1

TheNordicmodelandBritishpublicpolicyc.1997-2015:

socialdemocraticmythologyorfree-marketsupermodel?

ThesissubmittedtothedegreeofDoctorofPhilosophyatUniversity

CollegeLondon

byThomasHoctor

Supervisors: Examiners:

MaryHilson TitusHjelm

RichardMole J.MagnusRyner

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Declaration

I,ThomasHoctorconfirmthattheworkpresentedinthisthesisismyown.Where

informationhasbeenderivedfromothersources,Iconfirmthatthishasbeenindicated

inthethesis.

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Contents

Acknowledgements...........................................................................................................8

Abstract............................................................................................................................9

Introduction....................................................................................................................10

0.1Britainvotesleave..............................................................................................................10

0.2Models,identity,branding..................................................................................................12

0.3Thisstudyanditsaims........................................................................................................17

ChapterOne–TheNordicModel:Whatisitandwhydoesitmatter?.............................22

1.1Introduction.......................................................................................................................22

1.2.WhatistheNordicModel:MiddleWay,Rehn’sliberalismorMeidner’ssocialism?...........27

1.2.1Thepre-warcontext:‘theMiddleWay’..............................................................................27

1.2.2TheRehn-Meidnermodelandthewage-earnerfunds......................................................29

1.2.3Nordicdystopia:conservativevisionsofNorden...............................................................41

1.2.4Conclusions.........................................................................................................................44

1.3.Nordenintheinternationalsphere:TheColdWar.............................................................46

1.3.1TheendoftheColdWar:neitherwinnernorloser............................................................46

1.3.2Conclusions.........................................................................................................................52

1.4Conclusions........................................................................................................................53

ChapterTwo–NewLabour,NewModerates,NewNorden.............................................54

2.1Introduction.......................................................................................................................54

2.2.WritinganewSwedishSuccessStory.................................................................................56

2.2.1TheSwedishfinancialcrisis1991/2anditsaftermath.......................................................56

2.2.2ANewStartforNorden?....................................................................................................60

2.2.3TheNordicWay..................................................................................................................64

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2.2.4GlobalisationandEuropeanisationinNorden....................................................................68

2.2.5Conclusions.........................................................................................................................71

2.3.TheSwedishSocialDemocrats,Labour’sThirdWay,theSwedishModerates,andCameron’s

BigSociety................................................................................................................................73

2.3.1ChangingSocialDemocracyinSwedenandtheUK............................................................73

2.3.2‘Faraboveideology,butnotbeyondideals’:Labour’sThirdWay.....................................77

2.3.3Triangulatingtowardsanemptycentre:Cameron’sBigSociety........................................87

2.3.4Conclusions.........................................................................................................................99

2.4.Conclusionsandfurtherquestions...................................................................................102

ChapterThree–GovernanceandDiscourse:ApproachingtheNordicmodelasaquestion

ofpublicpolicy..............................................................................................................104

3.1Introduction.....................................................................................................................104

3.2Governance:Theorisingrelationsbetweenactors............................................................108

3.2.1Think-tanks,governmentandthemedia:Isthatreallyit?...............................................108

3.2.2Thedevelopmentofgovernanceasaconcept.................................................................112

3.3DiscourseTheoreticalApproaches....................................................................................120

3.3.1Introduction......................................................................................................................120

3.3.2Significationandemptysignifiers.....................................................................................121

3.3.3CriticismofLaclauandMouffe.........................................................................................125

3.3.4Discourse:Materialorideological?..................................................................................128

3.3.5GovernanceandDiscourseasmethodology....................................................................131

3.4SourcesandTerminology..................................................................................................136

3.4.1Theprimaryactors............................................................................................................136

3.4.2Sources.............................................................................................................................139

3.4.3Terminology......................................................................................................................142

3.5Conclusionsandquestions................................................................................................145

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ChapterFour–Nordicmodelsofpoliticaleconomy:flexibilityorsecurity?...................147

4.1Introduction.....................................................................................................................147

4.2WhyNordicflexicurity?....................................................................................................150

4.2.1Flexicurity:Wherediditcomefrom?...............................................................................150

4.2.2Thearchitectureofflexicurity..........................................................................................153

4.3Ataleoftwonetworks.....................................................................................................162

4.3.1The‘socialdemocratic’network.......................................................................................162

4.3.2The‘free-market’network...............................................................................................164

4.4Flexicurity:Anewlabourmarketsettlement?..................................................................167

4.4.1Swedenaspoliticalparadox.............................................................................................167

4.4.2Flexicurityinatimeofausterity.......................................................................................178

4.4.3TheIPPRandflexicurityfromtheemployers’perspective...............................................185

4.4.4Conclusions.......................................................................................................................189

4.5Utopia2.0:Free-MarketSweden......................................................................................193

4.5.1TheNewModeratesand‘theBigSociety’........................................................................193

4.5.2ConservativevictoryandtheInstituteofEconomicAffairs.............................................199

4.5.3Conclusions.......................................................................................................................209

4.6Schumpeteriansandneo-Schumpeterians........................................................................211

4.6.1TheliberalSchumpeter.....................................................................................................211

4.6.2ThecorporatistSchumpeter.............................................................................................213

4.6.3Conclusions.......................................................................................................................219

4.8Conclusions......................................................................................................................222

ChapterFive–Taxationorinsurance?ANordicmodelofchoiceinhealthcare..............227

5.1Introduction.....................................................................................................................227

5.2HealthcareSystems:anoverviewoftheUK,NordenandEurope......................................229

5.2.1TheInternalMarket1989-97............................................................................................229

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5.2.2Nordichealthcaresystems...............................................................................................232

5.2.3ConvergenceinEuropeanhealthcaremodels..................................................................237

5.3Constructingahealthgovernancenetwork.......................................................................241

5.4Whatcomesfirst,freedomorequality?TheNewLabourera............................................246

5.4.1AnewNHSandhowtodeliverit,1997-2002...................................................................246

5.4.2‘Competitors,collaborators,suppliersandcustomers’:backtothemarket2003-2007.253

5.4.3Competition,choiceandequality:whatdiditmeanforothernetworkedactors?.........257

5.4.4Localists,free-marketersandtheNordicmodel..............................................................262

5.4.5Conclusions.......................................................................................................................270

5.5BismarckorBeveridge?TowardstheLansleyPlanandtheHealthandSocialCareAct......273

5.5.1ThedeclineoftheNewLabourcoalition..........................................................................273

5.5.2Theorisingthefailureofthetaxation-fundedmodel......................................................279

5.5.3‘Unintelligiblegobbledygook’:TheHealthandSocialCareAct2012...............................286

5.6Conclusions......................................................................................................................291

ChapterSix–The‘c-word’andthe‘v-word’:ChoiceandvoucherreformintheEnglish

schoolsystem................................................................................................................294

6.1Introduction.....................................................................................................................294

6.2TheSwedishVoucherReformandtheEnglishschoolsystem............................................296

6.2.1NewPublicManagementandSweden’svoucherreform................................................296

6.2.2EducationinEngland2000-2010......................................................................................299

6.3Theeducationgovernancenetwork..................................................................................304

6.4‘Won’topponentsdismissthisasprivatisation?’:Articulatingapoliticallyacceptable‘school

choice’agenda.......................................................................................................................309

6.4.1Wewillforceyoutobefree!............................................................................................309

6.4.2‘Votersdon’tseemespeciallykeenonfreedom.’............................................................312

6.4.3Conclusions.......................................................................................................................322

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6.5‘It’sabitlikeIKEA:everythingissimpleandthesame.’:Creatingstandardisedbespoke

education...............................................................................................................................324

6.5.1Fromproposaltopolicy....................................................................................................324

6.5.2TheConservativeManifestoandtheAcademiesAct2010..............................................332

6.5.3Conclusions.......................................................................................................................343

6.6Conclusions:NotSwedishEnough!...................................................................................345

Conclusion.....................................................................................................................350

7.1Researchquestionsandmainfindings..............................................................................350

7.1.1Questions..........................................................................................................................350

7.1.2Summaryconclusions.......................................................................................................351

7.2Limitationsofthisstudy...................................................................................................356

7.3Implicationsandfuturedirections....................................................................................358

7.3.1TheNordiccountries........................................................................................................358

7.3.2Socialsteering...................................................................................................................362

7.3.3Modellingasanideologicaloperation..............................................................................364

Eight–Backmatter........................................................................................................368

A–ListofAbbreviations.........................................................................................................368

B-Bibliography......................................................................................................................370

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Acknowledgements

DuringthecourseofthisprojectIhaveincurredmanydebtsofgratitude.Iwouldliketothank

theArtsandHumanitiesResearchCouncilwithoutwhosesupportthisprojectwouldnothave

beenpossible.IextendmygratitudetoHakiAntonssonforhisunderstandingduringavery

difficult time. Likewise, without Claire Thomson’s generous support and assistance this

projectwouldneverhavegotstarted.Mysupervisors,MaryHilsonandRichardMole,without

whose dedication and care this project would never have been finished; I learnt a huge

amount from their thoroughness and attention to detail. I would also like to thank my

examiners,MagnusRynerandTitusHjelm,fortheirhelpfulandinterestingcommentsonthe

manuscriptandforgenerouslysharingtheirnoteswithme.IamverygratefultotheVargas-

Pritchardfamily:YolainaandDianafortheirencouragement(andDianaforlookingatparts

ofthemanuscript)andStephanforkeepingthingslight.MarkandMaurofornottalkingabout

work.MybrotherJamesforhissupportofandinterestinthemostarcanepartsofthisthesis.

Finally,IwouldliketothankSarahforeverything,especiallyteachingmethatsomethingsare

moreimportantthanwork.

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Abstract

PerryAnderson,oneofthefoundersoftheBritishNewLeft,remarkedthatSwedenwas‘not

somuch a normal object of real knowledge as a didactic political fable’.1In 1961, when

Andersonwrote‘MrCrosland’sDreamland’itwasself-evidenttohimthatSwedenandthe

wider Nordic region was a model of social democracy. Today this question is less

straightforward. Iarguethatwhilethere isclearagreementthatthere issuchathingasa

Nordicmodel, it ismuch lessobviouswhosepolitical fable it really is. In this thesis, Iwill

demonstratethatconflictoverthemeaningoftheNordicmodelisincreasinglytransnational

andthattheNordichasbecomeanimportanttopicinrecentdiscussionsofpublicpolicyin

theUKforactorsfromsocialdemocratstofree-marketliberals.Toillustratethiscontention

thethesisusesthreecasestudiesdealingwitharangeofunderstandingsofaNordicmodel

ofpoliticaleconomy;recentpublichealthdiscoursesabouttheNordiccountriesinEngland,

anda‘Swedish’FreeSchoolreformwhichwasenactedinEnglandandWalesin2010.These

casestudiesarestructuredusinga formofdiscourseanalysisandagovernanceparadigm

whichtheorisestherolesandstrategiesofactorsengagedinthecreation,implementation

andmaintenanceofpublicpolicy.IconcludebyarguingthattheNordicmodelhasgenerally

been deployed as a means to neutralise well-established antagonisms in public policy

programmes.Thisisasmuchafeatureoffree-marketliberaldiscourseassocialdemocratic

discourse.

1PerryAnderson,‘MrCrosland’sDreamland’,NewLeftReview1,no.7(1961):4.

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Introduction

0.1Britainvotesleave

Onthe23rdJune2016theUnitedKingdomofGreatBritainandNorthernIrelandvotedto

leavetheEuropeanUnioninareferendum.TheBritishpopulationpreferredleavebyamargin

of51.9%to48.1%.2Unlikemostofmycompatriots,Ifoundouttheresultofthereferendum

inasmallroomoverlookingtheharbourinAarhus,inDenmark.Itwasthesummersolstice

andtheentiretownstankofsmoke,asthelocalscelebratedSanktHans.OnMidsummerin

Denmarktherearegenerallyaroundeighteenhoursofdaylightandevenafterthesunsets,

the effect produced ismore like a lengthy twilight than true darkness. This is extremely

beautiful,andthelocalscelebrate itby lightingbonfiresandstayingupallnightwatching,

generallywiththeassistanceofalcohol.HadInotbeengivingaconferencepaperearlythe

nextmorning,Iwouldcertainlyhavejoinedthem.Asitwas,however,Ihadbarricadedthe

windowstoblockoutthesmoke,thelight,andthesoundofconfused,irritableseagulls.

Having convinced myself that I didn’t care about the result of the referendum, I was

nonethelessunabletosleepandhadcompromisedbyleavingablogofliveupdates,whichI

resolutelypretendedtoignore,onmycomputeronthetable.3Ataround4amDanishtime,

theblogflashedupinboldtype‘BritainhasvotedtoleavetheEuropeanUnion’.Ipromptly

fellasleep.

2 ‘EU Referendum Results’, The Electoral Commission, accessed 16 September 2016,http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/find-information-by-subject/elections-and-referendums/past-elections-and-referendums/eu-referendum/electorate-and-count-information.3AndrewSparrowandMatthewWeaver,‘EUReferendumLivewithAndrewSparrow’,TheGuardian,23June2016, http://www.theguardian.com/politics/live/2016/jun/23/eu-referendum-result-live-counting-leave-remain-brain-in-europe?page=with:block-576cbcb2e4b0f430381097e8#liveblog-navigation.

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ThefollowingdayDavidCameronannouncedthathewouldstepdownasPrimeMinisterand

LeaderoftheConservativeParty,inwhatwasanignominiousendtoacampaignwhichhad

beenfoughtonthebasisofparticulararticulationsoftheEuropeanUnion,Britain,and its

relationshipwiththerestoftheworld.GiventhatlargepartsofthisstudyareaboutDavid

Cameronandthereformagendaforwhichhewasthefigurehead, itwasnot immediately

clearwhethertheresultandhisself-immolationmademyprojectmoreorlessrelevant.

Onbalance,Iaminclinedtothinkthatithasmadetheprojectmorerelevant.Theresultof

thereferendumhasledtoanoverdue,thoughstilldisappointinglynarrow,discussionabout

contemporary British identity and public policy. And indeed, the EU had for a long time

functionedasapureOtherintheLacaniansense:ablockageofBritishdesire.Ittranspired,

however, that many of the frustrations and grievances which led large sections of the

populationtovotetoleaveturnedoutnottohavemuchtodowithEuropeanUnionpolicyat

all.Rather,itwasdomesticpoliticalagendas,suchasthoseexaminedinthisstudyandothers

likeit,whichwerechieflytoblameforthepoliticalandeconomiccriseswhichhadrocked

Britainsince2008.

Afurtherreasontothinkthatthisstudyretainsitsrelevance,evenasmanyofthemostsenior

membersofthelastgovernmentexitstageleft,isthatthecampaignwasalsoatriumphof

economicandpoliticalmodelling.Duringthecampaign,modelsasdiverseasCanada,Albania,

Norway,andIcelandwereusedtofurtherordisputeparticularclaimsaboutaBritishfuture

outsidetheEuropeanUnion.

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Many of these claims were fanciful. It was argued that Britain could remain part of the

European Free Trade Area (EFTA), while simultaneously imposing limits on European

migrationtoBritainandreducingitscontributionstotheEUbudget.Thiswastheso-called

‘Norwayoption’,eventhoughitbearsnorelationtoNorway’sactualrelationshipwiththe

EU, which includes free movement of labour, virtually all EU rules, and a reasonable

contributiontotheEUbudget.Andyet,theNorwegianmodelof‘Brexit’waswidelyquoted.

Why?WhatdoesthistellusaboutBritishviewsoftheNordiccountries?Andwhatdoesittell

usabouttheoperationofpoliticalandeconomicmodellingmoregenerally?

0.2Models,identity,branding

Culturally,politicallyandeconomically, theNordiccountriespunchfarabovetheirweight.

Whether it ishaute cuisine, television crimedramasor knitted jumpers, theNordicshave

provedparticularlyadeptatbrandingandmarketingdesirableaspectsoftheirculture.4Inthe

UK,forexample,Danishcultureisincreasinglyprestigiousasaresultofitsemphasisonhigh

quality,usuallyexpensive,andgenerallytastefulconsumerexports.Itisimpossibletoresist

here the urge to cite Pierre Bourdieu’s classic text Distinction: A Social Critique of the

Judgement of Taste. Indeed, the ever-growing popularity of Danish/Nordic consumer

productsandexperiences couldbe read inBourdieu’s termsaspartof a ‘dreamof social

flying’ among theBritishmiddle-classes.5An interesting sociological researchquestion for

another daymight be the extent towhichNoma, the ‘best restaurant in theworld’, and

4FionaSims,‘HowCopenhagenBecametheFoodieCapitalofEurope’,TheTimes,7August2010;MeropeMills,‘SceneStealer:CopenhagenGlowes intheTVDramaTheKilling,but It’saFriendlyCitywithGreatFoodandArchitecture’,TheGuardian,3September2011;LucySiegle,‘GrippingYarns:FamouslyWornbyTVDetectiveSarahLund,theJumperIsNowtheFaroeIslands’Best-KnownExport’,TheObserver,17November2013.5PierreBourdieu,Distinction:ASocialCritiqueof theJudgementofTaste,ed.RichardNice (Cambridge.MA:HarvardUniversityPress,1984),quotation370,365–71.

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‘NordicNoir’arereplacingIKEAasastereotypeoftheNordicregionamongBritain’sGuardian

readers.Perhapstheattractionliesinthecomplexandintrospectivefashionafterwhichthe

Nordicshavebranded themselves, especiallywhen contrastedwith themore superficially

aesthetic style of branding associatedwith theUSA, or Britain’s conservative branding of

itself,associatedsostronglyasitiswithimagesofpeoplewearingcrowns.

And,contrarytothewaythatbrandingworksin,say,theUK,itseemsclearthatthepopularity

ofNordenasabrandhasmuchtodowiththewaythatitsculturalexportsareembeddedinto

asocialsystem,or,atleast,aperceptionofasocialsystem.ThesuccessofBorgen,aDanish

politicaldrama,orTheBridge,aDanish-Swedishcrimedrama,isaboutmuchmorethantheir

quality,butalsothelongstandingappealofthesocietiesinwhichtheyareset.

Thisisnotarecentdevelopment,norisitacoincidence.Historically,SwedenandDenmark

used the Swedish Institute and the Danish Cultural Institute respectively as vehicles for

creatingparticularidentitiesforthemselvesinternationally.6Bythelatterhalfofthe1960s

major changes to the welfare state had created an internationally recognised discourse,

whichwasapprehendedoutsidetheNordicarea,andincreasinglywithinit,as‘theSwedish

Model’,andlater,fromthe1970s,‘theNordicModel’.7Thisdiscoursehasnotonlyprovided

fertilegroundfortheexportoftelevisionprogrammesandknittedjumpers,buthasalsoacted

as a framework for the establishment of political projects inside and outside the Nordic

countries.

6NikolasGlover,NationalRelations:PublicDiplomacy,National IdentityandtheSwedish Institute1945-1970(Lund:NordicAcademicPress,2011).7Ibid.,194;KazimierzMusial,RootsoftheScandinavianModel:ImagesofProgressintheEraofModernisation(Baden-Baden:NomosVergesellschaft,2000),228.

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Indeed,theperceivedsuccessoftheNordicsocialsystemshasseenthemusedasamodelfor

publicpolicyreformsinceatleastthe1930s.PerhapstheclassicexampleofthisisMarquis

Childs’TheMiddleWay,whichexercisedanimportantinfluenceonNewDeal-eraUSpolitics.

Later,Sweden,forwhichthetermsNordicandScandinaviansometimesstoodmetonymically,

wastheexampleparexcellenceofasuccessfulsocialistsocietyintheBritishLabourpolitician

AnthonyCrosland’s1956bookTheFutureofSocialism.8Onecouldevengosofarastosay

that,forCrosland,Swedenwasthefutureofsocialism.PerryAnderson,afoundingmember

oftheBritishNewLeft,wroteadetailedrebuttaltoCroslandintwoseparatearticlesin1961.

Anderson remarked that, as it appeared toCrosland, Swedenwas ‘not somuchanormal

objectofrealknowledgeasadidacticpoliticalfable’.9

TheseideasaboutthesuccessoftheNordiccountriestravelledbothasaresultofconscious

Nordicpolicies,andasaresultofinterestonthepartofforeignobserverslikeCroslandand

Anderson.The legacyof socialist internationalismandtheconnectionsbetweenEuropean

socialdemocraticandlabourpartieswerealsoimportantmeansbywhichsuchideaswere

transmitted.

By1992,theColdWarbetweentheUSAandtheUSSR,inwhichSwedenhadbeenneutral,

wasover;theNordiccountrieshadexperiencedaseriesoffinancialcrises,whichchallenged

thebasisoftheirsocialmodels;and,forthefirsttimein61years,aModeratePrimeMinister,

CarlBildt,ledSweden.Collectively,thesechangesprecipitatedaseriouscrisisinSwedishand

Nordicidentities.TheNordiccountrieshadbeendefinedhistoricallybytheirabilitytothumb

8C.A.R.Crosland,TheFutureofSocialism(London:JonathanCape,1980).9Anderson,‘MrCrosland’sDreamland’,4.

15

theirnosesattherulesofcapitalismbywhicheverybodyelsewas(supposedly)forcedtoplay.

Thesecrisesandthechangestotheglobalandnationalpoliticalordersmadethis identity

seemmuchlessstable.

Sincethe1990saseriesofattemptshavebeenmadetocreatenewmeaningfortheNordic

region.SomeofthemattemptedtounderstandthecoreofSwedishandNordicsuccessasa

consequenceoflong-standingcommitmenttofreetrade,openmarketsandpropertyrights:

thatistosay,economicliberalism.10Thishasnotnecessarilyhadamajorimpactonpopular

stereotypes of the Nordic countries. Although social themes, such as homelessness (The

Bridge/Broen),thetreatmentofimmigrants(TheKilling/Forbrydelsen),andethicalandsocial

issuesmoregenerally(Borgen)arecommonthemesinNordictelevisionprogrammes,even

Borgen,whichfollowedthecareerofafictionalfemaleDanishPrimeMinister,didnotdevote

anepisodetothenatureofpurchaser-providersplitsinNordichealthcareregimes.Onthe

otherhand,thenatureofNewPublicManagementreformswhichhavebeenimplemented

intheNordiccountrieshavebeencloselyfollowedbypolicymakerselsewhere,especiallythe

UK.

In 1961, when Perry Anderson wrote ‘Mr Crosland’s Dreamland’ it was self-evident that

SwedenandthewiderNordicregionwasaprospectivemodelofsocialdemocracy.Todaythis

questionislessstraightforward.Whilethereisclearagreementthatthereissuchathingasa

10LarsTrägårdh, ‘Statist Individualism’, inTheCulturalConstructionofNorden,ed.ØysteinSørensenandBoStråth (Oxford: Scandinavian University Press, 1997), 253–85; Rolf Torstendahl, ‘Sweden in a EuropeanPerspective - Special PathorMainstream?’, inTheSwedish Success Story?, ed. KurtAlmqvist andKayGlans(Stockholm:AxelandMargaretAx:sonJohnsonFoundation,2004),33–46;KlasEklund,HenrikBerggren,andLarsTrägårdh,‘TheNordicWay’,SharedNormsfortheNewReality(Davos:WorldEconomicForum,2011);NimaSanandaji,ScandinavianUnexceptionalism:Culture,MarketsandtheFailureofThird-WaySocialism (London:InstituteofEconomicAffairs,2015).

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Nordicmodel, it ismuch lessobviouswhosepolitical fable it really is.Themeaningofthe

Nordic is therefore a matter of contest not just within the region itself, but also

transnationally.Inthissense,itisperhapsunlikeanyotherregionintheworld(althoughof

courseindividualcountriesarefrequentlyusedaspolicymodels).Giventhatinterestinthe

Nordicmodelhasbeensosustainedforsolong,itisclearlyworthexaminingtheextentto

which themeaning of theNordic has changed, not least because, historically, theNordic

modelwasalmostalwaysconsideredasocialdemocratic‘politicalfable’.

Broadlyspeaking,literaturewhichdealswiththemeaningoftheNordicmodelhasaimedto

explain:whytheNordiccountrieshavebeensuccessful;howtheyareexceptional;howthe

Nordicmodel differs from othermodels (e.g. the ‘European SocialModel’), and how the

meaningoftheNordicmodelisconstructed.Theproblematicinthisthesiswillnecessarilybe

informedbytheseapproaches,butitwillnonethelessapproachthequestionofthemeaning

oftheNordicmodelinaslightlydifferentway.Ratherthanlookingatdifferentimaginingsof

theNordicmodelasprimarilyNordicphenomena,itwillinsteadunderstandthemintermsof

politicalimperativeswhichoperatetransnationally.Itisthereforeconcernedprimarilywith

themeaningoftheNordicasitisunderstoodinBritain,and,withinthat,howitisunderstood

by specific groupsofactors involved in the creation, implementationandmaintenanceof

public policy. The question therefore becomes: to what extent is the Nordic model an

importantandrelevantconceptinthecreationanddevelopmentofpublicpolicyintheUK?

Whyisitimportant?Andforwhomisituseful?

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0.3Thisstudyanditsaims

The overarching aim of this thesis is to examine exactly how andwhy the Nordicmodel

became an effective tool in UK public policy debates. To achieve this I will pose three

subsidiaryquestions,whichthethesiswillanswer:

1.HowistheNordicmodelarticulatedinBritishgovernancenetworkstoday?Howhas

itdevelopedandchangedovertime?

2.Whichactorshavearticulatedthesediscoursesandwhyhavetheydoneso?

3.Whateffects,ifany,hasthisprocesshadonUKpublicpolicy?

In order to answer the questions generated in the course ofmy research, this thesis has

adoptedacasestudyapproach.Ihaveselectedthreekeyareas:politicaleconomy,healthcare,

andeducation;toconductdiscourseanalysesofthedevelopmentofparticularideasabout

the Nordicmodel. These discourse analyses will use a range of sources produced in the

processofpublicpolicycreation,implementationandmaintenance.Thisincludes,butisnot

limited to: think-tank policy documents, government white papers, newspaper articles,

ministerialspeechesandlegislation.

Althougheachcasestudycontributestoansweringeachofthethreequestionsgivenabove,

eachalsofocusesmostheavilyononequestion.Thatistosay,chapterfour(politicaleconomy)

focusesmostintensivelyonquestiononebysettingoutabroadargumentabouttheavailable

articulationsof theNordicmodel inBritish governancenetworks. Indoing so, it indicates

developmentandchange in linewithamixtureofBritishandNordicpolitical imperatives.

Chapterfive(healthcare)ismoreactor-centred–therebycontributingtoansweringquestion

two–andexplainstheengagementbetweenactorsaswellassuggestingtheirreasonsfor

18

interactingwithoneanother.Itnecessarilyalsomakessignificantcontributionstothegeneral

argumentaboutcurrentarticulationsoftheNordicmodelinthefieldofhealthcare.Chapter

six(education)isconcernednotjustwiththediscourseswhichemerged,butalsowiththeir

concreteimpactsonpublicpolicyintheUK,makingagreatercontributionthantheothertwo

toansweringquestionthree.

Asnoted intheprecedingdiscussion,theNordicmodelconceptwasoperativeperhapsas

earlyas the1970sandSweden/Scandinaviawasusedasapoliticalmodelearlierstill. It is

thereforeessentialtoplacetheNordicmodelconceptinahistoricalperspectiveinorderto

meaningfullyexplainhowitchangedovertime.ChapteronewillthereforelocatetheNordic

modelaspartofalongtraditionofdiscussionoftheNordicsocialcompactsbyactorsinthe

Anglophoneworld.Thischapterwill lookattheNordicmodelfromaroundthe1960suntil

theendoftheColdWarin1990.Itisimportanttonotethatthisthesiswilluseaconstructivist

approachthroughout.ItisthereforeaxiomaticthattheNordicmodelconceptisempty,and

subjecttoarticulationbyactors.Chapteroneshouldbeconsideredgenealogicalinemphasis.

ItisthereforenotconcernedwiththeempiricalqualitiesoftheNordicmodel,butratherhow

itwasperceivedbyactorsovertime.

Thethreecasestudiesareprimarilyconcernedwithdevelopmentsoccurringfromthe1990s

onwards.Chaptertwowillthereforesituatepolicydebateswhichhavetakenplaceinsideand

outside theNordic countrieswithin this context. Itwill open by focusing on the Swedish

financialcrisisof1991/2anddevelopmentsinSwedishandNordicpoliticsinthetwodecades

followingit.Itwillalsoconsiderarangeofacademicscholarshiponeconomicandpolitical

changesinSwedenandsuggesthowtheapproachtakeninthisthesisdiffersfromtraditional

19

approachestounderstandingpoliticalchange.Itwillbeparticularlyfocusedonscholarship

usingargumentsbasedon‘globalisation’andnationalelectoralpolitics.Finally,thechapter

willsetouttwopoliticalparadigmsfromtheUK,sincetheseprovideessentialcontexttothe

casestudiesinchaptersthree,four,andfive.Thefirst,the‘ThirdWay’,wasassociatedwith

‘NewLabour’,whilethesecond,the‘BigSociety’,wasassociatedwiththeConservativeParty.

ItwillexplainthebasicideasofthesediscoursesandexplainhowtheystructuredUKactors’

engagementswiththeNordicmodelasapotentialsourceofpublicpolicy.

ChapterthreewillsetoutthetheoreticalframeworkwhichIwillusethroughoutthisthesis.

Itsfunctionistwofold.Firstly,itwillsetoutaparadigmexplaininghowactorsrelatetoone

anotherwithinthefieldofpublicpolicycreationandpoliticsmoregenerally.Giventheextent

towhichthisthesisispreoccupiedwiththespecificstrategiesofpoliticalactors,Iconsiderit

essential to situate these actors in relation to one another. It is my contention that

disagreementabout the field inwhichactorsoperate isoften latent rather thanexplicit. I

thereforehopetoputforwardaparadigmmakingmyunderstandingofrelationshipsbetween

actorsclearfromtheoutset.Akeyaimofthisthesisistogobeyondtheidentificationand

taxonomyofdiscourses/narratives/imagesoftheNordicmodel.Rather,theaimistoexplain

howdiscoursesbecomehegemonicandthematerialconsequencesofthishegemony.This

aimnecessitatesaconstructivistapproach,asInotedabove.Thesecondpurposeofchapter

threeistosetoutthespecifictenetsofthisapproach,includingexplainingconceptssuchas

discourse,hegemony,articulation,significationandsoforth,whichwillbeusedthroughout

the three case studies. Chapter three also outlines the key sources which will be used

throughoutthethesisandexplainshowtheywillbeused.

20

ThefirstcasestudylooksatthedevelopmentofdiscoursesofNordicpoliticaleconomysince

the late1990s. Chapter four’s primary aim is to examinewhyparticular discourses about

‘flexicurity’andNordicpoliticaleconomymorewidelybecamecurrentinUKpolicycirclesand

howthesediscourseswereorganised.Akeyquestiongeneratedbytheanalysisasks:whywas

itpossiblefortwoconceptionsofflexicuritytoemergewhichwerebasicallyinconsistentwith

oneanother?And,further,whywereNordic,especiallyDanishandSwedish,systemssuch

popularmodelsforUKpolicydiscourses?Tothisend,Iwillexaminetwogovernancenetworks

affiliatedtosocialdemocraticandfree-market liberal ideologicalpositions.Thecasestudy

will analyse how actors related to one another; how they organised their discourses

conceptually,andwhatthismeantfordebatesabouttheNordiccountriesinUKpolicycircles.

ChapterfivelooksatthedevelopmentofhealthpolicybeginningjustaftertheLabourvictory

in the1997GeneralElection.This secondcasestudy looksatNewLabour’sadoptionofa

Nordicmodelinhealthcare.ItplacesthethenLabourgovernmentwithinanetworkofactors

aspartofahealthgovernancenetworkwhichwasengagedinhealthpolicysteering.Itasks

howLabour’spolicydevelopedandchangedandwhyLabouroptedtouseaseriesofNordic

examplesinitsdevelopmentandimplementationofhealthcare.Itsaimistolookattheextent

towhichthesechangeswereaffectedbydistinctivelyBritishideologicalpreoccupationsand

difficultiesencounteredinthesteeringprocessasreformswereintroduced.Italsoaskshow

the ideological currents in the health governance network influenced the way Labour

structured its discourse, and analyses other available discourses about the Nordicmodel

whichexistedinthenetworkbetween1997and2015.

21

Thefinalcasestudylooksatthelong-termdevelopmentofa‘FreeSchools’policywhichthe

ConservativePartyadoptedaspartof itsmanifesto for the2010UKGeneralElection,but

whichhadbeenacentral idea in theeducationgovernancenetwork forat leastadecade

beforethat.Chaptersixwillanalysethedevelopmentofadiscoursewhichusedarangeof

models,butfocusedinitiallyonDenmarkand,later,onSweden.Iwillattempttoexplainthe

strategicimperativesandactorinterestswhichledtothismovefromDenmarktoSweden,

whilealsoexploringwhythischangeofmodeldidnotfatallyunderminethepotentialforthe

creationofaSwedish/Nordicschoolreform.Akeyobjectiveofchaptersixwillbetoexamine

the extent to which modelling is sustained by non-empirical propositions about the

functioningofsocialstructures,whicharesupplementedbytheintroductionofan‘empirical’

model,suchasDenmarkorSweden.

Thethesiswillconcludewithasummaryofkeyfindingsandpointtosomeoftheimplications

andfuturequestionsgeneratedbythesubstantivechapters. Inparticular, thissectionwill

drawtogetherthetendencyofallofthearticulationscurrentingovernancenetworkstoview

theNordiccountriesasameanstoneutraliseantagonisms(e.g.freedomandequality)which

disrupt the smooth functioning of the economy and public welfare systems. It will also

commentontheextenttowhichtheNordicmodelhasbecomeassociatedwithNewPublic

Management (NPM) reformsamongboth free-market liberalsand socialdemocrats. Iwill

summarisesomeimplicationsofthisstudyforfutureattemptstounderstandtheproduction,

implementationandmaintenanceofpublicpolicyusingagovernanceframework.Finally, I

will allude to the implications of this analysis of the Nordic models for modelling more

generallyandsuggestwaysofunderstandingmodellingasanon-empirical,ideologicalactivity.

22

ChapterOne–TheNordicModel:What is itandwhydoes it

matter?

1.1Introduction

WhatistheNordicmodelandwhydoesitmatter?Forthepurposesofthisthesis,theNordic

modelwillbeconsideredasitrelatestoBritishpublicpolicydebates.However,theconcept

itselfismucholder.ThischapterwillthereforesetoutagenealogyoftheNordicmodel,asit

wasunderstoodintheNordiccountriesandtheUK,toorientatethethesisinrelationtoa

widerbodyof literatureabout theNordic countries. Todo this, Iwill consider a rangeof

academic, political and popular sources. This chapterwill take the concept of theNordic

modelfromaroundthe1950suntiltheendoftheColdWarin1990/1.Chaptertwowillthen

continuethediscussionbeginningwiththe1991/2Swedishfinancialcrisisuntilmoreorless

thepresentday.

This studymusthoweverbeginbyquestioning itsownparameters, since Ihavebegunby

assertingthatthereissuchathingasthe‘Nordicmodel’.Thisisafarfromstraightforward

claim. Despite being widely used and understood internationally, the Nordic model is,

perhaps unsurprisingly, understood as much with reference to national differences as

similaritiesinNordenitself.JustasBritonsorGermanstendtobemoreawareoftheirown

internal divisions thanmembers of other polities, so too are themembers of theNordic

countries, and, ultimately, while there are a great many similarities and cultural

commonalitiesbetweentheNordiccountries,thereissimplynomistakinganIcelanderfora

Finn,forexample.ItmightjustaseasilybearguedthatthereisnomistakingaSwisscitizen

speakerofFrenchwithanotherSwisscitizenspeakerofGerman;however,thesharedidentity

23

ofthesetwospeakers,importantlyforthisdiscussionoftheNordicModel,derives,atleast

partially, from their common identificationwith rights and responsibilitieswithin a single

politicalsystem–i.e.theSwissConfederation.Theseconditionsobviouslydonotexistwithin

theNordiccountries,sinceNordenisnotastate,norhasiteverbeen.Evenduringtheeraof

the KalmarUnion (1397-1523) the kingdoms of Norway, Sweden andDenmark remained

distinct, although theywere united by a singlemonarch. Nor did the union cover all the

territorycurrentlyunderthesovereigntyofthefiveNordicstatesandtheirdependencies.In

otherwords,whiletheNordicmodelisdiscussedwithintheNordiccountries,assumptions

about unity, which are easily made in international discussions, throw up just as many

questionsaboutdifferencesastheyexposesimilarities.

Nevertheless, the linguistic closeness, at least between Norwegian, Swedish and Danish;

interlinked cultural heritage, and common assumptions about social mores and norms

virtuallynecessitatesomeacknowledgementofcommonality.Asaresult,thetermNorden

(lit.‘theNorth’)isusedintheNordiclanguagestodesignatethefiveNordiccountries:Iceland,

Norway,Sweden,DenmarkandFinland.Thisrecognisestheculturalandsocialcommonalities,

without the more problematic assertions of political homogeneity which the model

appellation implies. It isalso important tonotethat forspeakersofNordic languages, the

terms Norden and Scandinavian are importantly distinct. Scandinavian is a linguistic

designationwhich refers only toNorwegian, Swedish andDanish, excluding Icelandic and

Finnish.Withinthisthesis,thedesignationScandinavianwillrarelybeused(byme,itwillbe

quotedwhereitisusedbyothers),andwillonlybeused(again,byme)initslinguisticsense.

24

OutsidetheNordiccountries,however,thetermNordicmodelisnotonlyestablished,but

alsooffersanimportantwayofunderstandingtheNordiccountries,somethingwhichNordic

actorshavenotdiscouraged.DiscussionoftherelationshipbetweenNordicandnon-Nordic

articulationsofthemodelwill forman importantthreadtothediscussionofthescholarly

literatureontheNordiccountrieswhichfollowsbelow.Tosomedegree,theNordicmodelis

intheeyeofthebeholderand,whilethereareobviouslylimitstotheelasticityoftheNordic

modelconcept,itisvirtuallyimpossibletoprovideafastdefinitionoftheterm,evenjustin

itsusageamongUKpublicpolicyactors.Thatsaid,itisfairtosaythatuseoftheterm‘the

Nordicmodel’isslightlymorecommoninmediadiscoursethanpolicydiscourse.

In theprocessofcreating the threeoverlappingcorpora for theempiricalportionsof this

study,however,anumberofcommonalitieshavepresentedthemselves.Policydocuments

willoftenavoidusingtheterm‘theNordicmodel’,forthereasonsstatedabove,however,

despitethisSwedenandDenmarkareoftentreatedsimultaneouslyinthepolicyliterature,

andparticularaspectsofDanishpoliciesarefairlyfrequentlyusedtosupplementperceived

deficienciesin‘offtheshelf’Swedishpolicies.Relatedly,wherereportsavoidtheterm‘the

Nordicmodel’theyoccasionallysubstituteforthisthenon-separableformulation‘Sweden

and Denmark’. This supports the common suggestion that the Nordic model sometimes

standsmetonymicallyforSwedenandDenmark.

ItisalsonotunusualtofindthenationalisationoftheNordicModeltotheSwedishorDanish

model (less commonly, and only with regard to education and certain specific industrial

sectors,theFinnishmodel).Asnotedabove,thisoftenresults inacertainsleightofhand,

allowing the reinstatement of the broader Nordic policy smörgåsbord, but without the

25

problematic term ‘model’,by the simplemeansof cherrypickingacrossborders.Another

featureofthislocalizationofabroadertermistheuseofthe‘Stockholmmodel’toreferto

healthpoliciesenactedbyStockholm’slocalgovernment.Regardlessofthenationalpolitical

climate,Stockholmtypicallyelectsahighproportionoffree-marketrepresentativesfromthe

liberal Moderate Party (Moderata samlingspartiet). As a result, the Stockholm model

generallyreferstomeasuresintroducedbyfree-marketliberalsinhealthcare,althoughithas

alsobeenappliedtoeducationreforms.

Finally, oneof the keypolicy debates aroundpublic health sets up a distinctionbetween

Beveridgian,afterWilliamBeveridge,oneofthearchitectsofthemodernBritishwelfarestate,

thoughthiscategoryalsoincludesallfiveNordiccountries;andBismarckian,afterBismarck,

thearchitectof theGermanwelfarestate, thoughmisleadinglythiscategoryalso includes

France,theNetherlandsandSwitzerland.Thoughheisnotalwaysacknowledgedassuch,the

fatherofthisdiscourseistheDanishsociologistGøstaEsping-Andersen,whoseinfluentialtext

The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism set out a tripartite ideal-type system for

understandingwelfaresystems.11Thechiefdistinctiondrawnhereisbetweenastate-funded

andorganisedsystem,andasocialhealth insurancesystemwhich isprivately fundedand

organised,thoughimplicitlyorexplicitlyunderwrittenbythestate.ThetermNordicmodelis

thereforelesswidelyusedindiscussionsofhealthpolicy.Ontheotherhand,theperception

ofthehomogeneityofthevariousNordicsystemsis,ifanything,intensifiedbythisumbrella

designation,especiallysincetheBritishNationalHealthService is typicallybracketedfrom

thesediscussionsastheobjectinneedofreform.

