Political Behavior, Vol. 23, No. 4, December 2001 ( 2002)

THE LIMITS OF MOBILIZATION: TurnoutEvidence from State House Primaries

David Niven

Many analysts have lamented the decline of political mobilization efforts. They suggestthat the cause of worsening voter turnout may be traceable to the failure of politicalcandidates and political parties to target and activate nonvoters. This research ex-plores the effects of face-to-face mobilization efforts in a sample of September 5, 2000,Florida state house primary races. Controlling for their voting history, the face-to-facemobilization effort did increase turnout by about 8% among those contacted. How-ever, the effects were weakest among those who voted least regularly. The resultssuggest that implementing more face-to-face mobilization efforts would increase turn-out—mostly by encouraging occasional voters to go to the polls. However, those samemobilization efforts would not substantially affect the turnout of chronic nonvoters.

Key words: voter turnout; mobilization; state legislative elections; primaries.

U.S. presidential elections now routinely draw only half of the electorate tothe polls on election day. Perhaps even more startling, elections without thepresidency at stake attract voters at a rate ranging from less than 40% whenCongress is at the top of the ballot to under 20% for municipal or primaryelections.1 Overall, the United States ranks near the bottom in turnout amongall industrialized democracies (Teixeira, 1992).A significant number of analysts point to mobilization of voters as the most

promising means of addressing low levels of voter turnout. This study exam-ines the effect of face-to-face mobilization efforts undertaken in a sample ofSeptember 5, 2000, Florida state house primary races. I explore the relativeeffects of those mobilization efforts on the turnout of regular voters versusthose who vote infrequently.

David Niven, Department of Political Science, Florida Atlantic University, P. O. Box 3091,Boca Raton, FL 33431 (dniven@fau.edu).

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0190-9320/01/1200-0335/0 2002 Plenum Publishing Corporation

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WHO VOTES, WHO STAYS HOME?

Surveys on political behavior have produced a great deal of evidence dem-onstrating the link between voter turnout and socioeconomic status [SES](Brody, 1978; Campbell, 1966; Conway, 2000; Kleppner, 1982; Rosenstoneand Wolfinger, 1978; Verba and Nie, 1972; Wolfinger and Rosenstone, 1980).Researchers find that there are a number of factors that foster the link be-tween SES and voting, including higher SES being associated with havingmore free time, more interest in politics, a greater ability to deal with complexinformation, a greater sense of civic duty, and a more developed sense ofpolitical efficacy. In short, studies suggest that those with higher educationand income find the process of voting easier to engage in and more rewarding.Moreover, even as the well educated and wealthy are more likely to vote ingeneral, they are particularly more likely to vote in high information cost (i.e.,down ballot) elections (Schaffner and Streb, 2000).Despite the power of the SES explanation, scholars have been left to puzzle

over the continuing incongruent pattern in turnout that has emerged and wid-ened in recent decades. That is, even as education levels have improved na-tionwide, turnout has continued to fall.Thus, a number of studies explore the turnout equation by turning toward

the political system for explanations. For example, restrictive rules that madeit difficult for people to register to vote or to obtain an absentee ballot werethought by many to be significant hurdles that were lowering turnout. None-theless, even as these restrictive rules have generally been liberalized in thelast two decades, turnout has continued to fall. To wit, Brians and Grofman(2001) find that allowing election day registration has only a modest effect onturnout. Karp and Banducci (2001) find that making it easier to obtain absen-tee ballots does not significantly improve turnout, while Oliver (1996) con-cludes that making absentee voting easier increases turnout only when politi-cal parties actively attempt to encourage their supporters to apply for them.Piven and Cloward (2000) note with resignation that loosening the rules ofvoting has not had the great effect that they hoped for and that the task thatlies ahead to improve turnout is clearly mobilization.

