European

Historical

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EHES WORKING PAPERS IN ECONOMIC HISTORY | NO. 130

The Napoleonic Wars: A Watershed in Spanish History?

Leandro Prados de la Escosura

Universidad Carlos III and CEPR

Carlos Santiago-Caballero

Universidad Carlos III

APRIL 2018

EHES Working Paper | No. 130|April 2018

The Napoleonic Wars: A Watershed in Spanish History?*

Leandro Prados de la Escosura

Universidad Carlos III and CEPR

Carlos Santiago-Caballero

Universidad Carlos III

Abstract

The Napoleonic Wars had dramatic consequences for Spain’s economy. The Peninsular War had higher

demographic impact than any other military conflict, including civil wars, in the modern era. Farmers

suffered confiscation of their crops and destruction of their main capital asset, livestock. The shrinking

demand, the disruption of international and domestic trade, and the shortage of inputs hampered industry

and services. The loss of the American colonies, a by-product of the French invasion, seriously harmed

absolutism. In the long run, however, the Napoleonic Wars triggered the dismantling of Ancien Régime

institutions and interest groups. Freed from their constraints, the country started a long and painful

transition towards the liberal society. The Napoleonic Wars may be deemed, then, a watershed in

Spanish history.

JEL classification: E02, F54, N13, N43

Keywords: Napoleonic Wars, Peninsular War, Spain, Institutional Change, Growth.

*We gratefully acknowledge participants in the Waterloo Network and, in particular, its convenor, Patrick O’Brien, Jaime Reis,

and Alejandra Irigoin, for their comments and suggestions.

Notice

The material presented in the EHES Working Paper Series is property of the author(s) and should be quoted as such.

The views expressed in this Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of the EHES or

its members

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Introduction

TheNapoleonicWarsareusuallydepictedasamajorjunctureinEuropean

history.Historians’assessmentsofthePeninsularWar(1808-1814)tendtoemphasise

itsnegativeimpact.Inthisessay,wesurveytheshort-termeffectsofwarbutlookalso

atitslongrunconsequences.TheFrenchinvasionhadsevereconsequencesforthe

economyofSpainintheshortrun.TheactionsofFrenchandAlliedarmieshada

higherdemographicimpact,largerthananyothermilitaryconflict,includingcivilwars,

inSpanishmodernhistory.Confiscationsofcropsanddestructionoflivestockhindered

agriculture,whileshrinkingdemand,disruptedtrade,andinputsshortagehampered

industryandservices.Moreover,thelossoftheAmericanmainlandcolonies,aby-

productoftheFrenchinvasion,severelyharmedabsolutism,challengingitsviability.In

thelongrun,however,theNapoleonicWarscontributedtotheremovalofAncien

Régimeinstitutionsandinterestgroups.Asthecountryfreedfromtheirconstraints,a

farfromsmoothtransitiontowardsaliberalsocietywasinitiated.TheNapoleonic

Warsmaybedeemed,then,awatershedinSpanishhistory.

I.Theshort-runimpact

TheinvasionofSpainbytheNapoleonicarmieswasinitiallyapeacefulprocess

thattookplacewiththecompleteagreementoftheSpanishauthorities.1However,as

soonasNapoleonforcedCharlesIV’sabdication,insurrectionbrokeup,startingin

Asturiasandquicklyspreadingthroughoutthecountry.Bythen,Napoleonhadalready

stationedlargecontingentsofsoldiersinkeypointsofSpainandwasreadytoface

Spanishandalliedforcesintheupcomingwar.Howlargewasthedamageinflictedon

theeconomy?Thedirecteffectsofthewararehardtoreckon.Inthefollowing

paragraphswewillsurveyitsimpactondifferentsocialandeconomicdimensions.

1OnMarch16th1808,CharlesIVissuedaproclamation,“Breathcalmly:knowthatthearmyofmygoodallytheemperoroftheFrenchpassesthroughmykingdomwithideasofpeaceandfriendship.Itspurposeismovingtothepointsthreatenedbyanenemylanding…”(QueipodeLlano,2008:1202).

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Population

LossesduetomilitaryoperationsinSpain,amajorbattlegroundofthe

NapoleonicWars,havebeenestimatedaround300,000(Urlanis,1971),probablya

figureonthehighside.Mostofthecasualtiestookplace,however,amongthecivilian

population.Theconfiscationoffood,theviolenceofNapoleonicandAlliedarmies,and

thespreadofdiseases,aslargecontingentsofsoldiersmovingalloverthecountry,

wereitsmaincauses.Thereareabundantexamples.IntheshireofValdeorras,only

oneninthoftheSpanishcasualtiesweremilitary(Canales,2017).Frenchtroops

followedaveryclearstrategyindealingwithlocalresistance,namelybloodbathand

terrortoavoidfurtherinsurrections.Afterthesiege,Zaragozawascompletely

destroyedand54,000peoplelosttheirlives(Gates,1987:129).Equallybrutalwerethe

siegesofBadajoz,CiudadRodrigoorthecompletedestructionofSanSebastianatthe

handsoftheAlliedforces.

Figure1:MonthlyMortalityintheCitiesofAlbaceteandAvila,1807-1816(Jan-Dec1807=100)Source:Santiago-Caballero(2017).

Howtheviolenceexertedoncivilianpopulationsincreasedmortalityratescan

beexemplifiedbycomparingthecasesofAvila,whereresistancetotheFrenchtroops

wasmoderate,andAlbacete,sackedseveraltimesduringthewarasoccupationwas

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resisted(Figure1).WhileinÁvilamortalityremainedatthesamelevelbeforeand

afterthewar,exceptduringthesecondoccupationbytheFrencharmyin1812-13,in

Albacete,mortalityincreasedbymorethan50percentin1808-09and1811-13.2

Thenegativeeffectsofthewarwerealsoclearinthemarriagestrategiesofthe

populationinAlbaceteandAvila.Figure2showstheevolutionofmarriagesinboth

citiesbetween1801and1819.Therapidincreaseduringthefirstyearsofthecentury

sufferedasuddenstopfollowedbyareversalatthebeginningofthewarwiththe

numberofmarriagesdecreasingby35percentbetween1808and1814.Figure2also

showstheimportanceofthewarindirectmid-termeffectsasthereductionoffertility,

aconsequenceofyoungmalecasualties.

Figure2:MarriagesintheCitiesofAlbaceteandAvila,1801-19(5-yearmovingave.1801=100)Source:Santiago-Caballero(2017).

Moresignificantare,perhaps,thelossesresultingfromdeviationsfromthe

demographictrend.Fraser(2006)suggestedthatSpain’spotentialpopulation

decreasedbyaround0.8millioninhabitantsduringthefirstfifteenyearsofthe

nineteenthcentury,althoughthecasualtiesofthewardidnotexceed375,000.

