the nature of radical man radical man: the process … · charles hampden-turner. (cambridge:...

THE NATURE OF RADICAL MAN

Radical Man: The Process of Psycho-Social Development. ByCharles Hampden-Turner. (Cambridge: Schenkman Publish-ing Co., 1970). Pp. 313. $7.95.

T his is a volume which seeks to correlate personality "types"with social and political outlooks. In some measure, too, it re-

lates to that large body of literature since Hegel which deals withthe problem of man's consciousness and the bearing of conscious-ness on social action.

In many respects, it is a rather complicated book to examine,for it moves from statements of ideal-type character to empiricalconsiderations and then back again to ideal types. At times, one isa bit confused by this movement, particularly when Hampden-Turner on occasion seems to find an ideal type almost exactly re-flected in a given personality-it becomes a bit too neat. But criti-cisms of this type will be spelled out more fully later in this article.

I shall first attempt to reflect as accurately as possible whatHampden-Turner is trying to do, then I turn to certain queriesand criticisms and finally seek to summarize the strengths andweaknesses of his position.

I

Radical Man first states a paradigm, then relates the paradigmto "existential" reality, and finally contrasts "radical" with "non-radical" man in politics.

The Paradigm. So far as I can see, radical man is essentiallywhat many have termed the ideal of an altruistically "rational" or"autonomous" man. He is also a "true" human being, for Hamp-den-Turner throughout his discussion suggests that if men will onlybecome what their psychological potentialities make it possible forthem to become, they will take on radical characteristics. If onemight venture to import Aristotelian terminology, radical man isteleologically natural while his opposite is unnatural.

In other terms, man goes through a process of "psycho-socialdevelopment" which can be divided into several phases. As expe-rience "fills" his consciousness, the individual in his naturalgrowth process becomes "creative"-he is thus not merely a kindof empty box through which experience is sifted and then released

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on the other side of the box. He is not, in other words, a Skin-nerian mechanism.

What, then, is the process of psycho-social development whenit is functioning "normally"? There are, we are told, a number ofdifferent stages. Around these points one can both develop a cri-tique of non-radical man and build a structure within which em-pirical research can be conducted.

Man as a "free" person exists first of all through the "quality"of his perception.. He builds his own world from the materialswhich he selects and this is not merely a quantitative affair but isalso qualitative. Thus we cannot understand the human being ifwe assume that our methods of research are to be wholly quantita-tive. One of man's most significant qualities is his potentiality foraffection: love is a key to understanding him, yet in the usualquantitative experiments "we find an astonishing number of ex-periments on pain inflicting, prejudice, . . . and scapegoating ..Only rarely do we find experiments on affection or on indepen -

dence . . ." (p. 4).Man exists freely not only in terms of his perceptions but also

through the "strength of his identity." He is unique; and "whathuman beings regard as important and salient in their lives aretheir novel and non-repetitive activities . . ." (p. 7). Yet social re-searchers are constantly trying to blur this strength of identity byinvestigating primarily the "precise and invariable patterns of be-havior" of human beings rather than uniqueness; for the uniquedoes not lend itself to the kinds of methods which scholars regardas "scientific."

The individual personality is also free in his capacity for syn-thesizing the quality of his perception with his identity into an"anticipated and experienced competence."

With this competence, he "invests" in his human environment,"suspending his cognitive structures" and "risking himself in try-ing to bridge the distance to other persons. He thus has the ca-pacity to empathize with others, to see things from their perspec-tives and to find himself in relating to them. They help him"confirm" himself and he transcends himself in his "impact" onothers. In this relation of the self to the other, a dialectic is possi-ble out of which can emerge a "higher" synergy, the product of thecooperative interaction between two "free" personalities. In thismovement, each will "attempt to integrate the feedback from thisprocess into mental matrices of developing complexity" , throughthe quality of his perception and the "strength of his identity."

THE NATURE OF RADICAL MAN 87

And thus the cycle begins anew, with the "free" person "invest -

ing," "suspending," gaining strength through "synergy" and nov-elty through his own creative possibilities. If at any point the pro-cess is cut off, in whole or in part, the development is distorted.Some withdraw; others develop gross biases; yet others retreat intovarious kinds of escape.

In this paradigm of what will become radical man, two or threecharacteristics are noteworthy. One is that man is regarded as notmerely a product of the environment but also as positively reach-ing out and initiating the process. Another is the stress thatHampden-Turner places on suspending knowledge structures pe-riodically in order to see things from the perspectives of others andthus to enlarge supposed cognition. In someone who cannot sus-pend, or live with uncertainty, a kind of rigidity develops whichwill affect his world outlook and political philosophy. Although manis definitely "free," he is never isolated and the synergistic factorswhich erupt strengthen , and move the participants to higherground. One sees here a relationship very much like the "mirror"theory of human personality which owed so much to George Her-bert Mead. Mead's conception, in turn, would seem to root in cer-tain propositions of Hegel.

Thus far we have been Iooking at the paradigm in its most gen-eral terms, from the viewpoint of psycho-social development. Butthe writer goes beyond this and attempts to spell out in somewhatgreater detail, first, the implications of the paradigm and, second,its meaning for stages of moral development.

In terms of somewhat greater specificity, radical man's "exis-tence projects its own moral and creative synthesis into the world."The radical is, first of all, radical in his vision: he starts from hisexistential position; he sees the "absurdity" of that position, heviews the injustices about him; and yet he is determined to makethe world less "absurd" and to correct its injustices. In pursuingthis quest, he has the ability to "fashion" "new and daring facetsto his identity" which he often examines. Self-examination is, infact, as with Socrates, a hall-mark of the radical at all times.

In envisioning the possibilities of change, the radical is alwaysaware that he. cannot divorce himself from others. He "commits"himself spontaneously, "authentically," and "intensely." For hesees in others men who, like himself, have the potentiality forreaching out, increasing their competence, and standing up to ab-surdity; and he knows that without this commitment to others, hecannot become himself. This always involves risk, for in extending

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himself to others he must often suspend his assumptions and ex-pose his "undefended self" to "friends" and to the "forces of reac-tion." He is a man who, to use a popular expression not employedby the author, is "disarming." Hampden-Turner presents a por-trait which at this point reminds one of the New Testament: onesees a person who is "meek" and who stands ready to be reviled forthe sake of the Truth; an individual who in dialectic endeavors tofind himself by losing himself in others.