11GøstaEsping-Andersen,TheThreeWorldsofWelfareCapitalism(Cambridge:PolityPress,1990),26–9.

26

Whilethislevelofvariationmakesthecreationofataxonomytricky,andthoughthisthesis

happilyuses‘theNordicmodel’asagloss,itispartlythedifficultyofdefiningthistermwith

which it is concerned. Indeed, establishing the causes of precisely this difficulty is clearly

relevanttothemainaimsofthethesis.ItwillbearguedherethattheNordicmodelshould

bethoughtofaspossessingcharacteristicswhicharenotsusceptibletodeconstructivelogics

orthequalificationsgiveninacademicandpolicyreports.Inaway,thisidentifiesoneofthe

keyflawsofdeconstructionasgenerallypractised.Thatistosay,forallthequalificationsto

the effect that the Nordic model is clearly a construct and that the systems of its five

constituentsarenotidentical,manypolicyactorsnonethelessbehavepreciselyasifitwerea

concretething.TheNordicmodelwillthereforebeconsideredwithinthisthesisasaconcept

whichpossessesitsownstructuringlogic–thechiefaimwillbenottoattesttoitsrealityor

unreality,buttoidentifyhowthesestructuringlogicsfunction.

27

1.2. What is the Nordic Model: Middle Way, Rehn’s liberalism or

Meidner’ssocialism?

1.2.1Thepre-warcontext:‘theMiddleWay’

Ashasbeennoted,thisthesisisprimarilyconcernedwiththeNordicmodelasitisunderstood

inBritain.ItismuchmoreambivalentaboutdevelopmentsintheNordiccountriesthemselves.

To the extent that the empirical portions of this thesis are concerned with concrete

developmentsintheNordiccountries,mostofthereformagendasthatwillbediscussedhere

took place in the 1990s and 2000s. However, the Nordic countries have preoccupied

Anglophonescholarsandpoliticiansformuchlongerthanthat.

There was an important continuum between the kinds of constructions which were

popularised in the 1930s before the 1939-45War and some of those that again became

meaningful after 1945 up until the present day. This section will therefore offer a brief

summaryoftheNordicmodelbefore1939andthendiscussthepost-warRehn-Meidnerplan

and the development of a self-consciously social democratic Swedishmodel,which often

stoodmetonymicallyforthewiderNordicregionasapoliticalentity.

OneofthefirstdetailedattemptstoarticulateameaningforNorden,andcertainlythemost

enduringlysuccessfulfromtheinter-warperiod,bothinsideandoutsidetheNordiccountries,

wasundertakeninMarquisChilds’book,TheMiddleWay.Theconceptof‘theMiddleWay’,

indicating an alternative to laissez-faire capitalism and Soviet-style Communism,was first

usedinthe1930s.ThepublicationofChilds’workonSwedenwasvirtuallycontemporaneous

withanaccountofDanishsocialorganizationbyFredericHowe,whichfailedtocapturepublic

28

imagination.KazimierzMusiałsuggeststwopossiblereasonsforthesuccessofChilds’work.

Firstly,theabsenceoffootnotes inthetextanditsaccessiblewrittenstyle,and,secondly,

whencomparedwithHowe’sworkonDenmark,itsreluctancetochallengearticlesoffaith

forUSreaders.12Animportantfeatureofthe‘MiddleWay’designationwasalsoitssuccess

among Swedes. Childs’ book was written at a timewhen Swedish scholars were already

beginningtopropagateanimageofSwedenasasociallaboratory,adiscoursethatbecame

increasinglyinfluential,especiallyamongsocialscientists.13

Musiał’sexplanationofthesuccessofthe‘MiddleWay’canbeexpandedfurther.Inparticular,

Childs’neutralisationoftheconflictbetweentheconcepts‘freedom’and‘equality’,allowed

forthearticulationofSwedenaspartofapoliticalprojectwhichresolvedapotentialconflict

between notions of individualism current inUS thinking and the corporate nature of the

‘Scandinavianmodel-to-be’.14Forthisreason, these imagesof theSwedishmodel, intheir

Childsian articulation, ‘were able to enter the American discourse as very strong and

convincingarguments’.15

Thisemphasisonthe‘MiddleWay’wasfurthersupportedbythepublicitysurroundingthe

cooperative movement in Sweden and Finland, and Danish dairy production during the

1930s.16TheideathatNordiceconomicmodellinghadachievedanunusuallevelofcoherence

12Roots of the ScandinavianModel: Images of Progress in the Era ofModernisation (Baden-Baden: NomosVergesellschaft,2000),160–2.13Musial,Rootsof the ScandinavianModel; CarlMarklund, ‘TheSocial Laboratory, theMiddleWayand theSwedishModel:ThreeFramesfortheImageofSweden’,ScandinavianJournalofHistory34,no.3(2009):264–85.14Musial,RootsoftheScandinavianModel,201.15Ibid.,197.16 Mary Hilson, ‘Consumer Co-operation and Economic Crisis: The 1936 Roosevelt Inquiry on Co-OperativeEnterpriseandtheEmergenceoftheNordic“MiddleWay”’,ContemporaryEuropeanHistory22,no.2(2013):181–98.

29

comparedtoAnglo-Americancapitalismbyamelioratingthemostdestructiveimpulsesofthe

market economy and discouraging monopoly practices by big businesses, which were

commonintheUnitedStatesatthistime,wasalreadybecomingentrenched.17Thiswasallied

withaconstructionoftheNordiccountries,especiallySweden,ascarefulcurrencymanagers,

using price controls to avoid mass rounds of inflation, which had been a widespread

consequenceoftheGreatDepressionintherestoftheWesternworld.18

1.2.2TheRehn-Meidnermodelandthewage-earnerfunds

Bythe1970sand1980s,however,constructionsofScandinaviaappealedlessbroadlythan

theyhaddoneinthe‘30sand‘40s.Whereastheearlyarticulationsofthe‘MiddleWay’had

appealedacrosspoliticalgroups,laterinterestwasmoreoftenthepreserveoftradeunionists,

gradualistsocialists,socialdemocratsandformerCommunists/socialistsdisenchantedwith

the SovietUnion. Concomitantwith thiswas a construction,whichwas dominant among

liberalsandconservatives,whichessentiallyagreedwiththecontoursoftheNordicModelas

set out by socialists, butwhich simply inverted the value judgement. In otherwords, the

meaning of Norden was not in dispute between Left and Right: both were clear that

Scandinavia epitomised a high tax, statist model. The dominant interpretation of this

constructionwas,however,bitterlycontested.Amongsocialistsandsocialdemocrats,itwas

seenasanepitomeofmodernitywhichfreedpeoplefromwant,whereasontheRightitwas

seen as a dystopia which took away basic freedoms and created a region of depressed,

suicidal,alcoholics.

17Musial,RootsoftheScandinavianModel,198–201.18Musial,RootsoftheScandinavianModel.

30

As alluded to above, among socialist intellectualswho studied Scandinavia, therewere a

plurality of reasons for examining the components of themodelwhich varied fromusing

Sweden as a laboratory to test theoretical hypotheses to attempts to derive exportable

policiesinresponsetoparticularproblems.19Forreformistsocialists(i.e.thoseopposedto

violentrevolution),theviabilityofachievingsocialismbydemocraticmeans(usuallyreferred

toasgradualism)hadbecomeparticularlyimportantbythe1970s.ManyformerLeninistsand

TrotskyistshadbecomedisenchantedwithrevolutionaryMarxismasaresultoftheappalling

legacyofStalinism,andtheSovietresponsetotheHungarianUprisingin1956andthePrague

Springin1968.20Thismeantthattheviabilityofparliamentarysocialismwasofimmediate

concernforthoseneverornolongerconvincedbytheideaorlikelihoodofrevolution.Asone

ofveryfewplacestoconsistentlyelectapartycommittedtotheadvancementoftheworking

class,Swedenbecameacasestudyofconsiderablesignificanceforthegradualisttendency.

The gradualist image of Sweden tended to emphasise a number of characteristics of the

Swedishmodel,whichfittedinwiththeirdeterministicmodelofatransitionfromcapitalism

to socialism. These focused particularly on the consensual and corporatist aspects of the

Swedishsystem.Therestofthissectionwillfirstdescribetheprinciplesanddevelopmentof

theRehn-Meidnermodelandthendiscussitsrelevancetogradualism.

KlasEklund,whoheldpositionsintheSwedishMinistryofFinanceandPrimeMinister’sOffice

from1982-1990,hasnoted that theSwedishmodelhasat timesbeenconflatedwith the

19FrederickHale,‘BritishObserversoftheSwedishWelfareState,1932-1970’,ScandinavianStudies81,no.4(2009):501–28.20AndrewScott,‘LookingtoSwedeninOrdertoReconstructAustralia’,ScandinavianJournalofHistory34,no.3(2009):330–52.

31

Rehn-Meidner model, an economic system developed by the Swedish Trade Union

Confederation (Landsorganisationen i Sverige,henceforthLO)economistsGöstaRehnand

RudolfMeidner in 1951.21TheRehn-Meidnerplan is itself a rather interestingmodel and

representsaheterodoxapproachtotheproblemsofunemploymentandinflationcompared

toclassicalorKeynesianeconomics.ThefirstmajortenetoftheRehn-Meidnermodelwas

thatfiscalpolicymustbetighttopreventinflation,sinceexcessivedemandintheeconomy

wouldleadtoover-heating.22Indeed,RehnandMeidnerbecameinfluentialinthecontextof

aSwedisheconomywhichhadextremelyhighlevelsofdemandwhichtheyarguedwouldbe

exacerbated by pro-cyclical vulgar Keynesian policies, a characteristic of most post-War

Western economies’ embrace of Keynes. 23 Rehn-Meidner therefore contradicted the

hegemonicKeynesianviewoftheGoldenAgewhicharguedthattherewasanecessarytrade-

offbetweeninflationandunemployment;economicpolicycouldcontrolunemploymentor

inflation,buttheotherwouldalwaysriseininverseproportion.

ThesecondandthirdtenetsofRehn-Meidnerweretheemploymentoflabourmarketpolicies

tofightunemployment.Thismeantthatregionsorareaswhichwereparticularlyaffectedby

unemployment or other social problemswould be targeted by government intervention.

Selective intervention in struggling areas is related to the third tenetwhich arguedmore

generallyfor‘activelabourmarketpolicies’whichwould‘bothpushandpulllabourtomove

21KlasEklund,‘GöstaRehnandtheSwedishModel:DidWeFollowtheRehn-MeidnerModelTooLittleratherthanTooMuch?’, inGöstaRehn, theSwedishModelandLabourMarketPolicies: InternationalandNationalPerspectives,ed.HenryMilnerandEskilWadensjö(Aldershot:Ashgate,2001),53–72.22Ibid.,54Over-heating is thephenomenonwhereby supplyexceedsdemandcausingover-production.Thistriggersinflationasaresultoftoofewproductiveoutletsforcapitalcausingbottlenecksastoomuchcapitalissunkintounproductiveinvestments.23TimTilton,ThePoliticalTheoryofSwedishSocialDemocracy:ThroughtheWelfareStatetoSocialism(Oxford:ClarendonPress,1990),195.

32

tonewjobopportunities’.24Theabilitytomovelabourtowhereitwasmostneededwasan

importantstrengthofSwedishsocialdemocracyintheimmediatepost-warperioduntilthe

1980s.FrancisSejerstednotesthecontrastwithNorway,wheretheoppositepolicymeant

that the workforce was significantly less mobile. 25 However, this policy was not always

popular, especially as mobility generally entailed moving people southwards towards

StockholmandGothenburg.26

Finally, the Rehn-Meidner model argued for a solidaristic wage bargaining policy at the

nationallevel,generallyglossedas‘equalpayforequalwork’.27Thisstatementislessradical

than it appears and, although it certainly had socialist implications, Rehn and Meidner

imagined it as ameans of preventing wage drift, where wages in areas of high demand

outstrip those inareasof lowdemand through, forexample,paidovertime,causingprice

instabilityandinflation.28Moreover,thiswasseenasasourceoftransformationpressure,in

thatitpreventeduncompetitivefirmsfromdepressingwagestocompetewithmoreefficient

firms. 29 Such uncompetitive firms would instead be forced out of business and the

unemployedwouldbefoundnewjobsthroughtheactivelabourmarketpolicy.

24Eklund,‘GöstaRehnandtheSwedishModel’,54–5.25FrancisSejersted,TheAgeofSocialDemocracy,ed.MadeleineB.Adams, trans.RichardDaly (Woodstock:PrincetonUniversityPress,2011),223.26Ibid.,223–4.27Eklund,‘GöstaRehnandtheSwedishModel’,55.28 Ingemar Lindberg and J. Magnus Ryner, ‘Financial Crises and Organized Labour: Sweden 1990-94’,InternationalJournalofLabourResearch2,no.1(2010):33.29 Sejersted, The Age of Social Democracy, 223–4; Incidentally, one of the major Nordic criticisms of thecontemporary European Union is the tendency for major wage disparities between countries to distort orremove transformation pressures, allowing firms importing cheap labour to undercutmore productive andcompetitive firms. See, RolandBerger et al., eds., ‘Interviewwith PoulNyrupRasmussen’, inThe InequalityPuzzle:EuropeanandUSLeadersDiscussRisingIncomeInequality(London:Springer,2010),93–102.

33

Thesolidaritywagepolicyanditsachievementthroughtripartitebargainingisbyfarthemost

famousaspectoftheRehn-Meidnermodel,butitissignificantthatthelogicbehindthispolicy

wasmotivatednotsimplybyadesireforgreaterequality,butalsobytheexigenciesofstable

macroeconomicpolicy.Moreover,akeyplankoftheRehn-Meidnerplanwasaconsciously

regressive taxationpolicy, sinceRehn inparticular feared thatprogressive taxationwould

distort profits and therefore industrial reproduction. In other words, despite the core of

socialistthinkingwhichunderpinsmanyoftheideasputforwardbyRehnandMeidner,the

Rehn-Meidner model is a significantly more complex beast than is sometimes accepted.

Indeed,KlasEklundhasattemptedtoreclaimGöstaRehnasaliberal,ratherthansocialist,

economist,arguingthathisemphasisonsupply-sidemeasures, including inflationcontrols

andactive labourmarketpolicies, representsasophisticatedalternativeto free-marketor

neo-Keynesianpolicyagendas.30

TheRehn-Meidnerplanshouldcertainlybeconsideredanimportantpartofawidereraof

consensuspoliticsinSweden.Thisbroad-basedcohesioncameaboutatleastpartiallyasa

resultofthewillingnessoftheSwedishSocialDemocraticParty(Sverigessocialdemokratiska

arbetareparti,henceforthSAP) andtheLOtoworkintheinterestsofsocietyatlarge;rather

thanpursuinganaggressivelysocialistagenda,theywereinterestedina‘strongsociety’.31

Moreover,boththeTradeUnionsandbusinessgroupswereeagertopreventstatelegislation

intheareaofwagenegotiations.Indeed,theLO’shostilitytostatecorporatism,suchasthat

found in Germany, may even have matched that of business groups. This led to more

30Eklund,‘GöstaRehnandtheSwedishModel’.31Eric SEinhornand JohnLogue,ModernWelfareStates: ScandinavianPoliticsandPolicy in theGlobalAge(London:Praeger,2003),335.

34

consensualformsofbargainingthanwouldhaveotherwisebeenthecase.32And,arguably,

the actions of the first Palme government (1969-1976) in introducing legislation into the

labour market disrupted this process and led to the adoption of far more aggressive

negotiatingtactics,especiallyontheemployerside.33

The changing roleof the Swedish state iswell capturedby thewage-earner fundspolicy,

whichwasadvancedinthe1970sandearly1980s.Theintroductionofthefundsalteredthe

balanceoftraditionalbargaining,confoundingconsensualstereotypesandrevealingSweden

tobefarmoreadversarialthanmostgradualistshadimagined.34Thewage-earnerfundpolicy

wasfirstputforwardin1975byRudolfMeidner.Thefundswouldhavesetuplargereserves

ofcapitalwhichweretobeusedtoslowlybuyouttheownersofprivateSwedishfirms.The

ideawasthattheprofitswhichweretakenwouldbeimmediatelyconvertedintosharesin

the company from which the profits had been extracted and placed in the collective

ownership of employee representatives, thereby giving employees representation in

boardroomsandameasureofcontrolovertheprocessofnewcapitalformation.35Thiswas

notanationalisation,sincethestatewouldnotowntheshares,butwouldnonethelesshave

eventuallyamountedtowholesalecollectivisationofthemeansofproductioninSweden.

As Sejersted puts it, ‘[T]he reaction [to the wage-earner funds] would be at least as

spectacular as the original move’, 36 in the sense that the proposals aroused enormous

32Tilton,ThePoliticalTheoryofSwedishSocialDemocracy,190.33Sejersted,TheAgeofSocialDemocracy,387.34PeterAimer,‘TheStrategyofGradualismandtheSwedishWage-EarnerFunds’,WestEuropeanPolitics8,no.3(1985):43–55.35Tilton,ThePoliticalTheoryofSwedishSocialDemocracy,229.36Sejersted,TheAgeofSocialDemocracy,372.

35

oppositionfrombusinessleaders,splittheSocialDemocraticParty,andwerenotespecially

popularwiththegeneralpublic.J.MagnusRynerexplainsthelackofsupportwithintheSocial

Democratic Party with reference to a widespread acceptance, especially among younger

members of the party, of the epistemological basis of ‘neoliberalism’. He cites the claim,

widelyaccepted in theSAPat this time, that there is ‘anobjectivecompulsion to remove

obstaclestoa“free”and“clearing”labourmarket’asanexampleofthegradualacceptance

of ‘the neo-liberalization’ of social democracy. It is especially noteworthy given that this

commitmenttoafree,clearinglabourmarketconflictsfundamentallywiththebasicaimsof

theRehn-MeidnermodelandtheMeidnerplanforwage-earnerfunds.37

InBritain,thetoneformuchofthediscussionaboutthemeritsofSwedishpolicieswassetas

early as 1956 by Anthony Crosland’s The Future of Socialism. 38 During a very long

Parliamentarycareer (1950-1955,1959-1977),Croslandwas,amongotherthings,Minister

forEducation,ForeignSecretaryandPresidentoftheBoardofTradeundervariousLabour

governments. He was also an important intellectual during the so-called ‘Golden Age of

Capitalism’ inWesternEuropeandNorthAmericafromaround1950-1973.39ForCrosland,

thereformsofsuccessivegovernmentsacrosstheWesthadalreadymetmanyofthebasic

subsistenceneedswhichhadcausedsocialtensionbefore1939.Forexample,heapprovingly

quotedClementAttlee’sstatementthatthepost-warLabourgovernmenthadintroduced‘a

setofmeasureswhich“wouldmodifythenatureofcapitalismtoaseriousextent”,and“must

leadtoSocialism”intheend’.40

37J.MagnusRyner,‘Neo-LiberalizationofSocialDemocracy:TheSwedishCase’,ComparativeEuropeanPolitics,no.2(2004):102.38TheFutureofSocialism.39EricHobsbawm,TheAgeofExtremes(London:Abacus,1995),263–280.40Crosland,TheFutureofSocialism,26.

36

AccordingtoCrosland,thebasicaspirationsofhistoricalsocialismwerefourfold.Firstly,the

amelioration of ‘material poverty and physical squalor’.41Secondly, promotion of general

‘socialwelfare’forthoseoppressedorinneed.Thirdly,beliefinequalityandthe‘classless

society’,aswellas‘just’rightsforworkers.Andfourthly,rejectionof‘competitiveantagonism’

anditsreplacementwiththeidealsofsolidarityandcollaboration’.42Thefirstandlastofthese

aims, contended Crosland, had been basically achieved in Britain by the mid-1950s.43 In

Sweden,heargued,thishadhappenedevenearlier.HequotedPerAlbinHansson,theleader

oftheSAP(1925-1946),tothiseffect,sayingin1946:‘[W]ehavehadsomanyvictoriesthat

we are in a difficult position. A people with political liberty, full employment, and social

securityhaslostitsdream’.44

In this view, Sweden hadmademany of the social advances which gradualists hoped to

introduceafulldecadeearlierthantheyhadbeenrealisedinBritain.Moreover,Sweden’s

appealwasnotlimitedtoitsapparentmodernity.Thefactthat‘aSocialistGovernmentnow

seemsthenaturalorderof things’wasamajorattraction foraLabourpoliticianwhohad

spent time in government and opposition during a lengthy career. 45 Crosland was also

convincedthatSwedenwasalessclassrivensocietythanBritainandhearguedthatSweden

demonstrated the potential for consensual, rather than antagonistic, industrial relations.

Finally,andrelatedly,Swedenwasalsoheldtoprovethathighermeasuresofequalitycould

beachievedwithoutdirectcontrolofthemeansofproductionbylabour,alongstandingaim

41Ibid.,67.42Ibid.43Ibid.,69.44Ibid.,64,n.2.45Ibid.,114.

37

of revolutionary socialists and Marxists. Crosland therefore hoped to remove mass

expropriation of critical industries and wealth from the socialist agenda by arguing that

various consensual measures were equally effective at meeting the same goals, broadly

conceived.

In proving this point Crosland was evidently impressed by Sweden’s move towards

comprehensive education; its ‘joint enterprise councils’ and the role of Swedish (and US

American)tradeunionsmoregenerally;highlevelsofinvestment,combinedwithlowlevels

of private accumulation; and its limits on sharedividends,which controlled theextent to

whichprofits could be removed rather than re-invested.46Sweden therefore appeared to

Croslandasapossiblemodelforcreatinggreaterequalitythrougharangeofsocialmeasures

andcarefulmanagementofindustry,whichwouldalsomitigatethetendencytomilitancyin

thelabourforceandreducedemandsformassexpropriationofwealth.

Inthisview,then,ofthefourprinciplesCroslandsetoutdefiningtheaspirationsofsocialism,

SwedenhadachievedthefirstandfourthafulldecadebeforeBritain,andwaswellonitsway

toachievingthesecondandthirdinaharmoniousandconsensualfashion.Itisunclearwhat

Croslandwouldhavemadeofthewage-earnerfunds;hediedin1977,afterthefundshad

beenmooted, but before they were properly functioning. The funds are consistent with

Crosland’sargumentsagainsttheequivalenceofdirectownershipwithcontrolofthemeans

ofproduction,buttheynonethelessaimatcollectivisationofproduction,whichitappeared

thatCroslandbasicallyopposed.

46Ibid.,203–4,256,249,39–40,309.

38

Crosland’sstudyarousedsignificantoppositionamongrevolutionarysocialists.Muchofthis

wasstructuredaroundrejectingthetheoreticalandempirical logicwhichsupportedthese

claims.Inatwo-partreplyinthefirstvolumeofNewLeftReview,PerryAndersonresponded

to Crosland’s arguments about the nature of socialism and Sweden’s social system. 47

AndersonalsohadmanypositivethingstosayaboutthenatureofSwedishsociety,although

from a slightly different perspective. He was particularly impressed by the tendency for

Swedish politicians to take an active role in wider decision-making processes. This was

contrastedwithBritain,where,Andersonargued,theworstconsequencesofcapitalismwere

theresultofdecisionswhich:‘aretakennowhere.Theyarenottaken’[emphasisinoriginal].48

Inthesecondpartofhisargument,AndersonmovedontoconsiderSwedenmorethoroughly,

puttingforwardanunderstandingofSwedishsocialdemocraticsocietywhichsystematically

refuted Crosland’s arguments. In ‘Sweden: Study in Social Democracy’, Anderson built

towardsthisaim,whichwastoarguethattheSwedishmodeldidnotprecludetheaimof

collectiveownershipofthemeansofproduction.Hearrivedatthisconclusionbyarguing,

contraCrosland,thatSwedenwas‘atonceidiosyncraticandtypical’,inthesensethat,while

ithaddifferentorganisationalandindustrialstructurescomparedtootherWesterncountries,

itwas nonetheless characterised by sluggish socialmobility and ‘lived distances between

classes’justasgreatasinotherWesterncountries.49

47‘MrCrosland’sDreamland’;‘Sweden:StudyinSocialDemocracy’,NewLeftReview1,no.9(1961):34–45.48Anderson,‘MrCrosland’sDreamland’,10.49Anderson,‘Sweden:StudyinSocialDemocracy’,34.

39

However,forAnderson,Nordiccohesionwasfundamentallyafeatureoftherelativelysmall

sizeoftheNordiccountries; it isnotablehowsmoothlythisextrapolationfromSwedento

Norden occurs. He wrote that: ‘[P]eople are more likely to be aware of members of an

opposite social group as individuals in their own right; this tempers thewhole climateof

class’.50Hewas alsoobliquely critical of the tendency tomodelmore generally,whenhe

argued that intellectuals are ‘prone toabstract institutions from theperpetually changing

socialandeconomicmilieuwhichalonegivethemanyconcretemeaningatall’.51

TheFutureofSocialismremainsanimpressivereadsixtyyearslater;Crosland’sbasicgraspof

socialandtheoreticalissuesandhisvisionoftheirconnectednessishighlystimulating.Indeed,

giventheaimsofthisthesis,itisworthnotingthathisappealstointernationalmodels,above

allSwedenandtheUnitedStates,moreoftenhinderratherthanhelphisanalysisofthebasic

problematicsofasocialistagenda.MuchasAndersonobserved,Swedenhadalreadybythat

timebecome‘notsomuchanormalobjectofrealknowledgeasadidacticpoliticalfable’.52

Atonestage,Croslandalmostacknowledgedthis.Hechosea lengthyempiricalcasestudy

fromtheUnitedStates–thefamousMiddletownstudies,conductedbyRobertandHelen

Lynd–butnoted:‘IshouldhavepreferredtotakeSweden,whichinotherwayscomesmuch

nearertoasocialist’sidealofthe“good”society’.53However,theveryreasonforchoosing

the USA was the lack of available sociological literature on Swedish society! The sense

emergesthatsocialists’fondnessforSwedenwasbasedonmorethansimply itsempirical

qualities,especially,asinthiscase,wherethesewereactuallynotknown.Thepossibilitythat

50Anderson,‘MrCrosland’sDreamland’,12;Anderson,‘Sweden:StudyinSocialDemocracy’,34.51Anderson,‘Sweden:StudyinSocialDemocracy’,39.52Anderson,‘MrCrosland’sDreamland’,4.53Crosland,TheFutureofSocialism,179.

40

particulararticulationsoftheSwedish/Nordicmodelare,toadegree,immunetoempirical

prooforrefutationisonethatwillrecurthroughoutthisthesis.

Nonetheless,theargumentsCroslandsetouthadalastingimpactonthewaythatSweden

wasseeninBritain.HisanalysisestablishedSweden,alongwiththeUSA,astheepitomeof

modernityandwasinstrumentalinarticulatingSwedenasacorporatist,consensualsociety

with high levels of social equality and low levels of conflict. It also intensified an existing

connection inthemindsof intellectualsand,toa lesserdegree,thewiderpublicbetween

reformistsocialismandSweden.TheessenceofmanyoftheclaimsthatCroslandmadeabout

Swedenwillappearrepeatedlyinthisthesisatdifferenttimesandmadebydifferentpolitical

actors.ThisisnodoubtpartlybecauseCrosland’sanalysiswasverythorough(andalsopartly

becausethebasicdynamicsofcapitalismhavechangedsignificantlylessthanpublicdiscourse

generallyacknowledges).Likewise,Anderson’sargumentssurvivepartlybecausetheywere

clear and well thought out. But in his refutation of the gradualist argument against

collectivisation of the means of production, he also helped established two perennial

argumentsabouttheNordiccountries:theyaresmall;andtheirinstitutionsarespecificand,

hence,inimitable.

During theperiod fromthemid-1970s to themid-1980s,gradualists increasinglybeganto

questiontheextenttowhichSwedencouldbeconsideredconsistentwithsocialisttheories

of reformism. Peter Aimer used the introduction of thewage-earner funds policy to test

specificelementsoftherevisionisttheoriesofEduardBernstein,theintellectualfounderof

socialdemocracy.Simplyput,Bernsteinarguedthatprogresstowardssocialismwouldentail

the gradual transfer of control over the means of production from private to public

41

management.Thiswastobeachievedbypersuadingtheownersofproductivecapitalthat

thistransitionwasinthegeneralinterest.54Thewage-earnerfundspolicychallengedthisidea

intwoways.Firstly,asarguedabove,thewage-earnerfundsdidnotentailnationalisation,

but rather transfer from private ownership to collective, rather than state, ownership.

Secondly,theproponentsofthefundshadfailedtoconvincetheprivateownersofcapital

that the policy would be generally beneficial. Quite the reverse, there had been huge

opposition.ThischallengedmanygradualistassumptionsaboutthenatureofSwedishpolitics

(and social democracy). In practice, the strong opposition which the funds elicited

demonstrated that the Swedish system was less consensual and more divided than had

traditionallybeenassumed,and,furthermore,thepossibilityofsurmountingoppositionto

collectiveownershipwasactuallyrecedingratherthanimprovingovertime.55

1.2.3Nordicdystopia:conservativevisionsofNorden

Conservative constructions of Scandinavia broadly tended to engage less with specific

components of the Nordic policy regimes such as the Rehn-Meidner model. They did,

however,articulatea rangeofdiscoursesaboutNorden,whichwerebrought togetherby

RolandHuntfordinhisbookTheNewTotalitarians.56Thebookhasbecomesomewhatwell

known,andthestereotypesHuntfordproducedhavebecomefirmlyembeddedintheAnglo-

AmericandiscourseonNorden.Whereasconservativesandliberalshadtypicallybeenless

interested in Scandinavia, by the 1970s the neoliberal turn in political economy led to a

renewedinterestintheScandinavianmodel.Unlikesocialdemocrats,whosoughttolearn

fromtheNordicmodel,however,liberalandconservativecommentatorswantedtoputthe

54Aimer,‘TheStrategyofGradualism’,45.55Aimer,‘TheStrategyofGradualism’.56TheNewTotalitarians(London:AllenLane,1971).

42

model"ontrial"for its insistenceonequality,highlevelsoftaxationanduniversalwelfare

provision.AsFrederickHaleargues,TheNewTotalitarianswasultimatelyanextremelyflawed

pieceofwriting,whichinfuriatedmostofthehigh-profileSwedeswhohadbeeninterviewed

byHuntford,severalofwhomhadbeenquotedfromofftherecordconversations.57

Nevertheless, it became an important part of discourse for liberal and conservative

commentators both in Britain and Sweden. For those in theUK it confirmed various pre-

existing images of Sweden, including Swedes’ supposed sexual licentiousness, which had

become ingrained in theprevious twodecades. InHuntford’sdescription, the supposedly

deviant sexual mores of the Swedes, promoted in his view by the Social Democratic

government,wasactuallyasophisticatedformofmindcontrol.This includedtheamusing

claimthatSwedeslived‘inapermanentcloudofdepressiopostcoitus’.58Moreover,Huntford

madesimilarclaimsaboutvariousother facetsofsocialprovision inSweden includingthe

system of education, especially sexual education; the statemonopoly over broadcasting,

describedas‘agitprop’,andtheassertionthattheSwedishChurchwasproselytisingonbehalf

oftheSocialDemocrats.59

All of these facets of the Swedish state were fitted into Huntford’s extremely schematic

framework,whichbasicallyamountedtodescribingasocialformationwhichfittedwithhis

preconceivednotionthatSwedenwasakintothesocietyenvisagedbyAldousHuxleyinthe

novelBraveNewWorld.Atroot,whatHuntforddidwastoinvertthecommonstereotypeof

57Frederick Hale, ‘Brave NewWorld in Sweden? Roland Huntford’s “The New Totalitarians”’, ScandinavianStudies78,no.2(2006):167–90.58Ibid.,179.59Hale,‘BraveNewWorldinSweden?’

43

Norden,whichhadbeenestablishedbysocialdemocrats,notbydisprovingitempirically,but

by simply reinterpreting Utopia as Dystopia.60 Although his book became famous for its

shoddyjournalism,itnonethelessactedasarallyingcallforSwedishopponentsofthesocial

democratic hegemony and opponents of social democratic or statist policies in the

Anglophoneworld.Italsoservedaseriousfunctionbydrawingtogetherthedisparatestrands

ofdoubtwhichliberalandconservativecommentatorshadexpressedabouttheNordicsocial

systemsandweavingthemintoasingle,iftendentious,narrative.Whilecentralarguments

ofTheNewTotalitarianswerechallengedonavarietyofgrounds,thecriticismsitposedabout

theSwedishmodelstimulatedadebate,whichwassignificantabroadandinSweden.

Huntford’sworkmarksanimportantpointofdepartureforthisthesis,sincemostscholars

havegenerallyviewedthecontentofNordicsocialformationsasunambiguous,butsubject

todifferentinterpretation.Consider,forexample,KlausPetersen’scommentthat:

[I]nsomecountries,theNordicmodelhasatcertainperiodsbeenattractive

and associated with modern progressive social legislation while at other

timesandinotherplacesithasrepresentedgoodintentionsthatpavedthe

roadtohell.61

Whilethiswasbroadlytrueintheperiodtotheendofthe1980s,evenasNordenbeganto

slowlyreconceptualiseitself,theNordicmodelbecameincreasinglyambiguousintheearly

1990s.Thiswillbediscussedindepthinchaptertwo;however, it isworthnotingthatthe

60 For conceptual background to the inversion of Utopia to Dystopia, see: Reinhart Koselleck, ‘TheTemporalizationofUtopia’,inThePracticeofConceptualHistory:TimingHistory,SpacingConcepts(Stanford,CA:StanfordUniversityPress,2002),84–99.61KlausPetersen,‘National,NordicandTrans-Nordic:TransnationalPerspectivesontheHistoryoftheNordicWelfareStates’,inBeyondWelfareStateModels:TransnationalHistoricalPerspectivesonSocialPolicy,ed.PauliKettunenandKlausPetersen(Cheltenham:EdwardElgarPublishingLtd.,2011),57.

44

content of the conservative and liberal stereotypes of the 1960s and 1970s became

increasinglyunstableatthesametimeasthehegemonyofthesocialdemocraticarticulation

waschallenged,preciselybecausetheyweredefinedbyrejectionofit.

1.2.4Conclusions

Asmightbeimagined,giventhecentralimportanceoftheSocialDemocraticeratoNordic

identities,theprecisemeaningoftheRehn-Meidnermodelandthewage-earnerfundsisstill

amatterofcontest.Ofthesearticulations,perhapsthemostinterestingforthepurposesof

thisstudyisthatadvancedbyKlasEklund.HemakesaclearattempttoreclaimGöstaRehn

as a liberal economist, distancing him from Rudolf Meidner, who, in Eklund’s reading,

representedthesocialistpartoftheSwedishsocialdemocratictradition.Thisisparticularly

important given Rehn’s emphasis on supply-side labour market interventions, something

whichhasincreasinglybecomeassociatedwithDanishflexicurity(seechapterfour),andhis

insistence that countering inflation and full employmentwere notmutually contradictory

aims. Given the hegemony of free-market ideas in international policy-making and the

emphasis on supply-side, rather than demand-side, policy measures, this carves out a

relevancefortheNordicmodelwhichitwaswidelypresumedtohavelost.Italsodistances

contemporarySwedishsocialdemocracyfromtheperpetuallyunlovedwage-earnerfunds.

On theotherhand,extra-Nordicdiscoursesof themodelhardly reflected this complexity,

dominatedastheywerebydiscussionsofgradualistsocialismorbyaconservatismwhich

broadlyagreedwiththesediscourses,butinvertedthevaluejudgementtoproducealiving

hell,ratherthanheaven.ThecomplexityoftheRehn-Meidnermodel,though,shouldalertus

to the fact that theNordicmodel contains thepotential for seriousambiguity.Petersen’s

45

oppositionoftheNordicheavenandhellcapturesthediscoursesuptothelate1980s,but,as

thenextsectionandchaptertwowillargue,theNordicmodelconceptbecameincreasingly

unstabletowardstheendoftheColdWar,asaresultof ‘Europeanization’,andunderthe

pressuresofSweden’sfinancialcrisis.

46

1.3.Nordenintheinternationalsphere:TheColdWar

1.3.1TheendoftheColdWar:neitherwinnernorloser

TheendoftheColdWarintheearly1990snecessitatedmajorchangesinthewayScandinavia

wasconstructedbothinternallyandexternally.Geo-politically,oneofthefirstattemptsto

formulateanewpositionforScandinaviagloballywasundertakenbyOleWæver,whoargued

thattheendoftheUSSRandtheglobalpoliticalsettlementwhichcharacterisedtheColdWar

left Scandinaviawithouta roleandvulnerable to changingglobalpriorities,butespecially

thoseoftheUSA.Or,putslightlymoresuccinctly,thattheunderlyinglogicsthatsustained

themeaningofNordenhadeffectivelycollapsed.62Heidentifiedthreeareasofmeaningin

which this collapse was most significant: security, welfare, and ‘ThirdWorld’ diplomacy.

WæverarguedthatthecollapseofmeaninghadleftScandinaviansnostalgicfortheColdWar

andinastateof‘confusion’.63

It isworthsettingoutWæver’selucidationof theproblemhere, since thisoffersauseful

summaryofthinkinginNordenabouttheendoftheColdWar.Hisfirstmajorconcernwas

security.TheendoftheColdWarhadleftanidentityvacuumaswellasthemoreobvious

security issuesfacingtheNordiccountries.Thedisappearanceofsuchconceptsas ‘Nordic

balance’orself-definitionthroughdifferenceusingformulationssuchas‘lowertensionthan

inCentralEurope'or'moredetente-orientedthanCentralEurope'crippledNordicidentityin

securitymattersandmeantatotal re-formulationwasnecessary.Nordencouldno longer

define itself through the paradox of being part of the European security complex and

62OleWaever,‘NordicNostalgia :NorthernEuropeaftertheColdWar’,InternationalAffairs68,no.1(1992):99.63Ibid.,78–80.

47

simultaneouslyoutsideit,sincethatparadigmcouldnotsurvivethecollapseoftheUSSR.This

transitionwasparticularlydifficultforFinlandandSweden,sincetheconventionalneutrality

positionadoptedbybothcountriesbecameessentiallydevoidofmeaning.Thiswasmore

problematicfortheSwedesthantheFinns.EventhoughFinlandhadbeenintheSovietsphere

ofinfluencewithinlivingmemory,theyhadnotsoughttomakeavirtueofthenecessityof

non-alignment.Sweden,ontheotherhand,haduseditspositionofneutralitytocarveouta

diplomaticpositionwhichwascriticalofUSforeignpolicy,althoughSwedenwasnonetheless

well integrated intoWesternmarketsanddiplomatic frameworks.64Diplomaticdifficulties

aroseasadirectresultofthis:althoughSwedenhadnotbeenonthelosingsideintheCold

War,norhaditbeenformallyalignedwiththewinningside.

Outside the realm of diplomacy, Wæver also identified key economic difficulties facing

Nordenin1992.HedrewadistinctionbetweentheNordicmodelofwelfareasanidealtype

and the Swedish model. In Europe at this time the Scandinavian model was not being

consideredasasustainablesolutiontotheeconomicupheavalconfrontingEasternEurope.65

In this context, theNordicmodel had a distinct image problembecause of the failure of

planninginEasternEurope,andtheongoingliberalhegemony,initsvarious,thoughprimarily

ThatcheriteandReaganite,varietiesinthelate1980sandearly1990s.Norden,the‘planned’

society, fitted poorly with the aims of Eastern Europeans and the USA and, due to its

prolonged crisis, also compared unfavourably with the German model, which was

64AndrewScott,‘SocialDemocracyinNorthernEurope:ItsRelevanceforAustralia’,AustralianReviewofPublicAffairs7,no.1(2006):6.65Waever,‘NordicNostalgia :NorthernEuropeaftertheColdWar’,85;InthishefollowsGostaEsping-Andersen,who divides welfare states into three ideal types: liberal (e.g. UK), conservative (e.g. Germany) and socialdemocratic(e.g.Sweden).Esping-Andersen,TheThreeWorldsofWelfareCapitalism.

48

characterisedbyhighlevelsofwelfare,butrelativelylowlevelsofeconomicsteering.66The

bipolarityof the thenEuropeanCommission (EC)wasalsoseenasacauseof thecrisisof

Nordic influence on economic policy. The EC privileged French and German positions

espousingdirigismeandtheGermaneconomicmodelrespectively.Athirdposition,which

equatedbroadlywithfree-marketliberalism,washeldtodifferingdegreesinotherpartsof

NorthernEurope.Therewas thusno room for theNordicmodel in thisdiscussion,which

precipitatedanotherprofoundidentitycrisisatatimewhentheunderlyinglogicoftheNordic

model(i.e.modernity)wasbeingthoroughlyquestioned.67

Finally,WæverwasconcernedtolookatthewaysinwhichNordic’ThirdWorld’diplomacy

hadbeenaffectedbytheendoftheColdWar.Heidentifiedthisthirdareaasbeingatleast

somewhatmoresuccessful thanthe first two;however,healsonotedthat thesuccessof

Nordic diplomacy was contingent upon its perceived successes in security and economic

modelling.Althoughitrelatesexplicitlytonon-Europeanrelationships,thisisaparticularly

importantpointforthisstudyingeneral,sinceitwouldholdsignificanceforlaterinteraction

betweenNordenandotherEuropeancountries.

