the lottery paradox - rensselaer polytechnic...
TRANSCRIPT
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The Lottery Paradox
Rensselaer AI & Reasoning (RAIR) LabDepartment of Cognitive ScienceDepartment of Computer Science
Lally School of Management & TechnologyRensselaer Polytechnic Institute (RPI)
Troy, New York 12180 USA
Intro to Logic4/28/2016
Selmer Bringsjord • Kevin O’Neill
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Homeworks 3&4: Oops :).
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Homeworks 3&4: Oops :).
A+ problem with significant prize coming …
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Paradoxes are engines of progress in formal logic.
E.g., Russell’s Paradox — as we’ve seen.
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The paradox in this case?
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The paradox in this case?
• A perfectly rational person can never believe P and believe ¬P at the same time.
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The paradox in this case?
• A perfectly rational person can never believe P and believe ¬P at the same time.
• The Lottery Paradox (apparently) shows, courtesy of its two Sequences (of Reasoning), that a perfectly rational person can indeed have such a belief (upon considering a fair, large lottery).
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The paradox in this case?
• A perfectly rational person can never believe P and believe ¬P at the same time.
• The Lottery Paradox (apparently) shows, courtesy of its two Sequences (of Reasoning), that a perfectly rational person can indeed have such a belief (upon considering a fair, large lottery).
• Contradiction! — and hence a paradox!
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Types of Paradoxes
• Deductive Paradoxes. The reasoning in question is exclusively deductive.
• Russell’s Paradox
• The Liar Paradox
• Richard’s Paradox
• Inductive Paradoxes Some of the reasoning in question uses non-deductive reasoning (e.g., probabilistic reasoning, abductive reasoning, analogical reasoning, etc.).
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Types of Paradoxes
• Deductive Paradoxes. The reasoning in question is exclusively deductive.
• Russell’s Paradox
• The Liar Paradox
• Richard’s Paradox
• Inductive Paradoxes Some of the reasoning in question uses non-deductive reasoning (e.g., probabilistic reasoning, abductive reasoning, analogical reasoning, etc.).
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To set the stage, we bring to your attention OSCAR, now resurrected in the RAIR Lab @ RPI, courtesy of Kevin O’Neill…
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Automated Theorem Provers (ATPs)While there are countless ATPs available in the AI community, almost all use techniques like resolution which don’t directly reflect human reasoning. This means that nobody can intuitively understand complex machine-generated proofs – your experience with Slate won’t help.
As far as we know, the epistemic reasoner in John Pollock’s OSCAR was the only ATP which exclusively makes use of natural deduction (for now…we’re building a successor, MATR). But after Pollock’s death, the OSCAR project was abandoned for decades. Within the past year, we have managed to fully restore OSCAR’s ATP to its former glory.
Now, we can get automatically generated natural deduction proofs!
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Automated Theorem Provers (ATPs)
While there are countless ATPs available in the AI community, almost all use techniques like resolution which don’t directly reflect human reasoning. This means that nobody can intuitively understand complex machine-generated proofs – your experience with Slate won’t help.
As far as we know, the epistemic reasoner in John Pollock’s OSCAR was the only ATP which exclusively makes use of natural deduction (for now…we’re building a successor, MATR). But after Pollock’s death, the OSCAR project was abandoned for decades. Within the past year, we have managed to fully restore OSCAR’s ATP to its former glory.
Now, we can get automatically generated natural deduction proofs!
![Page 14: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/14.jpg)
Automated Theorem Provers (ATPs)While there are countless ATPs available in the AI community, almost all use techniques like resolution which don’t directly reflect human reasoning. This means that nobody can intuitively understand complex machine-generated proofs – your experience with Slate won’t help.
As far as we know, the epistemic reasoner in John Pollock’s OSCAR was the only ATP which exclusively makes use of natural deduction (for now…we’re building a successor, MATR). But after Pollock’s death, the OSCAR project was abandoned for decades. Within the past year, we have managed to fully restore OSCAR’s ATP to its former glory.
Now, we can get automatically generated natural deduction proofs!
![Page 15: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/15.jpg)
Schubert Steamroller ProblemWolves, foxes, birds, caterpillars, and snails are animals, and there are some of each of them. Also, there are some grains, and grains are plants. Every animal either likes to eat all plants or all animals smaller than itself that like to eat some plants. Caterpillars and snails are much smaller than birds, which are much smaller than foxes, which in turn are much smaller than wolves. Wolves do not like to eat foxes or grains while birds like to eat caterpillars but not snails. Caterpillars and snails like to eat some plants.
Prove: there is an animal that likes to eat a grain-eating animal.
You can imagine how much work it would be to make this proof by hand, but OSCAR finds the solution instantaneously!
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Schubert Steamroller ProblemWolves, foxes, birds, caterpillars, and snails are animals, and there are some of each of them. Also, there are some grains, and grains are plants. Every animal either likes to eat all plants or all animals smaller than itself that like to eat some plants. Caterpillars and snails are much smaller than birds, which are much smaller than foxes, which in turn are much smaller than wolves. Wolves do not like to eat foxes or grains while birds like to eat caterpillars but not snails. Caterpillars and snails like to eat some plants.
Prove: there is an animal that likes to eat a grain-eating animal.
You can imagine how much work it would be to make this proof by hand, but OSCAR finds the solution instantaneously!
See the transcript of Kevin’s interaction with OSCAR!
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Types of Paradoxes
• Deductive Paradoxes. The reasoning in question is exclusively deductive.
• Russell’s Paradox
• The Liar Paradox
• Richard’s Paradox
• Inductive Paradoxes Some of the reasoning in question uses non-deductive reasoning (e.g., probabilistic reasoning, abductive reasoning, analogical reasoning, etc.).
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Types of Paradoxes
• Deductive Paradoxes. The reasoning in question is exclusively deductive.
• Russell’s Paradox
• The Liar Paradox
• Richard’s Paradox
• Inductive Paradoxes Some of the reasoning in question uses non-deductive reasoning (e.g., probabilistic reasoning, abductive reasoning, analogical reasoning, etc.).
![Page 19: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/19.jpg)
Inductive Logic
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Inductive Logic
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Inductive Logic
Deductive (familiar)
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Inductive Logic
Deductive (familiar)
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Inductive Logic
Deductive (familiar)
Inductive (new)
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Defeasible Reasoning in OSCARImagine the following: Keith tells you that the morning news predicts rain in Tucson today. However, Alvin tells you that the same news report predicted sunshine.
Without any other source of information, it would be irrational to place belief in either Keith’s or Alvin’s statements.
