the military balance 2013

contents

Indexes of Tables and Maps 4

Editors Foreword 5

Part One Capabilities, Trends and Economics

Chapter 1 conflict analysis and conflict trends 7 trends in defence capability 16 anti-access/area denial: Washingtons response 29 Global trends in defence economics 32 europes defence industrial base 37Chapter 2 comparative defence statistics 41 Defence Budgets and Expenditure 41

Selected C-130H Hercules operators 43

Key defence statistics 44

IEDs and the rise of the MRAP 46

Sea-denial capabilities for selected countries in East Asia 47

Revamping Chinas tactical air power 48

Chapter 3 north america 49Chapter 4 europe 89Chapter 5 russia and eurasia 199Chapter 6 asia 245Chapter 7 middle east and north africa 353Chapter 8 latin america and the caribbean 415Chapter 9 sub-saharan africa 477Chapter 10 country comparisons force levels and economics 543

Part Two Reference

Explanatory Notes 557

List of Abbreviations for Data Sections 567

Index of Country/Territory Abbreviations 571

Index of Countries and Territories 572

Chapter One

Conflict Analysis and Conflict TrendsArmed conflict continued around the world in 2012. Many are captured on the 2013 Chart of Conflict included with this volume, and further details can be found in the IISS Armed Conflict Database. In a section new to The Military Balance this year, the IISS exam-ines the wars in Afghanistan and Syria, analysing the course of both wars from November 2012 to November 2013. Both involve conflict between insur-gents and governments, but with varying degrees of external assistance to all warring parties. A short concluding analytical essay compares the role of key military factors in both conflicts, offering some general conclusions about modern insurgency and counter-insurgency.

The war in afghanisTan

NATO and the Afghan government are racing against the clock to improve security, grow the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), develop the capacity of the Afghan state, reduce corruption, and persuade reconcilable insurgents to lay down their arms, all in time to allow Afghan authorities to assume the lead for security across the country and for NATO to withdraw from combat operations by the end of 2014. This does not require elimination of the insurgency but it does need to be reduced suffi-ciently so as to no longer pose an existential threat to the Afghan state and to be containable by Afghan security forces without NATOs combat power.

security transitionAt its May 2012 Chicago Summit, NATO declared that the Afghan security forces are well on track to take full security responsibility across the country by the end of 2014. Pledges of military and financial assis-tance made at Chicago and subsequently at Tokyo were designed to reassure Afghans that the country would continue to receive political, development and financial support after 2014. The additional 33,000 US surge troops deployed from 2009 had withdrawn by October, leaving 68,000 US troops alongside 28,000 troops from other nations. After Washington and Kabul agreed that Afghans would assume the lead for special operations and would take over the US prison

and detainees at Bagram, a USAfghan strategic part-nership agreement was signed in May, which led the US to designate Afghanistan a major non-NATO ally.

Since the surge began in 2009, security has improved. Improved intelligence and special forces capabilities caused significant attrition of insurgent leaders inside Afghanistan. Three tranches of districts and provinces across the country, including most of Kabul, entered the security-transition process. Two further tranches are due to do so next year. Transition does not mean that NATO-led forces withdrew from these areas, but rather that their role shifted to providing mentoring and support.

Despite insurgent ambitions to stage a counter-offensive, security gains made in the surge have not been rolled back. In September 2012, the UN assessed that there has been no significant deterioration of public order or security in areas in which the tran-sition has taken place. NATO claimed that violence was being held at arms length from much of the Afghan population, and displayed cautious opti-mism that the improving confidence and capability of the ANSF meant improvements in security would endure. Evidence suggested that ISAF and the ANSF were gaining an advantage over the Taliban: NATO statistics showed an 8% reduction in insurgent attacks during 2011, while the UN assessed a 30% decrease in security incidents in the first nine months of 2012, and NATO claimed a 38% drop in its casualties in the same period. There was evidence that insurgents had difficulties in acquiring IED components and credible reports of local popular uprisings against the Taliban in Ghazni Province and elsewhere. The Afghan rein-tegration programme has persuaded over 5,000 insur-gents to lay down their arms, although this has yet to have strategic effect.

Countervailing trendsTargeted killings of civilians (especially Afghan government officials) continued with, for example, over 230 people killed between May and July 2012 alone. Most were believed to be victims of Taliban assassinations. There were also reports of a small but steady stream of defections from the ANSF to the Taliban as well as indications of some local accom-

8 The MiliTAry BAlAnCe 2013

modations between the ANSF and insurgents. And there has been less military progress in southeastern Afghanistan, including the provinces bordering North Waziristan, the heartland of the Haqqani network in Pakistan. US Defense Secretary Leon Panetta told Congress that in eastern Afghanistan the topography, the cultural geography and the continuing presence of safe havens in Pakistan give the insurgents advan-tages they have lost elsewhere in the country.

Kabul was the location of only 1% of security inci-dents, but it was the focus of concerted efforts by the Haqqani network to launch spectacular attacks, mostly by infiltrating from Pakistan into eastern Afghanistan, through the border provinces of ISAFs Regional Command-East. NATO and Afghan forces claimed to have pre-empted many attacks on the city; citing the lack of any such successful attacks after April 2012. Earlier attacks that got through were successfully contained by Afghan forces and then counter-attacked by Afghan commandos, with ISAF support limited to helicopters and military advisers. But, as propa-ganda of the deed, such attacks had some success in portraying the transition as failing and eroding confi-dence within NATO nations. Meanwhile, an attack on Camp Bastion that destroyed six US Marine Corps AV-8B aircraft showed that well-planned attacks by determined insurgents are likely to continue.

PakistanIn 2011 Congressional testimony, outgoing US Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Mike Mullen criticised support provided to the insurgents by Pakistans Inter-Services Intelligence agency (ISI), claiming that the Haqqani network acted as a veri-table arm of ISI, though a January 2012 leaked NATO report contained evidence that both parties distrusted each other.

A deterioration in USPakistani relations, espe-cially after the killing of Osama bin Laden and acci-dental killing of 24 Pakistani troops by US forces, halted cooperation and closed NATOs supply lines. Although Pakistan eventually re-opened these supply lines, air-strikes against Pakistani targets from armed US UAVs continued to stoke Pakistani resentment of the US and contaminate attitudes towards ISAF.

It is not clear that Pakistan has sufficient civilian and military security capacity to further suppress Afghan insurgent safe havens, at the same time as countering its domestic militants. But the chal-lenge to the state posed by the Pakistan Taliban may have changed attitudes of some securocrats who

see a Taliban victory in Afghanistan as encouraging Pakistans insurgents. This may have been reinforced by popular and military shock at the October Pakistan Taliban attack on a teenaged schoolgirl.

The ansfThe planned expansion of ANSF strength to 157,000 Afghan National Police (ANP) officers and 195,000 Afghan National Army (ANA) personnel by the end of 2012 was ahead of schedule. An estimated 146,000 police officers and 185,000 army personnel were in place by October. NATOs training mission, there-fore, shifted its efforts from increasing force size to building support and logistic capabilities. NATO and Afghan initiatives sought to reduce attrition and absence rates, including initiatives to improve troop rotation and leave schedules.

By April 2012, some 40% of operations were led by the ANSF, with only 10% conducted solely by ISAF. Brigade-level operations were being mounted in Helmand by the Afghan army with little ISAF assistance, reflecting a considerable improvement in its capability. NATO was especially confident about the rapidly maturing capabilities of Afghan army and police special forces.

Until the surge the ANP was a lower international priority. But its capability development subsequently received more international support. As a result, attri-tion in the ANP fell below the 16.8% annual target. However, delivering results to ordinary Afghans depends on corresponding improvements in the whole machinery of justice, including courts, lawyers and prisons, as much as it did on bolstering police capacities. These areas lagged even further behind, as shown by NATOs refusal to send detainees to Afghan prisons betraying evidence of human-rights abuses. The Afghan Local Police, small self-defence forces in villages that have opted to resist the Taliban, are mentored by embedded teams of US special-operations forces. The UN assessed that by mid-August, more than 16,266 personnel were operating at 71 validated sites. While these local security forces have contributed to stability in several areas, concerns remain about issues of impunity, vetting, lack of clear command and control, and the potential re- emergence of ethnically or politically biased militias.