ThepolicyprescriptionsputforwardbyWæverinresponsetothecrisisofmeaningaffecting

NordenrepresentacarefullyconcertedattempttoreshapeaNorthernidentityinresponse

tothevariouspressuresnotedabove.Theyalsorepresentanacuteawareness,whichhad

developed primarily as a result of the ever-increasing imperative for nations to compete

66Waever,‘NordicNostalgia :NorthernEuropeaftertheColdWar’,85.67Ibid.,86.SincetheNordicmodel,atleastasarticulatedbySweden,hadbeenexplicitlyconstructedasbeingatthefrontiersofmodernity,the importanceofthemetonymicrelationshipbetweentheNordicmodelandmodernityshouldnotbeunderestimated,althoughitcannotbefullyexploredhere.

49

internationallyinvariousdifferentmeasuressuchasopenness,business-friendlinessandso

forth,thatdiscoursecanbeconsciouslyandmethodicallyshaped.However,inpointoffact,

Wæver’ssolutionswerenotasgoodashisproblems,inthesensethatfewofthesubstantive

suggestions he made were implemented as policy. Wæver’s primary prescription that

ScandinavianeededtopivottowardstheBalticandattempttocreateandmaintainaBaltic

group,basedprimarilyonnon-state-actors,hasbeenunsuccessfulexceptinlargelysuperficial

ways.68

OneofthekeyplanksofWæver’spaperwasthattheNordicareahadepitomisedmodernity,

butthatitwasnecessaryforittorecalibrateitsmodelinresponseto‘post-modernity’.The

adjustmenttopostmodernityeffectivelymeantreconstructingmeaningsalongtwoaxes.The

firstof thesewasgeographical/regional, thesecondsocietal/ideational.69KazimierzMusiał

describes these as referential points, which can provide mutually reinforcing meanings.

However, at least to begin with, reorientation followed very different trajectories. The

CopenhagenSchool,ofwhichOleWæverwasakeymember, looked toNordenasanew

source of meaning whereas the Swedes, who would have to play a major role in any

reconstruction of Nordic identity,were re-orientating towards Europe in response to the

perception of a generalised failure of the Social Democratic system. By the late 1990s

however,theNordicCouncil,whichdescribesitselfas‘theofficialinter-parliamentarybody

68Ibid.,97;Indeed,WæverhimselfnotesthatinterestinconstructingadynamicBalticregionprimarilyinvolvedWestBalticactors(i.e.Nordicones),andthatitwasprimarilyare-brandingexerciseinwhichthetermNordenwasreplacedbyasimilarlyemptysignifierlikeBalticorHanseatic.Tothelimitedextentthatthisre-orientationhasbeensuccessful,ithasonlybeenamongelitegroupsofpolicymakersandacademics.See,KazimierzMusial,‘ReconstructingNordicSignificance inEuropeontheThresholdofthe21stCentury’,ScandinavianJournalofHistory34,no.3(2009):37–41.69Musial,‘ReconstructingNordicSignificance...’

50

intheNordicregion’,70hadre-groupedandbegantodirectitsattentiontowardstheBaltic

StatesandRussia.

Thoughhewasbyfarthemostinfluentialexponentoftheliberalconstructivistschool,Wæver

wasnotaloneinhisattemptstore-articulatethemeaningofNorden.AsPirjöJukarainenhas

demonstrated,therewereatleastfivediscoursesonthepossibilitiesforreshapingNorden

going on in one policy journal (Nord Revy/North) during the 1990s. These included pro-

European,pro-regional,pro-urban,pro-Balticandenvironmentalistdiscourses.71Therewas

also a supplementary attempt to argue, probably accurately, that the Nordicmodel was

aboveall constitutedby theuniversalisticclaimsmadeof itbySweden,andthat thiswas

reinforcedby theotherNordic states.72Asa result, Sweden’sgeopoliticalpivot towardsa

EuropeanratherthanaNordicidentitycouldbeseenastheunderlyingcauseofthedamage

toNordenasacoherentidentity.73

Usingdiscoursetheory,MusiałtermsthisnewBaltic,consistingofNorden,thethreeBaltic

StatesandNorth-WestRussia,butexcludingNorthGermanyandPoland,a‘floatingsignifier’

whichisparticularlyopentonewformsofmeaning(Forafulldiscussionofthesignifier,see

chapterthree,section3.3).74InthisregardtheNordicCouncilhasgonesomewaytowards

70‘NordicCouncilHomePage’,accessed14December2016,https://www.norden.org/en/om-samarbejdet-1;TheNordicCouncilhasbeeninstrumentalinpromotingcooperationintheNordicregion,includingonarangeofpractical,bureaucratic,andstrategicmeasures.Seee.g.ThorvaldStoltenberg,‘NordicCooperationonForeignandSecurityPolicy’(Oslo,2009);ForawiderdiscussionofNordiccooperation,seealsoJohanStrang,‘NordicCommunities’(Helsinki:NordicCouncilofMinisters,2012).71Pirjö Jukarainen, ‘Norden IsDead– Long Live theEastwards FacedEuro-North:GeopoliticalRe-MakingofNordeninaNordicJournal’,CooperationandConflict34,no.4(December1999):375.72IverB.Neumann,‘ARegion-BuildingApproachtoNorthernEurope’,ReviewofInternationalStudies20,no.1(October1994):65.73HansMouritzen,‘TheNordicModelasaForeignPolicyInstrument:ItsRiseandFall’,JournalofPeaceResearch32,no.1(February1995):11–16ThecausesofSweden’sreorientationtowardsEuropewillbeconsideredbelow.74Musial,‘ReconstructingNordicSignificance...’,296.

51

institutionalizinganew regional identity; firstbywayofassistanceprogrammesand later

through knowledge exchange.Musiał argues that this has created a ‘newNorden’ in the

mindsofelitegroups,researchersandstudentswhointeractwiththeinstitutionssetupby

theNordicCouncil.75

However,inhisassessmentoftheimplementationofWæver’sthesisMusiałnotesthatthe

replacementofacommonNordicidentitywithaBalticonehasbeenafailure.Instead,the

Nordicidentityhasbeenreconstructedontermssetbythe‘old’Nordiccountriestowhich

the Baltic countries can align. The discursive shift towards the Baltic has ‘little empirical

groundswhen considering thewholeBaltic Sea region,withnorthernGermany, northern

PolandandpartsofRussia included’.76Where theNordicmodelhasachieved significance

again is not through geo-political realignment, but through the growing successes of

phenomenaofanessentiallynationalcharactersuchasDanish‘flexicurity’orSwedishand

Finnish technology firms. Nevertheless, Wæver’s basic contention: national and

international/regional identities can be manipulated; is of enormous importance. This

observationhasmarkedanimportantveininNordicthinkingsincetheendoftheColdWar

(consider, for example, the national branding literaturewhich has emerged in Norden in

recent times (see Introduction, above)), even if enthusiasm and appetite for universal

solutionstocontextualproblemshaswaned.

TheextendeddiscussionofNordicidentityenteredintobyWæverandcritiquedbyMusiał,

createsastartingpointforthisthesis.ThemeaningscreatedfortheNordiccountries,and

75Ibid.,297.76Ibid.,299.

52

Nordenmoregenerally,inthe1990shavedevelopedintoestablisheddiscoursesovertime.

Musiał’scritiqueinparticularforeshadowssomekeychangesinthemeaningoftheNordic

modelthatwillbeidentifiedinlaterchapters.Twofeaturesareespeciallyrelevant.Thefirst

is the increasing tendency for the Nordic countries to be reconstructed around national

meanings,whichare frequentlyconflated.Thesecond is the tendency fornewdiscourses

about Norden to become hegemonic in different areas of society. Although Musiał was

referringonlytothemeaningoftheBalticregionamongelitegroupsofpolicymakersand

academics,asimilartrendisobservableoutsidetheNordiccountriesamongpolicymakersin

the UK, especially those in leading think-tanks, the business press and among active

politicians.Whenthesetwofeaturesarecombined,anewNordenemergesinpolicycircles,

whichcombinesconcrete,butdistinct,aspectsofpolicyintheNordiccountries,forexample,

SwedishfreeschoolsandDanish‘flexicurity’.

1.3.2Conclusions

AlthoughtheColdWarwillnotfigureprominentlyintherestofthisstudy,whichwillbefar

moreconcernedwithdomesticpolitics,thesignificanceoftheColdWarforcontemporary

Nordic identity should not be underestimated. Norden has been particularly aware of its

globalandregionalposition,andthenecessityofundergoingatraumaticrebuildingprocess

intheaftermathoftheColdWarhasinformedengagementwithothercountries.Indeed,the

basic logic of Nordic engagement in “Third World” diplomacy: that success in economic

modellingandinstitutionbuildinggavetheNordiccountriesauniquerelationshipwithother

states;hasmuchincommonwiththecontemporaryideathatNordicsuccessandinnovation

inpublicserviceprovisionmakesitamodelforEuropeanstates,includingBritain,toemulate.

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1.4Conclusions

ThischapterhasarguedthattheNordiccountries,especiallySweden,werecharacterisedby

unusuallystableidentitiesintheperiodfromthe1950sonwards,andperhapsevenearlier.

TherelativestabilityofSweden’sidentity,andtheinstitutionalhegemonyoftheSAP,allowed

forthecreationofsimilarlystableidentitiesabroad.Indeed,therewassignificantconsensus

aboutthenatureoftheSwedishmodel,whichwasgenerallyagreedtobecharacterisedby

highlevelsofsocialwelfare;policiesdesignedtostimulatesocialequality;andhighlevelsof

economicsteering.AlthoughSwedenwasclearlyfarcloserinorientationandvaluestothe

WesterncapitalistnationsledbytheUnitedStates,itwasformallynon-alignedintheCold

WarandwasnotamemberofNATO.ThisallowedSwedentobuildinternationaldiplomatic

capabilitybecauseofitsnon-alignment.

AlthoughthefundamentalnatureoftheSwedishmodelwasnotchallenged,itsinterpretation

wasa sourceof conflict.Withinandwithout theNordiccountries, therewerediscussions

aboutthenatureofthestate.Socialdemocratsweretypicallyimpressedbythematerialand

socialachievementsmade inSweden,which liberalsandconservativestendedtoseeasa

nightmarisherosionofpersonalfreedom.However,theendoftheColdWarwasonesource

ofchallengetothisstableSwedishidentitybothathomeandabroad.Thenextchapterwill

lookattwootherchallengestoSwedishidentityintheearly1990s:theSwedishfinancialcrisis

andtheSAP’selectoraldefeatin1991.

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ChapterTwo–NewLabour,NewModerates,NewNorden

2.1Introduction

ThelastchaptersummarisedarangeofscholarshipwhichdealtwiththeNordiccountries,

theirunderstandingsofinternalpoliticaleconomyandrelationstothewiderworldfromthe

1960suntil the1990s.TheaimwastoestablishwhattheNordicmodelwashistorically in

ordertocontextualisemorerecentcontestsoveritsnatureinNordenandinUKpublicpolicy

debatesintherestofthethesis.Thischapterwillthereforepickupthenarrativeinthe1990s,

butwithasomewhatdifferentfocus.RatherthanfocusingongeneralvisionsoftheNordic

countries, itwill insteadbegintolookingreaterdetailattheimmediatepoliticalconflicts,

stretchingbacktothe1990s,whichcreatethebackdropforcontemporarydiscussionsofa

Nordicmodelofpoliticaleconomyandpublicservices.

IwillthereforebeginbyintroducingtheSwedishfinancialcrisisof1991/2,sincethiswasa

highly traumatic event for Swedish (andNordic) identities, leading to a period of intense

conflictoverthepoliticaleconomicfutureofSweden.Thenextsectionwillcoverattempts

duringthemid-1990stoimagineanewkindofSwedishmodel.Thisprocesswasmostlyled

bytheModerateParty,whichhopedtobreaktheSocialDemocraticParty(SAP)’spoliticaland

institutionalhegemonyinSweden,byre-imaginingSwedenafterafashionmorecompatible

withfree-marketliberalism.Thechapterwillthengoontodiscussattemptstounderstand

changesinSwedishpoliticsintermsofglobalisation.

Conterminously, thereweremajor changes in the political aims and approaches of social

democratic parties across Europe. I will summarise these changes and then discuss

55

developments inBritishelectoral politics from themid-1990suntil around2015, covering

boththeLabourandConservativeParty’sattemptstoreinvigoratethemselvesduringthisera

through the ‘Third Way’ and ‘Big Society’ agendas respectively. Finally, the chapter will

concludebysettingoutaseriesofquestionsgeneratedbythediscussionsinthischapterand

thelast.

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2.2.WritinganewSwedishSuccessStory

2.2.1TheSwedishfinancialcrisis1991/2anditsaftermath

The debate instigated by the Copenhagen School looked at the crisis ofmeaning from a

varietyofdifferentperspectives,butwasprimarilyconcernedwithNordicforeignpolicyand

creatingameaningforNordenasaresultofitsglobalpositioningandinteractions.However,

thecrisis,whichwasprecipitatedbytheColdWar,wasnotlimitedpurelytoforeignpolicy

issues.

ThepessimismoftheperiodimmediatelyfollowingtheSwedish/Finnishfinancialcrisisand

theendoftheColdWargraduallygavewaytomoreoptimisticvisionsofaNordicfuture.The

re-articulationofameaningfulNordicentityintheaftermathofcrisis,whichWæverandthe

CopenhagenSchoolwereattemptingtoenervate,hadresolveditself,althoughnotperhaps

alongthelinestheymighthaveimagined.TheNordiccountrieswerenolongerundergoing

the existential crisis they were in the early 1990s. While the meaning of Norden is not

necessarilysettledoruncontroversialitismoresothan,say,theEuropeanUnion.Indeed,in

sharpcontrastwiththeearly1990s,thereisagreementthatwecanonceagaintalkabout‘a

Nordicmodel’evenifthecontentofthatconcepthasalteredsubstantially.Reorientationof

thedomesticeconomiesand,perhapsmoreimportantly,atransformationindomesticself-

perceptionintheNordiccountrieshasbeenattheforefrontincreatingthesenewmeanings.

Asarguedabove, theendoftheColdWar leftahugegulf inNordic foreignpolicyand its

general engagement with the rest of the world, but also created serious difficulties in

domesticpoliticsintheNordicstates.Internationally,theNordicmodelofpoliticaleconomy,

whicharticulateditselfasathirdoptioninabipolareconomicdiscourse,wasbroughtinto

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crisis by the disappearance of one of those poles. This combined with and probably

contributedtoasecondmajorcrisis,whichrequiredadrasticalterationofmeaninginNorden:

the1991/2financialcrisisinSweden,whichalsohadseriouseffectsinFinland.

There were a variety of causes and effects of the Swedish financial crisis. A range of

explanations of varying sophistication have been offered from the ever-fashionable

invocationof‘globalisation’toargumentsthatSwedenwasunpreparedforthederegulatory

programmewhichwas introducedby the SocialDemocrats in the late1980s.77Aswill be

arguedbelowwithreferencetothe2008globalfinancialcrisis(whichincidentallywasmuch

lesssevereinNordenthantherestoftheEuropeanUnion),crisesofthiskindalwaysaccrue

akindofsurplusofmeaningwhichhidestheirtraumaticdestructionofthesymbolicorder.

JennyAndersson,forexample,arguesthatthecrisisofSwedishsocialdemocracyprogressed

slowlyaspreviouslystableconceptsweregivennewmeanings.78Thisiscertainlytrue,butit

isalsoimportanttonotethat,duetothetraumaticforceofthefinancialcrisis,thischangein

Swedishsocialdemocracyisgenerallylocatedin1991/2,ratherthanintheearly1980swhere

itsre-symbolisationbegan.

It isnonethelessworthsketchingsomeof themostwidely repeateddiscoursesabout the

financial crisis, since, as I have just argued, the contest over itsmeaningwas inextricably

linked with contests over the meanings of ‘Sweden’, ‘the Nordic model’ and ‘Social

Democracy’.

77For the former, seeEinhornandLogue,ModernWelfareStates;For the latter, seePärNuder, ‘Saving theSwedishModel’(London:InstituteforPublicPolicyResearch,2012).78JennyAndersson,‘GrowthandSecurity:SwedishReformisminthePost-WarPeriod’,inTransitionsinSocialDemocracy: Cultural and Ideological Problems of the Golden Age, ed. John Callaghan and Ilaria Favretto(Manchester:ManchesterUniversityPress,2006),118–34.

58

Thenarrativeofthecrisisitselfisfairlystraightforward.TheSocialDemocraticgovernment

hadgraduallybeguntoreformulateitspolicytowardstheEuropeanUnionbythemid-1980s.

By1990,deregulationofcapitalmarketsandtheremovalofcurrencyexchangebarriershad

already led to significant investment in Europeby Swedish firms.79During this period the

Swedishgovernmentalsopeggedthekronatoabasketofothercurrencies,ofwhichthemost

important was the DeutscheMark, by entering the European Exchange RateMechanism

(ERM).Thecrisis itselfbegan in the realestate sector.As the1980sboombegan to turn,

developers started to default on loans,which in turn caused the financial intermediaries

behindthesedealstodefaultontheirbankloans.80Indicativeoftherolewhichderegulation

inthecapitalmarketsplayedinthissituationisthefactthattheoriginallosseswhichsparked

thecrisisweremadebythe(Swedish)BeijerGrouponacommercialpropertydevelopment

attheElephantandCastleinLondon.81

Theproblembecameunmanageableduringthe1992ERMcrisis,whichalsocausedrunson

thelirainItalyandthepoundinBritain.Speculativeattacksonthekronaledtomasscapital

flight,whichtheSwedishRiksbankwaspowerlesstopreventduetotheabolitionofcurrency

exchangebarriers.ThisforcedtheSwedishgovernmenttotakeoverthebaddebtsofitsbanks

aftergivingupitsfruitlessattemptstodefendthekrona.82ThespecificsoftheSwedishdebt

79Fora fulldiscussionof the implicationsof Sweden’smove towardsEurope, seeDimitris Tsarouhas,SocialDemocracyinSweden:TheThreatfromaGlobalizedWorld(London:TaurisAcademicStudies,2008),119–140.80LindbergandRyner,‘FinancialCrisesandOrganizedLabour:Sweden1990-94’,29.81Ibid.82Ryner,‘Neo-LiberalizationofSocialDemocracy:TheSwedishCase’,101.

59

crisisarethereforehighlysimilartothechainsofeventsleadingtothe(East)Asiancrisisof

1997andtheglobalfinancialcrisisof2008.83

ThefinancialcrisisusheredinanumberofmajorchangesinSweden’ssenseofitselfanda

majorre-thinkinthefundamentalbasisofitsmacroeconomicpolicies,whichaligneditnot

onlywiththerestofEurope,butalsobroughtitclosertotheotherNordiccountries.Denmark

had undergone a major change in its economic strategy in the 1970s and entered the

European Economic Community, forerunner to the European Union, in 1973. This was

primarilyaresultofthenecessityoftradingwith,asitwasthen,WestGermanyandtheUK,

whichjoinedinthesameyear.Finland,NorwayandIceland,whichhavesofarhardlybeen

mentioned,wereallalsoalteringtheirregulatoryframeworksinpreparationforentryinto

theEuropeanUnion.Ofthethree,onlyFinlandultimatelyjoinedtheEuropeanUnion,in1995.

ThisfocusonanascentEuropeanidentityinNordenhadseriousconsequencesfortheidea

of‘Nordicness’andprecipitatedmuchsoulsearchingamidagenerallossofconfidenceinthe

SwedishorNordicmodel.ItwasinthiscontextthattheSocialDemocratsweredefeatedin

the1991SwedishGeneralElectionbyacoalitionof liberalandconservativeparties ledby

CarlBildt’sModerateParty.Itishowevernoteworthythatthecrisisofthe‘Nordicmodel’as

aconcepthadagreatdealtodowiththeSwedishidentitycrisis,sinceSwedenhadgenerally

advanced universalistic claims about the Nordic model, which the other four countries

assentedto,dependingontheirdegreeofsympathywithit.84However,giventheassociation

oftheSwedishorNordicmodelwithsocialdemocracy,thiswasdistinctlyproblematicforthe

83DavidHarvey,ABriefHistoryofNeoliberalism(Oxford:Blackwell,2005);DavidHarvey,TheEnigmaofCapitalandtheCrisesofCapitalism(London:Profile,2010).84Mouritzen,‘TheNordicModelasaForeignPolicyInstrument:ItsRiseandFall’.

60

Bildtgovernment.Thecrisisthereforeofferedachanceforamassivere-articulationofthe

modelwhichwasmoreconsistentwithaliberalpoliticalhegemony.

2.2.2ANewStartforNorden?

In this there was only partial success. The necessity of passing a series of retrenchment

budgets, with the support of the Social Democrats, to regain the confidence of financial

marketssupersededotherissuesaspriorities.85AlthoughtheBildtgovernmentdidintroduce

privateprovidersintohealthcare(seechapterfour),education(seechapterfive),andelderly

care,arangeofradicalproposalsproducedbyTheSwedishEmployersAssociation(Svenska

Arbetsgivereföreningen, henceforth SAF), were never implemented. These included the

termination of thewage-earner funds, the sale of onemillion public apartments and the

privatisationoflibraries,ambulanceservicesandfirefighting.86Someweredisappointedby

this, andMatsBenner, a Swedish sociologist and sciencepolicy researcher, lamented the

collapseofBildt’smuch touted ‘NewStart for Sweden’ (NyStart för Sverige) intoamore

prosaicattempttocontrolnationaldebtandunemployment.87

Evenso,duringthiserathebeginningsofarecognisablynewarticulationofSwedenandthe

NordicModelwerelaid.Thereremained,however,serioustensionsinthereproductionofa

meaningful identity for Norden, which, interestingly, but not all that surprisingly,

correspondedquitecloselytothesameprocessesofmeaningproductioninSweden.Using

TheSwedishSuccessStory?asanexampleofthesetensions,aseriesofdevelopingdiscourses

85LindbergandRyner,‘FinancialCrisesandOrganizedLabour:Sweden1990-94’,30.86Tsarouhas,SocialDemocracyinSweden,143.87MatsBenner,‘SuccessStoryOnline.Sweden-theMiddleWayoftheNewEconomy’,inTheSwedishSuccessStory?,ed.KurtAlmqvistandKayGlans(Stockholm:AxelandMargaretAx:sonJohnsonFoundation,2004),282.

61

can be picked out. Among these is the desire to identifywhatmade Sweden historically

exceptional;88whatledtoitsdecliningfortunes;89howdifferentSwedenwasfromtherestof

EuropeandNorden;90whatitscurrentstatewas,andwhatitsfuturefortuneswerelikelyto

be.91Bynomeanswereanswerstothesequestionsinherentlymutuallyexclusive,butthey

didshowanumberofintersectinglevelsatwhichSwedishidentity(anditcanprobablybe

arguedNordicidentityalso)wasundergoingrenegotiationduringthelate1990sandintothe

early2000s.Primarily,theshifttookplaceineconomicsandthewelfarestate.

LarsMagnussonandMatsBennerepitomisedtheneweconomicthinkingthatwasbecoming

entrenchedinSwedenatthetime.MagnussonarguedthatattemptsbytheSocialDemocratic

governmentsofthe1970sand1980storetardtheeffectsofthe‘thirdindustrialrevolution’

on the Swedish economy were a symptom of Swedish ‘over-confidence’ in the state’s

capability.Resistanceinthefaceofthewholesaleliberalisation,whichwasalsotakingplace

inmuchoftherestoftheworld,was,inthisview,futile.92

WhileMagnussonconcernedhimselfprimarilywithwhathadgonewrong:Swedish ‘over-

confidence’;BennerwasconcernedwiththewaysinwhichSwedenhadrecoveredfromits

financialcrisis.InBenner’sview,thefoundationsonwhichSwedishrecoveryhadrestedwere

multiple.Attheforefrontwasamovementto ‘de-collectivise’Swedishsociety,howevera

moreprosaictraditionalismwasalsoinevidenceinhisassessmentthat:‘[m]orehomework

88Torstendahl,‘SwedeninaEuropeanPerspective’.89LarsMagnusson,‘Adaptationorover-Confidence?SwedishEconomicHistoryintheTwentiethCentury’,inTheSwedish Success Story?, ed. Kurt Almqvist and Kay Glans (Stockholm: Axel and Margaret Ax:son JohnsonFoundation,2004),21–32.90Torstendahl,‘SwedeninaEuropeanPerspective’.91Benner,‘SuccessStoryOnline.’92Magnusson,‘Adaptationorover-Confidence?’

62

inschoolsandbettertraininginsocialscienceandeconomicsforjournalistswereamongthe

changesthatwereexpectedtofacilitatestableeconomicdevelopment’.93

However, fundamentally,heargued that ‘explanations include the technological leveland

infrastructure,conditionsforenterpriseandtheeconomicpolicypursuedduringthe1990s’

andthatby'[c]ombininginterestintechnologyandindividualism,Swedenseemstointegrate

the north European puritan and the Anglo-Saxon hedonist variants of capitalism’. 94 This

formulation of the new Swedish economy bore a striking resemblance to the older

formulationsusedbySocialDemocraticpoliticianswhodescribedSwedenasaMiddleWay

betweenAnglo-AmericancapitalismandSovietCommunismanditwasnotlongbeforethis

obviousallusionwasmadeexplicit:‘Swedenmayperhapsbecomethe"middleway"ofthe

new economy: a balanced compromise between stability and renewal in the dramatic

transformation of society, politics and the economy whose contours we are today just

beginningtodetect'.95

Thisrepresentsanimportantreformulationofthelong-standingconceptofthe‘MiddleWay’,

whichBennerattemptedtore-inscribeafterafashionthatcouldbeacceptableandrelevant

inside and outside Sweden, but which also reflected the re-orientation to free-market

economic orthodoxy in Swedish and international policy-making. Key to this were the

deployment of liberal explanations of the Swedish model, particularly the emphasis on

‘conditions forenterprise’and ‘technologyand individualism’and theirassociationwitha

project to create a compromise between ‘stability and renewal’. This demonstrates an

93Benner,‘SuccessStoryOnline.’,274.94Benner,‘SuccessStoryOnline.’95Ibid.,290.

63

attempt to retain the operative concept of the ‘Middle Way’, but radically alter its

associationswithotherconcepts.

ThiswasthenasignificantmomentinSweden’spresentationofitselftotheworld.Nolonger

wasitaplaceofstatistinterventionismandcollectivism.Instead,itretainedtheconceptof

theMiddleWay,butrearticulatedtheconceptwithanewmeaning inwhichSwedenwas

uniquelyplaced toharnessand ameliorate the flux anduncertainty thathadbecome the

norminglobalcapitalismsincethe1970s.

Individualismwas a newly recognised virtue. This casewas toucheduponbyBenner, but

madewithmuchgreaterforcebyLarsTrägårdhwhoarguedthat‘aGesellschaftofatomized,

autonomous individuals’ underpins the Nordic welfare model. 96 Trägårdh’s expansive

argumentwasthat’statistindividualism’,ashetermedit,wasthefundamentalprecondition

oftheNordicwelfarestates.Accordingly,thewelfarestate’sprimaryaimwastoempower

the individual to greater autonomy. His argument offered a historical contrast between

NordicandotherEuropeanformsofsocialorganisationwhereinEuropeanliberalismaimed

toraisethegeneralpopulationuptothelevelofaristocraticprivilege.IntheNordiccountries,

however, the peasant was valorised and the basically democratic structures of peasant

societyweremodernisedandexpandedintoageneralsocialethos.97

The emergence of the discourse of statist individualism contemporaneously with the

wholesaleintroductionofliberalisingpolicyreformissignificant.TheNordicindividualwas

96Trägårdh,‘StatistIndividualism’,253.97Ibid.,253–63.

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being created just as the traditionof collectivism inNordenwasbecomingunfashionable

within and without. Thus, this school of thought on the welfare state as a force for

empowering the individualbecameparticularlyuseful, since it fittedcomfortablywith the

liberal discourse that it was attempting to accommodate within traditional structures of

meaning.

2.2.3TheNordicWay

InterestintheNordicmodelhasincreasedsincethe2008globalfinancialcrisis.Notonlydid

Nordenseemtoemergefromthecrisisrelativelyunscathed,itwasalsoabletoretainahigh

standard of living for its populations at a time when other Organisation for Economic

CooperationandDevelopment(OECD)countrieswereslashingtheirbudgets.Oneparticularly

important attempt to explain (or potentially even sell) themodelwasTheNordicWay, a

reportsubmittedtotheWorldEconomicForumatDavosin2011bytheSwedishGovernment,

atthattimeledbyFredrikReinfeldt’sModerateParty.98ThereportwaswrittenbyKlasEklund,

HenrikBerggrenandLarsTrägårdhandwasanattempt tosketchout themeaningof the

Nordicmodelbysituatingitasamodelofpoliticaleconomywhichhaddevelopedoutofthe

Swedishfinancialcrisisandretrenchmentoftheearly1990sandwhichwasthereforedurable

inthefaceofthe2008globalfinancialcrisis.

The arguments put forward in the report masked a highly contested and rather novel

understanding of theNordicmodel,whichwas combinedwith narrative strands that are

commontodiscussionsoftheNordicmodel.Forexample,thereportbeganbyquestioning

98Göran Eriksson, ‘Slaget om Norden’, Svenska Dagbladet, 9 February 2012, http://www.svd.se/slaget-om-norden.

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the homogeneity of Norden, noting that there are differences between the five Nordic

countries. It also expressed scepticism about the efficacy of exporting policy solutions

developedintheNordiccountries.However,qualificationsaside,thereportdidagreatdeal

tohomogenisetheNordiccountriesandverylittletoarguethattheyshouldbeconsidered

asindependententities.

Threeprincipleclaimswereputforwardinthereport,twoofwhichareeconomic.Thefirst

ofthesewasthattheNordicmodelwasnotaffectedbythe2008financialcrisisbecauseof

theindividuallyscarringexperiencesofitsconstituentstatesinvariouscrisesbeginninginthe

mid-1970s(Denmark),the1980s(Norway),and intothe1990s(SwedenandFinland).This

hadcreatedacollectivityofindividualresponsesthathadledtoirondisciplineinbudgetary,

fiscalandmonetarypolicies,itwasargued.99Eklundtherebyattemptedtoportrayaformof

capitalisminNorden(withtheexceptionofIceland,whichishardlymentionedinTheNordic

Way)whichisbynomeansexemptfromtheeffectsofthe‘economiccycle’,butwhichhad,

through orthodoxmeasures taken in difficult circumstances, been able to ameliorate the

uniformlydireeffectsofthefinancialcrisiselsewhereintheworld.Heglossedthisusingthe

commonlyrepeated,andentirelyspecious,axiom“neverletagoodcrisisgotowaste”.The

secondprincipleeconomicclaimbroadlystemsfromthefirst:theNordiceconomiesareopen

andflexiblewithlimitedregulationandanemphasisonconsensus;hostiletoprotectionism

andbuttressedbystrongpublicwelfaresystemswhichsocialisetheinherentrisksofahighly

flexiblelabourmarket.100

99Eklund,Berggren,andTrägårdh,‘TheNordicWay’,5–11Thefirstsectionofthereport isactuallysubtitled‘LessonsLearned’.100Ibid.,9–11.

66

The third claim the reportmade is the sameargument about ‘statist individualism’made

elsewherebyTrägårdh,whowroteaportionofthepamphlet.TheNordicwelfaresystems,

heargued,arenotamediationofcapitalismandsocialism,butproceedfromacompletely

differentsetofassumptionsaboutwhatconstitutesindividualfreedom.Theessenceofthis

argumentwassketchedaboveandwillthereforenotberepeatedhere.Thediscursivetrend

identified inTheNordicWaymoved theNordic economic systems froma peripheral and

anomalous status to core status in international policy discourse, dropping claims to a

positionoutsideglobalcapitalism.Thiscanbesummedupquiteneatlybythereport’sown

argumentthat‘Nordiccapitalism’possesses‘fundamentalcoherenceandvitality’.101

The NordicWay should also be seen as an important intervention in Nordic, particularly

Swedish, politics in its own right. The pamphlet was part of a wider attempt by Fredrik

Reinfeldt’s Moderate Party ‘to define the [Nordic] model as a fundamentally liberal and

individualistic project’ and, to its critics, ‘an expression of ”extreme individualism”’. 102

Writing in the daily newspaper Svenska Dagbladet, Göran Eriksson noted that these

argumentsweremetwithsignificant interest,especially intheUK,butalso intheUS,and

wereclearlyimportantforReinfeldtinhiscampaigntore-definetheNordicmodelagainst

thetraditionalclaimthatitwasafundamentallySocialDemocraticachievement,builtona

tax-financedwelfaresystem.103

101Ibid.,22.102 Göran Eriksson, ‘Nyväckt intresse för nordisk modell’, Svenska Dagbladet, 6 September 2013,http://www.svd.se/nyvackt-intresse-for-nordisk-modell;Eriksson,‘SlagetomNorden’.103Eriksson,‘Nyväcktintresseförnordiskmodell’.

67

Thisratheraudaciousattempttore-interprettheNordicmodelreflectedamoreprotracted

conflict in Swedish politics over the nature of Swedish society, which, given Sweden’s

centralitytotheconcept‘Nordic’,hadimplicationsforthemeaningofthetermacrossthe

region.In2011,theSAPinitiatedproceedingstocopyrighttheterm‘theNordicmodel’.This

movewasmotivatedbytheintensifyingbattleovertheconcept,andTheNordicWaywas

widelyseenasamajorprovocationoftheSAP,whichrespondedbyclaimingthatitwanted

to ‘build Swedenback to the valueswhichmanyunderstand as typically Swedish’.104The

trademark was granted by the Swedish Patent and Registration Office (Patent- och

Registreringsverket)whichthereforeimplicitlyagreed‘thatitisthesocialdemocraticNordic

modelwearetalkingabout’.105

TheNordicCouncilandtheNordicCouncilofMinistersopposedthisdevelopmentandargued

thatwhilethe‘Nordiccocktailofwelfarestateandmarketeconomy’wasaresultoflabour

movements in the twentieth century, therewere practical and principled objections to a

nationalpartypatentingaconceptwhichcouldbeappliedtoandclaimedbyallfiveofthe

Nordiccountries.106ThedebateaboutTheNordicWayandtheSAP’sresponseformedpart

ofamuchlargerconflictovertheNordicandSwedishmodelconcepts,andtheintensityof

thebattlewassuggestiveofthedecliningabilityoftheSAPtomonopolisetheseconceptsas

it had generally doneuntil that time. Indeed, attempts to redefine the Swedishmodel in

104 Jan Söderström, ‘Socialdemokraterna har fått den nordiska modellen varumärkesskyddad’, Aktuellt ipolitiken,20December2012,http://www.aip.nu/default.aspx?page=3&nyhet=41506.105Ibid.106MichaelFunch, ‘Stridomdennordiskemodel skaber internationaldebat’,Nordisksamarbejde,14March2012,https://www.norden.org/da/aktuelt/nyheder/strid-om-den-nordiske-model-skaber-international-debat.

68

Sweden continued under the SAP-led government which defeated Fredrik Reinfeldt’s

Moderate-ledcoalitionin2014.107

2.2.4GlobalisationandEuropeanisationinNorden

TheSwedishSuccessStoryandTheNordicWayarewitnesstoan importantchange inthe

Nordic countries, particularly Sweden. After the end of the Cold War, the concept of

globalisation became an increasingly common structuring logic for European and North

American politics.Globalisationwaswidely invoked as a forcewhich necessitated certain

kindsofreformtomakenationstatesmore‘competitive’and‘flexible’,andwhichcouldbe

deployed to discipline demands from labour for greater employment and social

protections.108

PreviousgenerationsofpoliticiansandscholarshadtendedtoseeNordenasdistinctfrom

thewiderinternationalorderand,insomesenses,immunetothepressuresofthemarket.

AftertheendoftheColdWar,thisideabegantobechallengedwithinandwithouttheNordic

countriesandthetwinlogicsofglobalisationandEuropeanisationwerecentraltothisprocess.

This trend has also been reflected in academic literature. Since the 1990s, scholars have

increasingly viewed conditions in the Nordic countries as linked to underlying structural

conditionstowhichgovernmentsandpoliticalpartiesmustrespond.

107StefanLöfven,‘Stridenomsvenskamodellen’(Speech,talpåRågsvedsservicehusiStockholm,Stockholm,29 February 2016), http://www.socialdemokraterna.se/Stefan-Lofven/Tal-och-artiklar/2016/Striden-om-den-svenska-modellen/;StefanLöfvenandCarinJämtin,‘Nutarvistridförsvenskamodellen’,accessed15December2016,http://www.socialdemokraterna.se/Pressrum/nyheter/Nu-tar-vi-strid-for-svenska-modellen/.108Pauli Kettunen, ‘TheTransnational ConstructionofNational Challenges: TheAmbiguousNordicModel ofWelfareandCompetitiveness’,inBeyondWelfareStateModels:TransnationalHistoricalPerspectivesonSocialPolicy,ed.PauliKettunenandKlausPetersen(Cheltenham:EdwardElgarPublishingLtd.,2011),16–40.

69

AgoodexampleofthisviewisfoundinDimitrisTsarouhas’bookSocialDemocracyinSweden:

TheThreatfromaGlobalizedWorld.109Heargues,fromanessentiallynational(i.e.Swedish)

perspective, that traditional components of the ‘SwedishModel’were threatened by the

gradual move towards compatibility with the regulatory framework and goals of the

EuropeanEconomicArea(EEA)and,later,theEU.Tsarouhaschallengesthetypicalargument

that EU membership was a means for employers and the Bildt government to enact

deregulatoryreformswhichtheywerestrugglingtoimplementdomestically.Rather,henotes,

therewasasignificantpushbytheSocialDemocratsandTradeUnionstoreformulatetheir

agendasinsuchawayastobecompatiblewithmembershipoftheEuropeanUnion,andthat

fortheunionsthiswasastrategytoavoiddirectstateinterventioninthelabourmarket.110

MuchoftheambivalencetowardstheEUamongSwedishsocialdemocraticactors,heargues,

aroseoutofthesensethatwagenegotiationsandworkerprotection,althoughprotectedby

Europeanlaw,werepursuedfordifferentreasonsandunderdifferentideologicalconditions

thantheyhadbeenupuntilthatpointinSweden.Inparticular,therewasafeelingthatlegal

protection for workers was primarily seen as a means by which to eliminate unfair

competition throughwagedepression and thatwagenegotiationswerepursuedon a far

moreindividually-focusedbasisthanwascommoninSweden.111

WhileTsarouhas’argumentisclearlyvaluableandmakesanumberofsophisticatedpoints

abouttheinterrelationshipbetweenEuropeanandSwedishinterestsintheEuropeanUnion,

hisargumentproceedsfromthestartingpointofatransferfromEuropeandtherestofthe

109SocialDemocracyinSweden.110Ibid.,119.111Ibid.,130,137.

70

worldtoSweden.ItisthereforetemptingtoarguethatTsarouhas’choiceoftermsisastrong

predictor of his argument. Claus Offe, for example, has noted the grammatical effect

producedbytheterm‘globalization’,sinceitoperatesinthepassivevoice.112Thatistosay,

there is only globalisation; there are no globalists. 113 Pauli Kettunen has made strong

arguments against such conceptualisations of the Nordic countries. Kettunen’s argument

exposes the dialectical relationship between the ‘global’ and ‘national’ inherent to

‘globalization’discourse,throughanexplorationofthearticulationofthenecessityfor‘the

making of a competitive “us”’, which ‘reflexively embrace[s] the perspectives of the

transnational actors that compare us with others in their search for competitive

environmentsforeconomicperformance’.114

EricS.EinhornandJohnLogue’sargumentexpandstheframetotheScandinaviancountries,

which Iwould refer to asNorden, since Icelandand Finlandare included. Theynote that

recurringfinancialandeconomiccrisesbetween1989and1994hadsevereimpactsonthe

Nordic economies, which led to a reconsideration of some tenets of the ‘Scandinavian

model’.115Theyarguethat‘corporatistchannelsseemtohavebeenunabletohandlethenew

issues related toglobalization’,butalsonote that ‘theScandinaviancountries serveasan

early-warning system for theproblemsofadvanced industrial societies, theymayprovide

112 Claus Offe, ‘Governance - “Empty Signifier” oder sozialwissenschaftliches Forschungsprogramm?’, inGovernanceineinersichwandelndenWelt,ed.GunnarFolkeSchuppertandMichaelZürn(Wiesbaden:VSVerlagfürSozialwissenschaften,2008),61–76;ClausOffe,‘Governance:An“EmptySignifier”?’16,no.4(2009).113 This is changing at the time of writing in February 2017, as globalisation is increasingly rejected as animpositionofa‘liberalelite’,whoaresometimesreferredtoasglobalists,especiallyinauthoritarianandneo-fascistdiscourses.RebeccaMansour,‘AlexJonesMeltsGlobalistsoverTerror:Mind-ControlledMediaSacrificingthe West for Islam’, Breitbart, 21 September 2016, http://www.breitbart.com/big-government/2016/09/21/alex-jones-melts-globalists-terror-mind-controlled-media-sacrificing-west-islam/.114Kettunen,‘TheTransnationalConstructionofNationalChallenges’,32.115EinhornandLogue,ModernWelfareStates,328.

