the nizam; the origin and future of the hyderabad state, being the le bas prize essay in the...

8/12/2019 The Nizam; The Origin and Future of the Hyderabad State, Being the Le Bas Prize Essay in the University of Cam

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THE LIBRARYOFTHE UNIVERSITYOF CALIFORNIALOS ANGELES


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THE NIZAMTHE ORIGIN AND FUTURE

OF THEHYDERABAD STATE


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SonHon: C. J. CLAY AND SONS,CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS WAREHOUSE,AYE MARIA LANE,ffilaagoin: 50, WELLINGTON STREET.

ILetpjtfl: F. A. BROCKHAUS.jftrfn gorfc: THE MACMILLAN COMPANY.

Bombag anU Calcutta: MACMILLAN AND CO., LTD.

[All Rights reserved.]


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THE NIZAMTHE ORIGIN AND FUTUREl

OF THEHYDERABAD STATEbeing The Le Bas Prize Essay in the University

of Cambridge, 1904

byR. PATON McAuLiFFE, B.A.Scholar of S. Catharine's College

LONDON :C. J. CLAY AND SONS

Cambridge University Press WarehouseAve Maria Lane1904


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Cambtfoge:PRINTED BY J. & C. F. CLAY,AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS.


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DSH3MII

TOTHE GUILD OB FRATERNITY OF CORPUS CHRISTI

OF THE SKINNERS OF LONDON,GOVERNORS OF TONBRIDGE SCHOOL,

GOVERNORS OF THE SKINNERS' COMPANY'S SCHOOLTUNBRIDGE WELLS,

THIS ESSAY IS BY PERMISSION INSCRIBED.

1509378


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PEEFACE.trace the origin of the Hyderabad State

is to investigate the stages of a protracted andunfinished evolution. The whole history must betraversed to shew how the State's growth has beenspread over centuries of political consolidation.Nor can any period be determined as marking thecompletion of that process. From the nature of itssubject this consideration must be in part an eclecticreview of the progress made in one direction ; thatis, towards the present territorial and political unityof Le plus grand 6tat Mediatise (Reclus, Geog.Univ. VIIL 687).

In this work, whatever its value, the writerclaims originality, not for historical facts, which arethe common property of all who will seek them(although even in these it is hoped some generalinaccuracies have been corrected), but for the methodand purpose of their selection. The facts narratedhave been sought through all the common channelsof historical research, and no obligation has been


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Vlll PREFACEdesignedly left without acknowledgement in thefootnotes or in the appendix, which will be found tocontain a list of the chief authorities consulted. Ithas been thought right to include within this listexponents of conflicting theories, writers whosestatements and deductions have been denied ordisproved, and a bibliography it is hoped repre-sentative of the literature of the subject has beenattempted in order that the question may be viewedfrom more than one aspect.

There is in the writer's knowledge no historypublished of the Hyderabad State with pretensionsto be more than a brief summary or an apologeticstatement: but we are fortunate in that there isconsiderable information dating from before the timewhen British influence became preponderant, andthat this information is often nearly contemporarywith the incidents recorded, but especially that,coming down to us through channels and fromsources not exclusively British, it escapes the sus-picion of having been coloured or manipulated by aBritish apologist. That it should also be possible totake a fair view of the local history our thanks aredue to the

conflicting interests that afford accountsand interpretations of events from many varyingstandpoints, Native, British, French, partisan andimpartial.

All these authorities can be conveniently groupedin five classes. In the first are the wide standard


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PREFACE IXhistories, from Ferishta to Marshman, which dealingonly incidentally with the affairs of Hyderabadenable them to be seen in a right perspective. Inthis division Gribble's History of the Deccan (Vol. I.)may be consulted for the only accessible portraitof the first Asaf Jah, the founder of the reigninghouse of Hyderabad.The second group of authorities consists ofofficial publications, treaties, despatches, letters,reports, census notes and gazetteers put forward byauthority. It constitutes the raw material of theessayist or, in another aspect, is a storehouse of bare,but indisputable, facts to which appeals can be made.Yet for the historian's purpose this class of docu-mentary evidence needs to be supplemented andinterpreted by the personal element of more humanauthorities. For such a purpose there is exceptionalvalue in the memoirs, speeches, diaries, biographiesand historical monographs written by or concerningthe Residents and other persons of intimate con-nexion with the State's history. In them motives,tentative proceedings, and ambitions half attainedare revealed in a degree that -throws considerablelight on the meagre official records.For the very contrary reason the fourth class isto be carefully investigated. In it are groupedpublications of evident partiality such as the pamph-lets evoked by the financial scandals or set incirculation by Salar Jang's faction and exploiters


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X PREFACEto ventilate the Berar grievances. In the samesection are the articles to be found in periodicalreviews and the more responsible magazines whichhave opened their sheets to apologetic and polemicalwritings, for it is a matter of European interest thatthere are dans le public anglais sur la fayon deconsiderer la situation mate'rielle de 1'Inde deuxecoles: 1'une vante la prosperite croissante du payset des habitants, 1'autre en denonce au contraire1'appauvrissement continu (Annales des Sciencespolitiques, 1903, p. 661).

Finally, there is the class which embraces suchlegal works as deal with the State's position in thelight of International Law or its political relationtowards the government of India. These authoritiesafford the information on which this historical con-sideration has been made and will (it is thought), ifstudied in the order indicated, convey the bestimpression of the history of Hyderabad.

It has not been thought necessary to exhibit alegal refinement in the use of such words as pro-tectorate, suzerainty, feudalism and the like. Writerson the subject of International Law by no meansagree in their employment of terms, nor could anysatisfactory result be obtained, for the reason that inthe language of British diplomacy such technicalterms are given values and meanings which they donot bear in the more precise vocabulary of Con-tinental jurists. On this point reference can be


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PREFACE XImade, if desired, to M. Despagnet, Essai sur lesProtectorats.

It remains to add that in the spelling of Nativenames it has been recognized that the systeminvented by Sir W. Hunter and officially accepted(with modifications) is philologically the most correctbut is neither consistently employed by its authornor familiar to English readers. The fashion adoptedis admittedly arbitrary. In particular the officialspelling Hyderabad has been preferred to bothHaidarabad and Hydrabad. : the last formindeed has long been in use, as a matter of con-venience, to distinguish the native capital of Sindfrom its namesake in the Dekhan. The late G. W.Steevens was of opinion that The only sensiblemethod, it seems, is to spell known names in theway that they are known ; others, as you think theylook best (preface, In India). The author admitsthat this has been in the main his principle also.

This Essay was submitted to the Adjudicators ofthe Le Bas Prize in March 1904. It is now printedunaltered, except that a few corrections have beenmade, mostly suggested by official reports issuedsince that date. Advantage has also been taken ofthe opportunity of appending to Chapter I. a valuableparagraph taken from the last Decennial Report onthe progress and condition of India.

It should be added that this brief considerationwas intended to be nothing more than an Essay. It


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Xll PREFACEshould be judged as an attempt, by one with limitedtime to give to the subject and with no personalknowledge of India, to investigate and understand achapter of Indian history. Looked at so. this Essayit is hoped may be thought to fulfil the intentions ofthe founders of the Le Bas Prize and be a contri-bution to the study of the history, institutionsand probable destinies and prospects of the Anglo-Indian Empire.

S. CATHARINE'S COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.Easter Term, 1904.


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CONTENTSCHAPTER PAGE

I. INTRODUCTORY. MEDIEVAL HISTORY. THEENTRANCE OF THE TRADING COMPANIES . 1

II. THE FRENCH AND ENGLISH DUEL. SUBSI-DIARY ALLIANCE. THE CONTINGENT.INTERNAL PROTECTORATE . . .16

III. THE HYDERABAD ASSIGNED DISTRICTS ANDTHE AGITATION FOR THEIR RENDITION.SALAR JANG 41

IV. THE PRESENT IN ANTICIPATION OF THEFUTURE. BERAR AND ITS RENDITION.SOME ASPECTS OF THE FUTURE . . 59

APPENDIX 83


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CHAPTER I.INTRODUCTORY. MEDIEVAL HISTORY.

THE ENTRANCE OF THE TRADING COMPANIES.TWO-THIRDS of the Indian Empire are composed of

the Native protected States, whose reigning Princesare in various forms of subordinate alliance with theEmperor, or in the official, but, owing to the dangerof a false analogy, less appropriate phrase, under hissuzerainty 1 .

Though not decisive, it is instructive to find thatSir George Campbell concludes in his Modern Indiathat of these Nepal alone possesses any remains ofindependence 2. It has been more recently statedthat there exist in India des Etats proteges oufeudataires dont 1'ind^pendance est plus ou moinsreconnue par des traitds, illusoire presque toujoursdans 1'application 3 , and this sentence admirablysums up the history of the Hyderabad State, whichof all the native States, forming 364 distinct units, isthe premier in importance and in size.