MOBILIZATION EFFECT

Analysts looking at turnout from contemporary and historical perspectivesfind evidence to suggest the promise of mobilization efforts (Avey, 1989;Kleppner, 1982; Kornbluh, 2000; Teixeira, 1987; Winders, 1999). In fact, Aveyconcludes that “the major reason for low turnout today is lack of mobilization”(p. 123). Winders worries that mobilization is not a priority, however, becauseour modern political parties have no incentive to raise turnout. In other words,

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higher turnout only serves to make the job of campaign advertising and mar-keting to win a majority that much more expensive.Studies, primarily based on post election surveys, do support the claim that

mobilization efforts increase turnout (Banducci and Karp, 2001; Blydenburgh,1971; Cain and McCue, 1985; Caldeira, Clausen, and Patterson, 1990; Huck-feldt and Sprague, 1992; Kramer, 1970; Lupfer and Price, 1972; Price andLupfer, 1973; Rosenstone and Hansen, 1993; Wielhouwer and Lockerbie,1994). Concerns about much of this analysis have been raised by Green andGerber (2000a, 2000b), however, due to the likelihood of a spurious connec-tion behind the survey results. If parties and candidates target their messagesto those likely to vote, and survey analyses find that those who have beencontacted indeed vote more often, we may be crediting the contact with thedecision to vote when in reality it was the regularity of voting that attractedthe contact.Field work can ameliorate that particular concern by choosing subjects from

beyond the pool of likely voters. A notable recent look at face-to-face mobili-zation efforts by Green and Gerber (2000b) randomly targeted thousands ofNew Haven, Connecticut, residents to encourage them to cast a vote in theNovember 1998 midterm election. Green and Gerber found that their face-to-face mobilization efforts increased turnout about 9% among targeted indi-viduals. Since their targets were randomly chosen, there can be no fear thatturnout was the cause, rather than the effect, of mobilization. Other scholars,examining down ballot elections, have found face-to-face mobilization effectsof 20% or more (Eldersveld, 1956; Miller, Bositis, and Baer, 1981).2

Even as studies find a face to face mobilization effect, it has yet to bedemonstrated as a universal effect. That is, turnout may rise overall in re-sponse to mobilization, but we do not know the degree to which it rises amongthose least likely to vote. Indeed, while Avey (1989) posits that we mighteliminate the SES/turnout connection with the proper mobilization effort, wehave not yet established the effects of mobilization on the low-education, low-income American who is otherwise most underrepresented in the votingbooth.In fact, Doppelt and Shearer’s (1999) interviews of nonvoters paint a pic-

ture of near intractable commitment to non-voting among many Americans.They find a combination of “alienation and complacency” among nonvoters,fueling a feeling of “futility and indifference” toward politics and voting (p.220). Typically, the nonvoters they studied were not awaiting further informa-tion or encouragement to spark their interest in voting, but instead, wereconsistently unmoved by the prospect of political activity (see also Wells,2001).Realistic enthusiasm for the mobilization solution that some analysts advo-

cate hinges on the question of whether the effect actually exists among those

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who are otherwise unlikely to vote. Are the nonvoters Doppelt and Shearer(1999) studied capable of being reached? Or, are the mobilization effects thathave been demonstrated largely, or perhaps entirely, dependent on improvingthe turnout of people who regularly vote?

WHO CAN BE MOBILIZED?

Jackson (1993) writes of the potential behavior influencing effects of anypolitical campaign contact as a conditional process. The effectiveness of acampaign’s efforts are by no means constant across voters, as the capacity toinfluence voters is in large measure dependent on their receptivity to politicalmessages. Thus, the success of any effort to mobilize voters will likely varybetween voters.Psychological research on persuasive messages suggests two main factors

that should shape the effects of politically mobilizing contact. First, the acces-sibility of the message, the ease with which it comes to mind, affects theinfluence of the message (for example, Sengupta and Fitzsimons, 2000).Second, the capacity to understand the message (Eagly, 1974), the willing-ness of the targets to think about the message (Fabrigar, Priester, Petty, andWegener, 1998), and targets seeing themselves as personally affected by themessage (Petty, Ostrom, and Brock, 1981) affect the accessibility of theappeal.Thus, psychological studies imply that the mobilization effect will be limited

