THE LIVELIHOODS PROGRAMME

EARLY RECOVERY PROGRAMME (ERP)(Oct-2009 – Jun-2010)

Final ReportJuly 2010

Swiss Agency forDevelopment

and Cooperation (SDC)

Intercooperation Delegation Office PakistanTel: 091-5830254, 5830416, Fax 091-5829594

E-mail: icpak@intercooperation.org.pkURL: www.intercooperation.org.pk Government of

KPK

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Acknowledgements (alphabetic order)

Title Photographs:Anwar-ul-HaqIhsanullah KhanTajoon KhanTasdiq Hussain

Other photographs in the articles:Anwar-ul-HaqHussain AliIhsanullah KhanIrshad Ali MianKhalida AkbarSajjad AliTajoon KhanTasdiq Hussain

Compiled by:Arjumand Nizami

With an active support from:Iftikhar HussainKhalid HussainMuhammad Asad SaleemMuhammad RiazPierre-Yves SuterSaif-ur-Rehman BhattiSajjad HussainShabir HussainWaseem Jan

Any part of this report can be reproduced with proper citation in favour of the author andIntercooperation Pakistan©2010

Please send your comments and suggestion to IC Pakistan at icpak@intercooperation.org.pkAlso find this report at www.intercooperation.org.pk

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Table of Contents

Acronyms................................................................................................................................................ 41 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY .................................................................................................................... 62 BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE .....................................................................................................8

2.1 Background............................................................................................................................82.2 Context of the four valleys ....................................................................................................82.3 Objective of the ERP............................................................................................................112.4 Problems and issues identified to be addressed.................................................................11

3 IMPLEMENTATION AND MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS .........................................................133.1 Implementation strategy/Methodology: ............................................................................133.2 Time frame ..........................................................................................................................143.3 Institutional arrangement ...................................................................................................143.4 Partners and networks ........................................................................................................153.5 Guiding principles................................................................................................................163.6 Coordination with other actors...........................................................................................16

4 OUTPUTS AND MONITORING .......................................................................................................174.1 What was achieved?............................................................................................................174.2 Process for implementation of activities in the field ..........................................................204.3 Monitoring mechanism and Knowledge Sharing ................................................................214.4 Communication and Visibility..............................................................................................224.5 Links with regular LP............................................................................................................224.6 Exit from ERP, resuming to regular LP.................................................................................23

5 Lessons learned, challenges and things to improve .....................................................................245.1 ERP NGO Partners:...............................................................................................................245.2 Intercooperation team in the field......................................................................................25

6 Finance ..........................................................................................................................................27Annex 1: ERP activity plan and need assessment (4 valleys)- as agreed on 4th Nov 2009s..............28Annex 2: What is Cash for Work ...........................................................................................................29Annex 3 ERP Institutional diagram........................................................................................................34Annex 4: Valley-wise details on achievement in ERP ...........................................................................35Annex 5: Financial details .....................................................................................................................36Annex 6: List of participants .................................................................................................................38

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Acronyms

CfW Cash for WorkERP Early Recovery ProgrammeDLDD Department of Livestock and Dairy DevelopmentIC IntercooperationIDPs Internally Displaced PersonsLP The Livelihoods ProgrammeMC Mercy Corps PakistanNADRA National Database and Registration AuthorityNGO Non Governmental OrganizationNOC No Objection CertificatePDMA Provincial Disaster Management AuthoritySDC Swiss agency for Development and CooperationTZKT Tanzeem Zalmay Kul TeeratUN United NationsOCHA Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian AffairsCBO Community Based Organization

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1 EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since January 2009, the stability in Swat and Buner districts worsened and this culminatedin a military operation in May 2009 forcing over 2 million persons to flee their homes. Againsta total of percentage of displaced population of Swat (32%) and Buner (72%)1, the overallreported displacement in four LP valleys was 13% for Marghuzar, 17% for Chail, 24% forChagharzai and 41% for Amazai including migration to camps within/outside the districts aswell to other private places including relatives. This displacement resulted in loss of majorlivelihoods assets such as livestock, crops, farm implements as well as damages to privateand communal infrastructure. Intercooperation (IC) proposed to re-allocate part of theunspent Livelihoods Programme (LP) budget to implement an Early Recovery Programme(ERP) in four valleys of Swat and Buner where LP is active. A first general survey wasconducted by the IC team, in end September/early October. The results became the basis ofthe concept note submitted to SDC. The concept note was approved in October 2009 andERP was formally initiated in the last week of October 2009 with an inception workshop. Theobjectives of ERP included provision of early support and relief to the IDPs returning homes(re-establish livelihoods and create self confidence) as well as strengthen the communitiesimpacted by the military / security situation in order to eventually re-link them to thescheduled LP work in those areas. Each valley was differently affected by the militaryoperation. Hence ERP was sensitive to different post conflict contexts in each location rightfrom its start.

The initial priorities identified in the concept note were re-discussed in November in light ofdetailed and updated field assessments conducted by partners after green light was given bySDC. While some of the priorities identified were confirmed, a few needed adjustments (e.g.no support for dairy business, no provision of draught animals, more focus on communalinfrastructure etc.). For each intervention, a set of criteria was developed for procurement,identification of beneficiaries and distribution. One key approach used for the rehabilitation oflocal people was Cash for Work (CfW). CfW was considered to be important for generatingtemporary employment (main objective) while restoring various infrastructures which wereconsidered to be essential to revitalize the livelihoods of the people who became affectees(either due to displacement or due to staying back locked up in their houses and villageswith no opportunities around).

The ERP was embedded within the SDC funded Livelihoods Programme implemented byIntercooperation. It could use all the facilities available with LP, including office premises,human and physical assets, partners and networks. An active coordination with governmentline agencies (e.g. PDMA, agriculture, livestock, local government) was ensured at eachstep.

All the activities planned were achieved, with little variations in few cases. ERP wasimplemented in 115 villages benefiting 11,026 households with a total 81,395 directbeneficiaries (41,790 female and 39,605 male). Some of the highlights are as followed:

1. 100 ton high quality wheat seed was provided to 3,854 small farming families (individualhouseholds) for cultivating 2,000 acres land. Together with seed, 300 tons of fertilizerwas also procured and provided.

1 Total population of Swat with 3% growth rate applied on 1998 census figure of 1743000 people.Total population of Buner with 3.8% growth rate applied on 1998 census figure on 506048 people(http://buner.com/population.html). Displacement figures are official figures of the Provincial DisasterManagement Authority, verified by NADRA. According to DCO offices of the two districts, totalregistered displacement from Swat and Buner was 33% and 63% respectively.

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2. Under Cash for Work scheme, 26,515 person x days of employment was generated(2,931 skilled + 23,584 unskilled labour). This wage-labour came from 4,081 householdsgenerating a total cash income of Rs.8,540,550. of the total persons engaged, 39% weredisplaced and returned while the rest were those who were left behind and weredesperately in search of wage opportunities.

3. 950 sets of farm implements could be distributed including 50 kits for orchard pruning.4. 400 goats and 450 poultry units were provided to the most destitute families. Goats were

provided under pass-on scheme.5. 140 cash grants (Rs.5,000 each) and 80 grants (Rs.10,000 each) were provided to

village artisans and shopkeepers respectively. Their identification was a meticulousprocess in order to ensure that only the neediest receive this support.

6. In total, 31 drinking water supply schemes, 44 small irrigation channels, 99 km of villageroads and 29 pony tracks could be repaired under the CfW component. In total 12,314households will directly benefit from these schemes.

ERP was a special humanitarian project in three manners: Local partners were available with their pre-established rapport in the community. ERP built on earlier knowledge and networks of LP. The implementers of ERP had time to time experience in dealing with humanitarian

issues, yet none of them had a classical expertise in humanitarian subject. It wastherefore essential not to compromise on the process in some of the crucial areas, suchas beneficiary identification and procurement and focus on documenting learning forfuture reference.

Monitoring was an inbuilt mechanism in ERP through villagers themselves, local NGOs(partners), ERP team, Livelihoods Programme and IC staff assigned to support andbackstop ERP team. Regular reports were sent to SDC Islamabad as well as to ProvincialDisaster Management Authority (PDMA) summarizing the overall progress. A smoothcommunication was ensured at all levels in line with the volume of activities and the speed ofimplementation at one time in four valleys. However, communication suffered severalobstacles occasionally, including frequent jamming of telecommunication services,unannounced curfews and seasonal hurdles.