71

someilluminationoftherouteaheadfortherestofus’.116Inotherwords,theScandinavian

countriesarepassivelyaffectedbyglobalisation,butsimultaneouslyofferameanstodeal

withtheseinevitabilities.

Despite being a common observation about the nature of the nation state in the era of

‘globalization’,thereareaseriesofpotentialobjectionstothisanalyticalframework.Firstly,

as Klaus Petersen argues, notwithstanding the appearance of homogeneity in the Nordic

countries,a‘closerlookatthepoliticalprocessesleadingtoNordicmutualityagreementsand

cooperation often reveals practical problems, national interests and political

disagreements’.117Andsecondly,‘thetransnationalperspectivediffersfromgeneralstudies

of globalization or internationalization by also including questions regarding intention or

agency’.118Inotherwords, there isamorecomplexhistoryof theNordicmodelavailable

whichseestheNordiccountriesneitherashomogeneousnorpassivereactorstoglobalforces,

butasactivelyengagedwithoneanotherandtransnationallyaspartofarangeofdifferent

communities.

2.2.5Conclusions

The Swedish/Finnish financial crisis had amajor impact on the sense of a shared Nordic

identityandprecipitatedare-symbolisationoftheNordicmodeland,inparticular,Sweden’s

placewithinit.Thediscoursesconsideredinthissectionshowatrendwhicharticulatedthe

Nordicmodelasbroadlyconsistentwithliberal,free-marketnormsin internationalpolicy-

making.Whilethismovementbeganintheaftermathofthe1991/2financialcrisis,itisan

116Ibid.,343,345.117Petersen,‘National,NordicandTrans-Nordic’,52.118Ibid.,44.

72

ongoingprocess.TheNordicWaypamphletpresentedatthe2011WorldEconomicForum

showsthattheimpetustoestablishameaningfortheNordicmodelemptysignifierhas,if

anything, intensifiedsincethe1990s.Moreover,despitethecommonassumptionthatthe

Nordic countries are unambiguously socially democratic, the discourses which have

developedsince1991suggestthismayneedtoberevised.

In thesameperioda relateddiscoursedevelopedwhicharguedthat theNordiccountries

wereincreasinglybeingamalgamatedintotheinternationalorderthroughthetwinprocesses

of globalisation and Europeanisation. For all their uniqueness, itwas claimed, theNordic

countriesweresubjecttothesameforcesasothermajoreconomies.Withinthisframework,

however,theNordiccountriesofferedthepotentialforanalternativewayofdealingwith

these international forces. While this view is reminiscent of earlier ideas about Nordic

exceptionalism, it locates the Nordic countries firmly within a capitalist framework of

assumptionsaboutpoliticaleconomy.

Magnus Ryner notes that, ‘for those concernedwith the question ofwhether theNordic

countriescanprovideeffectivemythologiesforpoliticselsewhere,groundedtheorycertainly

makes the issue of transposition more complicated’. 119 This argument rests on the

assumption that these mythologies are socially democratic and that the Nordic model

increasinglyrepresentsaproblematicmodelofsocialdemocracy.Butperhapsthequestion

should increasingly be: can the Nordic countries provide effective mythologies for non-

sociallydemocraticpoliticselsewhere?

119J.MagnusRyner,‘TheNordicModel :DoesItExist?CanItSurvive?’,NewPoliticalEconomy12,no.1(2007):68.

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2.3.TheSwedishSocialDemocrats,Labour’sThirdWay, theSwedish

Moderates,andCameron’sBigSociety

2.3.1ChangingSocialDemocracyinSwedenandtheUK

ThelastsectionconsideredideasabouttheNordiccountrieswhichhavecirculatedsincethe

1991/2Swedishfinancialcrisis. It identifiedatrendtore-interprettheNordiccountriesas

increasinglyeconomicallyliberalandsubjecttotheforcesof‘globalisation’inmuchthesame

wayasotherwesterncountries.AnothertrendinanalysisofpoliticsintheNordiccountries

andBritainhasseendevelopmentsassymptomaticofattemptsbypoliticalpartiestoappeal

to their electorates. To conduct this research, scholars have often adopted comparative

approaches toassess the successofnationalpoliticalmovementsor theconsequencesof

governmental programmes. These studies have made important contributions to

understandings of national political movements and the differences between such

movementsindifferentplaces.Ontheotherhand,thisthesishopestocomplicatetheimplicit

assumptionthatnationalpoliticalprojectscanbeconsidereddiscretelybyplacingtheminto

adirect,actor-centredrelationship.

In commonwithportionsof the scholarshipon the impactof globalisation, this literature

tends to imagine political projects as responding primarily to specific ideological and/or

material conditions. Jonas Hinnfors, for example, looks in detail at UK Labour Party and

SwedishSocialDemocraticPartysourcesfromc.1950-1994andexaminestheextenttowhich

theparties’attitudestowardscapitalismandmarketschangedovertime.120Hearguesthat,

evenduringthe1980s in theUK–duringwhichtheUKLabourPartywassplitbetweena

120JonasHinnfors,ReinterpretingSocialDemocracy:AHistoryofStabilityintheBritishLabourPartyandSwedishSocialDemocraticParty(Manchester:ManchesterUniversityPress,2006).

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socialistfactionledbyTonyBenn,theTrotskyist‘MilitantTendency’,andthemoderatesocial

democratic party leadership – and the radicalism of the 1960s and 1970s in Sweden,

culminatingwiththewage-earnerfundspolicy,therewasalwaysanunderlyingacceptance

of capitalism.Moreover, in the current ‘neo-liberal’ era, Hinnfors finds little evidence to

suggest that the SAPhaveembraced the freemarket.However, he adds the caveat that,

‘[A]nti-capitalistthePartymaybebutaclearindicatorofitsbasicacknowledgementofthe

market’smeritsisthetrendtowardsusingmarketmechanismsasatoolinseveralsectorsof

the economy including thewelfare state’.121Hinnfors therefore notes that there is a gap

betweenrhetoricandactioninthepolicyprogrammesoftheSwedishSocialDemocratsand

theUKLabourParty.But this isprecisely the criticism levelledat theSocialDemocrats in

Swedenand,evenmoreso,NewLabour intheUK:theywhistledanicesocialdemocratic

tune,butintheendthedanceitselfwas‘neo-liberal’.

This might be described as representing the broad views of Jenny Andersson and John

Callaghan.Anderssonargues thatdespite the fact that theSwedishSocialDemocratshad

dismissedtheworkofFriedrichvonHayekandMiltonFriedmanas‘bourgeoispropaganda’,

theyweresimultaneouslycommissioningstudiesintotheeffectsofliberalpoliciesinReagan’s

USA,Thatcher’sBritainandPinochet’sChile.122Shedescribes thisasa slow-burningcrisis,

whichledtotheadoptionofapolicydubbedthe‘ThirdWay’inSwedenfrom1982,indicating

aconcertedattempttochangethearticulationofSocialDemocraticpolicy.Moreover,this

came at a time when there was a meaningful split emerging between the traditional

economistsoftheTradeUnionmovementandayoungergroup,ledbyKlasEklund,which

121Ibid.,82.122Andersson,‘SwedishReformisminthePost-WarPeriod’,126.

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waspushing for ideological renewal andwhich saw cost-cutting and savings in thepublic

budgetasameanstoachievethis.123Anderssonconcludesthatthetensionbetweenolder

articulationsofsocialdemocracyandthenew‘ThirdWay’‘wasresolvedthroughabreakwith

theparty’shistoricarticulationsandtheintroductionofanarticulationwhere“security”was

fundamentallysubordinatedto“growth”’.124

Elsewhere,AnderssonanalysedthedisjuncturesbetweenNewLabourandSAPdiscourses.

Herapproachisolates‘signifiers’(forafulldiscussionofthesignifier,see3.3below)which

illustratethesesplitsbetweenthetwoprojects.ShenotesthatwhileNewLabour’sdiscourse

of Britain was generally articulated around concepts like ‘renewal’ and the ‘electronic

workshop’, harking back to an industrial past, the SAP adopted the defensive, but less

nostalgic,‘safeguarding’andtalkedaboutthecreationofan‘electroniclibrary’.125Sheargues

thatthiscanbeseenasamajorcontrastbetweenaBritishdiscoursewhichenthusiastically

commodifiedindividualknowledgeandlearningas‘socialcapital’,andaSwedishdiscourse

whichsaweducationasameanstopromotesocialsolidarityandretardtheindividualising

effects of market-based social policies. 126 This approach contributes importantly to

scholarshipontheNordicmodelbyforegroundingtheimportanceofdiscourse.However,it

retainsthesplitbetweenrhetoricandmaterialeffects,andtreatstheSAPandNewLabouras

discreteentities.

123Ibid.,127.124Ibid.,130.125JennyAndersson,‘ThePeople’sLibraryandtheElectronicWorkshop:ComparingSwedishandBritishSocialDemocracy’,Politics&Society34,no.3(September2006):431–60.126Ibid.,441–50.

76

Callaghan argues that the ideological positions adopted byNew Labour rested on a false

argument that Western societies had entered a post-materialist phase, something that

necessitatedamoveawayfromthetraditionalmaterialistpoliticsofsocialdemocracy.127In

contrasttotheGermanandSwedishSocialDemocraticparties(andtoalesserextentthose

ofDenmark,NorwayandAustria), ‘TheBritishLabourParty…emergedfromthe1970sand

1980saspreoccupiedwithconventionaleconomicthinkingasithadbeentwentyyearsearlier,

thoughthe journeyhadtaken it from“analternativeeconomicstrategy” to reconciliation

with“themarket”andevenneo-liberalism’.128Indeed,giventhedemandsforanincreased

emphasis on environmentalist and feminist politics following the 1968 socialmovements

otherSocialDemocraticpartiesmadecallsforstateinterventionsintheeconomyandsociety,

‘onlyNewLabourexpectedtofind[anenvironmentalistpolitics]compatiblewith“enhancing

thedynamismofthemarket”’.129

If anything, therefore,whatHinnfors seesas adefenceof theSocialDemocrats andNew

LabouriswhatCallaghanconsidersthemostdamningevidenceagainstthem.Callaghaneven

makesthisexplicit:

It might be objected that the adaptations referred to are only verbal-

rhetoricalandprogrammaticand…it isonethingtoassertthecentralityof

environmentalism in a party programme, quite another to act upon this

precept’.130

127 John Callaghan, ‘Old Social Democracy, New Social Movements and Social Democratic ProgrammaticRenewal,1968-2000’,inTransitionsinSocialDemocracy:CulturalandIdeologicalProblemsoftheGoldenAge,ed.JohnCallaghanandIlariaFavretto(Manchester:ManchesterUniversityPress,2006),177–9.128Ibid.,185;cf.Hinnfors,ReinterpretingSocialDemocracy.129Callaghan,‘SocialDemocracy,1968-2000’,192.130Ibid.,188.

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This reveals a common split between rhetoric andmaterial effects in both Hinnfors and

Callaghan,butalsodemonstratestheproblemwithsuchasplit,sincerhetoricisseenaseither

totallymeaningfulortotallycynical.Inthelattermaterialistfashion,theoutcomesarethe

yardstickagainstwhichtherhetoriccanbemeasured.Intheformerquasi-idealistanalysis,

rhetoricistheprimarymeasureagainstwhichintentionshouldbejudged.Thatistosay,both

sides agree that there is a split between rhetoric andaction, though theydisagreeon its

significance–sinceinpracticeonebelievescompletelyinrhetoricandtheotherdisbelieves

completely.Theaimofthisthesiswillbetoofferananalysiswhicharguesthatrhetoricand

actionshouldnotbeconsideredseparate,butratherinterdependent:without‘articulation’

bysocialactors,actionhasnomeaning.131

2.3.2‘Faraboveideology,butnotbeyondideals’:Labour’sThirdWay

Whiletheperiodbeforethe1990sformsanessentialcontexttotherestofthethesis,the

‘ThirdWay’andthe‘BigSociety’formtheimmediatecontexttothethreecasestudieswhich

makeupthebulkofthisstudy.Thenextsectionwillthereforesetoutsomeofthecoreideas

ofbothpoliticalprojects,explainingtheirsimilaritiesanddivergencesandsettingouthow

theyrelatetothebroaderquestionofwhatconstitutestheNordicmodel.

Theconceptofa ‘ThirdWay’hasa longhistoryamongsocialistsandsocialdemocrats.As

notedabove,thetermwasusedbytheSAPinthe1980stodescribeareorientationaway

fromsecuritytowardsgrowthandflexibility.OutsideNorden,thetermwassometimesused

asasynonymfor‘theMiddleWay’todescribetheNordicpoliticalsettlements.Itwasalso

131Forfulldiscussionseechapterthree.

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used to describe other incarnations of socialism, including inter-war Austro-Marxism and

evolutionary socialist programmes more generally. 132 Broadly speaking, the Third Way

moniker referred to an alternative between ‘actually existing socialism’ – i.e. what was

practisedintheSovietUnion–andcapitalism.

Inthe1990s,theThirdWaybecameprimarilyassociatedwiththeNewLabourproject,ledby

TonyBlairandacoterieofotherseniorfiguresintheUKLabourParty.Thiswasbuttressed

intellectuallybytheworkofAnthonyGiddensandUlrichBeck,twoscholarswhoelaborated

theideaof‘reflexivemodernization’andwhoseworkwasmutuallyinfluencing.Inthissection,

twoworks,The ThirdWayand its Critics (Giddens) andWorldRisk Society (Beck),will be

consideredtoelaboratetheintellectualfoundationsoftheThirdWay.Inessence,however,

BlairandGiddens’ThirdWaydifferedfromearliergradualismbecauseofitsattempttofind

‘athirdwaybetweentheoldsocial-democraticmodelandneo-liberalism’.133

As an intellectual project, the Third Way can best be understood through a series of

statements which formed the core of its rationale. These will be given here and then

explained in greater depth below. Firstly, the ThirdWay was elaborated as a pragmatic

responsetochangedglobalconditions,whichcutacoursebetweentheorthodoxideologyof

left and right. Secondly, the projectwas deemed uniquely adaptable to the processes of

‘modernization’,whichwere a pressing issue for social democratic parties across Europe.

Thirdly,itwasclaimedthatsocialdemocracyshouldembracethepowerofmarkets,which

shouldberegulatedinsuchawaythattheyefficientlydistributedsocial‘goods’and‘risks’.

132Ilaria Favretto,TheLongSearch foraThirdWay:TheBritish LabourPartyand the Italian Left since1945(Basingstoke:PalgraveMacmillan,2003),1–14.133Ibid.,112.

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Fourthlyandfinally,inordertowinelections,theThirdWayshouldorientateitselfawayfrom

emancipatorypolitics,towardsanotionalpolitical‘centre’.

AkeythesisoftheThirdWayasitwasdevelopedbyUlrichBeckandAnthonyGiddenswas

an emphasis on the absence of adversarial politics in post-traditional societies.Whereas

previously, inmaterialistsocieties, identitieshadbeenconstructedbasedonasenseofus

andthem(i.e.workersandmanagers),thesedistinctionshadbecomeirrelevant,partlyasa

resultoftheannihilationofspacebythede-territorialisationofglobalcapital.134Inarguing

this, Beck claimed that there were ‘dangers produced by civilization which could not be

socially delimited in either space or time’ and that the result of this was that ‘the basic

conditions and principles of the first, industrial modernity … are circumvented and

annulled’.135LikeanumberofBeck’sothertheoreticalarguments,thisisdifficulttosustain,

sincebyremovingriskfromspaceandtime,hesimultaneouslyremoveditfromprocessesof

production, distribution and consumption. Such processes cannot be anything other than

spatialandtemporalphenomena.136

Clearly some forms of risk are (to some degree) outside the accumulative practices of

capitalism: volcanic eruptions, for example, are not conditioned by capital (although the

severityoftheirhumanconsequencesalmostalwaysare).However,giventheextenttowhich

thephysicalenvironment isshapedbycapital flows, it isoddtoarguethatthatsuchrisks

‘cannotbesociallydelimitedinspaceortime’;theriskstoadevelopmentbuiltonaflood

plain,whetheritbeinBoscombeorBangladesh,clearlycanbeapprehendedwithinthesocial,

134UlrichBeck,WorldRiskSociety(Cambridge:Polity,1999),2.135Ibid.,19.136DavidHarvey,TheConditionofPostmodernity(Oxford:Blackwell,1990);Harvey,TheEnigmaofCapital.

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andhencedelimitedinspaceandtime.Moreover,withthisargument,Becksubtlymovedthe

frontierofsocialanalysisawayfromthecapital-labourrelationandtowardsaproblematic

focusedheavilyonecologicaland‘post-materialist’issues.

According to Beck and Giddens, the collapse of the first industrial modernity revealed a

pluralityofdemands,includingecologicalandfeministinterests,whichcouldnotberesolved

withintraditionalstructures.137Thisradicaldecentringofdangersremovedthepotentialto

simply‘getridofthebadguys’,whichGiddensclaimedhadcharacterisedsocialdemocratic

andconservativethinkingupuntilthatpoint.138Rather,theThirdWay‘mustalsoleavebehind

theideathatleftandrightisthesoleandsovereigndividing-lineinpolitics’.139

Thischimedwithadesiretorejecttheoldleftandreplaceitwithanewpoliticswhichwas

structuredaroundecologicalrisksand‘individualizationandglobalizationprocesses’.140The

implicationsofthisargumentwerereflected inthepoliticalagendaofNewLabour,which

proposedaradicalshifttowardsindividualismandliberalcivilrightscausesandawayfrom

collectivism.Indeed,asIlariaFavrettohasnoted,thistriggeredamajorre-alignmentinBritish

politicsinwhichLabouroccupiedthecentristterritorywhichhadpreviouslybeenoccupied

bytheLiberalDemocrats.141Theshifttowardsecological,feministandcivilrightsissueswas

marked by a rejection of the ideological preoccupations of left and right. This is nicely

137Beck,WorldRiskSociety,92.138AnthonyGiddens,TheThirdWayandItsCritics(Cambridge:Polity,2000),38.139Ibid.140Beck,WorldRiskSociety,39.141Favretto,TheLongSearhforaThirdWay,118–122.

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capturedbyTonyBlair’sstatementtotheannualLabourPartyconferencein1996thatthe

partywaspartof‘atraditionfaraboveideology,butnotbeyondideals’.142

Having radically rewritten the rationale underpinning conventional political systems, Beck

and Giddens adopted a sleight of hand to head off the very real danger of a radically

constructivistreadingoftheirpoliticalthought,inwhichthepublicspherewasnothingmore

thanapluralityofinterests.Inordertodothis,Beckarguedthat:

‘[C]onflictsarepossible,butthesemustbeabletobesettledpredictablyin

thedesignatedarenasandwith thedesignatedprocedures.This reliability

includesthesocialacceptanceofadministrativeagenciesthatinterpretthe

scopeofactioninthearenaofconflictbetweenopposingvaluesandpossible

legal interpretationswith a fundamental priority for calculable, inherently

dynamicmodernization.143

Tooffer a translation, Beck aims to limit conflict to a small numberof areas, despite the

implicationsofhisconceptof‘subpolitics’,pointingintheoppositedirection,byarguingthat

ratherthanpoliticalsolutions,therecanbe‘correct’answerstopoliticalquestionsthatcan

be identifiedby ‘administrativeagencies’. The logicof theThirdWaywas thereforepost-

politicalinthesensethatwhileitwaslegitimatetopursuepoliticalends,thishadtooccurin

alimitedsphereandsubjecttothetechnicalidentificationofa‘right’answer.

142 Tony Blair, ‘Leader’s Speech’ (Labour Party Conference, Blackpool, 1996),http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=202.143Beck,WorldRiskSociety,100.

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Theconceptofmodernisationdovetailedwiththepost-ideologicalorpost-politicalelements

of the ThirdWay project. Despite having radically rejected ‘old’ ideologies based around

‘we/they’identities,BeckandGiddenswerenonethelessforcedtoreopenjustsuchasplit

betweenthosewhoembraced‘reflexivemodernization’andthosewhorejectedit.144Inother

words, therewere thosewho conceded the basic terms of the ThirdWay vision of post-

ideologicalpoliticsandthosewhodidnot,withsocietyconstitutedbythe‘modernisers’and

the outside constituted by those ideologues, conservatives and fundamentalists who

opposedit.145

Indeed, Laclau and Mouffe have argued consistently that antagonism, conceived of as

we/theyidentities,isconstitutiveofthepolitical,explainingwhytheabolitionofantagonism

failedanditsreintroduction(bystealth)was immediatelynecessary.146Modernisationwas

howeveracoreconceptoftheThirdWayprojectandtheimportanceofitssenseofprogress

shouldnotbeunderestimatedasameanstoeliminatepolitics.AsGiddensputit:

These questions…are about “life politics”, rather than the “emancipatory

politics”oftheleft.Lifepoliticsisabouthowweshouldrespondtoaworld

inwhichtraditionandcustomarelosingtheirholdoverourlives,andwhere

scienceandtechnologyhavealteredmuchofwhatusedtobe“nature”.147

Intheory,therefore,theThirdWaywashostiletoassertionsofthe‘naturalorderofthings’,

but nonetheless re-established just such an order through its claims that science and

144Ibid.,39.145ChantalMouffe,OnthePolitical,2nded.(London:Verso,2007),48–63.146ChantalMouffe,TheReturnofthePolitical,2nded.(London:Verso,1993);Mouffe,OnthePolitical;ErnestoLaclau,NewReflectionsontheRevolutionofOurTime(London:Verso,1990).147Giddens,TheThirdWayandItsCritics,40.

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technology had fundamentally altered the social order, which could therefore only be

apprehendedbythosewhohaveacceptedthecaseofmodernisation.148

While the emphasis on pragmatic, post-ideological politics and a programme of

modernisationwerecorecomponentsoftheThirdWayunderstandingofpolitics,akeyplank

ofitseconomicpolicywasanacceptanceofmarketsandmarketmechanismsasameansby

whichtoorganisesocietyandtodistributesocialgoodsandrisks.Inkeepingwiththepost-

politicalandmodernisingelementsoftheproject,therewasaseriousattempttoarguethat

the‘old’valuejudgementswhichopposedmarketsandthestateshouldbeabandoned.As

NicholasBarr,aformereconomistfortheWorldBank,nowbasedattheLondonSchoolof

Economics(LSE),hadit:‘[M]arketsareneithergoodnorbad;theyareenormouslyusefulin

well-knownandwidely applicable circumstances, less useful in others’.149In otherwords,

acceptanceofmarketswasa keyplankof themodernisingagenda,with theproviso that

markets must be regulated. Giddens in particular made the case for the acceptance of

markets in a way which directly echoed the public choice logic previously put forward

exclusively by the Conservative Party in the UK. 150 In contrast to Hinnfors’ revisionist

argumentthatLabour’scommitmenttothemarketremainedbroadlyconsistent fromthe

1950stothe1990s,theThirdWaydidmarkaqualitativeshiftfromgrudgingtoenthusiastic

acceptanceofthepowerofmarkets.WritesGiddens:

148J.MagnusRyner,CapitalistRestructuring,GlobalisationandtheThirdWay:LessonsfromtheSwedishModel(London:Routledge,2002),1.149NicholasA.Barr,‘Towardsa“ThirdWay”:RebalancingtheRoleoftheState’,NewEconomy,1998,76.150IanGreener,‘TowardsaHistoryofChoiceinUKHealthPolicy’,SociologyofHealthandIllness31,no.3(2009):309–24.

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[M]arket relations allow free choices to be made by consumers, at least

wherethereiscompetitionbetweenmultipleproducers…suchchoiceisreal

… since the decisions the individual makes aren’t given by authoritarian

commandorbybureaucracy.151

Moreover,theThirdWayembracedthe‘NewPublicManagement’(NPM)agendawhichhad

been popularised across the Western world, to differing degrees, in the 1980s. NPM

exponents argued that markets are not only the most efficient way of organising the

distributionofprivategoods,butthatthislogiccanalsobeextendedintothepublicsphere.

In other words, markets, or close approximations of them, can be used as a means of

supplyingnotonlybananasorITservices,butalsopublichealthcareandeducation.Inthis

theywereheavilyinfluencedbytheworkofMiltonFriedmanand,later,AlbertO.Hirschmann,

whosetoutawide-rangingintellectualvisionofapublicsectorrunthroughparticipationin

markets inhisnowclassicbookExit,VoiceandLoyalty.152Thisnecessitatedapronounced

shift away from traditional social democratic conceptions of equality, since, according to

Giddens, ‘[S]ocial diversity is not compatible with a strongly defined egalitarianism of

outcome’,rather ‘ThirdWaypolitics looks insteadtomaximizeequalityofopportunity’.153

Havingshiftedtothisstandpoint,itbecamepossibleforGiddenstoarguethat:

‘Marketsdonotalwaysincreaseinequality,butcansometimesbethemeans

ofovercomingit.Moreover,whileactivegovernmentisneededtopromote

egalitarianpolicies,thelefthastolearntorecognizethatthestateitselfcan

151Giddens,TheThirdWayandItsCritics,35.152AlbertO.Hirschmann,Exit,Voice,andLoyalty(London:HarvardUniversityPress,1970).153Giddens,TheThirdWayandItsCritics,53.

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produceinequality…evenwhenitisrecognizablydemocraticandmotivated

bygoodintentions.154

Ifequalityofopportunityistheprimaryaimofsocialdemocracy,thenmarketscancertainly

form part of the solution to social problems, as, according to public choice theory, the

distributive logicofmarketsmeansthat ‘nospecificassumptionsconcerningtheextentof

equality or inequality in the external characteristics of individuals in the social group’ is

necessary.155

Perhaps for this reasonaboveallothers,Europeansocialdemocratswerescepticalof the

ThirdWayandsawitasatbestambiguouslysociallydemocratic,atworstopposedtosocial

democrataims.156Compare,forexample,thecommitmentoftheNordicwelfarestatesto

decommodificationoflabourandthereductionofthedemandsofthelabourmarketonthe

populationwiththeargumentofsociologistsandproponentsoftheThirdWayJohnMyles

andJillQuadango,whocontendedthatsupportservicesandeducationwouldallowpeople

to‘commodifythemselves’,therebyreducingtheirdependenceonthestateforservices.157

Electorallyspeaking,theThirdWaywasastrategyfortheLabourPartytowinelectionsfrom

the ‘radical centre’.158Giddens defined this as a ‘politics of compromise’,which implicitly

confirmsthattheThirdWaywasnotnecessarilyconcernedwithre-articulatingmeanings,but

rather attempting to make existing meanings compatible with one another. Ironically,

154Ibid.,33.155JamesBuchananandGordonTullock,TheCollectedWorksof JamesM.Buchanan,Vol3: TheCalculusofConsent(Indianapolis:LibertyFund,1999),19.156Callaghan,‘SocialDemocracy,1968-2000’,184–185.157‘EnvisioningaThirdWay:TheWelfareStateintheTwenty-FirstCentury’,ContemporarySociology29,no.1(2000):158.158Giddens,TheThirdWayandItsCritics,43.

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therefore,Giddens’attempttoridpoliticsofanoutsidelimitstheThirdWay,bydefinition,to

thelesserofGramsci’stwoformsofhegemony.TheThirdWaycouldneveraspiretomore

thanatransformisthegemonybecauseitsdelineationof(reified) interestcoalitionsasthe

totality of the social field prohibited the establishment of an expansive hegemony. An

expansivehegemonywouldimagineaThirdWayprogrammenotjustasaneutralisationof

the antagonisms between particular interests, e.g. finance and small businesses, but as

representingthebroadinterestsofsocietyasawhole.159

Significantly, but perhaps not surprisingly, given that the Swedish Social Democrats had

adopted a strategy referred to as the Third Way as early as 1982, Giddens saw the

ScandinaviancountriesashavingbeenhistoricallyconcernedwithissuesthattheThirdWay

had identified,butalsomorerecentlysuccessfulatadaptingtothepressuresof ‘reflexive

modernization’.Togivetwoexamples,whichwillbehighlyrelevanttotherestofthisstudy,

Giddens noted that ‘the Nordic welfare states have long since concentrated upon active

labour market policies’. 160 As more recent examples, Giddens identified that, then

contemporary, ‘welfare-to-work’ policies, such as those introduced by New Labour were

‘based…asmuchonSwedishpoliciesasupon thosecoming fromtheUS’.161Furthermore,

thenrecentreformsinDenmark(andtheNetherlands),notablythe‘negotiatedeconomy’,

were‘ofdirectrelevancetothirdwaypolitics’.162Giddenswasthereforeimpressedbythe

nascent ‘flexicurity’ agenda (see chapter four). While social democrats in Europe were

159ChantalMouffe,‘HegemonyandIdeologyinGramsci’, inGramsciandMarxistTheory,ed.ChantalMouffe(London:Routledge,1979),168–204;Ryner,CapitalistRestructuring,GlobalisationandtheThirdWay:LessonsfromtheSwedishModel,11.160Giddens,TheThirdWayandItsCritics,17.161Ibid.,30.162Ibid.,31.

87

scepticaloftheThirdWay,then,Giddens,andaswillbedemonstrated inthebodyofthe

thesis,NewLabour,wereinterestedinthereformsofSocialDemocraticpartiesthroughout

Europeaspotentialmodelsfor‘modernization’.

Critically,however,Giddensclaimedthat‘Nordicsocialdemocracyhasbeencharacterizedby

awillingnesstointroducereformsonapragmaticbasiswiththeaimoffindingsolutionsthat

are effective’. 163 Nordic social democrats were therefore positioned as having been

modernisers,beforemodernisationhadevenbeenthoughtaboutinBritain.Thisdesignation

ofNordicsocialdemocracyasapragmaticsolution-orientatedsystemtobeemulatedsetsan

importantdirectionforthisstudy’sanalysisofthere-articulationoftheNordicmodelasa

significantconceptinBritishpolitics.

2.3.3Triangulatingtowardsanemptycentre:Cameron’sBigSociety

MuchanalysisoftheThirdWay,includingthatgivenhere,haslookedattheformulationof

the Third Way as an ideological position distinct from traditional social democracy and

‘neoliberalism’, and argued that ideological concerns conditioned the character of

subsequent reforms. Although there is a pronounced tendency, as discussed above with

reference to the split between rhetoric and action, to try to pinpoint the split between

rhetoricandreform,theneo-GramsciancritiqueadvancedbyMouffeandmanyothershas

argued persuasively that Third Way ideology and its policy programme are relatively

consistent. In the case of the Conservative ‘Big Society’ the situation is rather different,

especiallygiventhatthisisamorerecentphenomenon,andthereforelesshasbeenwritten

163Ibid.,17.

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aboutit.Toaddressthis,Iwilloffersomecontext,setouttheBigSociety’scentralthemes

andofferananalysisofwhathassofarbeenwrittenonthesubject,beforesettingoutits

relevancetothisstudy.

It has become something of a truism, especially since the result of the 2016 European

referendum,thatDavidCameron’stermasPrimeMinisterwascharacterisedbyaconstant

pirouettingfromcrisistocrisis.CameronwontheConservativeleadershipelectionin2005

onaplatformofmovingtheConservativePartytowardsthe‘radicalcentre’andmuchofhis

personalappealtotheelectoratewasmodelledonTonyBlair.Thisapproachhaditsrootsin

theConservatives’responsetoLabour’slandslideelectionvictoryin1997.

UnderWilliamHague(1997-2001)thepartymovedtowardsincreasinglyfree-marketpolicies,

oppositiontotheEuropeanUnion,andcriticismofLabour’simmigrationpolicies.Inthe2001

General Election, Labour increased its majority and the Conservative Party elected Iain

DuncanSmithasits leaderfollowingHague’sresignationasleader.DuncanSmith’stenure

waswidely considered a failure andhewas removed in 2003, two years before the next

GeneralElection.Hisreplacement,MichaelHoward,didrespectablyinthe2005election,but

atthecostofanumberofstanceswhichentrenchedthesuspicionthattheConservatives

werethe‘nastyparty’.Thisisoftensummedupbyanowinfamousadvertisingcampaignin

whichthetagline‘areyouthinkingwhatwe’rethinking?’appearedunderneathsloganssuch

as ‘it’snotracistto impose limitson immigration’.164Thisstrategywasrelativelyeffective,

arguablyinfluencingthestrategyforConservativegeneralelectionvictoriesin2010,2015and

164MartinKettle,‘AreYouThinkingWhatI’mThinkingabouttheElection?’,TheGuardian,8March2005.

89

VoteLeaveintheEuropeanUnionreferendumof2016.However,italienatedmanyliberal

voters,especiallyincitiesanduniversitytowns.

Cameron therefore looked to address areas of perceived Conservative weakness. This

entailedarejectionofissueswhichpreoccupiedtheConservativeParty,butalienatedvoters.

ThisstrategywasoftenglossedbyhisstatementtotheConservativePartyConferencein2006

that:‘[W]hileparentsworriedaboutchildcare,gettingthekidstoschool,balancingworkand

familylife-wewerebangingonaboutEurope’.165Thisusheredinamuchgreateremphasis

onecologicalandsocialissues,epitomisedbytheso-called‘hugahuskie’and‘hugahoodie’

campaigns.166TheBigSocietycampaignitselfappearedratherlateinthisprocess,butitsbasic

contourstookshapeasearlyas2006.Duringhisleadership,Cameronalsotried(andgenerally

failed,withspectacularconsequences)tosuppressissueswhichoccupiedtheConservative

Party,butwereunpopularwithwidersociety.Britain’smembershipoftheEuropeanUnionis

perhapsthemostobviousexampleofthis.

Theresultsofthisstrategywere,atbest,mixed.Theimpactsofthe2008financialcrisismeant

thattheBigSocietyprogramme,whichCameronhadbegunworkingoninopposition,was

effectivelystillborn.Itwasgreetedwithscepticismbythemediaamidquestioningastohow

suchapolicy,whichwas,at itsheart,communitarian,couldbepursuedalongsidemassive

fiscalretrenchment.Whilefewcommentatorsmakethisargumentevennow,itshouldhave

beenobviousthattriangulationhadbeensupersededbyeventsandthattheuneasypre-crisis

165 David Cameron, ‘Leader’s Speech’ (Speech, Conservative Party Conference, Bournemouth, 2006),http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=314.166GeorgeJones,‘CameronTurnsBluetoProveGreenCredentials’,TheDailyTelegraph,21April2006;GabyHinsliff,‘CameronSoftensCrimeImagein“HugaHoodie”Call’,TheObserver,9July2006.

90

interestcoalitionswhichNewLabourhadmanagedtoyoketogether,werenowthemselves

unstableandinsomecasesinastateoftraumaticidentitycrisis.

NewLabour,forexample,wasfondofclaimingthatithadended‘Toryboomandbust’.167

Economistsandpublicfiguresdissentingfromthisviewwereeasilydismissedasthe‘awkward

squad’ (failed to modernise!), because the consensus among mainstream economists,

business figures, themedia and thepolitical partieswas overwhelmingly in favour of the

broadeconomicmodelwhichLabourhadinheritedin1997.By2010,whentheConservatives

andLiberalDemocratsenteredgovernment,thisprecariouscoalitionhadsplinteredinthe

aftermathofthefinancialcrisis.Inthefieldofeconomicsaloneaseriesoffierce,and,atthe

timeofwriting in February2017,unresolved,pitchedbattleswerebeing foughtbetween

orthodoxeconomistsfavouringretrenchment(theInstituteofEconomicAffairsandCentre

forPolicyStudies);168neo-Keynesiansarguingforgreaterpublicborrowing(PaulKrugmanand

Joseph Stiglitz),169and a vocalMarxian and neo-Gramscianminority favouring a range of

measures including debtwrite-downs,170financial re-regulation, and non-market forms of

exchange (Paul Mason). 171 In this climate, attempts to neutralise antagonisms through

triangulationtowardsa‘radicalcentre’weredoomedtofailure,forthesimplereasonthat

theantagonismsthemselveshadbeenradicallyemptiedoftheirmeaningandthecentreitself

167 Tony Blair, ‘Leader’s Speech’ (Labour Party Conference, Brighton, 1997),http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=203;TonyBlair, ‘Leader’sSpeech’ (LabourPartyConference,Brighton,2005),http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=182.168KentMatthews,‘NoCaseforPlanB-LessonsfortheGreatRecessionfromtheGreatDepression’,IEACurrentControversies(London:InstituteofEconomicAffairs,December2011);GeorgeTrefgarne,Metroboom:LessonsfromBritain’sRecoveryinthe1930s(Surrey:CentreforPolicyStudies,2012).169PaulKrugman,‘TheCaseforCutsWasaLie.WhyDoesBritainStillBelieveIt?TheAusterityDelusion’,TheGuardian,29April2015;JosephStiglitz,‘AusterityHasBeenanUtterDisasterfortheEurozone’,TheGuardian,1October2014.170CostasDouzinasetal.,‘AllWeAreSayingIsGiveGreeceaChance’,TheGuardian,17February2015.171PaulMason,‘TheEndofCapitalismHasBegun’,TheGuardian,17July2015.

91

had collapsed into non-meaning. This was, to use a Lacanian term, the irruption of the

traumaticReal,whichdemandsre-symbolization,andre-totalizationofthesocialfield.Put

simply,theparticularcoalitionofinterestswhichTonyBlairandNewLabourhadmanagedto

negotiaterelativelysuccessfullybetween1997and2007hadbeendestroyedbythefinancial

crisis,somethingwhichCameron’sConservatives,andmostcommentatorsonBritishpolitics,

failedtograspadequately.

ThisisclearwhenoneexaminessomeofthefoundingtextsoftheBigSociety,beginningwith

JesseNorman’stextsCompassionateConservatism,CompassionateEconomics,andTheBig

Society.172Norman,aConservativeMP,attemptedtosetoutalogicofconservativethought

‘withitsrootsinAdamSmithandEdmundBurke,anditsmodernflourishinginOakeshottand

FriedrichHayek’.173Followingthefinancialcrisisof2008,Normansharpenedthiscritiquein

awaywhichexplicitlyrejectedtheeconomicideasassociatedwithNewLabourand,inamore

veiledfashion,withThatcherism.Atleastpartofthiswasdonethroughthereclamationof

Adam Smith, as, first and foremost, amoral philosopher, rather than an economist. This

allowedNormantobehighlycriticaloftheeconomicorthodoxywhichhadledtoacultureof

‘rampant materialism’. 174 It also allowed him to carefully put forward a critique of

Thatcherism, in particular her (in)famous remark that “there is no such thing as society”,

which he rejected on the basis that conservatism has a strong tradition of concernwith

institutionsandthatthejuxtapositionofindividualandstatecommonlyfoundintheliberal

172CompassionateConservatism (London:PolicyExchange,2006);CompassionateEconomics (London:PolicyExchange,2008);TheBigSociety (UniversityofBuckinghamPress,2010).Generallyspeaking, theargumentsmadeinthesethreetextsoverlapsignificantly,includingsomepassageswhicharerepeatedverbatimintwoofthethree.Iwillnotalwaysattributemultiplecitationstosuchpassages(whichareusuallythemostimportant),andthissectionusuallypreferstheearliertexts,fortheprosaicreasonthatIreadthemchronologically.173Norman,CompassionateConservatism,57.174Norman,CompassionateEconomics,19.

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traditionaccountsforonlyhalfoftheconservativephilosophicaltradition.175Instead,argues

Norman,societyshouldbeseenas ‘a three-wayrelation,between individuals, institutions

andthestate’.176

ThisisindeedadrasticsplitwiththehegemonicindividualismofThatcherismandtheThird

Way.Whenformulatedas‘athree-wayrelation’, it isevenreminiscentoftheproblematic

whichinformsLarsTrägårdh’sconceptof‘statistindividualism’(see2.2.1,above).177However,

in essence, it was a return to the institutionalism which informed the paternalistic

conservatismof EdmundBurke andOtto vonBismarck, somethingwhichNorman readily

acknowledged. This allowed Norman to address a range of bêtes noir of traditional

conservatives, including ratesofdrugabuse, familybreakdownand lackof social trust,178

whilealsoaddressing indirectly the legacyofThatcher’s governmentonpreviously strong

sectionsofcivilsociety.Inparticular,andimportantlyforthisstudy,Normanwasparticularly

focused onwhat Phillip Blond terms ‘working-class social institutions’,179especially those

whichprovidedsocialservices,which,after1945,weretakenoverbythewelfarestate.

Much as the theorists of the Third Way constructed a theoretical edifice which could

accommodatethefunctioningofglobalmarkets,Normanalsofindsawaytobringmarkets

withinhisschema.Hedoesthisratheringeniouslybyarguingthatitwouldbewrongto:

175Norman,CompassionateConservatism,37.176Ibid.,47;Norman,TheBigSociety,87–91.177Trägårdh,‘StatistIndividualism’;KatrineKielos,‘FlightoftheSwedishBumblebee’,Renewal117,no.2(2009):62.178Norman,CompassionateConservatism,2;Norman,CompassionateEconomics,19.179PhillipBlond,RedTory:HowtheLeftandRightHaveBrokenBritainandHowWeCanFixIt(London:FaberandFaber,2010),14;Norman,CompassionateConservatism,17.