Further, suppose you happened to watch the noon news report, and that report predicted rain. Then you should believe that it will rain despite your knowledge of Alvin’s argument.
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Defeasible Reasoning in OSCARImagine the following: Keith tells you that the morning news predicts rain in Tucson today. However, Alvin tells you that the same news report predicted sunshine.
Without any other source of information, it would be irrational to place belief in either Keith’s or Alvin’s statements.
Further, suppose you happened to watch the noon news report, and that report predicted rain. Then you should believe that it will rain despite your knowledge of Alvin’s argument.
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Defeasible Reasoning in OSCARImagine the following: Keith tells you that the morning news predicts rain in Tucson today. However, Alvin tells you that the same news report predicted sunshine.
Without any other source of information, it would be irrational to place belief in either Keith’s or Alvin’s statements.
Further, suppose you happened to watch the noon news report, and that report predicted rain. Then you should believe that it will rain despite your knowledge of Alvin’s argument.
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Defeasible Reasoning in OSCAR (cont.)
K- Keith says that MA- Alvin says that ~MM- The morning news said that RR- It is going to rain this afternoonN- The noon news says that R
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Defeasible Reasoning in OSCAR (cont.)
K- Keith says that MA- Alvin says that ~MM- The morning news said that RR- It is going to rain this afternoonN- The noon news says that R
See the transcript of Kevin’s interaction with OSCAR!
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The Lottery Paradox …
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E: “Please go down to Stewart’s & get the T U.”
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E: “Please go down to Stewart’s & get the T U.”
S: “I’m sorry, E, I’m afraid I can’t do that.It would be irrational.”
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E: “Please go down to Stewart’s & get the T U.”
S: “I’m sorry, E, I’m afraid I can’t do that.It would be irrational.”
…
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Sequence 1
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Sequence 1
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Sequence 1
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Sequence 1
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Sequence 1
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Sequence 1
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Sequence 1 Sequence 2
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Sequence 1 Sequence 2
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Sequence 1 Sequence 2
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Sequence 1 Sequence 2
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Sequence 1 Sequence 2
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Sequence 1 Sequence 2
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Sequence 1 Sequence 2
Contradiction!
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Sequence 1
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Sequence 1Let D be a meticulous and perfectly accurate description of a 1,000,000,000,000-ticket lottery, of which rational agent a is fully apprised.
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Sequence 1Let D be a meticulous and perfectly accurate description of a 1,000,000,000,000-ticket lottery, of which rational agent a is fully apprised.
From D it obviously can be proved that either ticket 1 will win or ticket 2 will win or … or ticket 1,000,000,000,000 will win. Let’s write this (exclusive) disjunction as follows:
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Sequence 1Let D be a meticulous and perfectly accurate description of a 1,000,000,000,000-ticket lottery, of which rational agent a is fully apprised.
From D it obviously can be proved that either ticket 1 will win or ticket 2 will win or … or ticket 1,000,000,000,000 will win. Let’s write this (exclusive) disjunction as follows:
Wt1 �Wt2 � . . .�Wt1T (1)
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Sequence 1Let D be a meticulous and perfectly accurate description of a 1,000,000,000,000-ticket lottery, of which rational agent a is fully apprised.
From D it obviously can be proved that either ticket 1 will win or ticket 2 will win or … or ticket 1,000,000,000,000 will win. Let’s write this (exclusive) disjunction as follows:
We then deduce from this that there is at least one ticket that will win, a proposition represented — using standard notation — as:
Wt1 �Wt2 � . . .�Wt1T (1)
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Sequence 1Let D be a meticulous and perfectly accurate description of a 1,000,000,000,000-ticket lottery, of which rational agent a is fully apprised.
From D it obviously can be proved that either ticket 1 will win or ticket 2 will win or … or ticket 1,000,000,000,000 will win. Let’s write this (exclusive) disjunction as follows:
We then deduce from this that there is at least one ticket that will win, a proposition represented — using standard notation — as:
9tiWti (2)
Wt1 �Wt2 � . . .�Wt1T (1)
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Sequence 1Let D be a meticulous and perfectly accurate description of a 1,000,000,000,000-ticket lottery, of which rational agent a is fully apprised.
From D it obviously can be proved that either ticket 1 will win or ticket 2 will win or … or ticket 1,000,000,000,000 will win. Let’s write this (exclusive) disjunction as follows:
We then deduce from this that there is at least one ticket that will win, a proposition represented — using standard notation — as:
Very well; perfectly clear so far. And now we can add another deductive step: Since our rational agent a can follow this deduction sequence to this point, and since D is assumed to be indubitable, it follows that our rational agent in turn believes (2); i.e., we conclude Sequence 1 by obtaining the following:
9tiWti (2)
Wt1 �Wt2 � . . .�Wt1T (1)
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Sequence 1Let D be a meticulous and perfectly accurate description of a 1,000,000,000,000-ticket lottery, of which rational agent a is fully apprised.
From D it obviously can be proved that either ticket 1 will win or ticket 2 will win or … or ticket 1,000,000,000,000 will win. Let’s write this (exclusive) disjunction as follows:
We then deduce from this that there is at least one ticket that will win, a proposition represented — using standard notation — as:
Very well; perfectly clear so far. And now we can add another deductive step: Since our rational agent a can follow this deduction sequence to this point, and since D is assumed to be indubitable, it follows that our rational agent in turn believes (2); i.e., we conclude Sequence 1 by obtaining the following:
Ba9tiWti (3)
9tiWti (2)
Wt1 �Wt2 � . . .�Wt1T (1)
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Sequence 1
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Sequence 1
√
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Sequence 2
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Sequence 2As in Sequence 1, once again let D be a meticulous and perfectly accurate description of a 1,000,000,000,000-ticket lottery, of which rational agent a is fully apprised.
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Sequence 2As in Sequence 1, once again let D be a meticulous and perfectly accurate description of a 1,000,000,000,000-ticket lottery, of which rational agent a is fully apprised.
From D it obviously can be proved that the probability of a particular ticket ti winning is 1 in 1,000,000,000,000. Using ‘1T’ to denote 1 trillion, we can write the probability for each ticket to win as a conjunction:
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Sequence 2As in Sequence 1, once again let D be a meticulous and perfectly accurate description of a 1,000,000,000,000-ticket lottery, of which rational agent a is fully apprised.
