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TheNewNewCivilWars

BarbaraF.WalterUniversityofCalifornia,SanDiego

bfwalter@ucsd.edu(858)822-0775

ForthcomingintheAnnualReviewofPoliticalScience,2017.

IwouldliketothankGregoirePhillips,MichaelSeese,DotanHaimandPageFortnaforveryhelpfulcomments.

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TheNewNewCivilWars1

BarbaraF.Walter

ThePhenomenon Somethingnewishappeningintheworldofcivilwars.Afterdeclininginthe1990s,the

numberofactivecivilwarshassignificantlyincreasedsince2003.2Overthepastthirteenyears,

large-scalecivilwarshavebrokenoutinIraq,Syria,Libya,Yemen,Chad,theDemocraticRepublicof

Congo,Nigeria,Pakistan,Rwanda,Somalia,SriLanka,SouthSudan,Chad,Mali,theCentralAfrican

RepublicandUkrainewhilenewcivilwarsthreatentobreakoutinTurkeyandEgypt.3Thesepost-

2003conflictsaredifferentfrompreviouscivilwarsinthreeimportantways.First,themajorityof

themaresituatedinMuslim-majoritycountries.4Between1989-2003,approximately40percentof

civilwarepisodeswerefoughtinstatesinwhichMuslimsmadeupamajorityofcitizens.Since

2003,thatnumberhasrisentoabout65percent.Second,thevastmajorityofrebelgroupsfighting

thesewarsespouseradicalIslamistgoals.5Thisisquitedifferentfrompreviouscivilwars,

especiallysincetheendoftheColdWar,inwhichfactionstendedtoformalongethnicandsocio-

economiclinesanddidnotrepresenttheideologicalextreme.Finally,oftheradicalgroupsfighting

thesewars,mostarepursuingtransnationalratherthannationalaims.Inpreviouswars,rebel

1ThisnameisborrowedfromMichaelLewis’book,TheNewNewThing:ASiliconValleyStory,whichdescribedthecultureofrapidinnovationandentrepreneurshipinSiliconValleyinthe1990s.2SebastianvonEinsiedel,“MajorRecentTrendsinViolentConflict,”UNUniversityCentreforPolicyResearch.OccasionalPaper,November2014,p.2.3ThislistisgeneratedbysummingacrossallcivilwarentriesintheUCDPdatasetinwhichtheepisodestatedate,ascodedbythevariable“stardate2”,is>2002.4Gleditsch&Rudolfsen2015;Gates,NygardStrandandUrdal,TrendsinArmedConflict,1946-2014.5Datasources:Gleditsch&Rudolfsen2015;UCDP-PRIOArmedConflictDatasetv.4-2015;PewResearchCenterhttp://www.pewforum.org/2011/01/27/table-muslim-population-by-country/;http://www.pewforum.org/2012/12/18/table-religious-composition-by-country-in-percentages/

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groupssoughtcontrolofthecentralgovernmentorterritorialseparationfromthestate,notthe

creationofaworldwideentitygovernedbyasinglesupremeleader.Thesethreepatternsare

strikingandsuggestthatweareinthemidstofanewwaveofcivilwarsthatwedonotyetfully

understand.

These“newnew”civilwars—allbutoneofwhicharebeingfoughtinAfrica,theMiddle

East,orSouthAsia—aretroublingforatleastthreereasons.First,theyhavethecharacteristicsof

warsthattendtolastalongtime:multiplefightingfactions(Cunningham2006),significantoutside

involvement(Regan2002,Balch-Lindsay&Enterline2000,Elbadawi&Sambanis2000),anddeep

societaldivisions(Collier,Hoeffler&Soderbom,2004).Eachoftheseattributeshasbeenfoundto

increasethedurationofcivilwars,andallarepresentinthecurrentwaveofcivilwars,especially

Chad,theDRC,Iraq,Libya,Nigeria,Somalia,Syria,Yemen,theCAR,Mali,UkraineandSouthSudan.

Theexistingresearchonthedurationofcivilwar,therefore,suggeststhatthesenewwarsarelikely

tobelongones.

Second,thesewarsarealsolikelytoresistnegotiatedsettlements.Existingstudieshave

foundthatcombatantsaremuchmorelikelytosignandimplementpeaceagreementsifathird

partyiswillingtocommitlong-termpeacekeeperstohelpimplementthedeal(Walter1997,2002;

DoyleandSambanis,2000;Fortna2004).Oneoftheproblemswiththisnewwaveofcivilwars,

however,isthatnostateorinternationalorganizationhascurrentlyshownanyinterestin

providingthisservice.TheAmericanpublic,forexample,isvehementlyopposedtosending

Americansoldiersbackintoanyconflictzone(Berinsky2007;Gallup2013),andthefivepermanent

membersoftheU.N.SecurityCouncilarenotinagreementabouthowthesewarsshouldend.This

suggeststhatthecombatantsineachofthesewarswillberequiredtoresolvetheseconflictsby

themselves,eitherthroughdecisivemilitaryvictoriesorthroughnegotiatedsettlementsthatthey

willhavetoenforce.

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Third,thesewarsareoccurringinregionswhereneighboringcountrieshavemanyofthe

riskfactorsassociatedwithcivilwarandare,therefore,indangerofcontagion.Jordan,Bahrain,

Algeria,Iran,SaudiArabia,Kuwait,andEgyptallhaveahistoryofauthoritarianregimes,practicing

exclusionarypolitics,thatareknownforcorruptandbadgovernance(Buhaug2006;Fearon2010;

Walter2010;Cedermanetal.,andBraithwaite2010).Lebanon,JordanandTurkeyhavetheadded

challengeofhavingtoabsorbmillionsofSyrianrefugees,aneventwhichexistingresearchhas

foundtobedeeplydestabilizing(Salehyan2006;Salehyan&Gleditsch2006;Gleditsch2007).

Thesedangerssuggestthatweareenteringaperiodofsustainedgrowthforcivilwars,notaperiod

ofincreasingpeace.

Thepurposeofthisarticleistwofold.Thefirstistobegintoanalyzethesenewtrendswith

aneyetorevealingwhatourcurrenttheoriescanandcannotexplainaboutthem.Thesecondgoal

istoofferanewtheoreticalframeworktobegintoexplainwhyweareseeinganincreaseincivil

wars,especiallythosefoughtinMuslimcountries,byradicalIslamistgroups,seekingglobalaims.