93

exclude institutions that have no physical presence at all. So we are not

talkingmerelyaboutaparticularlocalchurch,orrugbycluborbranchofthe

Women’sInstitute;butalsoaboutthemarket,thenationstateandthecity;

andmoreabstractlystill,aboutthefamily,marriage,andtheruleoflaw.180

Bythisexpedient,marketscanbeintegratedintoaconservativephilosophywhichisexplicitly

anti-individualistic.

Havingreclaimedthemarketasaninstitution,itwasthereforeessentialtoexplainhowthis

visionofthemarketasaninstitutionwasdifferentfromtheactualoperationofmarketsin

contemporarycapitalism.Todothis,NormandrewadistinctionbetweentheChicagoSchool,

ledbyMiltonFriedman,whichheviewedasdrivenbyanatomisticnotionofthesubject,and

thework of FriedrichHayek forwhom individualswere constituted by ‘their existence in

society’.181HelaterexpandedthiscriticismtoincludeJamesBuchananandGordonTullock

thefathersof‘publicchoicetheory’.Hedescribedtheirideasdamningly,saying:‘Thuswas

politicslogicallysubordinatedtoeconomics,andthuswasthetheoreticaljustificationlaidfor

centuriesofvoterdisgust,beforeandafterwards,withpoliticiansandpublicservants’.182This

oppositiontothecentrallogicoftheChicagoSchoolwassharedbyPhillipBlond,authorof

RedTory.HiscriticismoftheThatchereraisworthquotingatsomelength:

itwasdecidedshortlyafterMrsThatcher’selectionin1979thattheinterests

ofthestateandthemarketweresynonymous.Allhersupportersagreedthat

tofurthertheinterestsofthelatterwehadtorestricttheformer,butinorder

180Norman,CompassionateConservatism, 46; This criticalpassage is repeatedverbatim inNorman,TheBigSociety,106.181Norman,CompassionateConservatism,58.182Norman,CompassionateEconomics,26;RepeatedverbatiminNorman,TheBigSociety,55–6.

94

toextendtheinterestsofthemarket,Thatcherhadtoincreasethepowerof

thestate–alogicthatwasonlycompoundedandincreasedbyNewLabour.

Bothmarketandstatethusaccruedpowerinthenameofdemocracy,and

effectivelyandprogressivelyexcludedordinarycitizensfromeconomicand

democraticparticipation.183

Inotherwords,bothNormanandBlondconcludedthataparticularformofhegemonic‘neo-

liberalism’–Blondactuallyusedtheterm–hadtakenholdofBritishpubliclifeandthatithad

damaged the public sphere and many of the institutions which previously characterised

British civil society. Both were particularly concerned with the decline of working-class

institutions,especiallyhealth-insuranceschemes,mutuals,andtradeunions.184Thesolution,

therefore,wasintheencouragementofdiversecivilinstitutionstogrowandflourishatthe

expenseofaparticularformofmarket,populatedbyshareholdercorporations,andthestate.

Although the relationship between themarket and civil society had been complicated by

Norman’s acceptance of markets as ‘a source, not of social breakdown, but of social

cohesion’.185

‘Compassionate Conservatism’ and ‘Red Toryism’ should therefore be seen as essential

precursorstotheBigSocietyproject. It isclearthattheConservativeswereattemptingto

engagewithproblematicportionsoftheirideology,inparticulartheneglectofcivilsociety,

inmuchthesamefashionthatLabourhadattemptedtodothroughtheThirdWay.Thiscould

183Blond,RedTory,4.184Norman,CompassionateConservatism, 17;Blond,RedTory, 14; ConservativeMPRobertHalfonhas alsoarguedforarapprochementbetweentradeunions,exemplifyingtheinstitutionsoftheworkingclass,andtheConservativeParty.StoptheUnion-Bashing(London:Demos,2012).185Norman,CompassionateEconomics,64.

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be summed up in Theresa May’s famous designation of the Conservatives as ‘the nasty

party’.186Thereareclearelectoralimplicationsofthis,especiallygiventhatDavidCameron,

then Leader of the Conservative Party, had embarked on a self-consciously modernising

project which argued that ‘changing your party is just the precursor of changing your

country’.187ThisisnottosaythattherewasnotscepticismoftheBigSociety,evenamong

thosesupportiveof theConservativeParty,nora recognition thatportionsof theagenda

wouldproveproblematicintheaftermathofthefinancialcrisis.WritinginTheBigSociety

Challenge both Liz Truss, a Conservative MP, and Anna Coote, of the New Economics

Foundation,madeexactlythispoint.Trussarguedthat‘aseriesofcrises…haveshakenpublic

faith in the economy and our political system’. 188 Coote’s consideration was extremely

thoroughandaddressedtherelationshipbetween‘austerity’andtheBigSocietyprogramme.

Pre-emptingsomeoftheacademicliteraturewhichwillbeconsideredshortly,shenotedthat

theBigSocietywould fundamentallyalter thecontoursof the ‘post-warwelfare state’.189

Moreover,shenotedthat itwasuncleartowhatextentthepluralityof institutionswhich

Norman and Blond favoured would be able to flourish ‘as big corporates move in’, and

questioned the coherence of ‘shifting functions away from the state to independent

organisations if the new “providers” simply replicate thedeliverymodels of the state’.190

Therewas,then,scepticismastothepotentialoftheBigSocietytofunctioninconditionsof

fiscalretrenchment.

186MichaelWhiteandAnnePerkins,‘“NastyParty”WarningtoTories’,TheGuardian,8October2002.187Fredrik Reinfeldt,TheNew SwedishModel: A ReformAgenda forGrowth and the Environment (London:LondonSchoolofEconomics,2008).188LizTruss,‘Foreword’,inTheBigSocietyChallenge,ed.MarinaStott(Cardiff:KeystoneDevelopmentTrust,2011),ix.189AnnaCoote, ‘Big Society and theNewAusterity’, inTheBig Society Challenge, ed.Marina Stott (Cardiff:KeystoneDevelopmentTrust,2011),82.190Ibid.,88–9.

96

However,thispivotfromThatcherismtowardsaconservativetraditionconcernedprimarily

withinstitutionssuggestssomeofthelogicoflookingtotheNordiccountriesasapotential

for reform, especially given the incompatibility of Compassionate Conservatism with the

libertarianism so characteristic of contemporary Republicanism in the United States.

Politically, therefore,DavidCameron foundmuch to recommendFredrikReinfeldt’s ‘New

Moderates’.ReinfeldtbecameleaderoftheModeratePartyin2003and,muchlikeCameron,

lookedtoNewLabourasamodelforelectoralsuccess.191In2006,Reinfeldt,asleaderofthe

largest party in the liberal-conservative ‘Alliance’ (Alliansen), became Prime Minister of

Sweden.192TheModeratePartydidevenbetterinthe2010election,winningalmostashigh

apercentageofthevotesastheSocialDemocrats,althoughsignificantportionsofthisgain

appeartohavebeenattheexpenseofitscoalitionpartners,astheAlliancelostitsoverall

parliamentarymajority.193

Thisincludedapoliticalagendawhichhadbeendevelopedtomediatebetweenconflicting

corporatist and liberal instincts, both within the party and in Swedenmore generally. A

furtherattractionwastheemphasisonecological issues,whichCameronhadalignedwith

theBigSocietyagenda.Indeed,itisnoteworthythatCameronandReinfeldtsharedaplatform

attheLondonSchoolofEconomicsin2008atwhichReinfeldt’slecturewastitled‘TheNew

191TorbjörnNilsson,‘Moderaternaviddentredjevägensslut’,SvenskTidskrift,no.5(2003):9–14.192 Nicholas Aylott and Niklas Bolin, ‘Towards a Two-Party System? The Swedish Parliamentary Election ofSeptember2006’,WestEuropeanPolitics30,no.3(2007):621–33.193Nicholas Aylott andNiklas Bolin, ‘Polarising Pluralism: The Swedish Parliamentary Election of September2014’,WestEuropeanPolitics38,no.3(2015):730–40.

97

SwedishModel:AReformAgendaforGrowthandtheEnvironment’.194Theconnectionwas

eventuallyformalisedasthe‘NorthernFutureForum’.195

On the other hand, therewere areas of ideological difficulty in the relationship between

Cameron’sBigSocietyandReinfeldt’sNewModeratesplatform.Firstly,forallthatReinfeldt

wasmotivatedbyadesiretoencouragegrowthandmaintainatightfiscalpolicy,thiscame

withthecaveatthatthepurposeofthiswastocreatetheconditionsforfullemployment.For

Cameron,suchmeasureswereameanstocontrolinflation.196Moreover,giventhatthework

ofNormanandBlondhadsoemphaticallyrejectedMiltonFriedmanandtheChicagoSchool,

itisratherironicthattheUKConservativeswerenonethelessattractedtoSwedishvoucher

reforms, an ideawhichwas taken from Friedman and refined by public choice theorists,

whose work had also been rejected as leading to social atomism. Finally, Reinfeldt was

insistentonthenecessityofactivegovernmentinvestmentininfrastructure,andtheNordic

countriesingeneralhavealwayshaddevelopedindustrialpolicies.IncommonwiththeThird

Way,Cameron’sBigSocietywasunabletoseebeyondpublicservicereformastheremitof

thestate,anditistellingthatneitherNorman,norBlond,northeauthorsofTheBigSociety

Challengeputforwardmeaningfulsuggestionsforanindustrialpolicy.

PartsoftheacademicliteratureontheBigSocietywhichhasbeenpublishedthusfarhave

tended to see the Big Society as a cynical attempt cover up an underlying privatisation

194Reinfeldt,TheNewSwedishModel.195JamesCrabtree,‘DowningSt’sVikingInvasion’,TheFinancialTimes,14January2011.196Reinfeldt,TheNewSwedishModel.

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agenda.197Otherscholarsnotethattheconditionsforasomewhatnostalgicpolicyhadbeen

underminedbydecadesofderegulation,sincetheagenda‘dependsonrelativelystablework

and stable local or work-based communities: social policies from Thatcher on have

underminedthesematerialbasesofself-organization,resilienceandsociality’.198Yetothers

emphasisedtheextenttowhichtheBigSocietywasforcedtocompetewiththeopposing

logicsof‘theshrinkingstate,marketizationandapaternalisticviewofpersonalresponsibility’,

or that the programme was subject to internal splits, rendering it incoherent: ‘policy

announcementslinkedtopublicservicereformhavefocusedonwhatmightbedescribedas

a“thin”ratherthan“big”conceptionofcitizenship,emphasisingthecitizenasanindividual

consumerratherthanacommunitymember’.199

WhilealloftheseapproacheshaveidentifiedclearflawsintheBigSociety,uptothepointof

notingthatthevoluntaryandprivatesectorswereunlikelytospontaneouslyfillthegapleft

by the statewithout significant investment, they have generally notmade the argument

which informsthisthesis,thatare-orientationtowards institutionsandcivilsociety,while

potentiallyappropriate in2006,hadbecomeallbut impossibleby2008,asmanyofthese

institutionshadforfeitedtheirsymbolicmandatesasaresultoftheirrolesin,orresponses

to,thefinancialcrisisof2008.Thisisespeciallytruegiventhecorepositionofthemarket-as-

197 See, for example, Peter North, ‘Geographies and Utopias of Cameron’s Big Society’, Social & CulturalGeography12,no.8(2011):823:‘Coulditbe,then,thatcivilsocietyisbeingsetuptofail?Thattherealagendaisprivatisation?’198R.Levitas,‘TheJust’sUmbrella:AusterityandtheBigSocietyinCoalitionPolicyandbeyond’,CriticalSocialPolicy32,no.3(2012):16.199DanielSage,‘AChallengetoLiberalism?TheCommunitarianismoftheBigSocietyandBlueLabour’,CriticalSocialPolicy32,no.3(2012):376;HelenSullivan,‘DEBATE:ABigSocietyNeedsanActiveState’,Policy&Politics40,no.1(2012):147.

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institutionwhichunderpinnedsignificantpartsoftheCompassionateConservativeandRed

Toryagendas.

Therefore,whiletheoverwhelmingmajorityofscholarsofcontemporaryBritishpoliticshave

been scathing in their cynicism about the ‘Big Society’ project, I would like to offer a

qualificationtotheargumentthattheBigSocietywasapurelycynicalmarketingexercise.In

part,Cameron’sadoptionof theBigSocietywas clearlyapragmatic response to thenow

clichédesignationof theConservativesas ‘thenastyparty’,butwhetherheandhispolicy

wonks really believed it or not, the Big Society has in an important way lived on in the

Conservative-LiberalDemocratlegislativeprogramme.Thereiscertainlyacasetobemade

thatsomeofthemostsignificantfailuresandunintendedconsequencesthataroseduringthe

Conservative-LiberalDemocratcoalition(2010-2015)didsoasaresultofatripartitetension

betweenthelogicsofso-called‘austerity’,thecentralisationofpowerinBritishinstitutions

andtheutopianismofapseudo-communitarianideologyaroundwhichpolicyhadnotonly

beenmarketed,butdesigned.

2.3.4Conclusions

This section has identified and critiqued several pronounced tendencies in recent British

political and public policy debates. It argued that attempts to analyse party politics

programmaticallyhasaddedagreatdealtocontemporaryunderstandingsofsociety,political

partiesandsocialdemocracyinEurope.However, itnotedthatsuchapproachesgenerally

treatpartiesasdiscrete,nationalphenomena.Therehavebeenrelativelyfewstudiesabout

linksbetweenpoliticalpartieswhichcrossnationalborders.Thisthesishopestoshowthat

political developments occurring elsewhere can be, and are, of immediate relevance to

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politicalprojectsinotherstates.Itsaimistoopenatransnationaldimensiontoscholarship

onBritainandtheNordicmodelbyidentifyingconcretediscoursesandlinksbetweenpolitical

actors.Thenextchapterwillarguethatthe InteractiveGovernanceParadigmcanassist in

creatingaframeworkforthisanalysis.

Theimplicitsplitbetweenrhetoricandaction,orthetendencytoidealismandmaterialism,

wasalsoidentifiedabove.Iarguedthatscholarstendtomeasurethesuccessofpoliciesand

politicalprogrammesagainsteither theirmaterialconsequencesor theirstated intentions

andexpressedsomescepticismaboutwhethereithercouldbeunderstoodindependentlyof

theother.Forthisreason,thenextchapterwillsetoutamodelofdiscoursetheorywhich

treatsdiscourseasmaterialand,thoughnotalwaystotallysuccessful,setsoutamethodology

whichdoesnotdismisseithertheideologicalorthematerial.

Theprecedingdiscussionalso argued that atboth superficial and fundamental levels two

Britishpoliticalprojectswithgreatrelevanceforthisstudy,theThirdWayandBigSociety,

haveagreatdeal incommon.Bothareasmuchconcernedwithelectoralsuccessandthe

creationof a political, or at least governmental, hegemonyaswith transformationof the

socialfield.Botharealsocharacterisedbyattemptstodealwithcontentiousissueswhichhad

previouslydividedtheLabourandConservativepartiesrespectively.InthecaseoftheThird

Way,theperceptionoftheLabourParty’shostilitytotheprivatesectorandindividualistic

values; for the Big Society, a perception that the Conservatives had nothing to offer civil

society.Thesimilaritiesdonotendtherehowever.Despitetheemphasisonelectoralpolitics,

bothThirdWayandBigSocietysharedanarrowviewofpoliticsandthepolitical.

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Ratherthanaspiringtoawide-rangingtransformisthegemony,likethatoftheThatcherera,

bothaspiredsimplytoneutralisethepotentialantagonismsbetweeninterestcoalitions.This

mustberegardednotasafeatureoftheissueswhichthesepoliticalprojectsaddressed,but

ratherasanindicatorofthingswhichtheydidnot.NewLabourandCameron’sConservatives

bothbracketedtheissueofindustrialpolicy.Theleversoverwhichgovernmenthadcontrol

werefundamentallylimitedtofiscalpolicy,creatingaregulatoryframeworkforsocialactors,

andfunding,butnotnecessarilyproviding,publicservices.Indeed,afurtherdemonstration

of this is that one ofNew Labour’s first acts in governmentwas to privatise the Bank of

England,therebyremovingmonetarypolicyfrompoliticalcontrol.Thisfundamentallylimited

theabilityofeitherprojecttodissentfromorcontrolthepoliticalroleofmarkets,whether

ornotmarket-basedpoliticswasactuallyconsistentwiththeirpoliticalvisions.FortheBig

Society inparticular, theperception thatmarketshad failed in theirdistributive functions

during the 2008 financial crisis and the ensuing shock to the global political system this

engendered,createdaclimateofextremescepticismtowardsapoliticalprojectwhichhad

takentheroleofmarketsessentiallyforgranted.

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2.4.Conclusionsandfurtherquestions

The conclusions to each section in the last two chapters have attempted to sketch out

questionsthrownupbyanalysesandargumentsabouttheNordicmodelatdifferenttime

periods.Whatwillthisstudyadd?

The most common articulation of the Nordic model today is still related to its Social

Democraticnature.ItisheavilyassociatedwithSwedishclaimsandpolicyregimes,although

nationaldiscourses,especiallyrelatingtoDanishflexicurityandFinnishschools,arebecoming

increasingly widespread. Importantly, the balance between a socialist discourse and a

conservativeandliberaldiscourseofNorden,inwhichNordenwasasocialistutopiaanda

liberaldystopia,areincreasinglydifficulttosustain.Thishasinparttodowithastrugglefor

politicalhegemonyintheNordiccountriesbetweensocialdemocracyandalliancesofliberal

andconservativeparties.ThisisespeciallytrueinSweden,wheretheNewModeratesunder

FredrikReinfeldtwontwogeneralelections,in2006and2010,beforelosingin2014.Thiswas

thelongestperiodofnon-SAPruleinSwedensince1932.AmoredetailedoutlineoftheNew

Moderateagendawillbegiveninchapterthree,butthepublicationofTheNordicWayand

recentconflictoverthemeaningofthe‘Nordicmodel’(see2.2.1,above),indicatethatthis

remainsalivepoliticalissueinSweden(andNorden).

It isalsorelatedtoachange in the ideologyandaimsofsocialdemocracy inEurope.The

discussion of the Third Way above sketched out a sense of this change, which will be

examinedfurtherinacasestudyofNewLabour’shealthpolicyinchapterfour.

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A key aimof this studywill therefore be to offer an answer to thequestionofwhat the

contemporary Nordic model discourses are, however, this question implies a subsidiary

questionaboutwhethertheassumptionthattheNordicmodelrepresentsamodelofSocial

Democracyisbecomingincreasinglyproblematic.

This chapter alsooutlined several observations about the contemporary literatureon the

Nordicmodel. ItwasarguedthatmanycontemporarystudiesfocusonNordeneitherasa

nationalmodelsubjecttochangefromoutside,the‘globalisation’argument,ortheyseeitas

constitutedbyaseriesofdiscrete(usuallysociallydemocratic)politicalprojects,whichcan

be compared with other discrete political projects. This thesis aims to offer a different

approach.Necessarily,thisapproachwillhavelimits,butitwillofferatransnationalanalysis

oftheNordicmodelandattempttocomplicatethe(structural)globalisationargumentand

the(agent-centred)politicalprojectargument.Todothis,Iwilluseamethodologyinfluenced

bytheInteractiveGovernanceParadigm,whichwillbesetoutinchaptertwo.

Finally,thischapterarguedthatscholarshavetendedtoemploymethodologieswhichsplit

rhetoricalandmaterialphenomena,or,asitwasdescribedhere,rhetoricandaction.Scholars

have respondedwith limitless cynicism topolitical ideologyof all varieties, attempting to

prove the emptiness of ideology through comparison with material effects or the

(in)consistencyofideologiesovertime.Assetoutabove,Irejectthissplitonthegroundsthat

withoutideologicalarticulationthematerialassuchcannotexist. Inordertotheorisethis,

andtoexaminesomeimportanttheoreticalandmethodologicalissues,thenextchapterwill

dealwith thisquestion throughadiscussionofdiscourse theoryas setoutby Laclauand

Mouffe,whichwillbeemployedasananalyticaltoolthroughoutthisstudy.

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ChapterThree–GovernanceandDiscourse:Approachingthe

Nordicmodelasaquestionofpublicpolicy

3.1Introduction

TheprevioustwochaptersquestionedthemeaningoftheNordicmodelasaconcept,asking

howithadchangedovertime,andpointedtowardsthecontoursofthediscussionwithwhich

this thesis will be concerned. Primarily, the last chapters offered an explication of the

differentvisionsoftheNordicmodelandtriedtodrawouttheimplicationsofthesedifferent

analyses of what constitutes the Nordic. The majority of approaches considered were

concernedwith the socialist or social democratic implications ofNordic political projects,

howeverliberalandconservativeimagesofNordenwerealsoconsidered.Inparticular,itwas

arguedthattheaftermathoftheSwedish/Finnishfinancialcrisisof1991/2hadasignificant

andlastingeffectonSwedishandNordicidentities.

Ifthepreviouschaptersinitiatedanargumentabout‘whatwassaid?’,thischapterposesthe

equally vital questions, ‘who said it, andwhy?’. I argue that by asking this question, and

rigorouslyspecifyingthefield,itispossibletocreateamuchclearerpictureofwhichactors

articulatetheNordicmodel,whydoingsoisimportanttothem,andtoadvancemuchmore

detailedhypothesesaboutthediscursiveeffectsoftheNordicmodelasapoliticalproject

outsideNorden.Theanalysisinthisthesiswillbebasicallylimitedtodiscoursestakingplace

intheUnitedKingdom.

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ChaptertwoconsideredTheNordicWaypamphlet,whichwaspresentedtothe2011World

EconomicForum.200Thediscussionfocusedonthecontentofthepamphlet:whatclaimsdid

itmakeabouttheNordicmodel?However,thisonlyaccountsforhalfoftheimportanceof

thepamphlet.GiventhattheWorldEconomicForumisaclosedmeetingforgloballeaders

from politics, business, finance and so forth, it is clearly important that the Swedish

government, at that time led by Fredrik Reinfeldt’sModerate Party, felt it necessary and

important that such a group should receive apamphlet about theNordic countries, their

politics,economicsandbusinessclimates.

Muchoftheliteraturewhichwillbeconsideredinthisstudyhasasimilarprovenance.Johan

Wennström’sshortpiece,TheAwfulTruthAboutSweden,waspublishedbytheInstituteof

EconomicAffairs(IEA).201ThepieceoffersastrongrebuttaltoanarticleinTheGuardian,a

British newspaper, which argued that Sweden offered a successful economic and public

service model. 202 The IEA is a free-market think-tank operating in London, which has

important links with Sweden, including the Swedish free-market think-tank Timbro. 203

Wennströmhimselfwasa researchassociate thereand laterwenton towork forFredrik

Reinfeldt’sNewModeratesduringtheirsecondgovernment(2010-14). Itshouldtherefore

notbeseenasacoincidencethatmanyoftheargumentswhichWennströmadvancedinhis

articlemirrorthepolicyplatformonwhichtheModerateswouldgovernSweden.204

200Eklund,Berggren,andTrägårdh,‘TheNordicWay’.201 JohanWennström, ‘The Awful Truth About Sweden’, Current Controversies Paper (London: Institute ofEconomicAffairs,2005).202PollyToynbee,‘TheMostSuccessfulSocietytheWorldHasEverKnown’,TheGuardian,25October2005.203These links are longstanding and durable. See, for example, ‘Epicenter Press Release’, 14October 2014,http://www.iea.org.uk/in-the-media/press-release/iea-launches-new-european-policy-initiative.204Reinfeldt,TheNewSwedishModel.

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PärNuder, a Swedish SocialDemocraticpoliticianand former financeminister, hashada

connectionwithBritishthink-tankssincetheearly2000s,havingwrittenpiecesforbothPolicy

Network and the Institute for Public PolicyResearch (IPPR).205In particular,Nuder’s 2012

contribution to the IPPR shouldbe considereda rebuttal to attemptsbyUKConservative

politicians to use Sweden as a model for fiscal retrenchment and quasi-market service

reforms.

In2011,PerLedin,thenCEOofKunskapsskolan,achainofSwedishfor-profitschools,wrote

toTheObservernewspapertoargueagainstapiecewhichwashighlycriticaloftheSwedish

education system, especially its school chains.206Given thatTheObserver newspaper had

opposedasimilarreforminEnglandandKunskapsskolanhadbegunexpandingintoEnglish

schoolprovision,thiswasaclearattempttodefendboththecoreSwedishbusinessandthe

nascentEnglishportionofKunskapsskolan’soperations.207

Should these publications therefore be considered interventions in British or Swedish (or

Nordic)politics,orboth?Howshouldthevariousinterestsandcoalitionsofdifferentactors

betheorisedandunderstood?WhatistheroleoforganisationsliketheIEAandtheIPPRin

facilitating the creation of new public policy discourse? What is the role of the media,

government,NGOsandprivatecompanies?Whoaretheseinterventionsaimedat:politicians,

otherpolicyactors,orthegeneralpublic?

205‘ChallengeofRenewal’, inProgressivePolitics,vol.1.1(London:PolicyNetwork,2002),40–45;‘SavingtheSwedishModel’.206PerLedin,‘Letter:SwedenIsaTrulyClassAct’,TheObserver,25September2011;DispatchMalmö,Sweden,‘IntheLandThatPioneeredFreeSchools,theEducationBacklashIsGatheringPace’,TheObserver,11September2011.207JaneBird,‘Twickenham:AmbitiousSwedesPutAcademytotheTest’,TheFinancialTimes,4November2010.

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Toanswerthesequestionsthisstudywilldrawonthreeseparateliteraturesinanattemptto

situateactorsandtheirroleswithrelationtooneanother.Firstly,Iwillconsidertheexisting

literatureon think-tanksandexplain inwhatways this studywilluse insightsprovidedby

scholars working on think-tanks and in which areas it will attempt to supplement them.

Secondly,Iwillarguethatthemostrelevantframefortheempiricalanalysisundertakenhere

isaparadigmofgovernance.Abriefelaborationoftheconceptofgovernancewillbegiven

andthespecificargumentsofthetheoryofgovernancewhichwillbeusedherewillbelaid

out. Thirdly and finally, relevant portions of Laclau and Mouffe’s discourse theoretical

approachwillbeputforwardtoexplainhowthevarioussourcesunderconsiderationwillbe

analysed.

Although this study will argue for the necessity of a transnational understanding of

governanceandsocialsteering,itisworthnotingherethatitwilldosoprimarilythroughthe

analysisofUK-basedgovernancenetworks.Thisisprimarilyaresponsetothesheerdifficulty

ofconductingadiscourseanalysiswiththevastamountofdatawhichwouldbegenerated

byanalysingpolicydocumentsgeneratedinBritainandtheNordiccountries.Evenwhenthe

primaryfocusisonpolicystatementsmadeinoraboutBritain,however,itisstillpossibleto

demonstratetheimportantlinkagesbetweenBritishandNordicactors,astheselectionof

interventionsbySwedishactorsabovedemonstrated.

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3.2Governance:Theorisingrelationsbetweenactors

3.2.1Think-tanks,governmentandthemedia:Isthatreallyit?

This study will use a theory of governance to structure its observations about relations

betweenactors.208Asignificantliteraturealreadyexistsaboutthink-tanks,actorswithwhich

this study will be concerned in great depth. A think-tank will be defined as a private or

independentresearchinstitute.Thisexcludesuniversitiesandotherpublicresearchbodies.209

Whilethisthesiswillusethethink-tankliteratureasastartingpoint, itsaimsaredifferent

fromscholarshipaboutthink-tanks,sinceitsobjectofstudyistheNordicmodel,ratherthan

think-tanks themselves.Moreover, since I consider that the relationships between think-

tanksandotheractorsareunder-theorisedinpartsoftheexistingliterature,agovernance

paradigmhasbeenchosentostructurethisstudy’sengagementwiththink-tanks,butitwill

behelpfultosetoutthedifficultieswiththethink-tankapproachasameansofdemonstrating

theneedtogobeyondit.

Muchanalysisofthink-tankshasbeenfocusedontheirplaceinthecreationofpublicpolicy

and their role in shaping policy discourse. The desire to provide some sort of empirical

measurement of this has therefore generally conditioned approaches to think-tanks.

Primarily, the success of think-tanks has been measured in two ways: through the

implementation of specificmeasures championed by think-tanks, and by coverage in the

208Governancewillbeunderstoodhereas‘theprocessofsteeringsocietyandtheeconomythroughcollectiveactionandinaccordancewithsomecommonobjectives’.JacobTorfingetal.,InteractiveGovernance:AdvancingtheParadigm(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2012),14.Seealso3.2.2below.209FollowingDianeStone,CapturingthePoliticalImagination:ThinkTanksandthePolicyProcess(London:FrankCass&Co.,1996).However,Stone is consideringonlyUKandUS think-tanks. It isworthnoting that suchadistinctionmightberatherproblematicwhenappliedelsewhere.Germanyinparticularhasa longhistoryofindependent research institutions which, despite meeting the letter of Stone’s definition, would surely beexcluded fromthespiritof it, since theyarenotengaged in thekindofpoliticaladvocacy inwhichStone isprimarilyinterested.

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media.Neitherofthesestandardsisespeciallysatisfactory,orindeedparticularlymeasurable.

Thebehavioursofthink-tanksthemselvescomplicatemattersfurther,sincethink-tankswill

frequentlyattempttotakecreditfortheimplementationofpolicywhichresemblesapolicy

paper, even where the role of the policy paper in shaping the policy is unclear or non-

existent.210On the other hand, as Stephen Ball has argued, there are clearly similarities

between the policy agenda of political parties and Ministers of State, and think-tank

publications.211

Attemptingtomeasurethesuccessofthink-tanksbasedontheirmediapenetrationisjustas

problematic. The relationshipbetween think-tanks and themedia, especiallynewspapers,

television and radio, is symbiotic. Think-tanks can get their positions across to a mass

audience,whileeditorsareabletopublishorbroadcastinterestingorprovocativeitems.212

Moreover, think-tanks pursue a variety of strategies,with some stressing research-driven

agendasandothersfavouringpartisanadvocacy,withahostofpositionsinbetween.213The

growingroleoftheinternetandtheprecariouspositionofprintmediahasnodoubtfurther

complicated this relationship, given the downward pressure on newspaper budgets; the

growinginvolvementofpublicrelationsactorsandsponsorsincreating‘news’content,and

the different businessmodels (paywall vs. advertising) being pursued by differentmedia

groups.Thisisregrettablyoutsidethescopeofthisstudy.

210 JohanWennström, ‘The Awful Truth About Sweden’, Current Controversies Paper (London: Institute ofEconomicAffairs,2005).211StephenBall, ‘Education,Majorismand“theCurriculumoftheDead”’,CurriculumStudies1,no.2(1993):196.212DenhamandGarnett,‘TheNatureandImpactofThinkTanks’,55.213 Diane Stone, ‘Non-Governmental Policy Transfer: The Strategies of Independent Policy Institutes’,Governance:AnInternationalJournalofPolicyandAdministration13,no.1(2000):46.

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This traditional discussion about the best ways to measure the impact of think-tanks

therefore places them in a presumptive relationship with government and the media.

Althoughmost scholars stress the roleofother actorsengaged in awiderpolicyprocess,

whichhaveincludedarangeofinstitutions,including‘banks,consultanciesandlawfirms’,214

aswellasthe‘climateofopinion’,215thepresumptionthatpolicyprocessesoccurprimarilyin

governmentpermeatesthesediscussionsoftheeffectivenessofthink-tanks.Thisisclearlya

resultofanattempttoengageempiricallywiththink-tankswithoutfullytheorisingthepolicy

fieldinwhichtheyoperate,butitalsosuffersfromtheassumptionthatallactorsengagedin

policyformationseekto influencegovernments.Whilethis isclearlyan importantaimfor

policyactors,itisbynomeanstheonlyavailablestrategy.

ThreeexamplesofinterventionsbySwedishactorsintoBritishpoliticsweregivenabove.Two

intervenedinadebateinanewspaperandtwowerepublishedthroughthink-tanks.These

representstrategieswhichwereplayedoutinthepublicsphere,butwhichwere,inlinewith

the strategy employed by think-tanks, designed to influence ‘the views of a small

metropolitanmediaandpoliticalelitethatshapedpolicydebateinBritain’.216Thepolitical

eliteshouldhoweverbeconceivedofaswidelyaspossible,includingbusinessleaders,such

as Per Ledin, the CEO of a Kunskapsskolan, as well as elected and unelected officials,

intellectuals,academics,leadersofNGOs,tradeunionfigures,journalists,legalexpertsand

soforth.ThisechoesRenateMayntz’sargumentthatthetargetofstrategiesemployedby

214Ibid.,61–2.215DenhamandGarnett,‘TheNatureandImpactofThinkTanks’,57.216BenJackson, ‘TheThink-TankArchipelago:ThatcherismandNeo-Liberalism’, inMakingThatcher’sBritain,ed.BenJacksonandRobertSaunders(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,2012),52.

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networkedactorsisprimarilyothernetworkedactors,ratherthanamorphouspublics.217A

governanceparadigmismoresuitedtosuchananalysisthanafieldconstitutedaroundthe

actionsofthink-tanks.

Furthermore,thethink-tankliteratureisgoodatdescribingandcontextualisingtheroleof

think-tanks,218butithassofarstruggledtofindsuccessfulmethodstoempiricallyanalysethe

waysthatthink-tanksshapepublicpolicymoregenerally.Finally,itisworthnotingthatwhen

thequestioniswidenedfromspecificpolicycreationtosocialsteeringmoregenerally,which,

given this study’s emphasis onmaterial consequences of Nordic policies in the UK, is an

essentialpartofthequestion,itisnecessarytogobeyondthequestionofgovernment,media

andthink-tankrelations.

For present purposes, therefore, there are good reasons to situate actors as part of

governancenetworks;eveniftherewillinevitablybedisagreementsaboutthenatureofthe

fieldasIwilltheoriseithere,itissurelybettertoconstituteanobjectofstudy,ratherthan

assumeit.

217RenateMayntz, ‘Policy-NetzwerkeunddieLogikvonVerhandlungssystemen’, inPolicy-Analyse:KritikUndNeuorientierung, ed. Adrienne Héritier (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1993), 39–56; Renate Mayntz,‘Modernization and the Logic of Inter-Organizational Networks’, in Societal Change between Market andOrganization,ed.JohnChild,MichelCrozier,andRenateMayntz(Aldershot:Avebury,1993).218DenhamandGarnett,‘TheNatureandImpactofThinkTanks’;AndrewDenhamandMarkGarnett,‘Influencewithout Responsibility? Think-Tanks in Britain’, Parliamentary Affairs 52, no. 1 (1999): pp. 46–57; AndrewDenham and Mark Garnett, ‘“What Works”? British Think Tanks and the “End of Ideology”’, The PoliticalQuarterly 77, no. 2 (2006): 156–65; Stone, Capturing the Political Imagination: Think Tanks and the PolicyProcess.

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3.2.2Thedevelopmentofgovernanceasaconcept

Before amethodology grounding a network-based analysis can be set out, however, it is

important toexplain themajor contoursof thedebateongovernanceandoutlinehowa

paradigm created to analyse networked systems has developed. R.A.W. Rhodes’

UnderstandingGovernance outlines the context of the concept of governance and offers

variousdescriptivedefinitions.Hisuseofthetermorientshisworkinafieldwhichopposes

theoutmoded,institutionalistperspectiveoftheWestminsterModel,whichhaddominated

analysisofpoliticalinstitutions,andthereforealsopublicpolicy,beforethen.219Heidentifies

themovetowardsagovernance-basedpolicyterrainasaresultofthegradualfragmentation

of theexecutiveand its replacementwith ‘asymmetric interdependence’.220Rhodesnotes

that the proliferation of the term governance has generally occurred in response to

‘globalization’;however,he,probablycorrectly,suggeststhatthetermglobalisationhasno

generallyagreedmeaningandthatitseffectsaredifficulttodistinguishfromtheconcomitant

force of Europeanization, which does at least have an agreed meaning. 221 Moreover, a

drawbacktobothtermsisthedesignationofparticulartrendsaspossessingspecific, if ill-

defined,origins,therebyprejudgingananalysisoftheoriginationofforcescreatingchanges

insocialformations.Asaresult,unlessdiscussingargumentswhichexplicitlycallfortheiruse,

thisthesiswillgenerallyeschewthetermsglobalisationandEuropeanization.

WhileRhodescautiouslyendorsesbothterms,histheoryofgovernancecounterpointsthe

‘hollowingout’ofthestatefromtheoutsidewiththeassertionofashiftinBritishgovernance

219 R.A.W. Rhodes,Understanding Governance: Policy Networks, Governance, Reflexivity and Accountability(Buckingham:OpenUniversityPress,1997),7–8.220Ibid.,15.221Ibid.,18.

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during the 1980s and 1990s towards a more fragmented executive, which he calls the

‘differentiatedpolity’.Thismodelarguesthattheinternallogicofactionfromthecentre,in

thiscaseWestminster,alsoplayedanimportantroleintheestablishmentofpolicynetworks.

Moreover,movestowardstheexclusionofhistoricactors,particularlylocalcouncils,butalso

medical organisations, trade unions and so on, as well as the inclusion of new actors,

especiallybusinesses,createdasysteminwhichexcludedgroupswerefoundtobeintegral

totheimplementationofpolicy,whereasnewgroupswerelessamenabletopressurefrom

thecentrethantheoldoneshadbeen.Theinternallogicofthenewsystemdesigntherefore

didconsiderablelong-termdamagetothecentre’sabilitytoengageinpolicysteering.222

BevirandRhodes’laterworkadoptedapost-foundationalistapproachtogovernance,which

aimedtoexploretheconceptofgovernance‘byunpackingtherelevantbeliefsandexplaining

whytheyarose’.223Thisapproachgeneratedasignificantquantityofdescriptiveanalysesof

British and international governance structures, not least on the subject of New Public

Management (NPM), good governance (as used by the World Bank), and international

interdependence. However, despite producing at least seven descriptive definitions of

governance,BevirandRhodesfailedtoproduceaconcise,workabledefinitionofgovernance.

Therefore,eventhoughtherearesignificantpositivestothepost-foundationalapproach–

especially its high level of tolerance for ambiguity; a stance which is typically missing in

conventionalpoliticalscienceepistemologies–itisnotapositionaroundwhichagovernance-

222Ibid.,13–17.223MarkBevirandR.A.W.Rhodes,InterpretingBritishGovernance(London:Routledge,2003),17–43.

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orientatedresearchprogrammecanbeorganised,sincesuchanopennotionofgovernance

meansthatgovernancecanbeseeneverywhere,renderingtheconceptmeaningless.224

Moreover, there are tensions in Rhodes’, and Bevir and Rhodes’ characterisation of

governance,which has led to both theoretical and empirical criticismsof the governance

paradigm.ClausOffeaskswhethergovernanceshouldbeconsideredan‘emptysignifier’(for

broaderdiscussionofthistermsee3.3.2below),achargewhichapproachestheconceptby

questioningitsconceptualefficacyinactuallyexplainingthestructuresitseekstodescribe.

Offearguesthatsyntacticallygovernancemerelyfulfilsthesamefunctionasglobalization;

sinceglobalizationisgenerallyusedinthepassivevoice(e.g.‘textilesupplychainshavebeen

globalized’)itproducesthegrammaticaleffectofaprocesswithoutasubject.225Thesame

case can be made for governance, as the effects of decentred governance, rather than

executivegovernment,produceeffectswithoutanagentwhocanbeheldaccountable.226

H.K.Colebatcharguesthatithasnotbeenempiricallyverifiedthatgovernancehasemerged

sincetheintroductionofliberalreformsinthe1980s.Heoffersamorethoroughgoingcritique

than Offe, when he argues for the need to ‘cut off the king’s head’, in the sense of

disentangling the term government from a notion of a sentient actor. In other words,

governance practitioners assume that non-governmental actors have a significant role in

producingtheeffectsofgovernment,howeverthisleavesthesignifier‘government’intactas

the empty point around which a ‘modernist liberal democratic narrative of government’

224JacobTorfingetal.,InteractiveGovernance:AdvancingtheParadigm(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2012),13–14.225Offe,‘Governance-“EmptySignifier”odersozialwissenschaftlichesForschungsprogramm?’226Ibid.