Canales(2017)reckonsthatexcessmortalityreached0.6millionduring1809-13.Such2AsSánchezAlbornoz(1911)wrote,“duringthisperiodwhenmostoftheSpanishcitiesadorntheirhistorywithheroicdeeds,notasingleoneiscarriedoutintheAvilaoftheLoyalistsandtheKnights,asingleactthatwouldmadetheAvulensesofthattimeworthydescendantsofthehidalgosfrommedievalAvila”.

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figuresarenotfarapartfromcontemporaryestimatessuggestinganoverallwartollof

aboutonemillion(MuñozMaldonado,1833).PérezMoreda(1985,2010)considers

thisfigureplausible,provideditincludestheeffectsofthesubsistencecrisisof

1803/05onthenumberofbirths.Thus,addingupdirectcasualtiesandlossesresulting

fromexcessmortalityatotallossofnearlyonemillioncanbeputforward.

Figure3:MortalityinSpanishRegions,1800-1815(1800-1815=100).Source:Canales(2017)

Theregionalconsequencesofthewarwereunevenlydistributed.Inthesouth

andtheinterior,mostoftheincreaseinmortalitytookplacebeforethewar,asa

resultofthesubsistencecrisisof1803/05,whileitwasintheperipherywherethe

effectswereconsiderablylargerduringtheconflict,particularlyinCataloniaandthe

northernregions(Figure3).Madridwasespeciallyhitin1812,asconsequenceofthe

hungerproducedbythelowharvestsof1811andthesupplydifficultiesproblems

duringthewar(Fraser,2006:203).Thus,thoseregionsthathadalreadyexperienceda

significantpopulationcontractionduringtheprevioussubsistencecrisissuffereda

milderdemographicimpactduringthePeninsularWar.

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Agriculture

ThePeninsularWarhaddeepandwidespreadeffectsontheagriculturalsector.

PlunderingandconfiscationsbyFrenchandAlliedarmiesimposedaconsiderabletoll

onproducers.ThewaralsoaffectedAncienRégimeinstitutionsthathadconditioned

thesecularbehaviouroffarmersandpeasants.

NapoleonictroopsreliedonsuppliesfromFrancetocarryouttheirmilitary

operations,butguerrillaattackstosupplylinesforcedrequisitionsfromlocal

producers(Gates,1987:41).TheBritishexpeditionaryforcealsoreliedonrequisitions

thoughpromisedtopayfortheexpropriatedgoods.3

Confiscationsoflivestockwereparticularlysignificantandhadtwomain

effects,namely,thelossofasourceofproteinsconsumption,astheamountofmeat

anddairyproductsconsumedbythepopulationfell,andthereductionthecapital

stockusedforploughingandtransportationthatsurelyhadalongerimpact.War

taxationalsohadaconfiscatoryeffect.InCatalonia,forexample,theFrench

administrationcollectedmorethan100millionRealesthatwerepaidbysellingland

andlivestock.

ThewaralsoimpactedontheAncienRégimeinstitutions.Forexample,the

tithe,areligioustaxthat,inprinciple,represented10percentoftotalproduction,was

repealed.Moreover,municipallawsrestrictinglandcultivationstoppedbeingenforced

duringthewar.Sincetheearlyeighteenthcentury,demographicexpansiondemand

hadbeenmetbyincreasingagriculturalproductionattheextensivemargin(Santiago-

Caballero,2013).RelaxingcontrolsduringtheFrenchoccupationintensifiedthistrend

(LlopisAgelán,2010).

Inaddition,desamortización,namely,confiscationandpublicsaleofland

propertyofreligiousandcommunalinstitutions,tookplaceduringJosephBonaparte’s

ruleinordertofinancetheFrencharmy(RuedaHernanz,1997).Althoughthearea

affectedwaslimitedandconfiscationwaspartiallyrevertedafterthewar,the

3However,thiscompensationwasoftenfutile,astheownerhadtotraveltoLisbonandveryoftenwaitforweekstoreceivethemoney,somanyofthemsoldthebillstointermediarieswhoboughtthematconsiderableratesofdiscount(Fraser,2006:761).

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transformationofcommonsandchurchlandsintoprivatepropertywasirreversible.

Thiswasnotthefirstepisodeofdisentailment,however,asaprevious

desamortizaciónhadtakenplacein1798,asawayoffundingthewarsagainstthe

FrenchRepublicandtheUnitedKingdom(Herr,1971,1989).

Assessingtheimpactofwaronagriculturalproductionpresentsachallenge.

Historiansoftenusetithepaymentstodrawtrendsinoutputbutitspaymentbecame

erraticand,insomecases,non-existentduringthePeninsularWar(Álvarez-Nogalet

al.,2016).Ademandfunctionapproachprovidesanalternativeestimateofagricultural

consumptionperheadover1780-1820(Figure4).Aseverecontractionisobserved

duringthewarfollowedbyaquickrecovery.

Figure4:RealAgriculturalConsumptionperHead,1780-1820[1790/99=100)Source:Álvarez-NogalandPradosdelaEscosura(2013)

Outputinpreindustrialagriculturewashighlydependentonclimateconditions

andtheNapoleonicWarsbelongtoaperiodofclimaticinstability.TheMaldáAnomaly

oroscillation,thatincreasedsimultaneouslydroughtsandfloods,coincidedwiththe

firstDaltonMinimum-aphaseoflowsolarradiationbetween1790and1830-,andthe

eruptionoftheTamboravolcanoin1815,thatroseatmosphericCO2concentration,

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bringingwithithighclimaticirregularityandhydrologicextremes.Theseclimatic

anomalieswerematchedbyintenseoutputfluctuations(BarriendosandLlasat,2003;

Barrera-EscodaandLlasat,2015).

Figure5showsagriculturaloutputandseasonalrainfallanomalies–namely,

yearlydeviationsfromthehistoricalaveragerelativetothestandarddeviation-.An

inverseassociationbetweenoutputandrainfallvariationscanbepredicated,withwet

periodsassociatedtonegativeoutputfluctuations.

Figure5:AgriculturalOutputandPrecipitationAnomalies1500-1855.Sources:Agriculturaloutput,Álvarez-Nogaletal.(2016);Precipitation,Rodrigoetal.(1999).

Theexogenousshockbroughtbythewarandclimaticanomaliesimpactedon

thereturnstofactorsofproduction.Theextensionoflandundercultivationdepressed

landrents,thatfellbynearly50percentbetween1808and1812andneverre-gained

pre-warlevels(Figure6).Realwagessufferedamoreintensereductionduringthewar

butreturnedtopre-warlevelsby1817.