IbeginbyhighlightingthreedistinctwavesofcivilwarssincetheendofWorldWarII:one

thatbeganaround1951andendedwiththecloseoftheColdWar,asecondthatbeganaround

1992andendedsometimeafter2001,andathirdwavethatbeganwiththefallofSaddamHussein

in2003andcontinuestoday.Eachoftheseperiodsisdistinguishedbycivilwarswiththeirown

distinctattributes.Theseattributeshaveshapedhowweunderstandcivilwarsandhave

influencedthescholarshipthathasresulted.ThepostWWIIwaveofcivilwars,forexample,was

dominatedbyclass-basedrebellionsthatelicitedawaveofcorrespondingresearchfocusedon

peasantmobilizationandrevolution(Gurr1970;Scott1976;Tilly1978;Popkin1979;Wood2003;

Petersen2006).Warsinthe1990’sweredominatedbyethnicallybasedconflicts,manyofthem

separatistinorientation,thatpromptedasignificantbodyofresearchontheroleofethnicityand

identityincivilwars(Ellingsen2000;Quinn,Hechter&Wibbels2003;Cederman&Girardin2007;

Fearon,Kasara&Laitin2007;Wucherpfennigetal.2012;Denny&Walter2014).Wearenowina

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newphaseofcivilwar,wherereligionandideologyappeartoplayapredominantrole,andwherea

newtechnology–theinternet–appearstoinfluencebehaviorinnovelandunexploredways.This

newwavewillrevealtheboundariesofourexistingknowledgeofpoliticalviolenceandwill

demandadditionalresearchontheroleofideologyandinformationtechnologyinmultiple

dimensionsofcivilwar.

Inwhatfollows,Ilayoutthesethreewavesofcivilwarsingreaterdetail,focusingmost

heavilyonthethirdandcurrentwave.Ithenoutlinewhatourexistingtheorieshavetosayabout

thisnewphaseandwhatstillneedstobeexplained.Thearticleendsbyofferingatheoryforwhy

somanyoftoday’scivilwarsarecenteredinMuslimsmajoritycountries,whysomanyarefought

bygroupsthatembraceradicalIslamistideologies,andwhytheiraimsextendfarbeyondanysingle

state.

Beforecontinuing,Ishouldbeclearonwhatthisarticledoesnotdo.Thisarticleisbyno

meansanexhaustivelistofalltheexcellentresearchthathasbeendoneoncivilwarstodate.In

fact,therehasbeenanabundanceoftrulyoutstandingworkproducedoverthelasttenyearsthatI

willnothaveachancetodiscuss.Thisincludesgroup-levelresearchonrebelorganization(Krause

2013/14;Staniland2014);rebelalliances(Akcinaroglu2012;Christia2012;Posner2004;

CKurtado2007;Seymour2014),rebelfractionalization(Woldemarian2011;Warren&Troy2014),

rebelonrebelfighting(Cunningham,Bakke&Seymour2012;Nygard&Weintraub2014;Fjelde&

Nilsson2012;Warren&Troy2014)andrebeltreatmentofcivilians(Wood,Kathman&Gent2012;

Wood2010,2014;Hultman2012;Fjelde&Hultman2014;Metelits2010;Weinstein2007;Balcells

2010;Ottomann2015;Salehyan,Siroky&Wood2014;Humphreys&Weinstein2006;Stewart

2015;Flanigan2008;Taydas&Peksen2012).Italsoincludesmicro-levelresearchonindividual’s

decisionstojoininsurgencies(Weinstein2006;Humphreys&Weinstein,2008),commitatrocities

includingrape(Wood2009;Cohen2013),resistrebels(Arjona2014)anddemobilizeandintegrate

intosociety(Humphreys&Weinstein2007;Annanetal.2011).

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Thisarticleisalsonotanexhaustiveexaminationofallthequestionsthatstillneedtobe

answeredortheresearchthatstillneedstobedone.Volumescouldbewrittenontheroleof

womenandwomen’sstatusonissuesofglobalconflict.Thesamecouldbesaidabouttheeffectsof

environmentalstressandclimatechangeonstabilityandsecurity.Wearealsojuststartingto

seriouslyinvestigatetheeffectsoffoodandwaterinsecurityonviolenceandstatestability.And

multiplequestionscouldbeposedontheeffectsofagingpopulationsandshrinkingworkingage

populationsonconflict.Thisarticle,therefore,justscratchesthesurfaceofalltheimportantissues

thatcouldandshouldbestudiedmoredeeply.

Finally,thisarticlealsohasn’taddressedtheexplosionofdataweareexperiencing.6Weare

inaperiodofdataabundancewhereinformationiscomingonlinefasterthanwecananalyzeit.

Newtypesofdata(observational,events,geo-spatial,bigdata)willallowforawealthof

groundbreakingstudies,especiallyatthegroupandindividuallevel.Thissurgeofmaterialoffers

anunprecedentedopportunityforresearcherstogroundsocialsciencetheoryinhighqualitydata

andintheprocessmakerealadvancesinourknowledgeofsignificantreal-worldevents.This

articleissimplyanattempttoidentifysomeofthebiggesttrendsandmostpressingproblemsfor

whichpeopleandpolicymakersarecurrentlyseekinganswers.

ThreeWavesofCivilWar

Figure1revealsthethreedistinctwavesofcivilwarsthathaveoccurredbetween1946to

2014.WaveonebeganshortlyafterWorldWarIIandendedaround1991.Wavetwobegan

around1992andendedshortlyafter2001.Andwavethreebeganaround2003andcontinues

6Forthis,seetheexcellentreviewarticlebyCunningham,Gleditsch&Salehyan,“NewTrendsinCivilWarData:Geography,Organizations,andEvents,”2014.

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today.

Figureonerevealsthatwaveonewasthelongestandmostdistinctivephasetodate,

coincidingalmostexactlywiththeColdWarperiodandcharacterizedbysteadygrowthinthe

numberofcivilwars.Onthesurface,thereasonforthisincreaseisfairlyeasytoexplain:morecivil

warswerestartingduringthisperiodthanwereending(Fearon2004).Belowthesurface,

however,twoimportantphenomenaweretranspiringtoencouragesomanycivilwarstobegin.

Thefirstwastheendofcolonialism.Inthe30-yearperiodbetween1950and1980,Western

governmentswithdrewfromtheirAfricanandAsiancolonies,leavingbehindweakregimesopento

contestation.ThedecisionbyPortugaltorelinquishitscoloniesin1975,forexample,ledtothe

immediateoutbreakofcivilwarsinAngolaandMozambiqueascompetingdomesticfactionsfought

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tocontrolthesenewlyindependentstates.Partoftheincreaseincivilwarsduringthistime,

therefore,wasthetransformationofformercolonialwarsintoactivecivilwars.

ThesecondphenomenondrivingthisincreasewastheColdWarrivalrythatdeveloped

betweentheSovietUnionandtheUnitedStates.Untilthelate1980s,bothMoscowand

Washingtoneagerlychanneledequipmentandfundstoopposingsidesfightingcivilwarsinan

efforttoinfluencetheideologicalbalancearoundtheworld.Rebelsandgovernmentsfightingcivil

warsinNicaragua,ElSalvador,Honduras,Cambodia,Angola,Mozambique,Vietnam,Laos,

Guatemala,Burma,thePhilippines,Afghanistan,andPeruallbenefitedfromthisColdWarproxy

funding.Theresultwasawaveofnewcivilwarsthattendedtobreakdownalongclasslinesandbe

heavilyfundedbythesuperpowers(Russett1964;Huntington1968&1993;Gurr1971;Paige

1975;Scott1976;Muller1985;Kalyvas&Balcells2010;Evangelista1996;Kanet2006;and

Kirkpatrick1989).