There are ambitious plans to provide the Afghan Air Force with a robust fixed- and rotary-wing airlift capability, as well as attack helicopters and light turboprop attack aircraft. They may achieve an initial casualty evacuation capability in 2013. But personnel

9Conflict Analysis and Conflict Trends

IISS

KABUL

BADAKSHAN

TAKHAR

BAGHLAN

KUNARLAGHMAN

KHOST

PAKTIKA

GHAZNI

KANDAHAR

HELMAND

NIMRUZ

FARAH

HERAT

URUZGAN

DAY KUNDIGHOR

FARYAB

JAWZJAN

BALKH

SAMANGAN

KUNDUZ

SAR-E PUL

WARDAKBAMIYAN

PANJSHIR

KAPISA

ZABUL

LOGAR

PAKTIA

NANGARHAR

PARWAN

NURISTAN

BADGHIS

4 (UK)

23 (GEO)

6 (US)

(DNK)

33 (ROM)

|| 21 (ROM)

||

(TUR)||

(TUR)||

2 (FRA)

(US)

1 209 (AFG) 3 209 (AFG)

2 209 (AFG)

ISAF ProvincialReconstruction Teamand troop nationality(see above for key)

Now-withdrawn US surge formations

Kunduz (GER)||

Mazar-e Sharif (GER)||

2 207 (AFG)

3 RAR (US)||

2 215 (AFG)

(US)

101

25 3 USMC

12

Regional Command Air Assets

North

South

East

Southwest

||||

|||

|||

3 2 (US)

2 2 (US)

6 (ESP)

3 207 (AFG)

TAURINESE (ITA)

1 207 (AFG)

Sources: ISAF, IISS research. Military symbols depict unit/formations standard organisation, but many have been re-roled for deployment to Afghanistan with protected patrol vehicles and counter-IED equipment.

1 215 (AFG)

3 205 (AFG)

1 205 (AFG)

4 205 (AFG)

76 (US)

3 201 (AFG)

1 111 (AFG)

3 215 (AFG)

6 25 (US)

1 203 (AFG)

173 (US)

4 203 (AFG)

4 4 (US)

2 201 (AFG)

2 111 (AFG)

4 1 (US)

2 203 (AFG)

3 203 (AFG)

(US)

6 (POL)

1 201 (AFG)

(US)

(US)

Qaleh-Now

Herat

Farah

Lashkar Gah

Kandahar

Qalat

Tarin Kowt

Ghazni

Pol-e Alam

Wardak

Pul-e Khumri

Sharan

Khost

Jalalabad

Mehtar Lam

Kunduz

Gardez

Shibirghan

Chaghcharan

Bamiyan

Kunar

Regional CommandCapital Kabul

Regional Command West

Regional Command North

Regional Command South

Regional Command East

Regional CommandSouthwest

US

US

US

US

US

US

US

USPOL

CZE

TURNZL

US

ITA

ESP

LTU

TUR

GER

HUN

US UK

AUS

Albania 212Armenia 126Australia (AUS) 1,550Austria 3Azerbaijan 94Bahrain 95Belgium 283Bosnia-Herzegovina 54

Bulgaria 572Canada 950Croatia 260Czech Republic (CZE) 422Denmark (DNK) 613El Salvador 24Estonia 155Finland 136

France (FRA) 2,418Georgia (GEO) 800Germany (GER) 4,737Greece 12Hungary (HUN) 555Iceland 3 (civilians)Ireland 6Italy (ITA) 4,000

Jordan 720Rep. of Korea (ROK) 350Latvia 40Lithuania (LTU) 221Luxembourg 10Macedonia (FYROM) 168Malaysia 46Mongolia 88Montenegro 41

Netherlands 500New Zealand (NZL) 155Norway 145Poland (POL) 1,800Portugal 141Romania (ROM) 1,762Singapore 39Slovakia 343Slovenia 77

Spain (ESP) 1,450Sweden 506Tonga 55Turkey (TUR) 1,328Ukraine 25United Arab Emirates 35UK 9,500US 68,000US (OEF-A) 7,000

Estimated troop contributions of ISAF/OEF-A nations October 2012

Total 112,622

Map 1 afghanistan


shortages and presence of a criminal patronage network in the air force make December 2017 the earliest it can achieve full capability. The Border Police are similarly challenged.

friction and insider attacks2012 saw increasing friction between Afghans and ISAF. A particular incident was the mistaken burning of copies of the Koran by US forces at Bagram, reports of which led to nationwide riots. In general, these were successfully contained by Afghan police forces, as were protests in September against the provocative Innocence of Muslims web video.

Attacks on ISAF by Afghan troops and police have occurred since at least 2006, but greatly increased in 2012. Some 56 ISAF troops were killed between January and October 2012, 40% more than in the whole of 2011. NATO and the Afghan authorities announced initiatives to improve security against Taliban infiltration as well as drives to improve vetting and counter-intelligence. A spike in these attacks in late 2012, together with the tension resulting from the Innocence of Muslims video, led ISAF to order a reduction in low level tactical partnering with the Afghan forces below battalion level. As of October 2012, it was unclear when these restrictions would be lifted, but the impending US election meant they were unlikely to be relaxed in the short term. While suspending partnering could affect security provi-sion, some in the ANSF would welcome the increased authority and responsibility this suspension provides as long as their troops do not suffer major reversals in combat, which could affect confidence.

Insurgents will have taken comfort from this. It will reinforce the view that despite heavy attri-tion, they should continue to attack ISAF in order to exploit NATO and Western states casualty aversion.

Insider attacks were invariably claimed by the Taliban. But evidence, including an analysis by the Pentagon, suggested that a significant proportion of these attacks is instead carried out by Afghans who have unexpectedly snapped, often as a result of an apparently minor grievance or provocation. It is likely that war fatigue and accumulated Afghan resentment of the NATO presence are major moti-vating factors and, as a consequence, improved secu-rity measures may not have a decisive effect; such attacks will probably continue until NATO troops withdraw completely. But they have become a major threat to NATOs strategic narrative and to the polit-ical commitment of all troop-contributing nations.

Plans and prospects for 201315From 201214, NATO plans to adjust its force from a combat force with advisors, to an advisory force with combat capabilities. In March 2012, US defence official James Miller summarised plans for transition: at some point in 2013, the ANSF will be in the lead for providing security across Afghanistan. At that time, US and Coalition forces will be in a support role This includes US and coalition forces part-nered with Afghan units and it will include the smaller footprint associated with US and coalition forces in a train, advise and assist role. While NATO Secretary-General Anders Fogh Rasmussen has made great efforts to portray NATO nations as united in the transition strategy, national approaches to force reductions have diverged. Further US reductions will probably be at least matched by similar troop reduc-tions by other ISAF nations.

There is little evidence that military efforts are having sufficient coercive effect to bring insurgents to the conference table, let alone generate an acceptable deal. Meanwhile, it is far from clear that there will be sufficient improvement in Afghan governance and reduction in corruption to neutralise the root causes of the insurgency, even in areas that have been cleared and held. Transition may have proceeded as planned at the military level, but the UN assesses that, despite improvements in the security situation, these gains have not generated public perceptions of greater security and do not reflect improvements to the insti-tutional structures required for longer-term stability. Little has changed in the underlying dynamics to miti-gate a deep-seated cycle of conflict. Furthermore, a diminished international presence will have a signifi-cant financial impact in many areas that, at least in the short term, may even exacerbate predatory behaviour, with a reduced flow of money encouraging criminality.

On present trend, it is likely that the ANSF will reach full strength and will improve its capability. So as NATO reduces, they will, for example, likely hold onto those areas in southern Afghanistan now clear of insurgents. But the outcome most likely in 2015 is a situation much like today a security patchwork with the ANSF suppressing much insurgent activity in many areas. In these places, the insurgency would probably have a residual presence, and an ability to mount limited attacks. But, other areas, particularly in eastern Afghanistan, will probably remain under insurgent influence.

The end of the surge makes it unlikely that further major offensive operations will be mounted


to clear more areas of Helmand and Kandahar. As ISAF reduces in size, the troops available to train and mentor the ANSF will reduce, unless contrib-uting nations choose to reinvest in these areas. The US drawdown makes it far less likely that Haqqani network strongholds in southeast Afghanistan can be cleared, let alone held and built. However, if ISAF and the ANSF make insufficient military prog-ress in eastern Afghanistan, the insurgents ability to mount spectacular attacks in Kabul will continue to pose a strategic threat to NATOs narrative, creating in Afghanistan and internationally an impression of un-governability and failure of the transition process.

syriaBy the end of 2012, the conflict in Syria was a full-fledged insurgency, showing increasing elements of sectarian civil war. The UN estimated that as of October 2012, 30,000 people had died, over 2.5 million Syrians needed humanitarian assistance within the country, and over 340,000 had fled into neighbouring countries. The rebels sought to depose the regime of President Bashar al-Assad through either military defeat or forcing him to cede power. To prevent this, Assad and his forces sought to contain the insur-gency, then progressively neutralise the rebels, whilst re-establishing political control.

The war so farCivil protests erupted against the Assad regime in March 2011. In the absence of meaningful reform, protests increased and a security solution was implemented from July 2011. Syrian security forces heavy-handed efforts at repression were broadcast internationally by traditional media as well as social media and YouTube, rapidly giving the opposition information dominance in Western and Arab media. With both sides increasingly radicalising, and the opposition joined by self-organising armed groups, attacks on government forces gradually increased throughout 2011. By early 2012, the security solution had failed, as had an Arab League peace initiative and monitoring mission. The regime then pursued a mili-tary solution.