From D it obviously can be proved that the probability of a particular ticket ti winning is 1 in 1,000,000,000,000. Using ‘1T’ to denote 1 trillion, we can write the probability for each ticket to win as a conjunction:
prob(Wt1) =1
1, 000, 000, 000, 000=
1
1T^ prob(Wt2) =
1
1T^ . . . ^ prob(Wt1T ) =
1
1T(1)
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Sequence 2As in Sequence 1, once again let D be a meticulous and perfectly accurate description of a 1,000,000,000,000-ticket lottery, of which rational agent a is fully apprised.
From D it obviously can be proved that the probability of a particular ticket ti winning is 1 in 1,000,000,000,000. Using ‘1T’ to denote 1 trillion, we can write the probability for each ticket to win as a conjunction:
For the next step, note that the probability of ticket t1 winning is lower than, say, the probability that if you walk outside a minute from now you will be flattened on the spot by a door from a 747 that falls from a jet of that type cruising at 35,000 feet. Since you have the rational belief that death won't ensue if you go outside (and have this belief precisely because you believe that the odds of your sudden demise in this manner are vanishingly small), the inference to the rational belief on the part of a that t1 won’t win sails through— and this of course works for each ticket. Hence we have:
prob(Wt1) =1
1, 000, 000, 000, 000=
1
1T^ prob(Wt2) =
1
1T^ . . . ^ prob(Wt1T ) =
1
1T(1)
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Sequence 2As in Sequence 1, once again let D be a meticulous and perfectly accurate description of a 1,000,000,000,000-ticket lottery, of which rational agent a is fully apprised.
From D it obviously can be proved that the probability of a particular ticket ti winning is 1 in 1,000,000,000,000. Using ‘1T’ to denote 1 trillion, we can write the probability for each ticket to win as a conjunction:
For the next step, note that the probability of ticket t1 winning is lower than, say, the probability that if you walk outside a minute from now you will be flattened on the spot by a door from a 747 that falls from a jet of that type cruising at 35,000 feet. Since you have the rational belief that death won't ensue if you go outside (and have this belief precisely because you believe that the odds of your sudden demise in this manner are vanishingly small), the inference to the rational belief on the part of a that t1 won’t win sails through— and this of course works for each ticket. Hence we have:
prob(Wt1) =1
1, 000, 000, 000, 000=
1
1T^ prob(Wt2) =
1
1T^ . . . ^ prob(Wt1T ) =
1
1T(1)
Ba¬Wt1 ^Ba¬Wt2 ^ . . . ^Ba¬Wt1T (2)
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Sequence 2As in Sequence 1, once again let D be a meticulous and perfectly accurate description of a 1,000,000,000,000-ticket lottery, of which rational agent a is fully apprised.
From D it obviously can be proved that the probability of a particular ticket ti winning is 1 in 1,000,000,000,000. Using ‘1T’ to denote 1 trillion, we can write the probability for each ticket to win as a conjunction:
For the next step, note that the probability of ticket t1 winning is lower than, say, the probability that if you walk outside a minute from now you will be flattened on the spot by a door from a 747 that falls from a jet of that type cruising at 35,000 feet. Since you have the rational belief that death won't ensue if you go outside (and have this belief precisely because you believe that the odds of your sudden demise in this manner are vanishingly small), the inference to the rational belief on the part of a that t1 won’t win sails through— and this of course works for each ticket. Hence we have:
prob(Wt1) =1
1, 000, 000, 000, 000=
1
1T^ prob(Wt2) =
1
1T^ . . . ^ prob(Wt1T ) =
1
1T(1)
Ba¬Wt1 ^Ba¬Wt2 ^ . . . ^Ba¬Wt1T (2)Of course, if a rational agent believes P, and believes Q as well, it follows that that agent will believe the conjunction P & Q. Applying this principle to (2) yields:
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Sequence 2As in Sequence 1, once again let D be a meticulous and perfectly accurate description of a 1,000,000,000,000-ticket lottery, of which rational agent a is fully apprised.
From D it obviously can be proved that the probability of a particular ticket ti winning is 1 in 1,000,000,000,000. Using ‘1T’ to denote 1 trillion, we can write the probability for each ticket to win as a conjunction:
For the next step, note that the probability of ticket t1 winning is lower than, say, the probability that if you walk outside a minute from now you will be flattened on the spot by a door from a 747 that falls from a jet of that type cruising at 35,000 feet. Since you have the rational belief that death won't ensue if you go outside (and have this belief precisely because you believe that the odds of your sudden demise in this manner are vanishingly small), the inference to the rational belief on the part of a that t1 won’t win sails through— and this of course works for each ticket. Hence we have:
prob(Wt1) =1
1, 000, 000, 000, 000=
1
1T^ prob(Wt2) =
1
1T^ . . . ^ prob(Wt1T ) =
1
1T(1)
Ba¬Wt1 ^Ba¬Wt2 ^ . . . ^Ba¬Wt1T (2)Of course, if a rational agent believes P, and believes Q as well, it follows that that agent will believe the conjunction P & Q. Applying this principle to (2) yields:
Ba(¬Wt1 ^ ¬Wt2 ^ . . . ^ ¬Wt1T ) (3)
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Sequence 2As in Sequence 1, once again let D be a meticulous and perfectly accurate description of a 1,000,000,000,000-ticket lottery, of which rational agent a is fully apprised.
From D it obviously can be proved that the probability of a particular ticket ti winning is 1 in 1,000,000,000,000. Using ‘1T’ to denote 1 trillion, we can write the probability for each ticket to win as a conjunction:
For the next step, note that the probability of ticket t1 winning is lower than, say, the probability that if you walk outside a minute from now you will be flattened on the spot by a door from a 747 that falls from a jet of that type cruising at 35,000 feet. Since you have the rational belief that death won't ensue if you go outside (and have this belief precisely because you believe that the odds of your sudden demise in this manner are vanishingly small), the inference to the rational belief on the part of a that t1 won’t win sails through— and this of course works for each ticket. Hence we have:
prob(Wt1) =1
1, 000, 000, 000, 000=
1
1T^ prob(Wt2) =
1
1T^ . . . ^ prob(Wt1T ) =
1
1T(1)
Ba¬Wt1 ^Ba¬Wt2 ^ . . . ^Ba¬Wt1T (2)Of course, if a rational agent believes P, and believes Q as well, it follows that that agent will believe the conjunction P & Q. Applying this principle to (2) yields:
Ba(¬Wt1 ^ ¬Wt2 ^ . . . ^ ¬Wt1T ) (3)But (3) is logically equivalent to the statement that there doesn’t exist a winning ticket; i.e., (3) is logically equivalent to this result from Sequence 2:
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Sequence 2As in Sequence 1, once again let D be a meticulous and perfectly accurate description of a 1,000,000,000,000-ticket lottery, of which rational agent a is fully apprised.