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Figure6:RealLandRentandWageRates,1780-1820(1790/99=100)Source:Álvarez-NogalandPradosdelaEscosura(2013)

Figure7:InequalityTrends:RealLandRent/WageRateratio,1780-1820(1790/99=100)Source:Álvarez-NogalandPradosdelaEscosura(2013)

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Comparinglandrentsandrealwagesalsohelpustodrawtrendsinincome

distribution.Therationaleisthataslandismoreunevenlydistributedthanlabourand

averagereturnsusuallyhigherforlandownersthanforworkers,thelandrent-wage

ratioprovidesameasureofchangesinincomeinequality.Adecliningtendencysince

1800isobservedthattheendofthewardidnotrevert,exceptfortwopeaksduring

thepre-warsubsistencecrisis(1804)andinthePeninsularWar(1812)(Figure7).

Industry

Theeffectsofwarontheindustrialsectorincludedthereductionofinternal

andexternaldemand,scarcityofinputs,andheavytaxation.Inaddition,producers

facedunrestrictedcompetitionofFrenchandBritishgoods.

Forexample,inthewoollenfactoryofAstudillo,oneofthemaincentresof

textileproductioninOldCastile,thepriceofwoolmorethantripledbetween1808and

1814.Therequisitionofanimalsandtheincreaseoftransportcostswereprobably

behindthesechanges,whiletheinvasionofcommonmunicipallandsandtheirusefor

cultivationalsoreducedtheavailablepasturestofeedsheep.Producerswereforced

tocutdownpricesandprofitmargins(HernándezGarcía,2004:171).

Figure8:InputsBoughtbyErasmodeGómina’sCottonTextileCompany(1802-04=100)Source:Sánchez(2010)

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Inthecaseofthecottonindustry,mainlylocatedinCatalonia,inputsscarcity

severelyrestrictedproduction.Forexample,ErasmodeGómina’sfactoryinBarcelona

interruptedinputspurchases(cottonanddyes)duringthePeninsularWar(Figure8).

HeaviertaxationtofinancethewareffortbybothFrenchandAlliedauthorities

drainedresourcesfromproductiveactivitiesandreducedincentivesforeconomic

activity.InAstudillo,textileproducerswerechargedwithadditionaltaxesforthecity

topaytheFrenchinvaders(HernándezGarcía,2004:162).InMurcia,aftertheFrench

tookthecityonApril25th1810,GeneralSebastianiobtainedaransomof34,560

Realesfornotsackingthecitythatwasmainlypaidbylocalbusinesses(Melendreras

Gimeno,2000:64).

Theso-calledRoyalFactories(RealesFábricas)alsosufferedtheeffectsofthe

warandneverrecovered.Theyhadbeenestablishedtoreducetheimportationof

valuablegoodssuchasporcelain,glass,andfinetextilesandtoupgradethe

technologiesusedbylocalproducers(LaForce,1965).However,theirimpactremained

limitedandtheypracticallyceasedtoexistaftertheendofthePeninsularWar(Benaul

andSánchez,2004).TheRoyalFactorieswerealsoanobjectiveforbothsides,likethe

factoryofPorcelaininMadridthatwascompletelydestroyedbyEnglishtroopsbefore

leavingthecapitalin1812(MartínezCaviró,1973).

Althoughtheimmediateeffectsofthewarwereprobablysimilaracross

industries,whiletraditionalindustriescollapsed,modernindustriescontinuedtoadopt

newtechnologies.Therecovery,however,wasnotimmediateandintheCatalan

cottonindustrypre-war(1783-97)nominallevelsofinvestmentwereonlymetinthe

1830s(Sánchez,2000:502).

Anadditionalproblemfordomesticindustrybroughtbythewarwasahigh

levelofsmuggling.Netimportsexperiencedexponentialgrowthduringthewar,and

one-thirdweresmuggledthroughGibraltarandPortugal(cottontextilesandtobacco,

inparticular)(Figure9).Inaddition,theNapoleonicauthoritiesallowedFrenchtraders

tofloodSpainwithFrenchproducts.

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Figure9:SpanishNetImportsfromtheRestoftheWorld(excl.SpanishAmerica),1783-1820:withandwithoutSmuggling(0001808Reales)Source:PradosdelaEscosura(1993)

Trade

Oneofthemostobviouseffectsofthewarwastheimmediatedisruptionof

bothinternalandinternationaltrade.Marketshadgraduallyintegratedduringthe

eighteenthcenturyasthefallofthepricedifferentialforwheatbetweencoastaland

interiorregionssuggests(LlopisAgelán,2010)(Figure10).Thewarprovokeda

reversal,andthereturntopre-PeninsularWarlevelsofintegrationhadtowaituntil

themid-nineteenthcentury(PeñaandSánchez-Albornoz,1983).Marketdisintegration

provednegativeforeconomicactivitybyincreasingtransportcostsandrestrictingthe

supplyofgoodstourbancentres(Ringrose,1970,1983).

Transportcostsincreasednotonlyduetorisinginsecuritybutalsobecauseof

theshortageofmanpower.Muleteerslargelycarriedoutinternaltrade,shortandmid-

distance,inparticular.FrenchandAlliedarmiesforcedmuleteerstosupplythem

reducing,therefore,regulartransportservices(Ros,1999:195).Furthermore,

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guerrillas’confiscationofgrainsupplies,aswasthecaseofthoseaimedforMadridin

1813(Fraser,2006:697),providedanadditionalconstraintontrade.

Figure10:Marketintegration:averagewheatpricedifferentials(%) Source:LlopisAgelán(2010)

Internationaltradeincreasedduringtheeighteenthcentury,promoting

monetisationandmarketorientationatatimeofexpandingpopulationandrisingland

rents.ThistrendsufferedareversalduringtheNapoleonicWars.Fromthebeginning

ofthewarwithBritaininOctober1796,Spainmaintainedalmostnolinkwiththe

coloniesformorethantwodecades.TheFrenchinvasioncontractedtradefurtherand

triggeredthestruggleforindependenceinSpanishAmerica(GrafeandIrigoin,2012:

368).

Tradefelldramaticallyafterthewarbrokein1797,brieflyrecoveringafterthe

Amienspeace(1802)andshrankagainaswarresumed(1805-1808)(Figure11a).The

breakupofthePeninsularWarreducedrealdomesticexportsagain,thatreacheda

troughin1812,andkeptrealre-exportsatminimumlevels.Netimports,thatis,

retainedfordomesticconsumption,recoveredduringthewar(1809-11),largelydueto

allies’supplies,andexperiencedsteadydeclinethereafter.Relativetothesizeofthe

economy,thecontractionofthetradesectorisevenmoredramatic,withdomestic

exportsandnetimportsfallingafter1802andre-exportssince1793(Figure11b).