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organisesitself.227Moreover,heargues, it isunclearwhethergovernancestructuresarein

factnew,asistypicallyassumed,orwhetheritissimplytheuseofthetermthatisnew.The

widely-held contention that relationships andnetworks havediversified, complicated and

deepenedcannotbeverified,becauseaccountshavehistoricallyunderemphasisedthelevel

of negotiation involved in public policy creation and implementation. 228 Furthermore,

accounts of governing are integral to the governing process itself, further complicating

accounts of change in governmental structures. Part of the process of governing, argues

Colebatch, is the enactment of socially constructed concerns through the form of state

authority.229

Jacob Torfing et al. argue that the response to this critique must be to offer a precise,

workabledefinitionofgovernanceinordertoaddressthemostpressingdeficienciesofthe

concept’s classic formulations. This thesiswill thereforedrawonadefinitionprovidedby

Torfingetal.inInteractiveGovernance:AdvancingtheParadigm.Theregovernanceisdefined

as ‘the process of steering society and the economy through collective action and in

accordancewithsomecommonobjectives’[theiremphasis].230Governancenetworksshould

thereforebeseenasarecognitionthatnosingleactorcanentirelyaccountfortheproduction

ofpublic governance.231Networks are alsohighlydiverse, ranging fromclearly formalised

227H.K.Colebatch,‘MakingSenseofGovernance’,PolicyandSociety33,no.4(2014):310.228 Offe, ‘Governance - “Empty Signifier” Oder Sozialwissenschaftliches Forschungsprogramm?’; Colebatch,‘MakingSenseofGovernance’.229Colebatch,‘MakingSenseofGovernance’.230InteractiveGovernance:AdvancingtheParadigm,2012,14.231 Jacob Torfing, ‘Governance Networks’, in The Oxford Handbook of Governance, March (Oxford: OxfordUniversityPress,2012),99;Torfingetal.,InteractiveGovernance:AdvancingtheParadigm,2012,5.

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structures to loosermore flexiblestructures.The formerencourages theestablishmentof

normativebehaviours,thelatterfreerdecisionmaking.232

Forpresentpurposes,thekeyissueishowdiscourseoperatesingovernancenetworks.How

do actors advancing particular arguments, for example the transition towards a benefit

regimestructuredaroundworkfare,aimtowinacceptanceoftheirargumentsamongother

actors?Howdoparticulardiscoursesbecomehegemonicwithinnetworks?233AsTorfingand

Sørensen note, the governance network paradigm has certain methodological gaps, and

section3.3.5,below,willputforwardamethodwhichattemptstodealpracticallywiththese

related questions. 234 However, this question also opens up important supplementary

questions which must be addressed. Renate Mayntz has argued that for organisations

engaged in networked behaviours, the most important responses come from other

networked actors, rather than from amorphous publics. 235 What are the democratic

implicationsofthisobservation?

InPost-democracyandRulingtheVoidrespectively,ColinCrouchandPeterMairhaveput

forward the case for a system of social organisation which is dominated by elite actors

involvedinnetworkswhichextensivelybypassthedemocraticprocess.236Thelevelofpublic

disengagementsuggestedbythesetwoscholarsshouldalertustothepotentialforselective

blindness–whatTorfingetal.describeasa‘Faustianbargain’whichacknowledgesonlythe

232Torfing,‘GovernanceNetworks’,102–3,107.233Ibid.,109.234JacobTorfingandEvaSørensen,‘TheEuropeanDebateonGovernanceNetworks:TowardsaNewandViableParadigm?’,PolicyandSociety33,no.4(2014):341.235Mayntz,‘Policy-NetzwerkeunddieLogikvonVerhandlungssystemen’,39–56;Mayntz,‘ModernizationandtheLogicofInter-OrganizationalNetworks’.236ColinCrouch,Post-Democracy(Cambridge:Polity,2004);PeterMair,RulingtheVoid(London:Verso,2013).

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positiveaspectsofnetworkgovernance.Ontopofconcernsaboutdemocraticparticipation

and legitimacy,networksarealsoat riskofcapture ‘byexperts,politicalelites,andpublic

agencies’; a process which can easily precipitate governance failure due to stalemate

betweenactorsorpoororbiaseddecision-making.237Nevertheless,thepessimisticvisionsof

CrouchandMairomitthepotentialforpositiveoutcomesasaresultofcooperativenetworks,

andnetworkedsystemsofgovernanceshouldnotbedismissedoutofhand.Itisworthnoting

that in European level discussions of network governance the question of democratic

legitimacy has been integral from the outset due to longstanding concerns about the

democraticdeficitintheEuropeanUnion(EU).TheEUhasthereforeviewednetworksasa

waytoengageactorsinademocraticprocessratherthanasameanstoinducecooperation

in a fragmented terrain. 238 This demonstrates that despite the potential for network

governancetoalienatethepublicfromtheprocessofdecision-making,networkgovernance

canequallyofferthemeanstoengageactorsifnetworksaredesignedinordertoprovidethis

accessibility.

InasimilarveintomanydiscussionsofmarketsandNPM(anddeliberativedemocracy),many

scholarsimaginenetworkgovernancetobecharacterisedbyhorizontalrelationshipsdevoid

of power relations or as depoliticised spaces.239This is compounded by the tendency for

networkedformsofgovernancetodevelopinresponsetothefragmentationwhichresults

from the introduction of competitive reforms under NPM. As a result, the tendency for

network governance to facilitate cooperation and coordination is often identified as a

237Torfing,‘GovernanceNetworks’,107–8.238 Torfing and Sørensen, ‘The European Debate on Governance Networks: Towards a New and ViableParadigm?’,332.239Torfingetal.,InteractiveGovernance:AdvancingtheParadigm,2012,50–2.

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characteristic of networks, rather than a condition symptomatic of their development in

specificcontexts.Thisentirelymisrecognisesthepolitical,conflict-riddennatureofnetwork

governance.240

Forthepurposesofthisthesisthegovernancenetworkparadigmwillbeusedtosituateactors

withinaterrainfromwhichtheyintervenein,areshapedby,andinteractwithpublicpolicy.

Thedefinitionofgovernanceastheengagementofvariousactorsincollectiveactiontosteer

policywithreferencetosomecommonobjectiveshelpssituategroupswhichmightotherwise

be seen as possessing divergent interests within a common framework. It also explains

theoreticallytheirrelationshipstooneanother.Thisthesisoffersthreecasestudiesandeach

ofthethreechapterswilldealwithdifferentactors,howeverwhiletheirrelationshipsand

objectiveswillbeuniqueineachcase,thegovernancenetworkparadigmcreatesthemeans

totheorisetheirrelationstooneanother.

A further logicbehindthechoiceofagovernanceparadigm, rather thanapolicynetwork

rubric,isthepotentialtoofferamorethoroughcontextualisationoftheongoingnatureof

involvementbythink-tanks,companiesandothersinsocialsteering.Sincechaptersfour,five

and six of this thesis cover different areas of public policy, this framework allows the

theorisationofanumberofdifferentnetworksinwhichthesamepolicyactorsparticipatein

differentcapacities.TheInstituteofEconomicAffairsandCentreforPolicyStudies(CPS),for

example,producepolicypublicationsinallthreeoftheareaswhichwillbeconsideredinthis

thesis. Likewise, political parties participate across a range of networks. A policy-centred

240Ibid.,52.

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approachwouldbewellabletoexaminetherelationshipbetweenthink-tanksandpolitical

parties,butlessabletotheorisetheinvolvementofactors,suchasindependentschoolor

healthproviders,which,by thenatureof their interestsparticipateonly in somesteering

networks,butnotinothers.Thenextsectionwillputforwardamethodologywhichwillbe

used throughout the rest of the thesis to analyse the strategies of actors engaged in

networkedbehaviour.

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3.3DiscourseTheoreticalApproaches

3.3.1Introduction

Customarily,anideologyordisciplinebeginswithasetofwell-definedsubjectsandobjects,

withwhichitsinvestigationsareprimarilyconcerned.Thisistrueofliberalism(theindividual,

the state),Marxism (the working class, capitalism), and economics (producer, consumer,

money).But,asLacannotes,‘whatisthevalueofanoperationofthiskind,ifnotthatone’s

bearingsarealready laiddown,thesignifyingreferencepointsoftheproblemarealready

markedinitandthesolutionwillnevergobeyondthem’.241Thisremarkisactuallyaboutthe

ColdWar phenomenon of game theory, but it has significantly wider relevance, since it

impliesnotonlythattheoreticaloperationshavelimitations,butthattheselimitationsmay

in fact explain their usefulness. Lacan, and those using methodologies based on post-

structural discourse theory (henceforth: discourse theory), are therefore sceptical of

ideologiesanddisciplineswhich,byconstitutingactorsandagivenfieldinwhichtheyoperate,

bracketimportantontologicalandepistemologicalissuesfromthefieldofenquiry.

Forthisreason,thisstudywilladoptanapproachwhicharguesthatsubjectandobjectare

constructionsandultimatelygaintheirmeaningthroughtheirplaceindiscourse.Discourse,

itwillbeargued, ismadeupofsignifiers,andsignifiersareopentonewmeaningthrough

articulationintochainswithothersignifiers.Forpresentpurposesanin-depthdiscussionof

theontologicalandepistemologicaltenetsofdiscoursetheorywillnotbenecessary,although

somelimitedexplanationofthemethodologicalassumptionsofdiscoursetheorywillbegiven

tocontextualisetheroleofthesignifierintherestofthisstudyandthereasonsforselecting

241 Jacques Lacan, Seminar XI: The Four Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, ed. Jacques-Alain Miller(London:W.W.Norton&Company,1998),40.

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thismethodologyoverothers.242Withthisinmind,thenextfoursub-sectionswillofferabrief

discussion of signification and discuss some minor variants in the theory, including the

difference between Laclau’s ‘empty’ signifiers and Lacan’s ‘Master’ signifier. It will also

considersomecommoncriticismsofdiscoursetheory;explainhowadiscoursetheoretical

approachfitswiththeinteractivegovernanceparadigmsetoutabove,andwhatitwilladdto

theanalysisintherestofthestudy.

3.3.2Significationandemptysignifiers

ThetermsignifieroriginatedwithFernanddeSaussure.InhisCourseinGeneralLinguistics

Saussureposited that languagewas a system inwhich ‘sound images’, or signifiers,were

arbitrarily paired with ‘concepts’, or signifieds. 243 The great innovation of Saussurean

linguistics was its argument that ‘in language there are only differenceswithout positive

terms’.244ThisinsightisgenerallyreferredtoasSaussure’stheoryofvalue.Withinthesystem

oflanguage,however,thisrelationshipcouldnotbeconsideredarbitrary,sinceallsigns[in

Saussure,signifier+signified=sign]referredtoallothersigns,explaininghowa linguistic

totality could emerge. These relations of difference between signifiers maintained the

stabilityoflanguageasasystem.

242 For the problematics and development of discourse theory, see: Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe,HegemonyandSocialistStrategy,2nded.(London:Verso,2001);Laclau,NewReflectionsontheRevolutionofOurTime;ErnestoLaclau,Emancipation(s),2nded.(London:Verso,1993);SlavojŽižek,TheSublimeObjectofIdeology(London:Verso,2008);Thefollowingarehelpfulreadersonthesubject:JacobTorfing,NewTheoriesofDiscourse(Oxford:Blackwell,1999);DavidHowarth,PoststructuralismandAfter:Structure,SubjectivityandPower(NewYork:PalgraveMacmillan,2013);DavidHowarthandJacobTorfing,DiscourseTheoryinEuropeanPolitics:Identity,PolicyandGovernance(Basingstoke:PalgraveMacmillan,2005).243FernanddeSaussure,Course inGeneralLinguistics,ed.CharlesBally,AlbertSechehaye,andWadeBaskin(NewYork:McGraw-Hill,1966),67.244Ibid.,120.

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Saussure’stheoryoflinguisticvalueinspiredstructuralism,especiallyRolandBarthes,butalso

Louis Althusser, and post-structuralism, including Derrida, all of whom used many of

Saussure’s ideas about the dispersion of signifiers within a system in their work. 245

Structuralists,asthenamesuggests,wereconcernedwithstructuresandtheirfunctioning,

andtendedtoanalysestructuressynchronicallyasstable,evendispersions.Thismadeitvery

difficult to theorise change. Derrida argued that the major flaw of structuralism was its

retentionofthestrictidentitybetweensignifierandsignifiedwithinthesystem.Instead,he

argued, it is relations of difference between signifiers, rather than their relationshipwith

signifieds, which sustained systems, since every signifier is constitutively open to new

meaning and every system is constituted by its outside. 246 Everything is different from

everythingelse,butaboveallthe‘inside’,thatwhichiswithinthesystem,isdefinedagainst

the‘outside’,thatwhichisnotpartofthesystem.247Ifthesignifier‘democracy’isimagined

inthisway,itisclearthatitisassociatedwithothersignifierswhichcompleteitsmeaning

(e.g.parliamentary,adversarial),butitisequallydefinedbyits‘outside’(e.g.authoritarianism,

feudalism,etc.).

Thiswasasignificantbreakwithstructuralismandpost-structuraldiscoursetheoryowesa

greatdealtoDerrida.WhenDerridaassertedthisopennessofthesocial,however,hefailed

totheorisewhysystemsareexperiencedandapprehendedasclosed.Thedifficultquestion

245 See, for example, Roland Barthes,Mythologies (New York: The Noonday Press, 1972); Louis Althusser,‘Reading Capital’, 1970; Jacques Derrida,Of Grammatology, ed. Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (London: JohnHopkinsUniversityPress,1997).246See,forexampleJacquesDerrida,WritingandDifference,trans.AlanBass(London:Routledge,2001),29andpassim, inwhichDerridaarguesthatthecruxofallmeaning is ‘infinite implication, the indefinitereferralofsignifiertosignifier’.247On the role and functioning of the outside see Derrida,Of Grammatology, 30–64; Derrida,Writing andDifference,36–76.

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ofhowandwhychangeoccurshadthereforeultimatelynotbeenresolved.TheDerridean

explanationisambivalentastowhichforcesareresponsibleforclosure.Doesclosureoccur

becauseofastructuraltendency,orasaresultofagency?Indeed,empiricaldeconstructive

operations tend to be rather incoherent on this point, and often this important issue is

addressed only implicitly, i.e. the substantive argument itself explains the author’s

untheorised view of this question. Moreover, this failure has generally allowed

deconstructionists(anddeconstructivepragmatists,followingRichardRorty)toassumethat

theconstitutiveopennessofthesocialleadstogreaterliberalism.ErnestoLaclauandother

post-Marxistshavebeenhighlycriticalofthisassumption.248

LaclauandhiscollaboratorandpartnerChantalMouffehaveofferedanswerstothisquestion.

They argued that there is no ‘“objective” historical tendency’ for a totality to emerge.249

Rather,totalitiesareforciblyclosedbyactorsengagedinhegemonicstruggles.ForLaclauand

Mouffe,thesestrugglesareconstitutiveofthepolitical.Sincethereisnosocialwhole,there

isalwaysantagonismbetweenrivalgroupsengaginginstruggletoarticulatetheirparticular

aimsasuniversal.Articulationshouldbeunderstoodfirstandforemostasaninterventionby

political actors in discourse, whether as an attempt to define themselves, other parties,

processes,objects,orwhatever.Aboveall,articulationisaninherentlypoliticalact.250

248ErnestoLaclau, ‘Deconstruction,Pragmatism,Hegemony’, inDeconstructionandPragmatism,ed.ChantalMouffe,e-library(London:TaylorandFrancis,2005),49–70.249Laclau,New Reflections on the Revolution of Our Time, xiv; Laclau andMouffe,Hegemony and SocialistStrategy,125–29.250LaclauandMouffe,HegemonyandSocialistStrategy,x.

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This occurs because society cannot be a ‘full presence’ for itself; identities are always

prevented from completion by the intervention of the other. 251 However, the effect of

universalityproducedbyarticulatorypracticesisahegemonicdiscourse.Thesocialdoesnot

consistmerelyofasinglehegemony,indeed,experiencesuggeststhisisneverthecase,rather,

‘[I]nagivensocialformationtherecanbeavarietyofhegemonicnodalpoints’.252Anodal

pointwillbeunderstoodasapointindiscourseatwhichmeaningispartiallyfixedandthereby

achieves‘a“universal”structuringfunction’.253Akeyaimofthisstudywillbetoidentifythe

roleoftheNordicmodelsignifierinrelationtothese‘nodalpoints’.

For this study, then, discourse theorywill be used to analyse the process throughwhich

signifiersarearticulatedintohegemonicdiscoursesandthestrategiesthroughwhichthisis

accomplished. A signifier will be considered a ‘sound image’ in the sense that Saussure

understood it. However, as the previous discussion has indicated I do not agree that the

relationship between signifier and signified (the concept) is fixed. In my view, the best

explanationof the relationshipbetween signifier and signified is the Lacanianone,which

arguesthatthesignified isakindoffeelingwhich is impossibletoapprehend(inLacanian

terms,thesignifiedis‘Real’).254Inotherwords,thehegemonicarticulationofasignifier,e.g.

‘democracy’, serves toobscure the fact that thesignifierdoesnotpoint toanobject,but

rathertonothing.

251Ibid.,124–29.252Ibid.,139.253Ibid.,113,xi.254JacquesLacan,TheEthicsofPsychoanalysis:TheSeminarofJacquesLacanVII,trans.DennisPorter(London:W.W.Norton&Company,1992),65;IwouldarguethatthisisabetteraccountthanDerrida,whoseimmanentphenomenologicaltendencybracketsthesignifiedasaneffectof‘presence’,thatis,ourinherentBeing-in-the-World.Thisleavestheobjectiveasaspectralpresenceinhissystemofthought,ratherthanaccountingforitsnature.Derrida,OfGrammatology,10–18;Foucaultisstillmoreambiguousonthispoint.SeeMichelFoucault,TheArchaeologyofKnowledge(Abingdon:Routledge,2002),25–60.

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LaclauandMouffearguedthatsignifiersarearticulatedbyparticularactorsasuniversal.This

argumentcanbedemonstratedusingthesignifier‘democracy’.ForLaclauandMouffe,the

signifier‘democracy’reflectsasetofhistoricalconjunctionswhichhavebeenuniversalised.

It thereforemakes sense to imagine that the signifier itself is empty until it is filledwith

particular content.This contentmightbe ‘liberaldemocracy’ inwhich representativesare

electedtoalegislativebodythroughelections,andcertainfreedomsareguaranteedbylaw,

but it could equally be Laclau andMouffe’s own concept of ‘Radical Democracy’, which

includescommunityorganisations, industrialdemocracy,workers’councilsandsoforth.255

Theemptysignifier‘democracy’isfilledwithparticularcontentandappropriatestoitselfthe

overflow of meaning generated by its articulation as part of a set of equivalences and

differences.256The same signifier, for example ‘democracy’, can therefore be understood

totallydifferentlyattwodifferenthegemonicnodalpoints.

3.3.3CriticismofLaclauandMouffe

Althoughthisbroadlyoutlinesthechieftheoreticalapparatuswhichwillbeusedinthisstudy

toconductclosetextualanalysis,itisworthnotingsomeareasofcontroversywithLaclauand

Mouffe’sunderstandingofthefunctioningofthesignifier.Firstly,despitetheirprotestations,

at least in their earlywork, thisunderstandingofdiscourse is clearlyprone to formalism,

something which Laclau later acknowledged. 257 In other words, despite the claim that

hegemonyis‘aform…ofpolitics;butnotadeterminablelocationwithinatopographyofthe

255LaclauandMouffe,HegemonyandSocialistStrategy,153–181.256Laclau,Emancipation(s),44.257LaclauandMouffe,HegemonyandSocialistStrategy,139; JudithButler,ErnestoLaclau,andSlavojŽižek,Contingency,Hegemony,Universality:ContemporaryDialoguesontheLeft(London:Verso,2000).

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social’, the relationship between the particular articulation and the universal is clearly

understood as purely formal and could therefore be drawn as part of a topography.258

Effectivelytherefore,alluniversalsmustbeunderstoodasfundamentallyparticularinnature.

ForLaclauandMouffe,theprocessofhegemonizationisthemovementofaparticular,which

isnota‘fullpresence’foritself,toauniversal,whichobscurestheuniversal’sabsentfullness.

There are several ways to address this formalist tendency, two of which are particularly

productive.FeministscholarshavearguedagainstLaclauandMouffe’stendencytoseethe

universal as thehegemonizationof aparticular bynoting that auniversal claimabout an

identitymustprecede the realisationof it in itsparticularity.259This isa strongargument,

especiallywhenoneconsidersthehistoryofsocialmovementsforgenderandLGBTrights,

fromwhencethesecounterargumentsoriginate.Thesemovementsarticulatedwomenand

gaymenandwomenassubjectswhoshouldbeguaranteedbasicfreedomsandrightsjust

likeanyothercitizen.Universalidentitieswerearticulatedbeforeparticularidentitiescould

berealisedinthesocialfield,forexample,bythelegalsystem.Inotherwords,thearticulation

ofbasicrightsnecessarilyprecededtheassumptionoftheserights.Moreover,JudithButler

notesthatthisimpliesthat,contrarytoLaclauandMouffe’sargumentthatthesignifieritself

assumesuniversality,theuniversalityisinherentandimmanentinthesignifyingchain,inthe

sense that it is not the signifier itself, but rather its relations to other established empty

signifierswhichdeterminethesuccessofitsclaimtouniversality.260Whileitcouldbeargued

258LaclauandMouffe,HegemonyandSocialistStrategy,139;Butler,Laclau,andŽižek,Contingency,Hegemony,Universality.259LindaM.G.Zerilli,‘ThisUniversalismWhichIsNotone’,Diacritics28,no.2(1998):34–67.260Butler,Laclau,andŽižek,Contingency,Hegemony,Universality,33.Asignifyingchainshouldbeconsideredtheweboftemporarilystablerelationsestablishedaroundaparticularempty/Mastersignifier.Forexample,‘markets’,‘freedom’,‘democracy’wouldconstituteasignifyingchain.

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thatthenotionofnodalpointsaccountsforthis,forLaclauandMouffeitisthesignifierwhich

appropriatestheoverflowofmeaningfromthechainandisuniversalised.Thisisincontrast

toLindaZerilli’sandButler’sargumentthattheuniversalisingmomentisinthechain,rather

thanthesignifieritself.

Thereareanumberofreasonsforfindingthisausefulmeansofconductinganalysis,notleast

becauseitthrowsfargreaterfocusontotherelationshipsbetweensignifiers.Forexample,a

typical social democratic understanding of ‘democracy’ would enchain the signifier with

‘equality’, understood as equality of outcome, and ‘freedom’, understood as positive

liberty. 261 ‘Democracy’ understood by a free-market liberal would be articulated in the

oppositeorder. The signifierwouldbeenchainedwith ‘freedom’, understoodas negative

liberty,i.e.freedomfromcoercion.‘Freedom’inthisarticulationisoftenassociatedwiththe

signifier‘markets’,and‘equality’followsfrom‘freedom’,sinceallsubjectsarearticulatedas

beingequallyabletorealisetheirneedsthroughparticipationinmarkets.Inthisreading,then,

theuniversalnatureofdemocracyisarticulatedbeforeitsparticularcharactercanberealised

and the universal effect arises from the enchainment of democracywith other signifiers,

ratherthantheuniversalisationofthesignifieritself.

ThiseffectivelyreversesthelogicofLaclauandMouffe’sargumentofthesignifier.However,

athirdalternativearguesthatthesignifierisarticulatedinbothdirectionssimultaneously.

ThisargumentrestsonaseriesofLacanian/Žižekianpropositionswhichareratherabstruse.

SlavojŽižekreferstothissimultaneousmovementbetweentheuniversalandtheparticular

261IsaiahBerlin, ‘TwoConceptsofLiberty’, inFourEssaysonLiberty (Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1971),118–72.

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asthetautologicalfunctionofnaming.Putassuccinctlyaspossible,hearguesthatinthefirst

instanceaseriesofpropertiesareabbreviatedbyaconcept.Forexample,‘socialdemocratic’,

‘high levels of economic steering’, ‘social equality’ are abbreviated by the ‘Nordicmodel’

signifier (particular® universal). In the secondmovement, theorder is reversedand the

conceptsareusedtoexplicatethe‘Nordicmodel’inthefashionofaquestion:‘whatisthe

Nordic model?’ – ‘it is social democratic’ etc. etc. (universal® particular). In the final

movement,theconceptappropriatesthepropertiesneitherasabbreviationnoraspartofan

explicatingchain.The‘Nordicmodel’possessesthesequalitiesbecauseitisNordic,notsimply

asanabbreviationorexplication(particular&universal).262Thereareechoesofthisideain

KlausPetersen’sdescriptionoftheNordicmodel:‘theideaofaNordicsocietywasdeveloped

into a Nordic line in social policy, characterized by…universalism, tax-financing, public

responsibility, social rights and prophylactic social policy’, and his further argument that

‘[W]hensimilaritieswerefoundorestablished,they“turned”intosomethingNordic’.263Itis

this“turninginto”whichIthinkiscriticalandgenerallyunaccountedfor:theefficacyofthe

‘Nordicmodel’emptysignifierat“owning”non-Nordicphenomena.

3.3.4Discourse:Materialorideological?

Inchaptertwoitwasarguedthatscholarsveryofteninstigateasplitbetweenrhetoricand

reality,materialandideological,speechandaction.Whilescholars,especiallythoseworking

fromconstructivistperspectives,oftenrejectthissplit,thereisatendencytofallbackintoit.

Consider, for example, Christopher Browning’s disclaimer about his study of national

branding:

262SlavojŽižek,TheMetastasesofEnjoyment(London:Verso,1994),47–50.263Petersen,‘National,NordicandTrans-Nordic’,52.

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Thefocusontheconceptof“brand”heremakesitimportanttodistinguish

between “rhetoric” (marketing) and “reality” (actualpractices).Obviously,

from a discursive and constructivist perspective such a distinction is

problematicsinceourdiscoursesareconstitutiveofsocialreality.Thereason

for introducing the distinction, however, is to assert that the article is

interestedprimarilyinhowa“Nordicbrand”hasbeenmarketedovertime,

ratherthanwhethertheNordicshavealwaysliveduptothebrand.264

LaclauandMouffe’stheoreticalapproachtodiscourseissimilar,althoughratherthanbeing

constitutiveofsocialreality,forLaclauandMouffe,discourseisitselfmaterial.265Ittherefore

attemptstoresolvetheseparationbetweenthematerialandideological.Inthelastchapter’s

discussionofDavidCameron’sConservativeParty,Iindicatedthatinmyviewtheideological

tenets of the ‘Big Society’ persisted in the legislation, and that, despite probably fairly

accurate chargesof cynicism, theeffects of competing ideological positions inhere to the

policyarchitecturewhichwasintroduced,evenifthediscourseitselfwasneverpopularand

wasabandonedaltogetherby2015.Myunderstandingofideologyasfunctioningcynicallyà

laŽižek–inhisformulation:‘theyknowverywellwhattheyaredoing,butstilltheyaredoing

it’–informsthisapproach.266

Having said that, however, it is common, especially among Marxist scholars, to criticise

discourse theory for a flight from the ‘objective’.267The arguments put forward by Jules

264 Christopher S. Browning, ‘Branding Nordicity: Models, Identity and the Decline of Exceptionalism’,CooperationandConflict42,no.1(2007):31.265Laclau,NewReflectionsontheRevolutionofOurTime,111.266Žižek,TheSublimeObjectofIdeology,24–27.267See,forexample,JulesTownshend,‘DiscourseTheoryandPoliticalAnalysis:ANewParadigmfromtheEssexSchool?’,BritishJournalofPoliticsandInternationalRelations5,no.1(2000):129–42Thissummarisesanumberofcriticismslevelledatdiscoursetheoreticalapproaches.

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Townshendinathoughtfulcritiqueofdiscoursetheorywillbetakenhereasemblematicof

this view.While someof Townshend’spoints shouldbe rejected, partly as a result of his

conflationoftwomeaningsofthetermobjective(material,inthesenseofactuallyexisting,

andnoumenal,intheKantiansenseofThings-in-themselves),268hiscriticismthatdiscourse

theory focuses overwhelmingly on political struggles and social movements rather than

economicissuesisapposite.Atleastpartially,thisisafunctionoftheso-called‘normative

deficit’inLaclauandMouffe’swork.269UnlikeButlerandŽižek,orTownshendforthatmatter,

Laclau and Mouffe are agnostic about the central antagonism of contemporary social

formations.WhereasButlerarguesthattheconstitutiveantagonismistheimpossibilityofa

fullygenderedsubject,andŽižekarguesthatsocialrelationsundercapitalismareresponsible

fortheimpossibilityoftheclosedsocial,forLaclauandMouffethereisnocentralantagonism

andthereforenoidentitycentraltochange.Itisthereforedifficulttotheorisetherelationship

betweenanyparticularmovementandtheoperationoftheglobaleconomy.

Thereishowevernogoodreasontoimaginethataccumulativesystems,suchasmarketsand

quasi-markets,arenotsitesofarticulation,northateconomiccrisesandproblematicscannot

beapproached in this fashion. Indeed,Bob Jessopand JacobTorfinghaveproducedwork

using discourse-based approaches to political economy, and the neo-Gramscian school in

InternationalPoliticalEconomy,whichusestheconceptofhegemony,iswidelystudiedand

respected.270Ialsosuggestthatsustainingasetofheterodoxontologicalandepistemological

268LaclauandMoufferespondedtothisargumentwhenitwasfirstmadebyGeras,seeLaclau,NewReflectionsontheRevolutionofOurTime,90–120.269Townshend,‘DiscourseTheoryandPoliticalAnalysis:ANewParadigmfromtheEssexSchool?’,138.270Bob Jessop,The Future of the Capitalist State (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002); Jacob Torfing, ‘Towards aSchumpeterianWorkfare Postnational Regime: Path-Shaping and Path-Dependency in DanishWelfare StateReform’, Economy and Society 28, no. 3 (1999): 369–402; For a neo-Gramscian approach to the Nordic

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propositions, while using concepts with established ontological and epistemological

meanings in other schools of thought (compare orthodox liberal notions of discourse as

speech),causesissues.However,explainingestablishedconceptsfromfirstprincipleswould

a)requireprohibitivelylengthyarticles,andb)sufferfromwhatGraysonPerrydescribesas

‘thewrongkindofunreadability’.271GiventhatLaclauandMouffe’sworkwasdesignedto

escape thenegative connotationsof thedreaded i-word (ideology) inMarxist theory it is

worthquestioningwhetheranideology-basedapproachwouldfunctionbetter.Ontheother

hand,LaclauandMouffe’stheoreticalworkisoffargreaterfunctionalusefulnessthanmost

ideology-centredapproachesandforthisreasonithasbeenselectedhere.

3.3.5GovernanceandDiscourseasmethodology

WhiletheInteractivegovernanceparadigmanddiscoursetheoryofferstructuringlogicsfor

empiricalstudy,theyshouldnotbeconsideredmethodologiesinthemselves.Afewspecific

methodologicalremarksarethereforenecessarytoexplainhowthesetwoparadigmswillbe

usedhere.

Discoursetheoryaimstoidentifyandexplainhegemonicdiscourse.Howisdiscoursecreated

andsustained?Whatarethestrategiesthroughwhichitisdeveloped?Thisisanessentialbut

difficultquestion,especiallyinthesphereofpublicpolicy.Whilepublicopinionpollinghas

previously been used as ameans of identifying hegemonic discourses in civil society and

economies, see Ryner,Capitalist Restructuring, Globalisation and the ThirdWay: Lessons from the SwedishModelandpassim.271 Grayson Perry, ‘Democracy Has Bad Taste’, (Lecture, 2013),http://downloads.bbc.co.uk/radio4/transcripts/lecture-1-transcript.pdf.

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linking themto theirarticulationaspartofpolitical strategies,272suchanapproachwould

likelybeunsuccessfulindealingwiththerelationshipbetweentheNordicmodelandpublic

policyissues.Thisisduetothehighlevelofcomplexityofsuchissuesandtheextenttowhich

networked actors actively and passively exclude the public from engagementwith public

policystructures.Asnotedabove,theprimaryaudienceofthestrategiesofnetworkedactors

isothernetworkedactors,ratherthanpublics.

Intermsofitsconcreteanalysis,thisstudyisinterestedintwokeyareas.Thefirstoftheseis

rhetorical.It’sstartingpointistoidentifyandunderstandthekeysignifiersattachedtothe

Nordicmodel intherangeofsourcessetoutaboveandindoingsopointouthowcertain

signifiersstandmetonymicallyforoneanother–e.g.patientchoiceforfreedom–andhow

thisisarticulatedwithreferenceto,forinstance,apublichealthsystem.Thesecondportion

ofthisoperationistounderstandhowNordicsignifiersassistthecreationofsuchrhetorical

claims.273Secondly,giventheemphasisinthisthesisonrelationsbetweensubjects,whether

theybeauthorsorinstitutions,thereisaclear,thoughgenerallyimplicit,focusonthesplit

betweenthesubjectoftheutteranceandthesubjectoftheenunciation.

Thesubjectoftheutterancecanbeunderstoodasthestatementassuch,whilethesubject

oftheenunciationidentifiesfromwhencethestatementoriginates:doesitfulfiltheformal

criteria tobe consideredanauthority inpublicpolicy – is it froma governmentminister,

researchfellowinathink-tank,broadsheetjournalist,etc.?Wherethiscanbeunderstood,

272AnnaMarie Smith,New Right Discourse on Race and Sexuality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1994).273HowarthandTorfing,DiscourseTheoryinEuropeanPolitics:Identity,PolicyandGovernance,342–3.

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whatwas the speaker’s intention?Were there unconscious cues towhich the statement

alluded? 274 For example, speeches by former Education Secretary Michael Gove are

particularlydensewithreferencestoBritain’simperialpastandtheVictorianera.Arethere

potentially unintended consequences of such allusions? Is the audience expected to

understandtheminaparticularwayandtowhatextentcanthesubjectcontrolitsutterance

once it has entered discourse? Identifying these aspects of discourse and the position of

subjectsindiscoursearekeymethodologicalprioritiesforthisthesis.

Thisdiscussionhelpselucidatethereasonforchoosingthelogicofthesignifieroverrealist

approaches, such as Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA). It is the potentially interesting

implications of the fact that the signifier ultimately points to nothing (as opposed to

something) that make this approach interesting. Methodologically, this approach can

accommodate meaning creation, the unconscious cues to which signifiers refer and the

positionssubjectsadoptinthecreationofthesediscourses.

Toconducttheanalysis,Ipositaseriesofindicatorswhichwillbeusedtomeasuretheextent

towhichapolicypositionhasbecomehegemonicwithinagivengovernancenetwork.Despite

thereservationssetoutaboveaboutthepotentialformediatocreateadistortedimpression

ofthesuccessofpolicypositions,theywillbeusedasanindicationthatapolicyhasbecome

hegemonicwithinagovernancenetwork.Thisisduetothelikelihoodthatsustained,rather

than isolated, coverage results from general consensus about the benefits of a particular

policywithinanetwork.Theadoptionofapositionbyapoliticalpartythroughitsintroduction

274Ibid.,343–6.

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intoamanifestowill alsobe consideredgrounds to considerapolicyhegemonicwithina

governance network. Finally, the use of particular discourses inministerial speeches, the

introduction of legislation in Parliament and the implementation of a policy will all be

consideredevidencethatapolicyishegemonicinanetwork.

Itisperhapsslightlyironicthat,followingLacan,Ihavebeensoinsistentupontheemptiness

ofthesignifier,butthatIhavenonethelesspositedaseriesof‘networkedactors’insucha

waythattheyappearascoherentsubjects.275TheLacaniansubject,likethesignifier,isempty.

Thereasonsforthisarecomplexandnotultimatelyrelevanttotheempiricalargumentofthis

thesis, I will therefore not rehearse them here.276It suffices to say that the governance

networksthatIanalyseinthisthesisareconstructed–i.e.participantsinnetworkswouldnot

necessarilyrecognisethesenetworksasreallyexistingthings.Iamalsoawarethatthereisa

dangerofreifyingnetworksinthisanalysis,eventhoughtheseareasmuchconstructions–

bothwithinthisstudyandintheworldassuch–asanydiscourseswhichnetworkedactors

produce.

The discourses produced by governance networks will be analysed using the discourse

theoreticalapproachoutlinedabove.ThefocuswillbeonthefunctioningoftheNordicmodel

as an empty signifier. In particular, the relationship between the Nordic model and the

LacanianMastersignifier‘democracy’willbeexamined.Asarguedabove,thereisadegree

ofagnosticismabouttheprimacyofanyparticularidentityinLaclauandMouffe’stheoretical

275IwouldliketothankTitusHjelmandMagnusRynerfortheircommentswhichhelpedmetoclarifythispoint.276ButseeJacquesLacan,‘TheMirror-PhaseasFormativeoftheFunctionoftheI’, inMappingIdeology,ed.Slavoj Žižek (London: Verso, 1995); Bruce Fink, The Lacanian Subject: Between Language and Jouissance(Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,1995),49–68.

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work.Forthisreason,theyhavetendedtobesomewhatambivalentabouttheLacanianidea

thatthere isasignifierwhich‘”meanseverything” insofaras itdoesnotmeananything in

particulartherebyenablingeveryonetorecognisehimself/herselfinit’.277Giventhatseveral

wars, capital market deregulation, quasi-market public service reform and ethical

consumptionhaveallbeenjustifiedbasedonappealstodemocracy,however,thereisgood

reasontosupposethatanalysisofarelationshiptotheMastersignifier‘democracy’could

offerausefulframeofreferenceforanalysisoftheNordicmodel.Thisstudywilltherefore

supplement Laclau andMouffe’s discourse theory with the logic of the LacanianMaster

signifier.

277SlavojŽižek,EnjoyYourSymptom(London:Routledge,1992),156.

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3.4SourcesandTerminology

3.4.1Theprimaryactors

Thusfar,therehasbeenextensivediscussionofactorsintheabstract,butlittlediscussionof

theactorswithwhichthisstudywillbeconcerned.Giventhesheernumberofactorsengaged

in some capacity in contemporary social steering it will prove impossible to provide a

definitiveaccountoftheactorsconsideredthroughoutthestudyinthissection.Eachofthe

followingcasestudieswillincludeadiscussionofthemostrelevantactorsforeachoftheir

policy areas. However, given that some of the actors will appear repeatedly it is worth

sketchingoutabriefhistoryofsomeofthemhere.

Themajorityoftextsunderconsiderationinthethreecasestudiesbelowcomefromthink-

tanks,definedhereasprivateorindependentresearchinstitutes.278Thisiscloselyfollowed

bypoliticalspeechesandnewspaperarticles.Anumberofwhiteandgreenpapersarealso

considered,butthesearefewerinnumber.Itisthereforeworthasking:whatarethemajor

Britishthink-tanksandwhatdotheydo?

ThefirstBritishthink-tankwastheFabianSociety,foundedin1884,whichwasinstrumental

inthecreationoftheUKLabourParty.ThesecondwasChathamHouse,aninstitutesetup

forthestudyofinternationalaffairsin1920.Think-tanksappearedearlierandinmuchgreater

numbersintheUSA,anditwasnotuntiltheInstituteofEconomicAffairsandtheCentrefor

PolicyStudieswerefounded,in1955and1974respectively,thatthink-tanksbegantogain

significantinfluenceinUKpolitics.TheIEAwasfoundedbyAnthonyFisher,underpersuasion

278Stone,CapturingthePoliticalImagination:ThinkTanksandthePolicyProcess.

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fromFriedrichvonHayek,butwaseffectively runbyRalphHarrisandArthurSeldon, two

membersoftheinternationalMontPelerinSociety(MPS).MPSitselfwasfoundedbyagroup

of influential economists andphilosophers includingHayek, Ludwig vonMisesandMilton

Friedman.279The IEAhastherefore longnurtured important internationalconnectionsand

hasusedtheintellectualcredibilityofitsfoundersasameanstopropagateitsideasabout

free-marketeconomics.

CPSwasfoundedlaterand,incontrasttotheIEA,tendedtofocusasmuchonadvocacyason

producingtheoreticalpublications.280TheAdamSmithInstitute(ASI)focusesveryheavilyon

advocacyandthereforesitsattheoppositeendofthespectrumfromthe IEA.Themotor

behindthefoundationofCPSwasKeithJoseph,aclosefriendofMargaretThatcher,whoalso

hadstronglinkswiththethink-tank.Later,CPS,farmorethantheIEA,becamearecruitment

groundfortheConservativeParty.JohnRedwood,MPforWokingham(1987-),andDavid

Willets,formerMPforHavant(1992-2015),bothcuttheirteethatCPS.

Theemphasisonsocialandpoliticalmodellinghasanaugusthistoryinthink-tanks,asoneof

Joseph’s original motivations was to study the West German ‘social market economy’.

DenhamandGarnettdescribethisas‘arusetohidehistrueintention,whichwastoconvert

hispartytohiswayofthinking’(i.e.economic liberalism).281This isafairly instrumentalist

viewofJoseph’sinterestintheWestGermaneconomy,butitisindicativeofthesomewhat

crudematerialismcommontoanalysesofthink-tanks.Indeed,incontrasttothisview,itis

279KeithTribe,‘LiberalismandNeoliberalisminBritain,1930-1980’,inTheRoadfromMontPèlerin:TheMakingoftheNeoliberalThoughtCollective,ed.PhilipMirowskiandDieterPlehwe(London:HarvardUniversityPress,2009),68–97.280DenhamandGarnett,‘InfluencewithoutResponsibility?Think-TanksinBritain’,49.281Ibid.,48.