ThesecondwaveofcivilwarsbeganwiththeendoftheColdWarandlasteduntil

approximately2003.Thiswasaperiodofretrenchment:morecivilwarswereendingthanwere

beginning.Thedefiningfeatureofthisphasewasthelargenumberofcivilwars-manyofthem

long-standing-thatwerebeingresolvedinnegotiatedsettlements.Combatantsincountriessuch

asCambodia,Nicaragua,ElSalvador,Honduras,Croatia,Mozambique,andBosniahadtworeasons

topursuepeaceagreementsatthistime.ThefirstwastheendofeasyfinancingfromtheSoviet

UnionandtheUnitedStates(Bymanet.al.2001;Kalyvas&Balcells2010).TheContrarebels,for

example,hadnorealinterestinnegotiatingwiththeNicaraguangovernmentuntilWashington

discontinuedaidin1985.Oncemoneydriedup,combatantssuddenlyhadincentivestocooperate.

ThesecondwastheriseofaunifiedandactivistU.N.SecurityCouncilwillingtoapprove

peacekeepingoperationstosupportthesesettlements.Combatantswhowerewillingtonegotiate

peaceagreementssuddenlyhadathirdpartywillingtohelpthemimplementtheterms(Walter

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1997,2002;DoyleandSambanis,200x;Fortna2004).Theresultwasaslewofpeaceagreements

thatwerenotonlysigned,butwereactuallyexecuted.

Figure2revealsthelargeincreaseinthenumberofU.N.peacekeepingoperationsbetween

1989and2000,aperiodthatcoincidedalmostexactlywiththedropinthenumberofcivilwars

duringthattime.Together,theremovalofexternalfinancingforcivilwarsandtheriseinthe

availabilityofpeacekeepersmeantthatanegotiatedsettlementbecameamoreattractiveoptionfor

manycombatantsthancontinuedfighting.Theresultwasfewercivilwars.

Source:IPIPeacekeepingDatabase.http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/contributions/

Thethirddistinctwaveofcivilwarsbeganaround2003whenthenumberofcivilwarsthat

werestartingonceagainoutpacedthenumberofcivilwarsthatwereending.Twophenomena

likelyaccountedforthisincrease.Thefirstwasthedeclineinthenumberofcivilwarsendingin

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negotiatedsettlements.Afteranactivistperiodinthe1990s,U.N.peacekeepingoperationsfelloff,

leadingtofewersuccessfullyimplementedpeaceagreements.Buttherewasanadditionalreason

whythenumberofcivilwarsroseafter2003.LongstandingauthoritarianregimesintheMiddle

EastandNorthAfricathathadonceseemedinvinciblefacedthepossibilityofcollapse.TheU.S.

decisiontotoppleSaddamHusseinin2003andthewaveofArabSpringprotestsof2011createda

collectionofvulnerableandunstablegovernmentsacrosstheseregions.Theresultwasthe

outbreakofcivilwarinIraq,Syria,Libya,andYemenandtheexpansionofalQa’idaintocountries

suchasChad,Nigeria,PakistanandSomalia.

Thisthirdwaveofcivilwarsisuniqueinatleastthreeways.AsTable1reveals,thesenew

civilwarsarelocatedmostlyincountrieswithlargeMuslimpopulations.7Ofthe16large-scalecivil

warsthatstartedsince2003,10ofthem(63%)areinMuslimmajoritycountriesorcountrieswith

paritybetweenMuslimsandnon-Muslims.ThisincludesChad,Iraq,Libya,Nigeria,Pakistan,

Somalia,Syria,Yemen,Israel/PalestineandMali.Theonlypost-2003civilwarsthathavenotbeen

incountrieswithlargeMuslimpopulationsarethoseintheDRC,Rwanda,SriLanka,SouthSudan,

Ukraine,andtheCAR.Table1listsallcivilwarssince2003,theirstartingdate,thepercentofthe

populationthatisMuslim,andwhethertherebellionwasIslamistornot.

Table1:Large-ScaleCivilWarsStartedSince2003Location

EpisodeStartDate

MuslimMajorityCountry

MuslimPopulation%

IslamistRebellion

Iraq 2004 Yes 99 YesChad 2005 Yes 56 NoSriLanka 2005 No 9 NoSomalia 2006 Yes 99 YesPakistan 2007 Yes 96 YesRwanda 2009 No 2 NoYemen(NorthYemen) 2009 Yes 99 YesSyria 2011 Yes 93 Yes

7Gleditsch&Rudolfsen2015.

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Libya 2011 Yes 97 NoNigeria 2011 Parity 50 YesSouthSudan 2011 No 6 NoCentralAfricaRepublic 2012 No 15 NoMali 2012 Yes 90 YesDRCongo 2012 No 1.4 NoIsrael/Palestine 2014 Parity 49* YesUkraine 2014 No .9 No

*ThisnumberincludesMuslimslivingintheWestBankandGaza.

Aseconddefiningfeatureofthisthirdphaseofcivilwarsisthelargeproportionofrebel

groupsthatespouseradicalIslamistideasandgoals.Infact,manyofthesecivilwarsappeartobe

dominatedbyaparticularlyextremetypeofIslamistgroup–Salafi-Jihadists–anultra-conservative

reformmovementthatnotonlyseekstoinstitutesharialaw,butalsotoestablishatransnational

caliphatebasedonSunnidominance.Salafi-JihadistsrejectdemocracyaswellasShiaruleand

believethatjihadintheformofviolenceandterrorismisjustifiedinpursuitoftheirgoals.Salafi-

Jihadigroupsaccountforapproximately35%ofallmajormilitantgroupsinIraq,50%ofallmajor

militantgroupsinSomalia,and70%ofallmilitantgroupsinSyria.8

PartofwhatisdrivingthegrowthofSalafi-JihadistgroupsistheemergenceofalQa’idaand

itsstrategyofbuildingaglobalinternationalterroristnetworkbyco-optingandcooperatingwith

like-mindedjihadistgroupsaroundtheworld.Sincetheearly1990s,alQa’idahasformed

relationshipswithgroupsfromSaudiArabia,Egypt,Jordan,Lebanon,Iraq,Oman,Algeria,Libya,

Tunisia,Morocco,Somalia,Eritrea,Chad,Mali,Niger,Nigeria,Uganda,Myanmar,Thailand,Malaysia,

andIndonesia.IthasalsosupportedeffortsintheBalkans,CentralAsia,Chechnyaandthe

8TheIslamicState,al-Qaeda,Al-Shabaab,BokoHaram,andtheAbuSayyafGrouparejustafewofthemostprominentorganizationsthatidentifyalongSalafi-Jihadilines.Source:MappingMilitantOrganizations,http://web.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/.OnlytwogroupsareSalafi-JihadistinPakistan,however,PakistanandAfghanistanincludetheDeobanditradition–anotherfundamentalistgroupthatadoptsviolentmeanstoachieveambition–isdominantinthatpartoftheworld.Notably,though,Deobandicrossnationalambitionsaremuchmoremuted.

