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The Lessons of Catastrophic Disasters forHumanitarian Logistics
The Lessons of Catastrophic Disasters forHumanitarian Logistics
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José Holguín-Veras, William H. Hart Professor,
Director of the Center for Infrastructure, Transportation, and the Environment; and the VREF Center of Excellence for
Sustainable Urban Freight SystemsRensselaer Polytechnic Institute
What do we do?
Post-Disaster Humanitarian LogisticsField work to identify lessons (Katrina, Joplin, Haiti, Japan…)Translate these lessons into public sector policyDevelop decision support systems to expedite the response
An apology in advance…Delicate subject matterIt is not my intention to offend or hurt feelings…I apologize if I do…
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Our goal is to avert this… 3
“We need medicines, something to eat …”
“We are asking for food, water, medicine, shelter and clothing. Aren’t we humans?” (Pictures taken by JHV 10 days after the earthquake)
Major components of our work
Fieldwork: 9/11, Katrina, Indian Ocean, Haiti, Chile, Joplin, Japan, etc. etc.
Diagnosis and characterization:Causes of problems encounteredHow humanitarian logistics take placeQuantification:
Aimed at obtaining empirical estimatesProvide support to analytical modeling
Define mechanisms to improve responsePolicy Suggestions FEMA, Catastrophic Planning Groups
Basic research on analytical modelingTo develop Decision Support Tools
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Our approach to the Hum-Log challenge 5
MOB
MOBMobilization centers (MOB)
SA
Federal and State Staging Areas (SA)
PODs
Points of distribu-tion (PODs)Impacted area
LCLarge flows
Logistic centers (LC)
How to relax operational constraints
Lesson #1: Humanitarian Logistics is More Than a Technical Problem…
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We are Dealing with a Socio-Technical System… 7
A social network of individuals orchestrate operations
The set technical activities performedby the social network
The supporting systems (e.g., transportation, communication) over which social and
technical interactions take place
Resiliency and Disaster Response depends on and involves
the HUMAN, the TECHNICAL, and the PHYSICAL
Lesson #2: Disaster and Catastrophes
Are Not the Same…
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Disaster: Joplin, Missouri (50,000 residents) 9
Disaster: Joplin, Missouri (160 deaths) 10
Challenging but doable local distribution
Multiple entry points
Private sector supply chains: partially destroyed
Local supplies: partially destroyed
Small to midsize geographic area
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Catastrophe: Minami Sanriku (19,170 residents)11
Catastrophe: Minami Sanriku (1,205 fatalities) 12
Most local supplies are destroyed
Few entry points
Private sector supply chains severely impacted
Extremely complex local distribution
Could be an extremely large geographic area
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Impacts of Disasters/Catastrophes on HLCharacteristic Disaster CatastropheLocal supplies (households, stores)
Only partially destroyedMostly destroyed (3/4 DCs in PaP; all in
disaster area, 6/69 & 3/43 DCs in Tohoku)
Private sector supply chains
Impacted though functionalSevered (Haiti, Japan: 2+ weeks to restart, Ishinomaki: 87/150 truck comp.destroyed)
Demand for supplies IncreasesHuge increases on account of number of
people and businesses impacted
Convergence of low/non-priority cargo
Major problemHuge problem (50-70% of total cargo
entering the area)
Geographic area covered; entry points
Small to midsize; typically many entry points
Could be extremely large; typically few entry points
Complexity of the local distribution
Challenging though doableExtremely complex due to extent of infrastructure impacts, area impacted
Precautionary/ opportunistic buying
If any, it is localCould be significant (a food distributor in Japan reported doubling of base demand)
Net resultLocals are key in initial days, outside help
brings additional suppliesOutside help is the primary source of
supplies; complex distribution required
Implications
Need to specifically account for the unique needs generated by catastrophic eventsThe locals will not be able to provide a meaningful first wave
of resourcesPrepositioning required for catastrophic events
Modern supply chains do not have large inventoriesLocal inventories of supplies are likely to be destroyed
Help from the outside of the impacted area is neededPrivate sector supply chains are likely to be severely
impacted or destroyedOnly outside help could muster the resources needed
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Lesson #3:Commercial Logistics are DIFFERENT THAN