1 Ilbert, Gov. of India, p. 456.2 See also M. Chailley-Bert, Les Prot. de Vlnde Brit.3 Precis de Ggographie Econ. , Dubois et Kergomard, 1903.

M. 1


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2 THE ORIGIN OF THE HYDERABAD STATEIn area as large as Italy the Nizam's dominions 1

constitute a vast sloping plateau of mean elevation,comprising the heart of the Dekhan. Northward,separated from the dominions by a mountain chain,but still, as no part of British India, included in them,lies Berar or the Hyderabad Assigned Districts, withan area larger than that of Denmark, and knownlocally as Varhad or Barad. A study of the map willshew that the dominions, now entirely defined byBritish territory, touch on all sides what have beeninflammable points in the geography of Indianhistory.

Primarily they have been collected from theterritories of great Aryan nations resident in Telin-gana, Karnatika, Maharashtra, and Gondwana.The history of these countries before the mis-named Mughal invasion has little credit, but thebroad statements can be laid down that while theMuhammadans were entering Europe through Spain,their coreligionists invaded Hindustan frotnthe north-west through Sind, and that the subsequent threecenturies of Afghan rule were marked by the steadyexpansion of the Muslim power established at Delhi,until under their second dynasty the Muhammadansentered the Dekhan. The south country as far northas the Narbada had been subject to Rajput princeswhose seat was in the strong and ancient fortress ofDeogiri, Ptolemy's Tagara, where at the close of the13th century A.D. Ramdeo (or Ramachandra, for thereare both names found) was reigning as Raja of

1 See Asia, Vol. ii., by A. H. Keene, F.R.G.S. Exclusive ofBerar, Hyderabad contaiDs over 80,000 sq. miles.


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THE KINGDOM OF GOLKONDA 3Maharashtra, and, in the eyes of the Muslims, Kingof the Dekhan. In 1306 he came into conflictwith the Imperial power for withholding the tributefor the previous three years and was compelledto capitulate on the approach of the Emperor'sservant Malik Kafur with an overwhelming force.He and his successors remained tributaries of theEmperor until in the reign of the mad MuhammadTughlak the empire began to be dismembered. Itwas then that in 1347 Hasan Gangu, an Afghan ofthe lowest rank, founded in the Dekhan the Bahmaniempire, out of which in the early years of the 16thcentury the famous five Shahi kingdoms were cut,as in turn the great governors asserted their rebel-lious independence.Of these Sultan Kutb Kuli Khan, a Turkmanadventurer from Persia, who had risen in the Bahmaniservice to be governor of Telingana, was independentin all but name from 1512 A.D., when he founded atGolkonda the dynasty that bears his name. At thetime of his murder in 1543 his territory extendedfrom the Godavari beyond the Kistna and from thesea to about the seventy-eighth degree of longitudewest of the present city of Hyderabad.To that city its builder, Muhammad Kuli, fifth indescent from Kutb Shall, gave on its foundation in1589 the name of Bhagnagar, The Fortunate City,in honour of his mistress, Bhagmati, renaming it ather death Hyderabad, after Hyder Allah, the Lion ofGod, the Khalif Ali. But the city did not for yet manyyears supplant the older fortress of Golkonda as theseat of government. Entering into the usual Muham-12


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4 THE ORIGIN OF THE HYDERABAD STATEmadan alliances, during a long and successful reignmarked by conquest and splendour for thirty-fouryears Muhammad Kuli extended his realms at theexpense of his Hindu neighbours. Such, briefly butnecessarily told, is the story of the original kingdomsfrom which the Nizam's dominions were to beshaped.

In the following reign the Mughals under ShahJahan appeared in the Dekhan on their ill-advisedpolicy of premature expansion, and the history properof Hyderabad commences. Already Akbar had soextended his rule that Berar, then including all thepresent subah of Aurangabad, was in his hands from1596 until his death. In Muhammadan days it hadbeen a province under the immediate control of theImperial legate ; in the time of the Bahmani kings itappears as a troublesome border province with ill-defined frontiers, and after several vicissitudes wasfinally constituted by Akbar an Imperial subah.At a very early period of his desultory operationsShah Jahan had overawed Abdalla Kutb Shah, ofGolkonda, had exacted a regular tribute, and for-bidden the Shiite practice of reciting in the publicprayer during the Friday Khotab the name of theKing of Persia. A peculiar sequence of events con-nected with the intrigues of his Persian Minister MirJumla 1 , whom Bernier calls a man of almost un-imaginable capacity, brought him to more abjectdependence. Dying in 1672 a tributary of Delhi he

1 He instigated, for private reasons, Aurangzeb to takeGolkonda as the surest road to the throne of his father ; cf .Sleeman, Rambles and Recollections, 1 360.


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THE EUROPEAN TRADING COMPANIES 5was succeeded by his son-in-law Abu Husain who,following the custom of the illiterate Muhamraadanprinces, entrusted his affairs to one of the professionalBrahman class, a Maratha, on whose advice he enteredinto rebellious alliance with the Marathas, bringingon Hyderabad pillage and burning, and to himselfdeposition and lifelong imprisonment as a protectorof infidels. He was the last of the princes of Golkondapreceding the Asafia dynasty, known in Europeanhistory as the Nizams of Hyderabad 1 , who were inthe disintegration effected by the fitful wars ofAurangzeb to constitute themselves with the otherImperial lieutenants independent and hereditarysovereigns. Even at this period the foreign tradingcompanies had entered into relations with the Kingof Golkonda. For some years the Portuguese hadmaintained a factory at San Thome , within hisdominions, but in 1662 the town had passed out oftheir hands into the possession of a Muslim powerdependent on Golkonda. About ten years earlierthe traveller Bernier, who from his position as theImperial physician was thoroughly versed in Indianaffairs, had advised the French Company to procurefactories within the kingdom of Golkonda and atMasulipatam, as well as in Bengal ; and in December1699 the French agent at Surat, a certain Marcara,was able in spite of opposition from the English andthe Dutch to procure a firman from the king per-mitting the French Company to trade in all hisdominions and establish a post at Masulipatam.

1 The title is perhaps first officially employed, with definitelocal meaning, in the confirmatory treaty of 1831.


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6 THE ORIGIN OF THE HYDERABAD STATEThey were also especially exempted from taxes onboth imports and exports. Pursuing the advantagegained, the French commander De la Haye assaultedand captured San Thome in 1672, and successfullyresisted the attempt of the King of Golkonda toeject him. Negotiations for the peaceful tenureof the town were thwarted by the English traders,and soon afterwards the Dutch, who in Europewere at war with France, joined the king in ejectingthe invaders. Other commercial settlements weremade between the French Company and the nativeprince, but it was not until the advent of PierreBenoit Dumas that the connexion with Golkonda,and its successor Hyderabad, became political. Yetit is well to mention these early relations withGolkonda inasmuch as their common omission inhistorical narratives obscures a stage of the State'sdevelopment, and fails to shew the sequence ofintervention by the trading companies, if, as is thegeneral practice, the first appearance of the Com-panies is indicated as occurring upon the death ofthe first Nizam of Hyderabad.The founder of the dynasty of the Nizams wasAbid Kuli Khan, once Kazi of Bokhara, a linealdescendant of the first Khalif. During the reign ofShah Jahan he had entered India and Aurangzeb'sservice. After winning a name as a brilliant general,in 1686 at the siege of Golkonda, where his descend-ants were to reign, he drank, the native historianwrites, the sherbet of death from the hands of theAlmighty's messenger, but his grandson MirKamrudin, known better by the title of Chin Kalich


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THE NIZAM-UL-MULK 7Khan, was a most successful opportunist, clear-sightedand patient 1 , who entering into the combination thatafter two short reigns placed Farrukh Siyyar on thethrone of Delhi 2 was appointed Viceroy of theDekhan with the ancient title of Nizam-ul-MulkBahadur (Lord Regulator of the State), and in thatcapacity reduced to order the territories known asthe northern Sarkars. At the dissolution of. theBahmani Empire these dominions fell under therule of the Kutb Shahi State of Golkonda, but sincethe destruction of that State's sovereignty by theMughals had enjoyed a turbulent independence inthe anarchy pervading the Dekhan. In later timesthey became an important element in the politicalquestion, so that their connexion with Hyderabadcalls for a brief notice at this early period.The new Emperor was the instrument of hiscreators and ministers, the brothers Sayyid, and inendeavouring to form a coalition of the militarynobility against them he effected his own depositionand execution.