The first major government offensive focused on Homs, and particularly the Baba Amr district. The army surrounded and then shelled the area, causing significant destruction and loss of life. At the end of the operation, the armed opposition and most civil-ians had fled. This provided the model for subse-

quent government offensives: first, ring the area with checkpoints, and then engage with coordi-nated artillery, rocket and tank fire complemented by attacks from helicopters and fighter aircraft. The army appeared to forgo using combined arms tank/infantry tactics to mount close assaults on rebel posi-tions and it displayed no capability to counter impro-vised explosive devices (IEDs). Once bombardment was judged to have neutralised most opposition, troops would enter, often accompanied by snipers and the pro-government Shabbiha militia, to conduct house-to-house searches, often detaining (and alleg-edly executing many) young men of military age who had not fled. There was no meaningful reconstruction by the government.

Fighting intensified through the year with the armed opposition increasing in strength and effective-ness, and absorbing some defectors from regime forces. The rebels increasingly employed all the methods of modern insurgency including hit-and-run attacks, ambushes, assassinations and suicide bombings. They destroyed armoured vehicles using rocket-propelled grenades, land mines and IEDs, and learned to shoot down low-flying regime aircraft with small arms, anti-aircraft artillery, and possibly man-portable missiles. Weapons were largely seized from regime forces, or purchased in Libya, Iraq, Lebanon and Turkey. Attacks against air force bases sought to reduce regime airpower and capture anti-aircraft weapons.

The RussianChinese veto of a UN Security Council Resolution in February emboldened the regime to increase repression in Homs, Aleppo and Damascus. A subsequent UN peace plan, ceasefire and monitoring mission was used by both sides as an opportunity to regroup.

The regimes strategy was to secure loyalists and loyalist areas, and repress the opposition, while keeping level of conflict below that which would trigger international intervention. Assads narrative was that the uprising was a conspiracy of dark forces including al-Qaeda, Western states and other Arab nations. At the operational level, the regime sought to secure the Alawite heartland in western Syria, the road from Aleppo to the Jordanian border and those running southeast into Iraq, as well as the energy infrastructure and agricultural areas in the eastern Euphrates valley. But over time, the regime increas-ingly abandoned efforts to control much of the coun-tryside and withdrew from most of Syrian Kurdistan, providing a significant boost to PKK insurgents fighting in Turkey.


The only common objective of the opposition groups was to remove the Assad regime. There was no evidence of any effective higher-level command or direction at the operational or strategic level. Some groups operated under the umbrella of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), some autonomously. In some provinces, notably Idlib, rebel Provincial Military Councils coor-dinated activities by disparate rebel groups. Tensions emerged between the local population and the rebels, and between military defectors and armed civil-ians. Defectors brought military skills, but could be resented by those who switched sides earlier. There was some inflow of foreign fighters, many of whom were jihadis, some claiming membership of al-Qaeda. Home-grown radical factions such as Jabhat as-Nusra embraced terrorist tactics. Rebel forces committed atrocities, including killing prisoners, though in response to resulting outrage in Syria and abroad, prominent rebel brigades issued a code of conduct and pledged to uphold international law.

Concurrent with an 18 July bomb attack on Assads security council, there was a major uprising in Damascus and attacks on government border posts increased. But rebel limitations were exposed in the summer fighting around Aleppo. This showed stra-tegic overreach, as well as a lack of coordination and tactical and logistical shortcomings. The rush to liberate the city clashed with previously successful guerrilla tactics aimed at securing the countryside, harassing supply lines and complicating the move-ment of regime forces. Aleppo residents, including opposition sympathisers, failed to rally behind the rebel operation.

On several other occasions, rebel groups took over key urban areas, only to be subject to counter-attacks forcing eventual withdrawal. Provided government forces concentrated in sufficient strength, the rebels could not avoid eventual eviction. But these offensives caused such destruction that they reduced government support, while each counter-offensive served to weaken government control elsewhere. The rebels were waging a modern guerrilla war although less effectively than if they had a unified politicalmilitary strategy, campaign plan and a central military command.

Nonetheless, the rebels could, by October 2012, move freely in much of the countryside. They controlled significant parts of Idlib and Aleppo prov-inces bordering Turkey, and part of Damascus prov-ince, as well as several border-crossing points. The regime controlled the Alawite heartland of Latakia province and much of Damascus and Aleppo, but

they could not prevent repeated uprisings by the rebels in and around those key cities.

By October, it also became apparent that the government forces were over-extended and no longer had the military capability to re-assert control over the whole country. The regime lost control over several army and air force installations. There was evidence of exchanges of prisoners and of local cease-fires between rebel and regime commanders, for example in Ain al-Fijeh, a village with natural springs that provided water to Damascus.

The Syrian Air Force and Navy suffered few casu-alties, but the armys combat power considerably reduced, losing up to 2030 killed daily, more during intense fighting, with probably two or three times as many seriously wounded. Strength was also sapped by the steady stream of defections. Reserves were mobilised, but only half reported for duty. Despite its notional strength of 220,000 troops, the effective strength of the army was by autumn 2012 probably about half that. Perhaps half of these could be trusted with routine security duties, such as guarding instal-lations, manning checkpoints and escorting convoys. In sum, the regime could only be certain of the loyalty and fighting effectiveness of the mainly Alawite Special Forces, Republican Guard, and the elite 3rd and 4th divisions perhaps 50,000 troops in total.

external factorsThe government continued to receive military equipment from Russia and there were reports of Iranian expert, financial and material assistance, including credible rebel claims to have captured Iranian Revolutionary Guards posing as pilgrims. Media reports suggested that at least one member of Lebanons Hizbullah had been killed fighting for the regime. Rebels, meanwhile, drew support and recruits from the refugees in Turkey, Lebanon and Jordan. Some groups benefitted from foreign exper-tise, including from Libyans who fought against Muammar Gadhafi, but the best financed and armed appeared to be Islamist groups.

As well as providing financial support and report-edly some material assistance of unknown type, Gulf states and Saudi Arabia have allowed discreet fund-raising on their soil. Western governments feared that weapons would end up in the hands of radical groups, including al-Qaeda affiliates, so they limited assistance to non-lethal equipment such as commu-nications sets. They also tried to vet Syrian groups before providing assistance, and there were reports


that Western officials offered rebel groups modern weapons on the condition that they unite under a single leadership. There was evidence that Western states provided intelligence to select rebel groups, and encouraged regime defections. Covert coordina-tion centres were established in Turkey to manage foreign assistance, notably salary payments to FSA fighters. But this effort suffered from infighting among rebel groups and between donor countries, especially Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia.

Syria sought to deter external intervention. Politically, it relied on Russia and China to block UN Security Council initiatives by the UK, the US and France. Meanwhile, the regime was aware of foreign concern over its conventional and unconventional mili-tary capabilities, and sought to highlight uncertainty. Regime officials declared that its hitherto unacknowl-edged chemical and biological capabilities would not be used against the rebels, but did constitute a deter-rent against intervention or attack. Israel was deeply concerned about surface-to-air missiles, chemical or biological weapons and ballistic missiles falling into the hands of Hizbullah or other extremist groups.

Neighbouring countries were all affected. As of October 2012, Syrian refugees in Lebanon had exceeded 100,000, while an estimated 170,000 were in Turkey, 105,000 in Jordan and 42,000 in Iraq, placing strains on the receiving governments. Syrian shells fell on Jordanian territory. Lebanon saw regular cross-border fire, shelling and incursions, as well as abductions by Syrian intelligence. It suffered greatly increased tension and outbreaks of inter-communal fighting sparked by the conflict. In June, a Turkish RF-4 jet, which may have been on a reconnais-sance mission, was shot down by Syria after briefly violating its airspace; in September and October, Syrian shelling of Turkish territory prompted heavier counter fire by Turkish artillery. This may have been a deliberately disproportionate tactical response to deter further incidents.

neither intervention nor peace deal likelyCiting its difficulties in handling Syrian refugees, Turkey advocated a no-fly zone and safe areas, as did France, though both countries may have calculated the prospects of UN authority for such initiatives as

DAMASCUS

Deraa

HomsHoula

Hama

Deir ez-Zor

1,806

2,106

5,586

Tartus

Latakia

Idlib

Jisr al-Shughour

Aleppo

S Y R I A

Akcakale

Tall Abiaf

J O R D A N

LEBANON

AR RAQQAH

ALEPPO

RIF-DIMASHQ

DEIR EZ-ZOR

HAMA

HOMS

AL-HASAKAH

AS-SUWAYDADERAA

IDLIB

LATAKIA

TARTUSI R A Q

T U R K E Y

QUINETRA

3,070

8,328

6,923

2,453

149

171

3,813

4,609

2,700

51

614

87

25

45,849

61,086

79,356

110,649

Refugees

Naval base Military air base Major road

Civilian deaths per region since March 2011

Gasreserves

Oilreserves

Area of armedrebel activity

Sources: Political Geography Now, Center for Documentation of Violations in Syria, UNHCR, Economist, US Geological Survey

614

Israeli-occupiedGolan Heights

Map 2 Conflict in syria


remote. The practical challenges of a no-fly zone and a ground safe area, the two most-discussed humani-tarian options, not least those posed by Syrian air and coastal defences, are considerable. Experts assessed that Syrias air-defence network still constituted a credible threat.