A comprehensive exercise on lessons learned reflected that in similar situations in the future,systems for fund release, backstopping and monitoring must be rather quick and laid downon fast track. Another learning was that adhering to a well defined process for beneficiaryidentification and distribution/implementation was time consuming, but, on the other side wasextremely rewarding in ensuring transparency and ensuring a positive feeling incommunities. Compromising on process may end up favouring wrong people who actuallydid not deserve to be supported. ERP with pleasure noted that several hardliners, whoinitially resisted any sort of NGO support, became ERP supporters and in some cases evenclients (e.g. see story from an Imam in later pages). Many people changed their minds aboutNGOs and “western supporters” when they found their representatives as their first andimmediate supporters, rather than those who misled them in the name of religion but nevercame down for help when it was most needed.

The ERP was concluded in June 2010. A final workshop was held on 11th June 2010 inwhich the progress, experiences, obstacles & challenges and lessons learned werepresented by all partners (Annex 6 for participants’ list). In total CHF 614,000 wasearmarked for the project, of which CHF 506,787 (83%) were spent. In Pak Rupees, theoverall expenditure was 75% due to change in foreign currency exchange rate. The mainreasons for this saving were availability of high quality distribution items on lower costs andlower costs incurred on administering the project since existing LP and IC facilities weredeployed.

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2 BACKGROUND AND RATIONALE

2.1 Background

Since January 2009, the stability and peace situation in Swat and Buner districts worsened.This culminated during the period May–July 2009 when military operations forced more than2 million persons to flee their homes. This was the largest number of Internally DisplacedPersons (IDPs) since the partition. By the end of July / early August 2009, the IDPs startedto return homes. In early September 2009, these military operations were almost completedin Swat valley (although some pockets of resistance persisted), while still on-going inselected areas of Buner. Consistent reports, cross-checked with an internal assessmentmade by Intercooperation Pakistan, revealed that, in almost all areas:

a. Wheat (sown in 2008) could not be harvested (meaning neither staple food nor seedsfor the next season)

b. Maize (sown in 2009) was physically destroyed in the fields, as it could help miscreantsto hide.

c. In most orchards, fruits could not be picked-up and marketed. Besides, several fruitplants were damaged due to lack of maintenance.

d. Most of the livestock disappeared or died.e. Houses and physical infrastructure (drinking water sources, irrigation channels, electricity

network, schools, access roads and health units etc.) received destruction varying fromlimited to very severe.

IC proposed to re-allocate part of the Livelihoods Programme (LP) budget (which could notbe spent because of the above mentioned crisis situation) in order to implement an EarlyRecovery Programme (ERP) for the IDPspopulation in the four valleys of Swat and Bunerwhere LP was active. This was done considering theabove mentioned emergency situation, the previousinvolvement and experience of IntercooperationPakistan in engaging in emergency situations and theoption of SDC Pakistan of re-programming amaximum of 25% of the allocated funds forhumanitarian components within the ongoing projectsand programmes in NWFP.

The project was proposed and approved in October2009. The very first meeting with partners was heldimmediately after, in the last week of October 2009 inwhich a detailed work plan was prepared in line withthe priorities assessed by partners in the field. Theproject therefore commenced at the beginning of November 2009 when field activities couldbe started in four valleys of the two districts.

2.2 Context of the four valleys

Although military operation was declared in the two districts without defining any specificgeographical differentiation within the districts, each valley was differently affected by themilitary operation. Against a total of percentage of displaced population of Swat (32%) and

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Buner (72%)2, the overall displacement in four LP valleys was 13% for Marghuzar, 17% forChail, 24% for Chagharzai and 41% for Amazai including migration to camps within/outsidethe districts as well to other private places including relatives. Therefore the ERP planningwas sensitive to a different post conflict context in each location:

Marghuzar valley (Swat)

Marghuzar valley is located in the South of the district headquarter Saidu Sharif at a distanceof about 8 km. The total estimated population of the valley is 23,638 (2,933 households) andcomprises 13 villages and 7 hamlets. Agriculture and livestock are the main sources ofincome. During the conflict, both agriculture and livestock suffered tremendous damages.Most of the people fled their homes during military operation leaving behind their livestockand standing crops, which were damaged, stolen or lost due to cross firing. Some of the

people were locked in the valley and had nochoice but to consume their seeds stock(wheat and maize) and livestock for meetingtheir basic food requirements. Ultimately, theyhad no seed to cultivate. The main source oflivelihoods losses was disruptions inagricultural and livestock based activities, likemilk and poultry production, loss of standingcrops and ban on maize cultivation (whichcould hide militants). Because the militaryoperation started at time when Rabi crop wasready to be harvested, fruits and vegetableswere ready to be picked and taken to themarket, all crops, fruits and vegetables were

rotten. Additional vulnerabilities also arose due to the mass evacuation. Losses wererecorded by traders, small businesses and hotels. Significant damages were also caused topublic infrastructures (electricity and water supply). This led to loss of employment in theprivate sector as well as loss of livelihoods for self-employed people.

Chail valley (Swat)

Chail is situated to the north of Saidu Sharif at a distance of 57 Km. It is divided into four subvalleys i.e. Dabargay, Chail, Beshigram and Shinko. The climate of the valley is very cold inwinter and moderate in summer. Accessroads to the valley are jeep-able but rough,steep and hard to climb without four-wheelvehicles. Due to heavy snowfalls in winter,access to remote hamlets and villages isdifficult. The total estimated population of thevalley is 30,400 (3,800 HHs) in 45 villages.Main sources of income are agriculture,livestock, daily-wage labour out of the valley,selling medicinal herbs, small businesses andcraftsmanship. Some people also leave foroverseas jobs and women have a significantrole in household economy in their absence.

2 Total population of Swat with 3% growth rate applied on 1998 census figure of 1743000 people.Total population of Buner with 3.8% growth rate applied on 1998 census figure on 506048 people(http://buner.com/population.html). Displacement figures are official figures of the Provincial DisasterManagement Authority, verified by NADRA. According to DCO offices of the two districts, totalregistered displacement from Swat and Buner was 33% and 63% respectively.

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Chail was not subject to a direct military operation, but the valley was practically locked up inthe middle of the conflict zone from both ends. During the Taliban’s massacre and militaryoperations, people in Chail valley were asked to remain confined within the area andseasonal migrant families could not return to their native regions where they used to conducttheir normal summer activities. After a long harsh winter, people usually wait for summer tomaintain their houses, repair water channels, pedestrian paths, drinking water sources,village roads, etc. affected by snow. This could not happen in 2009 since people wereadvised to stay in their houses. They also exhausted their seed stocks for meeting their grainrequirement. This stock was barely adequate since the quantity of seed was not much owingto small land holding in the area. There was a dreadful shortage of food and manyhouseholds faced starvation for weeks. Provisions were procured at four time higher pricesfrom nearby places, whenever there was an opportunity. Productive livestock and otherassets were sold out at one third of their prices to meet urgent cash needs. Some livestockwas also lost to diseases which could not be treated since no veterinary services wereavailable.

Chagharzai valley (Buner)

Chagharzai a scenic valley of district Buner is located to the east of district Head QuarterDaggar at a distance of 40 Km. This mountainous area comprises of 4 Union Councils i.e.Batara, Pander, Gulbandai and Sorey. The total estimated population of the valley is about75,000 (11,164 hhs) and is comprised of 47 villages. Most of the people are dependent onagriculture and livestock for their livelihoods. However, due to small land holdings, even innormal situations they produce very little quantities which are hardly enough for their foodrequirements. Seasonal migration of people in search of labour is a regular feature of thisvalley. Chagharzai is situated at far flung distance from the district head quarter and thepeople have no access to basic needs such as water, health and education. Thecommunication network (including road) is very poor. The district was lately occupied by the

militants and the military operation wasinitiated here when it was at its peak inSwat. Majority of the people left the valleyand became IDPs within the district initiallyand later on went out of the district whenoperations intensified. The main sources ofpeoples’ livelihoods i.e. agriculture, livestockand small businesses were adverselyaffected. The livestock died due to crossfiring or lack of fodder and water availability.The standing crops were never harvested.Some of the people were in siege due toarmy operation and even deprived of therelief otherwise available to IDPs. They

were also ignored by the concerned authorities in registration as IDPs. They suffered greathardships while moving to the camps established by the government. Due to non availabilityof the basic needs, most of the families exhausted their assets (cash and physical).