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Philippines.Inshort,muchoftheexpansionofradicalIslamistgroupsaroundtheworldappearsto

betheresultofalQa’ida’spolicyofexpandingitsinfluenceviaalliance-building.9

Figure3showstheshareofallcivilwarstakingplaceinMuslimcountriesandtheshareof

insurgentsthatareIslamistsinthesewars.ItrevealstheincreasingdominanceofMuslimcountries

onthecivilwarlandscapeandthecentralroleIslamistinsurgentsplayinfightingthesewars.

Figure3:ShareofCivilWarsinMuslimCountries&ShareofIslamistInsurgents

Source:Gleditsch&Rudolfsen,2015

Athirddefiningcharacteristicofthecurrentwaveofcivilwarsisthetransnationalnature

ofrebelgoals.Salafi-Jihadistshaveglobalaims;theirobjectivesarenotlimitedtoasingle

government,inasinglecountry,orasingleregion.Theirgoalsaretoeraseinternational

boundariesandcreateaworld-widegovernment.ISIS,forexample,pursuesthesegoalsbyaligning

with“GlobalAffiliates”-groupsthathavepledgedallegianceandsupportforISIS–andithasfound

willingpartnersinSudan,Philippines,India,Algeria,Pakistan,Uzbekistan,Libya,Syria,Egypt,

Lebanon,Indonesia,Tunisia,Russia,Yemen,Afghanistan,SaudiArabia,Iraq,NigeriaandSomalia.

9SeeThomasJoscelyn,“GlobalalQaeda:Affiliates,Objectives,andFutureChallenges,”TestimonytotheHouseCommitteeonForeignAffairs,SubcommitteeonTerrorism,Nonproliferation,andTrade.July18,2013.

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ThetransnationalnatureofthesegoalsmeansthatgroupssuchasISISandalQa’idathreatena

largernumberofpeopleinagreaternumberofcountriesthananygroupinthepast.Italsomeans

thattheresourcesfromwhichtheycandrawbothintermsofmoneyandhumancapitalarelikely

tobedeeperandmoreextensive,makingthemamoreformidablefoe.10

WhatOurCurrentTheoriesHavetoSayAboutTheseNewTrends

WhySoManyCivilWarsinMuslimCountries?

Ourcurrenttheoriescanexplainsomeofwhatisgoingoninthisthirdwaveofcivilwars

butnoteverything.Existingmacro-levelstudieshelpilluminatewhysomanycivilwarshave

brokenoutinMuslimmajoritycountries.Chad,Iraq,Libya,Pakistan,Somalia,Syria,Nigeria,Chad,

Mali,CARandYemenareallcountrieswhereGDPpercapitaislow,unemploymentishigh,and

governmentsarerepressive,corruptandunconcernedwiththeruleoflaw.Theseareallfactors

thathavebeenfoundtoincreasetheriskofcivilwar(Hegreetal.2001;Sambanis2002;Fearon&

Laitin2003;Collier&Hoeffler2004;Buhaug2006;Fearon2010;Walter2014).Citizensinsomany

Muslimcountrieslikelyrebelledinlargepartbecausetheleadersofthesestatesweresomeofthe

mostrepressiveandauthoritarianintheworld,notbecausethesecountrieswereMuslim.

Still,thisdoesn’texplainthetimingofthesewars.ThegovernmentsofNorthAfrica,West

AfricaandtheMiddleEasthavebeenhighlyrepressiveandauthoritariansincetheywereformed

afterWWIIandmanyofthemhavebeenruledbythesameleaderfordecades.11Inaddition,there

areotherrepressive,corruptandpoverty-strikenstatesthatarenotintheMuslimworldthatdid

notexperiencerebellion.What,then,accountsfortheoutbreakofthesewars,inthesecountries,

startingin2003?

10ISISforexample,successfullyrecruitedapproximately15,000foreignfightersfrommid-2013untiltheendof2014.Dodwellet.al.TheCaliphate’sGlobalWorkforce:AnInsideLookattheIslamicState’sForeignFighterPaperTrail.April2016.11ThisincludesEgypt,Tunisia,Libya,Yemen,Somalia,Iraq,andSyria.

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Existingmacro-leveltheoriesthatpointtotheroleofstatecapacityindeterringrebellion

partlyanswerthisquestion(Fearon&Laitin2003;Collier&Hoeffler2002).TheU.S.decisionto

invadeIraqandtoppleSaddamHusseinin2003,andtheArabSpringdemonstrationsthatbeganin

2011createdanopeningforpoliticalactorstocompeteforpower.Leaderswhohadonceseemed

unbeatabledisappearedovernightorwererevealedtohavefarlesssupportfromtheirowncitizens

andmilitaryelitesthanhadoncebeenassumed(Bellin2012;Stepan&Linz2013).Theresultwas

awaveofprotestsanduprisingsfromindividualsdemandingchange.

Butcivilwarsbrokeoutinonlyfourcountriesthatexperiencedpopulardemonstrations

(Iraq,Syria,LibyaandYemen),notallofthem.Existingbargainingtheoriescan,perhaps,fillin

someoftheremaininggap.Bargainingtheoriescontendthatcivilwarsaremuchmorelikelyto

breakoutincountrieswheregovernmentleadersareunwillingorunabletonegotiatewith

challengers.PresidentAssadofSyria,PresidentGaddafiofLibya,andincumbentleadersinIraq

andYemencouldhaveavoidedcivilwarhadtheybeenwillingtomakesufficientconcessionsto

placateprotesters.ThisisexactlywhatKingAbdullahofSaudiArabiadidwhenheincreasedthe

economicstipendstoSaudicitizensfollowingprotestsin2011and2012.ItisalsowhatPresident

BenAliofTunisiaandPresidentMubarakofEgyptdidwhentheyagreedtostepdownfrompower.

Governmentsthatrefusedtoofferanyconcessionstotheprotestersweretheonesthatwereforced

tofight.