In the process of this reaching out, he will naturally feel greatempathy for all the despised of the world: for the "deviant," the"minority groups," and the "enemies" of his country. He sees a bitof himself in all these, for unlike un-radical men he knows that ifhe is to become all that he ought to be, he must search for strengtheven in the most outcast. Out of this commitment, he discoversnew meanings and from these come the bases for a strengthenedcommunity. The advanced level of cooperation and love becomethe background of the higher synergy about which we spoke ear-lier, and in the end the radical's consciousness is expanded for anew attack on the "absurdity" and the injustice about him.

This broader perspective in terms of consciousness has its par-allel in Hampden-Turner's discussion of the stages of moral de-velopment. Here he follows Kohlberg to some extent and suggeststhat there is a natural progression. The "obedience and punish-ment orientation," in which there is little if any autonomy orsense of personal participation in the establishment of norms, rep-resents the first level. At the second, that of "instrumental relativ-ism," there is a "naively egoistic orientation" in which right ac-tion is that which instrumentally satisfies the immediate self andoccasionally the selves of others. At the third stage is a "good-boy"outlook, which implies that one is constantly seeking social ap-proval and endeavors to conform to social stereotypes. The "lawand order" syndrome is next, where one tends to show respect forauthority as an end in itself and seeks to maintain a given order forits own sake. At the fifth level, a contractual legalistic orientationobtains. Duty is here defined in terms of contract or agreement.

When one reaches the sixth and highest point of development-that of radical man-one becomes fully autonomous. One's ori-entation is not only to actually established social rules but also toconceptions of choice that involve an "appeal to logical univer-sality and consistency. Existing rules are judged by conscienceand conscience is, of course, rooted in both reason and intuition.The conscientious will respect others and in so doing will rever-


ence that within himself which can discriminate between right andwrong. But in determining what is right and wrong, the radicalwill engage in the dialectic which is so characteristic of him as ahuman being. That is to say, he will reach out to others, considertheir perspectives, search within himself for principles that maytake account of the moral experience of others, and only aftermuch travail will emerge with a rule and the application of therule to a particular contingency.

In reading Hampden-Turner on radicalism and morality, oneis impressed by the way in which he weaves together-against thebackground of his psychological theory-many strands of what wemight call high ethics. There is, as we have noted, a New Testa-ment element, with its emphasis on love and cooperation. There isalso an ingredient borrowed from the Kantian stream of thought.Hegel is represented by the "mirror" theory of human personality,which has a direct bearing on our evaluation of moral experience.Finally, there is what might be termed a Greek constituent in that,while radical man must be willing to suspend judgment and toseek as many perspectives as possible, he eventually-if he is to re-main a human being-must make a decision and confront theworld with some kind of commitment.

The Ideal Type in Existential Reality. One can well under-stand an ideal type as representing some kind of extreme point ona continuum or as a goal for achievement. In this sense, one is ab-stracting and pushing to their logical ends characteristics whichone observes in existential reality-but characteristics, neverthe-less, which in any given situation are usually mixed with contraryelements. The "ideal type" Christian is not the "Christian" of his-

tory. The ideal type radical is not the "radical" we know in theworld of politics.

It is highly characteristic of Hampden-Turner, however, thathe not only projects a general paradigm but that he actually dis-covers it in considerable degree in the flux of historical events. TheWord has indeed become flesh and dwelt among us. And the au-thor seeks to show, through a citation of empirical tests, that near-ideal type radicals actually exist and that experimental situationscan be created in which "radicalism" is drawn out and empha-sized. What is more, the radical man is more "practical" than hiscontrariesin the sense that he is more productive, is in accord withthe "natural" course of human development, and, seemingly, is inagreement with the implicit ends of "history." Throughout, theparadigm is working to transform us and there are things we can


do to encourage it and to discourage the distortions represented insuch. ideal types as "conservatism," "authoritarianism," and var-ious other anti-radical views which Hampden-Turner abhors.

The author is nothing if not "practical. " He says that he be-gins from an existential perspective and seemingly has nothing todo with essences (although an ideal type which is part of the na-ture of things is seemingly very close to what the ancients wouldhave called an essence). He is also very much against what he callsthe assumptions of "behavioral" science, which studies "outwardbehavior" while "mental science" or "studies of consciousness"are "rarely referred to." "We know," he observes, "from the every-day social judgments which we make of people that their externalappearances are not only misleading but often trivial comparedwith deeper knowledge of their character." (p. 8).

In view of this, it is therefore rather surprising that Hampden-Turner cites "behavioral" studies so frequently to support his viewthat somehow "radical man" actually exists and that the fruits ofhis existence are so desirable. The discriminating reader mightraise an eyebrow or two and wonder how the author, so critical of"behavioralism" at the outset, could turn so frequently to whatmost would take to be "behavioral" tests in support of hisstatements.

Those esteemed to be "creative" writers were given tests(Hampden-Turner cites Frank Barron's Creativity and Psychologi-cal Health, Van Nostrand, 1963) and found to score very high onthe nine elements of the paradigm. Thus, on "identity," they ac-cepted themselves. On competence, they were high on the"achievement through independence scale. On "investment,"they were shown to have a "profound commitment to larger mean-ings of an esthetic and philosophic sort . . ." On suspension andrisk, they were "both sicker and healthier psychologically thanpeople in general." On self-confirming, self-transcending impact,they were, the tests showed, "personally effective . . . handle them-selves with pride and distinctiveness." In terms of the dialecticleading to synergy, they demonstrated "personal dominance andintellectual efficiency." Finally, with respect to integration of feed-back and complexity, they revealed (on Terman's Concept MasteryScale Verbal Intelligence Scale) "constant creation of private uni-verses of meaning.

On the "tolerance scale" (Hampden-Turner cites James G.Martin, The Tolerant Personality. Detroit: Wayne State Univer-sity), those scoring highest are humanitarians, show greater self-


insight, demonstrate stronger self-confidence, reveal greaterconcern with self-expression and a readier admission of weak-nesses, are undogmatic and trustful, evidence sympathy for the un-derdog, are more popular in the community, place greater stresson mutual assistance, and evidence more education and greatercapacity to abstract from concrete experience.

