the long winter: turkish politics after the … · contents 1 summary 3 the corruption scandal 4...

MAY 2014

THE LONG WINTER: TURKISH POLITICS AFTER THE CORRUPTION SCANDAL

MUSTAFA GURBUZ

RETHINK PAPER 15

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THE LONG WINTER:

TURKISH POLITICS AFTER

THE CORRUPTION SCANDAL

MUSTAFA GURBUZ

RETHINK PAPER 15

May 2014

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CONTENTS

1 Summary

3 The Corruption Scandal

4 Reframing the Scandal: “The December 17

Coup”

6 Reassignment of Police Forces

7 Charges against AKP Leadership

8 Increasing Control over the Judiciary

9 Assault on Independent Business Elite

10 Internet Curbs to Block Reporting About

Corruption

13 Unholy Alliances: Releasing Ergenekon

Suspects

14 Return of the Repressed: The Gezi Soul

Revives

16 Crackdown on Social Media

19 Post-Election Fury

21 Toward a Surveillance State

23 Appendix: A Timeline of Critical Events

24 About the Author

The Long Winter: Turkish Politics After the Corruption Scandal

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Summary

On December 17, 2013, a major corruption investigation launched by Istanbul district prosecutors hit the news. The police raided the houses of fifty suspects who had been followed for more than a year, including the sons of three Turkish government cabinet ministers. This event and its aftermath, coupled with a tense election campaign, ushered in a new era of politics in Turkey replete with unprecedented developments. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan reframed the corruption scandal as a global plot to overthrow his government, orchestrated by “external” and “internal” enemies. The government tried to stop the corruption investigation and related leaks by resorting to controversial measures that subdued the judiciary, controlled the media, expanded the powers of the intelligence agency, limited internet access, banned social media, and suppressed opposition. Despite the AKP’s comfortable win in local elections on March 30, 2014, Erdoğan maintained his confrontational style and went on to further controversial measures. This suggests that the political deterioration Turkey experienced after December 17 was not just election fever, but rather a more comprehensive transformation that will, apparently, mark Turkish politics for some time to come.

Mustafa Gurbuz

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The Corruption Scandal On December 17, 2013, a major corruption investigation launched by Istanbul district prosecutors hit the news. The police raided the houses of fifty suspects who had been followed for more than a year, including the sons of three Turkish government cabinet ministers. The main suspect was Reza Zarrab, a businessman of Iranian descent, who allegedly laundered $120 billion between 2009 and 2012 to help Iran evade sanctions due to its nuclear program. The son of the minister of interior was charged with illegally procuring Turkish citizenship for Iranian nationals in exchange for gigantic sums of money. Minister of Economy Zafer Çağlayan and Minister of EU Affairs Egemen Bağış were also accused of accepting bribes from Mr. Zarrab. Finally, twenty-six of the detainees, including Mr. Zarrab and two sons of the ministers, were arrested.

Dec 23, 2013 – “3 Sons of Ministers, 3 Bribery Bombshells”

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Reframing the Scandal: “The December 17 Coup” Reminiscent of his reactions to the Gezi Park protests in the summer of 2013, Prime Minister Erdoğan claimed that the graft investigations were a global plot to overthrow the government, orchestrated by “external” and “internal” enemies. Erdoğan specifically mentioned Israel and the United States as being the masterminds behind the investigation, adding that he did not have to allow their ambassadors to remain on Turkish soil.

December 23, 2013 - Pro-government newspapers accuse the United States of engineering the scandal, frame U.S. Ambassador Francis Ricciardone as the mastermind behind the plot, and

demand that he leave Turkey.


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Erdoğan asserted that the Gezi Park protests and the graft probe are directly linked. Both cases, he declared, are “coup” attempts. Erdoğan called on his supporters to join what he calls “Turkey’s new war of independence.”

December 24, 2013 – “Turkey’s new war of Independence” “This is a coup!”

Erdoğan specifically targeted the Gülen movement, also known as Hizmet, claiming that the movement had infiltrated the top levels of Turkey’s state structure and orchestrated this plot. He added that the government will “crush” the movement by entering “its dens.”

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December 22, 2013 – “We’ll enter your dens,” “Like the Assassins”.

During his electoral campaign, Erdoğan repeatedly argued that those who are deeply uncomfortable with a strong and independent Turkey attack “the new Turkey.” The terms Erdoğan employed most in his public rallies included: “a coup d’état,” “a coalition between outside and inside enemies,” “dirty coalition,” “global masterminds,” “parallel state,” “pawns of international powers,” and “traitors.”

