the last three outs - western connecticut state...
TRANSCRIPT
1
The Last Three Outs When closers choke
By Russell Westerholm
Thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the
Requirements of a degree in Writing
Professional Writing, Journalism option 1 May 2012
Thesis Advisor: Prof. Briggs
2
Abstract
This thesis is a long-form journalistic piece about why baseball closers choke.
Pitchers in baseball have always had the reputation of being neurotic and closers are
more so because their job is the most stressful in the game. Experts say there are two
ways a closer can focus; one is good and one is bad. Focus, confidence and execution
are the most important tools for a closer, and without all three, he is destined for
trouble. This project looks in depth into how brain processes affect focus, confidence
and execution and what actually happens in a closer’s mind in the ninth inning.
3
Table of Contents
Terminology and basic rules of baseball – 4
Focus, confidence, execution – 7
The Great Rivera – 11
Preparation – 16
Team Chokes – 19
Brain Processes – 25
The Postseason – 29
What can be done – 32
Works Cited – 35
4
Terminology and basic rules of baseball
• Blown save: when the reliever surrenders the lead in a save situation.
• Choking: in sports, choking is when an athlete fails in a situation where
success means winning the game and failure means losing.
• Clutch: a term used for athletes who are very good and consistent under
pressure.
• Double play: when two outs are recorded on one defensive play.
• ERA: stand for Earned Run Average. It averages how many earned runs a
pitcher gives up per nine innings.
o ERA is one of the main ways in which fans and analysts measure a
pitcher’s success.
• Extra innings: If the game is tied after the third out of the ninth is recorded,
extra innings ensue. Extra innings continue until one team takes a lead and
holds it through the bottom half of the inning.
• “Game 162:” refers to the last game of the season, as there are 162 games in a
season.
• Inning: consists of two halves – top and bottom – the away team hits in the
top half and the home team hits in the bottom half; both halves consist of three
outs. Each baseball game is made up of nine innings.
5
• Leagues and Divisions: Major League Baseball (MLB) has two leagues and
six divisions.
o American League (AL): East, Central and West
o National League (NL): East, Central and West
o The main difference between the two leagues is the designated hitter
rule. In the AL, a designated hitter hits in place of the pitcher. In the
NL, there is no designated hitter, pitchers have to hit.
• Long reliever (long-man): a relief pitcher whose job is to pitch more than
three innings at a time. Long-men are typically only used when a starting
pitcher has a short outing.
• Middle reliever: a relief pitcher who pitches one inning a game, sometimes
two, in the middle innings of a game (4th-7th).
• Pitching rhythm: a sequence of events in which a pitcher throws a pitch, gets
the ball thrown back to him by the catcher, gets the sign for the next pitch
from the catcher, then throws the next pitch.
o Many things out of the pitcher’s control can interrupt a pitcher’s
rhythm such as hits, home runs and foul balls. Pitchers can also ruin
their own rhythm by taking extra time between pitches and walking
around and kicking dirt around on the mound.
• Save: a save occurs when a reliever ends the game after entering the game
with the tying run due up.
6
• Scouting report: detailed report on any given hitter or pitcher listing
strengths, weaknesses and tendencies.
o For hitters: Report used by pitchers that lists details such as pitches the
hitter hits well (or poorly), what areas of the strike zone they hit well
(or poorly), if the hitter is patient or aggressive and any other
tendencies.
o For pitchers: Report used by hitters that lists details such as strongest
and weakest pitch, how often they throw each pitch and in what kinds
of situations and any other tendencies.
• Starting pitcher (starters): a pitcher who starts the game. Starters are usually
expected to last six to seven innings.
o Fun fact: relievers are a fairly new position, before relievers, starters
had to pitch the entire game no matter what.
o Quality start: when a starter pitches at least six innings and gives up
three or less runs.
• Triple play: when three outs are recorded on one defensive play. These are
extremely rare.
• Walk-off: when the home team scores the go-ahead run in the bottom of the
ninth or later. It is called a “walk-off” because the teams walk off the field
after the run scores because the game is over.
7
Focus, confidence, execution
In Yankee stadium, Metallica’s “Enter Sandman” begins to blare over the loud
speakers and every fan in attendance knows that marks the entrance of Mariano
Rivera.
In Boston’s Fenway Park, during his time spent as a Red Sox, once Dropkick
Murphys’ “Shipping Up to Boston” filled the stadium, everything else stopped. All in
attendance stopped to watch Jonathon Papelbon run onto the field.
In San Francisco, during the 2010 World Series, Brian Wilson was finishing
his warm up tosses when countless “Fear the Beard” signs began to go up. Soon after,
the crowd was roaring as the thickly-bearded closer ran onto the field.
The closer entering the ninth inning in a save situation is the climax of any
baseball game. There are many things that heighten the stakes in the ninth inning of a
close game. The crowd noise grows, the adrenaline pumps through the fans in the
stadium, the closer and the hitters. The outcome of a close game rides on the closer’s
performance and there is no point in a game where the crowd is louder than in the last
inning of a close game.
