the last best chance to save yemen

8/6/2019 The Last Best Chance to Save Yemen

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/the-last-best-chance-to-save-yemen 1/10

1 Center for American Progress | The Last Best Chance to Save Yemen

The Last Best Chance to Save Yemen

Ken Gude and Ken Sofer June 2011

Yemeni Presiden Ali Adbullah Saleh’s orced deparure o Saudi Arabia o receive urgen

medical care provides he Unied Saes and is allies an unexpeced opporuniy o end

he violen, mulisided ghing gripping he poores Arab naion.

Even hough Saleh is ou o he counry, his amily and supporers remain in conrol o

wha is le o his governmen and Saleh has pledged o reurn in a mater o days. Te win-dow will soon close on prevening an all-ou civil war in a counry ha has been plagued

by violence, economic decline, and humaniarian disress even beore his laes crisis.

O all he counries gripped wih unres during he Arab Spring, Yemen poses he mos

direc concerns o he securiy o he Unied Saes and he region. Te ghing beween

powerul ribes and he remaining elemens o Presiden Saleh’s governmen has creaed

an opening or al Qaeda in he Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP, o gain erriory and sae

areas o rain and plan atacks on Saudi Arabia, he Unied Saes, and oher counries.

Yemen’s geographic locaion near major shipping lanes and close o Somalia also raiseshe poenial or a new base o operaions or piraes should Yemen collapse enirely.

Fighing in Yemen in 2010 unrelaed o he curren crisis briey crossed he Saudi bor-

der and any new conic poses signican risks or regional sabiliy.

Te Unied Saes mus move beyond mere calls or Saleh o relinquish power and pu in

place a package o puniive acions and incenives o use wha litle leverage i has o ry

and head o more violence and genuinely improve he condiions in Yemen aer Saleh

goes. Tis package should include:

• Urging all paries o abide by he cease-re while Saleh is ou o he counry and

pressing Saudi Arabia o delay or preven him rom reurning o Yemen

• Proposing a revised ransiion plan based on Gul Cooperaion Council ramework

bu ranserring auhoriy over securiy services away rom he Saleh amily and

mainaining righ o peaceul proes




• Suspending miliary assisance and weapons ransers while he Yemeni governmen

shoos is own people

• Imposing argeed ravel, nancial, and oher economic sancions on Saleh, his

amily, and oher senior gures ha remain in his governmen in an eor o urher

isolae hem

• Capialize on he lull in ghing o announce an immediae humaniarian relie eor

o help he Yemeni people, who were already suering rom a dire humaniarian siua-

ion beore he recen crisis has acceleraed Yemen’s economic spiral

• Announcing a package o economic and developmen assisance or a pos-Saleh Yemen

Te Unied Saes should be under no illusions ha hese or oher acions would magi-

cally end he curren crisis or ransorm Yemen ino Swizerland. Given he sakes, how-

ever, general rusraion and limied capaciy o bring abou a complee soluion is no

excuse o sop pushing he paries owards a resoluion, and imporanly, o help shapehe pos-Saleh Yemen and he sanding o he Unied Saes wih Yemenis.

Multiple ongoing crises pre-date latest political unrest

Yemen is a sae in perpeual crisis always seemingly on he brink o chaos. Tere have

been sporadic violen clashes hroughou much o he las decade beween governmen

orces and Shiie rebels known as he Houhis in he norh along Yemen’s border wih

Saudi Arabia. Te ghing escalaed hrough he summer 2010, even spilling across he

Saudi border, bu ended wih a ragile cease-re signed in Augus 2010. Te Houhishave paricipaed in he proess agains he Saleh regime ha began in January, bu have

no been he leading acion or he driving orce behind he mos recen violence.

In he souh, which was once he independen Souh Yemen beore unicaion wih he

Norh in 1990, a renewed separais movemen ha has been largely peaceul ye sill

marked by some violen incidens hreaens he sabiliy o a unied Yemen. And he

erroris group al Qaeda in he Arabian Peninsula, or AQAP, has esablished a base o

operaions in Yemen’s vas ungoverned spaces and has launched atacks on he Yemeni

governmen, Saudi Arabia, and he Unied Saes.