among those who are completely disengaged from politics because the contactwill be quickly forgotten or ignored. Meanwhile, those who already vote regu-larly will not likely find mobilizing contact particularly relevant since theyalready value voting. It is with those in the middle, however, who are neitherfully disengaged from politics nor fully committed to it, where the potentiallies for mobilizing contact to be accessible and influential.Indeed, two studies of “vote by mail” elections in Oregon find it is this

middle, or peripheral, voter whose behavior can most effectively be changedby altering the costs of voting. Berinsky, Burns, and Traugott (2001) andSouthwell and Burchett (2000) find that reducing the costs of voting by hold-ing an election entirely by mail has relatively little effect on those who regu-larly vote, since they were likely to vote regardless of the format. Similarly,voting by mail has little effect on those who almost never vote, since their lackof interest outweighs the reduced cost in time and effort required in castinga ballot by mail. Instead, both studies conclude, it is occasional voters, whosedecision on whether to vote or not is near the midpoint of their personal cost/benefit analysis, whose turnout likelihood is therefore susceptible to beingaffected by the mail election system.Overall, this pattern is analogous to research conclusions that find those in

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the middle of the political interest continuum most susceptible to influentialmedia messages. In the media equation, the middle can be influenced and isaccessible (McGuire, 1968; Zaller, 1992), and it is in the inconsistency of themiddle that the potential for significant change in their opinions or behaviorlies. Conversely, it is harder to impart behavior changing information to thosewho are higher or lower in political interest because they are either set intheir ways or not paying any attention.To determine whether face-to-face mobilization can improve turnout, and

whether that effect is felt across the electorate or only among occasional vot-ers, this study examines the effect of face to face mobilization in a sample ofSeptember 5, 2000, Florida state house primary races. This was the secondprimary of the year in Florida, as the state held a separate primary for thepresidential race on March 14, 2000. Using individual level data, the effect offace-to-face mobilization efforts on those who regularly vote and those whoseldom vote is compared.A focus on the effects of face-to-face mobilization is particularly promising

as a personal approach has been found to be necessary to motivate “costly”behaviors such as blood donation, recycling, and volunteering (Jason, Rose,Ferrari, and Barone, 1984; Kilgard, 1999; Reams and Ray, 1993). Moreover,Green and Gerber (2000b; Gerber and Green, 2001) find that other means ofcontacting prospective voters, including telephone and direct mail, are far lesseffective at encouraging turnout.

THE DATA AND THE DISTRICTS

To gain a spot on the ballot, Florida requires candidates for the state houseto either pay a filing fee (of about $1600) or to collect ballot petition cardsfilled out by at least 1% of the registered voters in their district. Thus, if theychoose not to pay the filing fee, candidates must collect between 800 and1,200 (depending on the number of registered voters in each district) validpetition signatures to run for state representative. Campaigns generally collectmore than the minimum (between 50–500 extra signatures) in case any cardsare disallowed by the elections office. The ballot petition cards require thevoter to fill out their name, address, the date, their birthdate, and signature.It generally takes voters at least a minute to complete the card. Campaignsgather petition signatures personally from the voters, either with the candidateor a campaign worker making the contact. For the purposes of studying mobi-lization efforts, the significance of the ballot petition signing process is that itprovides an indicator of face-to-face contact between a campaign and a voter.A simple look at turnout in all legislative districts across the state suggests

the potential promise of this face-to-face contact. Statewide in 2000, in dis-tricts where no candidates collected signatures, turnout averaged 23.9% per-

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cent in the September 5, 2000, primary. In districts in which at least twocandidates collected signatures, turnout averaged 25.1%.The districts under study here represent the contested state house pri-

maries within Palm Beach County, Florida. The nine districts range from sol-idly Republican, to competitive between the parties, to solidly Democratic.Table 1 provides basic information on the nine districts, including the factthat 14 out of 27 candidates in these races chose to collect ballot petitionsignatures.While the September 5, 2000, primary ballot was headed by Democratic

and Republican contests for U.S. Senate, neither the Democratic frontrunner,Bill Nelson, nor the Republican presumed nominee, Bill McCollum, wagedany serious campaign effort against what were viewed as minor opponents.These nine south Florida districts, with about 120,000 residents each, fea-

ture economic and ethnic diversity. Encompassing slices of Palm BeachCounty running from the Atlantic Ocean west to the Everglades, the districtsinclude mansions on the ocean, pockets of urban poverty, new developmentsgeared to middle- and high-income professionals, and thousands of acres ofrural sugar cane farms. The county overall is about 12% Latino, 14% AfricanAmerican, and 71% White. Twenty-three percent of county residents are overthe age of 65.3