Most Western countries showed little enthusiasm for military intervention, though US President Barack Obama indicated in August that the use or transfer of chemical weapons would constitute a clear red line. However, the complexity of the crisis, its potential regional repercussions, deadlock at the UN and the projected costs of any military operations deterred other states. A UN mandate for action seemed impos-sible to obtain given Russian and Chinese refusal to accept the premise of Western and certain regional states that Assad should cede power.

In late 2012, ethnic and sectarian faultlines were deepening, with pro-government fighters sympa-thetic to the ruling Alawite minority ranged against mainly Sunni rebels. Although the regime retained the loyalty of a significant number of Sunnis and non-Alawite minority groups, and the armed opposition included many Sunni secular and non-Sunni fighters, the sectarian narrative was increasingly shaping perceptions and actions. The increasingly bitter fighting served to increase polarisation and mutual hatred, making the chances of a peace deal remote, as shown by the collapse of UN efforts to broker a late October ceasefire during the festival of Eid.

If both sides continued the approaches employed up to October 2012, rebel capability and internal and external support would probably grow, whilst government capability and support would reduce. Short of using chemical weapons against rebels, with attendant risk of international intervention, it was difficult to see how Assad could reverse this trend. So the balance of forces would, over time, likely shift to the rebels. However, should they abandon their guerrilla approach and attempt to permanently hold urban areas before such a tipping point is reached, government forces could tactically defeat them: if Assad could not win, the rebels could still lose. And without authoritative political and military leader-ship, competition between rebel groups over terri-tory and resources could increase, carrying with it the potential for inter-factional fighting. This could see the country descend into a civil war with the government just the strongest faction amongst many, increasing the chance of regional destabilisa-tion.

ConTrasTing aPProaChes ToinsurgenCy and CounTer-insurgenCyThe wars in Afghanistan and Syria are both contests between insurgents and government forces, and in each case both sides are supported by a variety of external actors. Insights can be derived from comparing both conflicts against two key principles of all military operations: unity of effort; and legiti-macy and operating in accordance with the law. Further insights can also result from comparison against two key principles of counter-insurgency: intelligence and focusing on the populations needs and security.

unity of effortBoth wars reinforced the value of unity of effort, both politically and militarily. In Syria, the Assad regime directly controlled its political strategy and its secu-rity forces. Meanwhile, the Syrian rebels were greatly handicapped by an almost complete lack of unified political authority and strategy; they also lacked a single overall military command and displayed only partial local tactical military coordination. All this greatly reduced their military effectiveness.

In Afghanistan, the Taliban-led insurgency achieved a degree of political and military unity of effort, although it was unclear if there was sufficient common ground between the various groupings that share the Talibans banner for an over-arching cease-fire to be implemented. On the government side, achieving unity of effort within the Afghan polit-ical arena appeared to be a major part of President Hamid Karzais approach in balancing various power brokers and factions, though as a result, some egre-gious corruption may have been tolerated.

At the strategic level, there appeared to be limited effective international coordination of reconstruction and development, but at the tactical level, Provincial Reconstruction Teams had some effect in achieving unity of international civilian effort at provincial and district level. Security operations gained unity of effort from a single NATOAfghan campaign plan: Operation OMID. At the tactical level, considerable unity of effort was achieved by NATOs partnering of Afghan units and formations, and by embedding teams of advisers. This means that combined AfghanNATO tactical operations had become well coordi-nated, providing few opportunities for the insurgents to exploit boundaries or seams between Afghan and NATO units.


Legitimacy and the lawBoth wars also showed the importance of achieving legitimacy and operating in accordance with the law. Syrian government forces, through repeated human-rights abuses including torture, rapidly forfeited their legitimacy with the civilian unarmed opposition, with the Sunni majority and with many Arab and Western states. This was reinforced by the pursuit of a military solution which saw overwhelming force used against rebel strongholds, with no apparent constraints on the use of force or attempts to reduce civilian casualties. Indeed, the overwhelming use of indiscriminate force appeared to be a deliberate attempt to intimidate actual and potential opposition supporters.

Despite international legal legitimacy conferred by numerous UN Security Council resolutions, NATO and Afghan government operations in Afghanistan have sometimes struggled to achieve legitimacy, particularly at a local level, where NATO found it difficult to understand complex tribal dynamics. But recognising that collateral damage and civilian casu-alties both eroded legitimacy and acted as powerful recruiting sergeants for the insurgents, NATO sought to use force with precision and discrimination. This has included highly restrictive rules of engagement and increased use of precision weapons, including guided missiles and precision artillery.

In both wars, legitimacy has also been an issue for anti-government forces. Taliban propaganda and statements have emphasised the importance of minimising Afghan civilian casualties, although the conspicuous contradiction between these senti-ments and the many civilian deaths from IEDs and suicide attacks rendered this message almost irrel-evant. Credible evidence of human-rights abuses sufficiently threatened the credibility of Syrian rebel forces to cause several rebel groups to issue codes of conduct.

intelligenceBoth wars have emphasised the importance of intel-ligence. During the Syrian governments security-solution phase, state security forces enjoyed some success in disrupting networks of protesters through arrest and detention operations. This probably bene-fitted from extensive background information gath-ered over many years, as well as tutelage by Iranian experts who had learned from the experience of repressing civil protest in 2009. But the Syrian Armys subsequent operations appeared to be indiscrimi-

nate, whilst some rebel attacks, such as the July 2012 bombing of the security headquarters, appeared to be very well-informed, possibly by insiders.

Security operations in Afghanistan, by contrast, have been increasingly well-informed by intelligence. A decade-long international effort to develop the Afghan National Directorate of Security is bearing fruit. And following the winding down of the Iraq War, large numbers of US intelligence and surveil-lance systems were shifted to Afghanistan. Combined with new techniques of data fusion and analysis, this greatly increased the effectiveness of intelligence-led operations, particularly the attack of insurgent networks by special forces.

focus on the peopleThis allowed NATO and Afghan forces to increas-ingly focus on the security and other needs of the general population. In security terms, this saw them implement the direction of former US General David Petraeus, borne of experience in Iraq, to protect the population. And as security improved, civilian devel-opment efforts increasingly sought to meet the needs of the Afghan population, connecting the govern-ment to the people at village and precinct level.

In Syria, by contrast, the government appeared to have effectively abandoned efforts to protect the majority Sunni population, providing opportuni-ties for the rebels to gain legitimacy. It attempted to protect its core Alawite supporters, but it appeared that extensive use of irregular militias stoked the flames of ethno-religious sectarian tension. And the government seemed to largely abandon efforts to provide government services to the majority of the Syrian population.

Both wars can be compared against many other principles of war, and specific principles of insurgency and counter-insurgency. But the greatest contrast is in the attitude to the use of force. NATO and Afghan operations in Afghanistan seemed overwhelmingly conditioned by a desire to use force proportionately and precisely, minimising unintended casualties and damage, and in conjunction with all the other levers of state governance. The Syrian governments approach appeared to be the antithesis of NATOs, apparently regarding force as a means and end in itself and a tool of repression and deterrence, accepting that this would result in considerable civilian casualties and collateral damage. In doing so, they conceded many opportunities to the rebels that NATO and Afghan forces seek to deny to the Taliban.

Trends in defence capability

Future intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance

For Western armed forces, the dilemmas highlighted in recent editions of The Military Balance continue. Budget pressures are forcing states to conduct defence reviews that in many cases are leading to reductions in military organisations, inventories and capabili-ties. A key element of this challenge will be to decide which capabilities to keep, and in what scale and number, and even whether these should be retained on a national basis.

Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capacities, sometimes costly and in recent years often procured by using funding for specific mili-tary campaigns, are central to this debate. At the same time, a reduction in overseas operations and a consequently smaller global footprint will test the effectiveness of ISR-relevant ties established in recent campaigns with allies, other partner states and even other national agencies. The requirement to maintain deployable armed forces is unlikely to diminish in the near future. The places into which these forces are deployed might not, however, resemble the theatres of operation of recent decades. Judging what ISR capabilities and organisations to maintain, both tech-nically and operationally, will be the challenge.