Beyond hese hard securiy challenges, he Yemeni economy is collapsing and he

counry aces severe waer shorages and an exploding populaion ha is already lacking

adequae ood supplies. Oil revenue accouns or nearly hree-quarers o all govern-

men revenue bu is oil reserves are running ou. Te World Bank predics oupu will

all o zero by 2017. Te loss o oil revenue will be caasrophic in a counry ha already

has more han 40 percen o is populaion living on less han wo dollars a day.




And i’s no jus he oil ha is running ou; waer oo is in increasingly shor supply. Te

majoriy o Yemen’s 21 aquiers are being depleed more rapidly han hey can be replen-

ished. Is capial, Sana’a, is prediced o be he rs world capial o run ou o waer, per-

haps as soon as 14 years rom now. Add o hese problems a populaion ha is expeced o

double o more han 45 million in he nex 20 years, and i is no hard o see why Yemeni’s

have many oher enormous challenges ha rank higher on heir lis han errorism.

President Saleh’s patronage-based grip on power

Saleh has masered he ar o doling ou avors and massaging key ribes or poliical ac-

ions hroughou his 30-plus years as presiden. Te vas paronage nework has allowed

him o rule in such a racured and unsable counry since 1978. Secreive paymens by

he Minisry o ribal Aairs and nonworking jobs a schools and hospials pay ou cash

o approximaely 6,000 ribal sheikhs, who in urn assure Saleh o heir ribe’s suppor or

he regime. Tese exremely cosly paymens have devasaed he Yemeni economy and

bankruped he naion. According o USAID, approximaely 40 percen o Yemeni schoolemployees are nonworking, paronage posiions. Nearly 6 percen o he governmen

budge is devoed o paying ribesmen or work ha hey do no do a Yemeni schools.

Te coninuaion o Saleh’s paronage sysem has been increasingly expensive or a

naion as poor as Yemen. As a resul, Saudi Arabia has supplemened some o he pay-

mens in order o ensure sabiliy on is borders. According o several repors, Riyadh

was he primary under o he Ahmar amily, he mos imporan rival ribe o Saleh’s

amily. Tis April, however, Saudi Arabia haled all paronage paymens as par o is

removal o suppor or he Saleh regime.

Te growing coss and nancial consrains caused by he curren crisis have led o

accusaions ha Saleh has pilered he Cenral Bank’s currency reserves and demanded

mulimillion-dollar loans rom Yemen’s riches businessmen in order o keep he paron-

age sysem rom alling apar. Despie his bes atemps, Saleh appears o be losing he

batle o keep he paronage nework inac, which has acceleraed he rae o ribal and

miliary deecions rom his regime.

One key pillar o Saleh’s paronage sysem remains unbroken: he key posiions wihin

he sae’s securiy apparaus lled by his amily members. While several op command-

ers wihin he Yemeni miliary have deeced o he opposiion, Saleh has prevened

urher deecion hanks o he igh conrol he has over he Republican Forces, Cenral

Securiy Forces, Privae Presidenial Guards, Naional Securiy Organizaion, and Air

Force where his sons and nephews hold he highes level o power in each organizaion.




Yemen’s Arab Spring

Inspired by he unisian revoluion, Yemen’s already racious populaion began proes-

ing Presiden Saleh’s 30-year reign and economic policies in January 2011. Saleh oered

a series o hal-heared poliical compromises as he proess grew in size and scope,

including developing a parliamenary sysem o governmen and oering o sep down

a he end o his erm. Te increasingly harsh acics used by Saleh’s securiy apparausagains he proesors led o he deecion o several o his senior miliary commanders.

Fear o wha could come aer Saleh’s deparure had a leas in par resrained American

and Saudi-led eors o push he Yemeni presiden o sep down. By early April, how-

ever, i was clear ha Saleh had become so weak ha concerns over a possible successor

regime were moo and his deplorable acions made his survival unenable. Te Unied

Saes, along wih he Saudis and he res o he Gul Cooperaion Council, or GCC,

began pushing or Saleh o sep down and ended payos o Yemeni ribes.