All 27 state house candidates in the nine districts were contacted first byphone and then, if unreachable by phone, by letter. Twenty-two candidatesor campaign aides discussed their experiences, including campaign plans re-garding voter contact and the decision on whether to collect petition signa-

TABLE 1. Overview of Florida State House Primary Races in Study September5, 2000, Election

Number ofFlorida Candidates Competitive/District Number of Who Gathered Uncompetitive# Party Candidates Petitions Race Turnout

78 D 2 0 C 18.082 R 3 2 C 21.483 R 3 2 U 22.184 D 3 1 U 22.484 R 2 0 C 17.487 D 3 2 U 16.988 D 5 5 C 23.389 D 4 1 C 24.091 R 2 1 C 15.3

Note: Competitive races are defined as those where the top candidate attracted less than 50%of the vote, or where the second place finisher came within 15 points of the first place finisher.

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tures. At least one candidate from all nine races studied was represented.Additionally, a minimum of four party precinct committee members fromeach district were also interviewed to discuss efforts any candidates may havemade in their areas to canvass voters.Among the candidates who collected petition cards, all reported canvassing

door-to-door in the district (both personally and using volunteers) and collect-ing signatures at public events and political meetings. Additionally, all re-ported using the petition gathering process as a vehicle for selling their candi-dacy and encouraging people to vote in the September primary. While therewere other offices on the primary ballot, there were no other competitiveraces, and, according to the candidates and party committee members, nocandidates in other races collected ballot petitions or engaged in any signifi-cant face-to-face mobilizing efforts. Nor were the candidates or precinct com-mittee members aware of any other personal mobilization efforts undertakenin the district by any candidate or group other than the state house candidates.To determine the mobilizing effect of face-to-face contact in these races, a

database containing the turnout history and demographics of 1,000 randomlyselected eligible registered voters from each of the nine races was obtainedfrom the county elections office.4 A list of all voters who signed a ballot peti-tion for one or more candidates was also obtained.

STUDYING A COUNTY’S PRIMARY ELECTION

Studying turnout in one county’s state house primary races offers the advan-tage of context. Candidates in every race, or their campaign leadership, pro-vided information about their campaigns. Further, the possibility of othercampaigns’ mobilization activity affecting turnout can be excluded, ultimatelyaffording greater confidence that the face-to-face mobilization effect can berealistically assessed. While the nine districts’ voters are by no means repre-sentative of any larger body, they are a quite diverse group whose votinghabits (in terms of turnout) tend to mirror that of the nation as a whole.Primary elections are also a quite significant forum for studying turnout.

Primaries produce the lowest turnout in Florida elections, falling short of evenmunicipal elections. Given low turnout levels, it is here where the most dra-matic effects of solving the turnout riddle would be felt. Just like nonpartisanraces, primaries present the challenge for voters of making a decision betweencandidates without using party label as a guide. This calls for developing acandidate-specific understanding of issue positions and other relevant infor-mation, a task few voters are eager to perform (Aldrich, 1995). Thus, electionswithout party labels draw not only fewer voters, but far fewer low SES voters(Schaffner and Streb, 2000; Schaffner, Streb, and Wright, 2000).Primaries are also likely to become even more significant elections as the

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effects of term limits spread through nearly half the nation’s state legislatures.In Florida in 2000, as term limits took effect for the first time and more thanhalf of all incumbent officeholders lost their jobs, highly contested primariesbecame ubiquitous. Indeed, there were more competitive primary races inFlorida than there were competitive general election races.

RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

To make comparisons based on voting regularity, the 9,000 voters in thedatabase were divided into three groups based on their behavior before theSeptember 5, 2000, primary election: consistent voters (those who had votedin the last three elections, including a primary), irregular voters (those whohad voted, but not all three times, in the last three elections), and seldomvoters (those who had not voted at all in the last three elections). Of the 9,000registered voters in the sample, 1,427 were consistent voters, 3,890 irregularvoters, and 3,683 seldom voters.As an example of the wide disparity between the three groups, consider

turnout in the state’s first primary of 2000, the presidential preference primaryof March 14, 2000. Turnout overall in the districts’ 2000 presidential primarywas 16.1%. Yet, nearly half of consistent voters (47.2%) cast a ballot in thepresidential primary, more than one-fifth of irregular voters (21.7%) partici-pated, while fewer than 1 in 30 seldom voters (2.8%) showed up for the Marchprimary.Analysts have expressed concern that one problem with mobilization efforts

is that campaigns often skip those least likely to vote. However, with thesedata we can see that candidates in these races contacted voters in all threelevels. Considering voters in the seven districts under study in which at leastone candidate sought petition signatures, reveals that 314 consistent voters,331 irregular voters, and 169 seldom voters signed a ballot petition card. Thus,the clear majority of signers were not consistent voters.Nonetheless, consistent voters were heavily overrepresented among signers.

Among those in the sample from the seven districts, overall 9% signed a peti-tion, reflecting the participation of 22% of consistent voters, 8.5% of irregularvoters, and only 4.6% of seldom voters. Candidates generally reported thatwhile their efforts were targeted toward consistent voters, they collected sig-natures from both regular voters and infrequent voters because of expediency.“We focused our door-to-door on neighborhoods where there were a lot ofregistered voters concentrated on a few blocks. Once we were on those blocks,we knocked on doors whether the person had voted in every election, orhadn’t voted in years,” said one candidate.Did the face-to-face contact of the petition signing process increase turn-

out? The turnout rate for all voters in these nine primary races was 21.8%.

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Among those who did not sign a petition, the rate was 19.9%. Among thosewho did sign a petition, the rate was 40.6%. It is surely numbers like thesethat fuel an enthusiasm for mobilization that has led some analysts to suggestthe proper mobilization efforts could double turnout (Avey, 1989). Alas, thisdisparity is largely built on the selection bias discussed above. That is, thenonsigners include a quite disproportionate group of registered voters whorarely see the inside of a voting booth, while the signers include a heavyconcentration of those who never miss a chance to vote.When these numbers are recalculated to control for voting history, the mo-

bilization effect, while by no means coming close to doubling voter turnout,nevertheless remains noteworthy. Applying the turnout percentages of thosewho did not sign a petition card from each of the three turnout cohorts sug-gests that if there was no effect from the face-to-face contact then 268 (32.9%)of those who signed should have voted. Instead, 331 (40.6%) of the signersturned out to vote, suggesting a mobilization effect of 7.7%.The question remains whether this mobilization effect was felt across all

three groups or only among more reliable voters. Table 2 presents the propor-tion of voters who turned out for the primary controlling for their votinghistory and whether they signed a ballot petition card. Comparing columnsone and two reveals that face-to-face contact increased voter turnout amongthe consistent, irregular, and seldom voters. However, the size of the effect isby no means constant. Contact with the irregular voter had the greatest effect,increasing their likelihood of voting by more than 15%. This is more thanthree times the size of the effect on consistent voters and almost seven timesthe effect of contact on seldom voters.Was this increase in turnout due to face-to-face contact or to some other

campaign tactic? Undoubtedly, these registered voters were exposed to a greatmany messages from these candidates beyond the face-to-face mobilizationefforts. While it is not possible to study the effects of petition signing in com-

TABLE 2. Face-to-Face Mobilization Effect Florida State House Primary,September 5, 2000

Turnout Among Turnout AmongNonsigners Signers Difference

Previous (percentage) (percentage) (mobilizationVoting History (n = 8,186) (n = 814) effect)

Consistent 57.1 61.1 4.0*Irregular 24.9 41.2 15.3*Seldom 3.9 6.1 2.2*Overall Effect 7.7

*Difference between signers and nonsigners significant at p < .001 using chi-square.