Butwhywouldsomeleadersrefusetomakeallowances?IfleaderssuchasGaddafiand

Assadhadtheabilitytoavoidwarvianegotiations,whydidtheychoosenotto?Accordingto

Fearon(1995)andPowell(2006),oneofthemainreasonsviolenceoccursisbecausewarring

partiescannotcrediblycommittosharepowerwitheachotherovertime.Thedecisionbysome

Arableadersnottonegotiatewaslikelymadeinlargepartbecausetheseleadersfacedsevere

commitmentproblemsstemmingfromdeepdemographicimbalancesintheircountries.InSyria,

theminorityAlawiteregimeofPresidentAssadhadincentivestofightacivilwarbecauseitcould

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nottrustthefarlargerSunnimajoritytocontinuetosharepowerinthefuture.InIraq,the

minoritySunniscouldn’ttrustthemorenumerousSh’iapopulationtohonoranypromisetoshare

oilrevenueandpoliticalcontrolonceinpower.ThechoiceforleaderslikeAssadandGaddafiwas

notwhethertoreformorfight,itwaswhethertobeoustedfrompower(andlikelyimprisonedor

killed)orfighttoretainfullcontrol.Mostminority-in-powerregimeschosetofight.

WhatWeStillDon’tKnow

Existingtheorieshelpexplainthebroadoutlinesofthisthirdwaveofcivilwars-whyit

brokeoutinpredominantlyMuslimcountries,inthelate2000s,andonlyinsomeArab-Spring

countries–buttheydon’texplainatleasttwobig,newpatternsweareobserving.

WhytheProliferationofRadicalJihadists?

Forreasonswehavenotyetidentified,thenumberofrebelgroupsespousingextreme

ideologies,especiallytheradicalIslamistideologywecallSalafi-Jihadism,hasincreased.12By

extremeImeanideologicalextremism,wherearebelgrouppursuesanideologythatismore

extremethanthemajorityopinionofthepopulationitseekstorule(Lake2002).Salafi-Jihadists

favorastricterinterpretationofIslamthanthebulkofsocietyinthecountriestheyseektocontrol.

Thismakesthegrowthandspreadofthesegroupsparticularlypuzzling.MostMuslimssurveyed

haveexpresseddisdainforgroupssuchasISIS.A2015PewStudyof11countrieswithsignificant

Muslimpopulations,foundthat“innocountrysurveyeddidmorethan15%ofthepopulationshow

favorableattitudestowardIslamicState.”13Whyhaveradicaljihadistsdonesowellsincetheearly

2000swhenmostMuslimcitizenshaveunfavorableopinionsofthem?

Currently,weknowverylittleabouttheroleofideologyincivilwar,especiallyextreme

ideology.Wedonotknow,forexample,whetherrebelleadersembraceaparticularideologyforits

ownsake—becausetheygenuinelybelieveinsuchideas—orformoreinstrumentalreasons—

12GleditschandRudolfson,2015.13JacobPoushter,“InnationswithsignificantMuslimpopulations,muchdisdainforISIS,”PewResearchcenter,November17,2015.

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becauseideologyhelpssolvecertainpracticalproblemsrelatedtorecruitmentandretention.We

alsodonotknowwhysomeideologiesemergeandresonateatsometimesandplacesbutnot

others.Whatwedoknowisthatthemoreextremegroupsinthiscurrentwaveofcivilwars-

especiallytheSalafi-Jihadists–areflourishinginwaysthatmoremoderategroupsarenot.14

Partofthereasonfortheproliferationoftheseradicalgroupscouldbethatothergroups

observetheirsuccess,learnfromthemandimitatetheirpractices.Thebetterthesegroupsperform

inwar,themorelikelyothergroupsaretocopythem.Learning,however,doesnotexplainwhy

thesegroupshavehadsuchsuccess.Threedifferentliteraturesofferpotentialinsightsintowhy

moreextremegroupsappeartohavedonebetterinwarthanmoremoderategroups.Spatial

modelsofpoliticalcompetitioninAmericanpoliticssuggestthatanextremeideologicalposition

couldgiverebelgroupsarecruitingadvantagewithmoredevotedandcommittedsupporters.15The

ideologicalextremeiswhereindividualsarelikelytobemorewillingtofightanddieforacause.16

Moderatecitizens,bycontrast,arelikelytobemoredifficulttorecruitbecausetheyviewthe

politicalstakesofvictoryordefeataslessvaluable.AccordingtoU.S.HouseIntelligencecommittee

Chairman,Rep.MikeRogers:“[c]ertainelementsofthe[moderate]rebelsarereachingacrossto

thesejihadistunitsbecausetheytendtobearmedandeffectiveandcommittedfighters,whichis

morethantheycansayfortheirownunitsattimes.”17Embracingaradicalideology,therefore,

couldallowrebelgroupstoattractthesubsetofthepopulationthatiswillingtofightlongerand

harderforacause.

14Salafi-Jihadists,suchasAlQaeda,ISIS,BokoHaramandAl-Shabaabhavebeenmoresuccessfulinobtainingrecruits,financing,andterritorythantheirmoderatecompetitors.Thereisastaggeringlackofdataonterroristrecruitmentandfinancing.ThebestwehavetodateisShapiro,Shatz,andJung,forthcoming.15Iannaccone,LawrenceR.andEliBerman.2006.“ReligiousExtremists:TheGood,theBadandtheDeadly.”PublicChoice128(1-2):109-129.SeealsoBerman2003;Berman&Laitin20087;Berman2011.SeealsoOritKedar2005onwhymoderatevoterspreferextremeparties.16SeeWalter&Kydd2017foramorein-depthanalysisoftheconnectionbetweenanextremeideologyandrebelrecruitment.SeealsoGatesandNordas,2016.17QuotedbyOstovar&McCants,p.28.QuotetakenfromChrisLawrence,“SyrianRebelssaidtoCutDealsforArmsfromExtremists,”CNN17October2012.

17

Theliteratureonproductdifferentiationfromindustrialorganizationoffersasecond

explanationforthesuccessofideologicallyextremegroupsincivilwar.Anextremeideologymay

helporganizationspositivelydifferentiatethemselvesfromothersimilar-lookinggroupsandthus

carveoutasegmentofahighlycompetitivemarket.18Onewayforgroupstodifferentiate

themselvesistotakeavaluethatiswidelyendorsedwithinapopulationandpositionthemselves

asthemostcommitteddefenderofthatvalue.InMuslimsocieties,Islamissuchavalue.Adopting

thepositionasthe“mostIslamic”grouphasadvantages.Fewpotentialrecruitsmotivatedbya

desiretoprotectIslamwillbeexcitedtojointhesecondmostIslamicgroup.Thedesiretopresent

oneselfasthemostcommittedrepresentativeofagroup,therefore,couldsparkaracetothe

ideologicalextreme,leadingtoaproliferationofever-moreradicalorganizations.

Finally,bargainingtheorymayalsohelpexplaintheemergenceandsuccessofsomany

radicalgroups.Rebelgroupscompetingforpoliticalcontrol–especiallyincountrieswithweak

institutionsandahistoryofpoliticalcorruption-faceapotentiallydebilitatingcommitment

problem.Citizensinthesecountriesknowthatpoliticalelites,onceinpower,willhavefew

constraintsontheirabuseofpower.Knowingthattheopportunityforexploitationishigh,

potentialsupportersarelikelytotrytodeterminewhichrebelleadersarelesslikelytosell-out

onceinpower.19Espousinganextremeideology–suchasSalafi-Jihadism–couldserveasan

effectivecommitmentdevicebecauseitpromisestopunishindividualsforbadbehavior.20Inthis

way,rebelleaderscanclearlysignalthattheyaremorelikelytogovernhonorablyonceinoffice,

makingthempotentiallymoreattractiveeventomoderatecitizens.