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Figure11a:RealDomesticExports,NetImports,andRe-exports,1778-1820(1808Reales).Sources:Trade,PradosdelaEscosura(1993);GDP,Álvarez-NogalandPradosdelaEscosura2013)

Figure11b:TradeShares:DomesticExports,NetImports,andRe-exports,1778-1820(%GDP)Sources:Trade,PradosdelaEscosura(1993);GDP,Álvarez-NogalandPradosdelaEscosura(2013)

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TradewithSpanishAmericancoloniesstimulatedindustryandservices,helped

byprotectionistlegislationthatmadeSpanishmanufacturesartificiallycompetitive.

Industrialexports,concentratedinafewsectors,textilesandfood-whichrepresented

morethanhalfofexportvaluein1792apeakyearininternationaltrade(36.6and

22.3%)-andpaperandiron(4.4and3.2%),andwereassociatedwithsomeexternal

economiesintheirregionsoforigin.Shipbuildinganditsassociateactivities(iron,

cordage,andtimberindustries)expanded,favouredbySpanishnavigationlaws.It

couldbesuggestedthat,atmost,exportsofdomesticmanufacturestothecolonies

madea5%contributiontoindustrialvalueaddedbeforetheNapoleonicWars(Prados

delaEscosura,1993).

Thecompositionofcolonialtradesuggeststhatthepossibilityofincreasing

productionbyreallocatingresourceswassmall,andthatmostgainspossiblyresulted

fromchangingconsumptionpatterns.By1792,over60%ofretainedimportsconsisted

ofcocoaandsugar.Furthermore,Spain'sdependenceonthecoloniesforraw

materialswasverysmall(rawcottonanddyestuffsonlyrepresented4%ofretained

importsin1792)(PradosdelaEscosura1993).Sincethesecolonialproductscould

havebeenacquiredoninternationalmarkets,gainsfromcolonialtradewouldonly

occurif,givencolonialrule,Spainacquiredthesamecommoditiesatlowerprices.

Furthermore,itcouldbesuggestedthatthelowdependenceoncolonialrawmaterials

providesameasureoftheweaknessofdomesticmanufacturing.IntheCatalancotton

textileindustry,Europeancottonyarnimportsweremoreimportantthancolonialraw

cottonimports,suggestinghowweakthespinningindustrywasatthetime.

Thesubsequentdeclineindomesticexports(one-fourthbetween1784/96and

1815/20)canbeattributedalmostexclusivelytothefallincolonialcommerce(which

shrankby60%).Theconsequencewastheendofthelong-standingequilibrium

distributionofdomesticexportsbetweenthecoloniesandEurope(roughlyone-third

andtwo-thirds,respectively),andtheestablishmentofanewdistributionthat

continuedthroughoutthenineteenthcentury(withforeignmarketsabsorbingfour-

fifths).Retainedimportsofcolonialgoodsfordomesticconsumption(whichhad

representedone-fifthoftotalretainedimports)fellto15%,butthiswasoffsetby

importsfromEurope.Thecollapseoftradewiththeempirewasparticularlysignificant

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forservices(financial,insurance,transportation),asisrevealedbythecontractionof

realtotalre-exportsto40%ofthepre-warleveland,forthosetoLatinAmericaby

three-fourthsbetween1784/96and1815/20.TheSpanishbalanceoftradealsofelt

theeffectsofcolonialindependence.Beforethelossofempire,Spainhadadeficiton

currentaccountwithforeigncountriesthatwasbalancedbyacorrespondingsurplusin

colonialtrade.Withcolonialemancipationthisbalancingmechanismdisappeared,

withdeflationaryconsequencesforthedomesticeconomy.Fortunately,afavourable

termsoftrade–resultingfromanimprovementvis-à-visEurope,morethanmatching

adeteriorationwithrespecttothecolonies--increasedthepurchasingpowerperunit

ofexportsbynearly40%between1784/96and1815/20,allowingSpaintoavoid

furtherdeteriorationinthecurrentaccountbalance.

AroughestimateoftherealcosttoSpainofthelossofhercoloniescanbe

attempted,makingassumptionsfavourabletothegenerallyacceptedviewthatthe

losswassignificant(PradosdelaEscosura,1993).Thefirstassumptionisthatthe

productiveresourcesembodiedinexportablesdidnothavealternativeusesinthe

domesticeconomy.Asimilarassumptionismaderegardingtheservices(shipping,

insurance,mercantile)providedbySpanishsubjectsinthecolonialtrade.Incontrastto

thenon-colonialtrade,almosttotallycarriedonnon-Spanishships,Spanishcolonial

legislationensuredthatthecolonialtradeusedonlynationalshipping.Therefore,with

thedeclineofSpanishAmericantrade,adeclineinSpanishmaritimeservicesclosely

followed.Thelossinstaterevenuesduetothecessationofpreciousmetalshipments,

andthereductionofcustomsdutiesresultingfromcolonialindependence,werealso

takenintoaccount,theassumptionbeingthatpublicrevenuesfromthecolonieswere

productivelyusedinthedomesticeconomy.TheupperboundestimateofSpanish

lossesimpliedbytheseassumptionswasnotmorethan6%ofnationalincome.And

whileitcouldbearguedthattheprofitsfromcolonialtraderepresentedahigh

proportionofthefundsusedtofinanceinvestmentinSpain,anupperboundestimate

oftheircontributionmadetototalcapitalformationisbelow15%by1784/96.These

results,derivedwithinastaticframework,areconsistentwithPalma’s(2016)who,

usingadynamicmodelfindsthatintercontinentaltraderaisedrealwagesand

urbanizationby6.2%and3.9%,relativelylowfiguresinEuropeanperspective.

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Finance

Inadditiontothecontractionofexternalpublicrevenues(customsrevenues

plusIndies’remittances),asaresultofthesharpdeclineofinternationalandcolonial

trade,thePeninsularWarrepresentedthecollapseofallgovernmentrevenuestoone-

fifthofpre-bellum(1784-96)levelandtoaboutone-tenthofitsrelativesize(Figure

12).

However,between1808and1815,theBritishGovernmentmadeadvancesto

theSpanishauthoritiesinmoney,weapons,andsuppliesthatpartlyoffsetthefallin

publicrevenues.Thus,Spainreceived7.8millionSterlingassubsidypaymentsfrom

Britain(Sherwig,1969:362-8),alargerfigurethanthe5.2millionofficiallyestimated

(ParliamentaryPapers,1854XXXIX(469)).Spainneverrepaidthesesubsidies,

however,aswerecondonedinthepeacetreaties.