From D it obviously can be proved that the probability of a particular ticket ti winning is 1 in 1,000,000,000,000. Using ‘1T’ to denote 1 trillion, we can write the probability for each ticket to win as a conjunction:
For the next step, note that the probability of ticket t1 winning is lower than, say, the probability that if you walk outside a minute from now you will be flattened on the spot by a door from a 747 that falls from a jet of that type cruising at 35,000 feet. Since you have the rational belief that death won't ensue if you go outside (and have this belief precisely because you believe that the odds of your sudden demise in this manner are vanishingly small), the inference to the rational belief on the part of a that t1 won’t win sails through— and this of course works for each ticket. Hence we have:
prob(Wt1) =1
1, 000, 000, 000, 000=
1
1T^ prob(Wt2) =
1
1T^ . . . ^ prob(Wt1T ) =
1
1T(1)
Ba¬Wt1 ^Ba¬Wt2 ^ . . . ^Ba¬Wt1T (2)Of course, if a rational agent believes P, and believes Q as well, it follows that that agent will believe the conjunction P & Q. Applying this principle to (2) yields:
Ba(¬Wt1 ^ ¬Wt2 ^ . . . ^ ¬Wt1T ) (3)But (3) is logically equivalent to the statement that there doesn’t exist a winning ticket; i.e., (3) is logically equivalent to this result from Sequence 2:
Ba¬9tiWti (4)
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Sequence 2
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Sequence 2
√
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Sequence 1 Sequence 2
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Sequence 1 Sequence 2
√√ Ba9tiWtiBa¬9tiWti
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Sequence 1 Sequence 2
(The contradiction we sketched earlier has arrived.)√√ Ba9tiWtiBa¬9tiWti
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A Solution to The Lottery Paradox …
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Strength-Factor Continuum
Certain
Evident
Beyond Reasonable Doubt
Probable
Counterbalanced
Improbable
Beyond Reasonable Belief
Evidently False
Certainly False
![Page 76: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/76.jpg)
Strength-Factor Continuum
Certain
Evident
Beyond Reasonable Doubt
Probable
Counterbalanced
Improbable
Beyond Reasonable Belief
Evidently False
Certainly False
![Page 77: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/77.jpg)
Strength-Factor ContinuumCertain
Evident
Beyond Reasonable Doubt
Probable
Counterbalanced
Improbable
Beyond Reasonable Belief
Evidently False
Certainly False
![Page 78: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/78.jpg)
Strength-Factor ContinuumCertain
Evident
Beyond Reasonable Doubt
Probable
Counterbalanced
Improbable
Beyond Reasonable Belief
Evidently False
Certainly False
![Page 79: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/79.jpg)
Strength-Factor ContinuumCertain
Evident
Beyond Reasonable Doubt
Probable
Counterbalanced
Improbable
Beyond Reasonable Belief
Evidently False
Certainly False
Epistemically Positive
![Page 80: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/80.jpg)
Strength-Factor ContinuumCertain
Evident
Beyond Reasonable Doubt
Probable
Counterbalanced
Improbable
Beyond Reasonable Belief
Evidently False
Certainly False
Epistemically Positive
Epistemically Negative
![Page 81: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/81.jpg)
Strength-Factor ContinuumCertain
Evident
Beyond Reasonable Doubt
Probable
Counterbalanced
Improbable
Beyond Reasonable Belief
Evidently False
Certainly False
Epistemically Positive
Epistemically Negative
![Page 82: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/82.jpg)
Strength-Factor ContinuumCertain
Evident
Beyond Reasonable Doubt
Probable
Counterbalanced
Improbable
Beyond Reasonable Belief
Evidently False
Certainly False
Epistemically Positive
Epistemically Negative
(4)
(3)
(2)
(1)
(0)
(-1)
(-2)
(-3)
(-4)
![Page 83: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/83.jpg)
Strength-Factor ContinuumCertain
Evident
Beyond Reasonable Doubt
Probable
Counterbalanced
Improbable
Beyond Reasonable Belief
Evidently False
Certainly False
Epistemically Positive
Epistemically Negative
(4)
(3)
(2)
(1)
(0)
(-1)
(-2)
(-3)
(-4)
![Page 84: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/84.jpg)
Certain
Evident
Beyond Reasonable Doubt
Probable
Counterbalanced
Improbable
Beyond Reasonable Belief
Evidently False
Certainly False
Epistemically Positive
Epistemically Negative
(4)
(3)
(2)
(1)
(0)
(-1)
(-2)
(-3)
(-4)
![Page 85: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/85.jpg)
Certain
Evident
Beyond Reasonable Doubt
Probable
Counterbalanced
Improbable
Beyond Reasonable Belief
Evidently False
Certainly False
Epistemically Positive
Epistemically Negative
(4)
(3)
(2)
(1)
(0)
(-1)
(-2)
(-3)
(-4)
Key Principles
![Page 86: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/86.jpg)
Certain
Evident
Beyond Reasonable Doubt
Probable
Counterbalanced
Improbable
Beyond Reasonable Belief
Evidently False
Certainly False
Epistemically Positive
Epistemically Negative
(4)
(3)
(2)
(1)
(0)
(-1)
(-2)
(-3)
(-4)
Deduction preserves strength.
Key Principles
![Page 87: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/87.jpg)
Certain
Evident
Beyond Reasonable Doubt
Probable
Counterbalanced
Improbable
Beyond Reasonable Belief
Evidently False
Certainly False
Epistemically Positive
Epistemically Negative
(4)
(3)
(2)
(1)
(0)
(-1)
(-2)
(-3)
(-4)
Deduction preserves strength.
Clashes are resolved in favor of higher strength.
Key Principles
![Page 88: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/88.jpg)
Certain
Evident
Beyond Reasonable Doubt
Probable
Counterbalanced
Improbable
Beyond Reasonable Belief
Evidently False
Certainly False
Epistemically Positive
Epistemically Negative
(4)
(3)
(2)
(1)
(0)
(-1)
(-2)
(-3)
(-4)
Deduction preserves strength.
Clashes are resolved in favor of higher strength.
Any proposition p such that prob(p) < 1 is at most evident.
Key Principles
![Page 89: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/89.jpg)
Certain
Evident
Beyond Reasonable Doubt
Probable
Counterbalanced
Improbable
Beyond Reasonable Belief
Evidently False
Certainly False
Epistemically Positive
Epistemically Negative
(4)
(3)
(2)
(1)
(0)
(-1)
(-2)
(-3)
(-4)
Deduction preserves strength.