Presiden Saleh agreed o sign a deal brokered by he GCC in April ha would give himimmuniy rom prosecuion in exchange or sepping down, only o back ou rom he

signing ceremony a he las momen on hree separae occasions. His hird reusal o

sign he GCC deal led o an open break beween he Saleh governmen and key Yemeni

ribes who had already los revenue rom he Saudis because o Saleh’s anics.

Te powerul Hashed ribal alliance led by Sadeq al-Ahmar, unleashed is ghers agains

governmen orces, which led o he deah o more han 155 people in only 10 days. On

June 3, a large explosion, reporedly rom a bomb planed in he presidenial palace,

injured Saleh, orcing him o ravel o Saudi Arabia or medical reamen. Clashes in

Sana’a have quieed since Saleh’s deparure, bu his amily is sill in Yemen conrolling hecounry’s securiy apparaus, and here are growing concerns over he poliical vacuum his

absence has creaed. While Yemeni ofcials claim ha Saleh is due o reurn “wihin days,”

new repors indicae ha his injuries are much more serious han originally repored and

will more likely need monhs o recover rom he burns susained in he explosion.

The Gulf Cooperation Council Transition Plan

Te mos recen ieraion o he GCC reay graned Presiden Saleh immuniy rom

prosecuion in exchange or ranserring execuive power o he vice presiden wihin

a week and ormally resigning as presiden wihin a monh o signing he reay.

Opposiion leaders would immediaely hal all proess and say o he srees hrough-

ou he ransiion process. A uniy governmen composed o boh ruling and opposiion

leaders would be ormed, and boh parliamenary and presidenial elecions would

occur wo monhs aer Saleh’s resignaion.




Te GCC deal is currenly he only plan or a peaceul poliical resoluion o he conic

on he able, and while realiies on he ground have changed since Saleh’s las rejecion,

i provides a decen ramework or an end o he crisis. Te rs sep o he agreemen,

he nominal ranser o execuive auhoriy o Vice Presiden Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi

has already occurred, albei under dieren circumsances han envisioned in he deal.

Opposiion leaders have saed hey will accep Hadi as a ransiion leader, and he has

he poenial o play a very posiive role in Yemen’s move o a pos-Saleh governmen, ye he rue power o he Yemeni sae in Saleh’s absence remains wih he leadership o

he securiy services.

Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula benefiting from unrest and violence

Te hrea rom AQAP is real. Tey have been implicaed in a leas hree atacks on he

U.S. homeland—he successul shooing by Major Nidal Hassan a F. Hood; he unsuc-

cessul bombing o a Deroi-bound airliner on Chrismas Day 2009; and he oiled

bombing o cargo aircra wih explosives placed in oner carridges in 2010. I is likely he erroris group’s inen on atacking he Unied Saes will no wane given he promi-

nence wihin AQAP o Anwar al-Alawki, he U.S. born recruier who is considered one

o he mos imporan inspiraional gures wihin he al-Qaeda nework.

Tere have been conicing accouns o AQAP advances during he mos recen phase

o he ghing. Some repors claim Islamiss—ideniying hemselves by a name AQAP

has used— ook over he own o Zinjibar, bu ohers indicae ha his could be merely

a ploy by Saleh o demonsrae he perils o orcing him ou. I is impossible or ouside

observers o know he veraciy o hese repors, bu i does seem clear ha AQAP is

aking advanage o he poliical unres and violence o eiher consolidae is posiion orgain erriory. Te proximiy—jus 160 miles across he Gul o Aden—o Somalia and

he poenial or alliance or coordinaion wih he al Shabaab erroris movemen here

increases he need o arge and disrup AQAP aciviies.

Bu i would be a misake o view he challenge o Yemen exclusively hrough he lens

o errorism or hard securiy hreas. Simply pu, here is no U.S. or oher ouside

miliary soluion o he muliple ongoing crises in Yemen. Yemen is no Aghanisan in

he 1990s, here is no radical Islamis movemen ha can ake over Yemen and allow

AQAP sancuary similar o he aliban and al Qaeda cenral. Te bes way o blun

AQAP’s advance is o pu Yemen on a more sable poliical and economic pah, no rely

on kineic miliary operaions.




Current U.S. policy toward Yemen

Te Obama adminisraion has invesed signican ime and resources o boh broaden

and deepen he U.S. relaionship wih he Yemeni governmen o help i gh error-

ism and deal wih oher securiy crises as he erroris hrea rom AQAP has grown.