In the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan, joint operations have increasingly been enabled by advanced ISR capabilities. Including mid- and low-tier unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and the accompanying command-and-control networks that integrate these and their output into force structures, these capabilities have developed beyond recognition since the 9/11 terrorist attacks prompted the Western intervention in Afghanistan. The use of ISR capabili-ties ranging from space-based and unattended ground sensors, as well as sensors on manned and unmanned aircraft, combined with pre-existing capacities such as signals, electronic and human intelligence, have given Western armed forces key information advan-tages in later stages of these recent campaigns.

After early failures in information collection, analysis and intelligence dissemination, the picture

improved in Iraq and Afghanistan. This was particu-larly true for US forces, after then-defence secretary Robert Gates, in April 2008, expressed his frustra-tion at failures in intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination in Iraq and Afghanistan, and moved to fast-track innovative approaches to fielding new capabilities. For British forces in Iraqs Multi-national Division South East, until Operation Charge of the Knights in Basra in March 2008, there had not been enough available ISR capabilities to support intelli-gence-led strike operations or maintain a counter-IED roadwatch.

Many of these new technical capabilities are now filtering down to non-Western armed forces. Differences between Western states and newer users lie more in the scale and ambition of use and coordi-nation, and the technological complexity of the capa-bilities employed. New users will have to be mindful of the challenges ISR capabilities bring, such as the supply of ever greater amounts of information, as well as the benefits. That said, the effect on new users of the challenges identified by Western states may be limited by the range of capabilities they can afford.

isr matures, slowlyIn their broadest sense, ISR capabilities have been used by armed forces for centuries: intercepts of written communications would have been familiar to the armies of antiquity, while technical means rapidly developed in response to advances in telegraphy, telephony and wireless communications from the late nineteenth century. It was during the Cold War that their use was considered to have matured.

However, the persistence of present-day ISR plat-forms is a new development. Designed to loiter for hours, days, or longer in the case of some space-based systems, such platforms conduct an ever-expanding amount of persistent surveillance (perhaps better termed data accumulation and assisted by technical advances in computer storage and processing power)on the ground and in cyberspace, and in both civilian and military domains.

Information-gathering capabilities used in Iraq ranged from strategic-level satellite reconnaissance

17Trends in defence capability

and U-2 over-flights to, after the situation received top-level attention in the spring of 2008, rela-tively low-cost airframes fitted with ISR suites like the MC-12 Liberty, as well as ground sensors. The campaign also saw ISR capabilities devolve down to small-unit levels: hand-launched UAVs, such as the Raven, Desert Hawk and Skylark, gave ground troops direct access to real-time imagery without the rela-tively time-consuming need to route tasking orders through a higher formation, and thus presumably waiting for other assets to be deployed, in the midst of a fast-moving environment. Though equipment such as this did improve timeliness, troops had first to be on the ground in sufficient numbers to either launch such assets, develop local knowledge and language skills, or gather information from interactions with local communities.

As the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan evolved into counter-insurgency campaigns, Western armed forces rediscovered the value of cadres of linguists and analysts capable of liaising with the local popu-lation or extracting information from prisoners. Information gathered from these multiple sources, including human intelligence and from ISR platforms or other methods such as email and mobile intercepts, was often combined in an analytic process termed fusion. In this, analysis centres would use sophisti-cated methodologies to fuse different kinds of intel-ligence into actionable mission packages that would then be disseminated in a timely manner, as noted in IISS Strategic Survey 2012 (pp. 367). This could then enable, where required, targeting by assets such as aircraft, ground troops or special-forces teams. Persistent surveillance from UAVs and improvements in communications also permitted real-time moni-toring of such operations, with damage assessments carried out near-concurrently.

too much information?As the amount of information requiring analysis has increased, so too have the challenges of aggregating, collating and analysing it. This problem is exacer-bated in conditions of high operational tempo such as exist in Afghanistan [where] huge volumes of data need to be analysed and packaged in something close to real time. At present the capacity to do this is severely limited (Ibid.). If anything, this is still a growing problem. Greater volumes of information are now accessible, for instance through cyberspace, giving the collection agencies ever more targets and potential sources to assess, and likely more collection

priorities. Additional analytical complications arise from the increased likelihood of circular reporting in digital sources (where a story is repeated by many sources creating a false impression that informa-tion has been corroborated) something clear to any regular Internet user.

In operational theatres, one way that Western states have sought to overcome challenges to collation and analysis is by increasing intelligence staffs. Another is by formalising fusion centres and putting these at the disposal of commands in peacetime, as well as war. In these centres, all-source analysis and information exploitation (and sometimes collection) is carried out by co-located civilian and military staff from a range of countries and agencies in a bid to avoid duplication of the collection and analysis effort, and in an attempt to enable more effective command and control of friendly forces and targeting of hostile forces. These groups are working in addition to national and multi-national intelligence cells and command-and-control networks. Meanwhile, the means that national and multinational organisations employ to analyse data have also evolved, with the emergence of technical tools to filter and analyse information. But still, the ability of intelligence agencies to collect data far outstrips their capacity to analyse it (Ibid.). While using technical means can help in tasks like filtering large amounts of data, making sense of the informa-tion still requires analysts exercising reasoned judge-ments.

operations draw down, and budgets contractNATO forces in Afghanistan are to withdraw from a combat role by the end of 2014, with the transition to Afghan security control. This reduction in resources, coupled with the increasing pressure on Western defence budgets because of the financial crisis, means that many Western armed forces now see themselves at a turning point, where reassessments of defence priorities and armed-forces structures and holdings will be necessary.

In relation to ISR, defence ministries will be considering which capabilities will form part of future military structures. This process is fraught with problems, as it requires states to make choices on national defence priorities and attempt to predict likely strategic challenges. Western armed forces will need to retain sufficient flexibility to respond to unforeseen crises, possibly including international disputes which might precipitate armed conflict

18 The MiliTary Balance 2013

between states. Changes in the strategic landscape, such as in the Middle East and North Africa, may also make it more difficult for Western states to assume that they will be able to rely on the assis-tance of regional partners in the same way as before. Meanwhile, the ability to field theatre- and tactical-level technical ISR assets may also be limited by factors such as a lack of launching sites or sensitivity about overflights.

operating in new environmentsDifficult decisions about which ISR capabilities to reduce and which to retain, while ensuring a similar level of coverage, analytical capability and timeli-ness, are unavoidable for Western armed forces. Though the operational environments of both Iraq and Afghanistan were eventually information-rich, the more recent Libyan campaign provided a rather different experience in ISR terms.

The NATO-led Operation Unified Protector imple-mented a no-fly zone and arms embargo over Libya, and NATO-led forces conducted air- and naval strikes against regime forces judged to be threatening to attack, or attacking, Libyan civilians. In October, rebel forces finally ousted Colonel Muammar Gadhafi from power. NATO deemed its operation a success, but it was a campaign generated from a cold start in terms of the availability of ISR assets, as well as up-to-date intelligence on Libyan force structures, disposi-tions and capabilities. A key challenge for NATO-led air forces and targeting staffs was the adaptation by Gadhafis forces to their loss of airspace control. They went on to use camouflage and dispersal to their advantage. The gradual development of rebel forces combat capability, the provision to them of secure communications devices and the incremental development of allied ISR coverage together with a suitable array of low-yield air-launched weapons helped in targeting and dismantling Gadhafis forces. However, the campaign highlighted the difficulties that Western forces would face in entering a fresh environment without an adequate understanding of it or the mature ISR architecture to which they have become accustomed.

In information-poor environments such as these, forces looking to intervene can of course generate new information sources or deploy whatever ISR assets are at their disposal. However, given recent experiences in coalition warfare, in which forces from NATO states have become used to operating in multinational environments and drawing on multi-

national ISR assets and analytical capacities, another approach may be to try to replicate these institu-tional partnership networks using differing groups of states. This could be one way of maintaining more comprehensive ISR capacities, but trusted networks suitable for high degrees of information exchange like NATOs fusion centres are likely to take a long time to establish, if they are at all feasible, given the levels of classification probably applied to some ISR output.

Widening the availability of low-level ISR capa-bilities to friendly nations such as the small hand-launched RQ-11 Raven UAVs provided to Uganda and Burundi by the US in 2011 could also help to maintain visibility, or access without presence, though doubts over whether such states would have the technical capacity to combine the output of each system into an effective information-sharing network might mean some residual involvement for Western states; this is, of course, assuming that states remain on friendly terms and that classification levels permit effective collaboration. That said, a number of non-Western states, such as Brazil, India, South Korea and Singapore, possess or are purchasing theatre-level UAV assets that could feed information into such networks or even assume command-and-control functions for themselves.