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plete isolation from other forms of campaign contact, Green and Gerber(2000b) conclude that other forms of campaign communication have littleeffect on turnout. Moreover, to the extent such communication efforts didhave an effect, the campaigns’ general emphasis on consistent voters as targetsfor direct mail and telephone calls would exacerbate the turnout gap betweenregular and irregular voters, but would not particularly affect the thrust of theconclusions presented here.None of the campaigns reported making any special effort to increase turn-

out exclusively among consistent voters who had signed their petition, irregu-lar voters who had signed their petition, or seldom voters who had signedtheir petition. Some campaigns noted that they included all petition signersin their direct mail and telephone efforts. Those efforts may have reinforcedthe stimulating effect of the face-to-face contact. Nevertheless, that practicedoes not undercut the conclusion that mobilizing seldom voters has only amodest effect on their inclination to participate.As a further check on the bivariate results, a logistic regression model was

created to test the effects of voting history and contact against other variablesthought to influence turnout. The dependent variable is voting in the Septem-ber 5, 2000, primary. As independent variables, age, race, number of votersin the household, and turnout in the voting precinct are utilized as indicatorsof demographic influences on turnout.5 Personal turnout history and face-to-face contact are also included separately and as an interaction variable.Whether the race was competitive is included as a dummy variable (for adiscussion of positive effect of competitiveness on turnout, see Caldeira, Pat-terson, and Markko, 1985; Jackman, 1987; Jackson, 1993). All variables havebeen coded to produce a positive coefficient if the relationship is in the ex-pected direction.The results in Table 3 reveal a rather consistent and unsurprising picture

of primary election turnout in a model that correctly accounts for the turnoutdecision of 91.6% of voters and achieves a Cox and Snell R2 of .39. The fourdemographic variables are all positive, meaning older whites with more votersin their household and higher turnout in their precinct were more likely tocast a primary ballot. For example, applying the odds ratio for each of thosevariables suggests a 65-year-old white person living with two other voters in aprecinct with 50% voter turnout in the last primary had a 39% likelihood ofvoting. Meanwhile, an 18-year-old African American living with zero voters ina precinct with 15% voter turnout in the last primary had a 10% likelihood ofvoting. Nevertheless, the largest personal factor was turnout history. Thosewho had voted in each of the three previous elections are estimated to havebeen 44% more likely to vote than those who had missed each of the threeprevious elections.Beyond personal factors, the political realities of the districts affected turn-

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TABLE 3. Factors in Turnout in Florida State House Primary, September 5,2000, Logistic Regression

UnstandardizedCoefficient Odds Ratio

Age .001* 1.004Race .079* 1.08Number of Voters in Household .042 1.02Precinct Turnout .004* 1.02Personal Turnout .621* 1.44Competitive Race .782* 1.15Contact .198* 1.11Interaction: Contact * Personal Turnout .057* 1.06Constant −.421*

Percent Correct (Model) 91.6Default Correct (Random) 78.2Improvement +13.4Chi-square 287.41Cox and Snell R2 .39n 9,000

Coding: age (years of age), race (0 = non-white, 1 = white), number of voters in household (thenumber of registered voters at that address), precinct turnout (primary turnout in 2000 presiden-tial primary), personal turnout (number of votes cast in last three elections), competitive race(0 = no, 1 = yes), contact (0 = did not sign petition, 1 = signed petition).

*p < .05.

out. For example, a competitive state house election improved the likelihoodof voting by about 7%. More significantly for the mobilization issue, though,signing a petition, as well as the interaction between signing a petition andone’s turnout history, were both significant factors in assessing turnout likeli-hood.Perhaps the best way to illustrate the implication of the mobilization effect

is to apply these results to the campaigns’ estimated time cost to contact anadditional voter. In conversations with the campaigns, they reported that mostpeople who were home were willing to talk and sign the petition card, butthat in any given neighborhood canvass, most people were not home.6 As such,finding a voter ready and willing to talk was reported to take about 10 minutes.Using the odds ratios, the likelihood of voting was calculated by manipulat-

ing contact (yes or no) and personal turnout history (participation in the lastthree elections). All other variables were set to their means. These estimateswere then applied to the population of registered voters in the study to deter-mine how many voters would move from the likely not to vote category (below50% likelihood) to the likely to vote category (above 50% likelihood) due tothe contact. Finally, that figure was applied to the 10 minute cost per voter