Reassignment of Police Forces Within 24 hours of the December 17 investigation going public, 24 police chiefs were reassigned, including all the police chiefs leading the investigation on behalf of the public prosecutor. These actions were taken by Minister of Interior Muammer Güler, whose son had been charged in the investigation. On December 21, the government amended judicial police regulations, requiring police chiefs to inform their superiors about all ongoing investigations. In the following weeks, thousands of police officers of varying ranks around the country were reassigned. Those reassigned


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were largely from organized crime divisions, which are responsible for investigating, among other things, corruption, bribery, and money laundering activities. These relocations were also conducted by Güler.

Charges against AKP Leadership On December 25, 2013, three ministers whose sons were implicated in the investigation abruptly resigned from office. On his way out, Minister for Environment and Urban Planning Erdoğan Bayraktar called on Prime Minister Erdoğan to resign. Mr. Bayraktar said that he was forced to resign, but whatever he had done was known and approved by the prime minister himself.

December 25, 2013 – The New York Times

On the same day, Idris Naim Şahin, an AKP deputy and former minister of interior (2011-13), resigned from the party. Şahin, a longtime friend and political partner of Erdoğan since the days when Erdoğan was mayor of İstanbul in the 1990s, said

that his reason for departure was recent transformations of the party. “The government,” said Şahin, “is now run by a small oligarchic elite in a way that excludes broad segments of the party constituency.”

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Increasing Control over the Judiciary On December 26, 2013, Public Prosecutor Muammer Akkaş, who had been overseeing the corruption investigation, was removed from the case. Following his removal, Akkaş gave copies of a written statement to reporters outside Çağlayan Courthouse in Istanbul. The prosecutor claimed that he had been prevented from performing his duty in the investigation.

Dec 27, 2013 – The New York Times

Prime Minister Erdoğan declared that the press release was a crime. He added that The High Council of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) had committed a crime by criticizing the government and supporting Mr. Akkaş. Earlier in the week, the council had condemned the government decree that required prosecutors to receive permission from ministers for investigations, calling it a blatant attempt to rein in the corruption investigation. The HSYK stated that the new decree “violates the Constitution, and those who govern the country are subject to the supervision of the judiciary.”

Jan 12, 2014 – Pro-government newspapers continued targeting the judiciary in line with

Prime Minister Erdoğan’s statement: “HSYK is run like a junta.”


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On February 15, 2014 , the Parliament, in a 20-hour session that featured a bloody fistfight, approved a bill that tightens the government’s grip on the judiciary. The new law allows the undersecretary of the Ministry of Justice to act as chairman of the HSYK. In addition, the law empowers the minister of justice in the HSYK in a number of ways, such as authorizing him to reshape the composition of all three chambers of the board and to initiate disciplinary procedures for HSYK members.

Assault on Independent Business Elite On January 23, 2014, the president of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen's Association (TUSİAD) stated that a country will not draw foreign investment when there is no respect for the rule of law and companies are increasingly pressured through tax fines. The next day, Prime Minister Erdoğan said that the TUSIAD president cannot use such language. “This is a betrayal of the country,” he added. “It means that you will find us against you.”

Pro-government newspapers on Jan 25, 2014: “We Shall Not Tolerate Traitors!” “TUSIAD

Betrays the Country!”

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Another victim of the offensive against the independent business elite was the gold mining company Koza Altın A.Ş. The company owns Bugün newspaper and Kanal Türk TV station, among the few media outlets that are critical of the AKP government. On December 31, 2013, the company’s activities were halted in Çukuralan goldfield, one of the company's five major gold mines. A few weeks later, attending an event organized by the Ankara Chamber of Commerce, Erdoğan called for a financial boycott of the Gülen movement. He denounced the movement activists as “blood-sucking vampires.”

Internet Curbs to Block Reporting About Corruption On February 18, 2014, President Abdullah Gül approved a new Internet law, passed earlier by the Turkish Parliament. The law allows the authorities, without a court order, to block web pages under the guise of protecting personal privacy, and to collect users’ browsing histories.

January 19 – The Wall Street Journal

On February 21, 2014, an editorial in The New York Times indicated that the law is intended to help protect Erdoğan and his allies from a widening corruption scandal by tightening government control of the Internet:

The new law is a transparent effort to prevent social media and other sites from reporting on a corruption scandal that reportedly involves


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bid-rigging and money laundering. In one audio recording, leaked last month to SoundCloud, the file-sharing site, Mr. Erdoğan is said to be heard talking about easing zoning laws for a construction tycoon in exchange for two villas for his family.

On February 25, 2014, an audio file posted on YouTube went viral. The file included recordings of alleged phone calls between Prime Minister Erdoğan and his son, Bilal, on the very day the graft investigation began. In the recordings, Erdoğan appears to tell Bilal to remove tens of millions of dollars and euros from the family’s homes as soon as possible. Erdoğan claimed the recordings were fake: “They presented a play that was written and dubbed by them.” He added, “What is done is a treacherous attack on the prime minister of Turkey. We will not let anyone get away with it.”