A closer needs to master three elements to be successful: focus, confidence
and execution.
In such close situations, with immense crowd noise, closers need focus on the
catcher’s target. Closers also need unshakeable confidence; they need to believe that
they are good enough to get any hitter out. Lastly, closers need to execute their best
pitches in precise locations because one mistake could lead to a blown save.
8
Closing pitchers have perhaps the most stressful job in baseball and one of the
most stressful jobs in all of sports. Their job is to get the most important three outs of
the game: the last three.
The last three outs are the most difficult and most important because they are
what stand in between a closer’s team, and a win. In the other dugout is an entire
lineup that will do everything they can to beat the closer.
Doubt is a closer’s worst nightmare. When doubt creeps into his mind, a
closer cannot help but visualize giving up the big, game-changing home run. In the
ninth inning, every mistake is magnified; hitters have heightened senses and reactions
due to the high amount of adrenaline. If a closer cannot match that level of focus,
adrenaline and confidence, doubt takes place. When doubt takes place in a closer’s
mind, he chokes.
Choking is a term more commonly used for athletes. It is used to describe
when he fails in a situation where success is imperative. Taking a step away from
baseball for a moment, choking exists in all types of professions and everyone
experiences pressure at some point in their lives. The mouth gets dry, palms start to
sweat, the mind races and all it can focus on is not choking. Paradoxically, the
desperate need to not choke, is exactly what causes people to choke.
“When the worries begin, [people] try to control their performance and force
an optimal outcome,” Sian Beilock, author of “Choke: what the secrets of the brain
reveal about getting it right when you have to,” wrote.
9
Choking usually occurs when a person is highly skilled at something, usually
a professional, and it follows a certain procedure. First, when people become nervous,
they become self-conscious, when a person is self-conscious, they try to avoid failure,
when they try to avoid failure, the brain tries to micro-manage basic motor skills of
the body.
For closing pitchers, choking occurs when they think about their throwing
motion or the point where they release the ball. When the pressure is high, the brain
focuses all its attention on making sure these automatic motor skills are done
perfectly instead of focusing on the task at hand, inducing paralysis by over-analysis.
“I have this vision of what I think choking is. I think most fans do. Athletes
have a slightly different perspective because they know the pressure that they’re
dealing with all the time,” Dr. Shane Murphy, professor of sports psychology at
Western Connecticut State University (WCSU) said. “It’s a pretty thin line between
success and failure.”
Murphy is the former psychologist for the Colorado Sky Sox, a triple-A
affiliate of the Chicago White Sox and before that, he was the first full-time
psychologist for the U.S Olympic committee.
Murphy said that sports psychologists tend to define choking differently than
fans do. He said they have a different perspective because they try to define it
operationally. The two definitions Murphy gave were anxiety-based and brain-
process-based.
10
Anxiety-based is what common sense tells us. Common sense says that an
athlete chokes because he let his anxiety get the best of him. Murphy said the brain
process explanation is gaining strength research-wise and can more accurately tell us
why pitchers choke.
In her book “Choke,” Beilock detailed the brain’s reaction to high-pressure
situations. “Your heart rate goes up, your adrenaline kicks in and your mind starts to
race – often with worries,” she wrote.
11
The Great Rivera
Mariano Rivera stood stoic on the Yankee Stadium mound. It was a regular
season game against the struggling Minnesota Twins, but Rivera was one out from
making history.
Rivera has made a career out of throwing one pitch, the cutter. The cutter is a
fastball that moves in towards a left-handed hitter and away from a right-handed
hitter. Rivera sometimes throws other variations of a fastball like the two-seamer
(moves the opposite direction of the cutter) and a straight four-seam fastball. He
makes it work because of pinpoint control and a rock-solid psychological approach.
A closer has the most stressful job in baseball because the score is always
close when a closer comes in. With the way managers order the lineups, the team’s
best hitters often come up in the last inning. If a starting pitcher gives up three runs
over the duration of seven innings, it is considered a quality start. For a closer, so
much as one run surrendered could be a blown save.
This kind of psychological stress is too much for young pitchers and, along
with the physical toll, weighs too heavily on older pitchers. Trevor Hoffman will
always be considered one of the game’s greatest closers, but as he arrived at the end
of his career, he simply could not get hitters out. When Hoffman turned 40, his ERA
went up to 3.77 and when Rivera turned 40, his ERA was 1.80. Hoffman retired after
the 2010 season at the age of 42, his ERA that year was 5.89. Rivera has entered the
2012 season at the age of 42.
12
Murphy said that different closers have different ways of handling pressure.
Pitchers like Papelbon throw their energy outward whereas Rivera has strategies for
keeping it inside. Murphy believes Rivera’s psychological approach is to not let the
hitter know what he is feeling. No matter the situation, Rivera always looks the same
whether it is his facial expression or the pitch that leaves his hand.
