The Limits of Humanitarian

Intervention from the Air: Bosnia

Contents

• Historical Background

(i) Pre-Bosnian War(ii) Bosnian War

• Failures of the International Community

• Threshold Conditions

• Non-Threshold Conditions

• Bosnia Today

Background to the Bosnian War

• Social Federal Republic of Yugoslavia - 6 republics.

• Bosnia: Muslims 44 percent, Serbs 31 percent, Croats 18 percent, remainder mixed.

• Federation held together by Tito till his death in 1980.

Key Tipping Points

• Election of Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia

Milosevic and his idea of a Greater Serbia.

Taking over control of Serbia, Montenegro, Kosovo and Vojvodina.

Key Tipping Points

• Rise of Nationalism in other Republics.

Election of nationalist Franjo Tudjman in Croatia.

Collapse of the Yugoslav Communist Party.

Slovenia and Croatia declared independence in mid 1991.

Key Tipping Points

• Serbia-Croatia war

Serbian Autonomous Region of Krajina.

Arms embargo (Resolution 713) imposed in the hope of preventing Croatian conflict from widening.

Key Tipping Points

• Breakdown of relations in Bosnia

Bosnian Serbs left assembly in late 1991, which later voted for sovereignty, declaring their own republic.

Referendum of Feb 29 and Mar 1 1992.

Start of violence.

Bosnian War: 1992-1995• A lesson in preventive deployment of

a sufficient amount of force (less costly)

• Combatants:Serbs: Army of Republika

Srpska Croats: Croatian Defense

Council Bosniaks: Army of Republic of

Bosnia and Herzegovina Various paramilitaries & the UN

(airstrikes)• Dayton and the belief in the efficacy

of the air campaign ~ the Kosovo debacle

•

minimum number of persons killed in the Bosnian war, by ethnicity, status as of mid-2003

Action by the international community

• UNHCR• Extension of UNPROFOR mandate • Peace plans (4)

Means of intervention: Humanitarian aid for besieged towns and cities, armed escorts for humanitarian aid convoys & air campaign

Key tipping pointsUN resolutions• Resolution 770 (13 Aug 1992)Provision of armed escorts for aid convoys“use all necessary means” to deliver humanitarian aid• Resolution 819 (16 Apr 1993)Application of “safe areas policy”Declaration of Srebrenica as safe zone• Resolution 824 (May 1993)Additions to list of safe areas

Incidents• Discovery of Serb detention centre for

Muslim prisoners by media outlets (Aug 1992)

Image of the Western governments at stake

• BS attacks on Srebrenica (1993)Heavy shelling & heavy civilian

casualtiesRefusal of access to aid convoys• Collapse of ceasefire (May 1993)• Sarajevo (Aug 1995)BS attack that killed 37 → intensification

of air campaign • Srebrenica

• Resolution 836 (4 June 1993)Authorization of the use of air support

1. Extension of UNPROFOR’s mandate “to deter attacks against safe areas”

2. Empowerment of UNPROFOR “acting in self-defence, to take necessary measures, including the use of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas… armed incursion”PROBLEM: interpretation of this resolution

Incidents• Sarajevo (Aug 1995)BS attack that killed 37 → intensification

of air campaign • Operation Deliberate ForceAir campaign stemming from 3

massacres (e.g. 7141 Muslim males in Srebrenica)

• Operation StormShift in BOP on the ground

Peace plans• Vance Owen plan (Jan 1993) –

stimulation of ethnic cleansing1.Partitioning of Bosnia (10 semi-

autonomous regions), awarding of territories to the groups in control of each area at that point in time

2.Broke Muslim-Croat alliance & renewed competition over the territories

3.Weakened military resistance to the Serbs

E.g. area between Vitez and Kiseljak

Failures of the international community

• Misinterpretation of the nature of the conflict.