February 26, 2014 - The Wall Street Journal

February 27, 2014 – The New York Times

Three days later, Reza Zarrab and the sons of ministers, who were the leading figures indicted in the graft investigation, were released from prison pending upcoming trials. Chairman Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu of the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) said he had predicted Zarrab's release a few weeks ago, warning that the government had

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promised to save Zarrab if he kept his mouth shut. Upon the release, Erdoğan commented, “Justice is served.”

March 1, 2014 – Radikal: “The December 17 Lasted (only) 73 Days!”


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Unholy Alliances: Releasing Ergenekon Suspects On March 6, 2014, a court decided to release the former chief of staff of the Turkish military, Ilker Başbuğ, who was the most high-profile prisoner in the Ergenekon trials. Within a few days, all of the leading Ergenekon suspects were released from Silivri Prison. The government declared that retrials are necessary, since there were some problems in the judicial process.

March 6, 2014 - “Başbuğ: The Parallel Structure Plotted against Us.”

Critics have long charged that the Ergenekon case, which investigated Turkey’s dirty war years in 1990s as well as coup attempts in recent years, has lately become a tool for the AKP government to suppress its opponents. After the release of the suspects, Erdoğan declared that “the new Ergenekon is the parallel structure,” indicating the Gülen movement. Amidst the graft scandal, this move was interpreted as Erdoğan’s attempt to collaborate with secularists against the Gülen movement. The prime minister condemned the movement for all mistakes and wrongdoings in the judicial process, despite the fact that the AKP was the biggest beneficiary. As anticipated, upon his release, Başbuğ said it was the parallel structure that had created dirty plots against them.

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March 16, 2014 - “Erdoğan: The Parallel Structure is the New Ergenekon!”

Return of the Repressed: The Gezi Soul Revives In the midst of heated politics, a teen’s death sparked mass protests across the country. Tens of thousands turned out for the funeral of 15-year-old Berkin Elvan, who died after nine long months in a coma. Berkin was hit by a police teargas canister while going out to buy bread for his working-class family during the Gezi protests in the summer of 2013. Berkin, with his spirited face and dark eyebrows, became a symbol of resistance against the tightening grip of the prime minister.

March 12, 2014 – The Wall Street Journal


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March 12, 2014 – “Justice Is Blind, Conscience Is Dead.”

Erdoğan neither expressed condolences to Berkin’s family nor apologized for the police violence. Instead, he claimed that Elvan was a member of a terrorist organization and had covered his face with a scarf. He stated that it was impossible for the police officer to know how old Berkin was. Moreover, in an electoral rally in Gaziantep, Erdoğan publicly criticized Berkin's parents for blaming the prime minister for the death of their son. He added, “Don't be fooled [into thinking] that these people gathered together for the funeral of a kid. . . . They particularly want to damage our economy, peace and the settlement process.”

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March 14, 2014 – A full-page advertisement seeking justice for the death of Berkin Elvan

published in the New York Times.

Crackdown on Social Media As the elections of March 30 approached, the government took further steps to curb social media sites. On March 20, 2014, access to Twitter was blocked only hours after the prime minister had said that Twitter failed to abide by court orders to remove content. “Twitter, Schmitter!” added Erdoğan, “We will wipe out all of these. . . . The international community can say this and that. I don't care at all. Everyone will see how powerful the Republic of Turkey is.”


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March 11, 2014 – The Wall Street Journal Editorial

The Twitter ban swiftly got the attention of the global media as well as Turkey’s allies in the West. The European Union’s Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Fule harshly criticized the ban. Likening Internet bans to “21st century book burning,” the U.S. state department stated, “Turkey has nothing to fear from the free flow of ideas and even criticism represented by Twitter. Its attempt to block its citizens’ access to social media tools should be reversed.”

March 22, 2014 – U.S. newspapers reacting to Turkey’s Twitter ban

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Three days before the election, a leaked audio recording hit YouTube, revealing a conversation in which the Turkish foreign minister, the spy chief, and a top general discussed scenarios that could lead to a Turkish attack against Syria. Turkish authorities said the content constitutes “a first degree threat to national security” and ordered the shutdown of YouTube. The Foreign Ministry stated, “The leak shows the scope of the cyber and electronic attack against our country. Those who did this are the enemies of our state and our nation.” On the same day, Erdoğan blamed “the parallel state” for the leak.

March 28, 2014 - BirGün dared to publish the content of the leak of a secret meeting on Syria: “Put a Ban on Us too, but We Must Publish This for Our Children’s Safety: ‘I’ll Send 4 Men to

Strike 8 Rockets!’”


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Post-Election Fury Despite AKP’s comfortable win in the local elections of March 30, Prime Minister Erdoğan continued his confrontational attitude. This suggests that his strategy was not part of campaign politics but something more.