`Self-actualizing" persons (a term of approval for Hampden-Turner) actually show, according to the tests, high creativity andinventiveness; more efficient perception of reality with unusualcapacity to detect the spurious and fake [query: doesn't this assumethat we know what "reality" is?]; acceptance of the "animal self"as part of the total self; great powers of work and concentration;freshness and innocence, being able as a consequence to face theunknown with less fear than most; deep feeling of sympathy andidentification with all humanity; capacity to take blows andknocks, with a "situational hostility" towards the pretentious, hyp-ocritical and self-inflated; and concern with eternal and basic is-sues having the widest frame of reference.

He also cites research on "college women with complex-en-lightened personally wrought religious philosophies" as rankinghigh on such variables as autonomy, internalized morality, socialperceptivity, tender-mindedness, self-insight, affection to parents,likeableness, activity in such occupations as marriage counsellor,and capacity for further growth.

Characteristics contrary to those of "radical" man are also re-vealed in the tests. Thus Hampden-Turner thinks of "anomie" asthe "failure of existence" and psychological "inventories" revealthat persons with a high level of anomie have these marks: they arenarrow and impoverished in terms of "perception"; "locked in"and stagnant with respect to identity; incompetent, with strongdoubts about their capacity to influence events; unable to live withrisk and hence rigid; unwilling or unable to bridge the wider dis-tances to others and hence filled with lack of empathy; unable tomake a self-confirming, self-transcending impact; constantly tryingto dominate, or submit to, others' perspectives in a non-dialectical"negantropic failure of synergy"; and unable to take responsibilityfor feedback; with consequent disintegration and lack ofcomplexity.

In an interesting chapter entitled "Dissent and Rebellion inthe Laboratory" (pp. 97-123), he seeks to show that rebellious anddissenting persons rank high on the paradigm of "radical man."They show greater empathy for others, for example, and they tend


to be more autonomous, ranking at the sixth level in terms ofmoral development.

He cites experiments which presumably demonstrate that "T-Group" training-roughly what some call Sensitivity Training-can bring out the rebellion and growth so essential for develop-ment of radical man. Such training also makes human beingsmore productive in an economic sense. And he shows that where acorporation encourages experimental attitudes and worker partici-pation, it not only reduces anomie but also, as one would expect,enhances output. Where rigidity in formal structure declines andleaders seek not to dictate but to evoke creativity, both the individ-ual and the corporation benefit.

Radical v. Non-Radical in Politics. Referring to concrete po-litical events and controversies, Hampden-Turner deals with suchissues as the "radical-conservative dimension in American poli-tics" (pp. 217-268); "Conservative and Radical Issues" (pp.269-302); "the Crypto-Conservatism of Technological Thinking"(pp. 303-348); and "the student radicals" (pp. 349-395).

In general, he differentiates sharply between the "Old Left"and "conservatism," on the one hand, and the "New Left," on theother. Old Left and Conservatives are objects of his repudiation,since they exemplify all the marks of the psychological and moralnon-radical; while the New Left, generally speaking, epitomizesthe paradigm of Radical Man. The Old-Left-conservative syn-drome, on the whole, is one of psychological rigidity; distrust of afree-flowing personality; dubiety about experimentation; a reluc-tance to reach out or empathize with political enemies; and dog-matism. The New Left, by contrast, including the student radicals,is characterized by psychological fluidity; trust in individuals;willingness to experiment and to suspend judgment; a capacity tobridge the gulf separating its members from other political groups;and an anti-dogmatic temper. The Old Left reflects "non-develop-mental radicalism" while the New Left reveals "developmentalradicalism." It is astonishing how neatly the author finds his para-digm of the Radical Man fitting the personalites and moral char-acteristics of those who follow the New Left.

"Less-developed" persons, of course, are characterized by suchnotes as alienation, a sense of futility and hopelessness, absence ofcommunication with others, and a feeling of guilt. How, then, canwe account for the fact that such apparently ineffective individualswere so successful in taking over the Republican Party in 1964 andin dominating various Communist fronts throughout modern his-tory? Hampden-Turner's answer to his own question is important:


. . . The Right and Old Left are not necessarily more anomicand socially frustrated at all. They are only so under the formalsystem, laws, and social structures imposed upon them by thedominant forces in society. What these dominant forces do is le-gitimize and institutionalize their own preferred styles of interac-,tion and levels of development. They sanction the extent of al-lowable rebellion and creativity, they decree how widelydifferentiated various groups or persons can become, what dis-tances must be bridged and which distances may be avoided, andhow much coercion may be used to bring deviant persons intoline. In many ways they set the conditions under which personsmay interact and these conditions may be hostile to or favorableto the levels of psycho-social development which certain groupshave attained or to which they aspire. (pp. 227-228).

Much political conflict, he argues, is a "struggle againstanomie by the under-developed and a struggle against repressionby the highly developed." The formal system usually supports theaverage degree of development. The underdeveloped (in terms ofthe paradigm) are pained by virtue of the fact that the "system"compels them to make choices which they cannot handle (a defini-tion of anomie). The highly developed are equally pained "for allthose who are suffering and will continue to do so because the sys-tem will not legitimize their emancipation, and represses individ-ual efforts to help." The system fixes the norm, "so that those whofeel more than the norm, bridge wider distances than the norm,and create more than the norm, are regarded as over-emotional,`far out,' and `reckless' while those who bridge lesser distancesthan the norm are `ethnocentric,' those who manipulate more thanthe norm are `authoritarian,' and those who suspend themselvesless than the norm are `prejudiced.' The struggle to set the normdecides who will successfully label whom, what, when and how."(p- 228).

This account obviously has importance for Hampden-Turner'sexplanation of the fact that both Old Left and conservatives canoften be so successful in their political manipulations. In order toset the norm of development at their own level, and thus suffer lesspain, the underdeveloped group "first withdraws into a cabal"where it can set its own norms and hence minimize its suffering,and then it will strike at the larger culture and attempt to "takeover" the norm-making functions in a quick coup. This explainsthe relative efficiency and speed of organized groups on the radicalRight and the Communist Left. But what of the anomie sup-posedly characterizing such groups? It "is the result of being most-ly unorganized politically and trapped in a system which expects


too much, and by whose standards the individual is falling short."This would explain the zeal and chiliasm of groups on both theradical Right and the Communist Left. In the view of the Commu-nist Left, for instance, alienation will be overcome if only the"commanding heights" of the economy can be captured.