Amazai valley (Buner)

Amazai is situated at a distance of 46 km from district head quarter Daggar towards South. Itborders Kaladaka in the east which was one of the hideouts for criminals and most of themilitants found a safe haven in this area. The total estimated population of the valley is33,250 (4,750 hhs) in 55 villages. It is mainly dependent on agriculture, livestock andemployment in the public and private sectors. This is the valley which resisted the most tomilitants and refused to provide local cooperation. However, the militants by force took overand the people from most exposed villages initially took refuge in nearby villages where

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people decided to stay back. Later, they were compelled to go out of the area as IDPs inSwabi and Mardan. They left their homes with all their belongings and valuables, most of thelivestock died as they were left tied in hurry and were unable to eat and drink. Few peoplesold their livestock at half prices to get cash to meet their immediate needs (especiallytransportation and food). During the military operation, a regular maintenance of theinfrastructures especially village roads and foot paths could not take place since the fewpeople who did not migrate were advised tostay homes. There was a severe shortageof food and many households facedstarvation for weeks. In order to meet theirfood requirement, they had to rely onreserved seeds of cereals and vegetablesand slaughtered the remaining livestockwhich they had kept for themselves as anasset. Food stuff was procured at four timehigh prices. The military did not allowharvesting of standing crops due to fiercefighting and operation, which furtheraggravated the livelihoods situation.

2.3 Objective of the ERP

The Early Recovery Programme had the following four main objectives:

1. Provide early support and relief to the IDPs, once they return homes, in the areas whereLP is active.

2. Contribute to restoring / re-establishing livelihoods assets and essential means forfamilies to move forward and decrease their vulnerability created by the recent war-likesituation.

3. Create self confidence among communities to begin with their lives complementing theirown struggles with some external support.

4. Strengthen the communities impacted by the military / security situation in order toeventually re-link them to the scheduled LP work in those areas.

2.4 Problems and issues identified to beaddressed

A first general survey was conducted by the ICteam, in the four valleys in end September /early October 2009.

The survey results received from the field weresummarised for identifying major prioritieswhich could be taken up by ERP. These werereported in the concept note prepared inOctober 2009:

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Table 1: Survey assessment concerning the situation of IDPs in Swat and Buner in LP areas(October 2009)

Swat Buner

Items Chail Marghuzar Amazai Chagharzai Proposedpriority

School buildings 0 + 0 +Bridges + + + +Police stations + + 0 +Health units + 0 0 0Private transports + + + +Private houses ++ ++ + +Private business +++ +++ + ++

Crops (wheat, maize) +++ +++ +++ +++ HighFruit trees +++ +++ +++ +++ HighFodder crops ++ +++ + ++Medicinal & Aromatic Plants +++ + ++ +Irrigation channels /watercourses + + ++ + High

Drinking water supply ++ ++ ++ ++ HighSanitation 0 + 0 +

Livestock (cattle) +++ +++ +++ +++ HighPoultry +++ +++ +++ +++ HighDraught animals (oxen) +++ ++ +++ +++ HighDairy business +++ +++ +++ +++ High

Small Farm equipment ++ 0 + +Animal sheds + 0 + +

0 : No damage at all + : Limited damages ++ : Substantial damages +++ : Severedamages

These initial priorities were re-discussed in November, after the approval by SDC, in light ofpartners’ detailed and updated field assessments. While some of the priorities identifiedwere reconfirmed, a few needed some adjustments, such as:

1. Damage to the fruit trees, initially identified as highest priority in all the valleys, wasshifted to non-priority in three valleys. It was an issue in Marghuzar only.

2. Repair of small irrigation channels was a common issue. These channels receiveddamages ranging from minor to complete disruption due to lack of maintenance ormilitary action. In all the valleys repair of these channels became a priority for localpeople to resume their regular farming activities. Chagharzai remained at the top ofpriority list in this regard due to maximum damages and the largest area affected.

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3. Repair of village access roads and ponytracks was also identified as a priority withvarying intensity in all the valleys.

4. Despite that cattle and draught animalswere severely affected, LP partners andthe ERP team concluded that this was notan area where ERP should intervene.However poultry, which is a significantcapital for poorest households, must begiven attention. Besides, in similar familiesrestocking of goats was identified asnecessary priority since for poorest familyit is important for domestic milkproduction.

5. Dairy business fell out of priority given the limited time with ERP.6. Replenishment of farm tools was identified as an important area due to partial / complete

loss, rusting or other forms of damages.7. Another area added in the priority list was the provision of small start up grants to village

artisans/shopkeepers to resume their businesses. Village artisans included blacksmiths,cobblers, book-binders, carpenters etc.

8. One message from partner was regarding the perception on displaced and left behind,while the displaced became vulnerable since most of their assets were gone in theirabsence, the ones who could not migrate had to suffer hunger, security threat, losses ofassets due to looting and not being able to take care of those while they were asked toremain homes. All lost employment opportunities when the two districts were in siege.

Annex 1 tabulates all the interventions for the four valleys with a quantitative breakdown.

3 IMPLEMENTATION AND MANAGEMENT ARRANGEMENTS

3.1 Implementation strategy/Methodology:

The methodology entailed for the Early Recovery Programme is summarised below:

Step 1 (Inception):• A 2-days inception workshop in October 2009 in Islamabad• A detailed assessment of the level of destruction in the valleys and villages (LP)-

early November 2009

Step 2 (Way forward):• Stocktaking on results brought by the partners and identification of priorities /

agreement on details• Joint identification of guiding principles for ERP

Step 3 (Practical details):• Detailed participatory planning together with the concerned communities for activities

and identity practical action plans

Step 4 (Implementation and monitoring):• Implementation in the field• Punctual and regular monitoring, review and reporting

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All the steps were conducted together with the four local NGO partners active in the fourvalleys of Swat and Buner.

For each intervention, a set of criteria established for procurement, identification ofbeneficiaries and distribution was followed. One key approach used for rehabilitation of localpeople was Cash for Work (CfW). Due to no livelihoods activities and other incomegeneration opportunities for almost 6-9 months during 2009, people were in dire needs ofcash to meet their daily essential needs. Hence CfW was considered to be an importantapproach for generating temporary employment (main objective) while restoring variousinfrastructures which were considered to be essential to revitalize the livelihoods of thepeople. The idea was to implement infrastructure related activities in a manner thatgenerates a number of wage-labour days (skilled and unskilled) where local people (eitherdisplaced and returned or those who stayed back and lost their assets and employments)could get temporary jobs. At the same time, the post rehabilitation repair and maintenance ofthe schemes was ensured through terms of partnerships with the communities prior to theirinitiation. The feasibility of CfW was analyzed in the inception workshop (Step 1) with thehelp of an expert on CfW and all the partners decided to go for it. Annex 2 presents theslides shared by the resource person and a brief write up by the resource person.

3.2 Time frame

The ERP was approved on 20th of October 2009. The field activities followed in earlyNovember 2009 and continued till 3rd June 2010. The rest of the month was used in holdingend of project workshop, documentation and reporting. The ERP closed on 30 th June, 2010.

3.3 Institutional arrangement

The ERP was embedded within the SDC funded Livelihoods Programme implemented byIntercooperation. The rationale to do so was that LP operates in districts Swat and Bunerwhere military operations were conducted resulting in the disruption of rural livelihoods.Besides, the funding of ERP came from the re-allocation of the LP budget, as it was notpossible to use a substantial share of the financial allocation made for these two districtsduring the last two yearly plans of operation. Being anchored within IC/LP, brought thefollowing advantages to ERP:

1. ERP could use all the facilities available with LP, including office premises and otherphysical assets.

2. LP/IC human resources were available to ERP for making smooth and quick progress inERP, which is the most crucial characteristic of any post emergency intervention.

Water Channel with CfW

The water channel starting from Marghuzar and ending at Maidagai provides irrigation toagricultural lands of 58 households. There were heavy damages received by the water channelduring the conflict. Due to this reason the water could not reach its destination in proper time andquantity. A piece of land which normally took 3-4 hours to be irrigated now needed more than 24hours. Downstream farmers complained that they were not receiving any water for irrigation. ERPinitiated reconstruction of the water channel. It was reconstructed employing local labour forcehence providing employment opportunity to 17 locals. The farmers and the livestock owners of thearea are very happy and thankful to ERP as now they can efficiently use water for their fields andlivestock. And the water is now available to the downstream farmers in its full flow and quantity.