Figure12.TheEvolutionofPublicRevenues,1778-1820[MillionReales,1808prices)Source:PradosdelaEscosura(1993)

Thewaralsointroduceddistortionsinthemonetarysystem.Forexample,it

providedtheFrenchoccupationalauthoritieswithanopportunitytoextractprecious

metalsfromSpainviamonetarymanipulations.Frenchcurrencywasallowedto

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circulateandtobeacceptedforpaymentsinSpain.AnadhocCommissionestablished

exchangeratesthatassignedthesamepurchasingpowertoFrenchcoinswithlower

intrinsicmetalliccontentthanSpanishones.Onaverage,thedifferentialwasabout10

percentforthemostcommonlyusedcoins(Vadillo,1846).Asaconsequence,in

occupiedterritoriesSpanishcoindisappearedandonlyFrenchcurrencycirculated

(QueipodeLlano,2010:1136).ThesituationwasnoteasilyreversedandFrenchcoins

werekeptincirculationafterthewar(Sardá,1948).The‘monetaryinvasion’notonly

impliedalossofsilver,butalsocontributedtomacroeconomicinstability.

Summingup

ThePeninsularWarhaddeepandnegativeeconomicconsequencesinSpain.

ThedemographicdirectandindirectimpactrepresentedadisasterforSpain,withthe

populationfallingonemillionshortofitspotentialanditsdirecteffectrepresenting

halfamillioncasualties,around5percentofthepopulation,morethandoublingthe

relativelossinthe1936-39CivilWar,andbecoming,hence,thebloodiestconflictin

Spain’smodernhistory.Theshort-termeffectsofwarinagriculturewereambiguous.

Onthepositiveside,thelackofenforcementofAncienRégimeinstitutions,including

avoidingthepaymentoftithes,allowproducerstoincreasecultivationandpaylower

landrents.Onthenegativeside,confiscationshitlivestockand,therefore,thestockof

capital.Thewarafflictedtheindustrialsectorindifferentways.Impoverished

populationreduceditsconsumption,militaryoperationsincreasedtransportcostsand

inputprices,andheaviertaxesdivertedcapitalfromproductiveinvestment.Services

werealsodisrupted;tradeinparticular,withinternationalexperiencedadramatic

collapse.Governmentrevenuescollapsedandtheoutflowofsilverhadadeflationary

impactontheeconomy.Asaconsequence,GDPperheadfellduringthePeninsular

Waranditsdeclinewasonlysurpassedbytheseveresubsistencecrisisof1803/05

(Figure13),eventhoughitseffectswereveryunevenlydistributedbeingthe

peripheralregionsthemoreafflictedones.

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Figure13.RealGDPperhead,1780-1820[1790/99=100)Source:Álvarez-NogalandPradosdelaEscosura(2013)

ThePeninsularWaralsosparkedthefightforindependenceinSpanishAmerica

andtheirinstitutionalconsequenceswerefarfromnegligible.Theempire

strengthenedabsolutistmonarchy.Colonialrevenuesallowedtheriseofastrong

politicalcentre,whichconcentratedpowerwithoutbeingdrawnintoextensive

bargainingwithitsmoreprominentsubjectsandinstitutions(YunCasalilla,1998).Prior

totheNapoleonicWars,Crownrevenuesofcolonialorigin(includingthesurplusfrom

colonialchestsandthosederivedfromcustomsduties)representedone-fourthofthe

total(Cuenca,1981),reducingthestateneedtoincreasetaxationonthemetropolis

population.Thus,itcanbearguedthatthecolonialempirehelpedtoconsolidateand

stabilisetraditionalinstitutionsandstructuresofpower.Theemancipationofthe

Americancoloniescontributed,therefore,totheendoftheAncienRegime(Fontana,

1991),andopenedthewaytotheliberalrevolution.

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II.TheLiberalRevolution

Theliberalrevolutionbroughtwithitaredefinitionofpropertyrightsthatchangedthe

populationstatusfromsubjectstocitizensequalbeforethelaw,theliberalizationof

commodityandfactormarkets,andtheParliamentarycontrolofpublicrevenuesand

expenditure.Itwas,nonetheless,alongprocessfraughtwithdifficultiesandpartial

reversals.

Animportantstepintheredefinitionofpropertyrightswasthecreationofthe

modernCodeofCommercein1829,whichconcentratedallthefiguresincommercial

mattersinasinglelegalinstrumentandprovidedjudgeswithaunifiedlegalframework

tooperate,reducinguncertaintyandtransactioncosts.TheCodeofCommerce,the

creationoftheBankofSanFernando,andtheestablishmentofthestockmarketin

Madridin1831,providedtheinstitutionaltransformationofthefinancialsystem

(Tedde,1994;Artola,1983:307).

Anotherstepregardedintellectualproperty.Afterashort-livedapatentactin

1820,thelegislationthatregulatedinnovationspropertyrightswasintroducedin1826

(SáizGonzález,1995:90).Thenumberofpatentsrosesteadily,especiallybetween

1843and1864(SaizGonzález,1996:14).

Theliberalizationofcommodityandfactormarketsimpliedmajorchanges.The

gradualsuppressionofthereligioustax,thetithe,increaseddisposableincome.The

tithewashalvedin1821,andthoughformallyabolishedin1837,thefinancial

constraintsduringtheFirstCarlistWardelayeditsdefinitiveeliminationuntil1841.

Furthermore,in1834,theinternalmarketforprimaryproductswasliberalisedand

taxesontheexportationofgrainsexportssuppressed(Artola,1983:297.

Theguildsthatrestrictedparticipationofnon-affiliatesandwomeninindustrial

activitieswerealsosuppressed.In1813theCadizParliamentaryAssembly(Cortes)

decreedthatestablishingafactoryorcarryingoutanindustriousactivitydidnot

requiredthepreviousapproval,ormembership,ofanyguild(RealDecreto8thJune

1813).However,in1814,theabsolutistgovernmentrepealedthedecree,andthe

21

eliminationofguildsprivilegeswasonlyeffectivesincethemid-1830s(R.D.20th

January1834and6thDecember1836).

Theliberalizationofthelandmarketincludedtheeliminationofmayorazgo(an

institutionthatcontemplatedthepossibilityofaddingnewassets,butwhoseproperty

couldnotbealienatedordistributedininheritance)andthedisentailmentofland,

(desamortización),thatimpliedtheconfiscationandsaleofecclesiastical,communal,

andpublicland.Thechangefrommayorazgoandentailedpropertytoabsolute

propertyreducedtransactioncosts,increasedtheamountoflandinthemarket,and

providedanincentiveforitsexploitation.Thedesamortizaciónwasalsomotivatedby

government’sneedtoincreaseitsrevenues.While‘old’taxesdisappeared,broadening

thefiscalbasewasdifficult,-asthedelayed1845fiscalreformsuggests-,atatimeof

raisingdemandforpublicservicesamongthenewcitizens(Tedde,1994;Comín,1988,

1990).