18Theoreticalsynergiescanbefoundintheliteratureonindustrialorganization.SeeespeciallyTirole,1988.19ThismechanismisrelatedtothesignalingmechanismidentifiedbyBerman(2009)buttakesitfurther.Bermanarguedthatthesacrificesrequiredbyfundamentalistorganizationshelpedtoscreenoutunreliablerecruits.Wearguethatsacrificescanserveawiderpurpose,enablingagrouptocrediblycommittopoliciesthatenhancethepublicwelfareratherthanenrichtheorganization.20Fearonunpublishedpaper,1994.EthnicWarasaCommitmentProblem.Iannaccone,LaurenceR.1992.“SacrificeandStigma:ReducingFree-RidinginCults,Communes,andotherCollectives.”JournalofPoliticalEconomy100(2):271-292;BuenodeMesquita,Ethan.2008.“TerroristFactions,”TheQuarterlyJournalofPoliticalScience3:399-418.SeealsoBerman2011:Radical,Religious&Violent.

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WhytheNewEmphasisonTransnationalAims?

Allofthesetheorieshelpexplaintheproliferationandsuccessofviolentextremistgroups

butnotwhysomanyofthemhaveembracedanideology–Salafi-Jihadism–thatemphasizesglobal

aims.Theyalsocannotexplainwhysomanygroupshaveadoptedthesegoalsatthisparticular

time.Thesearethepuzzleswestillneedtosolve.

Onepossibleexplanationfortheriseofglobally-orientedgroupsisthatrebelleadersare

beingstrategicaboutbuildingthelargestpossiblebaseofsupport.AnappealtoaworldwideSunni

caliphatehastheadvantageoftappingintoanenormoustransnationalaudience.SunniIslamisthe

mostpopularformofIslam,comprising90percentofallMuslimsandextendingacrossmultiple

ethnicitiesandinternationalboundaries.ByframingtheirgoalsaroundatransnationalMuslim

caliphate,rebelleadershavefoundawaytopotentiallymobilizemillionsofpeoplebehindamuch

largergrabforpower.21Inaddition,appealingtoasectarianidentitythatextendsacross

internationalbordersallowsgroupstorecruitmoneyandsoldiersfromaroundtheworld,notjust

locally.MilitantgroupsinSomalia,thePhilippines,andBangladesh,therefore,notonlyannounce

thattheyareSunnitoappealtodomesticaudiences,butalsotosignaltoSaudiArabiaandthe

Emiratesthattheywelcometheirsupport.Theresultismorefundingandbackingfromalarge,

wealthypoolofexternalpatrons.

TheMissingLink:InformationTechnologyandCivilWar

Thebiggestgapinourunderstandingofthenewnewcivilwars,however,hastodowiththe

timingoftheemergenceoftheseextremeideologicalgroupswiththeirtransnationalaims.The

advantagesofembracinganextremeideologyhaveexistedlongbefore2003,yettheproliferation

ofradicalIslamistrebelgroups,especiallySalafi-Jihadists,isnew.Thesameistrueofthe

advantagesofappealingtoaglobalaudience.Ithasalwaysbeenbeneficialtotrytorecruitfromthe

21Theuseoftransnationalideologyisnotnew.TransnationalSunniIslamismisakintotransnationalcommunism/MarxismduringtheColdWar.Whatisnewistheoilwealthintowhichtheseappealsarelikelytoconnect.

19

biggestpoolofpotentialvolunteersanddonors.Thefactthatthesegroupsareproliferatingnow

suggeststhatsomethingelseisgoingon.

Theinventionofinformationtechnology,especiallytheadventoftheWeb2.0intheearly

2000s,isthebignewinnovationthatislikelydrivingmanyofthesechanges.Rebelgroupsare

embracingtheinternetandadaptingtheirstrategiesandtacticstoexploitaradicallynew

informationenvironmentanditisthisnewinformationtechnologythatlikelyexplainstheir

strategies.In1998only12terrorist-relatedwebsitesexistedontheinternet.By2003therewere

approximately2,630sites,andbyJanuary2009therewere6,940.22Today,thenumberofmedia

sitesusedbyrebelgroupsandterroristcontinuestogrowexponentially:inIraqthenumberof

downloadablepostsdisseminatedbyISISviaofficialwebsites,Twitter,Facebookandvarioussocial

mediaaccountsincreased12-foldbetweenJanuary2014andJanuary2015alone.23What

distinguishesthisthirdwaveofcivilwarsfrompreviouswavesisthatitisthefirsttobefoughtina

newinformationenvironmentthatrewardsamoreextremeandglobalorientation.

Inwhatfollows,Iexploresixlargeimplicationsofthisnewenvironmentontheoutbreak,

conduct,andresolutionofcivilwars.Intheprocess,Ihopetomapanemergingsetofresearch

programstohelpexplainsomeofthemostpressingunansweredquestionsinthefield.

Thecivilwarsthathavebrokenoutsince2003arethefirsttobefoughtinaWeb2.0eraof

user-generatedmaterial.Wenowliveinaworldwherecitizensandelitesoperateinaninteractive

internetenvironment,whereanyonewithasmartphonecaneasilyproduceanddisseminate

materialfromalmostanywhereontheglobe.24Thisnewinformationenvironmentwillproduce

winnersandlosersandchangethedynamicsofcivilwarsinwayswehavenotyetexplored.25It

22“TheInternetasaTerroristToolforRecruitmentandRadicalizationofYouth,”DepartmentofHomelandSecurityWhitePaper,April24,2009,p.2.23Source:DatasetonRebelPropaganda,Walter&Phillips,2016.24Shapiro&Weidman2015.25Aday,Sean,HenryFarrell,MarcLynch,JohnSides,JohnKelly&EthanZuckerman,BlogsandBullets:NewMediainContentiousPolitics,”UnitedStatesInstituteofPeace,2010.