The cutter has allowed Rivera to be one of the most consistent pitchers of all
time. The pitch requires no wrist movement, therefore places no stress on the elbow.
It is easy for catchers to catch for him because they know what pitch he throws; they
just need to give him a target. His delivery is simple and smooth and places no
unnecessary stress on his shoulder or anywhere else.
Rivera’s name is written all over the closer’s record book and especially in the
Yankee record book. One record had eluded him until Sept. 19, 2011: the all-times
saves record previously held by Hoffman, a pitcher who featured baseball’s two most
basic pitches: a fastball and a changeup.
A changeup gets its name from what it does, it is a change of pace. Pitches
such as curveballs and sliders are thrown with a flick of the wrist, creating a different
spin than a regularly thrown ball. Hitters can identify a slider or a curve by the way
the ball spins, each one looks distinct. Fastballs and changeups are thrown with no
wrist flick so neither one has a distinct spin. The changeup is arguably baseball’s
most deceptive pitch because it is thrown the same way a fastball is thrown, but with
four fingers placed on the ball, drastically slowing the pitch down.
13
Each closer has a signature pitch, a pitch he throws better than anyone else.
Early on in his career, Papelbon has developed an exceptional splitter, Hoffman had
the changeup and Rivera has his cutter.
All around the Panamanian-born closer fans stood cheering and flashing
cameras, but Rivera was as calm and collected as he has ever been. His calm
demeanor is something that he has become known for in his 18-year season. Rivera
has won five World Series titles, he has the most postseason saves of all-time, but
never does he ever look anything but calm.
In Murphy’s heart monitoring research he did on the U.S figure skaters, he
learned that no matter what the skater’s demeanor was, skaters experienced the same
kind of rise in heart rate. Even though Rivera was on the brink of achieving the
greatest honor there is to achieve at his position, Rivera kept his mild, calm demeanor
even though his heart rate was probably racing.
Rivera comes from a generation of mild-mannered closers. After recording a
save, Rivera will calmly walk toward his catcher, shake his hand and then high-five
his teammates. Hoffman was the same way, as were many of the closers from the
1990’s.
When the 2000’s came around, the closer position changed, Rivera did not. A
pitcher named Francisco Rodriguez came through the Los Angeles Angels system
who helped make famous the high-energy persona.
Along with a new, more intense persona, more and more closers started
developing extra pitches. All relief pitchers, closers, set-up men, middle relievers,
14
only have two or three pitches that they throw really well. Because they are only in
the game for an inning at a time, there is no need for a larger pitch arsenal.
A growing trend among closers is the development of more pitches.
Rodriguez was one of the first to start throwing as many five different pitches in an
inning. He could throw a fastball, a changeup, curveball, slider and a two-seam
fastball. Jonathon Papelbon is known to feature four pitches: fastball, curveball, slider
and a splitter.
Rivera does have a wrinkle to his game and his psychological strength. He is
not very good in non-save situations. For example, a common managerial move in
tied game is, if the team is at home, to bring in the closer to pitch the ninth. Managers
like this move because their team can win the game in the bottom half of the inning
and bringing in the closer all but ensures a scoreless half inning. These are precisely
the types of situations where Rivera is at his worst.
From a psychological standpoint, it is an entirely different ball game because
there is an even smaller margin for error. As is proven over and over again, the
smaller margin for error, the more athletes push themselves to be perfect.
Rivera has pitched 781 and one-third innings in save situations and carries a
1.92 ERA. In his 605 career saves, Rivera has an ERA of 0.66, meaning that his ERA
in save situations is boosted by his blown saves. In 383 and one-third non-save
situation innings, Rivera has a 2.35 ERA.
In the eight inning, Rivera has a career ERA of 1.76 and a career ninth inning
ERA of 2.02. In innings 7-9, or the “clutch innings,” Rivera’s ERA is 2.00 and he
15
averages nearly five-and-a-half strikeouts per walk. However, in extra innings,
Rivera’s ERA goes up to 2.98 and opposing batters hit for an average of .248. Give
Rivera a situation he is not familiar with and even the greatest of all time will
struggle.
With two outs in the inning, Rivera threw a straight fastball on the outside
corner for a strike. The next pitch was his cutter thrown in on the lefty hitter, who
pulled it foul for strike two. The third pitch was back on the outside corner and the
hitter just looked at it for strike three. The all-time record was his and Rivera did what
he always has done, he walked to his catcher, shook his hand then received
congratulations from his teammates.
16
Preparation
For a closer, physical preparation is just as important as mental preparation.
Even though they have to be as mentally tough as they are, they also need to master
their pitches. It is difficult for a closer to succeed without exceptional pitching ability.
If a closer stays healthy and maintains a high level of pitching ability, he makes his
team that much better. If not, it is a detriment to that team, an incredibly difficult
obstacle for a team to work around.