Through the stormy next six months that wereended by the accession of Muhammad Shah (1719-1748), Chin Kalich Khan was with the power behindthe throne, but disappointed in the partition ofhonours and suspected of too great an eminence bythe brothers Sayyid, he turned with large forces fromhis new governorship of Malwa to the Dekhan and

1 He was for a short time Subahdar of Oudh, but retired tolive for a while as a Fakir in Delhi until better days came.

2 By the battle of Agra Dec. 28, 1712. Four days later he tookformal possession.


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8 THE ORIGIN OF THE HYDERABAD STATEestablishing himself at Asirghar maintained hisposition against the forces of the Emperor's masters,whom a court conspiracy shortly afterwards cut off.To the vacant office of Chief Minister at Delhi ChinKalich Khan was summoned, and after securing prac-tical independence in the Dekhan, he proceeded earlyin 1722 to assume his office, only to be alienatedfrom the mind of the Emperor 1 by a cabal, and toretire in consequence to his viceroyalty in theDekhan in October 1723 with the title of SupremeDeputy of the Empire. It was more than a suspicionthat the unsuccessful attempt of the local governorof Hyderabad to dispossess the Viceroy was directlyinspired by the Emperor, who at the same timeremoved the Nizam from his subsidiary governor-ships of Malwa and Guzerat. The incident, for itwas nothing more, strengthened the Nizam in hisindependence. It was then, according to the mostcredible narrative, that to cover his failure theEmperor honoured his Viceroy with the title of AsafJah'2, and with instructions to settle the country,repress the turbulent, punish the rebels, and cherishthe people.

Conflicting accounts ascribe to various dates thepresentation of this title, by which the dynasty of theNizams is still locally known, but, whatever theoccasion, it is evident that during this period it washeld with nothing more than a delegated and vice-regal authority. And although the seat of admini-

1 Native historian.2 i.e., Equal to Asaf, the reputed Grand Vizier of King

Solomon.


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CONSOLIDATION OF THE KINGDOM 9stration was at first established at Aurangabad, andlater removed further from the Maratha border toHyderabad, that city did not become the recognizedcapital until the time of Salabat, while even nowthe Nizam is regarded, by convention, merely asencamped in the Dekhan, not established in a perma-nent palace. Neither did the founder of the kingdomever assume the title or insignia of royalty, nor hissuccessors when invited consent to do so, or todispense with the formal confirmation of their officeby the Mughal Emperors and their successors. Itwas only that the retention of the choicest piece ofImperial patronage became hereditary in the familyof Chin Kalich Khan, whose immunity in his virtualindependence was due to the consideration that hewas the only barrier to the insurgent Marathas.Their activity, however, it remained his policy todivert from himself to Delhi, until their ambitions,as enunciated by Baji Rao, Let us strike thewithered trunk and the branches will fall of them-selves 1, became a personal menace and drove himinto active support of the Emperor, to lose all histerritories from the Narbada to the Chambal,including Malwa, to which he had been restored.Yet in spite of its object the Maratba enterprise hada moulding, compressing, unifying influence onHyderabad.

In 1741 the Nizam was found again at theEmperor's side, but being recalled from participationin the turmoil of the Persian invasion, concerning

1 Elphinstone, H. of India, ii. 599.


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10 THE ORIGIN OF THE HYDERABAD STATEhis part in which Dow's Hindostan affords muchcurious information, he took advantage of his son'srevolt to consolidate his possessions south of theNarbada, and to reduce the Karnatik to the status ofan hereditary province, while leading the prevailingfaction of Turani nobles at the Court of Delhi, wherehe was represented by his eldest son ; for he neithersevered his connexion with the Emperor nor dis-claimed his own subordination. In correspondencepassing between him and the French at Pondicheryin 1741 he was accorded merely the position of chiefMinister of Muhammad Shah, and claimed no more 1 ,although the tone of his letters to the Frenchgovernor was distinctly condescending. Not theleast interesting feature of this communication is theprominence of the title Asaf Jah, which clearly ismeant (the Emperor being described as anotherSolomon) to mark the premier rank of the Nizamamong the Imperial officers.

At the time of his death he was ruling over allthe present State, and, as the titular subahdar, overall Southern India. In reality his sphere of powerwas defined by the Bhonsla northwards, and on thesouth by the Rajas of Mysore, Trichinopoli, andsmaller principates. Even his most immediatevassal, the Raja of Arcot, Lord of the Karnatik, actedin complete independence, and it was he who re-ceived at Madras and Pondichery, as humble traderspaying tribute and rent, the English and Frenchadventurers who were to intervene in Hyderabad

1 See letter in Abbe Guyon : Hist, des Indes Orient. (1744).


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INTERVENTION OF THE TRADERS 11politics 1 . With the Nizam's death in 1748 came theusual struggles over the succession. His second sonNasir Jang seizing the treasury drew the army tohim, alleging a renunciation on his elder brother'spart. Another claimant appeared in Muzaffar Jang,a grandson, claiming succession by bequest. As anImperial legate only, it is to be noticed, the Nizamcould bequeath by Muhammadan law neither sove-reignty nor treasure, and it was here that theEuropean power intervened at the close of themedieval period of South India, at a time also when,with the Mughal Empire in decadence, a wave ofHindu enthusiasm drove those patrons of anarchy,the Marathas, over the whole peninsula.

It was nearly two hundred years since in 1583Ralph Fitch and others being desirous to see thecountreys of the East India first came to Golkonda 2.Their successors the East India Companies of Franceand England were almost the last of the adventurous

1 The first communications between the English Co. and theNizam were opened by Commodore Griffin commanding thenaval forces of Madras. He successfully appealed against theFrench proclivities of the governor of Arcot.

2 For an account of how Ralph Fitch of London, merchant,John Newberie, William Leedes, jeweller, and James Story,painter, were imprisoned at Goa and escaped to Golkonda, seeHakluyt's Collection of the Early Voyages, Travels and Discoveries,etc., 1810 ed., vol. ii. 382. Hence wee went for Gulconda the king whereof is called Cutupde lashach. Here and in the kingdome of Hidalcan and in thecountrey of the King of Decan bee the Diamants found of theolde water.

The king mentioned is Muhammad Kuli Kutb Shah, thefounder of Bhagnagar, i.e. Hyderabad.


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12 THE ORIGIN OF THE HYDERABAD STATEcorporations to trade with the East Indies. Betweenthem there was, until Aurangzeb died, Jittle of thehostility that marked the relations of other Com-panies, but at his death the French adventurers tookadvantage of the general anarchy with no smalladditions to their factories and prestige, so that theopening of the 18th century saw a political, if notcommercial, French supremacy.

M. Dumas, their governor of Pondichery, byintervention in local quarrels initiated the policyof alliance and protectorate that was more fullyelaborated by his brilliant successor Joseph Fra^oisDupleix. It was in Lord Macaulay's phrase, modelledon M. Hamont's,

to govern the motions and speakthrough the mouth of some glittering puppet digni-

fied with the title of Nabob or Nizam. The warbreaking out in Europe over the question of theAustrian Succession was welcome in the East, andwhen concluded by the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle in1748, left the French prestige heightened in India,where the international relations of England andFrance afforded an opportunity for the prosecutionof informal hostilities on the earliest occasions.Such an occasion presented itself the very year ofthe treaty, for the Nizam-ul-Mulk who ruled fromthe Narbada to Trichinopoli, from Masulipatam toBijapur, was dead with no heir-apparent either byMuhammadan law or by that of the Asafia House.For Hyderabad and the English the situation wasmore critical than could have been then evident.For Hyderabad it was the beginning of a newevolution to end in the formation of the present State.


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A RETROSPECT 13The British policy will be found beginning from

this crisis to pass through four stages. First of allthe maintenance of a balance of power was sought ;then (and here begins the first of Sir William Lee-Warner's three divisions of the history) the positionof primus inter pares, followed by that of primussupra omnes, until finally there was entertained theproject of domination, to be reached by the realisationof the successive theories of the Ring Fence, Sub-sidiary Alliance, Subordinate Isolation, Protectorate,and Real Union 1. As an introduction to the secondchapter of Hyderabadi history there may well bequoted a most valuable paragraph from the lastDecennial Report on the Progress of India. Thewhole chapter is most interesting2. It calls attentionto two striking facts, First, that with remarkablyfew exceptions these States, certainly in their presentdimensions, rank and position, are of more recentorigin than the British Power in India. Secondly,that had it not been for the protecting arm of thatPower there is hardly a single State that would nothave long since been absorbed by a more powerfulneighbour or dismembered by fratricidal rivalry orinternal sedition. The rise of the greater number ofthe States in the north and centre of the countrytook place during the decadence of the MoghalEmpire and the general anarchy and confusion thatprevailed everywhere in India during the last half of

1 The whole thought is from M. Chailley-Bert, Les Protect, deVlnde Brit. i. Sec. 3.

5 Statement : East India (Progress and Condition, 1901-2),pp. 23, 24.


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14 THE ORIGIN OF THE HYDERABAD STATEthe 18th century and attended the downfall of theMaratha rule in the early years of the 19th. Wethus find in power descendants of the successfulfreebooter, the favoured minister or general, andthe rebellious deputy of his Sovereign. It proceedsto say that the relations between the BritishGovernment and the Native States have beenclearly described by Sir William Lee-Warner, andquotes his words concerning the three periods intowhich the history falls :