Thenewlandpropertyrightsimpliedtheabolitionoftheprivilegesenjoyedby

theMesta.Theseprivilegeshadimposedseverelimitationsontheabilityof

landownerstoenclosetheirproperties(GarcíaMartín,1988:123).Thelawspassedin

1813,andreinstatedin1834,explicitlyallowinglandenclosuresandreinforcingthe

owners’propertyrights.

Theredefinitionoflandpropertyrightswasfarfromasmoothprocess.For

example,ithasbeenarguedthattheuppernobilitytookadvantageofaweakstateto

transformtheirjurisdictionalrightsovergiventerritoriesintolandrights,implyingthe

expropriationoftheirlegitimateowners,thelocalpeasants(Moxó,1965).

Astreamoftheliteraturehasclaimedthatthedisentailmentdidnotchange

thestructureoflandpropertyasonlythealreadyaffluentcouldaffordbuyingnew

property(Herr,1971,1989).Acarefulassessmentofawideliteratureleads,

nonetheless,tomixedresults,aspropertybecamemorewidespreadinsomeregions

butnoinothers(RuedaHernanz,1985,1997).

Recently,theviewthattheabsolutepropertyoflandbroughtbytheliberal

revolutionledtoefficiencygains(GarcíaSanz,1985)hasbeenchallengedbysome

22

historianswhoarguethattheeliminationofcommunalpropertyrepresentedaheavy

blowtopeasants’livingstandards,asitonlybenefittedasmallelitewhilelocal

communitieswereunderminedbymarketincentives(BeltránTapia,2015).The

negativeassessmentoftheliberalreformshasaforerunnerintheviewthathavingto

paytaxesincashandsellingtheiroutputinthemarket,atatimeofdeflation,made

peasantsworseoff(Fontana,1978;Torras,1976).Supportfortheanti-liberal(Carlist)

reactionbypeasantsandlownobility,seemstohavebeenfuelledbytheuncertainty

ofpropertyrightsandthelackofpublicgoods(pósitos4,hospitals,etc.)thatthechurch

andotherinstitutionshadprovidedintheAncienRégime,andthenewliberalregime

couldnolongerafford,asgovernmentrevenueswereusuallybehindexpenditures.

Wecould,therefore,concludethattheinstitutionalchangesthatstartedwith

andfollowedthePeninsularWarwerepartoftheliberalreforms.Waractedasa

catalystforthedevelopmentofliberaleconomicpolicies,evenunderabsolutistrule.

Theconsequenceswerenewpropertyrights,reducedinformationandtransaction

costs,andincomere-distribution.

III.Thelong-runimpact

Sofarthefocushasbeenontheshort-termconsequencesoftheNapoleonic

Wars.However,thelongrunconsequences,largelyneglectedbyhistorians,deserve

consideration.Aglanceatthepost-NapoleonicWarserarevealsadistinctive

behaviour,whencomparedtothepre-warera,foranydimensionofsocialand

economicactivity.Thus,over1820-60demographicexpansionacceleratednearly

doublingitspaceinthesecondhalfoftheeighteenthcentury(from0.42to0.76%

yearly)(PérezMoreda,1999:8),whichimpliedthat,by1860,thesizeofthe

populationwas50%percentlargerthanin1787.

4Municipalinstitutions,destinedtostorecerealsfortheirloantothepeasantsintimesofscarcity.

23

Figure14Population,1530-1857Sources:Álvarez-NogalandPradosdelaEscosura(2007)

Furthermore,thedistributionofthepopulationalsovaried.Fromageographic

perspective,thetendencytoconcentrateonthePeninsula’speripheryintensified.

Moresignificantfromaneconomicpointofviewwastheincreaseintherateof

urbanizationintheearlynineteenthcentury(0.4%).Thus,ifwelookattheadjusted

rateurbanization-namely,theshareofpopulationlivingintowns5,000andover,and

thatexcludethoselivingonagriculture-,itshowsthat,in1857,almostone-fourthof

thepopulation(23.2%)livedoutsideanddidnotdependuponagricultureasitsmeans

ofsubsistence,asignificantimprovementoverthelevelin1787(17.4)(Álvarez-Nogal

andPradosdelaEscosura,2007).

24

Figure15AdjustedUrbanizationRates(lesspopulationlivingonagriculture)1530-1857Sources:Álvarez-NogalandPradosdelaEscosura(2007)

Agriculturalconsumptionperpersonincreasedduringthe1820s,fallingduring

theCarlistWar(1833-39)and,then,exhibitedagrowingtrenduntiltheearly1850s

(Figure16).Fromalongrunperspective,theearlynineteenthcenturyrepresentsa

breakinthedecliningtrendofconsumptionperheadthatimprovedatyearlyrateof

0.33percentbetweenthe1810sandthe1850s(Álvarez-NogalandPradosdelaEscosura,

2013).Itisworthnotingalsothat,afterthePeninsularWar,therewasashiftupwards

inthelevelofefficiency(totalfactorproductivity)inagriculture,asevidencefor

AndalusiaandOldCastileshows.

25

Figure16RealConsumptionperheadinAgriculture,1815-1850(1850/9=100)Sources:Álvarez-NogalandPradosdelaEscosura(2013)

Figure17TotalFactorProductivityinAgriculture,1760-1860(1790/9=100)Sources:Álvarez-NogalandPradosdelaEscosura(2007)

26

Theincreaseinthevarietyofgoodsandservicesprovidedbythemarketand

thereformoflandpropertyrightsthatbroadenedaccesstoproperty,favouredanew

scenarioinwhichincreasingrealwagerateswentupalonganintensificationofwork.5

Thus,duringthefirsthalfofthenineteenthcenturywhileeconomicallyactive

populationinagriculturemultipliedby1.5,theareaofcultivatedlanddidby2.4

(BringasGutiérrez,2000:86).

Asregardsmanufacturing,althoughtheimmediateeffectsofthewarwere

probablysimilaracrossindustries(reduceddemand,scarcityofinputs,high

transportationcostsandheavytaxation),whiletraditionalindustriescollapsed,

modernindustriescontinuedtoadoptnewtechnologies.Similarly,thelong-term

consequencesforindustryofthelossofthecoloniesdependedontheflexibilityand

dynamicnatureoftheindustryconcerned.