There are many ways a closer must prepare himself for the mental and
physical toll he is about to endure. Physical preparation effects mental preparation
and vice versa. Having confidence in his pitching ability gives a closer confidence on
the mound, which often leads to better focus. When a pitcher is under-prepared, he
will not be able to execute and lack of execution leads to a vicious cycle of lack of
focus and confidence.
Murphy said that part of being really good at your respective sport is being
really honest. A closer must look at his work and ask himself, “Was it enough?”
Honesty in the first place is one of the best ways for a closer to recover from choking.
If he is up front with himself about the amount of work he put in and feels he has
done everything he can, then a choke looks more like an isolated incident instead of a
long-term problem. Being honest about physical preparation also determines if it is a
technical problem or a focus problem and that is where sports psychologists come in,
to help with an athlete’s mental preparation.
17
Beilock has conducted numerous studies on athlete’s mental preparation and
has found that golfers made more high-pressure putts while distracted than when they
were left alone. Some methods of distraction included playing a series of words over
the loudspeaker and every time the golfers heard a word, they had to repeat it. This
was meant to draw the golfer’s attention from the putt itself and to the word, letting
the golfer’s motor skills take over.
She also described similar study with basketball players taking free throws.
When the researchers played music for the players taking free throws, they were
distracted from over-analyzing the thing they knew so well how to do and just did it.
Dr. Nicholas Gallucci, professor of Sports Psychology at WCSU, disagrees
with this method of distraction.
“I think it’s a better strategy to think about what you want to do,” he said.
Murphy disagrees as well, comparing it to treating an injury. Murphy said if a
pitcher has a tight arm, he would not distract himself with anything, he would treat
his arm to get it loose. According to Murphy, imagery works well with pitchers.
Getting pitchers to associate success with certain cue phrases like “let it go” are
effective.
What Gallucci and Murphy said confirms research done by psychologist Bill
Morgan. Morgan studied runners at the University of Wisconsin and he believed that
his athletes should practice association rather than disassociation or distraction.
Morgan believed athletes should learn to focus on the right things instead of distract
themselves entirely by paying attention to what they need to correct. Both Gallucci
18
and Murphy say that athletes should focus on the desired outcome and visualize their
desired outcome.
Morgan referred to this as association vs. disassociation. Association meant
the athlete focused on the right things (strategy focus) in high-pressure situations.
Disassociation meant the athlete would try to distract themselves during tense
moments. Morgan found that his runners performed better when focusing on strategy
instead of technique, than when they distracted themselves completely.
That is not to say that Beilock is wrong. Her research garnered positive
results, as has Morgan’s. In fact, Murphy’s cue phrase strategy ties in with Beilock’s
strategy of having golfers repeat cue words. These two strategies are very similar, but
differ in one way: association vs. disassociation, both have been proven effective.
19
Team Chokes
Jonathon Papelbon could have sent the Red Sox to the playoffs, he could have
stopped one of the worst team collapses in baseball history, but he did not.
Since becoming the Sox’s closer in 2006, Papelbon has been one of the best.
As a closer, he has not had less than 30 saves in a season. He has a career ERA of
2.33 and has just over a strikeout per inning pitched.
That is not to say Papelbon deserves all of the blame because his team simply
could not win games in the month of September of 2011, finishing with a 5-17 record
from Sept. 3 – Sept. 28. On Sept. 3, the team held a nine game lead in the American
League wild card over the Tampa Bay Rays. On the last day of the season, Sept. 28,
the two teams were tied.
The Red Sox were experiencing a “team choke.” Murphy said that when a
team chokes, it is anxiety-based. When a team starts to play poorly when they cannot
afford to play poorly, feelings of anxiety can easily spread throughout the clubhouse.
“Everybody starts to press a little,” Murphy said. “The more you try, the
worse it gets.”
In a video titled “Psychology of Loss” by Gordon Edes, Adjunct Professor of
Psychology at Mercy College, George Kemp said, “It’s hard to look at the decline of
a unit, a body, and watch it fall and be a part of that and not identify yourself as a
contributor to this fall [and say to yourself,] ‘There is something wrong with me as
well.’”
20
Murphy said the idea of a team collectively choking under pressure better fits
the anxiety-based definition. When a team is not playing well when they really have
to be playing well, a player might start to harbor doubt. This kind of tension can and
does spread to the other players in the rest of the clubhouse.
The ’04 Yankees
The 2004 New York Yankees fits the definition of a team choke as well as
any team ever could. They held a three-games-to-none lead against the Boston Red
Sox in the ALCS, one win from advancing to the World Series. Instead, the Red Sox
surmounted arguably the greatest comeback in the history of the sport by winning the
next four games.
Alex Rodriguez said he was embarrassed and Mariano Rivera said what most
people found obvious: the Yankees lacked pitching that year. The rest of the team
simply do not like talking about it any further.
A “team choke” differs in definition from an individual choke, which tends to
be more of a brain-process approach. When an individual athlete chokes, it is usually
because he gets caught up in his own thoughts or his own self-doubt.