Post-Disaster Humanitarian Logistics
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Two different environments 16
Characte-ristic
Commercial LogisticsRegular Humanitarian
LogisticsPost-Disaster
Humanitarian Logistics
Objective pursued
Minimization of private (logistic) costs
Minimization of social costs (logistic+deprivation)
Minimization of social costs (logistic+deprivation)
Origination of cargo flows
Self-contained Mostly self-containedImpacted by material convergence
Knowledge of demand
Known with some certainty
UncertainUnknown/dynamic, lack of information/access to site
Decision ma-king structure
Structured interactions controlled by few DMs
Structured interactions controlled by few DMs
Non-structured interac-tions, thousands of DMs
Periodicity / volume
Repetitive, relative steady flows, "large" volumes
Repetitive, relative steady flows, "large" volumes
One in a lifetime events, large pulse in demand
Supporting systems
Stable and functionalStable, though not always functional
Impacted and dynamically changing
Wide Spectrum of Operations
Our main focus (emphasis on catastrophes)
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Lesson #4: We Need to Deal with
Material Convergence…
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Components of the flows (PAHO, 2001):
Urgent or high priority (HP): items required for immediate distribution and consumption
Non-urgent or low priority (LP): not immediately required but might prove useful at a later stage must be classified, labeled and stored until needed
Non-priority (NP): goods that:are inappropriate for the event, time, contextarrive unsorted or in a condition impossible to efficiently
inventory and difficult to identify in a timely mannerhave surpassed expiration dates, are perishable, or are in
poor/damaged conditionarrive without an appropriate site for distributionneed to be discarded, incinerated, buried or disposed
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What is the problem?
The efficiency of the flow of high-priority goods depend on the flow of low/non priority cargoes
The cargo that arrive to a disaster site (estimates):60% are non-priority, 30-35% are low priority, 5-10% are high priority
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Non-Priority
Low-Priority
High-Priority
It happens in all disasters 20
Katrina, 2005
Haiti, 2010Japan, 2010
Japan, 2010
Sandy, 2012
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Implications
We need to proactively deal with LP/NP convergenceThe huge volumes of NP-MC produces major impact
at entry points, and at the disaster siteImpacts at entry points
Increased congestion due the vehicular trafficIncreased delays due to lack of proper documentation
(bill of lading, manifest, consignees)If not controlled they impact the disaster site
Impacts at disaster siteOnly a fraction of the massive volumes of cargo are
actually needed at the disaster siteMore often than not, the incoming trucks dump
the cargo anywhere they can
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Lesson #5-A: In Catastrophic Events the Local Distribution Is
an Overwhelming Challenge…
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Resources (staff-hours) consumed 23
Loading: 10 staff-hours (forklifts)Driving: 12 staff-hours Total: 22 staff hours
Semi-trailer (driver and helper) moving 30 tonnes: Santo Domingo-Port-au-Prince (six hours drive)
Relative manpower used 1:12:60
Loading: 240 staff-hours Rations: 1,080 staff-hoursTotal: 1,320 staff hours
Helpers split rations, organize distribution, handout rations
PODs
Loading: 240 staff-hours (helpers)Driving: 36 staff-hours Total: 276 staff hours
Six 5 tonne trucks (driver and helper) transport to six PODs (1.5 hours each way)
Staging area
Our estimates are that in Haiti, about 20,000 volunteers were needed to distribute supplies
Lesson #5-B:Only the Local Social Networks Can Tackle the Local Distribution Challenge (Haiti’s Lesson)
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Major damage to critical infrastructure 25
Why did this happen? 26
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The Cause of the Problems Seen in TV… 27
The earthquake severely disrupted the centers of power (Government, United Nations, Catholic Church) removing the natural interlocutors of foreign (outside) aid groups
Entry points
Local physical / social distribution network
Physical and social links with local distribution networks were severely disrupted
The crisis could have been avoided if the local business class would have helped the foreign aid groups
(could not find evidence suggest that they helped much)
Aid from rest of Haiti / Dominican Republic
through small groups flowed well,
Why??