Clashes are resolved in favor of higher strength.
Any proposition p such that prob(p) < 1 is at most evident.
Key Principles
Any rational belief that p, where the basis for p is at most evident, is at most an evident (= level 3) belief.
![Page 90: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/90.jpg)
Sequence 1, “Rigorized”Let D be a meticulous and perfectly accurate description of a 1,000,000,000,000-ticket lottery, of which rational agent a is fully apprised.
From D it obviously can be proved that either ticket 1 will win or ticket 2 will win or … or ticket 1,000,000,000,000 will win. Let’s write this (exclusive) disjunction as follows:
We then deduce from this that there is at least one ticket that will win, a proposition represented — using standard notation — as:
Very well; perfectly clear so far. And now we can add another deductive step: Since our rational agent a can follow this deduction sequence to this point, and since D is assumed to be indubitable, it follows that our rational agent in turn believes (2); i.e., we conclude Sequence 1 by obtaining the following:
Ba9tiWti (3)
9tiWti (2)
Wt1 �Wt2 � . . .�Wt1T (1)
![Page 91: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/91.jpg)
Sequence 1, “Rigorized”Let D be a meticulous and perfectly accurate description of a 1,000,000,000,000-ticket lottery, of which rational agent a is fully apprised.
From D it obviously can be proved that either ticket 1 will win or ticket 2 will win or … or ticket 1,000,000,000,000 will win. Let’s write this (exclusive) disjunction as follows:
We then deduce from this that there is at least one ticket that will win, a proposition represented — using standard notation — as:
Very well; perfectly clear so far. And now we can add another deductive step: Since our rational agent a can follow this deduction sequence to this point, and since D is assumed to be indubitable, it follows that our rational agent in turn believes (2); i.e., we conclude Sequence 1 by obtaining the following:
Ba9tiWti (3)
9tiWti (2)
Wt1 �Wt2 � . . .�Wt1T (1)
4
![Page 92: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/92.jpg)
Sequence 1, “Rigorized”Let D be a meticulous and perfectly accurate description of a 1,000,000,000,000-ticket lottery, of which rational agent a is fully apprised.
From D it obviously can be proved that either ticket 1 will win or ticket 2 will win or … or ticket 1,000,000,000,000 will win. Let’s write this (exclusive) disjunction as follows:
We then deduce from this that there is at least one ticket that will win, a proposition represented — using standard notation — as:
Very well; perfectly clear so far. And now we can add another deductive step: Since our rational agent a can follow this deduction sequence to this point, and since D is assumed to be indubitable, it follows that our rational agent in turn believes (2); i.e., we conclude Sequence 1 by obtaining the following:
Ba9tiWti (3)
9tiWti (2)
Wt1 �Wt2 � . . .�Wt1T (1)
4
4
![Page 93: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/93.jpg)
Sequence 1, “Rigorized”Let D be a meticulous and perfectly accurate description of a 1,000,000,000,000-ticket lottery, of which rational agent a is fully apprised.
From D it obviously can be proved that either ticket 1 will win or ticket 2 will win or … or ticket 1,000,000,000,000 will win. Let’s write this (exclusive) disjunction as follows:
We then deduce from this that there is at least one ticket that will win, a proposition represented — using standard notation — as:
Very well; perfectly clear so far. And now we can add another deductive step: Since our rational agent a can follow this deduction sequence to this point, and since D is assumed to be indubitable, it follows that our rational agent in turn believes (2); i.e., we conclude Sequence 1 by obtaining the following:
Ba9tiWti (3)
9tiWti (2)
Wt1 �Wt2 � . . .�Wt1T (1)
4
4
4
![Page 94: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/94.jpg)
Sequence 1, “Rigorized”Let D be a meticulous and perfectly accurate description of a 1,000,000,000,000-ticket lottery, of which rational agent a is fully apprised.
From D it obviously can be proved that either ticket 1 will win or ticket 2 will win or … or ticket 1,000,000,000,000 will win. Let’s write this (exclusive) disjunction as follows:
We then deduce from this that there is at least one ticket that will win, a proposition represented — using standard notation — as:
Very well; perfectly clear so far. And now we can add another deductive step: Since our rational agent a can follow this deduction sequence to this point, and since D is assumed to be indubitable, it follows that our rational agent in turn believes (2); i.e., we conclude Sequence 1 by obtaining the following:
Ba9tiWti (3)
9tiWti (2)
Wt1 �Wt2 � . . .�Wt1T (1)
4
4
4
4
![Page 95: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/95.jpg)
Sequence 1, “Rigorized”Let D be a meticulous and perfectly accurate description of a 1,000,000,000,000-ticket lottery, of which rational agent a is fully apprised.
From D it obviously can be proved that either ticket 1 will win or ticket 2 will win or … or ticket 1,000,000,000,000 will win. Let’s write this (exclusive) disjunction as follows:
We then deduce from this that there is at least one ticket that will win, a proposition represented — using standard notation — as:
Very well; perfectly clear so far. And now we can add another deductive step: Since our rational agent a can follow this deduction sequence to this point, and since D is assumed to be indubitable, it follows that our rational agent in turn believes (2); i.e., we conclude Sequence 1 by obtaining the following:
9tiWti (2)
Wt1 �Wt2 � . . .�Wt1T (1)
4
4
4
4
![Page 96: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/96.jpg)
Sequence 1, “Rigorized”Let D be a meticulous and perfectly accurate description of a 1,000,000,000,000-ticket lottery, of which rational agent a is fully apprised.
From D it obviously can be proved that either ticket 1 will win or ticket 2 will win or … or ticket 1,000,000,000,000 will win. Let’s write this (exclusive) disjunction as follows:
We then deduce from this that there is at least one ticket that will win, a proposition represented — using standard notation — as:
Very well; perfectly clear so far. And now we can add another deductive step: Since our rational agent a can follow this deduction sequence to this point, and since D is assumed to be indubitable, it follows that our rational agent in turn believes (2); i.e., we conclude Sequence 1 by obtaining the following:
9tiWti (2)
Wt1 �Wt2 � . . .�Wt1T (1)
4
4
4
4 B4a9tiWti (3)
![Page 97: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/97.jpg)
Sequence 2, “Rigorized”As in Sequence 1, once again let D be a meticulous and perfectly accurate description of a 1,000,000,000,000-ticket lottery, of which rational agent a is fully apprised.