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far more productive to view the strength of think-tanks as owing in large part to their

commitment to particular ideals rather than a political party.282The lack of contradiction

whichthink-tanksexperienceinworkingwitharangeofpoliticalpartiesandsubjectmatters

shouldcertainlybeattributedtothis featureoftheir identities,even ifcertain institutions

naturallymakeeasierbedfellowswithsomepoliticalpartiesandorganisationsthanothers.

ThisisparticularlytrueoftheIEA.

Withtheexceptionofthemucholder,andstillactive,FabianSociety,mostsocialdemocratic

think-tanksdevelopedlater,inresponsetotheperceivedsuccessoftheIEA,CPSandASIat

influencingthepolicyagenda.Theearly1990s,whichusheredintheNewLabourera,wasa

particularly intense period of activity for social democratic think-tanks. Think-tanks had

alwaysusedthepracticalityoftheirresearchasanadvert.TheIEA,forexample,arguedthat

itdidnot‘representabatchofeggheadsintheacademicclouds’.283This intensifiedinthe

NewLabourperiodinresponsetothenaturalinclinationforthink-tankstoseethemselvesas

solution-orientedandtheinfluenceof‘post-ideological’ThirdWayideas(see2.3.2,above).284

1988 and 1993 saw the foundation of the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) and

Demosrespectively, twothink-tankswithabroadlysocialdemocraticoutlookand,at that

time, ties to the Labour Party. Later, the number of social democratic think-tanks and

affiliatedjournalsmultipliedtoincludegroupssuchasCompass,whichwasoriginallyathink-

tankforLabourPartymembers,buthassincebroadeneditsremittoworkwithotherparties

andorganisations,Renewal,andPolicyNetwork,which isan international think-tank.The

Fabian Society has remained highly active in producing policy papers and influencing the

282Jackson,‘TheThink-TankArchipelago:ThatcherismandNeo-Liberalism’,56.283Ibid.,48.284DenhamandGarnett,‘“WhatWorks”?BritishThinkTanksandthe“EndofIdeology”’.

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directionoftheUKLabourPartyandtheBritishsocialdemocraticandlabourmovementin

general.

Ontopofthistherearegroupswhicharemoredifficulttoplaceinrelationtotheestablished

political parties. Good examples of organisations such as these are the Social Market

Foundation(SMF)andCivitas.Thesegroupsdescribethemselvesasnon-partisanandengage

witharangeofactorsondifferentissues.SMFisgenerallyconcerned,asitsnamesuggests,

withsocialmarkets,ratherthanfreemarkets.Similarly,Civitas is interestedincivilsociety

institutions and organisations. Their positions should therefore be considered liberal

conservativeandoccasionallycommunitarian,allowingthemtoengagewithfactions inall

threemajorpoliticalpartiesandalargerangeofactorsinvolvedinsocialsteeringandpolicy

creation.

Theactorswhichwillbeconsideredhere,andwhichhaveengagedwiththeNordicmodel,

represent a large spectrumof political positions and have broad and deep networks and

relationshipswithotherorganisations.Oneofthekeyaimsofthisstudywillbetoexplore

how these different positions affect their articulation of the Nordic model as an empty

signifier,andtheirpositioningwithinnetworksisessentialtoacomplexunderstandingofthis.

3.4.2Sources

Asnotedabove,thisthesisdrawsonawiderangeofdifferentmaterialasevidence.Primarily,

ittakesasitsstartingpointpolicyreports,documentsandworkingpapersproducedinthink-

tanks,researchinstitutes,governmentministries,theCabinetResearchUnitandsoon.The

thesisalsomakesextensiveuseofministerialspeeches,WhitePapers,ActsofParliamentand

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any other forms of document generated by government departments and parliamentary

business.Thestudyalsodrawsonarangeofnewspapers,periodicalsandmagazines,both

thosewithaspecificfocus(e.g.thebusinesspress)andpopularpublications(e.g.broadsheets,

tabloids).Ihavedrawnadistinctionbetweenbusinessandpopularnewspapersduetothe

differencesintheirfocusandaudience.ThereadershipandinfluenceofTheFinancialTimes

(FT)andTheDailyTelegraphareclearlydistinct:TheFT’sinterestsinSwedishschoolchains

mayhaveasmuchtodowiththeirinvestmentpotentialastheirabilitytoprovideadequate

schooling.Newspapers,otherthanTheEconomistandtheFT,whichareinternational,though

basedinLondon,wereselectedonlyiftheypublishedontheUKmainland.National,i.e.UK-

wide, publications were generally preferred, except in cases where no national sources

existed.PrivateEye,TheMorningStar,theBBCNewswebsiteandfreedailynewspapers(e.g.

Metro) were generally excluded from such searches, since, given their interests and

perspectives,theycannotbeconsideredintegratedintogovernancenetworks.

Articles were selected based on keyword-searching using the Nexis online archive; 285

economist.comandft.com(whicharenotpartoftheNexisarchive).IalsousedtheEconomist

Historical Archive and the Financial Times Historical Archive for pieces published before

c.2006. This inevitably involved trial and error to identify relevant sourcematerial.When

researchingmediasourcesforchapterfiveonthetopicofFreeSchools,forexample,Iuseda

combinationofqueriesbasedonwide-castresults–e.g.“MichaelGove”AND“Academies

Act” – and then gradually narrowed the search from information gathered from policy

documents and the articles already collected. This process generated queries for, among

285https://www.nexis.com

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other things, “Kunskapsskolan”, the Swedish education chain, and two of itsmost senior

figures“AndersHultin”and“PerLedin”.

Howarthnotesthatthetextualmaterialgatheredfordiscourseanalysisisusuallydetermined

bytheprobleminvestigated.286Forthisstudy,ithasthereforeprovednecessarytobuildthree

overlappingcorporaofdocuments,withreferencetothethreedifferentcasestudieswhich

formtheempiricalspineofthethesis.Theseoftenoverlapsignificantly,asitisfairlycommon

forpolicyreportstosetoutrecommendationsacrossvariousdifferentsectors.Forexample,

NormanBlackwell’s rather self-explanatorily titledBetter SchoolsandHospitals setsout a

market-orientatedprogrammeofreformsfortheeducationandhealthsectors.287

However,itisalsoworthbearinginmindthattheacademicfields,asdistinctfromthepolicy

debates, are often demarcated along sectoral lines and operate at a high level of

specialisation.Thatistosay,whileinpolicytermsactorsmayproposesimilarreformsacross

arangeofpublicservices, inacademicdebatesdiscussionofhealth,educationandlabour

marketregimesaretypicallyseparate.Thecorporaarethereforenecessarilymoreexhaustive

withreferencetothepolicydebatesastheyoccurredingovernancenetworks.Whileeach

casestudywillnonethelessorientate itselfwith referencetoacademicarguments ineach

field,practicalnecessityplaceslimitsonthelevelofengagementwithsucharangeofspecific

technicalarguments.Furthermore, it isnotthepurposeofthisthesistoproveordisprove

particulartheoriesabouttherunningofthewelfarestate,butrathertoexaminetheprocess

286HowarthandTorfing,DiscourseTheoryinEuropeanPolitics:Identity,PolicyandGovernance,337.287BetterSchoolsandHospitals(London:CentreforPolicyStudies,2004).

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ofpolicyformationandexaminehowthisfunctionswithreferencetoaspecificobject:the

Nordicmodel.

3.4.3Terminology

For a study concerned so explicitly with terminology it is clearly important to set out

somethingofaglossary,inorderthatthereadercanorienthim-orherselfwithinaseriesof

easilydefinablecategories.Onethingwhichwillgenerallybeavoidedislabelswhichare,or

areperceivedtobe,pejorative.Asaresult,termssuchasleft-wingandright-wingwillnot

appearexceptaspartofquotations.Iwillalsotendtoavoidthetermneoliberalism,notso

muchbecauseitispejorative,itisnowincludedinTheEconomiststyleguide(itshouldbe

unhyphenatedapparently),288butbecause it isopaque.Whatexactly isneoliberalismand

who isaneoliberal? Is JosephSchumpeteraneoliberal justbecause intellectualswhoare

described as neoliberal, generally by others, use his concepts of entrepreneurialism and

creativedestruction?Ananswertothisquestionisoutsidethescopeofthisstudy,butitis

difficult to avoid the conclusion, to paraphrase Deleuze and Guatarri, that neoliberalism,

rather like capitalism, is quasi cause. That is to say, it is both process of production and

product:theprocessofneoliberalisingproducesneoliberalism.Iconsiderthatanyusageofit

shouldthereforebegroundedinaclearanalysisofhowitfunctions(adiscourseanalysis,in

otherwords)andasaresultitwillbeavoidedhere.

ThetermsliberalandsocialdemocratwillbothbeusedintheirtraditionalEuropeansenses,

ratherthantheAmericansensewhereliberalmeans,effectively,socialdemocrat.Herein,a

288 The Economist, Style Guide (London), accessed 10 December 2016, http://www.economist.com/style-guide/hyphens.

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liberal is someone who believes in free-markets, individual freedoms set out in law and

universalhumanrights.Asocialdemocratissomeonewhobelievesinamixedeconomyand

socialwelfareschemes.Thetermconservativewillgenerallyrefertoastanceorstanceson

socialissues,asUKconservativestendtofavourliberaleconomicpolicies.Asineverything,

however,theconfrontationoftheseidealtypetermswiththeactuallyexistingstateofparty

politicsinBritainthrowsupnothingbutdifficulties.Thisisespeciallytruewhenthetermsset

outrefertoorareusedbypoliticalparties.Asisconventional,Conservativewithacapital‘C’

referstomembershipoftheUKConservativeParty,butshouldnotbetakentoindicateany

particular ideological stance, since the Conservative Party embraces views from

neoconservativetolibertarianandmuchinbetweeninitsranks.Thetermconservativewith

asmall‘c’willthereforeusuallybeusedinconjunctionwithsomeotherdefiningadjectivein

order to make the distinction clear. Of particular relevance is the term One Nation

conservative, which broadly equates to the Compassionate Conservative and Red Tory

positionssetoutbyJesseNormanandPhillipBlond(see2.3.3,above).Thisisdistinctfrom

thefree-marketliberalismofthemodernConservativeParty.

Similarly,theinternaldivisionsoftheLabourPartymakeitdifficulttodesignatethepartyas

uniformly socially democratic, especially since the term was considered freighted with

baggageduringTonyBlair’sandGordonBrown’speriodsasleadersoftheParty.Andindeed,

manysocialdemocrats,socialistsandsoforthwoulddescribetheNewLabourprojectwhich

BlairandBrownembarkeduponasultimatelyliberalineffect,ifperhapsnotinintention.To

avoidconfusion,then,themoreliberalsectionsoftheLabourPartywillbedefinedbasedon

theirassociationwithNewLabour–theproject’scriticswithinthepartyassocialdemocrats

orsocialistsbydegreeofdifference.ThetermsBlairiteandBrownitewillnotbeusedbyme,

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but may appear in quotations, especially from newspapers contemporary with the then

Labourgovernment.

As was pointed out to me at a conference by several Danish scholars, the term social

democratasemployedinthisstudyisratherambiguouswhenappliedtotheNordiccountries.

Indeed,theNordiccountrieshavetwoSocialDemocraticparties(DenmarkandFinland),one

SocialDemocraticAlliance(Iceland),oneLabourParty(Norway)andoneSocialDemocratic

LabourParty(Sweden,itsofficialEnglishnameomitstheLabourportionofitsSwedishname).

Moreover,giventheextensiveperiodsoftimeduringwhichsocialdemocratshavegoverned

intheNordiccountriesandtheverydifferentplatformswhichtheyhaveadoptedatdifferent

times,thedesignationisnotstraightforward.289Thetermsocialdemocrathasprimarilybeen

chosentodistinguishactors involved inreformistpolitics intheUKfromtheLabourparty

itself,since,asnoted inthediscussionabove,somethink-tanksare internaltotheLabour

party. As a result, any discussion of a ‘labour’ governance network or similar would be

unhelpfulandmightimplydirectaffiliationwiththeparty.Althoughthetermisclearlymore

complexwhenappliedtotheNordiccountries,thenotionofsocialdemocraticgovernance

networkswill only be usedwhen referring to theUK, hopefullyminimising any potential

objectiontoitsuseonthesegrounds.

289 On this, see Tilton, The Political Theory of Swedish Social Democracy; Hinnfors, Reinterpreting SocialDemocracy;Sejersted,TheAgeofSocialDemocracyandchaptersoneandtwo,above.

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3.5Conclusionsandquestions

Thelastthreechaptershavesetoutanumberofissuesandcontextswhichwillbeexplored

intherestofthisstudy.Chaptersoneandtwolookedatarangeofscholarshipandissuesin

NordicandBritishpoliticsfromapproximately1970onwards.Thischapterhaslookedatthe

issueofhowactorsshouldbetheorisedinrelationtooneanother:itisonethingtoargue

thatdiscoursesexist,butevenadetaileddiscourseanalysisisincompletewithoutaproperly

theorisedfieldinwhichactorsengageinarticulatorypractices.Ihavethereforesetoutthe

argumentthattheinteractivegovernanceparadigmcanbeusedtostructureobservations

abouttherelationshipsbetweenactors.Thespecificformofdiscourseanalysiswhichwillbe

usedinthisstudywasthenelaborated,includinganumberofminorcriticismsandalterations

which will be used to conduct the analysis. Finally, the chapter made a couple of

methodologicalremarkswhichexplainedwhatwouldbeconsideredahegemonicdiscourse

andhowthiswouldbeestablishedempirically.

In the introduction, I posed three keyquestionswhichwouldbe addressed in three case

studiesinchaptersthree,fourandfive.Thekeyquestionsposedbythethesisare:

1.HowistheNordicmodelarticulatedinBritishgovernancenetworkstoday?How

hasitdevelopedandchangedovertime?

2.Whichactorshavearticulatedthesediscoursesandwhyhavetheydoneso?

3.Whateffects,ifany,hasthisprocesshadonUKpublicpolicy?

As has already been suggested, it is likely that there will be no single answer to these

questions,norwillanyanswerprovidedherebeabsolutelydefinitive,howeverthisstudywill

make a contribution to understanding of how the Nordic model functions as an empty

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signifierincontemporarypolicydiscoursesinBritain.Itsaimisthereforetocontributetoa

body of literature on theNordicmodel aswell as a literature on British public policy. In

chapterfourIwillsurveyliteraturedealingwithNordicpoliticaleconomyfromtheearly2000s

until2015.Thisanalysiswillemploythekeyconceptssetoutinthischaptertoidentifythe

empty signifiersaroundwhich thesediscourseshavebeenconstructedandexamine their

successesandfailuresinpositedgovernancenetworksinBritishpublicpolicy.

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ChapterFour–Nordicmodelsofpoliticaleconomy:flexibility

orsecurity?

4.1Introduction

ThischapterwillexaminetheNordicmodelasanapproachtopoliticaleconomy.However,

very fewNordicmacro-economic policies have been adopted or implemented in theUK.

Thereareahostofreasonsforthis,someofwhichwillbeexploredhere.Asaresult,this

chapter will function slightly differently to chapters five and six, which deal with the

development,adoptionand,toadegree,implementationofconcretepolicies.Firstly,itwill

identify the networks responsible for articulating discourses about the Nordic countries.

Secondly,itwilldiscusstheparticularsignifiersusedtoarticulateaNordicmodelofpolitical

economy in the UK, particularly drawing out attempts to understand Nordic economic

regimes in terms of the signifier ‘freedom’. Thirdly, it will attempt to understand these

discourseseitheraspartofwiderpoliticalprojects–e.g.socialdemocracyandfree-market

liberalism–orprogrammesforalteredregulatoryregimes.

ThefactthatpoliticaleconomicandpublicservicediscoursesoftheNordicmodeldivergeis

interestinginitself,howeveritnonethelessmakesconsiderablesensethatnetworkedactors

would consider amodel of political economy an important prerequisite to public service

discourses, since social welfare systems are almost always envisaged as embedded in

contingent economic formations. It is therefore significant that, whereas specific policy

reformshavecomeaboutasaresultofpolicydiscoursesingovernancenetworksonhealth

andeducation,therehasbeennosignificantchangeinthebasiccircumstancesofBritain’s

economy as a result of nonetheless quite well-developed articulations of the Nordic

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economies.Thisisnodoubtatleastpartlyduetotheunfashionabilityofindustrialpolicyin

theUK inthe last thirtyto fortyyears,but it isprobablyalsoademonstrationof theself-

imposedfocus,sharedbyNewLabourandtheConservative-LiberalDemocratcoalition,on

publicservicesratherthanthefunctioningoftheeconomyitself.

Moreover,NewLabour’shealthcarediscourse(chapterfive)offersamuchmoresystematic

demonstrationofare-articulationoftheNordicmodelaspartofasocialdemocraticproject,

althoughtheFreudReport,whichoutlinedchangestounemploymentpaymentrulesinthe

UK(see4.2.2,below),isalsoagoodexampleofthis.Similarly,thetranspositionofaSwedish

FreeSchoolspolicy toEnglandandWales (chapter six) isacleardemonstrationofa free-

market attempt to articulate the Nordic model signifier as part of a liberal-conservative

politicalproject.However,thisisnottosaythattherearenotspecificmacroeconomicpolicies

whichareconsideredimitable.Thefocusofthechapterisstillmodelling,evenifitismore

difficult to identify specificpolicy regimechangesassociatedwith thesediscourses.A key

argumentwillbethat‘flexicurity’,apolicymostcloselyassociatedwithDenmark,hasbeen

identifiedasapotentialmodelforreform,alongsidediscourseswhichaimtoaccountforthe

macroeconomic‘success’oftheNordiccountries.Thiswillbedonebyidentifyingthechief

signifiers aroundwhich such discourses have been articulatedwith a focus on notions of

‘freedom’,‘security’,and‘democracy’.

Thechapterwillthereforebeginbyofferinganexplanationofwhatismeantby‘flexicurity’

andexplainthestructuringprinciplesofthepolicyinDenmark.Itwillalsoofferafewremarks

aboutthesimilaritiesbetweenDanishandSwedisheconomicpolicies.Itgoesontoconstruct

twogovernancenetworksinwhichthesediscourseshavebeenarticulated,andexplainthe

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relationsbetweenthedifferentactorsusingtheInteractiveGovernanceparadigmsetoutin

chaptertwo.Finally,itwillofferananalysisofarticulationsofNordicpoliticaleconomyinthe

twogovernancenetworkssetoutintheopeningsectionandanalysetheprimarysignifiers

andsignifyingchainsaroundwhichthesediscoursesareorganised.

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4.2WhyNordicflexicurity?

4.2.1Flexicurity:Wherediditcomefrom?

Theactualmeaningoftheratheruglyportmanteau‘flexicurity’isanongoingandcontested

question.This sectionhasbeen titled ‘WhyNordic flexicurity?’ to reflect the fact that the

originsanduseoftheconceptflexicurityaremorecomplexthanitstypicalassociationswith

Denmarkmightsuggest.Duringthe1990sandearly2000s,thereweresignificantsimilarities

betweenthestructuresoftheDanishandDutchlabourmarkets,andtheterm‘flexicurity’

wasfirstcoinedbyDutchsociologistHansAdriaansensin1995todescribetheDutchsystem

ofsocialprotections.290Politically,thetermbecameassociatedwithDanishPrimeMinister

Poul Nyrup Rasmussen, but it was propagated academically by Ton Wilthagen, a Dutch

economist.291InDenmark,thesystemofreformswhichcametobetermedflexicuritywas

associatedwiththeNordicfinancialcrisesandExchangeRateMechanism(ERM)crisisofthe

early1990s.AlthoughtheeffectsoftheserelatedcriseswerefarmoresevereinSwedenand

Finland (see 2.2.1, above), Denmark nonetheless experienced significant difficulties,

especiallyrisingunemploymentandcurrencydevaluation.292

Thenextsub-section(4.2.2)willgointogreaterdetailaboutthemacroeconomiclogicbehind

flexicuritypoliciesandwillintroducetheargumentthatflexicuritycanbeseenasa‘varietyof

capitalism’,ratherthanaspecificregulatoryregime,andgiveasummaryofthemostrelevant

academicliteratureonthetopic.

290TorEriksson,‘FlexicurityandtheEconomicCrisis2008-2009:EvidencefromDenmark’2012.291TonWilthagen,Flexicurity:ANewParadigmforLabourMarketPolicyReform,DiscussionPaperFS-I(Berlin:Wissenschaftszentrum,Berlin,1998).292JonErikDølvik,JørgenGoulAndersen,andJuhanaVartiainen,‘TheNordicSocialModelsinTurbulentTimes:Consolidation and Flexible Adaptation’, in European Social Models From Crisis to Crisis: Employment andInequalityintheEraofMonetaryIntegration(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2014),247–304.

151

Aswellaspartofdomesticreformprogrammes,thetermhasalsobeenusedextensivelyby

theEuropeanCommissionandintransnationalgovernancenetworks.TheCommission’suse

offlexicurityhasattractedsignificantscrutiny,andanumberofscholarshavesuggestedthat

farfromrepresentinganewdirectionforEUpolicy,itshouldinsteadbeseenasacontinuation

ofprevalentthinkingintheCommission.SincetheDutchandDanishlabourmarketswerethe

bestperforminginEuropeinthelate1990s,itwaslogicalthattheCommissionshouldadopt

aflexicuritypolicywholesale.293Indeed,thequestionwasofconsiderableinterestinthemid-

2000s, and politicians from all over Europe of different political orientationswere asking

whethertheNordicmodelhadthepotentialtobeemulated.294ThequestionoftheDutch

andEuropeandiscussiononflexicurityisoutsidethescopeofthisthesis,althoughhowthis

discussion reflects European attitudes to Denmark and the Nordic countries remains a

questionofconsiderableinterestforfutureresearch.

Thesupersessionof‘Dutchflexicurity’withaprimaryassociationwithDenmarkhasgenerally

beenunderstoodasareactiontothewiderscopeofprotectioninDenmark.Whereasthe

Dutchsystemisprimarilyconcernedtooffersecurityforthoseengagedinirregularworking

patterns, in theory theDanish system includesanybodywho is integrated into the labour

market,broadlyconceived.Despitethegeneralagreementintheacademicliteratureabout

293MaartenKeuneandMaria Jepsen, ‘NotBalancedandHardlyNew:TheEuropeanCommission’sQuest forFlexicurity’ (European Trade Union Institute for Research, Education and Health and Safety, 2007); TonWilthagenandFrankTros,‘TheConceptof“Flexicurity”:ANewApproachtoRegulatingEmploymentandLabourMarkets’,Transfer:EuropeanReviewofLabourandResearch10,no.2(2004):166–86.294NickClegg,‘TooGoodaModeltoBeIgnored’,EuropeanPolicyCentreWorkingPaper20(2005):29–31.

152

theclosed,andaboveall,Danish,meaningwhich shouldbeascribed to flexicurity, Ihave

intentionallyre-openeditundertheterm‘Nordicflexicurity’.295Thisisfortwochiefreasons.

Firstly,therearesignificantsimilaritiesbetweentheregulatoryregimesandassumptionsof

the Danish and Swedish labour markets. Pär Nuder, a Swedish former Social Democrat

member of the Riksdag, has described the Rehn-Meidner Model (see 1.2.2, above) as

‘Flexicurity–beforeflexicuritywasevenaword’.296KeuneandJepsenbroadlyagreewiththis

characterisation, describing the European Commission’s flexicurity as ‘hardly new’ and

pointingtotheRehn-Meidnermodeltoshowthatquestionsofflexibilityandsecurityinthe

labourmarkethavelongpreoccupiedpolicy-makers.297Thispointwillbedescribedingreater

detailbelow,butitisworthnotingherethatmanyofthechangestotheRehn-Meidnermodel

since1991(see2.2,above)havebroughtitfurtherintolinewiththeDanishregulatoryregime.

Specifically,Sweden’sabandonmentofnationallevelwagebargaining,butretentionoftight

counter-inflationaryandactivelabourmarketpoliciesmeanthatthecontemporarySwedish

labour market and macroeconomic policies strongly resemble the core tenets of the

flexicurityagendainDenmark(see4.2.2,below).

Secondly,inpolicyandstrategicliteraturetheNordiccountriesaretypicallyintegratedand

separatedhaphazardly.Thiswascommenteduponintheprecedingchaptersandwillbea

running theme throughout this study. As a result, any attempt to distinguish too rigidly

295Forexample,MogensLykketoft,aDanishSocialDemocraticpoliticianandformerFinanceMinister,isexplicitinhisargumentthattheflexicurityprogrammeshouldbeconsideredaDanishphenomenon:DenDanskeModel-eneuropæisksucceshistorie(Copenhagen:ArbejderbevægelsensErhvervsråd,2010).296Nuder,‘SavingtheSwedishModel’.297KeuneandJepsen,‘NotBalancedandHardlyNew:TheEuropeanCommission’sQuestforFlexicurity’.

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betweentheNordicsystemsislikelytofallfoulofthisconflationandrequiretheomissionof

relevantliteratureforreasonsofpedantry.

4.2.2Thearchitectureofflexicurity

ThissectionwillofferadescriptionofthepolicyarchitectureofDanishflexicurityandwhere

necessarypointtosimilaritieswithothersystems,especiallytheNetherlandsandSweden.

Thetransitiontowardsthe labourmarketarrangement inDenmark,which is todaywidely

referred to as flexicurity, began in 1993. An important feature of flexicurity is that it sits

somewherebetweena regulatory regimeanda setofprinciples for reforming the labour

market.PoulNyrupRasmussen,formerPrimeMinisterofDenmark(1993-2001),makesthis

caseinadescriptionofwhatheseesasthecoreofflexicurity’ssuccess.Hedescribesitasa

‘combinationofpoliciesandtheactiveparticipationofthesocialpartners’.298Forthisreason,

while flexicurity could perhaps be defined by a list of specific regulations, neither Nyrup

Rasmussennormanyof theotherDanishorNordiccommentatorssee itassuch. Indeed,

whileNyrupRasmussennotesthatDenmarkhas‘thehighestmobilityinanylabourmarket

anywhereintheworld’,299hestressesthattheNordiccountries‘alsooffertheircitizensthe

highest economic and social security in theworld’.300Mogens Lykketoft, financeminister

duringNyrupRasmussen’spremiership,setsoutamoredetailedlistofpolicieswhichcould

beconsidereda‘flexicurity’programme.Significantly,hearguesthatthepolicywasdefined

by a combination of ‘macroeconomic steering’ and deep structural reform of the labour

marketandtaxsystem.301

298PoulNyrupRasmussen,‘LearningfromtheNorth-Let’sFocusonBestPracticeinAllofEurope’,EuropeanPolicyCentreWorkingPaper20(2005):51.299Bergeretal.,‘InterviewwithPoulNyrupRasmussen’,98.300Rasmussen,‘LearningfromtheNorth’,52;Seealso,Bergeretal.,‘InterviewwithPoulNyrupRasmussen’,98.301Lykketoft,DenDanskeModel,22.

154

HearguesthattheenormousinvestmentintrainingmadeduringthiserainDenmarkwas

complementedbytightenedrulesaboutacceptingavailablejobs(i.e. ifanappropriatejob

wasavailableitcouldnotbeturneddown).Indeed,theactivelabourmarketpolicyelements

offlexicurityhavebeenverypopularintheUK.Nordicactivationpolicieswereofinterestto

NewLabourintheirattempttointroducenewcriteriaforcontinuedreceiptofunemployment

payments and sanctions for failure to meet them, as well as quasi-markets in the

administrationofsuchbenefits.302In2005-2010,duringaperiodofopposition,IainDuncan

Smith,formerleaderoftheUKConservativePartyandlaterWorkandPensionsSecretary,

studiedDanishandSwedishunemploymentsystems,andthereareclearechoesofNordic

principlesintheideasbehindhisUniversalCreditscheme.303Inparticular,theprinciplethat

accepting work should never lead to loss of income, which has not been effectively

implementedatthetimeofwriting,wasinfluencedbytheDanishwelfareregime.Moreover,

there has been significant discussion in recent times about the possibility of outsourcing

contractsforprovidingJobCentrePlusservices.Theoutsourcingofserviceshasbeenacore

partofreformstotheA-KassesysteminDenmarkandstudiesonthishavebeenpublishedin

Britishthink-tanks.304

302DavidFreud,‘ReducingDependency,IncreasingOpportunity:OptionsfortheFutureofWelfaretoWork(TheFreudReport)’(Leeds:DepartmentforWorkandPensions,2007);AnneDaguerreandDavidEtherington,‘ActiveLabourMarketPoliciesinInternationalContext:WhatWorksBest?LessonsfortheUK’(Norwich:DepartmentforWorkandPensions,2009).303AdrianWooldridge,‘TheVikingsRiseAgain,butThisTimeTheirAxeIsAimedattheState’,TheSundayTimes,16February2014;CatherineHaddon,‘MakingPolicyinOpposition:TheDevelopmentofUniversalCredit,2005-2010’(London:InstituteforGovernment,2012).304 Freud, ‘The Freud Report’. See in particular section 7 on the role of JobCentre Plus. Sharon Wright,ContractingoutEmploymentServices:LessonsfromAustralia,Denmark,GermanyandtheNetherlands(London:ChildPovertyActionGroup,2008).

155

However,theDanishconceptofflexicuritygoesbeyondthis.Amajorpartofthelogicofthe

reformwastherecognitionthatunskilledandsemi-skilledproduction jobscouldbeeasily

outsourcedtoChina,SouthEastAsiaand India, requiringactivesteeringtocreateamore

skilled labour force (opkvalificiering), 305 a focus which was not necessarily mirrored in

attemptstoimportportionsofthepolicytotheUK.However,thefailuretomaintainthislevel

ofinvestmentinskillsisLykketoft’smajorcriticismoftheFoghRasmussengovernment(2001-

2009), demonstrating a generalised preference among European governments for the

reductionof unemployment paymentswithout generating newexpenditure on education

and training.306Therewerealso reforms to thesystem forobtainingcredit in thehousing

market,whichhadbeenimplicatedinsomeoftheproblemsleadingtothecrisisoftheearly

1990s inDenmark.Thiswascombinedwithareformtothetaxsystem,whichbeganasa

short-termreliefprogramme,butwasretainedasastructuralreductionofincometax.307

Importantly,however,Lykketoftarguesthatthesesupply-sidereformswereonlyeffective

because they were combined with active industrial, environmental and energy policies,

alongsideinfrastructureinvestmentswhichcouldbetargetedtowardstheneedsofparticular

industries. A primary focus was on IT and technology. 308 In other words, in Lykketoft’s

understanding, the success of theDanishmodel between 1993 and 2001was down to a

mixture of supply- and demand-side reform. Although Den Danske Model should be

considered an active intervention in party politics, it is broadly consistentwith a general

consensus thatNordiceconomic successbefore the2008 financial crisiswasa resultof a

305Lykketoft,DenDanskeModel,25.306Ibid.,29.307Ibid.,23.308Ibid.,23–4.

156

mixtureof supply- anddemand-side factors; its ability toprovide for theneedsof IT and

technology service businesses; and a not entirely planned elision of Nordic economic

structures with the demand growth of the Chinese economy. 309 Moreover, Lykketoft’s

argumentaboutgradualunder-investmentinskillsandtrainingintheFoghRasmussenera

agreeswithadevelopedcriticismofa transition from ‘learn-fare’ to ‘work-fare’ inDanish

socialsecuritypolicyandtheintroductionofcentralisingNewPublicManagementreforms

fortheprovisionoftheseservicessince2001.310

Thekeyindicatorofthechangetowardsflexicurity,atleastasitisunderstoodintheacademic

literature,wasthatalongsideadecreaseinunemployment,therewasacontemporaneous

increase in employment. One might expect increases in employment to automatically

accompanydecreases inunemployment.However, inpractice,this israrelythecasesince

there are variousmeansbywhichofficial statistics canbemassaged. Theunemployment

figurecanbereducedthroughthecreationoftrainingoreducationschemesorthroughearly

retirement schemes.What the Danish system had achieved in this period was therefore

noteworthy,evenifthereweresuggestionsthatsomeofthereductioninunemploymenthad

been achieved at the cost of higher wage dispersions – i.e. new jobs had been created

primarilyatthelowerendofthewagescale.

Mostcritically,PerKongshøjMadsenarguesthat:

309Dølvik,Andersen,andVartiainen,‘TheNordicSocialModelsinTurbulentTimes’,265,254,264.310Foracrosssectionoftheseargumentsfromseveraldifferentperspectives,seeHenningJørgensen,‘FromaBeautifulSwantoAnUglyDuckling:TheRenewalofDanishActivationPolicySince2003’,EuropeanJournalofSocialSecurity11,no.4 (2009):337–67;Torfing, ‘TowardsaSchumpeterianPostnationalWorkfareRegime’;BarbaraVis,‘StatesofWelfareorStatesofWorkfare?WelfareStateRestructuringin16CapitalistDemocracies,1985–2002’,PolicyandPolitics35,no.1(2007):105–22.

157

Denmarkseemstohavecreatedauniquecombinationofstableeconomic

growthandsocialwelfaresincethemid-1990s,atatimewhenliberalswere

arguing that the classical Scandinavianmodelwasbecomingobsoleteand

wasnolongerabletofacethedemandsofflexibilityandstructuralchange

arisingoutoftechnologicalprogressandthegrowingforcesofinternational

competition.311

Madsendescribes this asa “thirdway”,which combines the flexibilityof a liberalmarket

economywiththesocialsafetynetofasocialdemocraticwelfarestate.AccordingtoMadsen,

thesuccessofthispolicyrestsona‘GoldenTriangle’,whichhearguesischaracterisedby:a

flexible labour market, generous unemployment support, and active labour market

policies.312 Without labouring the point, this triad strongly resembles the contemporary

settlementoftheSwedishlabourmarket.

LiseLotteHansenarguedthatthisGoldenTriangleshouldbemodifiedtoasquaretotake

accountoftheimpactofcaringservicesonlevelsoffemaleparticipationintheDanishlabour

market.Shethereforere-labels‘flexicurity’as‘flexicarity’,313andconcludesthattheDanish

labour market is still highly gender-segregated, with 60% of jobs, sections and branches

dominatedbyonesex.Moreover,menandwomentendtobehavedifferentlyoncepartof

theunemploymentsystem,withmenre-integratingintothelabourforcefasterasaresultof

311‘HowCan It Possibly Fly? The Paradox of a Dynamic LabourMarket in a ScandinavianWelfare State’, inNationalIdentityandtheVarietiesofCapitalism:TheDanishExperience,ed.JohnL.Campbell,JohnA.Hall,andOveK.Pedersen(McGill-Queen’sUniversityPress,2006),327.312Madsen,‘HowCanItPossiblyFly?TheParadoxofaDynamicLabourMarketinaScandinavianWelfareState’.313LiseLotteHansen,‘FromFlexicuritytoFlexicArity:GenderedPerspectivesontheDanishModel’,JournalofSocialSciences3,no.2(2007):88–93.

158

atendencytofavourplacementsandon-the-jobtrainingovereducationschemesfavoured

bywomen.314Despitethis,manyofitscentralfunctionshelpincreasefemaleparticipationin

thelabourmarket,notleastitsemphasisontheprincipleofindividualism,wherebymoneyis

allotted based on individual entitlements rather than based on the family unit. 315

Furthermore,thewidespreadacceptanceofandpublicsubsidygiventocareofchildrenand

theelderlydisproportionatelybenefitswomen,sincethese,historicallyunpaid,caringroles

aretypicallyperformedbywomen.316

Arguably, several featuresof thewiderDanisheconomyalso create conditionsof greater

securitythanthoseinotherEuropeanlabourmarkets.ThefirstisthattheDanisheconomyis

characterisedbylargenumberofsmallandmedium-sizedenterprises(SMEs),whichmeans

itislikelythatworkerswholosetheirjobscanfindcomparableworkrelativelyrapidly.The

1990ssawageneralimprovementintheconditionsintheDanishlabourmarketingeneral

with large number of new jobs created. Finally, Madsen highlights the importance of

generousunemploymentbenefitsasakeydriverofthehighlevelsofsecurityintheDanish

labourmarket.317

RegardlessofwhetherDanishflexicurityischaracterisedasaGoldenTriangleorasasquare,

itcanbesaidtoconformtoTonWilthagen’sdefinitionoftheconceptas:

314Ibid.315Ibid.316Ibid.317Madsen,‘HowCanItPossiblyFly?TheParadoxofaDynamicLabourMarketinaScandinavianWelfareState’.

159

‘Apolicystrategythatattempts,synchronicallyandinadeliberateway,to

enhance the flexibility of labour markets, work organisation and labour

relationsontheonehand,andtoenhancesecurity–employmentsecurity

and social security–notably forweakergroups inandoutside the labour

market,ontheotherhand’318

WhatWilthagendescribesas‘flexibilityof…workorganisationsandlabourrelations’isalso

amajorconcernoftheDanishvariantofflexicurity.TheDanish,andarguablyalsoSwedish

and Finnish, social compact has always rested upon strong and active trade union

engagementwithmanagementandstate.Incontrasttothelogicof‘socialpartners’common

to much of Western Europe, the Nordic countries have typically generated compromise

accordingtoalogicof‘socialparties’,withparticularantagonisticinterests.Paradoxically,the

articulationofcapitalandlabouraspossessingdifferentinterestshastypicallyledtomore

durable compromises than the logic of social partners. 319 The so-called September

Compromiseof1899betweenemployersandtradeunionsmarksthebeginningofageneral

consensusintheDanishlabourmarketthatemployersshouldbeabletohireandfireatwill,

on the proviso that social provisions guaranteed a comparable standard of living for

employees losing their jobs. 320 Such consensual measures have characterised Danish

industrialrelationssince;in1987tradeunionsagreedtotakeaccountofthemacro-economic

situationinwagenegotiations.ThismeantthatDanishtradeunionstypicallysuggestedwage

levelsbelowthelevelofinternationalwageinflationtokeepDanishindustrycompetitive.321

318WilthagenandTros,‘TheConceptof“Flexicurity”:ANewApproachtoRegulatingEmploymentandLabourMarkets’,169.319Forafullversionofthisargument,seePauliKettunen,‘ReinterpretingtheHistoricityoftheNordicModel’,NordicJournalofWorkingLifeStudies2,no.4(2012):21–43.320Madsen,‘HowCanItPossiblyFly?TheParadoxofaDynamicLabourMarketinaScandinavianWelfareState’,346–7.321Ibid.,342.

160

Despite theapparentnoveltyof ‘flexicurity’,whichmaybeasmucha result of the sheer

uglinessoftheneologismasanythingelse,itisfairtosaythatwhilesomefeaturesofDanish

flexicurityrepresentrecentinnovations,othersarefirmlyembeddedwithintheDanishsocial

compact.And,asKeuneandJepsenpointout,preoccupationswitheconomicsystemswhich

balance flexibility for employers (and employees) and security for workers are not new.

Indeed,reconcilingthemhasbeenalongstandingaimoftheNordicsocialcompacts.322Inan

inversion of the classic (neo-)orthodox economic argument that high wage levels and

solidaristic bargaining practices make firms uncompetitive, an explicit aim of the Rehn-

Meidnermodelwastoallowuncompetitive firmstobepricedoutof themarketplaceby

guaranteedincrementalwageincreasesandcollectivebargaining(see1.2.2,above).Thisin

turnallowedlabourtobere-distributedefficientlyacrossmoreproductivefirmsinthesame

sector.323Therefore,despitecommoncaricaturesofSwedenas ‘the lastSoviet state’, it is

clearthattheRehn-MeidnerModelwasactivelyconcernedwithmacro-economicflexibility.

Another importantsimilaritybetweencontemporary flexicuritypolicies,bothabstractand

actual, and theRehn-MeidnerModel is theemphasison income rather than job security.

Intuitively,jobsecurityisregulationwhichmakesitdifficultforemployeestobeunilaterally

dismissed. Income security is not tied to a particular position. Instead, a state or fund

administerssupporttomaintainincomelevelsduringaperiodofunemployment.Themost

generous, including those offered today in Denmark and Sweden, may even tie

unemploymentpaymentstopreviousratesofincome,meaningthatsuddenorunexpected

322KeuneandJepsen,‘NotBalancedandHardlyNew:TheEuropeanCommission’sQuestforFlexicurity’.323Dølvik,Andersen,andVartiainen,‘TheNordicSocialModelsinTurbulentTimes’.

161

unemploymentdoesnotleadtodrasticfallsinstandardsofliving.ForWilthagen,thisshift

fromjobsecuritytoincomesecurityisakeyplankofflexicurity,andthemovefromoneto

theotherintheDutchregulatoryregimeisthekeyindicatorthataflexicuritypolicyhadbeen

adopted. 324 It is therefore significant that systems based on income security have

characterisedtheDanish,SwedishandFinnishsystemsfordecades,lendingsomecredence

toNuder’sclaimthatSwedenhadflexicurity‘beforeflexicuritywasevenaword’.

324WilthagenandTros,‘TheConceptof“Flexicurity”:ANewApproachtoRegulatingEmploymentandLabourMarkets’.