Each period is the expression of an idea, which has leftits mark as much on the form and language of the treaties asupon their extent and their objects. Up to the year 1813,which may be fixed as the closing year of the first period, thepressure of Parliament and the prudence of the MerchantCompany operated in the direction of a policy of non-inter-vention. The Company was barely struggling for its existence,and it recoiled from the expense and danger of extending itstreaties of alliance and self-defence beyond the Ring Fence ofits own territorial acquisitions. In the next period, whichlasted from 1814 to the Mutiny of 1857, larger schemes ofEmpire dawned upon its horizon and dominated the policy ofits Governor-Generals. The exclusion of any States from theProtectorate was proved by experience to be both impoliticand cowardly. Empire was forced upon the British rulers ofIndia, and the bitter fruits of a policy of leaving the Statesunprotected were gathered in the Pindari War, in the revivalof schemes of conquest in the minds of the Mahratta, and inthe humiliation of the Rajput Houses. Surrounded on allsides by the country princes, the Company's officers saw thatno alternative remained except annexation, which they wishedto avoid, or a thorough political settlement of the Empire stepby step with the extension of their direct rule. Withoutorder on their frontier, peace in their own territories wasimpossible ; and the only prospect of order among the NativeStates was to undertake arbitration in all their disputes with


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A RETROSPECT 15each other, and to deprive all alike of the right to make waror to enter into any unauthorised conventions with each other.The policy of the period was one of isolating the NativeStates, and subordinating them to the political ascendancyof the British power. The expressions of 'mutual alliance'and 'reciprocal agreement' are exchanged for the phrases' subordinate alliance, ' ' protection, ' and ' subordinate co-operation. ' But whilst the States are deprived of all controlover their external relations, the traditional policy of non-interference is still for a while preserved in their internalaffairs. Here the phrases of international law maintain theirlast stronghold, and it is deemed inconsistent with a sove-reignty to introduce a foreign agency for effecting anyreforms. No remedy for continued misrule is yet knownexcept a declaration of war, or, at a later date, annexation.At last a further change occurs with the suppression of theMutiny ' the Crown of England stands forth the unquestionedruler in all India.' Annexation is found to be needlesslydrastic. International law is wholly out of place, and the newconception of Indian sovereignties not only justifies, butrequires, intervention to save the State. A different set ofengagements are taken, which bring to light the union of theStates with the British Government in the extension ofrailways and in the common promotion of works of publicbenefit. The relations which to-day subsist between theprotected States and their protector are the resultant of thesethree periods, and of these several ideas, namely, non-interven-tion, subordinate isolation, union 1.

1 Sir W. Lee-Warner, KCSL, The Protected Princes of India,quoted in the Government Eeport.


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CHAPTER II.THE FRENCH AND ENGLISH DUEL. SUBSIDIARY

ALLIANCE. THE CONTINGENT. INTERNALPROTECTORATE.

THE situation in the dispute of the successionhas been stated. It was complicated by the appear-ance of a claimant to the feudatory throne of theKarnatik, and the adoption of opposing interests bythe English and French Companies. After somesuccesses and many intrigues the English candidate,Nasir Jang, was murdered in a plot of Dupleix'slaying by his own Patan nawabs (Dec. 5, 1750), andMuzaffar Jang succeeded, with Dupleix paramountas king-maker and suzerain. Of Muzaffar Jang it issaid that II etait condamne' a n'etre jamais qu'unepompeuse marionnette dans les mains de politiques 1,and a body of French troops was stationed under theMarquis de Bussy in Hyderabad itself, which was atBussy's suggestion made the capital in 1753, toprotect and intimidate the Nizam. For its mainten-ance the cession of large territories near Pondichery,

1 Hamont's Dupleix, p. 28.


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SUBSIDIARY ALLIANCE WITH THE FRENCH 17the province of Karikal, and the district of Masuli-patam were demanded, and so was commenced apractice that became a vital condition of the State'sexistence and is the chief subject of this consideration.The violent death of the new Nizam in 1751 wasfollowed by the selection by the French of asuccessor even more subservient, in the person ofSalabat Jang ; but it is more important to note theanxiety growing in Europe at the continuous andunauthorised hostilities between the French and theEnglish Companies, resulting in the withdrawal oftheir author Dupleix, the Alberoni of the East,and in M. Godeheu's peace mission that negotiatedthe provisional treaty of Pondichery in 1754. Itsfirst and chief article, that both nations should forever cease from interference in the differences ofnative Princes, was not likely to be long respectedby either contracting party: it was, in Hamont'sepigram, the substitution of Augustulus for Caesar,and the renunciation of the French methods andideals that had dominated India.

After five years the treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle wasindeed honoured with eighteen months' truce, butthere was no promise of ultimate peace in thethought that while the French were paramount at theCourt of the Nizam, whose precarious throne theywere pledged by the acceptance of territorialsecurity to maintain, the English Company were ina like position at the Court of his vassal in theKarnatik. Both were deeply committed, and fromthis time the English Company's policy becametimidly aggressive.

M. 2


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18 THE ORIGIN OF THE HYDERABAD STATEThe official renewal of war in Europe over the

Austrian Succession was made an excuse for inter-vention in the dispute of the Nizarnat, and moredirectly, for sending from France the Irish Comtede Lally with a force for which Dupleix had beggedin vain. He landed in India, as he writes in hisletters, pour en chasser les Anglais, and nototherwise to continue Dupleix's policy. The sub-sequent private and public quarrels of Bussy andLally, aggravated by the latter's evil genius, PereLavaur, by endangering the French territories,already menaced by Olive, compelled the withdrawalof Bussy with his subsidiary force from Hyderabad,and made the weakness of the Nizam's positionresting solely on French support apparent to all, andmost clearly to the Nizam. Not the least of hisdangers was the attitude of his brother Ali, in whomwas early seen, by the Mughalai party at Court, acounterpoise to the development of French ambitionsat the cost of Muhammadan supremacy. Theiropposition to such a project had in 1756 been soclearly seen that Bussy seized Hyderabad, while Alihad been alternately appeased with honours andrestricted by supervision. In 1757 he was formallyinvested as heir to the succession and entitledNizam-ul-Mulk, Asaf Jah, which serves to remindEnglish readers that these familiar titles were nodistinguishing prerogative of the reigning prince,although by habituation they have become so under-stood and officially employed. Suspicious of histreatment, Nizam Ali revolted in some degree andoccupied the capital, but acknowledging his brother's


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THE DECADENCE OF FRENCH INFLUENCE 19supremacy was entrusted with almost equal au-thority.In the meantime, on the invitation of the chieflocal prince in the Sarkars, Colonel Forde had beendespatched from Calcutta, stormed Masulipatam andgained for the East India Company all the territorydependent on that fortress, thus transferring to theCompany the dominating influence in Hyderabad,which was marked by the first treaty with theNizam in 1759. By it the French troops at thecapital and on the coast were to be expelled forever, but the northern Sarkars were in practicemainly left to the nominal rule of the Nizam.

In retrospect it is seen that it was the effort ofthe French to impose their authority over theDekhani dependencies, especially in the disposal ofthe Nawabship of the Karnatik, that enabled theEnglish Company to acquire in five years nearly allthe territories their rivals had ever held, and toexercise a preponderant, if not predominant, in-fluence in the Nizam's councils, although over HisHighness they claimed with wise patience nosuzerainty for yet thirty-five years. It is a curiousfact that at this time Clive foretold the later policyof England towards India in a letter to Pitt (datedJan. 7, 1759), in which he suggested the means andpointed out the advantages of the assumption by theCrown of an absolute government. The propositionwas however laid aside for a century, till 1858,when it was embodied in the proclamation ofNovember 5th.In 1761 Bussey's forecast and the Nizam's per-

2 2


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20 THE ORIGIN OF THE HYDERABAD STATEsistent apprehensions of his brother were realized :Nizam All superseded and imprisoned the Nizam,on the pretext of detected communications in timeof war with the Marathas, and two years later wasparticipant in his murder. Following the procedureof Salabat with the French in 1752, Nizam AH nowten years later offered the English Company four ofthe Northern Sarkars in return for armed assistance ;but the offer could not be entertained. In October,1765, however, the directors were advised that on theinitiative of Mr Palk, president of Fort St George,Sanads for all five Sarkars had been obtained fromthe Emperor, that mysterious fountain from whichhis strongest neighbour might pretend to drawauthority 1, against a possible revival of Frenchactivity in the old theatre of the Coromandel wars.In strict legality the Sarkars were subordinate tothe Nizam as Viceroy : that had been recognized bythe treaty of Paris two years earlier, but more re-motely they were subject to the Emperor of Delhi.In the name of the Company military possession wastaken, nor was the Nizam's position as the inter-mediate over-lord acknowledged until his retaliatoryraid of the following year into the country of theCompany's ally, the Nawab of the Karnatik, made itexpedient to obtain his acquiescence to a treaty bywhich the Company in return for a ratification oftheir grant of the Sarkars agreed to keep a subsidiaryforce at his disposal for any duty right and properof which the Company were to be the entire and sole