Mary Kaldor: defining character of the war was that the violence 'was directed not against opposing sides, but against civilian populations'

1. Justification for the refusal to commit since outsiders could do little

2. Lack of protection for the Serb civilians targeted by the Bosniaks and Croats

• Western recognition of the sovereignty of Bosnia encouraged Bosniaks to push for independence

• Lack of commitment and in turn, decisive action or troop numbers required for the efficacy of the intervention

• Use of an air campaignMandate Authorized strength

Deployment as of Mar 1994

Shortfall

Reopen Sarajevo airport and protect humanitarian convoys

10,110 9,071 1,039

Protect safe areas 7,600 5,000 2,600

Total 17,710 14,071 3,639

• Lack of viability of the safe areas 1. safe areas turned into permanent

refugee camps, contrary to the Vance Owen plan

e.g. the '93 'open jail' of Srebrenica & '95 massacre 2.boxing up of the largest ethnic group

into the smallest area

What could've been done

• Lifting of the arms embargo from the start

Fear of escalation from 'leveling the killing field'

• UN trusteeshipBUT huge financial assistance and personnel to rebuild industries and the political and legal system• 1992: international protectorateBUT necessity of long term policing role which ultimately was realized with the IFOR and SFOR postwar

Humanitarian intervention?Thresholds Fulfilled?Supreme humanitarian emergency

○

Last resort ○

Proportionality ∆

Positive humanitarian outcome

○/∆

Humanitarian motives ○/∆Humanitarian justifications ○

Legality ○

Selectivity ○

THRESHOLD CONDITIONS

Supreme humanitarian emergency?

• Ethnic cleansing • Arms embargo → Muslims & Croats

defenceless & could not be relied upon to end violations

• Refugees and casualtiesBy fall of 1992, almost 2 million refugees (approx half of Bosnia`s population)

By 1994, est 150,000 killed, 150,000 wounded.

Last resort?• Measures already taken:

Sanctions that called for U.N. members to freeze Serbian assets abroad etc

Undermined by deliveries of supplies which came overland from Greece and up the Danube from Russia & Ukraine.

Arms Embargo

Proportionality? UNHCR UNPROFOR

Cost $697 million $1.7 billion

Staff in former Yugoslavia

678 30, 000 (from 34 nations)

Staff in Bosnia 263 14, 000 (from 14 nations)

Fatalities in the former Yugoslavia

11 79 (34 from hostile action)

• One of the largest UN operations at that time.

• Slowed down war machine• Failure to protect safe areas and

emboldened Muslim and Croat militias

Proportionality

• Benjamin Valentino.

• No `low-cost` intervention.

• Evaluating intervention in terms of dollars per life saved?

Positive humanitarian outcome?

• Prevented starvation.

• Did airstrikes contribute towards the Dayton accords?

• Misunderstanding of conflict leading to unrealistic expectations of humanitarian outcomes e.g. failure to protect Serbs as well.

NON THRESHOLD CONDITIONS

Humanitarian motives?Various purposes of the intervention:Recognition of Bosnia --> Internationalisation of the problem would deter Serbian interferenceTo ensure the safety of the humanitarian aid convoys & safeguard the safe areasMaintain the image of the Western governments involved (instrumental prudential concerns)

Issue of misinformation:Safe areas identified solely for Muslims

Humanitarian justifications?

UN resolutions

Legality?

Security Council authorization

Selectivity?

Intervention as part of a larger regional commitment to stabilise the former Yugoslav republic

Humanitarian intervention?Thresholds Fulfilled?

Supreme humanitarian emergency

○

Last resort ○

Proportionality ∆

Positive humanitarian outcome

○/∆

Humanitarian motives ○/∆

Humanitarian justifications ○

Legality ○

Selectivity ○

Bosnia Today

• Under Dayton Accords, Bosnia structured as confederation comprising of 2 entities, autonomous Serb Republic and a Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Bosnia Today

• Return of refugees. Approx half of wartime refugees considered to have returned. BUT........

• Improved climate security and diminishing presence of peacekeeping forces.

• Gradual coordination of the 2 entities of Bosnia.