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estimate, to produce an estimated time cost to activate an additional voter ineach of the three voting frequency categories. In Figure 1 we see that activat-ing an extra voter takes under an hour among irregular voters, almost 3 hoursamong consistent voters, and nearly 6 hours among seldom voters.Thus, even as face-to-face mobilization clearly has an effect, it is a grueling

process to activate any large quantity of voters. To dramatically affect turnout,these numbers suggest that an incredible outlay of man hours must be ex-pended, especially to affect those who seldom vote. It would seem the pros-pects for mobilization’s capacity to make voting a near universal practice arequite slim.Nonetheless, the effect on irregular voters is important and bears our atten-

tion. These data clearly suggest that more people voted in these primariesthan would have absent the campaigns’ efforts expended to personally contactvoters. The capacity, even in low information settings, to lower the barriers tovoter turnout for the irregular voter has significant implications for both in-creasing turnout and diversifying the electorate (Schaffner and Streb, 2000).There is also an important public policy implication in this pattern. While

we have witnessed great legislative battles over the rules affecting individualvoters, little attention has been dedicated to the potential ramifications onturnout of requiring face-to-face campaign contact with voters. Fourteen ofthe twenty-seven candidates in these state house primary races collected peti-

FIG. 1. Mobilization effort needed to produce one additional voter Florida state houseprimary, September 5, 2000.

Note: Estimate based on logistic regression results.

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tion cards (rather than paying a fee) to get on the ballot and in the processcommunicated with thousands of voters and increased voter turnout. If Flor-ida and other states require candidates for down ballot races to collect signa-tures (without a fee option), they will in effect rekindle mobilization effortsthat some have written off as vestiges of another era.

CONCLUSION

The capacity to mobilize voters has been held up by many analysts as amost promising vehicle to reverse the long standing decline in voter turnoutin U.S. elections. This study augments the findings of scholars who have stud-ied the face to face mobilization effect (Eldersveld, 1956; Green and Gerber,2000b; Miller, Bositis, and Baer, 1981) by documenting the effect both in thefield and through the efforts of actual campaigns. As Green and Gerber note,there is no place better to study political behavior than in the field. Moreover,there is no better way to establish verisimilitude than to utilize the behaviorof actual voters and candidates.Overall, the results show that turnout was increased by about 8% among

those who had face-to-face contact with one of the Florida state house cam-paigns. That effect was greatest among those who vote occasionally but notconsistently, who were 15% more likely to vote after the face-to-face contact.Contact was least effective in changing the behavior of those who seldom vote,who became only 2% more likely to vote after contact.As is the case in much of the work assessing the implications of reform in

registration and voting rules (Knack, 1995; Rhine 1995), the results here sug-gest that face to face mobilization has the capacity to improve turnout, butlacks the power to make voting a regular habit of average Americans.

NOTES

1. Statistics from the Committee for the Study of the American Electorate, available at www.gspm.org/csa.

2. Green and Gerber (2000b) note, however, that these studies overstated their success ratebecause targeted individuals who could not be reached were taken out of the experimentalgroup and placed in the control group. Thus the effect of individuals who were harder toreach, and harder to mobilize, were artificially removed from the results.

3. Data from the Census, available at: http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/12/12099.html.4. Florida uses a hybrid of an open and closed primary system. Primaries are closed, allowing

only previously declared party registrants to vote, when candidates from multiple parties filefor a seat. Primaries are open when all the candidates for a seat are from the same party.Among the races in the sample, all but the District 78 contest were closed primaries.

5. Age, race, number of voters in household, and precinct turnout are related to the kinds ofinfluences most studies find among SES variables. Ideally, education and income would beincluded as well, but no individual level data are available for those variables.

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6. The tendency to allow the campaigns to present their message was not reported to vary byvoting regularity. In other words, among those who answered their doors, regular voters wereas likely as seldom voters to listen to the campaign’s pitch.

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