1 Westlake, Chapters on International Laic, p. 201.


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THE SUBSIDIARY FORCE 21judges 1, and when their services were not required topay annually certain benevolences in considerationof the free gift of the Sarkars. The life interest ofthe Nizam's brother in the fifth, the Gantur, Sarkarwith final reversion to the Company was admitted.The Nizam and the Company were to have friendsand enemies in common. In the course of thepolitical developments there should be noticed theimplication of the Nizam's independence in foreignpolitics of the dictation of the Emperor, but it cannotbe said that in this the Company's advisers followedan invariable and consistent policy.The most important feature of this treaty isperhaps beneath the surface. So far the policy ofthe Ring-Fence had prevailed. That was the main-tenance of a circle of protection, or in other words,the establishment of the frontier protectorate. Itbegan after the victory of Plassey and lasted untilthe end of Lord Minto's term of office, being brokenonly by Lord Wellesley during that period, in whichannexation was discountenanced, treaties of alliancerare. But by the treaty of Nov. 12, 1766, withHyderabad, a new system was inaugurated. Onceagain Hyderabad is shewn as the field of politicalexperiments. It was felt that the barriers set upwere not firm, could not be strengthened and mustbe replaced. The theory of Subsidiary Alliance wasdeveloped. Equality gave place to superiority as anideal, and frontier protectorates such as Hyderabadbecame in anticipation dependent and controlled

1 Articles 2 and 10, Nov. 12, 1766.


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22 THE ORIGIN OF THE HYDERABAD STATEdominions, although the word protectorate was prob-ably unknown and the idea but in the kernel at thisperiod. It required the treaties of 1798 to definemore exactly the situation accepted in 1766'.An opportunity of putting into practice the termsof the treaty presented itself the following year.Hyder Naik at the head of a mercenary band hadusurped the throne of his master, the Hindu Raja,and aimed with French encouragement at makingMysore the paramount power in South India. Itnecessitated the hasty, but legal, withdrawal fromHyderabad of the English protecting forces, to thedispleasure of the Nizam, who for a while joinedthe rebel and usurper, as he afterwards styledhim in the treaty of reconciliation (Madras 1768) 1.By this treaty an arrangement was effected to buryin oblivion what is past and to release the Nizamfrom his former liability to furnish the Company withtroops on their demand. But the article of greatestinterest and importance in consideration of laterdiplomacy is the sixth. It provided the Nizam athis need and charges, whenever the situation wouldallow, with Sepoys, artillery, and European gunners,and thus foreshadowed that subsidiary system whichWarren Hastings evolved with real genius. Of theSubsidiary Alliance there is no better descriptionthan in the following sentences : Cette alliancea debute par fournir aux princes indigenes des secoursmilitaires ; elle a continu^ par former a la disciplineeuropeenne leurs contingents indigenes qui assisteront

1 Article 9. The Nizam declares and makes known to theworld that he regards the said Naigue as a rebel and usurper.


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SUBSIDIARY ALLIANCE 23les Anglais ; puis par demander, au lieu de secoursen hommes, des secours en argent ; puis par faireassigner des terres comme garantie des sotnmespromises. Proprietaires ou possesseurs de ces terres,il a fallu des lors, les defendre. De la toute 1'eVolu-tion de la politique britannique 1. It was the de-termination of Warren Hastings not to permit aMaratha reign of terror to build up another politicalunity out of the vacated dominion of the Mughals,and with this thought he bound by treaties andsubsidies the native princes in a form of SubsidiaryAlliance that secured the integrity of their realms,while placing them in a dependent relationship tothe Company, and drawing to the latter the allegiancethat was due to the nominal Emperor, for the accept-ance of a subsidiary force gave the British as anindispensable correlative of the stipulation for protec-tion'2 a controlling power in all external and, in somedegree, internal policy. The Mughal Empire, infact, and the Maratha were but terms : they were nolonger even territorial aggregates. They had neverbeen administrative unities. The Vizier in Oudh,the Nizam at Hyderabad, the Mayor of the Palaceat Puna, asserted or denied at pleasure their sub-mission to the puppet kings at Delhi and Satara.In Macaulay's phrase the form and the power ofgovernment were everywhere separated ; and witha splendid disregard of consistency, either party forthe advantage of the moment advocated the claim

1 Annales des sciences politiques, 1899, p. 154 note. Prinsep,H. of India, vol. i. p. 5, can be seen also.2 Prinsep, H. of India, vol. i. p. 5.


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24 THE ORIGIN OF THE HYDERABAD STATEof the actual or the titular government. It is doubt-ful whether throughout India one single Statepossessed the double authority.

This manipulation of political theories wasespecially seen in the relations of the EnglishCompany with the Hyderabad State, for theycounteracted the native States with their owndiplomatic weapons.

Meanwhile in the uncertain position of theSarkars there was the assurance of future trouble.The benevolences due for them, according to theconditions of the Company's tenure, had fallen intoarrears and desuetude, and further, an illegalarrangement had been made by the Madras Govern-ment with the Nizam's brother, by which he leasedto the Company the Gantur Sarkar in which he helda life-interest. It had been done with no sanctionfrom Bengal and was immediately disowned by theSupreme Government, as constituting an unfriendlyact against the Nizam of the nature of an intriguewith his subjects ; and its chief authors includingthe Governor, Sir William Rumbald, were punished.But it had the double effect of driving His Highnessinto hostile coalition with the Marathas, and ofoccasioning the mission of the first political agent,Mr Hollond. to the Nizam's Court. The conciliatoryaction of the Supreme Government in the restorationof the Sarkar, over which so much trouble had beenmade, was reciprocated by the Nizam, influenced byhis now dominant wish for an ultimate alliance withthe Company, and a negotiation was almost effectedfor the rendition of the Sarkar in perpetuity when


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THE DEFINITIVE LETTER 25advices from England forbade such a course 1 . Inthis the Company's policy was more clearly shewn in1786, when Lord Cornwallis went to India withexplicit instructions to demand the surrender of theSarkar, which by the extinction of the life-interestof Basalat Jang had legally reverted to the Companyfour years before. These instructions could not beimmediately executed when English and Frenchrelations were critical, but two years later thedemand was made and, being at once accorded,became the occasion of the first appointment of apolitical Resident to the Hyderabad Court, to securecompliance with treaty obligations. In this con-nexion, the question of the Sarkars is of primaryimportance for any appreciation of the manner inwhich the English supremacy grew up and shapedthe fortunes of the State. It bound the two Powerstogether by a tie of preferential treatment, and as itwas felt that such marks of preference for Englishfriendship should be the occasion of a closer bond, aningenious and happy expedient was found (in viewof the legal prohibition of any contraction of newalliances not arising from war) of considering the oldtreaty of 1768 as still binding while interpreting anddefining it in such a manner as to satisfy the Nizam'srequirements. The expression that the subsidiaryforce should be at the Nizam's disposal wheneverthe situation allowed, was defined as meaning that

1 Negotiations were opened, during the war in 1784, withNizam Ali, and it was purposed to cede His Highness all theNorthern Sarkars, but Lord Macartney who had arrived at Madrasprocured the withdrawal of the scheme.


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26 THE ORIGIN OF THE HYDERABAD STATEthe force should always be available except againstthe Company's allies, among whom were specifiedthe Maratha chiefs; but the name of Tipu Sultanwas not on the exceptive lists.

It was further laid down, that either partyshould be at liberty to pursue diplomatic communi-cations with any other of the Dekhani powers forits private benefit, provided such intercourse was nothostile to its ally, but an explicit refusal to reopenthe question of the Northern Sarkars was given.Throughout history this latter decision has neverbeen rescinded.