Hampden-Turner repeats a very old assertion which neverthe-less is important for our evaluation. He argues that the conserva -

tive, by contrast with the radical, is characterized by his attempts toforce man into an ideal "essence " apart from man; whereas thegenuine radical-the developmental radical, of course, and not theOld Left-sees man as an end in himself and as the measure of allthings. And he quotes Silvan Tomkins approvingly:

Is man the measure, an end in himself, an active, thinking, de-siring, loving force in nature? Or must man realize himself, at-tain his full stature only through a struggle toward, participationin, conformity to, a norm, a measure, an ideal essence basicallyindependent of man? (p. 229).

The radical sees human "needs" as guiding behavior; the con-servative maintains that knowledge of "external values and facts"shapes human behavior. The radical is sensitive to his own inneridentity and feelings; the conservative subordinates his inner feel-ings to internalized or external morality. The conservative conceivesman as "morally incompetent, or competent only as an agent of asuperior moral purpose. And so on.

And it should be emphasized that statements of this kind oftenseem to be taken not merely as rough generalizations referring to awhole class but as literally applicable to given individuals. Conservatives apparently often conform quite exactly to the ideal typeconservative. Thus the "narrowness" of the Right is said to be re-flected in men like Barry Goldwater, who is portrayed as not con-cerned with human wants. He is only interested, according toHampden-Turner, in Eternal Verities.

Hampden-Turner's heroes are New Left activists, who are "sig-nificantly more responsive to their inner feelings" than are therigid conservatives. New Leftists "trust their feelings sufficiently"to say that they are sickened by the Vietnam War. When their"stomachs are turned" by the horrible war, "they regard patri-otism or support for prior Presidential commitments as a poorexcuse for condoning" the terrible acts of the Americans. The"needs" of human beings take priority, not the demands of an "ex-ternal" morality.

' THE NATURE OF RADICAL MAN 95

In Congress, the developmental radical can be differentiatedfrom the conservative by noting certain key issues which dividethem. Thus the genuine radical will support a disclosure of per-sonal assets; the conservative will reject disclosure. The radical sus-tains open housing; the conservative opposes it. The favorablevotes of radicals on the Arms Control and Disarmament Agencycould be predicted, as could the votes of conservatives against. Theconservative insistence on worship in the schools perpetuates thenotion that there is someone on top, with schoolmasters, priests,and senators as His interpreters. Naturally, too, radicals supportstronger gun controls, while conservatives, predictably, will op-pose them.

When he comes to discuss the dichotomy between conservativesand radicals on what he calls technological thinking, Hampden-Turner makes some of his most telling points. Not that it is quiteas simple as he seems to make it but that his observations on thepower of technology and the mystique of technological progresshave so much to commend them. He rightly points out that formany social scientists Method has become a kind of end-all; sub-stance takes a back seat. And he notes also the tendency in Ameri-can culture to think of technology as being beyond collective hu-uman control. Conservatives, he maintains, have a basic faith intechnique; developmental radicals seek to subordinate techniqueto human needs and believe in man's capacity to plan deliberatelyfor the introduction or rejection of technology. The author's vil-lain on the conservative side is Robert Strausz-Hupē who epito-mizes the mystique of technological progress and equally the con-servative's distrust of deliberate planning. Appropriately enough,Hampden-Turner quotes him:

It would seem there are no practical ways to guide the furtherdevelopment of technology. If such methods existed they wouldcreate problems and dangers just as grave as those resulting fromspontaneous technological growth. It cannot therefore be a ques-tion of controlling technology as a whole but rather guardingagainst concrete dangers.

Throughout history attempts have been made to curtail tech-nological development, military and civilian. These crude inter-ventions against one or the other device were invariably unsuc-cessful. (p. 318).

Hampden-Turner's highest praise is reserved for the so-calledstudent radicals. They are obviously to be classified as New Left


and become in effect the very model of the Ideal Type Develop-mental Radical. Research "proves," according to Hampden-Tur-ner, that the student radicals at Boston University are "highest on theexistentiality and moral freedom scales"; "lowest on the scale ofperceptual narrowing"; "highest on the scale of `sensitivity to ownfeelings' "; "highest on scales of inner direction and achievementvia independence." They are "authentic and intense." In terms ofthe notion of radical man, one can hardly imagine a higher en-comium.

In short, Hampden-Turner appears to find many ideal-type de-velopmental radicals and conservatives in the existential world.The types are not merely laid up in heaven: they fit certain mem-

bers of Congress, for instance, and many in the New Left like tightgloves. The psychological tests, he thinks, bolster his thesis aboutpsycho-social development and the correlation between psycholog-ical characteristics and moral-political ones. What is more, onegathers that the radical pattern-whether psychological or moral-political-is somehow in accord with the idea of "humanity";whereas the conservative paradigm, psychological or moral-po-litical, is "anti-humanity."

All this, then, and more, is the substance of Radical Man.

II

What kinds of questions can we ask concerning this analysis?We might begin by suggesting that one will rarely find any-

where a better picture of the kind of man that countless among usaspire to be. Hampden-Turner sketches out graphically the charac-teristics which many through the ages have identified as the ideal.The Rational, Empathetic Man, aware of his dependence on oth-ers, reaching out even to his enemies; loving, accepting the awfulresponsibility of decision-making (whether individual or politi-cal); conscious of the absurd aspects of existence yet determined tochange the world in a direction more nearly approximating hisideal; aware of conventions and customs yet at the same time judg-ing them; rebellious on occasion yet not apologizing for the rebel-lion; dubious about making formal systems the end-all of existenceand acutely sensitive to the fact that techniques are always tendingto become ends in themselves-these are notes not only of Hamp-den-Turner's ideal-type human being but also hall-marks of a veryancient outlook. There is little that is new about this normativeportrait; but Hampden-Turner paints it with extraordinary preci-sion, eloquence, warmth, and insight. Commendably, he reveals


his feelings, which many other social scientists seek to hide. Heseeks a "humanist" psychology as he reiterates centuries-old aspi-rations of many men and women.