Thedeclineinexportsafterthelossofthecoloniesillustratesthelackof

competitivenessofSpanishindustries,astheycouldnotoffertheLatinAmerican

consumereitherthepricesorthequalityofherWesternEuropeancompetitors,

specificallyGreatBritain.Forexample,theBasqueironandsteelindustry(whichsold

atleastathirdofitsoutputtocolonialmarketsattheendoftheeighteenthcentury)

becameuncompetitivefromthe1770sonward.Asimilarsituationcharacterisedthe

Valenciasilkindustry.Betweenthe1790sandthe1820snetexportsofrawsilkrose

whilenetimportsofsilktextilesincreased.Catalanshippingwasyetanotherindustry

whichhadgrownundercolonialprotectionandsufferedafterwards.However,cotton

textilesdevelopedfurtheroncethecolonialmarkethadbeenlost.Afterthewarthe

productionoftextilesinCataloniarecoveredandmechanized,aprocessthatwas

particularlyintenseinspinning,whichabsorbedthreequartersoftheincreasein

investmentafter1814(Sánchez,2000:502).AsFigure18shows,thenumbersof

water-framesandmulesincreased(inthousands)from12.9in1807to77.3in1829

and622.9in1850.Thesemachinesrepresentedjust13percentofallspinningframes

in1807butrosetorepresentmorethan77percentby1850(Sánchez,2000:508).As

Rosés(1998)hasshown,intheCatalancottonindustry,thelevelofhumancapital5Thus,by1850,economicallyactivepopulationinagricultureworkedanaverageof240daysperyear(GarcíaSanz,1979-80)comparedtoaround170daysintheeighteenthcentury(Álvarez-NogalandPradosdelaEscosura,2013).

27

allowedtheadaptationofforeigntechnologies,whileefficiencygainsinspinningand

weavingcontributedone-fourthandone-third,respectively,oftheincreasedinoutput

between1830and1860.

Figure18:InvestmentinCatalanCottonTextiles,1760-1840(1760-1771=100) Source:Sánchez(2000)

Themorecompetitiveandflexiblesectorsoftheeconomyeventuallyadapted

tonewcircumstances,particularlycommercialagriculture,whichturnedtowards

growingmarketsinWesternEurope.FranceandBritainbecametheleadingmarkets

forSpanishexports,accountingformorethanhalfofSpain'ssalesabroaduntiltheend

ofthenineteenthcentury.ThetermsoftrademovedfavourablyforSpanishprimary

producers.Technologicalprogressloweredthepricesofindustrialgoodsandgrowing

demandraisedagriculturalprices.Asaresult,thepurchasingpowerintermsof

importsperunitofexportstrebled(Figure19).Meanwhile,LatinAmericanmarkets

neverrecovertherelevancetheyhadbeforeemancipationabsorbing,atbest,afourth

ofallexportsfromSpain,andmostinCuba.

28

Figure19TermsofTradebetweenSpainandBritain,1784-1857(1854=100).Sources:PradosdelaEscosura(1994)

Onthewhole,theeconomyexpandedsteadilyduringtheearlynineteenth

century,exceptduringCarlistWar(1833-1839),andthepopulationexpansionwas

accompaniedbyasustainedincreaseinGDPperhead.Suchbehaviourthat,insome

Europeancountries,wouldbedeemedastheovercomingoftheMalthusiantrapwas

notthecaseinSpain,afrontiereconomy,inwhichpopulationandpercapitaincome

hadevolvedalongsideovertime(Álvarez-NogalandPradosdelaEscosura,2013).The

noveltywasthatbothpopulationandpercapitaGDPgrowthhadintensified,with

yearlyratesof0.7and0.4%,respectively,compared,forexample,to0.4and0.1%

duringtheeighteenthcentury.

Onthedownside,despiteexhibitingfastergrowthandhigherlevelsofper

capitaincomethaneverbefore,SpainfellgraduallybehindnorthwesternEuropean

countries(BritainandFrance,inparticular)(Álvarez-NogalandPradosdelaEscosura,

2013:23).

29

Figure20.RealGDPperhead,1815-1850[1850/59=100)Source:Álvarez-NogalandPradosdelaEscosura(2013)

Howwasthisprogressdistributed?Realwageratesincreasedinthe1820s,but

forthe1825trough,fellsteadilyduringtheCarlistWar,andrecoveredthroughthe

1840s(Figure21).Reallandrents,inturn,rosetothebeginningoftheCarlistwar

showingadecliningtendencythereafter.Theratiobetweenlandrentsandwages

providesameasureofincomedistributionthatsuggestsalong-termdeclinein

inequalitypunctuated,nonetheless,byreversalsin1825andatthebeginningandend

oftheCarlistWar(Figure22).

30

Figure21:Reallandrentandwages,1815-1850(1790/99=100)Source:Álvarez-NogalandPradosdelaEscosura(2013)

Figure22:InequalityTrends:RealLandRent/WageRateratio,1815-1845(1790/99=100)Source:Álvarez-NogalandPradosdelaEscosura(2013)

31

TheNapoleonicWars:aWatershed?

Theempiricalevidenceonthepost–wareramarshalledheresuggeststhatthe

NapoleonicWarsconstitutedadefiningmomentinSpanishhistory.Itcouldbe

objected,however,thatthismightsimplybeanexpostergopropterhocargument.

Therelevantquestionseemstobe:intheabsenceofwar,wouldtheEnlightenment

elitehavecarriedoutthereformoftheabsolutiststate,initiatingagradualtransition

towardsaliberalsociety?Theliteratureoffersexamplesthatprovidesupporttothis

hypothesis,i.e.,thesoundpublicfinancesofCharlesIVpriortothewar(Barbierand

Klein,1985Cuenca,1981;Merino,1987;Tedde,1990);Spain’sintegrationinthe

internationalfinancialworld,withCadizandMadridstockexchangescloselyconnected

withthoseofAmsterdam,London,andParis(Tedde,1988);Spain’sactiveinvolvement

intheAnglo-Frenchtradeliberalizationplansofthe1780s,neverimplementedasthe

warbrokeoff(Ehrman,1962).Besides,thebestmindsofSpanishEnlightenment,such

asJovellanosandCampomanes,wereacquaintedwiththeliberalideasspreading

throughoutWesternEurope(Anes,1995;deCastro,1996;Llombart,1992).However,

therearealsoargumentsagainstthehypothesis.Thecolonialempirereinforced

absolutismandonlythewarbroughtittoanend,challengingtheviabilityofthe

AncienRégime(YunCasalilla,1998).Moreover,thedifficultiesandreversalsfacedby

theliberalreformersmilitateagainstasuccessfulgradualtransitionfromabsolutismto

liberalismintheabsenceofwar.

Pursuingtheselinesofenquiryandposingtheadequatecounterfactuals

represent,however,acompleteresearchprogrammewaybeyondthescopeofthis

essay.Asacompromiseandprovisionalsolutionwecanputourhypothesistoa

statisticaltest.Theexerciseconsistsoftestingwhethertherearestructuralbreaksin

theseriesoftheeconomicvariablespreviouslydiscussed.Ofcourse,suchanexercise

fallsshortofaproperhistoricalexplanationbut,ifthestatisticaltestcastsapositive

result,theimplicationisthatourproposednarrativeisnotfarfetched.