From D it obviously can be proved that the probability of a particular ticket ti winning is 1 in 1,000,000,000,000. Using ‘1T’ to denote 1 trillion, we can write the probability for each ticket to win as a conjunction:
For the next step, note that the probability of ticket t1 winning is lower than, say, the probability that if you walk outside a minute from now you will be flattened on the spot by a door from a 747 that falls from a jet of that type cruising at 35,000 feet. Since you have the rational belief that death won't ensue if you go outside (and have this belief precisely because you believe that the odds of your sudden demise in this manner are vanishingly small), the inference to the rational belief on the part of a that t1 won’t win sails through— and this of course works for each ticket. Hence we have:
prob(Wt1) =1
1, 000, 000, 000, 000=
1
1T^ prob(Wt2) =
1
1T^ . . . ^ prob(Wt1T ) =
1
1T(1)
Ba¬Wt1 ^Ba¬Wt2 ^ . . . ^Ba¬Wt1T (2)Of course, if a rational agent believes P, and believes Q as well, it follows that that agent will believe the conjunction P & Q. Applying this principle to (2) yields:
Ba(¬Wt1 ^ ¬Wt2 ^ . . . ^ ¬Wt1T ) (3)But (3) is logically equivalent to the statement that there doesn’t exist a winning ticket; i.e., (3) is logically equivalent to this result from Sequence 2:
Ba¬9tiWti (4)
![Page 98: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/98.jpg)
Sequence 2, “Rigorized”As in Sequence 1, once again let D be a meticulous and perfectly accurate description of a 1,000,000,000,000-ticket lottery, of which rational agent a is fully apprised.
From D it obviously can be proved that the probability of a particular ticket ti winning is 1 in 1,000,000,000,000. Using ‘1T’ to denote 1 trillion, we can write the probability for each ticket to win as a conjunction:
For the next step, note that the probability of ticket t1 winning is lower than, say, the probability that if you walk outside a minute from now you will be flattened on the spot by a door from a 747 that falls from a jet of that type cruising at 35,000 feet. Since you have the rational belief that death won't ensue if you go outside (and have this belief precisely because you believe that the odds of your sudden demise in this manner are vanishingly small), the inference to the rational belief on the part of a that t1 won’t win sails through— and this of course works for each ticket. Hence we have:
prob(Wt1) =1
1, 000, 000, 000, 000=
1
1T^ prob(Wt2) =
1
1T^ . . . ^ prob(Wt1T ) =
1
1T(1)
Ba¬Wt1 ^Ba¬Wt2 ^ . . . ^Ba¬Wt1T (2)Of course, if a rational agent believes P, and believes Q as well, it follows that that agent will believe the conjunction P & Q. Applying this principle to (2) yields:
Ba(¬Wt1 ^ ¬Wt2 ^ . . . ^ ¬Wt1T ) (3)But (3) is logically equivalent to the statement that there doesn’t exist a winning ticket; i.e., (3) is logically equivalent to this result from Sequence 2:
Ba¬9tiWti (4)
4
![Page 99: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/99.jpg)
Sequence 2, “Rigorized”As in Sequence 1, once again let D be a meticulous and perfectly accurate description of a 1,000,000,000,000-ticket lottery, of which rational agent a is fully apprised.
From D it obviously can be proved that the probability of a particular ticket ti winning is 1 in 1,000,000,000,000. Using ‘1T’ to denote 1 trillion, we can write the probability for each ticket to win as a conjunction:
For the next step, note that the probability of ticket t1 winning is lower than, say, the probability that if you walk outside a minute from now you will be flattened on the spot by a door from a 747 that falls from a jet of that type cruising at 35,000 feet. Since you have the rational belief that death won't ensue if you go outside (and have this belief precisely because you believe that the odds of your sudden demise in this manner are vanishingly small), the inference to the rational belief on the part of a that t1 won’t win sails through— and this of course works for each ticket. Hence we have:
prob(Wt1) =1
1, 000, 000, 000, 000=
1
1T^ prob(Wt2) =
1
1T^ . . . ^ prob(Wt1T ) =
1
1T(1)
Ba¬Wt1 ^Ba¬Wt2 ^ . . . ^Ba¬Wt1T (2)Of course, if a rational agent believes P, and believes Q as well, it follows that that agent will believe the conjunction P & Q. Applying this principle to (2) yields:
Ba(¬Wt1 ^ ¬Wt2 ^ . . . ^ ¬Wt1T ) (3)But (3) is logically equivalent to the statement that there doesn’t exist a winning ticket; i.e., (3) is logically equivalent to this result from Sequence 2:
Ba¬9tiWti (4)
4
4
![Page 100: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/100.jpg)
Sequence 2, “Rigorized”As in Sequence 1, once again let D be a meticulous and perfectly accurate description of a 1,000,000,000,000-ticket lottery, of which rational agent a is fully apprised.
From D it obviously can be proved that the probability of a particular ticket ti winning is 1 in 1,000,000,000,000. Using ‘1T’ to denote 1 trillion, we can write the probability for each ticket to win as a conjunction:
For the next step, note that the probability of ticket t1 winning is lower than, say, the probability that if you walk outside a minute from now you will be flattened on the spot by a door from a 747 that falls from a jet of that type cruising at 35,000 feet. Since you have the rational belief that death won't ensue if you go outside (and have this belief precisely because you believe that the odds of your sudden demise in this manner are vanishingly small), the inference to the rational belief on the part of a that t1 won’t win sails through— and this of course works for each ticket. Hence we have:
prob(Wt1) =1
1, 000, 000, 000, 000=
1
1T^ prob(Wt2) =
1
1T^ . . . ^ prob(Wt1T ) =
1
1T(1)
Of course, if a rational agent believes P, and believes Q as well, it follows that that agent will believe the conjunction P & Q. Applying this principle to (2) yields:
Ba(¬Wt1 ^ ¬Wt2 ^ . . . ^ ¬Wt1T ) (3)But (3) is logically equivalent to the statement that there doesn’t exist a winning ticket; i.e., (3) is logically equivalent to this result from Sequence 2:
Ba¬9tiWti (4)
4
4
![Page 101: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/101.jpg)
Sequence 2, “Rigorized”As in Sequence 1, once again let D be a meticulous and perfectly accurate description of a 1,000,000,000,000-ticket lottery, of which rational agent a is fully apprised.