As a "normative" portrait painter, then, he is superb.At the same time, we need to raise certain questions having to

do with the meaning and implications of the portrait. To many ofthe questions Hampden-Turner gives answers; but we may legit-imately wish to query the answers as well. And inevitably, as inany comprehensive study of this character, there are ambiguitiesand uncertainties which should be identified.

Here we address ourselves to a few of these issues: (1) the wide-spread utilization of psychological tests in a work which at theoutset seems to be highly suspicious of "scientific" investigationsof this kind; (2) a tendency to find his ideal types actually existingin relatively uncorrupted form; (3) some of the curious dichoto-mies he develops between "radicals" and "conservatives" and therather unusual use of labels connected with them; and (4) ambi-guities about the "is" and the "ought."

The Utilization of Psychological Tests. At the very beginningof his discussion as well as elsewhere, Hampden-Turner appears tocast doubt on many "empirical" methods of investigation, legiti-mately berating social scientists for their built-in biases. Thus hesays: "What human beings regard as important and salient in theirlives are their novel and non-repetitive activities, but what givessocial investigators the feeling of being scientists is their preciseand invariable patterns of behavior. (p. 7). Or again, he quotesunfavorably Ithiel de Sola Pool: "The social sciences can be described as the new humanities of the Twentieth Century. Theyhave the same relationship in the training of mandarins of theTwentieth Century that the humanities have always had to thetraining of mandarins in the past." (p. 135).

Yet despite this general antagonism to methods supposedlycharacteristic of the social sciences, the volume is studded withcharts and graphs reporting the results of correlations and of psy-chological tests generally. Hampden-Turner is apparently seekingto show, through such tests as the Minnesota Multiphasic, that thepattern of psychological characteristics which he holds up as anideal type actually exists. Despite his warning that human beingsregard the novel as most salient in their lives, he is constantly cit-ing tests which seek to correlate psychological attributes of groupsof human beings with moral and political characteristics-to em -

phasize, in other words, not the novel or the unique in each hu-man being, but the uniformities among human beings or subor-


dinate categories of humanity. At times, indeed, the charts andgraphs become so ubiquitous that the often very clearly writtentext becomes obscured.

A central question we are raising is whether Hampden-Turnerreally needs most of these tests. If he is seeking to portray a patternof psychological traits or moral notes which he thinks desirable,how can psychological tests help him, even assuming their valid-ity? On the other hand, if his purpose is not normative but merelydescriptive, most of the language of seeming censure which he useswith respect to the "conservatives" and "old Leftists" is irrelevantand, indeed, harmful to his major purpose.

This does not even raise the question as to the validity of psy-chological tests in general-a subject which is itself too compli-cated to examine at this point. But it is curious that Hampden-Turner, who rightly is dubious about the attitudes of socialscientists, should seemingly be so eager to use their methods. Inhis discussion of "T" or "sensitivity" groups, for instance, he ap-pears to be relatively uncritical. At times, one gathers the impres-sion that he thinks that if we could only establish more of them,such problems as war, low productivity, and alienation would goaway. But whatever the usefulness of T-groups for developing gen-eralizations about small aggregations, one wonders whether onecan extrapolate from the experiences of relatively small groups tothe activities of large and complex ones.

All this is not to say that social science approaches may not beof value. But it is to express a sense of puzzlement that Hamp-den-Turner, who seems on the one hand to be a skeptic, should onthe other embrace so many psychological tests that would appearto be on shaky ground according to his own criticisms.

Tendency to Find Ideal Types Existing in Relatively PureForm. The utilization of ideal types is subject to the enticementthat the investigator may forget that they are ideal types only. Heis always strongly tempted to find them in existence. Thus theideal-type "economic man" of the nineteenth century was oftentreated as an actual description of the way men in fact behaved;and this led to gross errors in understanding the complex humanbeings who are far more than economic.

There is a proneness in Hampden-Turner to move in the samedirection. Whether one interprets his ideal type Radical Man as"normative" or "empirical," he frequently appears to find a per-fect fit with existential men and movements. He does, to be sure,recognize this danger at points. Thus, unlike many political scien-


tists, he wisely recognizes that "It is a fallacy to think of societiesas either democratic or undemocratic. They are more or less dem-ocratic. . . . (p. 383). Yet he himself, when he comes to judge"conservatives" and "radicals, " has a tendency to forget the "moreor less" and to find the ideal type in history.

His ideal type conservative, for example, has "a number ofstrategies designed to shorten distances or to avoid the wider ones.These include toughminded attitudes towards those with distantbeliefs, warm praise and celebration of short distances, the use ofobjects to symbolize the unity of shared values, and the call toclose ranks against the Enemy." (p. 249). And he has a proclivityfor finding exactly these characteristics mirrored in Barry Goldwa-ter. Thus Goldwater is quoted as believing in "the necessity andinevitability of social and economic classes . . ." (p. 249). He wishesalso to limit "foreign aid only to our allies." (p. 251). And Hamp-den-Turner quotes him unfavorably: "The Negro has increased hisown chances for complete acceptance through self-improvementand patient effort toward social equality." (p. 251). In discussingthe modern State, Goldwater said: "The result is a Leviathan, avast national authority out of touch with the people, and out oftheir control. (p. 251). Or again: "And so if we would improveeducation in America . we will not rush to the federal treasurywith requests for money. We will focus attention on our localcommunity " (p. 251). "We should declare the world Commu-nist movement an outlaw in the community of civilized nations.Accordingly, we should withdraw diplomatic recognition from allCommunist governments." (p. 251).

Now Goldwater undoubtedly said all these things. But he alsosaid other things which sometimes moved in opposite directions.Moreover, he did things which appeared to contradict what heprofessed. Thus, while he condemned going to the national gov-ernment for assistance, he was constantly putting pressure on Con-gress and the Administration to get vast federal expenditures forArizona. Hampden-Turner, in making Goldwater an arch-conser-vative, also fails to note that many of his pronouncements couldeasily be endorsed, as they stand, by New Leftists (who, supposed-ly, are at the opposite pole politically; who are, indeed, represen-tative "developmental radicals"). Thus radical students at BostonUniversity-a case study of radical man for Hampden-Turner-could undoubtedly have subscribed to Goldwater's statement thatwe have created a "Leviathan, a vast national authority out oftouch with the people, and out of their control. " And many a New


Leftist would not be averse to such propositions as "We will focusattention on our local community ..."

