHthe speculativemethodof the infinite dea which s purelyself-grounded,nnuls the nature f majesty ltogether.On one side, onlythe self-groundedness f speculationcanthinkthe ungroundednessof majesty.On the other side, thisthought,whichthusexcludes everycomprehensionof under-standing, s itself contemplationbetrachten),hich s perhapsin itsturn,byreason of its nature what s to contemplate ),or of its object (the ungroundedness of the existent),or forbothreasonstogether, ess a processof appropriationthantheindicationof an infinite and infinitely istant relationbe-tweenphilosophyand themonarch. In thissense, philosophyat once masters the monarch and recognizes only in hismajesty he unbridgeabledistancefromexistence to the con-cept. That is to say, in this case, the unbridgeable distancefromthe union as such to the concept of its subjectivity,hedistancefrom the people as efficacious o the concept of theorganism or the distance from the relation to the Self ingeneral. What philosophycan onlycontemplatehere, insofaras it contemplates the singular distanceof the monarch, isdistance itselfas the institution f the relation. Philosophycontemplatesthe relation, eparation and if I mayso put it,thus avows of itself ts separation from the separation thatmakes the relation,thisseparationthat thas not been able to

assume in love nor in the fightnor in the people.Thus the subjectwho is the monarchis so onlyat the priceof negation or rather of the breaking out or dispersion ofsubjectivityn himself. nasmuch as he is neither an absolutemonarch and even in relationto war,he should not in rightbe that) nor a simple symbol,the monarch or rather themajestyhat he is confirmshimselfas being necessarilytheopposite of a subjectivity. ot a dialecticalopposite throughwhichsubjectivitymightre-establishtself,but what mightbecalled a distancing n itself f subjectivity, splittingn which,finally, omething ike the relationmight just barely cometo light.


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THE HEGELIAN MONARCH 513On theone hand, n fact, hismonarch an onlybe deliv-ered overto theuniversalizingogicof thethis: When saymyself,his ingular elf,I say in general all the elves;each ofthem s ustwhat say:me,this ingularme Phenomenology).The monarch, s we saw,onlysays me, or rather I (inGerman,t is alwaysch), o sign, o affixhis name.And thesingularityf thepropername s never, s we know as Der-

ridaknows), ingular noughnotto be able to be reiterated.As an absolute ingularity,hemonarch its lso intoabsolutereiterability,r better,he is exactly,uridically nd exactlyreiterablend interchangeable. hichmeans hathis urisdic-tion s absolutelydemocratic n a nonconstitutionalenseofthe term.On the otherhand,this amepositing f thesingular-Stateis to be understoodbove all as the totalizationn theSubjectof subjects nd of their union. By this account,whethermonarch, arty, rAnfhrertheterm s in#280), t s all thesame:the ssence f thetotalitariantate sinsubjectivity,ndin theorganicityhatmakes ts structurend itsprocess.Themonarch s theorganor thesuperorganforganicitytself,fthe Grund eterminingtselfof #278,which s thusfinally(dialectically)heGrund fGrundlosigkeittself.But thisvery eterminationeverthelessontradictsheef-fective eparation f the ecceity f the monarch.And thiscontradiction,hatHegelwants o resolve utcannot, pens nlaw thepossibilityf a dis-organizationf totalitarianolitics.Between hetotalityf thesubjectivitynd the ndividualityfthemonarch,here s as muchdialecticalinkage s absoluterupture. or individuality,osay t now ntermsmoreBatail-lean (that s to say,hyper-Hegelian)hanHegelian, s neces-sarily n the separation, hus in the noncompletionf therelationalso in love)and thus of subjectivity.trictlypeak-ing,weshould aythat ntheorganic otalizationf theHege-lian State he monarch s acking:ither e is not n individual,orelse he isone,and thenhe isexceptedfrom hetotality,eexceeds t or he remainswithdrawnromt. t is thusthatwe