This interpretation of the treaty was conveyedin a letter from the Governor-General (July 7, 1789),who was in a position to inform the Nizam that theletter had, by a declaration of the British Parliament,all the force of law;. For the opinion had beengrowing in England, that so vast an empire couldnot be held by a trading Company, and the questionbecoming one of party politics a Board of Control toratify or annul the Company's political actions wasconstituted, thus bringing the Nizam's Governmentinto direct and permanent relation for the first timewith the British Crown. But the domination of theMarathas over Hyderabadi affairs ceased only whenCitizen Tipu of Mysore bought peace in 1792 atthe cost of half his territory, at the close of a vainattempt to disestablish a balance of power in whichthe Company's intervention could always turn thescale. In the division of Tipu's surrendereddominions the Nizam participated. A little laterhe was involved in a dispute with the Marathas of


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LE CORPS FRANCOIS DE RAYMOND 27Puna over certain lands and revenues, and on hisrequest that the British subsidiary force, with whichhe was conditionally supplied, should be augmentedand made available for offensive purposes, he wasinformed that from any intervention, other thanmediatorial, the Governor-General, Sir John Shore(afterwards Lord Teignmouth), claimed legal exemp-tion by the express terms of the definitive letter of1789 which prohibited the employment of the forceagainst the Marathas, and although the Resident,Sir John Kennaway, wrote (Jan. 1, 1794) that theNizam was ready to. enter into engagements such aswould render the English masters of his countryfor ever, the position did not invite a closer alliancethat might bring with it governmental responsibili-ties but no commercial advantage to a tradingcompany. At this neutrality the Nizam had resortto his domestic levies under the general command ofM. Raymond. In addition to the Corps Fra^ois deRaymond 1 he possessed other mercenaries com-manded by American, French, and Irish officers.But of all these Raymond's Corps was the chief.It formed the main part of the Nizam's army, waspaid from territorial assignments, and being com-manded by Frenchmen of the most virulent andnotorious principles of Jacobinism, was the basis ofthe French party in India. The ensuing battle ofKardla was one of mercenaries led by the Europeanadventurers to be found during these years at every

1 Cf. Fraser, Our Faithful Ally, etc. p. 147. Raymond affectedto consider his corps

a French body of troops employed andsubsidized by the Nizam.


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28 THE ORIGIN OF THE HYDERABAD STATEnative Court, and significant of the fact that thenative thrones could only stand with alien support.It had not indeed been decided by a pacific Court ofDirectors that in the Nizam's case this supportshould solely be the Company's, but in that directionthe future looked, and the terrors of the socialisticand revolutionary opinions of the French at homeand in India were made to strike with full force intothe Nizam, above all things orientally conservative.

During the unhappy movements of this war, thetranquillity of the Nizam's dominions had beensecured according to treaty by the Company, butSir John Shore's neutrality was bitter, and anattempt was made to dispense with the Company'sbattalions while the French force was enlarged intoan excellent and formidable corps. For a few daysthe battalions were dismissed 1 , and the course ofhistory might have been very different had notimmediate local and family reasons necessitated theirrecall, for even if their use could not be permittedagainst the Marathas so as to disturb the judiciouspolitical balance obtained in the Dekhan, they gavethe Nizam both importance and security. At thesame time their retention was desirable to theCompany as protecting the Karnatik, and affordingan entry into Mysore, Berar, the countries of thePeshwa, and in particular of Sindhia, who through theMaratha dissensions now loomed far greater in thepolitical outlook than the Peshwa or the Nizam.There was the further consideration that while TipuSultan was inviting the Nizam into a combination

1 Quite legally by clause 4 of the Definitive Letter of 1789.


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THE SUBSIDIARY ALLIANCE STRENGTHENED 29against the British, and extending even to Arabiahis

correspondenceto effect such a Jihad, the Englishfaction at Hyderabad were working for an unlimited

defensive alliance with the Company, and their leader,Mir Alam, was pledged if such a treaty were effected,to procure the dismissal of every Frenchman in HisHighness's country 1. On the English side it wasthought that it would be a wise policy for us tocheck the rapid declension of the Nizam's weightamong the powers of Hindosthan, as the newGovernor-General (Lord Mornington) wrote to theBoard of Control in 1798. And a more intimaterelationship with the British was willingly acceptedby the native Government as a protection againstthe Marathas, even with some loss of political inde-pendence. By a treaty of September, 1798, theGovernor-General consented through Mir Alam, theMinister for English affairs (a significant title), totreble the subsidiary force on the disbandment ofthe French corps, but forbade in a despatch to theResident, defining the course of negotiations, anyacceptance, not merely invitation, of territorial cessionfor the maintenance of the troops, declaring that tobe an irregular ambition utterly repugnant to thedisposition

of this Goverpment.The clause quoted should in fairness be re-membered for later consideration. And, in passing,

there should be noticed that by the Nizam's requestthe enlarged force was put under the command ofa British officer of high rank. It marks the begin-ning of the military domination. The degree of

1 Our Failliful Ally, the Nizam (Fraser), p. 206, and foil.


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30 THE ORIGIN OF THE HYDERABAD STATEindependence resigned can be seen in the provisionthat foreign complications generally, and in particularwith Puna, should be settled by arbitration, for sincethe treaty of Seringapatam two of the three allies,the Nizam and the Peshwa, had by their mutualhostilities deprived the Company of the benefit thatmight be expected from a triple alliance and thebalance of power obtained. Further, in the event ofwar with Tipu under the treaty of Puna, the Nizam'sFrench mercenaries were prepared to desert anddestroying the native dynasty to fly the Frenchstandard over Hyderabad. These reflexions causedthe assent of the Governor-General to be given themore readily to the long-desired treaty (Sept. 1,1798). The subsidiary force was immediately aug-mented and Raymond's corps of 14,000 men dis-banded by the armed diplomacy of Lord Wellesley(Mornington) 1 . It left the Nizam's dominions aprotected State situated between Maratha possessionsand territories over which the Company held virtualor in part actual sovereignty 2 ; but as yet no suze-rainty was claimed for the Company; only by theeighth article of the treaty of 1798 the point wasgained for ever, that no European should be employedor retained in the Nizam's service without the know-ledge and consent of the Company. In a passage 3too long for quotation M. Chailley-Bert well remarks

1 Raymond had died but Perron was in command and the oldname was kept.2 Tapper, Our Indian Protect., p. 20.3 Les protectorate de I'lnde Brit. Annales des Sciences

Politiques, 1899, pp. 134-6, 182.


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AN INTERNAL PROTECTORATE 31that a frontier protectorate thus became an internalone, un protectorat de securite un protectorat dedomination by the law of British expansion, andwas next to become un protectorat de controle.Although no suzerainty Avas claimed by the Companysome independence was certainly resigned by theNizam, whose nominal cooperation was by suchmeans secured in the final war with Mysore. Theclose of that war, on the fall of Seringapatam in1799, saw the Nizam's dominions widely extended,but it was on terms of more marked dependence, bythe partitive agreement that was incorporated in thetreaty of 1800. Two years later the terms weremore permanently settled, but there was no sub-stantial change from the position assumed in 1800,when perhaps the most important compact in theState's history was signed. It sealed a perpetualand general defensive alliance between the Nizamand the Company who had in fact become one andthe same. This statement in the preamble, re-peated in the articles, may be said if the phrase beallowed to express a compulsory self-subordinatingequality on the Nizam's part, that only neededanalysing to shew virtual dependence. His Highnessresigned

theright

ofholding direct diplomatic

orbelligerent relations with any power independentlyof the Company, in whose adjustment of all differ-ences he was to acquiesce in consideration of theCompany's protection from all unprovoked hostilityor aggression, and of their station in perpetuity withinhis territories of an efficient subsidiary force 1 . For

1 The treaty speaks of ' ' The permanent subsidiary force.


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32 THE ORIGIN OF THE HYDERABAD STATEthe maintenance of this force there were cededpermanently and in full sovereignty turbulent dis-tricts presented to His Highness by the partitivetreaties exacted from Mysore in 1792 and 1799, andas these territories were acquisitions from Tipupresented to the Nizam gratuitously by the Company,he lost neither money nor any portion of his originaldominions, yet secured for ever the integrity of hisState and the maintenance of his line 1 . There wasin the bargain no departure from Lord Wellesley'sformer prohibition of territorial cession to whichattention was drawn in anticipation of this action :there was implied no complete and sinister change inthe Governor-General's opinion of the morality ofterritorial securities. But in another aspect a sig-nificant change of policy is clearly observed. Withthe fall of Tipu, the motive and means for a resto-ration of the balance of power in the Dekhandisappeared. The inevitable struggle that had tocome with the Marathas demanded that the formertheory should be replaced by the policy of Britishsupremacy. In the light of this silent but deliberatepurpose, the history from this point must be read,but the sovereignty of the Nizam was not suspended

1 The Deccan districts ceded by the Nizam of Hyderabad atthe end of the 3rd Mysore War in 1800... are for the most partunfertile and are seldom irrigable ; the rainfall is nowhere morethan 30 inches, and sometimes is less than 25 inches, and thepeople are almost entirely dependent on land The people areon the whole backward, and education does not flourish. Page 4of the Fourth Decennial Report on Progress and Condition of India,1901 1902. If this is the case after a century of British care thevalue of the territories in 1800 could have been little.


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THE DEATH OF NIZAM ALI 33under the form of protectorate nor did his dominionsform with those of the Company a unity politically,in the Indian use of the word.