The point (an old-one, of course) is that lines of demarcation,both psychologically and morally-politically, tend to becomeblurred when we look at any specific leader (even granted thatthere may be differentiating tendencies as between whole groups).In no given leader, whether of the New Left or of the so-calledconservatives, will one find a pure ideal-type developmental radi-cal or a pure ideal-type conservative. Not only will their politicalattitudes often seemingly coincide-after all, both Edmund Burkeand many a New Leftist will support emphasis on the small com-munity, the immediate or primary group-but within each personthere will be conflicts between and among "ideal types," In anygiven individual, there is apt to be a greater fuzziness than onemight offhand suspect. While Hampden-Turner would probablyrecognize this in the abstract, his dichotomies in the existentialworld (as contrasted with those between ideal types) frequentlysuggest that he tends to forget it. In this, of course, he is like manyof us.

Dichotomies Between Radicals and Conservatives. What onelabels a particular psychological or political tendency is, of course,rather arbitrary; and no one of us has a patent on terms. But thereis a tradition as to how labels should be affixed and about the char-acteristics presumably to be associated with the labels. Not infre-quently, in Hampden-Turner, one will find an individual orgroup given a label whose presumed content is in conflict withpredominant usage.

Barry Goldwater is again a prime example. While Hampden-Turner is constantly referring to him as a conservative, he is al-so presumably putting a classical conservative like Edmund Burkeunder the same rubric. Yet it is very difficult to place Goldwaterand Burke in the same category; and it is equally hard to fit certainaspects of Hampden-Turner's "conservative" into the classical tra -

dition of conservatism.If one compares Burke with Goldwater, for example, one finds

that the former stressed continuity rather than rapid change; non-violence rather than violence; the little platoon rather than thehuge heterogeneous society; the refusal to abstract "reason" fromthe world of experience and emotion. Now Goldwater's attitudesfit some of these characteristics but are utterly contrary to others.Thus to carry out Goldwater's idea of what American societyshould be, radical changes would have to be instituted-in the


well-established pattern of Social Security, for example. WhileBurke was suspicious of violence, Goldwater quite frequentlyseems to espouse it, particularly in international relations. Burke"reached out" (to use a term frequently employed by Hampden-Turner) to "enemies," as in his efforts at conciliation with Amer-ica; Goldwater, at least as portrayed by Hampden-Turner, refusesto do so. Yet both are "conservative." This leads one to wonderabout the use of a single term to designate the outlooks of personsso widely separated in their views.

In existential terms, such labels as "radical" and "conservative"often do injustice to the actual conduct of individuals. ThusHampden-Turner says that existential conservatives "accentuatethe communist menace" so that "people will close ranks andshorten distances." (p. 252). Hence deviant persons of many kinds-homosexuals, advocates of gun control, experts in mentalhealth, those selling pornography, etc.-are labeled communists.But this tendency to label is surely not peculiar to conserva-tives. Many on the New Left as well engage in the process. Thuswe have an all-embracing label known as "pro-establishment";and "pigs" notoriously is hurled at those-particularly all police-who are seen simply as exponents of a status quo point of view.In concrete "reality," the distinguishing labels not infrequentlycease to have much meaning. Again, while Hampden-Turnerwould recognize this in the abstract, when he comes to discuss thedifferentiation between radical and conservative in the concrete, hesometimes appears to forget it.

The "Is" and the "Ought." Those old perennials, the "is"and the "ought" also create puzzles for the reader of Radical Man.

Hampden-Turner calls himself an "existentialist." At the sametime, he talks of "development" and seemingly means by it thatthere is a natural growth process toward what is truly human. Wehave seen some of the constituents of this process. The "ought" isrelated to the process in the sense that the "natural" developmentis supposedly "good"; and those who interfere with the process-conservatives, Old Leftists and so on-are ostensibly resisting thegood. These propositions are not stated this baldly but wouldseem to be clearly involved in the development of the Hampden-Turner thesis. The thesis would appear to be another variant ofthe old, old effort to derive an "ought" from an "is." In terms ofthis particular attempt, of course, one can do so only by imputingthe quality of "good" to the process of natural development whichone discerns; and the quality of good can be imputed only if one


assumes, on faith, that what is the process must by that fact be val-uable. Of course, one must somehow vindicate the methodwhereby one discovers the true "is," as well as accept the assump-tion that the "is" is indeed the "ought." Contrary tendencieswould have to be put down as "distortions" or "illusions" orfalse consciousness,"-all of which seem to be at least implicit inHampden-Turner's analysis of conservatives and Old Leftists.

Now this is in many respects a very attractive contention. As awould-be radical myself, I wish I could say with any certainty thatthere is something peculiarly "natural" or bindingly "normative"about the ideal of radical man. I can accept the ideal and shouldlike very much for mankind to embrace it and make it the standardto which they would aspire. Nor do I doubt that many personshave the capacity to become radical.

Where I part company with Hampden-Turner-and presum-ably with those who think like him-writers like Erich Fromm,Erik Erikson, and so on-is in doubting that there is anything pe-

culiarly natural about all this. Men also have the capacity to set upa different cycle of "development " and how can one say with anyauthority that this cycle is in any sense less binding normativelythan that stated by Hampden-Turner? In fact, most personsthroughout the ages have pursued contrary cycles, rejecting auton-omy and living lives which we call prejudiced. I personally sub-scribe to Hampden-Turner's ideal of what man should be; but Icannot see how a mere statement of the ideal gives the paradigmany kind of final authority to bind others. Yet this seems to bewhat the author has in mind, for he suggests that persons who donot develop along his lines become "neurotic," debilitated," and"alienated," all of which words have the connotation of obvi-ously undesirable and "bad." But suppose an individual en-joys being neurotic, debilitated, and alienated-that he is, per-haps, "masochistic"? If some men have a "need" to gain plea-sure from pain (and Hampden-Turner is, as we have seen, con-stantly talking about the morality based on need), how can theauthor condemn it?