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3. The four existing NGO partners thatimplement the LP in the four valleys ofSwat and Buner could quicklyorganize themselves to implementERP. Hence NGOs were ready to startimmediately in the field when ERPwas approved by SDC.

4. The project could bank upon severalpartners with whom LP was alreadycollaborating and was enjoying goodsynergies and rapport. These includedAgriculture, Livestock and DairyDevelopment departments, etc.

5. ERP capitalized on the relationshipsand networks established by LP among its partner communities. Similarly theimplementation of activities was largely facilitated in the villages where CBOs (men andwomen) organized by NGO partners existed.

6. The Steering Committee for LP took the major decisions (e.g. approval for ERP budgetallocation and suggestions for collaboration in the field) for ERP. This provided a goodanchorage to ERP for demanding collaboration from government partners (particularlydistrict administration).

7. Finally, the most important element was the future continuation with LP. ERP couldcontinue for a short duration and phase out conveniently and responsibly due to the factthat these four valleys could switch back to LP after ERP was over. Hence forcommunities it was a kind of reassurance as well as a message to sustain ERPinterventions for future productive engagement with LP.

The programme mainly operated through LP-North office where a full-time manager wasemployed on a short term contract, exclusively for ERP. The Manager worked in closecollaboration with the Coordinator LP North and the four NGO partners. His team alsoincluded four supervisors (one for each valley) who closely monitored and ensuredtransparency in the implementation of all the interventions in the field. This entire team wassupported by Intercooperation and LP Team Leader from Peshawar in the following areas:

1. Finding solutions to burning issues / trouble shooting2. Maintain liaison with Provincial Disaster Management Authority and regular reporting3. Facilitate regular review of activities in the field and give advice4. Documentation / knowledge management5. Financial flow and controlling

An institutional diagram for ERP is shown in Annex 3.

3.4 Partners and networks

Four NGO partners implemented the programme in the four valleys

LP Partner Valley1 Lasoona Marghuzar, District Swat2 Service providers facilitation, Chail Chail, District Swat3 Jarga Chagharzai, District Buner4 Rural Development Support Programme (RDSP) Amazai, District Buner

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Besides these NGOs, the following departments / development agencies provided supportfor various interventions:

- Agriculture Department, Districts Swat and Buner- Livestock and Dairy Development Department, Districts Swat and Buner- Individual engineers- Cereal Crop Research Institute (CCRI), Pir Sabak Nowshera- Pak Green Spray Centre Swat for Pea seed and seed treatment chemicals- Local private vendors for agricultural tool kits, fertilizers and infrastructure material- Sarhad Traders, Peshawar for goats and poultry- Local vendors for infrastructure material

A relatively new partner to LP/ERP was the Provincial Disaster Management Authority(PDMA) which resumed coordination among all the humanitarian initiatives in the conflictaffected districts. A Non Objection Certificate (NOC) was granted by PDMA toIntercooperation to initiate an ERP in Swat and Buner (September 09, 2009 extended inApril 2010).

3.5 Guiding principles

The overall guiding principles mutually agreed with partners were as follows:

1. Transparent way of identifyingbeneficiaries - focus the most affectedby the conflict and poorest / poor

2. Ready to answer any questionregarding equity at any time

3. Systematic exchange of informationwith coordinating partners

4. Keep a low profile regarding visibility5. Buy local material as much as possible

to revive the local economy6. CfW priority: who couldn’t get

registered in IDP camps and landless7. Always discuss operation and

maintenance of schemes and plan amechanism for this

8. Always document a major shift9. A clear distinction between ERP and LP is well explained to communities at each step10. Be practical and brief in reporting given the workload in the field11. Regular coordination with other agencies active in the area using different means12. Ensure photo-monitoring to record activities

3.6 Coordination with other actors

Three coordination mechanisms were available with ERP:

1. Intercooperation was a member of UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs(OCHA), which made an effort to coordinate all the rehabilitation activities in the twodistricts. These meetings aimed at avoiding duplication and registering who was doingwhat in different localities of Swat and Buner.

2. Line departments (e.g. agriculture, livestock etc.) who collaborated with severalhumanitarian initiatives at a time in various localities, also served as a way to avoid

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duplication. They proactively provided information to ERP on where to concentrate withinthe valleys in case other humanitarian agencies stepped in with other similar supportaround the same time with the same people (mainly the case in Marghuzar).

3. Informal means were used for engaging in collaboration and sharing information. Theseincluded staff’s own social networks within the districts and humanitarian organizations,their observations and encounters, and feedback from communities.

The second and the third means for ensuring coordination were more effective than the oneintroduced by OCHA. The feedback from IC collaborators showed that the meetings werehighly crowded and could not systematically serve the purpose.

4 OUTPUTS AND MONITORING

4.1 What was achieved?

All the activities planned were achieved in ERP, with little variations in few cases. ERP wasimplemented in 115 villages benefiting 11,026 households with a total 81,395 directbeneficiaries (41,790 female and 39,605 male). Some of the highlights are as followed:

1. 100 ton of high quality wheat seed was provided to 3,854 small farmers (individualhouseholds) for cultivating 2,000 acres land. Together with seed, 300 tons of fertilizerwas also procured and provided.

2. Under Cash for Work scheme, 26,515 person days of employment was generated. Ofthese, 2,931 were skilled and 23,584 were unskilled labour. This wage-labour came from4,081 households generating a total cash income of Rs.8,540,550. On average, 39% ofthe CfW benefited displaced and returned, while 61% went to those who stayed behindand desperately needed to be at work for cash.

3. 950 sets of farm implements could be distributed including 50 kits for orchard pruning.4. 400 goats and 450 poultry units were provided to the most destitute families. Goats were

provided under pass-on scheme.5. 140 cash grants (Rs.5,000 each) and 80 grants (Rs.10,000 each) were provided to

village artisans and shopkeepers respectively. Their identification was a meticulousprocess in order to ensure that the neediest receive this support.

Grow or go hungry again!!

Organizing 100 tons of wheat seed and 300 tons of fertilizer within a week time was the firstchallenge ERP faced. Seeds were to be sown within the first half of November. It became evenmore challenging since funds had not been released yet. The Livelihoods Programme (North)mobilized its networks for procurement of good quality wheat seed and fertilizers. It seemed thatfinding desired quantities of seed and fertilizer would be hard since several other players alsoplanned for supplying seed and fertilizers in different valleys of Swat and Buner. The AgricultureDepartment arranged the desired quantity within no time and hence procurement issue wasimmediately solved. The second challenge was to ensure that they are delivered in time in the twodistricts. The trucks loaded with seed and fertilizers were intercepted by the security forces atseveral points arguing that chemical fertilizers were banned due to risk of explosives. This wasdisturbing since the ban had been lifted few days ago. The department was approached again. Acopy of notification was obtained and shared with the security forces to allow trucks to theirdestinations. The farmers, who were not sure whether or not they will be able to sow the seed thisseason, finally got quality agriculture inputs from ERP just towards the end of the sowing season.While ERP was winding up in the field, the farmers have harvested their wheat crop and shared thatthey got bumper crops of wheat this year (2010). They attributed this to the quality seed andfertilizers and regular visits from Agriculture department field staff for advice. Farmers have beenreminded that they must preserve seed for the next crop and use the rest of the crop as grains.

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6. In total 31 drinking water supply schemes, 44 small irrigation channels, 99 km of villageroads and 29 pony tracks could be repaired under the CfW component . In total 12,314household directly benefit from these schemes.

The following table depicts progress achieved against planned activities and the number ofhouseholds benefited (a valley-wise detail is given in Annex 4).

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Detail of Progress AchievedS.No.