Three years later the Nizam died. As a summarycriticism of his reign, it may be stated that in thethirteen years preceding his accession, three reigningprinces and one claimant died violent deaths, yet his imbecile and extravagant

reign brought moredisasters to his country. In every war from 1748

to 1790 (with the one exception of the Marathacampaign of 1761) the Hyderabadi Governmentwas thwarted, with consequent loss of territory orrevenue 1 , nor is it possible to avoid seeing that theNizam's alliances with the English, whether or notthe superior benefit was generally, in the end, theCompany's, were all that prevented the Company'sultimate advantage from being secured at the ex-pense of, instead of in participation with, HisHighness. It was only his subservience to theBritish that preserved the dominions from annihila-tion in a geographical, as well as political union ofthe Marathas, and his own person from being sacrificedto the ambitions of his sons.

Under these circumstances neither the princenor his country paid an unduly heavy salvage.Indeed, as Marshman points out, Hyderabad has beenremarkably and undeservedly fortunate in its history.Nizam Ali was succeeded by his eldest son,Sikandar Jah. Some years before the Nizam'sdeath, His Highness had made it known that he

1 Of. Letter (Nov. 24, 1819) from Eesident to Governor-General and Lord Hastings.M. 3


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34 THE ORIGIN OF THE HYDERABAD STATEpurposed to apportion his realm among his threeelder sons. To this project he contemplated seekingthe sanction of the Marathas and the British. TheImperial sanction it is significant was not considered.But during the Nizam's severe, it was feared mortal,illness in 1797, the eldest son was appointed regentafter violent opposition from the Mughalai party.Two years later the Nizam's death seemed soimminent that the Governor-General supplied theResident with a statement (dated Nov. 6, 1799) ofcertain conditions, on the acceptance of which bySikandar Jah, the British influence would be pledgedto support his claim to the Nizamat. They wereaccepted, and every preparation made for his imme-diate succession when the moment should come 1 ;but the Nizam's recovery caused the negotiationsto be abandoned.

These conditions were included later, on theNizam's recovery, in the treaty of 1800, and havingbeen already discussed need only be mentioned hereto indicate the position of a protected prince whichSikandar Jah would have willingly assumed, even inthe absence of the famous treaty. On his ultimateaccession the Nizam readily assumed that position,but it was a further anomaly that His Highnessshould seek, although the union of the State withthe Company's Government had been fully cemented,confirmation in his office from the titular Emperorof Delhi. His father had been willing to dispensewith it, but the right of confirmation was a pre-rogative always exercised by the over-lords of the

1 Wellington's Despatches, May 19, 1803.


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THE POSITION OF SIKANDAR JAH 35Nizaras, whether they were the Delhi Emperors, theCompany as trustees for the British Crown, or theBritish sovereigns. Yet it is important to assertthat it is not as successors of a pageant dynastyat Delhi that the British Government claim anysuzerainty over the sovereign States, as one might,for example, infer from Lord Dalhousie's subsequentreference to the Crown as the successors of the DelhiEmperors 1 .The dependency has been effected rather by ashifting policy of gradual and unforeseen aggressionas the weakness and the strength of the contractingparties have been shewn. Consequently, while thesovereignty of the Nizams is to be freely admitted,it has a limited significance that was imposed onSikandar Jah by his signature to a treaty of 1803,confirming all his predecessor's grants and obligations.

In the year of his accession the Maratha warsbroke out again. Internecine struggles and a seriesof calamities had driven the refugee Peshwa to con-clude with the British the treaty of Bassein, and byit to purchase forcible restitution to his power. Hehad entered into the same dependent relation as theNizam had done, and so verified the conjecture andhope expressed in the 18th Article of the treaty ofHyderabad in 1800, that the head of the Marathas,as the embodiment of Hindu aspirations, mightultimately follow the action of the chiefMuhammadanruler. It depicts Hyderabad as the field of politicalexperiments and the centre of the Company's

1 Cf. also Westlake, International Law, p. 200.32


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36 THE ORIGIN OF THE HYDERABAD STATEproblems in the matter of the native States; anaspect very illuminative throughout the States'history. Both on national and on religious grounds,Sindhia and the Raja of Nagpur were by no meansprepared to acquiesce in such a situation. Nor isthat less than could be expected when the contem-porary feeling, expressed a little later by the Residentat Hyderabad

1, was that, An alliance with us uponthe subsidiary system, however it may contribute to

the advancement of our own power, leads inevitablyto the ultimate destruction of the State whichembraces it. To avoid that position the Marathaconfederates (who, claiming the Chauth, arrogatedpolitical supremacy over all India) marched onHyderabad as the local representative of the sub-sidiary policy. The treaty of Deogaum, whichconcluded the subsequent British victories, releasedthe Nizam from all tribute and obligations to theMarathas, who further ceded to His Highness,through the Company, the whole of Berar west of theriver Ward ha. To this he had no justifiable claim, forthe Marquess Wellesley had at the beginning of thewar serious occasion to weigh the advantages ofdeclaring the Nizam a public enemy for his disloyalinclination to the Marathas, whose interest pervadedall branches of the administration2. But the generouspolicy prevailed, and the close of the war, whichmade the Emperor of Delhi a pensioner of theCompany, put the British power in a commanding

1 Letter from H. Eussel to Court of Directors, East IndiaCompany, 1824.

- Wellington's Despatches, Jan. 9, 1804.


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THE CONTINGENT FORCE 37position with regard to other States 1, and madeirrevocable the Nizam's decision to lean upon theBritish. At the same time, their assumption ofresponsibility for the integrity of the Nizam'sdominions necessitated the formation of the Hydera-bad Contingent. The subject has been frequentlydiscussed with improper recriminations. Had HisHighness acted on the reiterated advice of his chiefmilitary authority, Colonel Wellesley, repeatedlygiven him during the years 1803, 1804, and 1805,and maintained the levies on his personal initiative,the situation would not have involved Berar in adelicate complication which has only recently beensatisfactorily arranged. And, as its consideration isdemanded for a correct understanding of the Nizam'sposition under the Emperor of India, it will beunfolded at some length in the continuation of thenarrative.

The treaty of 1800 (Article XII.) placed at theCompany's immediate demand a stipulated force ofHis Highness's troops; but exclusive both of this,which had necessarily to be a standing army, and ofthe protective Subsidiary Troops provided by theCompany for the Nizam, a general mobilisation ofthe native army at need was contemplated. It isobvious, accordingly, that the treaty contemplatedtwo standing armies, the Contingent (as by anticipa-tion it may be called) and the Subsidiary Force, inde-pendent of the disbanded native soldiery. But afterthe first Maratha war, in which the Nizam's troopshad been inadequate and inefficient, or practically

1 Wellington's Despatches, July 13, 1804.


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38 THE ORIGIN OF THE HYDERABAD STATEnon-existent, the Prince refused to support a con-tingent force, although threatened with the prospectof annexation or an abrogation of the alliance 1 .There was no great desire on the Company's part tomaintain such alliances in which interests andambitions clashed. At the same moment a similarconnexion had been broken off with Jaipur for non-compliance with the terms of agreements made.That course with Hyderabad meant annexation ;both parties knew it, and the Nizam seems to havetraded upon the unwillingness of the Company toannex. All that could be effected was to have someof the State's troops organized by British officers.After the mutiny of the regular soldiery in 1813 thesystem was extended, a corps formed in the capitalunder the Resident's patronage, and named theRussel Brigade in his honour. Being paid directlyfrom the Resident's treasury, which diverted for thatpurpose some of the peshcush due for the NorthernSarkars, it came in time to consider itself part of theCompany's armies. It was one of the circumstancesthat made Hyderabad scarcely differ from a Britishprovince, by consolidating all powers and resourcesin the hands of a minister who was a British agent.Such an incident could not have occurred had notthe British Indian Government been exercisingthrough the Resident a virtual domination contraryto the instructions of the Company's Directors and,avowedly, in violation of the fundamental treaty of1800. But it was a concession to the extremities andimportunities of the Hyderabad Government, and not

1 Wellington's Despatches, Jan. 19, 1805.


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THE CONTINGENT FORCE 39less legal because it did not wait for legal mechanism,at a time when the Governor-General could write,The Nizam's territories are one complete chaos, fromthe Godavari to Hyderabad ; of which statement thereis ample corroboration in Wellington's Despatches.The moral responsibility of the Company for soundrule was sufficient justification. The interference ofthe Resident was felt especially in the appointmentof the native Ministers. A request for advice intheir selection put forward at first spontaneously andas a little piece of flattering courtesy, became insucceeding appointments an indispensable obligation,and is one of the little connexions that have becomefast bonds.Of the native officials, the dominant MinisterChandu Lai cultivated the British friendship andreceived high praise from Lord Ellenborough, whoseperspicacity is to be doubted. The Minister ad-vocated as the only political remedy, the placingof the administration of the country under thecontrol of the British, and although this Extremestep could not be taken, probably ws neverintended to be taken, the country's welfare justi-fied the conversion of the Nizam into a faithfuland efficient ally, by rigorous insistence on theexecution of his obligations. The liability of HisHighness to furnish a, supplementary force in warnecessitated its preparation during peace, and inso-much as it was a fixed and permanent obligation,the funds for its maintenance should have been ofthe same nature. So far back as 1805 ColonelWellesley (Lord Wellington) had, with an interesting


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40 THE ORIGIN OF THE HYDERABAD STATEpremonition of the future, proposed that the revenuesof Berar should be sequestered for the cost of such aforce. His advice had not been taken and theContingent is seen to have been paid most irregularlyon the sole responsibility of a subordinate minister,and, in part, by loans from local usurers. As willbe patent, it was not the cost of the Contingent, butthe irregularities of its payment and the wholefinancial confusion that made the country insolvent 1 ,until in 1823 the peshcush, due annually from theNorthern Sarkars, was redeemed by the Companyand the payment of the force thus left in full to theNizam. But the mismanagement consequent onsecurity from internal revolt increased the burden ofsubsidy, and the maladministration, that partlyoriginated the protective system, continued it.