Sept. 28, 2011: “Game 162” Boston Red Sox vs. Baltimore Orioles
Nolan Reimold, a career .246 hitter, was up with a runner on second base.
Papelbon’s first pitch missed high and outside, the next pitch also missed high and
outside, the third and fourth pitches were high and outside and in the strike zone, but
Reimold swung and missed both pitches.
21
There are two reasons a pitcher would throw four straight pitches to one area
of the strike zone. The first would be because the hitter is exceptionally weak in that
zone and the second would be because he is consistently missing his target, which
might suggest a problem with pitching mechanics. Papelbon was likely attacking
Reimold in a zone where he believed Reimold was weak. Papelbon knew Reimold to
be a hitter that feasts on pitches in the middle or inside part of the zone.
The fifth pitch was in the strike zone, it was not high and outside, it was right
in the middle of the strike zone. Reimold did what any professional hitter does with a
fastball down the middle, he hit it hard. Reimold doubled and the tying run scored.
Red Sox – 3, Orioles – 3
The next batter was Robert Andino, a career .245 hitter who had played his
first season as a full-time starter. Papelbon’s first pitch to Andino was a slider that
missed high, not even threatening the strike zone. The next pitch was a fastball down
the middle for a strike; the count was one ball to one strike. The catcher’s target for
the third pitch was set at the hitter’s knee level, a pitch that often results in a ground
ball. The pitch that Papelbon threw ended up belt-high and Andino hit a line drive to
left field. Carl Crawford slid to try to catch it but could not. He popped up and tried to
throw Reimold out at the plate but was too late. The Orioles won and the Red Sox
were headed home.
Former Red Sox manager Terry Francona is known for his honesty and his
integrity as a baseball manager. In interviews he is transparent with reporters, always
22
answering truthfully, and after the game he confirmed what Murphy had to say about
a “team choke.”
“There were some things that did concern me, as the season progresses, there
are events that make you care about each other and this club didn’t always have them
as much as I wanted them to,” Francona said.
Strategy vs. Technique
After the game, Papelbon said he felt great during his outing and by all
appearances he looked great. However, Papelbon did something that a lot of athletes
do when they choke. They talk about it afterwards.
One sign that an athlete is over-thinking a situation is when he can tell you
what he did wrong, he micro-manage skills that are automatic. When an athlete
performs well under pressure it is usually harder for him to verbalize what they did or
what he was thinking because he does not know.
"It's the location. I was trying to go in, off the plate on the first double. And
the second double I was trying to go down and away and the ball ran in,” Papelbon
said in a Providence Journal article.
When a professional athlete is doing something he has been trained to do,
something he has practiced extensively, he does not need to think about it and can
become fully immersed in what he is doing. These two frames of mind can be
categorized into two types of focus: strategy and technique.
23
Papelbon said he was trying to go down and away to Reimold (the second
double), when ESPN’s virtual on-screen strike zone showed all five pitches to be
elevated in the strike zone.
In her book “Choke,” Sian Beilock said, “in pistol shooting, a rifleman
focuses on the target he is trying to hit rather than his trigger finger.”
There is no way to truly know what Papelbon was thinking on the mound
unless someone was to strap him to a chair and wire him up to a lie-detector. But
when looking at physical signs like kicking the dirt or taking extra time between
pitches, it becomes apparent what a pitcher is thinking.
Dr. Nicholas Gallucci, professor of sports psychology at WCSU, believed
Papelbon might have been stuck in technique focus.
“Papelbon might have thought about how he learned to pitch and how to place
a pitch instead of letting his mind go free,” said Gallucci.
Gallucci also connected technique focus to declarative knowledge, which is
the type of knowledge that can be explained or put into steps and procedures. He said
it is counterproductive for athletes to use declarative knowledge when competing.
Strategy focus is a deep level of concentration that requires focus,
concentration and execution. Of course, for professional athletes, the execution is
second nature, given their extensive history playing their sport.
When a pitcher does not consider the things he already knows how to do, like
throwing a ball or locating a pitch, he does not worry if his delivery was smooth, or
24
his release was right. The pitcher thinks about what pitch he should throw and where
it should end up.
The full immersion concept is also known as an out-of-body experience
because afterwards it is hard for people to explain what they felt or were thinking.
This kind of experience is necessary to be a successful closer.
“There is no separation between what they’re doing and what they’re thinking
[in an out-of-body experience],” Gallucci said. “They’re not analyzing, they’re just
doing it.”
25
Brain Processes
The Atlanta Braves’ closer Craig Kimbrel found himself in a situation very
similar to that of Papelbon. On Sept. 5, 2011, the Braves had an eight-and-a-half
game lead in the National League Wild Card race over the St. Louis Cardinals. The
Braves lost 20 of their last 30 games to end the season and found themselves trying to
save their season on the last day, just like the Red Sox.
The Braves’ collapse did not garner much attention compared to the Red Sox.