Activity Plan Achieved HHbenefited

Direct Recipients Major outcomeMen Women

1. Wheat seed distributions (Kg) 98,500 100,000 3,854 3,683 171 Sowing on 2000 acres of landwith an approximate productionof 4000 tons of grain

2. Fertilizer for Wheat (bags) Urea: 3,950 3,950 3,854 3,683 171DAP for wheat (bags) DAP: 1,975 1,975 3,854 3683 171

3. Pea seed distribution (Kg) 1000 1,200 200 200 0 Sowing on 50 acres of land withan approximate production of 8tons of peas

4. Fertilizer pea seed (bags) Urea: 50 50 200 200 0DAP for vegetables (bag) DAP: 50 50 200 200 0

5. Farm implements (kits) 900 900 900 890 106. Orchard plants 6,000 6,469 57 57 0 33 acres of orchard re-

established7. Pruning kits 50 50 50 50 08. Goat distribution (no.) 400 400 400 52 348 The recipients were trained in

goat and poultry keeping prior todistribution

9. Poultry distribution (unit of 5 birds) 450 450 450 72 378

10. Start-up grants village artisans 140 140 140 140 011. Start-up grants village shopkeepers 80 76 76 66 1012. Repair of drinking water schemes

(no.)31 31 2,433 31 villages have clean drinking

water13. Repair of water channels (no.) 44 45 4,535 Channels in 33 villages restored

irrigation for 20,372 acres land14. Repair of village roads (Km) 95 99 2,549 Access roads repaired in 30

villages15. Repair / improvement of pony

tracks (no.)29 29 2,797 In 29 villages repaired /

improved pony tracks16. CfW agriculture/infrastructure

schemesTotal person days 28270 26515 4,081

Skilled person days 3900 2931Unskilled person days 24370 23584

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4.2 Process for implementation of activities in the field

Often in humanitarian programmes thevolume and pace of workimplementation does not practicallyallow a long process which usually is acharacteristic of normal developmentproject. In case of ERP, however, threethings were special:

i) local partners were available withtheir networks and pre-establishedrapport in the community and

ii) ERP was not a new comer for ashort duration.

iii) Although the implementers of ERP(individuals and organizations) hadearlier exposure to dealing withhumanitarian issues (e.g.earthquake, heavy snow,avalanches), none of them wereexperts in executing classicalhumanitarian projects.

Hence it was essential not to compromise on the process in some of the crucial areas, suchas beneficiary identification and procurement. Some of the ingredients of the processensured in the field were as follows:

1. Orientation of CBOs on the intervention, selection criteria of beneficiaries, specificobjective of the ERP, its time frame and consensus building

2. Identification of the most deserving individuals/ households /communities and enlistingthem by the CBOs

3. Verification of the identified beneficiaries bythe ERP supervisors and submission ofsemifinal lists to the ERP Manager

4. Meeting of the ERP/LP team members withthe selected beneficiaries and checkingagainst the criterion set for by the ERP andfinalizing the lists

5. Issuance of tokens to finally selectedbeneficiaries in front of the CBOrepresentatives and signing terms ofpartnership with the identified recipients

6. Procurement of materials locally throughpurchase committee composed of by partnerNGO, ERP monitoring officer and ManagerERP besides ensuring quality of thematerial.

7. Packing and storing in safe places andcommunication of dates and venue to theselected beneficiaries for distribution

8. Display of the expenditure details of all theinterventions in the village and requests

Business and education together: Small grant

Bahadur Gul lives in Chail. He is the only son ofhepatitis infected Naseeb Gul and responsible forsubsistence of his family, comprising his parents andhimself. The 15 years old is a student of grade 9 andruns a small home shop in the village. He sells dailyneed items and also binds books to earn bread forhis family. During insurgency, all the schools in thearea were closed and his business of book bindingalso came to a halt. Although the situation got betterafter a year but the boy had suffered a lot and wasunable to resume his small business. He wanted tocontinue his education and support his family butwith no resources and a burden of debts. He wasnear to quit his education and start working as a dailywage labourer. He was identified by ERP as one ofthe 40 artisans for small grants. The programmeprovided him Rs.10,000 which he could spend inbuying material for shop and binding stuff. Herestarted his business with the grant, while heresumed his education as well.

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made to people to comment on quality standards against costs shown, to ensuretransparency and accountability

9. Involvement of experts from livestock department for checking quality and health ofgoats / chicken prior to provision

10. Implement and ensure post completion care and management of the intervention by theindividual recipient and community.

11. Complete documentation of the data and information from the start till the end for record(including photo monitoring).

4.3 Monitoring mechanism and Knowledge Sharing

Monitoring was an inbuilt mechanism in ERP:

1. Villagers monitored activitiesfacilitated by display chartspresented by partner NGOs.Partners on the other hand, paidregular visits to the villages andmonitored the progress of the ongoing activities. Similarly theymonitored the use of distributedmaterial by direct recipients, e.g.timely sowing, fertilizer application,use of cash grant, performance ofthe chickens and goats etc.

2. The second level of monitoring wasperformed by the supervisorsengaged by ERP for each valley.They frequently travelled fromvillage to village to monitor ongoingschemes, labour engagement andcash payment to the wage labour.They also supervised andmonitored material procurement(local as well as from outside thevillage).

3. ERP manager, together with the LPNorth Staff visited all four valleys inthe field on frequent basis tomonitor the progress and alsooversee that all criteria and guidingprinciples were followed.

4. IC Peshawar staff responsible forbackstopping ERP team interacted with them in Swat on monthly basis and supported

Agriculture tool kit, seeds and fertilizers

Bhatto comes from village Pandair, Buner. She is a widow and has no helping hand other than herson who is a daily wager in Karachi. She used to practice farming on her own but when theconflicts broke out, she was forced to quit farming. She lost her agricultural tools in the time ofrush. When she returned, she had nothing. It was impossible for her to purchase new tools andrestart farming. Bhatto received wheat seed and fertilizers from ERP. She also received basicagricultural tools and is now very happy to resume her farming.

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them in compiling data on necessary formats (IC as well as PDMA) and report to thedonor and coordinating bodies.

Concise reports were sent to SDC Islamabad and PDMA containing the findings, mainachievements, unexpected problems and overall progress.

4.4 Communication and Visibility

A smooth communication was ensured at all levels since with the volume of activities andthe speed of implementation at one time in four valleys, effective communication wasabsolutely necessary. However, communication suffered certain obstacles from time to timeincluding frequent jamming of telecommunication services due to security, unannounced

curfews in Swat and seasonal hurdlesdue to heavy snow and rain.

The project also heavily relied onfrequent face to face interactionsbetween partners and LP/ERP/IC stafffor discussing progress, removingbottlenecks and making adjustments.This strategy proved useful sincedistant communication (throughemails) had its own limitations.Visibility of support extended by thedonor through international NGO, wascarefully organized in the given conflictprone situation.

As a consensus with all actors involved, it was decided that visibility is only secondary toeffective implementation of the project.

4.5 Links with regular LP

A number of interventions had a close link with what regular LP promotes in the field. A fewexamples are as follows:

1. Wheat / pea seed distribution was packaged with regular extension visit by field staff ofthe Agriculture Department.

2. Goat distribution was conducted withpass-on agreements with therecipients. This implied that eachrecipient will pass-on the first babygoat to the next poorest householdand hence this process will continue.

3. Recipients of goats and chickens werefirst equipped with basic skills ongoats and poultry management andfollow up visits by the livestockdepartment experts.

4. Operation and Maintenancearrangement for infrastructureschemes was made essential to be

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discussed with community before a scheme was started.5. Communities were encouraged in their self-initiatives to either expand a scheme or

supplement CfW through volunteer support (locally called Asher). In many cases whenCfW call was taken by the most deprived, relatively better offs came forward withvolunteer support which boosted everyone’s moral in the village.

4.6 Exit from ERP, resuming to regular LP

Right at the start, messages were given to the recipient communities that the ERP approach(full subsidy, no contribution but participation from the affected community) will apply only forERP duration, while the previous approach (community contribution and participation, no orminimum subsidies) will continue under regular LP. Hence certain principles wereestablished for the exit strategy from ERP (June 2010) and fully switch back to LP:

1. The partner NGOs and communities had to be clearly informed about the closure of ERPinterventions by mid May 2010.

2. Clear messages given to all the ERP related communities about the cessation of theERP approach and reverting back to the regular LP approach and continue it on everynext interaction with community.