Aid flowing to Port au Prince faced huge
distribution bottlenecks
Emergent Humanitarian Logistic Structures
Three structures emerged with vastly different network topologies: Agency Centric Efforts, Partially Integrated Efforts, and Collaborative Aid Networks
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a) Agency Centric Efforts(ACEs)
b) Partially Integrated Efforts
(PIEs)
Impacted area
c) Collaborative Aid Networks
(CANs)
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ACEs in action 29
CANs in action: Servicio Social de Iglesias 30
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Implication
After large catastrophic events, the most efficient way to distribute critical supplies at the local level is through the use of the existing social networksExtending the mission of these networks is easier than
creating a network from scratchOutside efforts are doomed to be ineffective for distribution:
They are not geared for that, their strength is long-haulToo many PODs are needed: cars are not an option,
people cannot walk several miles to get suppliesNot enough man-power to man the PODs neededNot enough local know-how
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Lesson #6:The Importance of Private Sector Integration
(The Chief Lesson from the Tohoku Response)
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Initial actions
Earthquake Monitoring System collect data (200 seismographs, 4,200 intensity meters)
Early Warning System informs people, agencies Tsunami Monitoring System gets into actionWarning issued: 6-7 m tsunamiFalse alarms on Feb 22nd
and March 9th led peopleto ignore this one…
People at risk evacuated, disaster response agencies set to work
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MLITT’s Command Center: 1,800 CCTV cameras34
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Impacts of the tsunami: Critical Infrastructure
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Most of the critical infrastructure survived
Sendai Port:Protected by two sets of breakwaters including a massive
deep water tsunami breakwater 3 km from the port Back in operation a week later for emergency traffic, and to
domestic commercial traffic 18 days later
Sendai Airport:Located about one km from the coast behind a 4 m seawallBack in operation six days after
Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Plants:Located on top of a 6 m bluff, protected by tiny breakwaterFlooding of the generators led to the nuclear crisis
Cities and towns protected by seawalls (designed below historical records)
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Sendai port 37
Minamisanriku 38
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Minamisanriku’s hospital…a critical facility 39
Water level
Contrasting performances…
The access restoration process (e.g., opening of roads, minor/midsize repairs) was a huge successFor instance, 11 out the 13 East-West arterials leading to
the impacted areas were opened within 24 hours
The post-disaster humanitarian logistic effort was deficient…
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Post-disaster humanitarian logistic operations
Inauspicious start, no agency was preparedDuring first 6 days, a very limited amount of critical
supplies reached IDPs (some did not get any)There was looting…not reported in the pressThe needs were not being met…a crisis underwayThen, a handful of food distribution companies:Realized that private supply chains were not working, and
that the government was not aware of the looming crisisApproached the (surprised) government and volunteered to
deliver supplies, it took them a week to start deliveries (others were turned away because of the fuel issue)
Volunteered for a month, fell trapped (government did not want to pay, they could not stop the service)
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Contrasting performances 42
Factor:Access restoration (road
openings, etc.)Post-disaster humanitarian
logisticsNature of the task in disasters vs catastrophes
Similar nature, more of the same in catastrophes
Very different
Public sector's level of technical familiarity
High Low/non
Jurisdiction of public agency Regional Local (prefectures or cities)
Private sector's level of technical familiarity
HighHigh with commercial, only
basic idea of PD-HL
Nature of agreements with private sector
Specific Vague
Public sector's ability to integrate/coordinate help
High Low/non
Linkages to potential sources of help
Many and strong (with construction companies)
Few and weak (with logistic companies)
Need for supporting social networks
None High
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Implications
Private sector participation is crucialFor this participation to be effective, certain conditions
must be met:Both sides, public and private, must know each otherPublic sector must plan for private sector helpPrivate sector must have a clear idea what is expected…among others…
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Lesson #7: Try to Deal with the Dynamic Nature of
Supply and Demand
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Temporal distribution of Requests (Katrina)
The temporal distribution of requests for the months of August, September and October