Depuy Naional Securiy Adviser John Brennan has made a leas our rips o mee

wih Presiden Saleh and ew ou o he region jus las week o coner on he crisis wihSaudi Arabia and he Unied Arab Emiraes, he wo key players in he GCC.

Te Obama adminisraion has signicanly increased counererrorism and miliary

assisance o Yemen since he ailed Chrismas Day plo, more han doubling i o $150

million in 2010 and adding anoher $100 on op o ha or 2011. Te U.S. governmen

has also provided counererrorism and oher miliary assisance o he Yemenis oal-

ing more han $500 million since 2009. While his aid package does no compare wih

hose o Egyp or Pakisan, i is a meaningul conribuion o Yemen’s naional securiy

resources and does give he Unied Saes some leverage.

According o Te New York imes , he Unied Saes has inensied is drone and air-

srike campaign agains AQAP since he laes ghing began and Saleh’s orces shied

away rom counererrorism. Te repor only cies wo specic incidens, so i is difcul

o ascerain he ull exen o his U.S. aciviy. While his kind o kineic operaion can

be useul as par o a broad sraegy ha seeks o boh couner hreas emanaing rom

Yemen and assis he counry ’s economic and poliical developmen, such acion on is

own is virually cerain o be counerproducive.

Firs, such acions are prone o manipulaion by local acors or simply bad inelligence

inormaion, boh endemic in he chaoic environmen o Yemen oday. Second, even when successul, civilian casualies—or even jus he claim o civilian casualies—

severely alienaes he local populaion he poenial or blowback o erase any acical

bene rom hese srikes is very high. I he sum oal o U.S. policy in Yemen can be

described as “deah rom above,” hen he Unied Saes will no be popular and we may

even engender greaer sympahy among he local populaion or hose we arge.

Package of punitive ac tions, humanitarian relief, and economic incentives

Te deaul expecaion or ar oo many in he Unied Saes and around he world is

or America o x his problem or resolve ha crisis. Te realiy is ha even a counry as

powerul as he Unied Saes has limied capaciy o aec change and ha is especially

rue in a counry acing as many problems as Yemen. Te ulimae resoluion o he

crisis in Yemen is he responsibiliy o he Yemenis. Bu he Unied Saes mus no be

consigned o a policy o saying o Presiden Saleh, “Go, or we’ll say go again,” and should

use wha leverage i has in an atemp o seer he paries owards a peaceul resoluion

o his laes crisis.




Call for explicit cease-fire and urge Saudis to delay or prevent Saleh from

returning to Yemen

Presiden Saleh’s deparure o Saudi Arabia is he only reason or he curren breah-

ing space in he poliical crisis in Yemen. Jubilaion eruped in he srees o Sana’a as i

looked like Saleh had ranserred power o his depuy. Te vice presiden has assumed

he powers o he presidency bu i is clear ha he remaining elemens o he Salehregime believe ha he will reurn o power. I seems nohing is ever easy in Yemen.

Fighing has signicanly died down since Saleh’s deparure when Saudi King Abdullah

quickly negoiaed a ragile cease-re, bu sporadic clashes persis. Te cease-re could

unravel a any momen, especially i expecaions build on any side regarding Saleh’s

prospecs or reurn. I is vial o consolidae his breahing space wih an explici cease-

re while Saleh is in Saudi Arabia. Tis does no need o be a ormal agreemen, merely a

public pledge by he major ghing acions—he Hashed ribe, he breakaway miliary

unis, and he governmen—o cease atacks.

AQAP is unlikely o abide by any cease-re and is a major complicaing acor ha could

make any genuine cease-re elusive. I is no hard o imagine a scenario when one pary

cies an alleged AQAP atack as jusicaion or realiaion or oher acion. Bu a cessa-

ion o atacks by he main ghing paries o his laes phase o he conic would be an

unequivocal posiive and allow or a reurn o negoiaions o resolve he poliical crisis.

I is vial ha his window made possible by Saleh’s deparure be exended as long as pos-

sible o ensure he maximum leverage can be used or he Unied Saes and he GCC o

peel o enough o he Saleh governmen so ha his reurn o power becomes impossible.