That Hampden-Turner does indeed attempt to gain anought from the presumed tendency of psychological evolution-as some Darwinists tried to establish a firm ought on the sup-posed basis of biological evolution-is indicated by his approvalof these words from Ludwig von Bertalanffy:

So evolution appears to be more than the mere product of


chance governed by profit. It seems a cornucopia of evolutioncreatrice, a drama full of suspense. . . . Life spirals laboriouslyupwards to higher and ever higher levels paying for every step.... It passes into levels of higher differentiation and centraliza-tion, and pays for this by the loss of regulability after distur-bances. It invents a highly developed nervous system and there-with pain. It adds to the primeval parts of this nervous system abrain which allows consciousness that by means of a world ofsymbols grants foresight and control of the future. . . . (p. 34).

Hampden-Turner comments that, "Every segment of my cyclehas been cited by five or more theorists of psychological develop -

ment as a criterion for `positive mental health and mature humanfunctioning'."

The problem with statements of this kind is to identify what ismentally healthy. As for "mature human functioning," that de-pends on what ends the "functioning" is supposed to attain andthese ends cannot be discovered by a study of either "biological" or"psychological" evolution. We witness in life many kinds of endsattained-from almost perpetual schizophrenia to the most "devel -

oped" forms of integration. While Hampden-Turner and I mightagree (we do) that integration represents an ideal devoutly to bedesired, its "goodness" surely depends on a kind of revelation tous-we cannot find the goodness or desirability by describing oneof the processes through which we have gone. The conservativesupposedly moves through a process which violates the onesketched by Hampden-Turner as developmentally radical. Whichof these is good or desirable, however, cannot be discovered bycontrasting the two processes but rather by imputing value to theone or the other as by a kind of intuition.

If the author is willing to grant this proposition, then we haveno quarrel. But he seems to repudiate all notions of revelation.Thus he says that according to the McClosky scale, anomic per-sons are obsessed by Mysticism. Although he at no point describeswhat he means by this much-abused term, its basic classical mean-ing is the notion that we can have direct experience of God. Mys-ticism and "Calvinism" are epithets of opprobrium in Hampden-Turner's system. Yet all our sense of values, uncertain as it is,would seem to depend on something very much like mysticalexperience-an attempt directly to apprehend ultimate moralvalue and the hierarchy of values. But this he appears to repudiate,even while he rejects any mechanical model of man. So one issomewhat puzzled by his account of our experience of right andwrong.


The puzzlement is compounded when we note his contrast be-tween alleged conservatism and radicalism with respect to humanneed as the criterion for action. It will be remembered that the con-servative, according to him, finds values in sources "outside" manhimself; he separates "value from human need." (p. 263). The con-servative is "one who regards values as external to men , and largelyindependent of his wishes." (p. 273). The developmental radical,by contrast, views the basis for action as the fulfillment of human"needs,"-he does not see the foundations in values outside manhimself, as does the conservative.

I find this dichotomy very puzzling indeed. In the first place, itis not clear what Hampden-Turner means by "values outside manhimself. Truth-telling? Chastity? Loyalty? Charity? All thesewould seem to arise from within man. In fact, I can't think of anyvalues which we profess that do not relate to man's whole experi-ence of and insight into his life-whether they be the values of thehippie, the New Leftist, or the conservative sinner. To be sure,many conservatives sacralize their values-attribute them to a Godwho constitutes the ultimate ground of being. But then so domany non-conservatives. And if we are right, the ultimate percep-tion of basic values, whether of the hippie or of the conservative, issome kind of supposed revelation or intuition.

Then again, where is the conservative who would admit thathis values are not "human"? Certainly Burke regarded Traditionas valuable; and he perceived it to be so because he thought humanexperience over centuries testified to it as a proximate standard ar-rived at after collective perceptions or insights. When Goldwater(or others classified by Hampden-Turner as wicked conservatives)talks of Eternal Verities, he usually means those values whichcommon human experience supposedly testifies to be of greatestworth.

On the other hand, what is one really saying when one aversthat developmental radicals root their systems or ways of thinkingin human "needs." Does one mean wants or desires? But there aremany wants or desires and, in the event of conflict among them,one must somehow make decisions as to which shall take prece-dence. Not all desires are equally desirable; and this seems to beone of the things the despised conservative is saying. Man tellshimself he needs many things, some of which are incompatiblewith others; and he cannot evade the problem of ranking somehigher than others and perhaps suppressing some altogether. Thisis the root of much so-called conservative thinking and I, for one,who profess to be a radical, do not see how we can dispense with


some degree of self-suppression or repression. Civilization ispainful; and while man is sweetness and light, another side ofhim reflects the realm of darkness. Simply to say that his needsmust be satisfied is to beg the question of "which needs?"

If needs be interpreted as felt or perceived desires, then ourbody of moral principles is a guide as to which needs should begiven the greatest emphasis and which the least.

To be sure, principles of morality tend to be codified into rigidsystems, after which we often become uncritical of them. Weshould always be open to new and perhaps better insights. If thisis what Hampden-Turner is suggesting, he is indubitably right.Principles originally arising out of direct insight and experiencetend to become gods and not to be re-examined in terms of theiractual effects on human beings. But in a sense, the classical conser-vative tradition of Burke is saying much the same thing, althoughfrom a somewhat different perspective. Burke warned against theFrench Revolution because it was allegedly based on rigid deduc-tions from doubtful premises far removed from the flesh-and-bloodhuman situation. While the ideal type developmental radicalwould be flexible, surely all too many New Leftists (who are clos-est to the ideal type, according to Hampden-Turner) actually arerather rigid in their judgments of those who disagree with them.

Generally speaking, one supposes, Hampden-Turner is tiltingin the direction of "situation ethics" of some kind. The goodguys are the situation ethicists while the bad guys are the fixedprinciples men. But just how far should or can one go in rejectingfixed principles? Surely one cannot discard them altogether, leav-ing standards to be invented under conditions of situational stress.Ideally, it would seem, one should bring to any situation a set of atleast tentative guides based on experience, reason, and intuition,reserving precise application of them until one has rapidly sur-veyed the contingencies of the situation. If the conservative beidentified as a rigidly fixed principles man and the developmentalradical be seen as an extreme situational ethicist, then both arewrong. But Hampden-Turner tends to exaggerate the tendency ofexistential conservatives to adhere to the first position and of ex-istential radicals to support the latter.