March 31, 2014 – AlMonitor

April 9, 2014 – The Khaleej Times

The opposition parties charged that the AKP rigged the elections in several cities including the capital, Ankara. The Republican People’s Party

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(CHP) filed for a recount in many places, claiming that tallies registered with the election board had been manipulated. The party cited discrepancies in official records from voting sites.

April 2, 2014 - Hurriyet Daily News

A massive power outage that occurred in 22 cities across the country on election night increased suspicions of election fraud. Minister of Energy Taner Yildiz said in response to the claims, “I’m not joking, dear friends. A cat entered a substation and caused the outage. Similar things always happen and have happened before. So, it’s wrong to connect this incident to the elections.”

April 2, 2014 – Today’s Zaman


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Toward A Surveillance State Amidst the corruption scandal, the AKP government drafted a new law expanding the powers of the intelligence agency (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı – MİT), including eavesdropping. The bill to reorganize MİT was proposed to the Turkish Parliament in late February and has sparked a massive public reaction. What is popularly known as the “MİT law” finally went into effect on April 26, 2014.

February 20, 2014 - “Full Authority to MİT”

The new law enables MİT to conduct operations without fear of serious judicial oversight. With this law, MİT now has unfettered access to the archives and databases of every ministry and can collect any data on citizens. Moreover, the law requires private companies to hand over consumer data and technical equipment to MİT when requested. Critics argue that the law appears to contradict Article 20 of the Turkish Constitution, which protects privacy of citizens.

March 20, 2014 – The New York Times

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Specifically, the MİT law authorizes the intelligence agency to conduct operations against possible threats overseas as designated by the Cabinet. MİT will not be accountable for such operations; all responsibility will lie with the civilian government. Furthermore, MİT agents operating under an assumed identity will not be accountable for their activities and MİT agents who infiltrate terrorist organizations will have no criminal liability for crimes committed while undercover. The law also authorizes MİT to conduct wiretaps without a court order. MİT will be authorized to wiretap phone conversations overseas on the orders of the undersecretary, who heads the agency, or his aide. Critics of the government called the MİT law a decisive step toward turning Turkey into a “mukhabarat regime” – a type of regime frequently observed in Middle Eastern autocracies where the government rigorously monitors the words and actions of its citizens.


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Appendix: A Timeline of Critical Events

Dec 17 – Police arrest 50 suspects, including three sons of ministers, as part of a graft probe.

Dec 18 – 24 police chiefs are reassigned, including all the police chiefs leading the corruption investigation.

Dec 21 – The government amends police regulations, requiring police officers to inform their superiors about all ongoing investigations.

Dec 25 – Three ministers whose sons were implicated in the investigation resign. Former minister of interior Idris N. Şahin resigns from the AKP.

Dec 26 – Public prosecutor Muammer Akkaş, who was overseeing the corruption investigation, is removed from the case.

Feb 15 – The government approves a bill that subordinates the HSYK to the Ministry of Justice.

Feb 18 – President Gül approves a highly controversial Internet law.

Feb 25 – Recordings of alleged phone conversations between Prime Minister Erdoğan and his son Bilal Erdoğan hit the social media.

Feb 28 – Reza Zarrab and the sons of the ministers are set free.

Mar 8 – Former chief of staff who was imprisoned in connection with the Ergenekon investigation is released from prison.

Mar 10 – Main figures in the Ergenekon investigation are released en masse.

Mar 12 – Berkin Elvan, a symbol of the Gezi protests, dies after nine long months in a coma.

Mar 20 – Access to Twitter is blocked.

Mar 27 –Access to YouTube is blocked following the leak of a secret government meeting.

Mar 30 – Local elections are held. AKP wins most of the mayoral races. Erdoğan gives a victory speech, vowing to crush opposition groups.

Mar 31– Opposition parties file for recounts in many cities, claiming that the elections were rigged.

Apr 26 – After President Gül’s approval, the “MİT law” that greatly increases the powers of the intelligence agency takes effect.

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About the Author Mustafa Gurbuz received his Ph.D. in sociology from the University of Connecticut and is currently a post-doctoral scholar at the University of South Florida. His doctoral dissertation, “Kurdish Ethnic and Islamic Mobilizations in Turkey: A Study of Rival Movements,” explores how social movement activists construct a competition culture after a long period of political violence. Dr. Gurbuz's publications appeared in Research in Social Movements, Conflict, and Change, Middle East Critique, Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs, European Journal of Turkish Studies, and Research in Social Stratification and Mobility. Dr. Gurbuz is associate editor of Sociology of Islam and a contributing editor of Mobilizing Ideas.

the long winter: turkish politics after the … · contents 1 summary 3 the corruption scandal 4...

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