1 The degeneration of :the State that in later times wasattributed to the cost of the Contingent existed long before thecreation of that force. See p. 12 of the Letter to the Court ofDirectors of the E. I. Co. by H. Russel, 1824.

i.^


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CHAPTER III.THE HYDERABAD ASSIGNED DISTRICTS AND THEAGITATION FOR THEIR RENDITION. SALAR JANG.WITH Lord Wellesley's retirement had come a

timid repudiation of his audacious but providentpolicies, and the course of non-intervention declaredonly a year after his departure was followed by LordCornwallis, Sir George Barlow, and in a less degreeLord Minto. But when Sir Charles Metcalfe becameResident at Hyderabad local reforms were pressingin their need. For the just assessment and collectionof the revenue together with the settlement of theland question, the Resident introduced Britishsupervisory officials to travel and check the localadministration. He obtained for his project thesanction, cordial or not, of the Native and theSupreme Governments, although so open a suppres-sion of His Highness' authority had not the fullapproval of the Governor-General, Lord Hastings.Yet these reforms were little to put against thefinancial depression. In Hyderabad the long estab-lished firm of William Palmer and Company werelending the Nizam's Government sums amounting


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42 THE ORIGIN OF THE HYDERABAD STATEto 300,000 annually for no warrantable purpose,and on no other apparent security than the prospectof territorial cession, while the private interests ofthe Resident, the patronage of the unsuspectingGovernor-General, and the special 1 consent of theBritish Government, were a moral guarantee to thebankers for a rapidly increasing debt on whichinterest of 25 per cent, was exacted. Even in acountry of high interest that can justly be calledexorbitant, for it was double the highest legal ratepermitted in British India and the rate on whichthe firm itself was borrowing. The bankers hadpractically usurped the government, and had becomein the Dekhan a power greater than the Nizam, theEast India Company or the Governor-General. Theirexample was followed by native usurers, one ofwhom, Puran Mai, between 1827 and 1829, heldmost of Berar in farm, and had to be expelled bythe insistence of the Resident as the firm of Palmerbefore him. At this crisis Sir Charles Metcalfe, bycounteracting the virtual minister, Chandu Lai, saved (to use Salar Jang's words) the sinkingState. But the whole economy of the State madethe withdrawal of British domination, in view of themoral responsibility assumed, an impossibility whenNasir-ud-Daula succeeded his father and was officiallyproclaimed by the British in 1829. Two points arenoticeable on the occasion : it is, in the first place,significant of the gradually changing relationship,that advantage was taken of his accession to denotein the terms and courtesies of official communications

1 Required by the Act, George III. 37, chapter 97, 28.


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INTERNAL DISORDER 43the equality of the Governor-General with theNizam ; secondly, that His Highness received theBritish congratulations on assuming the Sove-reignty, for to no other feudatory prince is the termof sovereignty accorded by the Supreme Govern-ment.

In the internal administration of his dominionsthe Nizam immediately claimed and was grantedabsolute and unsupervised rule, with the abolition ofMetcalfe's civil service, for which was substituted thefarce of Native Commissions. Yet 'the dominantMinister, Chandu Lai, never ceased. to apply for thatadvice and influence which could not on the nowstricter observance of non-intervention be given, andthe inevitable misrule ending in a protest from theSupreme Government that they could no longerremain indifferent spectators to the disorder andmisrule which had so long prevailed, a policy wassketched (but held in suspense) such as shouldreduce the Nizam to the position of a cypher underthe advice and control of the Resident 1 . But it wasmerged in the fuller reconstitution shortly effected,and by no means summarily imposed. It was nolonger possible to trust the good faith or the capacityof the Native Government. The religious outbreakof the Wahabis (whom Reclus calls 1'avant-gardedes mahometans Sunnites ) implicated the reigningfamily, and made it necessary in the interests of thesubjects that the Nizam should remain one whosecapital is overawed by a British cantonment, and to

1 Cf. Despatch of 1838.


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44 THE ORIGIN OF THE HYDERABAD STATEwhom a British Resident gives, under the name ofadvice, commands which are not to be disputed 1.A private letter from Hyderabad 2 almost con-temporary with this sentence speaks of distress andmisery and moral degradation everywhere, of labourrepaid only with extortion and plunder, of desertedvillages and mouldering forts.

These conditions made the cost of the HyderabadContingent, as it was now officially styled, a perpetualvexation to the Nizam, and equally so, as having nocommercial vahie, to the Directors of the Company.In 1842 the Resident wrote inexactly, that theContingent was provided for by no existing treaty.Lord Dalhousie, also

3, admitted that its maintenance

in its present form was legally requisite neither bythe spirit nor the letter of the treaty of 1800. Theform was avowedly in Metcalfe's phrase a jointconcern between Rajah Chandu Loll and us. Yetits efficient maintenance in some form was requiredby treaties, and its retention in one particular formby the Nizam from 1816 gave that form a degree ofofficial sanction that could not be immediatelysacrificed to a casuistical point of equity if theundefined dependence upon the Company, assuringthe Native State against foes within and without,was to continue without disadvantage to theCompany or menace to His Highness.

It remained for the Company to insist upon theup-keep of the military strength while providing

Macaulay, Clive, Jan. 1840.5 Letters of Lieut. St John, p. 74, Feb. 1844.3 Minute of March 30, 1853.


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TERRITORIAL SECURITY FOR LOANS 45that in the insolvency of the Nizam's Governmentfrom 1843 onwards the non-payment of the troopsshould not precipitate a military crisis and deprivethe Company of any benefit from their alliance.This real apprehension was brought to the considera-tion of the Nizam by Lord Dalhousie in a letterwhich for its plain truthfulness has been censured asfull of unworthy invective and sarcasm

1.But though it became necessary to advance the

Nizam's Government heavy sums of money, theCompany, as Lord Dalhousie observed, did notbecome their creditor to serve any purpose of theirown, nor was it other than an unwelcome extremitythat His Highness had to be informed in 1 843 thatterritorial security, the only available guarantee,would be demanded for further assistance. OnDecember 31, 1850, which had been determined asthe ultimate limit of the period in which unsecuredcredit could be given, the increasing debt remainedunpaid, and the Resident was instructed to selectdistricts suitable for the purpose of being temporarilyceded as the desired security. In his choice theResident was to pay attention to their fitness forpermanent retention if future contingencies shouldmake inevitable a course in other respects undesir-able. But Lord Dalhousie, whose name unfor-tunately is always connected with the policy ofannexation, had to oppose and censure the insistenceof the Resident, that for a definite number of yearsthe whole of the Nizam's country should be ceded tothe sole and exclusive management and authority of1 Quarterly Review, vol. civ., p. 265.


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46 THE ORIGIN OF THE HYDERABAD STATEthe Company 1 . He reminded the Resident that we acknowledge the Nizam as an independentprince, and that were it not for the existence of theSubsidiary and Contingent Forces our relations withthe State of Hyderabad would be merely those whichusually are formed between two independent Powers.Nothing could be more clear than that Lord Dal-housie had no sinister contemplations of depositionand annexation such as have been ascribed to him 3 ;but to the words of the sentence quoted above wemust take serious exception. Lord Dalhousie waswriting in some heat and with resentment of theveiled dictation of the Resident. Nor was he alawyer to make nice distinctions in popularsynonyms. A more legal mind perhaps wouldhave discriminated between the terms sovereigntyand independence 3. His error however was not apalpable blunder, but can frequently be found incontemporary legal writers of recognized authority,and it is notorious that in the past the IndianGovernment has exposed itself to misconstructionby a

the nizam; the origin and future of the hyderabad state, being the le bas prize essay in the...

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