From D it obviously can be proved that the probability of a particular ticket ti winning is 1 in 1,000,000,000,000. Using ‘1T’ to denote 1 trillion, we can write the probability for each ticket to win as a conjunction:
For the next step, note that the probability of ticket t1 winning is lower than, say, the probability that if you walk outside a minute from now you will be flattened on the spot by a door from a 747 that falls from a jet of that type cruising at 35,000 feet. Since you have the rational belief that death won't ensue if you go outside (and have this belief precisely because you believe that the odds of your sudden demise in this manner are vanishingly small), the inference to the rational belief on the part of a that t1 won’t win sails through— and this of course works for each ticket. Hence we have:
prob(Wt1) =1
1, 000, 000, 000, 000=
1
1T^ prob(Wt2) =
1
1T^ . . . ^ prob(Wt1T ) =
1
1T(1)
Of course, if a rational agent believes P, and believes Q as well, it follows that that agent will believe the conjunction P & Q. Applying this principle to (2) yields:
Ba(¬Wt1 ^ ¬Wt2 ^ . . . ^ ¬Wt1T ) (3)But (3) is logically equivalent to the statement that there doesn’t exist a winning ticket; i.e., (3) is logically equivalent to this result from Sequence 2:
Ba¬9tiWti (4)
4
4
B3a¬Wt1 ^B3
a¬Wt2 ^ . . . ^B3a¬Wt1T (2)
![Page 102: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/102.jpg)
Sequence 2, “Rigorized”As in Sequence 1, once again let D be a meticulous and perfectly accurate description of a 1,000,000,000,000-ticket lottery, of which rational agent a is fully apprised.
From D it obviously can be proved that the probability of a particular ticket ti winning is 1 in 1,000,000,000,000. Using ‘1T’ to denote 1 trillion, we can write the probability for each ticket to win as a conjunction:
For the next step, note that the probability of ticket t1 winning is lower than, say, the probability that if you walk outside a minute from now you will be flattened on the spot by a door from a 747 that falls from a jet of that type cruising at 35,000 feet. Since you have the rational belief that death won't ensue if you go outside (and have this belief precisely because you believe that the odds of your sudden demise in this manner are vanishingly small), the inference to the rational belief on the part of a that t1 won’t win sails through— and this of course works for each ticket. Hence we have:
prob(Wt1) =1
1, 000, 000, 000, 000=
1
1T^ prob(Wt2) =
1
1T^ . . . ^ prob(Wt1T ) =
1
1T(1)
Of course, if a rational agent believes P, and believes Q as well, it follows that that agent will believe the conjunction P & Q. Applying this principle to (2) yields:
But (3) is logically equivalent to the statement that there doesn’t exist a winning ticket; i.e., (3) is logically equivalent to this result from Sequence 2:
Ba¬9tiWti (4)
4
4
B3a¬Wt1 ^B3
a¬Wt2 ^ . . . ^B3a¬Wt1T (2)
![Page 103: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/103.jpg)
Sequence 2, “Rigorized”As in Sequence 1, once again let D be a meticulous and perfectly accurate description of a 1,000,000,000,000-ticket lottery, of which rational agent a is fully apprised.
From D it obviously can be proved that the probability of a particular ticket ti winning is 1 in 1,000,000,000,000. Using ‘1T’ to denote 1 trillion, we can write the probability for each ticket to win as a conjunction:
For the next step, note that the probability of ticket t1 winning is lower than, say, the probability that if you walk outside a minute from now you will be flattened on the spot by a door from a 747 that falls from a jet of that type cruising at 35,000 feet. Since you have the rational belief that death won't ensue if you go outside (and have this belief precisely because you believe that the odds of your sudden demise in this manner are vanishingly small), the inference to the rational belief on the part of a that t1 won’t win sails through— and this of course works for each ticket. Hence we have:
prob(Wt1) =1
1, 000, 000, 000, 000=
1
1T^ prob(Wt2) =
1
1T^ . . . ^ prob(Wt1T ) =
1
1T(1)
Of course, if a rational agent believes P, and believes Q as well, it follows that that agent will believe the conjunction P & Q. Applying this principle to (2) yields:
But (3) is logically equivalent to the statement that there doesn’t exist a winning ticket; i.e., (3) is logically equivalent to this result from Sequence 2:
Ba¬9tiWti (4)
4
4
B3a¬Wt1 ^B3
a¬Wt2 ^ . . . ^B3a¬Wt1T (2)
B3a(¬Wt1 ^ ¬Wt2 ^ . . . ^ ¬Wt1T ) (3)
![Page 104: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/104.jpg)
Sequence 2, “Rigorized”As in Sequence 1, once again let D be a meticulous and perfectly accurate description of a 1,000,000,000,000-ticket lottery, of which rational agent a is fully apprised.
From D it obviously can be proved that the probability of a particular ticket ti winning is 1 in 1,000,000,000,000. Using ‘1T’ to denote 1 trillion, we can write the probability for each ticket to win as a conjunction:
For the next step, note that the probability of ticket t1 winning is lower than, say, the probability that if you walk outside a minute from now you will be flattened on the spot by a door from a 747 that falls from a jet of that type cruising at 35,000 feet. Since you have the rational belief that death won't ensue if you go outside (and have this belief precisely because you believe that the odds of your sudden demise in this manner are vanishingly small), the inference to the rational belief on the part of a that t1 won’t win sails through— and this of course works for each ticket. Hence we have:
prob(Wt1) =1
1, 000, 000, 000, 000=
1
1T^ prob(Wt2) =
1
1T^ . . . ^ prob(Wt1T ) =
1
1T(1)
Of course, if a rational agent believes P, and believes Q as well, it follows that that agent will believe the conjunction P & Q. Applying this principle to (2) yields:
But (3) is logically equivalent to the statement that there doesn’t exist a winning ticket; i.e., (3) is logically equivalent to this result from Sequence 2:
4
4
B3a¬Wt1 ^B3
a¬Wt2 ^ . . . ^B3a¬Wt1T (2)
B3a(¬Wt1 ^ ¬Wt2 ^ . . . ^ ¬Wt1T ) (3)
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Sequence 2, “Rigorized”As in Sequence 1, once again let D be a meticulous and perfectly accurate description of a 1,000,000,000,000-ticket lottery, of which rational agent a is fully apprised.