The number of requests doubled and almost tripled during the second and the third day of the emergency
First eighteen days 80% of the requests
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Days
Num
ber
of r
eque
sts
60544842363024181261
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40
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Lesson #8: Control Precautionary/Opportunistic
Buying
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In anticipation of shortages, households and businesses purchase almost ALL critical supplies in the market
After a large disaster… 47
Local supplies destroyed, no supplies/services to purchase, no money to pay for them…
The tragedy is that these supplies are the one best positioned to help the survivors…
Lesson #9: Prevent the Collapse of Private Sector
Supply Chains
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Amount of Cargo/Person Consumed in Cities
In normal conditions the amount of cargo entering a city ranges from 10 to 45 kg/person-dayUsed for human consumptionTo support manufacturing and commerce
In disasters:About 20 kg/person-day are needed by survivorsAbout 40-60 kg/person-day are needed by the response
After a large disaster supply chains stop, or slowdown, reducing the flow of cargo to areas near the disaster that were not directly impactedThe humanitarian crisis is made significantly worseIn both Haiti and Japan, took two weeks for normal
deliveries to resume…
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Lesson #10:Comprehensive Approaches Are Needed to
Ensure Efficient Logistical Responses
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Recommendations
Create a logistic committee to integrate civic societyControl material convergence Control precautionary/ opportunistic buyingDesign scalable response plansPreposition critical supplies and equipmentDevelop supporting technologies and systems
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Logistic committee
Create logistic committees with representatives of all sectors of civic society:Social networksDistributors of critical suppliesTrucking companies with local and regional reachLocal social networks, etc.Pre-designate locations as Points of DistributionCompanies that handle critical supplies, trucking companiesTrain potential participants in post-disaster HL
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Material convergence
Non-priority supplies:Use educational campaigns and the media to dampen the
flow at the sourceExercise physical access control to prevent them from
reaching the site, send them to processing centers
Low-priority supplies:Send them to storage at off-site locations
High-priority supplies:Expedite them
Encourage monetary donations
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Control precautionary/opportunistic behavior
Develop agreements with private sector providers to requisition critical supplies after catastrophic events
Ration critical supplies in the vicinity of impacted areaEducate the public about the negative impacts of
hoarding
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Pre-position critical supplies
The assumptions of the National Response Plan work well for disasters, not for catastrophic events
To respond to catastrophic events, pre-position of supplies is a MUST
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Design of response plans
Must:Be based on scalable responses
Will work in a wide range of eventsNo need to design for WORST scenario
Ensure easy integration of outside help
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Develop new technologies
Key priorities:Robust communication systems for responders, including
key members of the civic societyRemote Sensing systems to assess needs and define
priorities
A Final Lesson about Risk Communication:A story of survival that started
“…a thousand years ago…”
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Which hill would you run to escape the tsunami?57
Acknowledgments
Key contributors: M. Jaller, F. Aros-Veras, J. Amaya, L. van Wassenhove, T. Wachtendorf, N. Pérez, L. Destro, E. Taniguchi, F. Pedrozo…
Research supported by NSF: SGER CMMI-0554949: “Characterization of the Supply Chains in the Aftermath of
an Extreme Event: The Gulf Coast Experience” RAPID CMMI-1034635 “Investigation on the Comparative Performance of
Alternative Humanitarian Logistic Structures” CMMI-0624083 “Contending with Materiel Convergence: Optimal Control,
Coordination, and Delivery of Critical Supplies to the Site of Extreme Events” RAPID CMMI-1138621 “Field Investigation on Post-Disaster Humanitarian
Logistic Practices under Cascading Disasters and a Persistent Threat: The Tohoku Earthquake Disasters”
Japan Science and Technology Agency’s project (J-RAPID) “Collaborative Research on Humanitarian Logistics in Great East Japan Earthquake Disasters.
IIS-1124827 “Cyber Enabled Discovery System for Advanced Multidisciplinary Study of Humanitarian Logistics for Disaster Response”
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Thanks!
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José Holguín-Veras, William H. Hart Professor
Director of the Center for Infrastructure, Transportation, and the Environment