The Braves were up four runs to three over the Philadelphia Phillies, a team, who like
the Orioles, was not playing for anything. In the top of the ninth inning, in the
Braves’ home stadium Turner Field, Kimbrel had a chance to stop his team’s huge
collapse and send them to the playoffs.
Kimbrel surrendered a single to the first hitter he faced, struck out the next
and walked the next two after that. The bases were loaded and there was only one out.
Kimbrel was experiencing a tell-tale sign of a pitcher who cannot focus: loss of
control. The next batter hit a sacrifice fly out and scored the runner from third, the
game was now tied.
The Braves Manager took Kimbrel out of the game and the reliever ended the
inning. Later, in the top of the 13th inning, Braves pitcher Scott Linebrink surrendered
a run, giving the Phillies a one-run lead, but the Braves had the last at-bat. They could
only muster one base-runner who was quickly erased on a season-ending double play.
After the game Kimbrel said, “Part of being a closer is being able to bottle up
your emotions and harness them.”
26
Despite his inexperience, Kimbrel makes a very good point about what it
takes to be a top closer. Emotions are a dangerous thing for closers, letting the wrong
ones take over can lead to an outing much like the one Kimbrel experienced. But the
second half of his statement is much more telling.
It is not enough to bottle up emotions; a closer has to be able to harness them.
A closer has an emotional job, there are a lot of emotions he must deal with. Anxiety
and doubt are two of the most difficult to handle.
According to Murphy, what occurs in this over-controlling brain process is the
use of conscious control. This means that people are consciously taking control of
something that has been second nature. When Kimbrel started feeling anxious, he
probably used his brain process to try to control his anxiety instead of thinking about
what pitch to throw and where, or visualizing what outcome he wanted.
Heart Rate
Murphy was the first full-time sports psychologists for the U.S Olympic
Committee, he served with them from 1986-1994. During his time there, he and his
team conducted research on the figure skaters.
Skaters wore heart-monitoring equipment while performing their routine.
Murphy found that 60 seconds before they began their performance, their heart rate
would go up to about 200 beats-per-minute. Throughout their performance, they
would maintain this abnormally high level.
27
“I would not doubt that the same thing is happening for a pitcher,” Murphy
said. “Maybe not 200 beats-per-minute, but they’re experiencing a lot of
physiological tension in a really close game.”
Uncontrollable and unpredictable
Another aspect of choking is when something happens that simply cannot be
stopped. Some elements in baseball cannot be predicted or controlled by the players.
For example, many times a hitter will hit a fly ball 400 feet and the outfielder will
catch it for an out. On the other hand, speedy hitters can bunt the ball four feet in
front of home plate and make it safe to first base.
Linebrink was the pitcher on the mound when the Phillies’ Hunter Pence hit
the single in the top of the 13th inning with runners on first and third that eventually
won the game. Linebrink is not a highly-touted closer, he is not even a closer, but he
ended up with the loss and allowing the winning run to score. However, the swing
Pence took on his RBI single is not the kind of swing he will ever try to do again.
The pitch would have been called a ball inside had Pence not swung. It
jammed him as well as an inside pitch could have, but Pence got his bat on the ball.
Pence took such a max-effort swing, he fell to his knee after taking it. Off the bat, it
looked like a weak flare, a pop-up to the infield. Pence got from his kneeled position
and began to run hard, he saw the Braves’ second baseman Dan Uggla sprinting
toward his pop-up.
The Braves’ first baseman, rookie Freddie Freeman, was positioned parallel to
first base. The ball scooted right past Freeman on his right and continued toward
28
right. Uggla, sprinting all the way, finally got to the ball when it was in shallow right
field. By the time he picked the ball up, Pence was safe at first and the runner had
crossed the plate. It was a perfectly placed hit.
In “Choke,” Beilock told a story about U.S gymnast Alicia Sacramone in the
2008 Beijing Olympic Games. Sacramone was ready to start her routine on the beam
during the all-around team finals and the U.S and China were both vying for the gold
medal. Sacramone was held back twice by the judges before she could actually start
he routine. She ended up falling on her initial jump onto the beam and had to start
from the floor. This cost the U.S team insurmountable deductions and prevented them
from winning the gold.
Uncontrollable and unexpected things happen many times in sports, especially
baseball and especially for pitchers. There are countless instances where a hitter hits
the ball three feet from the plate, but beats out the throw to first. There are also
numerous times where a hitter will hit a fly ball 400 feet and it is caught by an
outfielder for the out. In this case, Linebrink made a great pitch, but Pence hit a lucky
jam shot into a spot where no defender could get to it fast enough.
29
The Postseason
Dennis Eckersley is one of baseball’s all-time greatest closers, but he spent
the last 10 years of his 24-year career as one. For the first part of his career, he was a
dominant starter, a power pitcher who racked up strikeouts, but also allowed his fair
share of runs and walks. In the midst of his career that was being threatened by
declining skill and focus due to alcoholism, Eckersley reinvented himself as a closer.