Cooperation could also include common procure-ment or operation of ISR assets. Discussions continue among NATO and EU member states over the pooling and sharing of assets, and there has been progress on NATOs Alliance Ground Surveillance initiative. Cooperation is easier among countries with established military-to-military ties, but concerns over sovereign control of capabilities and intelligence mean that it is not straightforward.

enduring truthsWith the withdrawal from relatively benign ISR environments in Iraq and Afghanistan, limitations on information obtained through technical methods mean that, unless the information gathered is judged sufficiently reliable, human intelligence will remain vital in discerning intent. It is also apparent that Western armed forces platforms will be fewer in the future and personnel numbers will also decline. So as well as assessing what lessons should be learned from joint operations over the past decade, Western military planners will be keen to examine which ISR capabilities represent the best value and are discrimi-nate in terms of the level of information they generate,


so that smaller teams of analysts are not swamped by information. The risk remains that any capabili-ties shelved now may be precisely those required in the future. Specialist analysts will also have to be retained, even if in smaller numbers, as will deploy-able intelligence specialists from military and civilian agencies. Useful capabilities are not simply military ones. Developments in civilian forensic technology have been applied in tracking bomb-makers, while biometrics technology widely fielded by US forces enables the effective collection of security-relevant information on civilians or prisoners that is capable of integration with database systems.

Meanwhile, defence establishments, and security authorities more broadly, will need to be far-sighted in maintaining their investment in language training for intelligence specialists and other force members who are likely to come into day-to-day contact with locals, along with core training for military intelli-gence staffs down to battalion level, to ensure that the skills accumulated in past campaigns do not atrophy. While financially attractive, focusing language training on a core set of approved languages runs the risk of limiting both the pool of current expertise as well as the capacity to surge the training provi-sion in minor languages as required. Civilian agen-cies, meanwhile, need to consider how to retain the links with armed forces that have further developed in the past decade, and to remain aware of these forces intelligence requirements in large- and small-scale contingencies, while ensuring that the support they can offer is scaleable, and can be increased in size if required. Above all, the lessons learned from campaigns relating to useful assets, analytical tech-niques and capabilities need to be institutionalised within armed forces, at the tactical as well as opera-tional levels, so that capabilities endure even as forces may shrink. Developing assets, information and anal-ysis into an effective ISR architecture takes time; the challenge lies in keeping that time to an affordable minimum.

Though the barriers to accessing certain parts of the world may well rise, the requirement for Western armed forces to exert influence and perhaps estab-lish a presence internationally will remain; doing so will require accurate and timely information, within an increasingly information-rich environment. For states wishing to preserve the ability to project force at speed in unfamiliar environments, the shape of future ISR capabilities will remain a key preoccupa-tion.

land: countering the threat oF improvised explosive devicesImprovised explosive devices (IEDs) have been the weapon of choice for insurgents in the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. With the raw materials often costing less than $20, these devices are cheap, often home-made, simple to use and effective, serving as an asymmetric counter to advanced armies techno-logical advantage.

Initially overlooked by many Western military planners and advocates of the Revolution in Military Affairs, these devices are now estimated to have been responsible for nearly 70% of military casualties in Iraq and Afghanistan. By sowing fear, lowering troop morale, limiting freedom of movement and undermining public support, they have high impact at the tactical, operational and strategic levels. Tens of billions of dollars have been spent in trying to neutralise the IED threat. Yet, they remain likely to create further problems in future.

IEDs are not new, and in recent decades have been used by non-state groups in Colombia, India, Iran, Lebanon, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Somalia and Thailand. During its conflict with the UK, the IRA made extensive use of IEDs, which greatly restricted the mobility of security forces, nearly succeeded in killing then-prime minister Margaret Thatcher and inflicted the majority of military, police and civilian casualties.

The unexpectedly heavy casualties inflicted by IEDs in Iraq and Afghanistan greatly contributed to the growing unpopularity of these wars in the US and other NATO countries. This was a strategic shock that had significant consequences for Western policy, tactics and procurement. As the operation in Afghanistan winds down, the US and its allies may find it difficult to retain expertise in countering IEDs. However, the increasing use of IEDs elsewhere means that the counter-IED capabilities developed in recent years will remain vital for armies and police forces.

challenge in iraqFollowing the US-led invasion of Iraq in 2003, insur-gents used large amounts of ammunition abandoned by the disbanded Iraqi Army in order to manufacture IEDs. Aided by Internet-based learning, their capabil-ities improved rapidly and by August 2003, US casu-alties caused by IEDs overtook those caused by small arms and rocket-propelled grenades. By the end of the year, IEDs were responsible for two-thirds of US


deaths. UK forces in southern Iraq quickly applied the tactical approaches that they had used to counter IEDs in Northern Ireland, though the British Army was slow to recognise the vulnerability of its lightly armoured Snatch Land Rovers, with the resultant British casualties undermining popular support for the war.

US forces did not have the benefit of this experience, but the problem was quickly recog-nised by commanders in Iraq. In December 2003, CENTCOMs commander at the time, General John Abizaid, asked Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld to commission a major cross-govern-mental response to the threat, along the lines of the Second World War Manhattan Project to develop the atomic bomb. The Pentagons initial response was slow and under-resourced. But by 2006, the 12-strong Joint IED Defeat Task Force had evolved into Joint IED Defeat Organisation (JIEDDO) with several thousand dedicated government, military and contract personnel. Countering the new threats not only required an array of armoured vehicles, electronic jammers and remote-controlled robots, it also required close cooperation between intelli-gence and operations staff, scientists and industry, placing demands on the flexibility and agility of armies, military-procurement bodies and defence ministries of all the coalition nations.

Initially, much of the US response focused on improving physical protection, such as personal body armour, and reinforcing existing tanks and armoured fighting vehicles. But support and logis-

tics units had few, if any, armoured vehicles. So in the first two years of the war, these troops resorted to desperate expedients, such as adding makeshift armour, made from scrap metal, to soft-skinned vehicles. Although many armoured high-mobility multi-purpose wheeled vehicles (or humvees) were fielded in 200405, they were quickly overmatched by improved insurgent IEDs and it was not until November 2006 that the requirement was identi-fied for the more heavily armoured mine-resistant ambush-protected (MRAP) vehicle. Some 28,000 MRAPs had been procured by US and NATO forces by August 2012.

But despite the application of sophisticated intel-ligence, scientific, industrial and military resources to the problem, an actionreaction relationship evolved between insurgent bombers and coalition troops, scientists and engineers. The many ways of config-uring bombs and the complex technology required to counter them meant that it could often take six to 12 months between the emergence of a new type of IED and the fielding of a sufficient technical countermea-sure by trained troops.

operational approachIn Iraq, the US military moved from a strategy of addressing the IED itself and its consequences (more armour and better medical care) to preventing insur-gent networks from building and laying IEDs in the first place. Based on British doctrine, a common counter-IED approach was applied by all coali-tion troops in Iraq and, later, in Afghanistan. This

case study: explosively formed projectilesAn example of the IED challenge and response was the fielding of explosively formed projectile (EFP) devices against British forces in southern Iraq from 200509. There was nothing new about the technology, in which explosives detonating behind a disc-shaped charge mould it into a high-energy metal slug that is capable of punching through even tank armour with lethal results. Indeed, during the Cold War the British stockpiled French-manufactured EFP mines for use against Warsaw Pact ar-mour. But drawing on expertise from Hizbullah and with a supply of EFP components from Iran, Shia militias used EFP devices to great effect against coalition vehicles.

Initially the British had no technical countermeasures and could only reduce the threat by adapting tactics. This included rigorous control of road movement and devot-

ing considerable resources to force protection. This so re-duced the available combat power of the British brigade that both its operational effect and its ability to train Iraqi forces were reduced. It was months before additional ar-mour and other countermeasures to protect against EFPs were fielded. It was only in the aftermath of the 2008 Iraqi forces surge in Basra, Operation Charge of the Knights, that the level of security forces on the streets in Basra City was sufficient to disrupt the emplacement of EFPs.

In the UK, the issue had political significance as many British lightly armoured Snatch Land Rover 44 patrol vehicles were destroyed by EFPs, causing well-publicised casualties. This produced considerable criticism that the reaction of the government, Ministry of Defence and army had been too slow.


saw three lines of action: defeat the device; attack the network; and train the force at all levels of command. All needed to be integrated by rapid infor-mation exchange across forces, so that counter-IED action could quickly be initiated.

Defeat the device Detecting technologies included hand-held devices, sniffer dogs and sophisticated search techniques and equipment, while electronic jammers were fitted to vehicles and carried by troops, to block trigger signals sent to bombs. Considerable effort was also devoted to the development of explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technologies that would help in neutralising devices detected before detonation and recovering them for forensic analysis.

These measures were complemented by attempts to disrupt the laying of IEDs, principally by imposing more rigorous control over road movements and with more patrols on the ground, though these depended on there being sufficient troops to dominate an area. Air movement alleviated the threat, although some transport aircraft and helicopters struck IEDs placed on landing sites. And while many countries bought more helicopters and isolated units were supplied by parachute, not even the US could move sufficient troops and supplies by air. Therefore, previously soft-skinned trucks also had armour and jammers added.