3. LP North and partner NGOs ensured that all the remaining interventions were concludedwithin the project duration.

4. Any left-over amount budgeted against any intervention will be surrendered to SDC andnot re-planned against others.

It leaps beyond recovery!!! Cash for work scheme

Village Dara is situated at a distance of 3 km from Dabargay. 1 km jeepable track was paved in1985 from Dabargay. The track is repaired by the inhabitants of Dara annually. The condition ofthe track became so miserable that the locals were forced not to use it for vehicles but only as afoot track. In the years 2007-2009 the militancy issue in Swat became fierce. The survival was sotough that they could not pay attention to their communal infrastructure. The only paved track inthe village got further dilapidated and the whole community faced a lot of problems in carriage oflife goods particularly at times of emergency. People of Dara were assigned to repair the trackfrom Dabargay to Dara under the CfW scheme. Nearly all the households participated. The trackwas repaired in the allocated men-days and material. But this was not the end…!

The villagers came together and continued the journey. Without any further assistance from ERP,with an extraordinary spirit, they started repairing the remaining foot track. They succeeded inconstructing a 3 km road up to their village. They proclaim, with a sense of obligation “thanks SDCand IC”, we are beyond the situation, as it was before the crisis.

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5 Lessons learned, challenges and things to improve

Both Intercooperation and its partner organizations are not formally humanitarianorganizations. Hence a lot of emphasis was placed on documenting the learning for future, ifimmediate stepping into humanitarian role is again needed later on. An elaborated exercisewas conducted with partners to identify the major learning, challenges and areas ofimprovement. Their ideas are summarised in the following:

5.1 ERP NGO Partners:

Positive lessons / what worked

1. Local procurement of tools contributed to the revival of local economy.2. Social acceptability through implementation by local partners provided an edge over

other organisations working in the area.3. There were diverse activities and limited staff thus volunteers and interns were involved.4. The concept of CfW was new for local organisations but after their orientation with the

concept, proved to be very effective.5. The implementation in areas where CBO’s are active was easier and contributed to

building their capacities.6. The process of identifying beneficiaries and distribution mechanism were transparent.

The neediest people were approached. This gave a sense of ownership in thecommunity and developed self confidence among deprived ones. This also contributedto changing perceptions about NGOs.

7. Help was taken from the local religious scholars and influential community membersfrom time to time, to enhance their goodwill.

8. As compared to other organisations the ERP effectively utilized a smaller budget for alarger bulk of activities (cost effectiveness).

9. Good communication developed among the supervisors and the CBO’s boosted theefficiency of the field activities.

10. Supervisors happily reported to have learned computer skills on job, which will help themin future.

11. Introductory sessions with thePakistan Army helped. Passeswere issued for travelling todifferent locations.

12. During heavy rain/snow falls, thefocus was diverted from fieldactivities to the identification ofthe beneficiaries for making bestuse of time.

13. The confidence shown by the ICand LP team in local partnersimproved their self confidenceand capacity of work.

14. Proper and efficient data formatshelped in timely and effectivedocumentation.

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Challenges / things to improve

1. Financial delays and heavier engagement in agricultural activities resulted in lateprovision of cash grants.

2. In the beginning it appeared that the clarity on the objectives of ERP between donor andpartners was not the same.

3. There was always an accumulation of activities at one time, high workload.4. The formats for data provision provided by PDMA and IC kept changing from time to time

thus making data delivery difficult.5. Implementation of activities, while war was still on in few areas, was a difficult task.6. The field activities got hampered by occasional military operations in pockets,

unannounced curfews and bad weather.7. There were political hiccups during the implementation of the field activities since political

leaders wanted to cash the situation in favour of their party members.8. The funds and number allocated for cash grants was rather low whereas the needy

people were in much greater number.9. The supervision on motor bikes proved tough due to the remoteness of the target areas

and difficult hilly terrain with dirt roads.10. During this phase a lot of other organisations came into the valleys so the staff turnover

increased. This factor negatively affected the speed of activities.

5.2 Intercooperation team in the field

Positive lessons / what worked

1. Collective volunteerism from communities ensured the overall quality of outputs andtimely completion of the project.

2. Change of attitude among religious hardliners towards NGOs resulting from firstresponse from NGOs (rather than religious leaders).

3. Active involvement of women in activities.4. Understanding the difference between two contexts matters in relief and rehabilitation

work: Conflict affected (threats persist) vs. earthquake affected (only welcoming).5. Clear message to community from Day 1 on cut-off date and shifting from ERP to LP

was important to ensure a smooth transition to regular the Livelihoods Programme.6. Active coordination with the line departments contributed to enhancing quality of

activities and avoiding overlaps.7. CfW was a great start with high quality briefing and discussion among partners right at

the beginning. It was a unique learning with innovations in specific situations. Thishelped inclusion of the neediest, weakest and special segments in communities.

8. CfW decision was not top down – the decision was left by SDC to IC and partners basedon first building an understanding about it (done in Islamabad).

9. New discoveries – women farmers in Buner and Chail (agriculture), womenentrepreneurs – important for LP to look into, in the future.

10. Transparency of the process was our edge, in identification of beneficiaries, distributionand payment mode, highly appreciated and owned by communities.

Challenges / things to improve

1. Staff accidents and smaller mishaps at times resulted in delayed activities.2. Late approval for ERP by SDC sharply narrowed down the time needed for season-

based agricultural activities (yet partners made it).3. Financial management was organized according to the classical controlling procedures

of the Programme. This resulted in time consuming approvals and flow of funds,eventually leading to late disbursals.

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4. Limited time available for wheat purchase and dispatching coupled with initial constraintsin fund transfers– very hard to manage with.

5. Seasonal obstacles resulted in accumulated activities/ increased workload in latermonths.

6. ERP remained under-resourced in terms of staff and communication – hence morechallenging (especially due to concentration of activities in certain periods).

7. Security situation remained an obstacle from time to time due to occasional incidents,sudden curfews, jamming of communication channels, etc.

8. Changing monitoring formats and little possibilities for briefing on how to fill them was aheadache and not strength of field staff.

9. District coordination mechanism (formal channels) did not prove as useful as expected.

Imam-e-masjid as daily-wage labour

Sher Mohammad is an Imam (Prayer Leader) in village Saleem Khan. His family needs weretaken care of by the villagers. After harvest of cereal crops, every farmer donated a fixed share ofthe grain. The family lived a very poor life but enjoyed a lot of respect in the village. When themilitary operation started, there was no one to harvest ready crops in the village hence there wasnothing to be given to Imam and his family. This was the turning point in his life. Till now he didn’tperform any work for his livelihoods and even now he was shy to jump into a wage-labour workdue to his self respect being an Imam, and that too funded by an NGO in the village. The ERPteam proposed him to serve as a waterman for the freshly constructed cement work in theschemes. Hence his job was to fetch water from a distance and make sure that the new structuresremain moist till they are firm. This way he started earning a bit and his ideology about NGOsbegan to change. Colleagues from Lasoona Organization during discussions with the SherMohammad also learned that he knew sewing but he did not practice it after becoming an Imam.He was unable to buy a machine for himself due to lack of finances. He shared that he will try tobuy a sewing machine with his earnings since this kind of situation may arrive again in future. Hebelieves now that depending on grains from the villagers should not be his only livelihoodstrategy.

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6 Finance

The funding of the ERP came from the LP budget, and consisted of the funds earmarked forSwat and Buner districts which were unspent because of the bad security situation in2008/2009. The overall situation of budget and expenses is summarised as follows:

Total Budget Totalexpenditure

Balance % Expenditure

PKR 49,586,240 36,995,443 12,590,797 75%CHF 614,000 506,787 107,213 83%

(Exchange ratePKR80.76)

(Exchange ratePKR73)

The main reasons for saving in budgeted amount for ERP are:

a. Wheat seed was procured from the Agriculture Department on a lower rate than fromopen market. A ban on fertilizer import in Swat (due to risk of using for explosives) waslifted. Hence prices went down substantially. Besides, logistic costs for purchasingagriculture inputs were lower than expected.

b. Less CfW opportunities were generated for carrying material from vehicle to the source.c. Livestock could be arranged on lower prices than expected and budgeted.

Annex 5 shows a detailed expense report of ERP. The Graph 1 presents the percentage offunds utilized for key activities in ERP. Graph 2 reflects percentage of funds utilized for eachof the four LP valleys in Districts Swat and Buner.