1988 was the first year he spent as a full-time closer. The Oakland Athletics
(commonly known as “the A’s”) were taking a chance on Eckersley who was fresh
out of rehab. In ’88 Eckersley recorded 45 saves in 51 opportunities and surrendering
just 11 walks with 70 strikeouts. He helped the A’s to make the playoffs that year and
in the second round (ALCS), the A’s swept the Red Sox. Eckersley saved all four
games and won the ALCS Most Valuable Player (MVP) award.
In game one of the World Series, facing the Los Angeles Dodgers, Eckersley
surrendered one of the most famous home runs in the history of the postseason. With
two outs in the ninth inning in the Dodgers’ home park, Eckersley walked Mike
Davis to bring the potential winning run to the plate: Kirk Gibson.
The count was three balls and two strikes, a full count, but before the pitch,
Gibson called time. The umpire granted Gibson a timeout and Gibson went over to
the dugout to speak with the Dodgers’ scouts. The scouts told him that Eckersley has
a strong tendency to throw a backdoor slider on full counts. Gibson was a left-handed
hitter, so a backdoor slider would have looked like it would miss outside then dart
inwards and catch the outer part of the strike zone at the last moment. Gibson stepped
30
back in the box ready for what was likely to be the dreaded Eckersley slider. Sure
enough, Eckersley threw it and Gibson deposited the pitch into the right field
bleachers for a walk-off home run giving the Dodgers a one-game-to-none lead in the
series.
Although it was only the first game, the A’s did not come back and Dodgers
won the ’88 World Series. Eckersley, however, did recover.
Game one of the ’88 World Series is one of the most famous, and most
unlikely, instances of a closer choking to lose a game. However, Eckersley laid the
ground work for how to recover from such a devastating loss. Choking has been
known to ruin careers by destroying a closer’s confidence, but not Eckersley.
Eckersley was on the wrong side of an uncontrollable and unpredictable
situation. When Gibson called time with the home plate umpire, Eckersley’s pitching
rhythm was interrupted. Also, Gibson spoke with scouts who have been watching
Eckersley closely and knew what he wanted to throw in that situation. When
Eckersley threw the slider, and Eckersley’s slider is one of the best ever, Gibson was
not expecting to see anything else. By all appearances, Eckersley was able to accept
the fact that he was beat by a scout and hitter who capitalized on Eckersley’s
tendencies. Then Eckersley moved on from that game and had a career-defining 10-
year stretch as a closer.
He went on to record 390 career saves including a historic season in 1992
when he won the regular season MVP and Cy Young award (awarded to the league’s
31
best pitcher), an award seldom won by relievers. That year Eckersley recorded 51
saves, carried a 1.91 ERA and struck out 93 hitters along with just six walks.
Eckersley only had a limited amount of postseason experience, but in the
postseason, he did not fare well compared to his dominant regular season stats. He
had a 3.00 ERA in all his postseason games combined. In three different World
Series, he had an ERA of 5.79 and only recorded one save. Eckersley is not alone
amongst dominant closers who do not fare well in postseason play.
32
What can be done
Hap Davis was the team psychologist for the Canadian national swim team
and he had an idea to help prevent the swimmers from failing. His strategy was to
make the swimmers watch a tape of their failed races.
Beilock described the system that Davis put in place in her book “Choke.”
First he would have the swimmer watch a tape of his failed race, then he would talk
with Davis and would express feelings about the tape, verbalize what he could do
better and imagine the same race with a better outcome. After the “intervention,” as it
was called, the swimmer would watch the tape again.
“When the swimmers initially watched their own poor performance before the
intervention, they showed more activity in in several emotional centers in the brain,”
Beilock wrote.
Most of the activity in their brain came from the prefrontal cortex, which is
often at the center of most chokes. The prefrontal cortex controls the orchestration of
actions and thoughts in accordance with internal goals. When a pitcher is exercising
conscious control, he is using his prefrontal cortex heavily.
“When the swimmers watched their failed races again after the intervention,
they had less emotion-related brain activity and more activity in important motor
regions of the brain,” Beilock wrote.
This means that something occurs in the intervention phase that gets athletes
to think differently about how they perceive failure. Dr. Gallucci had a similar
method to help athletes recover from choking.
33
“I would have a frank discussion to see what is on his mind, what he thinks of
himself, what goes through his mind and why he doesn’t perform well under
pressure,” Gallucci said.
Murphy said that after a pitcher would choke, he would talk to the pitcher.
“Right after the game, I’d probably leave him alone,” Murphy said.
Next time they worked together, they would come up with strategies to help
the pitcher relax in game situations. Strategies would also include getting pitchers to
focus on the right things, like the catcher’s mitt.
“That’s all you need to think about, once you’ve chosen your pitch, you just
need to relax and throw the pitch,” Murphy said. “From that point on, thinking too
much is probably a detriment.”