III

In terms of an over-all evaluation, Hampden-Turner has put usin his debt by drawing out the implications of that syndrome ofcharacteristics which he chooses to call radical man but which


many of us would be content to term rational altruistic man. Theemphasis on freedom in this cluster of characteristics is refreshingin a day when Skinnerian or semi-Skinnerian perspectives are alltoo common. The stress, too, on creativity-which is real and notspurious, not merely a re-combination of old ingredients-isequally admirable and true to our experience of man's potential.Likewise such hall-marks of radical man as his capacity for com-mitment, his power of suspension, awareness of the responsibilityof decision-making, ability to reach out to others to complete him-self and themselves, and the power to attain new levels of con-sciousness from which he re-initiates the process-all these notesof radicalism are spelled out in a variety of contexts.

As a picture of man's possibilities and a portrait of what is de-sirable for human conduct, it is difficult to flaw this sketch.

In spelling out the contrary characteristics of "anomie" or"non-radical" man, too, the discussion of Hampden-Turner maycommend itself to us. The ideal type would include a tendency torigidity in psychological and moral hall-marks; a viewpoint seeingman as simply the product of circumstances; a dubiety about manas genuine creator; a tendency to what some have called legalismin ethics; and a kind of insecurity which often reflects itself in anobsession about the acceptance of authority, frequent withdrawalsfrom others, a sense of isolation, or a desire to dominate. Hereagain, as an ideal typical description of a combination of noteswhich somehow fit together, the portrait is one which, if regardedas a kind of abstraction from the world of complex existence, isrecognizable. And I personally should agree with Hampden-Turner in repudiating it as a norm for human conduct.

So, too, we may go along with him if we interpret his psycho-logical testing as indicating very rough and qualified cor-

relations-assuming the validity of the tests, about which many ofus may express serious doubts. That there is a tendency for rigidpsychological types to be "authoritarian" politically, for example,was well known long before the modern craze for psychologicaltesting. In some measure, indeed, the very definitions them-selves-of developmental radical on the one side and anomie manon the other-will shape the kinds of questions we ask on psycho-logical tests and thus tend to frame the kinds of answers we re-ceive. It required no psychological tests to tell many of us that the"character armor" (to use the expression of the late WilhelmReich) of Old Leftists and some so-called Rightists was often sim-ilar. And that workers might be more productive if they are treated


with respect and given a genuine voice in determining the condi-tions of their work was an old proposition of socialists to whichresults of testing add only a slight dimension.

But psychological tests at best-if we regard some of them asvalid-can indicate only a very rough statistical probability. Inany given instance of a person labeled "developmental radical" or"conservative," human beings will be highly mixed and often con-tradictory. Unfortunately, there is a tendency in Hampden-Turnerto forget this and to see ideal-type radicals or conservatives actuallyembodied in given individuals or movements-despite the fact thathe does in the abstract emphasize the uniqueness of every person.

He is at his best when he gets away from his psychological testsand simply describes a certain method of thinking and its implica-tions for human conduct. Thus his analysis of what he calls "tech-nological thinking," whether we label it liberal, conservative, orradical, rings very true to any student of American culture. Thetendency to make technique the end and to worship it is a modernform of idolatry; and like any idolatry it limits our critical capac-

ity, as Hampden-Turner repeatedly recognizes, and makes us blindand stupid.

Many of the most important ambiguities and questionablestatements of the volume arise when we get beyond "radical man"as an ideal type and see him as somehow the "natural" expressionof "true" humanity. It is in this area, it seems to me, that Hamp-

den-Turner is least satisfactory. He appears to come perilouslyclose to attempting-in a rather ambivalent way, to be sure-to de-rive an ought from a purely existential descriptive "is." If we wereto regard his Radical Man as a kind of Platonic Form seeking toimpress itself on the realm of mere existence, that would be under-standable-the essential "is" would then be endeavoring to redeemthe lower world of the "existential," as it were. But Hampden-Turner would no doubt be horror-stricken by this interpretation,since he would think of it as seeking to impose values from "out-side" man himself. Again and again, he repeats that he is an ex-istentialist and that he will have nothing to do with the world ofspurious essences. And his unflattering comments on conserva-tives and other assorted non-radicals seem to be directed in part atPlatonists and their modern counterparts. He repudiates a Platonicframework, yet the implications of his theory of "natural" devel-opment would seem to require it, or something like it.

How can the mere statement of one type of psycho-social de-velopment by that fact alone become a norm? Why should not the


non-radical expression of psycho-social development be held up asthe ought? The answer is not clear. To provide an answer, itwould appear, he might have to turn to Revelation, or Faith, orsome scripture-and this would push him too far in the directionof the "undeveloped" conservatives. So we are left unsatisfied.

One sometimes gathers the impression that radical man is thewave of the future, as in the sense described by writers like CharlesReich (in The Greening of America). Insofar as this is suggested,however, it is difficult to see where supporting evidence can befound. The overwhelming majority of mankind have at best takenonly a halting half-step in the direction of radicalism. Perhapsmost lead lives of quiet desperation; seek to flee from freedom; areslavish in their attitudes to rulers; often embrace tyranny withrelish; and have an almost infinite capacity for believing anythingtheir political leaders tell them, no matter how outrageously itviolates truth. If "natural" psycho-social development means thatwhich characterizes most of mankind-intellectuals and non-in -

tellectuals alike-then it is a syndrome just the reverse of that por-trayed by Hampden-Turner.

It is not "normal"-in the sense of being usual-for most hu-man beings to be radicals. In fact, there seems to be somethingagainst the psychological grain in the very notion of radicalism.The most basic rebellion of man would be to revolt against his"existential" nature as a non-radical being. But revolt in the nameof what? His "essential" nature? If so, how can one discover itwithin Hampden-Turner's framework? Questions of this order re-main with us as we put down this very learned and provocativevolume.

MULFORD Q. SIBLEYUniversity of Minnesota

the nature of radical man radical man: the process … · charles hampden-turner. (cambridge:...

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