Overall financial distribution among main activities - Graph 1

56%

4%

24%

16%

AgricultureGrantsCfWMaterial Infrastructure

Valley-wise expenses in the field - Graph 2

22%

20%

38%

20%

MarghuzarChailChagharzai

Amazai

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Annex 1: ERP activity plan and need assessment (4 valleys)- as agreed on 4th Nov 2009sSupport Chail Chagharzai Marghuzar AmazaiCereal seed (wheat) fungicide treated (not for eating) 12500 kg (518 hh) 37500 kg (1500 hh) 11250 kg (300 hh) 37500 kg (1372 hh)Vegetable seed (50 acres) 1000 kg peas 0 0 0Agriculture implements (revised)* 250 kits 500 kits 150 kits 0Fertilizers for cereal (bags) 500 urea, 250 DAP 1500 urea, 750 DAP 446 urea, 223 DAP 1500 urea, 750 DAPFertilizers for vegetable 50 urea, 50 DAP 0 0 0Goats (Rev mechanism) 120 hh 120 hh 100 hh 60 hhPoultry 150 hh 100 hh 100 hh 100 hhWater channels 14 villages critical 8 villages critical 8 villages critical 0

total person days 1868 4000 1500 0Person days channel (skilled) 280.2 600 225 0Person days channel (unskilled) 1587.8 3400 1275 0

Drinking water (29 schemes) 9 villages critical 10 villages critical 8 villages critical 4 villages criticalTotal person days 450 500 800 200Skilled 180 200 480 80Unskilled 270 300 320 120

Orchard rehabilitation (saplings) – 50 orchards in 5villages

0 0 1000 plants 0

Pruning tools 0 0 50 kits 0Start up grant (artisans) 40 max 60 max 40 max 0Start up grant (entrepreneur) 20 max 40 max 20 max 0Rehab or partial maintenance of village roads Valley roads with

several villages (15km)

6 villages critical (24km)

4 villages critical(roughly 20 km)

6 villages critical (35km)

Total person days 1500 2600 2500 2400Skilled 225 390 375 360

unskilled 1275 2210 2125 2040Rehab or partial maintenance of pony tracks 10 villages critical 14 villages critical 5 villages critical 0

Total person days 1500 2800 750 0skilled 150 280 75 0

Unskilled 1350 2520 675 0

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Annex 2: What is Cash for Work

What is Cash-for-Work3

Dr. Jawad AliMercy Corps, Pakistan

1. Definition:

An alternative to Food-for-Work Approach, Cash-for-Work (CfW) is a short-term intervention to providetemporary employment mainly by humanitarian assistance organisations to the most vulnerable segments ofthe population in food insecure, disaster-affected or post-conflict environments (DFID).

In the above definition please read public, communal and also private for ‘public’. Private is applicable wheremany of the community individuals could benefit from an intervention. For example, terrace repair in a givenvillage where some households can benefit from repair of their terraces while others (e.g. landless, labour)could benefit from offering labour for terrace repair).

From the above definition, Food for Work (FfW) or Cash for Work (CfW) are implemented in situationswhere people are not able to buy food and other essential due to: 1. unavailability of cash to buy essentials forlivelihoods; 2. unavailability of food in the market. Such a situation is analyzed by asking the followingquestion:

What was the impact of the emergency on food and income sources and assets, essential forcommunity livelihoods? Are people able to meet their basic needs with food and income availableafter the emergency?

Therefore CfW (an alternate to FfW) is implemented in situation described below:

• A shock has resulted in a decline in income resulting in destitution• As a result people are no longer able to meet their basic needs and are adopting short-term coping

strategies that are damaging to their long term livelihoods and assets• Sufficient food supplies and/or essential goods are available locally to meet immediate needs. People

will buy them using the income they earned from CfW programmes.

2. Search for Thematic area for CfW (Few examples):

– Bury the dead, debris clearance, rehabilitation of major roads, Temporary shelters, rubble clearance,solid waste management (clean the village/city);

– Small Infrastructure: Irrigations channels, water and sanitation facilities, clearing fields, other farmingrelated activities;

– Communal services, e.g. rehabilitating schools, drinking water sources, village roads, reconstructionand rehabilitation of public buildings etc.

– Provide manual labour for carrying goods manually through difficult terrain

3 This note is a summery of Mercy Corp’s document on Cash-for-work available on line.http://reliefweb.int/rw/lib.nsf/db900sid/SODA-73M3YH/$file/mc-cashforwork.pdf?openelement

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From the sections 1 and 2, we understand that the main purpose of any CfW is to induce cash in localeconomy for the affected population so that people can buy essential goods to survive in post emergencysituation. Therefore the emphasis is not on work rather on distributing cash (for work and not for free) so thatpeople are not compelled to fall in a cycle of permanent destitution through selling their valuable assets andtake loans, which they may not be able to pay. Another purpose is also to avoid cash induction from othersources that can be harmful both to the individuals as well as to the society in general (e.g. in a state ofdesperation youth may seek employment with miscreants and extremists to bring cash home).

The above brings us to the conclusion that CfW is to provide immediate cash to the emergency affectedpeople. For that purpose, distribution of cash in itself is either 1. Not possible in many situations; 2. Can beharmful to the society; 3. Can create conflict among the community etc. Therefore we need to seekopportunities where people can be employed to deliver cash. This includes both existing opportunities (createdby the factors which caused emergency) and created opportunity for CfW (e.g. construction of pony tracks,footpaths, improved farming terraces, water conservation and reduced erosion for helping the community intheir livelihoods).

We should not link CfW with repair of damaged physical infrastructure in order to see a link between CfWand the emergency. All emergencies do not necessarily damage physical infrastructures, but they do takepeople out of employments. The link is that the people have lost their livelihood/income sources (earningopportunities - crops, fruits, closure of business and construction work for long periods resulting in loss ofcash income particularly for daily wage labour) due to emergency and they do not have enough cash tosurvive in post emergency situations. Swat is a perfect example of such emergencies.

In case of Swat we may not be able to deliver cash to the affected population if we link CfW with damagedinfrastructure. The Swat emergency is not comparable to Tsunami or the October 2005 earthquake whereinfrastructure (private, communal as well as public) was almost completely damaged and the opportunities forCfW through repair of infrastructure were many. Fortunately, in Swat few buildings were damaged due to fullscale insurgency and military operation against the insurgents. Not many opportunities for CfW in damagedpublic sector infrastructure exist as often perceived by outsiders. Given this situations, opportunities need tobe explored for CfW to deliver cash to the affected population so that the markets in villages and semi urbanareas resume functioning (buying and selling). Overall economy of Swat and livelihood sources of peopleincluding farming, tourism, and other employment sectors have suffered since 1993 when insurgentstemporarily created disorder and took control of Swat followed by a military action against them. The recenttakeover by insurgents followed by another military operation has exacerbated the situation in Swat forcingpeople out of employment and livelihoods for a longer period.

Creating CfW opportunities can include construction of pony tracks, footpaths, cleaning thecities/towns/villages (environmental related activities) where procurement/purchase of large quantities ofmaterial is not involved. First preference must be given to communal services so that a larger segment ofpopulation is served through the impact of the activity.

3. Advantages of CfW:

• Allow setting broader objective – food security, basic needs, improvement of assets or communityneeds, jumpstarting economic development, stability.

• Ease of administration: It can be implemented far more quickly and with fewer delays than food aid dueto logistical issues

• Empowerment: It empowers beneficiaries to buy food or other necessities for immediate use andaccording to the priorities of the individual. It enables people to determine their own choices and priorities

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• Endurance: Despite short term nature of intervention, the positive results can endure far beyond the endof programme activities

• Continuation: CfW programmes can be planned such that they are converted into longer term livelihoodseconomic development programmes (e.g. through forming maintenance committees for infrastructuresand hence injecting social bonds between communities)

• Migration: Employment opportunities generated by CfW programming enables many to remain homeand serve their families and communities

• Rehabilitation: Of individual, community and local economy• Debt reduction: Cash earned through CfW can help break debt cycles which may be exacerbated by the

need for immediate cash in a post-disaster/post-conflict environment• Self esteem: Cash is earned by people through offering their manual capacity to work. This enhances their

self esteem in the community – and helps mitigating impact of trauma created by a war-like situation.

4. To Summarise:

The main objective of CfW is to provide cash to the affected population; cash comes first and work later.People need immediate cash to buy necessary goods. And immediate cash is provided through CfW.