20

usedtobe,forexample,thatmasspropagandawasoutofreachtoeveryonefightingcivilwars

exceptgovernments.Thosewhodidnotcontroltelevisionorradiostationswereforcedto

disseminatepropagandabywordofmouthorbyhand,greatlylimitingtheiraudienceand

influence.Theinternet,however,hasgiveneventhesmallestrebelgroups(orevenindividual)the

sameaccesstolargeaudiencesasthegovernmentstheyareseekingtodefeat.Inaddition,thetype

ofinformationthatcanbedisseminatedhasalsochanged.Real-timevideoscannowbewirelessly

postedfrombattlefieldstowebsitesallowingcombatantstodisseminatematerialthroughoutthe

warevenfromremotelocations.Theinternetalsoallowscombatantstobuildnetworksof

individuals–manywiththesameextremeideologicalviews–whocaneasilyconnecttoeachother

andorganizetheiractivities.Individualsandrebelentrepreneurscannoweasilylinktoavirtual

communityoflike-mindedcitizensaroundtheworld,influencingtheminwaysthatwasdifficultor

impossiblepre-2003.Addtothisthefactthatpropagandainaninternetageisdifficulttostop

(governmentscan’tinterceptcommunicationswithoutsacrificingeveryone’sprivacy)andit

becomesclearthatinformationwillbecomeabigger,notsmaller,partofthestrategyofwar.

Instantaneous,globalcommunicationislikelytohaveatleastsixmajorimplicationsforcivil

warsthatwillneedtobestudiedingreaterdetail.First,informationtechnologyislikelytobenefit

individualcitizens(especiallycitizensinhighlyrepressivecountries)morethanpoliticalelitesin

thosecountries.Dictatorsandautocratswillfacegreaterdifficultylimitingandcontrollingtheflow

ofinformationandthemessagestheircitizensreceive.Governmenteliteswillalsohavegreater

difficultypreventingindividualsfromcoordinatingtheirprotestactivity.Citizensarelikelytobe

betterinformedaboutthebehaviorofgovernmentofficials,thewell-beingoftheirparticularethnic

orsectariangrouprelativetoothergroups,andthelevelandextentofdissatisfactioninsociety.

Theresultcouldbeaboonforpopulardemonstrationsandgrass-rootsorganizing.Recentmicro-

levelresearchontheuseoftwitterbyprotestersinEgypt,forexample,foundthatsocialmedia

21

allowedprotesterstobetterorganizetheiractivityandevadegovernmentcrackdowns,making

spontaneousdemonstrationspossible(Steinert-Threlkeld2016).

Second,globalinternetcampaignsarelikelytomakeitmorefeasibleforrebelgroupsto

form,leadingtocivilwarswithagreaternumberofwarringfactions.26Itusedtobethatrebel

entrepreneursrequiredabaseoflocalsupportandfinancingtomakemobilizationpossible.The

internet,however,islikelytochangethis.27Internetmediacampaignsmakeiteasierforrebel

entrepreneurs,especiallythosewithlimitedlocalbacking,togarnerinternationalattentionand

solicitthesoldiersandfinancingnecessarytostartawar.28Theresultislikelytobegreater

externalinvolvementincivilwars,indifferentguises,andalargernumberofwarringfactions.The

evidenceseemstosupportthis:theaveragenumberofrebelgroupsfightingincivilwarshas

increasedovertime.29In1950theaveragenumberorrebelgroupsincivilwarswas8;in2010it

was14.

Third,thenewinformationenvironmentalsomeansthatrebelgroupsarelikelytohave

greaterincentivestoframetheirobjectivesinglobalterms–somethingwehaveobservedwiththe

proliferationofSalafi-Jihadistgroups.First,theinternetallowswarringfactionstobemore

ambitious,ignoreinternationalborders,andsettheirsightsonaffectinglarge-scalechangeby

drawingontheresourcesofaglobalizedworld.Second,theinternetislikelytorewardgroupssuch

asalQa’idaandISISwithglobalaims,sincetheywillhaveawideraudiencefromwhichtogenerate

revenueandrecruits.Inshort,thenewinformationenvironmenthasshiftedtheadvantagefrom

26DavidE.Cunningham."VetoPlayersandCivilWarDuration."AmericanJournalofPoliticalScience.2006;DavidE.Cunningham,BarrierstoPeaceinCivilWar.CambridgeUniversityPress,2011.;KathleenGallagherCunningham."ActorFragmentationandCivilWarBargaining:HowInternalDivisionsGenerateCivilConflict."AmericanJournalofPoliticalScience.2013.27Foradescriptionofthedramaticshiftsinhowrebelleaderscanraiseandtransferfunds,seeMichaelJacobson,“TerroristFinancingontheInternet,”CTCSentinel,June2009,Vol.2,Issue6,p.19.28PaulCollierandAnkjeHoeffler."GreedandGrievanceinCivilWar."OxfordEconomicPapers.2004.29Source:UCDPDyadicDataset,v.1-2015.SeealsoChristia2012.

22

home-growngroupswithlocalbasesofsupport,totransnationalgroupswithglobalnetworksand

connections.

Fourth,theinternetislikelytomakeitpossibleforrebelgroupstosustainthemselves

longerinwar.That’sbecausewarringpartiescannowtapintoagreatervarietyoffinancingthat,

cumulatively,islikelytobemoreconsistentovertime.30Thedecentralizednatureoftheinternet

meansthatrebelgroupsneednolongerbedependentonasinglesourceofincomeorasingle

patron.Iftheyloseaccesstoonesourceofincome(i.e.,coca)oronepatron(i.e.,Iran),theystill

haveaccesstomillionsofpotentialindividualdonors.Theeasieritisforrebelgrouptoobtain

consistentfinancing,andtheeasieritisforoutsiderstohelpfinancethesecampaigns,thelonger

civilwarsarelikelytobe.

Fifth,theinternetislikelytomakethespreadofcivilwarevenmorelikely.Researchhas

foundthecivilwarsproduceacontagioneffect;onceonecivilwarbreaksout,itincreasestherisk

thatcivilwarbreaksoutinneighboringcountries(SaleyhenandGleditsch2006;Salehyan2006;

Gleditsch2007;Salehyan2007;Kathman2010).OneofthepotentialimplicationsofaWeb2.0

worldisthatideasandideologyarelikelytospreadmorerapidlyandmorewidely.Thisoccursin

twoways.Thefirstisdirectlythroughthedisseminationofinformationviatheweb,andthe

secondisindirectlythroughtherecruitmentofforeignsoldiers.ISISandalQa’ida,forexample,use

internetpropagandatorecruitforeignfightersfromaroundtheworld.Thesefightersthencometo

activewarzones,receivetraining,indoctrination,andexperience,andeventuallyreturnhome,

creatingnewnetworksintheirnativecountries.

Finally,theinternetcouldpotentiallyeliminatetherestraintsrebelandgovernmentleaders

havetotargetlocalcitizenswithabuse.Studieshavefoundthatrebelgroupsthatarereliantonthe

localpopulationforsupportorfinancingarelesslikelytocommithumanrightsviolations(Wood,

30PaulCollier,AnkeHoeffler,&MansSoderbom,“OntheDurationofCivilWar,”JournalofPeaceResearch,2004.

