Industrial and Organizational Psychology, 3 (2010), 38–40.Copyright © 2010 Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology. 1754-9426/09

The Nature of Knowledge,Reflective Practitioners, and theValue of Experience

RYAN E. SMEREKDenison Consulting

I agree with McCall’s passionate essayadvocating experience as the centerpieceof leadership development (McCall, 2010).There is something deeper, however, inMcCall’s essay about the nature of knowl-edge and why experiential knowledge ismore valued than explicit, technical knowl-edge (and the vehicles used to present suchknowledge such as training and compe-tency models that McCall decries). One rea-son is the tighter linkage between thoughtand action than typically presumed byacademics and HR professionals. In otherwords, knowledge is revealed through intel-ligent action, such as a superb musicalrendition or a brilliantly delivered lec-ture. Knowing is doing. Our knowledge isembedded in action, and in most casesaction is spontaneous and owes little toconscious deliberation (Bargh & Chartrand,1999). Our intelligence is revealed throughcompetent performance and is difficult todescribe discursively (Wilson, 2002).

This knowing in action is developedthrough more experience (or practice). Webegin to see situations the same way asmature professionals and develop intuitionsabout the correct way to perceive, think,and feel in a professional context. The

Correspondence concerning this article should beaddressed to Ryan E. Smerek.E-mail: ryan smerek@post.harvard.edu

Address: Denison Consulting, 121 W. Washington,Suite 201, Ann Arbor, MI 48104.

practice of leadership does not involveformalized knowledge but rather the skillsof ‘‘in situ coping and making do’’ (Chia &Holt, 2006, 2008). Through experience webegin to behave more intelligently in theworld without having a formalized theoryof it (Dreyfus, 1997). In other words, ourknowledge is tacit and is not achievedthrough cognitive effort or articulationand codification. This is contrary to theacademic and competency models ofleadership that McCall finds lacking andis frustrating to those seeking reflectiveanswers about practices from executives.Just as McCall says, ‘‘You don’t have tospend too much time around managers andexecutives to notice that reflection is nottheir strength.’’ Their knowledge is largelytacit, and they are unable to articulate whatit is they are doing—their knowledge is inaction.

Second, much of McCall’s plea of learn-ing from experience mirrors the workcompleted by Donald Schon and otherson developing the ‘‘reflective practitioner’’(Schon, 1983). The suggestion McCallmakes on being more intentional in devel-oping reflective moments is an integral partof the pedagogy of practicums and capstoneexperiential learning courses (Schon, 1987).Schon’s work has been influential in ped-agogical reforms in schools of education,medicine, social work, urban planning,and design by placing experiential learn-ing at the center of professional education.

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This is higher education’s equivalent toMcCall’s argument for more developmen-tal experience in a professional context.Schon’s (1983) seminal book, The Reflec-tive Practitioner, challenged educators toreconsider the role of technical knowledgeversus ‘‘artistry’’ in developing professionalexcellence. Schon describes how profes-sionals make sense out of situations thatare complex, uncertain, unstable, unique,and value conflicted. In these situations,professionals cannot apply their technicalknowledge of how to deal with unambigu-ous situations (e.g., a dentist completinganother root canal). Instead, complexity anduniqueness spark reflection in action, andmuch of professional mastery is knowing inaction—our tacit ability to perform withskilled intuition.

The idea of reflective practitioners isparticularly relevant to senior executives(the implicit job description in McCall’sarticle) who mostly deal with situationsthat are complex, uncertain, unstable,unique, and value conflicted. No standardprofessional knowledge exists to applystandard solutions. The simpler problemsare handled lower in the hierarchy whilethe unique and value-conflicted problemsrise to executive positions. Reflection inaction involves the ability to changecourse during some complex performancein response to changing and unanticipatedcircumstances. Jazz improvisation is oneexample, reshaping a lecture in responseto a student’s question would be another.When actions fail to achieve the desiredresult the hallmark of professional artistry ison-the-spot experimentation. The capacityto reflect in action is a pathway tomastery, whether it is developing executivecompetence or musical ability.

If we take the artistry of managing andleading more seriously, then just as you can-not learn to paint by reading about painting,experience is the process through which theart of managing is learned. And althoughacademic knowledge can be useful indeveloping a novice into a competent man-ager—defined as one who can decide whatto do in a limited set of circumstances—it

cannot help us achieve practical proficiencyor mastery (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 2005). Forthis level of expertise, coaching and appren-ticeship are needed to develop a style ofacting that is passed from person to per-son without recourse to formalized models.Practical wisdom is developed that beginsto affect our perception and the manner inwhich we respond to situations. This formof tacit learning by doing comes throughapprenticeship and experience. This back-ground experience develops a repositoryfrom which we can unconsciously draw todeal with novel situations.

However, although ‘‘most expert perfor-mance is ongoing and nonreflective, thebest of experts, when time permits, thinkbefore they act’’ (Dreyfus, 1997, p. 28).Just as Schon describes reflection in action,there are some situations that are so unfa-miliar that experts act deliberately ratherthan responding intuitively. This is notresorting to abstract, rational deliberationand rule following but a skilled form of cop-ing. As Schon describes, reflection in actionis the process of being consciously awareof one’s knowing in action. Reflection inaction differs from reflection on action,which happens off line when we thinkback on something we have done to con-struct how our knowing in action mayhave resulted in an unexpected outcome.Improving our ability to reflect in actionand respond with alternative repertoires isa hallmark of skilled expertise. If executivesbecome better at reflection in action, thisskilled awareness can occur in situ and alterthe flow of events.

Finally, although I agree with McCall’sargument, there is one point of contention:What is and is not experience? McCallseems to equate experience as facing hard-ship or having a great manager in anorganization. By his definition, experienceis not training or educational programs ofany sort. He also states that ‘‘360 feedback,performance management, training inter-ventions, and HR processes,’’ and ‘‘training,mentoring, rotational programs, coaching,and development programs’’ are not expe-rience. But cannot training or educational

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programs be counted as ‘‘experience’’?Facing the challenges of understanding andresponding to case studies, and having tolearn financial models and how to use them,getting feedback in a 360, having an in-depth discussion with a coach, and havingto learn how to handle working in teams ona class project all offer valuable lessons fordeveloping leadership capabilities.

Instead, is McCall arguing againstcontext-free knowledge? Is abstract, tech-nical, codified knowledge less valuableto leadership development than the self-awareness and mastery that comes throughexperience? If so, do we not create suchexperiences in the classroom through sim-ulations and exercises, and drive reflectionto improve analytic and leadership capa-bilities? These developmental activities areseemingly dismissed by McCall, as areother HR interventions, but not experience.I would argue for a broader view of experi-ence than McCall allows.

In sum, the argument that McCall makesis persuasive; however, we need to betterunderstand why technical competency andmodels have not gotten us as far as we’d

like, and what is and is not valuable devel-opmental experience. McCall has helpedfire such a debate.

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Chia, R., & Holt, R. (2008). The nature of knowledgein business schools. Academy of ManagementLearning & Education, 7, 471–486.

Dreyfus, H. L. (1997). Intuitive, deliberative, andcalculative models of expert performance. InC. E. Zsambok & G. Klein (Eds.), Naturalistic deci-sion making (pp. 17–28). Mahwah, NJ: LawrenceErlbaum.

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