To provide cash through CfW, we need to seek/create opportunities for CfW. The link between CfW and emergency is that the people lost income sources due to emergency regardless

of any physical damage to infrastructure and assets. Hence, CfW should not be liked to only “repair” of damage public infrastructure, although this provides

the best opportunity for CfW. In cases where cash is extremely short and is not immediately inducted, there is a risk that people may

resort to activates that are harmful both to the individual households and the society in general. Shortage of liquidity may result in shifting people’s livelihoods towards destitution due to selling capital

assets crucial for their livelihoods in longer term.

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33

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Annex 3 ERP Institutional diagram

SDC

IC/LP

LP-NorthERPManager

ERP Supervisor ERP Supervisor ERP Supervisor ERP Supervisor

JargaChagharzai,

Buner

RDSPAmazai, Buner

SPF ChailChail, Swat

LasoonaMarghuzar,

Swat

PDMA

DCO Office/UNOCHAAgriculture Department Swat and Buner

DLDD Swat and Buner

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Annex 4: Valley-wise details on achievement in ERP

Support Marghuzar Chail Chagharzai Amazai

Achievedhhbenefited

DirectRecipients Achieved

hhbenefited

DirectRecipients Achieved

hhbenefited

DirectRecipients Achieved

hhbenefited

DirectRecipients

Male Female Male Female Male Female Male FemaleWheat seed distributed (2000acres) 12500 kg 348 346 2 12500 kg 515 515 0 37500 kg 1500 1331 169 37500 kg 1491 1491 0CFW agriculture 175 94 94 140 days 40 40 0 421 252 507 170 170 0Pea seed distributed (50 acres) 0 1200 kg 200 200 0 0 0Farm Implements distributed 150 150 149 1 250 kits 250 198 52 500 500 491 9 0

Fertilizer distributed (bags)450 Urea,225 DAP 223 222 1

550 Urea,300 DAP 715 715 0

1500Urea 750DAP 1500 1331 169

1500Urea, 750DAP 1491 1491 0

Goats distributed 100 100 49 51 120 120 1 119 120 120 2 118 60 60 0 60Poultry distributed (5 birds perunit) 100 units 100 60 40 150 150 5 145 100 100 7 93 100 100 0 100Water channels 8 600 29 3560 8 375 0

Total person days 1130 139 139 0 2463 318 318 0 4323.5 535 0Skilled 191 135 0 535 535 0 0

Unskilled 939 2328 0 3788.5 3788.5 0 0Drinking water schemes 8 260 9 1180 8 776 4 217

Total person days 528 79 79 0 614 99 99 0 173 20 200 62 62 0Skilled 168 159 75 75 0 80

Unskilled 360 455 98 98 0 120

Fruit plants distribution in 7villages (57 orchards)

6469plants 57 57 0 0 0

Pruning tools 50 50 50 0 0Grants delivered 40 40 40 0 40 40 40 0 60 60 60 0 0Grants delivered 10 10 8 2 20 20 13 7 46 40 45 1 0

Rehab or partial maintenanceof village roads 20 km 804 15 km 2500 28 km 920 36 km 2549

Total person days 2,610 220 220 0 1758 320 320 0 3026 350 2450 687 687 0Skilled 375 118 383 383 0 285

unskilled 2,235 1640 2643 2643 0 2165Rehab or partial maintenance

of pony tracks 5 592 10 815 14 1390 0Total person days 750 105 105 0 1782 211 211 0 3464 380 0

skilled 75 72 280 280 0 0Unskilled 675 1710 3184 3184 0 0

36

Annex 5: Financial details

ERP-Statement of Expense (1 CHF = Rs.73)

Budget lineBudgeted

Rs.Actual Exp

Rs.Balance

(+/-)% of

UtilizationExp. in

CHF Remarks

A Part A: Agriculture Inputs

Wheat 3,950,000 3,530,000 420,000 89 48,356 Seed available from department on lower rate

Vegetable seeds, peas 300,000 306,000 -6,000 102 4,192 Department advised increase in seed rate per acre

Orchard 300,000 142,965 157,035 48 1,958 Plants were available for lower prices

Agri kits 2,700,000 1,836,400 863,600 68 25,156 Implements were arranged locally and cheaper

Urea bags 4,795,200 3,276,720 1,518,480 68 44,887 The price dropped after lifting of ban

DAP bags 6,069,000 3,803,240 2,265,760 63 52,099 The price dropped after lifting of ban

Goats 4,800,000 4,194,400 605,600 87 57,458 Available on lower price

Poultry 900,000 603,000 297,000 67 8,260 Available on lower price

Total for Agi Inputs 23,814,200 17,692,725 6,121,475 74 242,366

Overheads, procurement/supply 3,572,130 2,101,887 1,470,24359 28,793 Lower transportation cost due to local availability of

fertilizers and other material

C4W Part (A) 1,190,710 372,900 817,81031 5,108 Not much labour generated for carriage, the beneficiary

farmers themselves carried material

Grand total Part A 28,577,040 20,167,512 8,409,528 71 276,267

B Part B : Infrastructures

Water channels

WC man days (skilled) 552,500 430,500 122,000 78 5,897

WC man days (unskilled) 1,878,900 2,116,650 -237,750 113 28,995

Material for WC 1,018,000 1,009,009 8,991 99 13,822

Drinking water

DW man days(skilled) 470,000 241,000 229,000 51 3,301

DW man days(unskilled) 303,000 309,900 -6,900 102 4,245

Material for WC and DW 1,330,000 1,142,239 187,761 86 15,647

37

Budget lineBudgeted

Rs.Actual Exp

Rs.Balance

(+/-)% of

UtilizationExp. in

CHF Remarks

Road

Road man days(skilled) 675,000 580,500 94,500 86 7,952

Road man days (unskilled) 2,295,000 2,604,900 -309,900 114 35,684

Material for road 2,600,000 2,635,305 -35,305 101 36,100

Pony tracks

Tracks man days (skilled) 252,500 213,500 39,000 85 2,925

Tracks man days (unskilled) 1,363,500 1,670,700 -307,200 123 22,886

Material pony tracks 651,000 654,538 -3,538 101 8,966

Total Part B 13,389,400 13,608,741 -219,341 102 186,421

Overheads Procurement / supply part B 839,850 397,705 442,145 47 5,448 Transportation of material saved due to local material

C4W part B 279,950 - 279,950- - Little labour generated for carrying material was actually

accounted in the respective schemes

Grand Total Part B 14,509,200 14,006,446 502,754 97 191,869

C. Part C: Cash Grants

Startup grant artisans 700,000 700,000 0 100 9,589

Startup grant enterprise 800,000 700,000 100,000 88 9,589

Total part -C 1,500,000 1,400,000 100,000 93 19,178

Total (A+B+C) 44,586,240 35,573,958 9,012,282 80 487,314

D. Part D: Administrative & Operational costs 5,000,000 1,421,485 3,578,515 28 19,472This budget line was planned higher for security reason. Only28% was used for staff and admin costs

Total Budget 49,586,240 36,995,443 12,590,797 75 506,787

38

Annex 6: List of participants

S.# Name Organization1. Pius Rohner SDC2. Muhammad Arshad Gill SDC3. Ernesto Morosin SDC4. Pierre-Yves Suter Intercooperation Pakistan5. Arjumand Nizami Intercooperation Pakistan6. Iftikhar Hussain Intercooperation Pakistan7. Asad Saleem Intercooperation Pakistan8. Shabir Hussain LP Team Leader9. Khalid Hussain RC LP North10. Ms. Bacha Jehan LP North11. Sajjad Ali ERP Manager12. Nasir Khan (could not attend) ERP supervisor13. Mojahid Mian ERP supervisor14. Abid ERP supervisor15. Hafiz ur rehman ERP supervisor16. Waseem Jan LP North17. Dr. Jawad Ali Mercy Corps / resource person CFW18. Asif Abbasi Mercy Corps Swat19. Syed Muhammad Aftab ACTED20. Said Rehman (could not attend) PDMA21 Wisal Ahmad Oxfam GB22. Bakht Bahadar JARGA23. Tajoon JARGA24. Noor ul hoda Community representative Marghuzar25. Khalida Akbar Chail26. Tasdiq Hussain Chail27. Abdul Haleem Community representative Chail28. Anwar-ul-Haq LASOONA29. Ihsanullah Khan LASOONA30. Mohammad Nawab Community representative Chagharzai31. Hussain Ali RDSP32. Kamran RDSP33 Zarin Khan Community representative Amazai34. Dr. Javaid Iqbal Livestock Deptt.35. Fazal Maullah Agriculture Deptt.