Attack the network In Iraq, extra intelligence resources were deployed to identify insurgents involved in IED construction and supply, as well as those planning attacks and planting and operating the devices. Airborne surveil-lance, particularly from long-endurance manned and unmanned aircraft, proved particularly useful in identifying insurgent teams planting devices. These could then be attacked, or in the case of those making or moving bombs, followed. The prefer-ence was to detain insurgents and seize devices and bomb-making material for forensic and technical analysis and the development of further intelligence. Biometric technology fielded by US forces greatly improved their ability to link bomb components to bomb-makers.

Train the force Troops would ideally train with the specialist counter-IED equipment they would use in theatre. However, there was often insufficient equipment for pre-oper-

ational training, and troops had to learn on the job, with all of the attendant risks. In the case of British forces in Iraq, casualties tended to be suffered during the first weeks of tours of duty as troops learned on operations, until sufficient equipment was provided for pre-deployment training.

ieds in afghanistanThe dominant IED in Iraq was the explosively formed projectile (see box, p. 20), which coupled a highly engineered warhead with civilian infrared control technology, optimised against armoured vehicles. The typical IED in Afghanistan has been a much simpler home-made bomb initiated by a so-called victim-operated pressure plate. But these IEDs have been laid even more widely. In the southern prov-inces of Helmand and Kandahar, the density of IEDs has approached that of minefields previously laid in state-on-state warfare. In 2009, 9,304 IED explosions were recorded, but this rose to 15,225 in 2010 and peaked at 16,554 in 2011.

Techniques used to attack IED networks in Iraq have been refined. Combined with improved counter-measures and pre-tour training, these techniques have resulted in fewer troops being killed or injured by roadside bombs; the US has claimed a 40% reduc-tion in IED casualties in Afghanistan during 201112. JIEDDO assesses that with adequate numbers of UAV-borne sensors to detect IEDs, the number of bombs found before they explode has increased to 64%, after stubbornly hovering around 50% for years. However, experts repeatedly say that the best tools remain sniffer dogs with handlers, a well-trained soldiers eye and information from a supportive local population. Using these tools, NATO foot patrols in Afghanistan currently achieve an average 80% detec-tion rate. But insurgent IEDs remain the single-largest source of civilian deaths in Afghanistan, killing nearly 1,000 in Afghanistan in 2011, according to the United Nations.

In early 2010, at the height of Operation Moshtarak in Helmand and Kandahar Provinces, US and British forces used heavy engineer tanks to clear routes through these dense belts of IEDs by firing rocket-propelled explosive hoses. Later that year, the British Army fielded its Talisman system: a dedicated group of armoured vehicles and expert personnel with powerful surveillance systems, small UAVs/ground robots and the Buffalo, an armoured vehicle with a remotely operated arm. The US has similar route-opening detachments. Both teams also include high-


mobility JCB armoured excavators to repair damage caused by IED blasts. Dedicated surveillance systems have been fielded, including specially modified surveillance aircraft.

Increased protection has saved lives, but has reduced the effectiveness of NATO forces. Soldiers have to carry heavy loads body armour, jamming equipment and mine detectors meaning that their mobility is correspondingly reduced. In addition, the large numbers and types of protected vehicles create logistical challenges, reducing both operational flex-ibility and NATO troops ability to interact with the Afghan people.

Beyond iraq and afghanistanIn 2011, almost 600 IED incidents per month occurred in countries outside Iraq and Afghanistan. Anti-government forces have made increasing use of them in Syria, in roadside bombs and suicide car bombs, and in assassination attempts. The Syrian govern-ment claimed that there were over 700 IED incidents in May 2012 alone. By August 2012, it was clear that not only were Syrian rebels successfully destroying government tanks and armoured vehicles with IEDs, but also that government forces appeared greatly handicapped by an apparent lack of tactical counter-IED capability.

Armed forces of countries that may have to fight Western forces will have observed the advantages that IEDs have given to insurgents in Iraq and Afghanistan. They are likely to see the overlapping characteris-tics of IEDs and conventional sea- and landmines. So countering both IEDs and conventional landmines will remain a core requirement for land forces.

In an age of austerity, the absence of major opera-tions will make keeping knowledge and expertise alive difficult. A relevant example is British tactical intelligence in Iraq, where hard-won tactical intel-ligence skills and capabilities that had been devel-oped in Northern Ireland and used to great effect against IRA bombers were allowed to atrophy as the campaign there wound down, to the consequent disadvantage of operations in Basra. The British managed to regenerate these capabilities in time to have an impact in Afghanistan. This shows how difficult it can be to retain the intellectual capital and understanding to regenerate idle military capabili-ties. The recently announced Army 2020 reorganisa-tion of the British Army provides for the retention of sniffer dog, search and EOD capabilities in a specialist brigade.

Speaking at IISS in February 2012, the JIEDDO chief argued that the threat is an enduring and global one that cannot be solved by any single silver bullet. JIEDDO has proposed that institutionalising counter-IED capabilities requires continued invest-ment in relevant research and development as well as forensic capabilities, retaining current techniques to fuse operational information and intelligence, continuing to train service personnel in counter-IED tactics, and a whole-of-government response as part of wider security efforts. To counter this widening threat, greater national and international cooperation will be required among intelligence agencies, police and security forces, scientists and the defence and security industries. However, funding for such efforts could be under pressure as NATO troops withdraw from Afghanistan: future armies may well, therefore, merge counter-IED efforts with broader counter-mine capabilities.

maritime: suBmarine capaBility improvementsA key trend in maritime procurements is the rapid development of submarine fleets. States with existing fleets are developing the capabilities of their vessels while a number of states, particularly in the Asia-Pacific, are fielding submarines in their inventories for the first time.

Submarines offer the ability to project power at range and with stealth. They are the most expensive type of naval vessel, tonne for tonne, but are afford-able for an increasing number of states. Most states opt for conventionally powered submarines, but even the list of countries operating nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) is expanding: India commissioned its first SSN in more than 20 years in April 2012, while Brazil is developing an SSN capability.

Submarine capabilities are also developing. Air-independent propulsion systems have been widely adopted in conventionally powered subma-rines; these systems increase cruising times and reduce acoustic signatures. Weaponry has also improved: many submarines now have the capacity to launch varying types of missiles beyond the ballistic systems long seen in nuclear ballistic-missile submarines, while torpedoes have become faster and more accurate, with better guidance systems and on-board sensors. This will only heighten the imper-ative for states to improve anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities.


expanding conventional fleetsWhile fleets are being developed in Europe, the Middle East and North Africa, and Latin America, a raft of submarine purchases in the Asia-Pacific has provoked more concern, given that Asian defence-modernisation programmes often reflect efforts to hedge against the assumed motives of others. As noted in The Military Balance 2012 (p. 208), this risks destabilising interaction between defence strategies, doctrines and capability-development programmes. It means that there is increased potential for actionreaction procurements.

The growth in Chinas submarine fleet has encour-aged this view. Over the past two decades, its fleet has grown from 46 to 66. In 1992, the majority comprised outdated, 1950s-era Romeo-class diesel-electric submarines. Twenty years later, and particularly after the creation of the South Sea Fleets 72nd submarine flotilla in the early 2000s, China could boast 12 Kilos imported from Russia, and the indigenously designed and constructed Song- and Yuan-class, with the older Ming-class now slowly being decommissioned.

Other regional states are ordering new boats, some for the first time, others are updating ageing fleets, and still others are increasing the number of hulls in service in a concerted effort to expand their sub-surface capabilities. Countries such as Malaysia,

Singapore, Vietnam, Indonesia, South Korea, Australia, Japan, India and Pakistan are all expanding their existing fleets or creating new ones. For states surrounding the South China Sea the location of a number of disputes over territory or maritime bound-aries or those perceived as potential regional rivals to China, these procurements are a reaction to Beijings growing surface and sub-surface fleet. Procurements of these advanced capabilities may also spring from a desire to improve military capabilities in the wake of economic growth, while there are a number of sub-regional rivalries and military competitions that also go some way to explaining procurements.

Beyond East Asia, other states are also expanding or improving their fleets of conventional submarines, particularly in the Middle East. Israel took delivery of its fourth Dolphin-class (German Type-212 variant) submarine in May 2012, as part of its plan to double the size of its three-boat fleet. Algeria similarly doubled its two-boat fleet with two improved Kilos in 2010. Iran continues to maintain its three-vessel Kilo-class fleet, with one of the boats having been repaired after a lengthy refit in early 2012, but it is also expanding its midget submarine fleet through the indigenous Qadir-class to offer asymmetric sub-surface capabilities in the crowded and often shallow Persian Gulf.