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514 SOCIAL RESEARCHcan solicit heopposed meanings nvoluntarily laced byMarxin theexpression personified overeignty, ywhichhe char-acterizes the monarch in his commentary as just as it iserroneous of these paragraphs of Hegel.The closure of individualitymakes the incompletenessofthe relation s such. The monarch recordsthis ncompletenessjust as much as he bringsabout the union. Or rather andbeyond what Hegel thinks he effectuates he union by notcompletingthe relation,by inscribing t in the space of theseparationwhich is that of the relation itself.For the incompletenessof the relation s the relation tself.This does not mean thataccordingto another and more subtledialecticthe monarchaccomplishes, ompletes,therelation. tmeans that in spite of the dialectic the Hegelian monarchinscribes something which is not a political solution, butwhich forms the limit, he inevitableoutcome of the solutionof the Political according to subjectness.Relation resists, n-sists, nd inscribes tself s separation.Separation is visible or readable everywhere upon themonarch: as ecceity,he has value only throughhis body, hisimmediatenaturalbeing; as jurisdiction,he is onlythe singu-lar difference f themouthwhichpronounces or of the handwhichsigns. In all these respects,his individualitys insignifi-cant: whatsignifies s onlyhis separation.But separationdoesnot signify,t distances,and in this sense it inscribes.What it inscribes s thefinitude f the relation.The relationis in finitudebecause it s incompleteness. Thus it s not.)Andthe thoughtof finitude s doubtless necessarily, eyond whatin Heidegger seems to subjectit to a unity even a nonsub-jective one), a thoughtof relation. Now finitude n general (orfiniteness,fHegel never thinks f finitude s such) is also, forHegel, theinevitable lementof urisdiction s such. He says tin #529 of the Encyclopediabout the decision of justice:That 3years, 0thalers,tc., ronly 1/2 ears, 3/4, 4/5 tc. oinfinity,houldbe what s awful,annotnany ensebedecidedfrom heconcept,ndyet t s ofthegreatestmportancehat


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THE HEGELIAN MONARCH 515decisionhould etaken. hus, f tself, hatspositiventer-venesn the aw s the ontingentndarbitrary,ut nly oputa termo he rocessfdecision,rom hepoint fview fexternalconsiderations.his s how thappens ndhow t hasalwayshappened f itselfn every egislation;t s onlynecessaryohave determinedonsciousnessnthis espectgainstpuriousgoals ndchatter,s if nall respectshe awcan andmust edeterminedyreason r uridical nderstanding,n purelyrationalnd ntelligentrounds.t isanemptyxercisenper-fectionodemand ndexpect nythingf thiskind n thedo-main fthefinite.Juris-dictions nottheapplicationf an already ubstantiallypresent eason, t s theentrance nto he determinateelationofthat hroughwhich inite ndividuals lacethemselves irstof all in relation: ight thecopresence f freedoms, ut infinitude nd separation. o be sure,one can also find uicklyenough, along this path, something rbitrary bout themonarch. uttheHegelianmonarchmust, s wehave under-stood,offerus from hispointon, as an objectof thought,something therthan a monarch and especially his,thatwhat have called politicalurisdiction equires, rom hevery enter fand bythe avowalofthephilosophicalhoughtof thepolitical,n essential ithdrawalfthePoliticals subjectand as organicity. withdrawal hichresponds o the rela-tion, which takes the relation back everywhere n theunion which desocializes, ne might ry o say, organicsociality,nd which depoliticizes hepolitical ubject.The question f the monarch ecomes hefollowing: owto think oliticalurisdictiono that tconsists eithern sub-mission o the Subject,nor in a simplesymbolisma flag senough),but n thecircumscriptionf a place of the sym-bolization f the relation tself,fa symbolizations not asubjective usion, utexactly heestablishmentf a relation,

and theplottingut of itsseparation.This questionwouldbe thatof the voice of a people,insofar s a people wouldnot be a subject,nd as itsvoicewouldpass through place,a mouth, part and separated


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516 SOCIAL RESEARCHfrom tself. here remains oubtless o be invented n affir-mation fseparationwhich s an affirmationfthe relationandwhich s what he Statedenies, efuses,r represses. ucha task, makeclear in closing,does not present tselfforme as willhave beenunderstood underthe rubric f soci-ety gainst heState, which lways uns the risk freducingthesequestions o thetopicof civil ociety, nd of ignoringtheexigency ncountered ere.The affirmationf therela-tionwouldhaveto be a politicalffirmation,n a sensewhichremains o be discovered.

Translated byMary Ann and Peter Caws

the jurisdiction of the hegelian monarch - nancy

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