Te Unied Saes should urge he Saudis o delay Saleh’s reurn or as long as possible.

Propose a revised transition plan

Te atacks on proesers and he general violence ha has marked he period since

Saleh reneged on he GCC plan or he hird ime may preven a reurn o he original

erms o he deal. Ye he rs phase o he plan, ranserring auhoriy o Vice Presiden

Hadi, has occurred. Te main challenge a his phase in he ransiion is ha Hadi does

no have his own base o power or suppor and Saleh’s son and nephew sill conrol he

securiy services.

Te problems wih he Yemeni governmen, however, are sysemic and do no reside

solely in Presiden Saleh. Saleh’s sons and nephews mus relinquish conrol o he secu-

riy services o an agreed neural pary o ruly improve he srucure o he governmen.

In exchange or giving up hese poss, hey will be included in he immuniy deal ha

Presiden Saleh was oered or giving up power.




Aer credible allegaions ha he securiy services atacked and killed unarmed pro-

esers, his exension o immuniy will be a biter pill or he opposiion o swallow. In

exchange, he opposiion should reain he righ o peaceul proes hrough he ransi-

ion process in order o ensure he voice o he people o Yemen can be heard as he

counry esablishes a new poliical order.

Suspend military aid

While i appears ha ha U.S. miliary assisance has eiher slowed signicanly or

sopped during he curren crisis, here has been no ormal announcemen ha he

Unied Saes has suspended miliary assisance o he Yemeni governmen. Concerns

ha a suspension o such assisance may bene AQAP during he curren crisis are

undersandable bu incorrec. I is clear ha AQAP is aking advanage o he crisis, bu

he bes way o sop ha is o end he curren crisis. Te botom line is ha he Yemeni

governmen is spending is ime ghing o a major challenge rom powerul ribes and

massive popular proess, no argeing AQAP. A suspension o assisance would noimpac he gh agains errorism.

One serious poenial drawback is ha a suspension o miliary assisance could,

alhough i is unclear, require he Unied Saes o wihdraw he Join Special

Operaions Command uni currenly coordinaing counererrorism operaions rom

Sana’a or resul in he Yemeni governmen asking hem o leave. Tis o course has is

downsides, bu counererrorism operaions absen a broader engagemen sraegy are

jus as likely o be counerproducive. Coordinaion wih Yemeni governmen orces

seems exremely minimal a his juncure given he ocus o Yemeni orces and nohing

would preven coninued cooperaion wih he miliary unis under he command o General Ali Mushin al-Hamar, who deeced o he proesers in March.

Addiionally, i is imporan or Americans o realize ha U.S. counererrorism opera-

ions and our miliary suppor or Presiden Saleh are deeply unpopular wih Yemenis.

While errorism is our number one concern abou Yemen, i ranks ar down mos

Yemenis’ lis o concerns given all he roubles in heir counry.

A U.S. miliary aid suspension would cerainly no mean ha Saleh’s guns all silen, bu

he Unied Saes simply canno coninue o provide weapons o a counry ha uses

hem o kill peaceul pro-democracy proesers.

Implement targeted sanctions

While he reach o argeed sancions may no be deep, he precarious naure o Saleh’s

curren poliical posiion, his exensive use o a paronage sysem ha requires consan

unding, and his increasing reliance on he Unied Saes or securiy assisance show




ha an inernaional sancions regime could aally weaken Saleh’s grip on power. Unlike

Syria, where he Unied Saes sancioned isel ou o inuence prior o he curren cri-

sis, he Yemeni securiy apparaus’ increasingly close relaionship wih he Unied Saes

makes i much more vulnerable o a cessaion o assisance and equipmen.

A unilaeral decision by he U.S. governmen o reeze asses and hal wire ransers o

Saleh and his amily members—including his sons and nephews who conrol he coun-ry’s securiy services—would have a ar reaching impac on he way oreign naions

view and address requess by he Saleh amily o use heir nancial insiuions. While

large oreign banks oen inormally abide by U.S. sancions agains individuals, he

paricipaion o he Gul naions in argeed sancions will be crucial given he amoun

o Yemeni money ha is likely held in oreign nancial ceners such as Dubai. Tough

hese sancions may no be decisive, hey will send a clear message ha acions do have

real consequences and could help change he calculaions o hose around Saleh abou

he value o saying by his side or bringing abou an end o his poliical crisis.