23

2014).Conversely,rebelgroupsthatreceivesignificantmaterialsupportfromexternalpatronsare

morelikelytouseviolencetowardcivilians(Wood2010;Weinstein2007;Salehyan,Sirokyand

Wood,2014).Rebelgroupsinthecurrentcivilwarsappeartobefollowingthispattern.InIraq,

ISIS,Jubhatan-Nusra,andtheal-Mahdiarmyallenjoyedsignificantfinancingfromoutsideandall

havebeensignificantlymorelikelytotargetcivilianswithviolencethangroupsthatdidnot.31By

freeingcombatantsfromtheneedtosolicitlocalsupport,theinternetmayalsobefreeingthemto

engageinmorecivilianabuse.

Thesesiximplicationsonlyscratchthesurfaceofthemanywaysinformationand

communicationtechnology(ICT)islikelytoaffectthestrategiesandtacticsofpoliticalplayers

competingforpower.Playersateverylevelofaconflict–citizens,protesters,rebelleaders,rebel

organizations,societalgroups,governments,andexternalstates–arelikelytobeaffectedby

advancesininformationtechnology.Inaddition,innovationsinICTwillplayamultifacetedroleat

everystageofconflict-fromprotest,toviolence,tocivilwar-andtheimplicationswillbefar-

ranging.Itisnoweasierforindividualstoobtaininformationabouttheirgovernmentandeach

other.Itiseasierforthemtocoordinatethemselvesinprotest.Itiseasierforrebelgroupstoform

andsustainthemselves.32Anditiseasierforoutsideplayers–individuals,radicalorganizations,

andstates-tointerveneinthesewarsandinfluencetheirprogressandoutcomes.Theincreasing

technologicalcapabilityofcombatantsandtheiraccesstoinformationisthenextbigbreakthrough

inthestudyofcivilwar.

ThefactthatthenewICTenvironmentwillaffectsomanyaspectsofcivilwarsmeansthat

allcombatantsineverycivilwarwillfeelitseffects.Citizensandrebelleadersinnon-Muslimcivil

wars–suchasthosecurrentlytakingplaceintheDRC,Rwanda,SriLanka,Ukraine,SouthSudan

andtheCAR-arecertainlystrategizingabouthowbesttonavigatethesenewtechnologies.Whatis

31Source:Walter&Philipsdataset.32Thesameargumentmayapplytotheriseofpro-governmentmilitias.SeeCarey&Mitchellinthisvolumeforadetaileddiscussionofthesefactions.

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differentaboutMuslim-majoritycountries–andthereasonthesetrendsarefirstobservedthere-

isthatthesecountrieswerebestpositionedtotakeadvantageofaweb2.0world.TheglobalSunni

populationisenormous,creatingaready-madebaseofsupportthattheinternetandsocialmedia

couldsuddenlyreach.Inaddition,theSunnipopulationinoil-poorcountriessuchasSyria,Somalia,

ChadandMalicoulduseICTtodirectlylinktotheoil-richSunnipopulationsofthePersianGulf.

Thislargetransnationalkinshipgroupwasperfectlysituatedtobetappedbyweb-savvypolitical

entrepreneurs.

Thisdoesnotmeanthatothergroupsinotherregionsoftheworldwillnotlearnhowto

exploittheadvantagesofICT.Myguessisthatanygroupwithalargenumberofinternationalkin,

especiallywealthykin,willpursuesimilarstrategies.Sunnisareleadingthewaybecausethe

benefitsofaweb2.0worldhavebeeneasiestforthemtotap.

Conclusion

Theworldisexperiencinganewwaveofcivilwarsunlikeoneswehaveseeninthepast.

Thiswaveischaracterizedbytheriseofrebelgroupspursuingextremeideologies,ariseinthe

numberoftransnationalactorsinvolvedinthesewars,andtheuseofgoalsandstrategiesdirected

atglobalratherthanlocalaudiences.Thesetrendsareaprecursortoaseriesofchangesweare

likelytoseeincivilwarplayersadapttoanewandevolvingICTenvironment.

Thefieldofcivilwarhasnotyettheorizedaboutthewaysinwhichthisnewtechnologyis

likelytorevolutionizecivilwar.Thisarticleidentifiedsomeofthewaysinwhichcombatantsare

likelytoadapttheirstrategiestoexploitthisnewinformationenvironment,butmuchmorework

needstobedone.ThefactthattheWeb2.0hasradicallychangedthequantityandqualityof

informationavailabletoindividuals,groupsandgovernments(andthewaytheytransmitit)means

thatmuchofwhatweknowaboutcivilwardynamicswillalsochange.Thistransformationis

currentlymanifestingitselfintheriseofglobalJihadigroupsintheMuslimworld.Butitwillbe

exploitedbyothergroupsaswell.

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Notsurprisingly,itwasinthecountriesthatweresomeofthemostrestrictiveintermsof

informationandfreespeechwherenewinformationandcommunicationtechnologyfirsthadits

largesteffect.Globally-orientedgroupssuchasalQa’idaandISISformedandprosperedin

countriesthathadpreviouslybeensomeofthemostinformation-poorcountriesoftheworld(in

additiontosomeofthepoorestandmostauthoritarian).Itwasinthesecountrieswherethenew-

foundflowofinformationallowedforanopening–anopeningforindividualstoorganize,forrebel

groupstolinktoothergroups,andforhumancapitalandwarfinancingtobegintoflow.

CombatantsinMuslimcountrieswerealsoquicktofigureouthowtoexploitICTtotheir

advantage.Theydiscoveredthatframingtheirmovementalongaworldwidedividethatislarge

(Sunni),wealthy(oil-rich)andideologicallyextreme(Salafi-Jihadist)allowedthemtoutilizethe

webinwaysthatbringinmoremoneyandrecruitsthanhadpreviouslybeenpossible.Infact,the

trans-bordernatureofboththeSunnipopulationandPersianGulffinancingwastailormadeforthe

internetage.Itwasagroupwithalargeinternationalaudienceandwealthyoutsidedonorsthat

mosteasilyexploitedthesenewtechnologies.

Movingforward,ourchallengeasscholarswillbetofigureoutthefullrangeofimplications

thatemergingtechnologieswillhaveoneveryaspectofcivilwar.Itisalsototheorizeaboutwhois

mostlikelytoutilizethistechnology,whentheyarelikelytodoso,andtheconditionsunderwhich

thesenewstrategiesaremoreorlesslikelytosucceed.I’veoutlinedsomeimplicationsand

theorizedaboutwhyweareobservingthese“newnew”civilwarsinpredominantlyMuslim

countries.Butmuchmoreworkneedstobedone.Wedon’tknowexactlyhowthisthirdwaveof

civilwarswillevolveandwhichadditionalgroupsandcountrieswillbestexploittheseadvances.

Wealsodon’tknowwhichstrategieswillturnouttobethemostsuccessfulandhowthese

strategiesarelikelytochangeovertime.Whatwedoknowisthattheinternetwillplayabigger,

notsmallerrole,ineverydecisionthatismade.Ourjobistofigureouthowandwhyitisso

important.

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