The Kaleidoscope Model of Food

Security Reform:Introduction and Applications to Input Subsidy Policies

Danielle Resnick

Motivations and Aims

Since MDGs and Paris Declaration, growing concern with a “results based agenda” and achieving policy impact

o Motivated greater attention to techniques to evaluate the impact of policy interventions already chosen (e.g., 3ie)

How can we better understand where policy decisions emerge in the first place and the possibilities for reform?

o Requires a holistic understanding of the underlying policy processo Requires integrating insights from separate food security spheres

(agriculture vs. nutrition and public health)

Inductively derived the Kaleidoscope Model by uncovering a set of variables, across broad range of scholarship that were consistently important in driving change

Kaleidoscope Model of Policy Change

Source: Resnick, Haggblade, Babu, Hendriks, and Mather (2017).

Initial Application to Two Domains

Characteristics of policy

domain

Input subsidies Micronutrients

Evidence base Abundant but contested

(social science)

Abundant and

uncontested

(medical science)

Time frame to impact Short-term Long-term

Visibility of response High Low

Beneficiaries Targeted Dispersed

First movers Domestic governments International donors

Interministerial

coordination

Low High

Opportunities for rent

seeking

High Low

Suite of Tools

Policy chronologies – process tracing by indicating whether certain events precipitated subsequent policy changes

Policy domain mapping – roles of key actors (e.g., formulation, administration, oversight, or knowledge)

Stakeholder inventories – identifies perceived winners and losers and their preferences

Circle of influence graphics – aligns stakeholders in a two-dimensional space to map their preferences vis-à-vis a policy with their power

Hypothesis testing tables – codes significance of variables

Application to Input Subsidy Programs

• Fertilizer Subsidy Program (2008–present)o Targeted voucher (2008–2009)o Waybill system (2010 onwards)

• Fertilizer Support Program (2002–2008)• Farmer Input Support Program (2009 to

present) o Integration of e-voucher (2015 to

present)

• Geographical targeted fertilizer subsidies (2003–07)

• Pilot targeted voucher (2007–2008)

• National Agricultural Input Voucher Scheme (2008–2014)

What Pushed ISPs onto Agenda?

(1) Recognized, relevant problem • Low use and affordability of

inorganic fertilizer for food staple crops since market liberalization

(2) Focusing events• S. African droughts of 2000–2002• Global food and fuel price crisis of

2007/08

(3) Powerful advocates• Presidents Mwanawasa, Kufuor,

and Kikwete• Fertilizer companies (Ghana and

Tanzania)

What Explains ISP Design?

(4) Knowledge and research • Less significant in initial design

than in subsequent refinements• Regional diffusion was prominent

(5) Norms, biases, ideology, and beliefs • Where government supply chains

had been dismantled during SAPs, private-sector design was more feasible (Ghana/Tanzania vs. Zambia)

• Initial sunset clauses reflected donor biases on subsidies

(6) Cost-benefit calculations • Low initial economic costs

o Borne largely by the donors• Low political costs

o Perceived as rural vote buying

Why Were Proposed Design Modalities Adopted?

(7) Powerful opponents vs. proponents • Initially few opponents • More pronounced over time but

for different reasons

(8) Government veto players• Strong presidents often

announced programs as a fait accompli to their parliaments (e.g., Ghana, Zambia)

(9) Propitious timing • Proved important but in no

obvious direction (e.g., ISPs adopted both in advance of and in the aftermath of elections)

Does Planned Implementation Actually Occur?

(10) Requisite budget • Release of promised donor

resources proved critical

(11) Institutional capacity • Delays in transfers from

finance to ag ministries• Hugely complex programs at

subnational level

(12) Implementation veto players • Fertilizer importers could

significantly delay or halt the programs if not paid

(13) Commitment of policy champions • Much higher in Tanzania and

Zambia than Ghana

What Motivates Refinements or Reform?

(14) Changing information and beliefs• Preponderance of research, media

reports, and parliamentary inquiries in these programs over time

(15) Changing material conditions• Creates government receptivity to

new information (e.g., macro crisis, end of budget, or project support)

(16) Institutional shifts• New presidents, parties, and

ministries of agriculture (e.g., Ghana, Zambia)

Conclusions and Recommendations

With respect to ISPs • Improve interministerial cooperation and align budget calendars with

agricultural planting seasons • Multiple program objectives result in complex program designs that may be

inappropriate given weak institutional capacity • ISPs can be a perceived opportunity for vote buying or elite patronage; efforts

at reform cannot be achieved through technical arguments alone • Degree of fungibility of donor funding affects donor influence in the design

(most in Tanzania, least in Zambia)

The Kaleidoscope Model provides an operational framework with testable hypotheses that are applicable across different countries and policy domains• The 16 hypotheses are not always applicable but do offer a maximum set of

conditions to consider retrospectively and prospectively• Moves away from silver bullet hypothesizing that implicitly underlies some

development interventions

We wish to acknowledge the co-authors of the six initial

field studies:

Suresh Babu, Nicolette Hall, Jody Harris, Nicole Mason, Elizabeth

Mkandawire, David Mather, Stephen Morgan, Flora Nankhuni, David

Ndyetabula, Dorothy Nthani, Nic JJ Olivier, Nico JJ Olivier, Phillip

Randall and Hettie C Schönfeldt.

For More Information, Please Visit

http://foodsecuritypolicy.msu.edu/

www.feedthefuture.gov