Table 1 germanys type-209 submarine and successor types: world operators209/1100 209/1200 209/1300 209/1400 209/1500 214

Argentina 1 (1)

Brazil 5

Chile 2

Colombia 2

Ecuador 2

Egypt 2 (in negotiation)

Greece 3 (1) 4 4 (2)

India 4

Indonesia 2 3 (Chang Bogo)

South Korea 9 (Chang Bogo) 3 (6)

Peru 2 4

Portugal 2

South Africa 3

Turkey 6 8 6

Venezuela 2

Total 6 (2) 25 6 18 (3+2) 4 9 (14)The Type-209 submarine is the most popular exported boat in the sub-surface sector. Thus far, the 209, in its various guises, has been exported to 13 countries, with a 14th in negotiation, while its successor the 214 has already been exported to four with a fifth contracted. The remarkable success of German manufacturer HDWs submarine types, which have now seen 68 vessels exported, is owing to a number of factors: their modular designs allow for incremental improvements and various options tailored to the client; their size and adaptability makes them appealing to a wide range of countries; and the initial development of the 209 occurred as many countries were looking to update ageing pre-Second World War submarine designs. The above figures do not include the six Type-210 (Ula-class) supplied to Norway, the four Dolphin-class boats delivered to Israel and the Type-212A design that has also been procured by Italy.


In Latin America, Chile received two Scorpene-class boats in 2005, adding to its existing fleet of two Type- 209s, while Brazil has ordered four Scorpene-class boats to be received in the latter half of this decade.

In Europe, a number of replacement programmes are currently in train. Germany has commissioned four modern Type-212 submarines two are in build and has exported four of the class to Italy, of which two are already in service. Greece has received four Type-214s (the export variant of the 212), and, despite its financial troubles, has agreed to complete a six-boat deal with Germany. Turkey has ordered a further six Type-214s, to replace the six oldest Type-209s in its 14-boat fleet.

After a long hiatus, Russia has once again started to produce conventional submarines, with two classes, the Lada and the Varshavyanka, being separate, improved variants of the original Kilo design. One Lada was commissioned in 2010 and two more are in build, while six Varshavyanka are apparently to be built and transferred to the Black Sea Fleet.

improved technological capabilitiesThe proliferation of air-independent propulsion (AIP) systems signifies a substantial improvement in conventional submarine stealth. Originally, AIP systems were confined to Europe and Russia, but these are now in use in Pakistan, Malaysia, Singapore, South Korea, Japan and China. The Vietnamese Kilos and Indian and Brazilian Scorpenes will all have AIP technology.

AIP allows boats to remain submerged for extended periods, perhaps up to three weeks, without the need to snorkel for air, making it more difficult for surface and aerial forces to track them. A benefit of current AIP systems is that some can be retrofitted into existing vessels; the Swedish Stirling cycle AIP system, for example, can be inserted into a boat by extending the hull. Until recently, conventional AIP technology was produced exclusively by Germany, France, Spain, Sweden and Russia. However, with the Yuan-class submarine, China has also begun to produce and deploy AIP-equipped vessels, and will co-produce with Pakistan AIP technology for Islamabads future submarines.

For countries with relatively poor ASW capa-bilities, AIP-equipped submarines compound the problems raised by submarine proliferation more generally; that is, assuming that the countries in possession of these systems are able to operate them to best effect. So the decision in various East Asian

capitals to purchase submarines can be seen from two perspectives. On the one hand, as a tacit admis-sion that some states are unable to compete with the modernisation of Chinas surface fleet and as a result are adopting sea-denial rather than sea-control capa-bilities. On the other hand, these submarine procure-ments can be viewed as an attempt to exploit the Peoples Liberation Army Navys perceived weak-ness in ASW. The corollary of this is, of course, that it will only encourage China to develop its ASW capabilities to counteract this perceived weakness, as evidenced by an increased focus on improving ASW capabilities in, for instance, the new Type-056 corvette. These requirements will only increase now that China has commissioned its first aircraft carrier, where ASW escorts will be crucial to ensure its survival. The development of the Y-8X maritime patrol aircraft, currently in service, and in particular the prototype ASW variant with a magnetic anomaly detector, will be another significant step forward for Chinas ASW capabilities.

Weapons are also improving. Torpedoes have become quieter, faster and able to operate at greater depths. Like submarines, torpedoes are manufac-tured by a relatively small number of countries, meaning various states will use the same type. In the heavyweight torpedo market, for example, Raytheons Mk 48 is now in service in 29 countries officially (and unofficially in China as the unlicensed, reverse-engineered Yu-6/Yu-7) and Atlas Elektroniks DM2A4 is in service in Germany, Spain, Pakistan, Turkey, Greece and Israel.

Propellers have largely been phased out in favour of quieter propulsors, while sound-isolation tech-niques, exhaust muffling and body damping have all aided acoustic quieting. Sensors and guidance systems have improved, notably in terms of target acquisition and discrimination. Torpedoes are also increasingly incorporating active/passive sonars to detect and track targets, while wake-homing torpe-does, a technology developed in the 1960s in the Soviet Union, are now utilised in Atlas Elektroniks DM2A4. Supercavitation, the technology that allows torpedoes to greatly increase their speeds up to 250 miles per hour, remains limited to the Russian VA-111 Shkval, in service since the early 1970s; torpe-does reportedly exported to China lacked fire-control systems, limiting their utility. In the US, a programme funded by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is examining the uses of supercavitation, though the noise created by the process, as currently


understood, limits its attractiveness. An Iranian claim that it tested its first supercavitating torpedo in 2006 has not been verified.

Television images of Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles (LACM) exiting US and UK submarines in recent campaigns, such as against Muammar Gadhafis regime in Libya in 2011, highlight another developing sub-surface capability: to launch an increasing number of guided weapons from subma-rines. Though only six states can currently launch LACM from submarines, shorter-range submarine-launched guided missiles are proliferating. France has supplied the Exocet to Pakistan and India, while the US submarine-launched Harpoon is in service with 11 navies. Introducing such technology is not simply a matter of fitting missiles to existing torpedo tubes. Some boats have bespoke vertical launch systems fitted to enable missile-launch capability, while others have specially widened torpedo tubes or the ability to launch missiles from canisters. But while costly complications may thus be introduced in design, manufacture and also on-board weapons storage and handling, these are outweighed by the resulting capa-bility improvements.

more nuclear powerThough the first operational nuclear-powered subma-rine, USS Nautilus, was launched in 1954, until 2009, only the five members of the UN Security Council had constructed and launched SSNs. While the cost and expertise required to operate nuclear submarines has hitherto proven an effective barrier to entry, this situation is now changing. India and Brazil are both developing SSNs, in moves that some have ascribed as much to each states great-power aspirations as to military necessity. India previously operated a Soviet Skat-class (Charlie I) SSN from the late 1980s until 1991, and has recently taken delivery of a Russian Akula-class boat, christened INS Chakra. India also launched, in 2009, a nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine, INS Arihant, though this boat has yet to enter service, and its missile complement is unclear. Brazils aspirations are rooted in nuclear-powered boats. Frances DCNS, involved in the construc-tion of Brazils four Scorpenes, is also assisting in the design and construction of the non-nuclear portions of Brazils nuclear submarine.

SSNs are attractive due to their duration, range and speed relative to conventional counterparts. The largest SSNs in the world, the Russian Typhoon-class ballistic-missile boats, can theoretically remain

submerged on patrol for six months. As such, nuclear power is necessary for an effective contin-uous at-sea nuclear-deterrent capability. However, nuclear submarines tend to be noisier than conven-tionally powered boats as certain systems such as reactor pumps must constantly operate; a situ-ation exacerbated as conventional boats become quieter. Furthermore, substantial technical exper-tise is required to maintain and sustain SSNs, with land-based infrastructure also required for fuel management and storage. Decommissioning nuclear submarines is also problematic and costly because of the need to dismantle and store the reactor safely.

Future submarine marketDevelopments in submarine technologies, as well as a wider set of operators, will likely encourage further investment in ASW capabilities, from depth charges to sonar, frigates to ASW aviation. This will only be reinforced if other technological advances make submarines and their weapons systems more effective. At the same time, submarines are likely to be used for a wider range of roles. Intelligence gath-ering, special-forces insertion, mine-laying and land-attack are but four, while it should not be forgotten that submarines are also a key part of ASW capa-bilities themselves. The North Korean attack on the Cheonan in 2010 demonstrated the difficulties that even advanced navies can have in tracking and sensing potentially hostile submarines. Given this inherent advantage, submarine proliferation is likely to continue as more navies seek to exploit the range of capabilities that these boats offer.

military aerospace: Faster target engagements BeckonAdvances in guidance technologies are providing world air forces with the capacity to engage targets with a high degree of accuracy in all weathers, day or nig

the military balance 2013

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