Provide immediate humanitarian relief

Tis laes crisis is jus one among many ha he people o Yemen have been orced o

endure in recen years. Wih more han 40 percen o he populaion living on less han

wo dollars a day, heir humaniarian siuaion was already precarious. Now he mul-

isided clashes beween Saleh, ormer miliary commanders, major ribes, and AQAP

hreaens a ull-scale humaniarian disaser.

Clearly, he ongoing ghing makes he delivery o relie supplies difcul, bu during

he cease-re while Saleh is ou o he counry i is possible or he nongovernmenalorganizaions, wih U.S. and GCC suppor, o deliver immediae criical aid o he

Yemeni people. Addiionally, Saleh’s absence rom he counry provides an opporu-

niy o call or a emporary cease-re o allow humaniarian relie o come in. Te mos

imporan issue o concern is he growing waer shorage hroughou he naion. Yemen

already aced waer supply issues as he mos waer poor naion in he Middle Eas, bu

he loss o domesic oil, which powers he drills ha pump waer, has cu o large sec-

ions o he populaion o waer supplies.

Disaser relie organizaions should immediaely sar supplying he populaion wih

waer supplies, while he Unied Saes simulaneously works wih Saudi Arabia o

diver nearby diesel uel o ge he waer pumps up and running again. Te nex prioriy

will be o reconnec he counry’s elecrical grid, which has largely been shu down by

rebel ribes, and give he populaion access o elecriciy again. Coming o he direc aid

o he Yemeni people during his crisis is no only morally he righ hing o do, bu i

would improve he sanding o he Unied Saes wih he populaion on he verge o a

major poliical ransiion.




Introduce a package of economic incentives for a post-Saleh Yemen

Te violence and poliical urmoil in Yemen has cos he counry $5 billion—17 percen

o is GDP—and pu he poores counry in he Middle Eas on he verge o economic

collapse. Whoever leads he nex Yemeni governmen will need signican suppor ar

beyond miliary assisance o gh errorism.

As Presiden Obama highlighed during his speech on he Middle Eas wo weeks ago,

he unres across he region largely reecs a rusraion wih limied economic opporu-

niy. Te Unied Saes should make clear ha i is prepared o assis a pos-Saleh Yemen

wih a package o economic aid and developmen programs. Economic assisance in a

pos-Saleh Yemen should cener around hree key issues: esablishing a posoil economy,

developing he counry’s agriculural secor, and implemening a smarer waer sraegy.

Te economic challenges o Yemen are no ones ha he Unied Saes could or should

help solve on is own, as he oher Arab Gul naions have signican ineres in seeing a

sable Yemen on is borders. Presiden Obama should call on Saudi Arabia, he Unied Arab Emiraes, and Qaar o use heir oil and naural gas wealh o develop a deb relie

and invesmen program similar o wha he presiden proposed or Egyp and unisia.

A he very leas, he money or ribal paronage paid or by Saudi Arabia should be

divered o sraegic invesmen in he Yemeni economy. Te deails o wha role he

Unied Saes and regional parners will play in Yemen’s economic uure will need o be

addressed in close cooperaion wih he leaders o Yemen’s nex governmen o ensure

ha economic policies and assisance are coordinaed or eeciveness.

Tere are genuine radeos by promoing such acive involvemen by he Gul naions,

who have proven relucan o allow an open, democraic naion o grow on heir borders.Given our domesic scal resrains and limied ies o he uure leaders o Yemen, how-

ever, coordinaing our prioriies or Yemen’s uure wih he capabiliies o our regional

parners will be essenial o puting Yemen on he pah oward sabiliy.

Conclusion

Te laes bou o poliical violence in Yemen hreaens o push an already racured

counry ino a genuine ailed sae. While i is rue we have limied capaciy o end he

violence and poliical unres, he Unied Saes mus ake advanage o he las remain-

ing window o opporuniy—Saleh’s orced deparure o Saudi Arabia or medical rea-

men—o help bring abou a peaceul resoluion o he crisis.

the last best chance to save yemen

Documents