From D it obviously can be proved that the probability of a particular ticket ti winning is 1 in 1,000,000,000,000. Using ‘1T’ to denote 1 trillion, we can write the probability for each ticket to win as a conjunction:
For the next step, note that the probability of ticket t1 winning is lower than, say, the probability that if you walk outside a minute from now you will be flattened on the spot by a door from a 747 that falls from a jet of that type cruising at 35,000 feet. Since you have the rational belief that death won't ensue if you go outside (and have this belief precisely because you believe that the odds of your sudden demise in this manner are vanishingly small), the inference to the rational belief on the part of a that t1 won’t win sails through— and this of course works for each ticket. Hence we have:
prob(Wt1) =1
1, 000, 000, 000, 000=
1
1T^ prob(Wt2) =
1
1T^ . . . ^ prob(Wt1T ) =
1
1T(1)
Of course, if a rational agent believes P, and believes Q as well, it follows that that agent will believe the conjunction P & Q. Applying this principle to (2) yields:
But (3) is logically equivalent to the statement that there doesn’t exist a winning ticket; i.e., (3) is logically equivalent to this result from Sequence 2:
4
4
B3a¬Wt1 ^B3
a¬Wt2 ^ . . . ^B3a¬Wt1T (2)
B3a(¬Wt1 ^ ¬Wt2 ^ . . . ^ ¬Wt1T ) (3)
B3a¬9tiWti (4)
![Page 106: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/106.jpg)
Paradox Solved!Deduction preserves strength.
Clashes are resolved in favor of higher strength; clashes propagate backwards through inverse deduction.
Any proposition p such that prob(p) < 1 is at most evident.
Any rational belief that p, where the basis for p is at most evident, is at most an evident (= level 3) belief.
![Page 107: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/107.jpg)
Paradox Solved!Deduction preserves strength.
Clashes are resolved in favor of higher strength; clashes propagate backwards through inverse deduction.
Any proposition p such that prob(p) < 1 is at most evident.
Any rational belief that p, where the basis for p is at most evident, is at most an evident (= level 3) belief.
B4a9tiWti (3)
![Page 108: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/108.jpg)
Paradox Solved!Deduction preserves strength.
Clashes are resolved in favor of higher strength; clashes propagate backwards through inverse deduction.
Any proposition p such that prob(p) < 1 is at most evident.
Any rational belief that p, where the basis for p is at most evident, is at most an evident (= level 3) belief.
B4a9tiWti (3) B3
a¬9tiWti (4)
![Page 109: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/109.jpg)
Paradox Solved!Deduction preserves strength.
Clashes are resolved in favor of higher strength; clashes propagate backwards through inverse deduction.
Any proposition p such that prob(p) < 1 is at most evident.
Any rational belief that p, where the basis for p is at most evident, is at most an evident (= level 3) belief.
B4a9tiWti (3) B3
a¬9tiWti (4)
![Page 110: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/110.jpg)
Paradox Solved!Deduction preserves strength.
Clashes are resolved in favor of higher strength; clashes propagate backwards through inverse deduction.
Any proposition p such that prob(p) < 1 is at most evident.
Any rational belief that p, where the basis for p is at most evident, is at most an evident (= level 3) belief.
B4a9tiWti (3)B3a¬9tiWti (4)
![Page 111: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/111.jpg)
Paradox Solved!Deduction preserves strength.
Clashes are resolved in favor of higher strength; clashes propagate backwards through inverse deduction.
Any proposition p such that prob(p) < 1 is at most evident.
Any rational belief that p, where the basis for p is at most evident, is at most an evident (= level 3) belief.
B4a9tiWti (3)
![Page 112: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/112.jpg)
Paradox Solved!Deduction preserves strength.
Clashes are resolved in favor of higher strength; clashes propagate backwards through inverse deduction.
Any proposition p such that prob(p) < 1 is at most evident.
Any rational belief that p, where the basis for p is at most evident, is at most an evident (= level 3) belief.
B4a9tiWti (3)
B3a¬Wt1 ^B3
a¬Wt2 ^ . . . ^B3a¬Wt1T (2)
![Page 113: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/113.jpg)
Paradox Solved!Deduction preserves strength.
Clashes are resolved in favor of higher strength; clashes propagate backwards through inverse deduction.
Any proposition p such that prob(p) < 1 is at most evident.
Any rational belief that p, where the basis for p is at most evident, is at most an evident (= level 3) belief.
B4a9tiWti (3)
B3a¬Wt1 ^B3
a¬Wt2 ^ . . . ^B3a¬Wt1T (2)
![Page 114: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/114.jpg)
Paradox Solved!Deduction preserves strength.
Clashes are resolved in favor of higher strength; clashes propagate backwards through inverse deduction.
Any proposition p such that prob(p) < 1 is at most evident.
Any rational belief that p, where the basis for p is at most evident, is at most an evident (= level 3) belief.
B4a9tiWti (3)
B3a¬Wt1 ^B3
a¬Wt2 ^ . . . ^B3a¬Wt1T (2)
This is why, to Mega Millions ticket holder: “Sorry. I’m rational, and I believe you won’t win.”
![Page 115: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/115.jpg)
Pollock’s Solution to The Lottery Paradox …
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Pollock’s Solution to LPFor any ticket, it would seem reasonable to conclude that it will not win the lottery.
But since you can make the same argument for every ticket, given that all other tickets lose, you could deductively conclude that your ticket will win at an equal level of belief. Then, paradoxically, it would seem that you believe that every ticket will lose, but also win.
There is no way to choose between the two competing arguments, so it would be irrational to believe one over the other. However, we still deductively believe that some ticket will win.
![Page 117: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/117.jpg)
Pollock’s Solution to LPFor any ticket, it would seem reasonable to conclude that it will not win the lottery.
But since you can make the same argument for every ticket, given that all other tickets lose, you could deductively conclude that your ticket will win at an equal level of belief. Then, paradoxically, it would seem that you believe that every ticket will lose, but also win.
There is no way to choose between the two competing arguments, so it would be irrational to believe one over the other. However, we still deductively believe that some ticket will win.
![Page 118: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/118.jpg)
Pollock’s Solution to LPFor any ticket, it would seem reasonable to conclude that it will not win the lottery.
But since you can make the same argument for every ticket, given that all other tickets lose, you could deductively conclude that your ticket will win at an equal level of belief. Then, paradoxically, it would seem that you believe that every ticket will lose, but also win.
There is no way to choose between the two competing arguments, so it would be irrational to believe one over the other. However, we still deductively believe that some ticket will win.
![Page 119: The Lottery Paradox - Rensselaer Polytechnic Institutekryten.mm.rpi.edu/COURSES/INTLOGW/Lottery_Paradox.pdfThe paradox in this case? • A perfectly rational person can never believe](https://reader035.vdocuments.net/reader035/viewer/2022071213/6031704d5cc7a9698f541e80/html5/thumbnails/119.jpg)
Pollock’s solution to LP
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Kevin demos Pollock’s Proposed Solution …
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Kevin demos Pollock’s Proposed Solution …
See the transcript of Kevin’s interaction with OSCAR!
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slutten