Thus,wehavetestedourseriesofrealGDPpercapita,agricultural

consumption,wages,landrents,therent/wageratio,andagriculturalpricesfor

structuralbreaks,eitherinthetrendorthelevel,over1750-1850.Acaveatisneeded.

32

Ratherthanexogenouslychoosingthedatesatwhichtheseriesaretestedfor

structuralbreaks,weallowedthedatatoendogenouslyidentifywherethebreak(if

therewasany)appeared.

AstherecouldbemorethanjustonestructuralbreakweusedtheClemente-

Montañés-Reyesunitrootteststhatallowustoestablishtheexistenceofoneortwo

structuralbreaks.6Table1summarisestheresults.InthecaseofLandRentandthe

Rent/WageRatioonlyonestructuralbreakwasfoundand,therefore,thespecifictest

designedtoidentifyonlyonebreakwaspreferred.

Table1StructuralBreaksinMainEconomicVariables,1750-1850

Coefficient Year1 Coefficient Year2PerCapitaGDP 4.1*** 1783 9.8*** 1814AgriculturalConsumptionperHead 9.6*** 1762 6.0*** 1817AgriculturalPricesPrices 7.5*** 1785 -6.2*** 1811Wages -15.8*** 1761 22.7*** 1818LandRent -14.6*** 1809Rent/WageRatio -18.8*** 1811

Note:***statisticalsignificantat1%;**at5%;*at10%;

ThebreaksfoundbeforethewarshowanincreaseinpercapitaGDPgrowth,

butalsodecreasingwages,increasinginequality,fallingagriculturalconsumptionper

person,andariseagriculturalprices.Afterthewar,percapitaGDPgrowthaccelerated

withabreakpointaround1814,similartothecaseofrealwagesthatalsoincreased

rapidlyaftertheconflict,withabreakaround1818.Theendofthewaralsomeantan

improvementinagriculture,withconsumptionexpandingandpricesdecreasing,asthe

breakpointsaround1817and1811,respectively,show,whilelandrentshoweda

decreaseatthebeginningoftheFrenchinvasionwithabreakpointaround1809.

Inequalitymeasuresalsodeclinedwiththebeginningofthewar,showingabreak

pointfortheRent/Wageratioaround1811.

Usingthestructuralbreakpointslocatedintheseries,wecannowcomputethe

trendsofthedifferentvariablesbeforethewarandextrapolatethemtothepost-war

periodandcompare,then,thecounterfactualvaluestotheactualones.Thisway,we

6Wecomputedtwodifferentspecificationsofthetests,butfinallyoptedfortheinnovationaloutlierunitroottestthatallowsformoregradualchangesratherthanfortheadditiveoutlierunitroot,whichismoreadequatetocapturingverysuddenvariationsintheseries(Clementeetal.,1998).

33

cangetacrudeideaofwhetherthewarrepresentedadiscontinuityineconomic

trends.

Table2MainEconomicVariables:Post-warCounterfactualandActualLevels

Counterfactual Actual %Change %YearlyRate YearPerCapitaGDP 883 985 12 0,3 1850AgriculturalConsumptionperhead 83 107 29 0,7 1850AgriculturalPrices 196 82 -58 -2.5 1850Wages 71 171 139 2.5 1850LandRent 96 67 -30 -1.2 1845Rent/WageRatio 128 44 -66 -3.6 1845

Table2presentstheactualandcounterfactualvaluesattheendofthe

consideredperiodandtheimpliedchangewithrespecttothepre-wartrend

projection.WecanobservethatGDPpercapitalevelswere12percenthigherbymid-

nineteenthcenturythanwhattheywouldhavebeenhadpre-wartrendsprevailed.

Also,realwageswere139percenthigherandlandrents30percentlower.Therewas

alsoanimprovementinthecaseofinequality,astheRent/Wageratiothatwastwo-

thirdslowerthanthepre-warprojectedvalue.Agriculturalconsumptionperhead

increasedbynearlyone-thirdandpricesmorethanhalvedcomparedtothepredicted

levelswithpre-wartrends.

Thus,itcansuggestedthattherewereimportantgainsthatwouldnothave

beenachievedhadpre-wartrendspersistedintheearlynineteenthcenturyandthat,

consequently,thewarrepresentedadefiningmomentfortheSpanisheconomy.

IV.Conclusions

TheeconomicconsequencesofthePeninsularWarinSpainwereclearly

negativeintheshortterm.Theimmediatedemographiceffectsofthewarwereharder

thananyotherconflictinthehistoryofthecountry.Agriculturewasaffectedin

differentways.Whileforcedexpropriationshadaclearnegativeeffect,theelimination

oftheAncienRégimecontrolsmadepossibletoincreaseproductionandprovideda

moreflexibleinstitutionalframeworkfavouringeconomicgrowth.Industrywas

34

hamperedbytheimpoverishmentofthepopulationandthedisruptionoftradethat

increasedthecostofinputs.Warrepresentedaheavyblowfortraditionaland

inefficientindustries.Internationaltradesufferedaseverecontraction.GDPperhead

fellduringthePeninsularWar,withitseffectsunevenlydistributed.

ThelossoftheAmericasmainlandcolonies,anotherby-productofthe

NapoleonicWars,hadshort-runnegativeeffectsoncapitalformation,trade,and

manufacturingindustry,andGovernmentrevenues,buttheoverallimpactonGDPwas

muchlowerthanpreviouslyassumedinqualitativeassessments,andconcentratedin

particularregionsandeconomicsectors.Moreover,ifadirectlinkcouldbeestablished

betweenSpanishAmericaindependenceandthefalloftheAncienRégime,thelossof

thecolonieswouldhavecontributedsignificantlytothetransitiontoliberalismin

Spain.

Inthelongrun,theNapoleonicWarstriggeredacomplextransitionfroman

absolutistempiretoamodernnation.Theliberalreformsredefinedpropertyrights,

makingallcitizensequalbeforethelaw,freedcommodityandfactormarkets,and

introducednewlegislationandregulationofeconomicactivities.Moreover,liberalism

representedcontroloftheexecutivethroughtheparliament.Thelong-term

consequenceswereamoreefficientallocationofresourcesandsustainedeconomic

growth.Needlesstosay,seriousobstaclesemergedontheway,withcivilwarsand

militarytakeoversasmajorsetbacksthatdeferredthetransition.Onthewhole,the

NapoleonicWarsmaybedepictedwatershed.

35

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