In each instance, the solution is reached through a one-on-one discussion. In
each instance, the athlete has to verbalize what he believes he did wrong and how he
thinks he can medicate it. To do this, the athlete must use his prefrontal cortex, the
part of the brain that orchestrates actions and thoughts in accordance with internal
goals. The part of the brain that is over-used when an athlete chokes is the same part
of the brain an athlete must use to get over that choke.
The prefrontal cortex is the root of all problems when a closer chokes. It is
also responsible for expressing people’s personality. The way Rodriguez pounds his
chest, or when Papelbon dances his Irish jig, or the way Rivera stays calm and
collected, are all functions of the prefrontal cortex.
34
There are many ways to medicate a choke and many have been proven to
work. Perhaps no single one is better than the other, but choking is part of the game
and always will be.
35
Works Cited
Murphy, Shane. Personal Interview. 15 March 2012 Gallucci, Nicholas. Personal Interview. 14 March 2012 Beilock, Sian. "Fixing the Cracks in Sports and Other Fields." Choke: What the
Secrets of the Brain Reveal about Getting It Right When You Have to. New York: Free, 2010. 207-32. Print.
1714sandstorm. "Baltimore Stuns Boston in the 9th - 2011 -." YouTube. YouTube, 28 Sept. 2011. Web. 17 Apr. 2012. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Dj18SEuSvCw>.
"Braves Complete Epic Collapse, Miss Playoffs." Â | Ajc.com. Web. 17 Apr. 2012. <http://www.ajc.com/sports/atlanta-braves/braves-complete-epic-collapse-1191030.html>.
"Craig Kimbrel Notches 41st Save, Sets MLB Rookie record." Craig Kimbrel Notches 41st Save, Sets MLB Rookie Record. Web. 17 Apr. 2012. <http://hardballtalk.nbcsports.com/2011/08/31/craig-kimbrel-notches-41st-save-sets-mlb-rookie-record/>.
Ejflex. "The 2011 Boston Red Sox EPIC September Collapse (Watch It Unfold in Chronological Order)." YouTube. YouTube, 29 Sept. 2011. Web. 17 Apr. 2012. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sPNpJX8b-bc>.
"How Mariano Rivera Dominates Hitters." The New York Times. The New York Times, 29 June 2010. Web. 17 Apr. 2012. <http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2010/06/29/magazine/rivera-pitches.html>.
Lehrer, Jonah. "How Science Can save You from Choking." The Guardian. Guardian News and Media, 25 July 2009. Web. 17 Apr. 2012. <http://www.guardian.co.uk/sport/2009/jul/26/sports-psychology-choking>.
"Mariano Rivera, New York Yankees Won't Forget 2004 Collapse." New York Daily News. Web. 17 Apr. 2012. <http://articles.nydailynews.com/2009-10-22/sports/17935784_1_hideki-matsui-alcs-cc-sabathia>.
"Multiple Sports." Bleacher Report. Web. 17 Apr. 2012. <http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1063192-most-unlikely-chokes-in-sports-history/page/4>.
NatsTown2K10. "Jonathan Papelbon Blown Save Against Orioles." YouTube. YouTube, 29 Sept. 2011. Web. 17 Apr. 2012. <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Jc3GinrTEqE>.
"The Numbers." Papelbon Reflects on Blown Save, Season | Red Sox Blog. 17 Apr. 2012. Web. 17 Apr. 2012. <http://blogs.providencejournal.com/sports/red-sox/2011/09/papelbon-reflec.html>.
"Overcoming Performance Anxiety with Sports Psychology." About.com Sports Medicine. Web. 17 Apr. 2012. <http://sportsmedicine.about.com/cs/sport_psych/a/aa010603a.htm>.
36
"Psychology of Loss." ESPN. Ed. Gordon Edes. ESPN Internet Ventures. Web. 17 Apr. 2012. <http://espn.go.com/blog/boston/red-sox/post/_/id/14769/phsychology-of-loss-for-fans-players>.
"September Collapse of Red Sox Could Be Worst Ever." FiveThirtyEight. Web. 17 Apr. 2012. <http://fivethirtyeight.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/09/27/september-collapse-of-red-sox-could-be-worst-ever/>.
"SI.com - MLB - Red Sox Stun Yankees 10-3 to Reach World Series - Thursday October 21, 2004 1:39AM." Breaking News, Real-time Scores and Daily Analysis from Sports Illustrated – SI.com. Web. 17 Apr. 2012. <http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2004/baseball/mlb/specials/postseason/2004/10/21/bc.bba.alcs.ap/index.html>.
Syed, Matthew. "The Psychology of Choking." BBC News. BBC. Web. 17 Apr. 2012. <http://www.bbc.co.uk/sport/0/13185266>.
"Video: Boston Sportswriter Jinxes Red Sox Season - Big League Stew - MLBÂ Blog - Yahoo! Sports." Yahoo! Sports. Web. 17 Apr. 2012. <http://sports.yahoo.com/mlb/blog/big_league_stew/post/video-boston-sportswriter-jinxes-red-sox-season?urn=mlb,wp21403>.