162

4.3Ataleoftwonetworks

4.3.1The‘socialdemocratic’network

Althoughthesenetworkscouldbeconstitutedinanumberofways,andthisdescriptionof

thesocialdemocraticnetwork isnotdesignedtobedefinitive, it isnonethelesshelpful to

theorisethenetworksinrelationtoeachother.AsInotedinchapterthree(3.3.5),thereisan

inherent riskof reifyingactorsand their relationshipsby theorising them in thisway. It is

thereforeworthreiteratingherethatIconsidertheactorsinthesenetworkstobeinternally

split and that their identities and relationships to other actors should be considered

interventionsindiscourseinmuchthesamewayastheiractualpolicyproposals.

Thesocialdemocraticnetwork,asIhavetermedit,isenvisionedhereascomposedofactors

affiliated to various organisations, primarily based in the UK and Sweden. Importantly

however,thesocialdemocraticnetworkIpositinthischaptershouldbeseenasdistinctfrom

othersocialistortradeunionnetworkswhicharenotunderconsiderationhere.Athink-tank

suchastheInstituteofEmploymentRights,forexample,shouldnotbeconsideredanactor

insocialdemocraticgovernanceprocesses,sinceitisunion-affiliatedanddidnotparticipate

inthecreationofpolicywiththeothernetworkedactorsunderexaminationinthisstudy.

In the earliest phase of the social democratic networkmost actorswere affiliated to the

LabourParty,whichwasatthattimeingovernment.Whendiscussingtheperiodfrom1997-

2010 the party will be referred to as New Labour. This gave the network significant

importanceandcontributionsbyTonyBlair,thenPrimeMinister,andPeterMandelson,one

ofthearchitectsofNewLabour,willbeconsideredhere. Indeed,atthetimeofwriting in

January2017,Mandelsonispresidentofthethink-tankPolicyNetwork,fromwhichanumber

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ofpublicationswhichformpartofthisanalysisaretaken.PolicyNetworkisaninternational

think-tank andhashad significant successbringing togethermajor figures fromEuropean

socialdemocraticandlabourparties.AswellasNewLabourfigures,thethink-tankhashad

contributions fromGerhard Schröder, former Chancellor ofGermany,Dominique Strauss-

Kahn, the now disgraced former head of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), Helle

ThorningSchmidt,formerPrimeMinisterofDenmark,andAnthonyGiddens,theprominent

sociologist.Thisreflectsasignificantlevelofinfluenceatthepolicylevelandanobvioussite

oftransnationalpolicytransfer.

Two further New Labour affiliated think-tanks, Progress and Renewal, also played an

importantroleinthearticulationoftheNordiccountries,particularlySweden,asamodelfor

reform of the British economy. Renewal is a journal rather than a think-tank, but it has

significant influencewithin the social democratic governance network and has published

contributionsontheNordicmodelfromBritishandSwedishcontributors.Compass,founded

in 2003 by Labour politicians dissatisfiedwith the Party’s direction under Tony Blair, has

tendedtobesignificantlymorecriticalofthehegemonicdiscoursesintheLabourParty.Itis

sometimes seen as the counterweight to Progress. Compared to Progress and Renewal,

Compass ismore concernedwith trade union issues. It is nonetheless affiliatedwith the

Labour Party and should therefore be considered a well-integrated actor in the social

democraticgovernancenetwork.

Asecondcomplimentaryportionof thesocialdemocraticnetworkwhichhasoutlived the

effectiveendofNewLabourasapoliticalforcewasconcernedmoregenerallywiththehealth

ofBritishsocialdemocracyanditstradeunions.Despiteitslongstandingaffiliationwiththe

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LabourParty,theFabianSociety,whichwasinvolvedinthefoundingoftheparty,shouldbe

consideredlessdirectlyengagedwithNewLabourandperhapsasinterestedintheNordic

modelasamodelforreformofthetradeunionmovement,althoughitisstillmostclosely

associatedwiththeliberalwingoftheLabourParty.Similarly,theWorkFoundation,while

generallysympathetictotheLabourParty,shouldbeconsideredmoreconcernedwithlabour

marketandtradeunionissuesratherthanwithLabourPartystrategy.

TheInstituteforPublicPolicyResearch(IPPR)occupiesasomewhatdifferentpositionwithin

the network. Firstly, it is significantly less concernedwith advocacy in general, preferring

contractwork,generallyconsistingofthoroughlyresearchedpolicypublicationswhichare

focused on detail and outliningworkable solutions to specific problems.325Secondly, and

partlyasaresultofitsemphasisoncontractwork,ithaspublishedsignificantlymorewidely

notjustonstrategicorsectionalinterests,buthasattemptedtoformulatepolicyinsucha

waythat itwouldappealnotonlytosocialdemocraticgroups,buttoaddresswidelyheld

concerns about the functioning of capitalism. Its contributions to the social democratic

network are therefore more reflective of wider concerns about the relevance of social

democraticreformsthanthoseputforwardbystrategyoradvocacyorientatedactors.

4.3.2The‘free-market’network

Thefree-marketnetworkis,inimportantways,significantlymoreinfluentialthanitssocial

democraticcounterpart.Although it is centredarounda smallernumberoforganisations,

primarilytheInstituteofEconomicAffairs(IEA),CentreforPolicyStudies(CPS)andtheUK

325DenhamandGarnett, ‘InfluencewithoutResponsibility?Think-Tanks inBritain’,54;DenhamandGarnett,‘“WhatWorks”?BritishThinkTanksandthe“EndofIdeology”’,163.

165

ConservativeParty,italsoincludesactorsaffiliatedwiththeSwedishModeratePartyandthe

linksbetweentheseactorsaredeepandproductive.326Indeed,theNorthernFutureForum,

sometimesreferredtoastheNordic-BalticSummit,foundedin2011,isanindicationofthe

strengthoflinksbetweentheConservativePartyandtheSwedishModerateParty.Moreover,

the IEA has developed important links with Timbro, a free-market think-tank based in

Stockholm,whichhasledtothecreationofawidernetworkofinstitutionsaswellasfairly

regularcollaborationsbetweenBritishandSwedishactors.327Alongwithconnectionstothe

media,especiallyTheEconomistwhichfrequentlypublishesarticlescitingresearchaboutthe

Nordic countries conducted by the IEA, 328 this makes for a much more effective and

coordinatednetworkthananythingwhichhasbeenproducedbysocialdemocrats.

Ontopofthis,thenetworkfunctionsmuchmoreefficiently,giventhemixedcharacterofits

actors.TheIEAandCPSareprimarilyengagedintheproductionofresearchandadvocacyfor

particularpolicies.ThishasfrequentlyincludedstudiesofNordicpolicies,includingmodelsof

politicaleconomy,healthcareandeducation.Aclearstrengthofthefree-marketnetworkis

the generally high level of integration between actors and the relative consistency of

networkedactors’discoursesandconcerns.Thecontentofthediscourseswillbeexploredin

depthbelow.However, it isworthnotingthat thegreater levelsofconsistency,especially

between international actors, allows for more effective hegemonization of a basically

heterodoxarticulationoftheNordicmodel.Inthisrespect,therefore,theNorthernFuture

Forumshouldbeconsideredanimportantstepinformalisingtherelationshipbetweenthe

UK Conservatives and the Swedish Moderates, given the already developed personal

326StephenPollard,‘HasCameronFallenforaSwedishModel?’,TheTimes,19September2006.327‘EpicenterPressRelease’.328‘FoundingVikings’,TheEconomist,18June2016.

166

relationshipbetweenDavidCameronandFredrikReinfeldt.Thisismirroredbythepresence

of(loosely)Moderate-affiliatedactorssuchasJohanWennströmandNimaSanandajiatthe

InstituteofEconomicAffairs(andtoalesserdegree,CPS).Thisdemonstratestheexistence

ofasmall,butnonethelesswellorganised,free-marketnetworkoperatingacrosstheUKand

Sweden.Thisnetworkisalsoabletoaccesstheconnectionsandresourcesofitsconstituent

organisations, includingtheIEA,theUKConservativePartyandsomediplomaticresources

throughtheNorthernFutureForum.

Although the literature on flexicurity is not particularly well developed outside the

governance networks, there has been some media coverage of flexicurity policies. The

coverage itself is frequently inaccurate and error laden. For example, an article in The

Observerin2010mentionedthatPoulNyrupRasmussen‘coinedthephraseflexicurity’,which

is false.329An article in The Sunday Times in 2012 describes TonWilthagen as a Danish

economist,heisDutch.330Thesesortsofinaccuraciesarecharacteristicofthediscussionof

flexicurityintheBritishpress.Thismightbecharitablyattributedtodeadlinepressures,or

lesscharitablyviewedasademonstrationthatBritishjournalistshaveapoorgraspofdetail,

especiallywhenitcomestocomplexissues.Itisnonethelessnoteworthythataflexicurityor

politicaleconomicdiscourseexistsintheBritishpressatall,especiallygiventhecontinued

ambiguityandcontestationoftheterminthegovernancenetworksinwhichmostofthese

discourseshavebeenarticulated.

329TobyHelm,AnushkaAsthana,andPaulHarris,‘InFocus:HowBritain’sNewWelfareStateWasBornintheUSA’,TheObserver,7November2010.330JenniRussell,‘Don’tArgue,PickaBenefittoGiveup’,TheSundayTimes,15January2012.

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4.4Flexicurity:Anewlabourmarketsettlement?

4.4.1Swedenaspoliticalparadox

Theearly2000susheredinthebeginningofaperiodofconcernthatSocialDemocracyinthe

UK,FranceandGermanyhadslowlylostitsdynamismandthatarejuvenationofEuropean

SocialDemocracywasnecessary,despiteitsrecentelectoralsuccesses,atleastinBritainand

Germany.331GiventhatarealfearwasemerginginNewLabourcirclesthat,astheysawit,

thecurrent ‘periodof revisionismandenlightenment in the1990s risksgivingway to the

familiar chorus of heresy and betrayal’, the need to articulate a renewed vision of social

democracywasparamount.332NewLabour’spoliticalvisionhadbeenbadlydamagedbythe

legacy of the Hutton inquiry into the death of Dr David Kelly and the controversial

introductionofuniversitytuitionfees.333

In 2005, Robert Taylor, formerly the Sweden correspondent for The Financial Times,

publishedSweden’sNewSocialDemocraticModel throughCompass,334a Labour-affiliated

thinktank.Hispamphletintersectsinimportantwayswiththedebatewhichwastakingplace

in the UK Labour Party at that time. His description of flexicurity as ‘crucial to our

331PeterMandelson,‘Introduction’,inWhereNowforEuropeanSocialDemocracy?(London:PolicyNetwork,2004), 5–10; Patrick Diamond, ‘Permanent Reformism: The Social Democratic Challenge of the Future?’, inWhereNowforEuropeanSocialDemocracy(London:PolicyNetwork,2004),31–41.332Diamond,‘PermanentReformism’,37.333Mandelson,‘Introduction’.TheHuttonInquiryinvestigatedthesuicideofformerUNweaponsinspectorDrDavidKelly.ItwasallegedthatDrKellyhadbeenhoundedbytheGovernmentandmediaafterhewasrevealedtohavebeenthesourceofaleak,allegingthatthegovernmenthad‘sexedup’,intheinfamousphraseofthetime,intelligencedocumentswhichmadethecaseforthe2003invasionofIraq.TheChilcotInquirypublisheditsfindingson6July2016.SirJohnChilcotarguedinhisjudgementthatthecaseforwar,whichwasbasedontheclaimthattheIraqigovernmentpossessed‘WeaponsofMassDestruction’(WMD),was‘presentedwithacertainty thatwas not justified’. This effectively vindicatedDr Kelly’s original claims; John Chilcot, ‘Sir JohnChilcot’s Public Statement’ (the Iraq Inquiry, London, 6 July 2016), http://www.iraqinquiry.org.uk/the-inquiry/sir-john-chilcots-public-statement/.334 Robert Taylor, Sweden’s New Social Democratic Model: Proof That a Better World Is Possible (London:Compass,2005).

168

understandingof thenewmodel’ set an important tone formuchof the literaturewhich

wouldcomelaterandforegroundedflexicurityaskeytotheongoingappealoftheNordic

ModelinUKpolicycircles.335ForTaylor,the‘oldSwedishModel’wasestablishedbasedona

consensusbetweenrulingandruled,employerandemployee,capitalandlabour.Aboveall,

‘cohesiveness’and‘solidarity’typifiedhisexplanationofthehistoricalsuccessoftheSwedish

Modelincreatingaunifiedandequalsociety.Characteristicallyofsocialdemocraticdiscourse

onSwedenbefore1991hesingledoutcollectivebargainingand ‘thesocialwage’ascore

elementsoftheoldModel.336

Taylor’sviewofthe‘oldSwedishModel’wasbasicallyorthodox(seechapterone).However,

inordertoestablishthecontentofanemergentdiscourseonflexicurity,itwasessentialfor

himtoestablishwhatwasmeantbythe‘newSwedish(orNordic)Model’.Thelistofmetrics

TayloridentifiedinSweden’s(andtheotherNordiccountries’)favourcomparedtotheUK

wasimpressive:theelusivecombinationoflowunemploymentandhighemployment;high

rates of internet penetration and computer ownership; high expenditure in research and

development;highscoresonthehumandevelopmentindex,allcombinedwithhighscores

foreconomiccompetitiveness.337Furthermore,heargued,despiteashifttowardsnewforms

of industry, in particular technology, Swedenhad not abandoned its traditional industrial

sectors,suchasforestry,paperandpaperproducts,chemicalsandsoforth.338

335Ibid.,26.336Ibid.,6.337Ibid.,12–16.338Ibid.,17.

169

Inother areas, the ‘newmodel’was still verymuch characterisedby valueswhich Taylor

associatedwiththe1950sand1960s.Inthefaceofpressuresforgreaterflexibilityinterms

ofwagesettingandasocietalmovetowardsindividualism,thesestructureshadadaptedto

maintain the basic corporatist, democratic structure of Swedish society. Trade Unions in

particularweresingledoutasaprogressiveforceformodernisationintheworkplace,which

pushed for industrialmodernisation and disciplinewage demands. Importantly, however,

Swedish employerswere also seen as keen tomaintain corporate structures and ‘do not

merelypaylipservicetonotionsofcorporatesocialresponsibility’.339

Inotherwords,theNordiccountrieswerecharacterisedbyhighlevelsofsocialcohesion,just

astheyhadbeenhistorically.AccordingtoTaylor,thisallowedthemtoundertakemorewide-

ranging reformthanwaspossible inBritainwhere ‘spin,manipulationof the factsandan

unappealinghyperbole’hadconspiredtopreventtheachievementofmeaningful ‘popular

consent fornecessaryeconomic and social change’.340The contrastbetweenSwedenand

BritainunderNewLabour’s stewardship is implicit,butnonethelessevident.Forexample,

Taylor quoted approvingly from a report commissioned by the International Labour

Organisation (ILO) which argues that ‘“mature” companies are not in favour of applying

unilateralhireandfirepoliciestowardstheirownemployeesthatarebasedonshort-term

responsestoasuddensharepricechange’.341Sincethedemandforflexiblehiringandfiring

339Ibid.,20.340Ibid.,8.341Ibid.,21.

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isacommoninjunctionfromUKpolicythinktanksandexecutivesofBritishindustry,itisnot

difficulttoinferthelikelytargetofthiscomment.342

ForTaylor,then,therewereimportantcontinuitiesbetweenthe‘new’modelandthe‘old’,

not least that theysharedanemphasison ‘thoseunderlyingvaluesof freedomandsocial

cohesion,prosperityandsolidaritythatcharacteriseditsoriginalform’.343InSweden’sNew

SocialDemocraticModel,adiscourseofa‘newSwedishModel’begantoemergewhichwas

articulatedaroundanumberofemptysignifiers.KeytotheunderlyingdiscourseofSweden

which Taylor used was the apparent ability of the Swedish Model to neutralise the

antagonism between ‘freedom’ and ‘equality’, a distinction which has been central to

hegemonic liberal discourse since at least Isiah Berlin’s essay Two Concepts of Liberty.344

TherewaswidespreadacceptanceofBerlin’s articulationof ‘equality’with ‘coercion’ and

‘liberty’, or perhaps rather, ‘negative liberty’, with the absence of force. 345 This is an

inescapabledeadlock(inliberalthought)whichTaylortriedtoneutralise.Thisquestionhas

formedsomethingofapreoccupationfortheBritishLeftsincetheendoftheSovieterain

EasternEurope,ifnotearlier.TonyBlairevenwentsofarastowritetoBerlinaboutjustthis

questionshortlybeforethelatter’sdeathin1997.346

342 See, for example, Adrian Beecroft, ‘Report on Employment Law’ (London: Department for Business,InnovationandSkills,2011)whichcausedasmallfuroreonpublicationasaresultofitscalltosignificantlyreducethesafeguardsinUKemploymentlaw.343Sweden’sNewSocialDemocraticModel,10.344Berlin,‘TwoConceptsofLiberty’;Forthisargument,seealsoTrägårdh,‘StatistIndividualism’.345 See Berlin, ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’, 131–5. Berlin argues that any attempt to alter the fundamentalambitions or goals of individuals inherently requires imposition and relations of power. Within a liberalontologicalsystem(suchassocialdemocracy)thiscriticismisdifficulttoanswer.ItstargetisMarxism,ormorebroadlythoughtsystemsinfluencedbyHegeliannotionsoftheself,whichargueforthe‘higherself’whichBerlincritiques.Morerecentneo-andpost-Marxisttheorytendstoviewpowerasconstitutive,thatistosay,itselfontological,makingthe‘negativeliberty’argumentredundantonthebasisthattherecanbenorelationshipswhicharenotconstitutedbypower.346TonyBlair,‘ALetterfromTonyBlair’,23October1997,http://berlin.wolf.ox.ac.uk/letterstoberlin.html.

171

Todothis,Taylorattemptedtoasserttheclassicsocialdemocraticorderofprioritybetween

the signifiers ‘liberty’ and ‘equality’. He argued, for example, that ‘the Swedish Model

remained an inspiration to those on the democratic left who believed in ‘the pursuit of

equalityinthenameoffreedom[emphasisadded]’.347Hecontinued:

WhilethenewSwedishModelcontinuestoseekanaccommodationwitha

more individualistic society in Sweden in itswelfare state reforms, it also

emphasises that themanagement of democratic change is best achieved

through a clear focus on the need to attain andmaintain stability in the

widestsenseofthatword.OneoftheprimaryfeaturesoftheoldModelwas

its determination to protect people from the consequences of adversity,

especiallythosewholackedthematerialmeanstofendforthemselvesina

deeplyclassdividedsociety.348

ForTaylorthen,accesstoschools,socialservicesandhealthcareofthehighestqualityalso

formedacorepartoftheSwedishSocialDemocraticParty(SAP)programmetoresolvethis

tensionbetweenlibertyandequality,despitetheneedtomaintaintraditionalemphaseson

stabilityandtheameliorationof inequality.Putdifferently,creatingconditionsofmaterial

andsocialequality isthe logicalprecursortoanyattempttoachieveequality inthesocial

democratic vision, a principlewhich informs the ‘newmodel’ asmuchas the ‘old’ in this

discourse.

347Sweden’sNewSocialDemocraticModel,26.348Ibid.

172

Furthermore,Sweden’sNewSocialDemocraticModel’sapproach tocorporatismreflected

similarpreoccupations.Asnotedabove,thecompactbetweentradeunionsandemployers

was an important part of the emerging discourse on a ‘new Swedish model’. The re-

invigoration of the British trade unionmovement was, and remains, a key aim of social

democraticthinkerssincetheirprecipitatedeclineduringtheThatchereraandtheslower,

butsteady,continuationofthetrendinthe1990sand2000s.Astheinterestsofemployers

and employees are typically considered to be mutually contradictory in Anglo-American

thought,thishasgenerallyledtodeadlockandmilitancyonbothsides.WhileTaylorfreely

notedthattherehavebeenperiodsoftradeunionascendancyinSwedishhistory,notably

duringtheeraofthewage-earnerfunds,hisprimaryobjectivewastoarguethatthegoalsof

capitalandlabourneednotbemutuallyexclusiveandthatthisfoundingantagonismcould

beresolved.ThishadbeenachievedinSwedenbytheself-reinforcingresponsiblebehaviour

ofemployers’groupsandtradeunions.349

Moreover,thiscallfortheresolutionofsocialantagonismthroughcorporatiststrategieswas

echoedacrossa rangeofpolicy literaturewhichwasbeingproduced in socialdemocratic

governancenetworksatthistime.InRaisingLazarus,DavidCoats,undertheauspicesofthe

FabianSociety,arguedthatapolicychangebyunionswasneededtoarrestthedeclineof

tradeunionismacrossEurope.InBritain,therehadbeenattemptstoreconcilethetwosides

of themovement calling for ‘organisation’, i.e. themore radical oppositional part of the

movement,and ‘partnership’, i.e. creatinga compactwithemployers.350Ultimately,Coats

349Ibid.,13.350‘RaisingLazarus:TheFutureofOrganisedLabour’(London:FabianSociety,2005).

173

was critical of government and union policies which entrenched perceptions of a split

betweentheinterestsofunionsandemployersandsupportedmovestobring‘theUKcloser

to the “European social model”’.351He noted that the only exception to the generalised

declineoftradeunionismwasintheNordiccountries,sincethese,alongwithBelgium,were

characterised by union participation in the administration of unemployment benefits.352

Coatsthereforeidentifiedtheintegrationoftradeunionsintothesystemscommonlyused

byemployersandgovernmenttosupportandtrainworkersasanimportantmeansbywhich

toreversethegeneraldeclineofunionismintheUKandmuchofEurope.

Taylor and Coats thereforemade strikingly similar appeals for greater levels of industrial

democracy. Coats even argued that employees were widely convinced of the need for

collaboration to solve workplace problems and improve working conditions.353 The chief

difficultywasthattheytypicallysawlittleconnectionbetweenthoseaimsandthewiderrole

oftradeunionism.Nevertheless,itisclearthatbothTaylorandCoatssawthecreationofa

social compact between employers and employees as a key step towards solving the

antagonismsofcontemporarycapitalism,andthatSwedenandtheNordiccountriesoffera

model for this process. Although somewhat peripheral, both identified flexicurity as a

componentofthisstrategy.Taylorsawflexicurityasameansbywhichtoprovidebasiclevels

ofsecurityandtherebygain‘consentandco-operation’for‘theprocessofmodernisation’;

Coatsasameanstoarrestthedeclineofunionismandintegratethemajorunionsintoan

351Ibid.,23This rathergives the lie to theclaimthatCoats’goalsaresomehow ‘beyond’ the ‘organisation’-’partnership’splitintheunionmovement,sincethisaimcanonlybeconsideredconsistentwiththe‘partnership’approach.352Ibid.,11,63.353Coats,‘RaisingLazarus:TheFutureofOrganisedLabour’.

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expandedsocialcompact.354Therewasgeneralagreementthatifsuchacompactweretobe

effective it would articulate corporatist solutions in a way that neutralised the tension

between equality and freedom, by articulating unionism and collective organisation as

inherentlydemocratic.

Socialdemocraticthinkersinthemid-2000swerethereforelookingtoaflexicurity-influenced

Swedish/NordicModelasameanstoadvanceadiscourseofa‘neweconomy’usingamixture

of ‘modernising’ and characteristically social democratic chains of signification. This idea

intersectednotonlywithdebatesandanxietiesdevelopinginNewLabourcircles,butalso

withattemptsbytheSAPtoexplainSwedishattitudestowardslabourmarketpolicy.Inan

earlierarticleforPolicyNetwork,PärNuder,formerSwedishfinanceminister,contendedthat

‘socialdemocratsmustsimultaneouslycombat long-termunemploymentand improvethe

publicsectorwithoutriskingmacroeconomicstability’andthat‘mistrustinthegovernment’s

ability to deliver safety and security for all’ breeds militancy and populism.355 Given the

diagnosisoftheissuesfacingsocialdemocracyinthemid-2000s,andtheincreasingdivisions

whichwereemerginginEuropeansocieties,itiseasyseehowahegemonicdiscoursebegan

toemergearoundapolicywhichpromisedtoneutralisetheseantagonisticforces.

Intheyearbeforethe2010UKGeneralElection,KatrineKielospublishedFlightoftheSwedish

Bumblebee. In her text, shewas explicit aboutwhat she described as the ‘three political

paradoxes’aroundwhichtheSwedishModelwascreatedandratherpoeticallyarguedthat

European social democrats ‘should study the principles behind the flight of the Swedish

354Taylor,Sweden’sNewSocialDemocraticModel,26;Coats,‘RaisingLazarus:TheFutureofOrganisedLabour’.355Nuder,‘ChallengeofRenewal’,41.

175

bumblebee,notthemovementof itswings’.356That istosay,Kielos,muchlikeTaylorand

Coats,viewedtheSwedishModel lessasaspecific regulatoryregimetobeemulatedand

more as a source of inspiration for a hegemonic political project. Given that her piece

appeared inRenewal, a New Labour-affiliated journal, this focus on strategy rather than

specificpolicyframeworksischaracteristic.

Kielossummarisesherargumentasfollows:

That individualism requires a large public sector; that change requires

security;andthathelpingthepoorrequiresexpandingbenefitstoincludethe

richarethethreeparadoxesthatshapedsocialdemocracyinSwedenduring

thetwentiethcentury.Theircommonfeatureis:morepolitics,notless.357

Importantly,allthree‘paradoxes’wereseenaspolitical,ratherthantechnicalormanagerial.

Inthissense,KielosechoedNuder’scommentthat‘[I]tiscommonlyarguedthatthepolitical

paradigmhadmovedbeyondleftandright,thattherewerenodifferencesinvaluesonlyin

methods.Thisisaright-wingnotion’.358ForKielosandNuder,then,individualfreedomwas

creatednotthroughtheabsenceofthestate,butasaresultofthestate’sintervention:what

BerggrenandTrägårdhrefertoas‘statistindividualism’.359

WhereasAnglophonepoliticalphilosophy tends toviewsocietyasanoppositionbetween

individual and state, and Western and Central Europe has tended to view society as a

356Kielos,‘FlightoftheSwedishBumblebee’,61.357Ibid.,64.

358Nuder,‘ChallengeofRenewal’,41–2.359Kielos,‘FlightoftheSwedishBumblebee’;Trägårdh,‘StatistIndividualism’.

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collectionofgroups,e.g.family,establishedfaiths,charitiesetc.,Swedishsocialdemocrats,

arguedKielos,seesocietyasatrianglecomposedofthestate,theindividualandfamilies.Just

astheindividualshouldnotbedependentonthestate,heorshe,butespeciallyshe,should

alsonotbedependentonthefamily.However,thebalancebetweenthethreepointsonthe

trianglerequiresadegreeofactiveinterventionbythestate.Kielospointedparticularlyto

thegreaterleveloffemaleparticipationinthelabourmarketasasignthatSwedish‘state

feminism’hadbeeneffectiveingrantingwomenimportantfreedoms,thoughshenotedthat

Swedishwomenareinnosenseequalwith,orasfreeas,Swedishmen.360

The two furtherparadoxes identifiedbyKielosdependon the first, since the largepublic

sector acting as guarantor of individual freedom also provides security for the individual

duringtimesofupheaval:‘ifyoudon’tprotectworkers,workerswillsoondemandthatyou

protectjobs’.361ThoughtheRehn-Meidnermodelhadbeensignificantlymodified,itsbasic

commitment–toassistworkerswholosttheirjobsbyretrainingthemandrelocatingthem

tofindnewones–hadbeenmaintainedevenifthemeansbywhichsecuritywasofferedhad

beensubstantiallychanged.362Significantly,attemptstoresolvethisfundamental‘paradox’

informthediscourseofflexicuritywhichwouldgraduallybegintoemergeinsocialdemocratic

circles.Kielos’finalparadoxconcernedthenecessityofaninsistenceonuniversalbenefitsin

a free society. She argued that the antagonismbetween the rich,whowonderwhy they

shouldcontributetoasystemfromwhichtheygainlittle,andthepoor,whoaskthemselves

360Kielos,‘FlightoftheSwedishBumblebee’,62.361Ibid.,63.362Kielos,‘FlightoftheSwedishBumblebee’.

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whytheyshouldcontributetoasocietythatholdsthemback,canberesolvedbyapolitical

projectwhichgivesbothareasontosupportandmaintainuniversalbenefitsystems.363

LinkingTaylorandCoats,anEnglishsocialdemocratandatradeunionist,andtheirSwedish

counterpartsNuder and Kielos,was a shared conviction that a social democratic political

projectcouldonlybesuccessful if itattemptedtoneutraliseantagonismswhichhadbeen

constructedbyahegemonicliberalideologyandcreateditsownexpansivehegemony.Kielos

is explicit about this necessity, since her work identifies specific areas in which social

democratswereforcedtodealwithantagonisms,or‘paradoxes’asshetermsthem.Herfirst

paradoxisaclearattempttoarticulateacollectivistproblematicinwhich‘equality’isalogical

precursorto‘freedom’.LikeTaylorandCoats,shelinksthisclassicsocialdemocraticsignifying

chainwithafurtherlogicofmodernisation,byarguingthat‘changerequiressecurity’,and

thatsocialprotectionsarenecessaryfortherealisationoffreedom.

As argued above, the potential for a social democratic hegemony had been a source of

interest,andlateranxiety,forthoseleadingtheNewLabourproject,includingTonyBlairand

Peter Mandelson. The New Labour project foundered intellectually on the question of

whether ‘freedom’and ‘equality’couldbereconciled,asdemonstratedbyBlair’s letter to

Isiah Berlin. For all four authors considered above, a ‘new Swedishmodel’ points to the

potential signifierswhich an expansive social democratic hegemony could appropriate to

itselfandtheorderofthechainintowhichtheyshouldbearticulated.Kielos’frameofthe

‘three paradoxes’ of Swedish society shows a desire, shared by all four publications, to

363Ibid.,64.

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neutralisetheseantagonismsinthepoliticalsphere,ratherthanthroughabstracttechnical

mechanisms–atrainofargumentwhichNuderderidedas‘right-wing’.

Moreover, all four argued that direct policy transfer from Sweden to the UK, or other

European countries more generally, would not be effective. In this sense, the social

democratic governance network associatedwith the Labour Party eschewed direct policy

fixes taken from the ‘new Swedishmodel’, butwas nonetheless intimately involvedwith

attemptstounderstandthepoliticalfunctionofadevelopeddiscourseontheSwedishmodel

andwhatthechangessincethe1990smeantforSwedishsocialdemocracyandthefutureof

social democracyacrossEurope. Significantlyhowever, thisdiffers fromattemptsbyNew

Labourand,later,Cameron’sConservativestoimportspecificNordicregulationsandpolicy

systems.

4.4.2Flexicurityinatimeofausterity

Followingthe2008financialcrisisandensuingglobaldepression,socialdemocracyentered

serious decline across Europe.Whereas in the early 2000s PeterMandelson, Tony Blair,

GerhardSchröderandothershadbeenconsideringthenecessityofsocialdemocraticrenewal

fromapositionofrelativeelectoralstrengthandoffthebackofconsecutivevictoriesacross

Europe,theirsuccessorswereslowlyroutedinelectionsacrossEuropeasConservativeand

ChristianDemocraticpartiesandcoalitionsgraduallydisplacedsocialdemocraticpartiesand

coalitions. This had important consequences for the policy literature which was being

producedontheissueofflexicurityandchangestothestructureofthelabourmarket.The

firstofthesewasthatmuchofthepolicyliteraturewasbeingcreatedinattemptstocapture

theattentionofaUKLabourPartywhichwasstrainingtoholdtogetherfactionswhichhad

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been, to greater or lesser degrees, disciplined by electoral success and strong central

leadership.Thisdisciplinehadgraduallybrokendown,notleastbecausethecentral issues

andelectoralstrategieswhichhadbeenusedtosuchgreatsuccessbyNewLabourwerenow

beingused,thoughwithimportanttweaks,byDavidCameron’srevitalisedConservativeParty.

WhereBlairwas‘toughoncrime,toughonthecausesofcrime’,Cameronpositionedhimself

asanewprogressive.ThisclaimwasnottakenseriouslywithintheUKLabourParty,which,

perhapsinnosmallpartduetoitscontemptfor‘CompassionateConservatism’(see2.3.3,

above,and4.5.1,below),didlittletoactivelyrefuteCameron’sassertionofhimselfasthe

‘championofprogressiveideals’.364

Uponassumingofficeaspartofacoalition,theConservativesadoptedastringentprogramme

ofpublicspendingcutswhichwasgraduallysubsumedundertherubricof ‘austerity’.The

ideathattheEuropeanSocialModelhadtobesustainedinthefaceof,potentiallypermanent,

contractions in levels of public spending and taxationwas not new, at least in academic

circles.365However,thiscreatedsignificantdifficultiesfortheLabourParty,andBritishsocial

democracymore generally, since a chief component of the Conservative strategywas to

blameLabour’sspendingcommitmentsforthesizeofthepublicdeficit.Governancenetworks

whichhadpreviouslybeenproducingpublicationsabout flexicurityandalternative labour

marketregimesfromapositionofinstitutionalstrengthwerenowdoingsoinradicallyaltered

circumstances. The title of Robert Tinker’s 2015 publicationMaking the Case for Public

364RuthListerandFranBennett,‘TheNew“ChampionofProgressiveIdeals”’,Renewal18,no.1/2(2010):84–109.365PaulPierson,‘CopingWithPermanentAusterity:WelfareStateRestructuringinAffluentDemocracies’,inTheNewPoliticsoftheWelfareState,ed.PaulPierson(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2001),410–62.

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Spending,producedfortheFabianSociety,offersaconcisesummaryofthepositioninwhich

actorsinsocialdemocraticgovernancenetworksnowfoundthemselves.366

A range of issueswhich had been stubborn butmanageable during the period of steady

expansionbefore2008(i.e.unemployment),rapidlybecamemattersofsignificantlygreater

concern following the financial crisisand theperiodof contractionand lowgrowthwhich

followed it. Paradoxically, this meant that flexicurity approaches were becoming more

attractivetosocialdemocratsatexactlythetimetheywerealsobecomingmoreattractiveto

liberalthinkers,butforcompletelydifferentreasons.Thetensionbetweenthe‘flexibility’and

‘security’signifiers intheflexicuritydiscoursewillbeconsideredingreaterdetailbelow.It

thereforesufficestopointoutherethatwhileitwasthesecurityaspectsoftheflexicurity

discoursewhichappealedtosocialdemocrats,theoppositewasthecaseinthefreemarket

governancenetwork,whichtendedtoseeflexicurityasameanstoeliminateemployment

regulationwithoutthesocialdrawbacks(risingunemployment,worseninglivingstandards)

thisusuallyimplies.

Moreover, the nascent relationship between The NewModerates (DeNyaModeraterna)

underFredrikReinfeldtand theUKConservativeParty (see,2.3.3,above,and4.5,below)

meantthatdeployingtheSwedishorNordicModelofflexicuritywaslessstraightforwardly

social democratic in its implications. Especially since after 2010 Labour offered tepid

opposition to Conservative plans to introduce Swedish-style free schools in the UK (see

chapter five). Nonetheless, articulations of labour market reforms which bear strong

366‘MakingtheCaseforPublicSpending’(London:FabianSociety,2015).

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resemblances to the flexicurity model appeared with regularity in social democratic

governance networks. In a 2012 policy paper, Governing as Social Democrats, Patrick

Diamond set out a series of structural reformswhich he argued could form a basis for a

renewed European social democracy. 367 His suggestions for structural reform included,

effectively,areturntoindustrialpolicyandthecreationoftrainingorplacementschemesfor

thoseunabletofindjobs.368Eventhoughhedidnotcallit‘flexicurity’,thisdemonstratesthe

extenttowhichthecentralconcernsandsignificationchainsoftheflexicuritydiscoursehad

alreadycometodominatethestrategiesofactorsinsocialdemocraticgovernancenetworks.

GiventhepoliticalslumpwhichtheUKLabourPartyenteredafterits2010GeneralElection

loss,thecallsforpoliticalrenewalalongSwedishorNordiclineshadrapidlydwindledashopes

foranexpansivesocialdemocratichegemonyrecededstillfurtherthanunderNewLabour.In

thiscontext,PärNuderheroicallycontinuedtocallforareturntoaformofsocialdemocracy

whichmost other social democrats were gradually abandoning.369In Saving the Swedish

Model,NuderarguedthatthestrategyofderegulationwhichSwedenhadembarkeduponin

themid-1980shadcaughttheeconomycompletelyunprepared,leadingtoadebtcrisisinthe

early 1990s. From there hemade a case for the Swedishmodel in termswhich could be

viewed as an attempt to rebut claims made about it by the then-Conservative-Liberal

DemocratcoalitiongovernmentintheUK.This isespeciallytrueoftwostatements,which

almostcannotbereadasanythingotherthanveiledcriticismofUKgovernmentpolicysince

the2010GeneralElection:‘[F]oraresponsiblegovernment,abudgetconsolidationcannever

beaboutcuttingthedeficitatthelowestpoliticalcost’;and,‘[S]ortingoutthepublicfinances

367‘GoverningasSocialDemocrats’(London:PolicyNetwork,2012).368Ibid.,4.369Nuder,‘SavingtheSwedishModel’.

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isjustameans:combatingunemploymentshouldbetherealgoal’.370Tinkerechoesthisidea

whenhesaysthatthe‘levelofpublicspendingshouldnotbetotemic–governmentsshould

aimfor“bigsolutions”ratherthanfixatingonthesizeofthestate’.371

Nuderofferedanaggressivedefenceofactiveinterventioninthelabourmarketaspartofhis

assertion that the Swedish Rehn-Meidner Model had set many of the contours for a

contemporarypolicywhichboresignificantresemblancestoDanishflexicurity.Heidentified

rigidfiscalpolicyand“socialbridges”astenetsofSweden’sformermodelwhichhadbeen

retained, andwhich had informed a new approach to the economy.372Moreover, Nuder

asserted that the introduction of active labour market policy had to respond to both

technologicalchangeswhichmadeindustriesdefunct,andlatterly,significantchangewithin

industries,requiringsignificantretraining,typicallyinIT.Bycombiningclearobjectiveswith

structuralreformstoencouragegrowthandsignificantinvestmentineducationandfemale

participationintheworkforce,heargued,reiteratinghisargumentfrom2002,Swedenhad

managedtoupdateitsmodelinafashionwhichwasconsistentwiththeprinciplesofitsold

modelandcouldthereforeofferapoliticalpathtogenuinelysociallydemocraticreform.373

PatrickDiamond,whoalsocontributedtoearlierNewLabourerapolicydebates,offereda

similarlypoliticallyfocussedcritiqueoflabourmarketpolicyin2013.Henotedthat:

There is a persistent legacy of short-termism, alongside a failure to carry

through long-term investment decisions. There is a lack of co-ordination

370Ibid.,2,3.371Tinker,‘MakingtheCaseforPublicSpending’,35.372Nuder,‘SavingtheSwedishModel’,6.373Nuder,‘SavingtheSwedishModel’.

183

between leading economic actors, particularly between employers and

educationalinstitutions….Theadversarialnatureofthepoliticalsystemhas

led to too many short-term fixes and insufficient long-term, strategic

decision-makingwithaclearpolicyrationale.Thecivil service inWhitehall

generally lacks private sector skills and management experience, having

lambastedindustrialpolicyinthepastasmerelyconcernedwithcorporatism

and‘pickingwinners’.374

Diamond approvingly noted that the Nordic countries, especially Sweden and Denmark,

investedaroundthreepercentofGDPinactivationpoliciesinthelabourmarket,contrasting

thiswithaUKfigureoflessthan0.6percentbetween1997and2010.375Hewentontomake

theargumentthat‘despiteobviousinstitutionaldifference,Britishpolicy-makershavebeen

too pessimistic about replicating the strengths of the skills system in Northern European

economies’.376Usingasecondmodelwhichiscertainlyworthexploring,Diamondwasalso

clearly impressed by the German Mittelstand, the generally small and medium-sized

companieswhichformthebackboneoftheGermaneconomyandwhicharesupportedby

lendingfromregionalbanks(Sparkassen),whichofferpublic,regionally-orientatedbanking

andfinance.377

WilsonWong,aresearcherattheWorkFoundation,writingin2013inacollectionpublished

bytheFabianSociety,offeredasummaryofDanishflexicurityasapotentialmeanstoreverse

the emphasis on the signifier ‘flexibility’ which had been hegemonic in economic policy

374PatrickDiamond,‘TransformingtheMarket’(London:Civitas,2013),51–2.375Ibid.,57.376Ibid.,57–8.377Ibid.,71.

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discoursesince theThatcherera.Hiscontribution ‘TheNewDeal forBritain?’,alsomakes

explicittheextenttowhichsocialdemocraticgovernancenetworkswerebeginningtolook

outsidetheUKLabourpartyforapotentialsolutiontolabourmarket issues.Despitetheir

historic connections with the Labour Party, neither Nuder nor Diamond addressed their

reports specifically todebatesgoingonwithinLabourat this time.Wongargued that the

introductionofflexicurityintheUKwould‘re-definetheroleoftradeunionsasanintegral

partofpolicysetting’.378ThisechoedDavidCoats’publicationRaisingLazarus,whichargued

thatintegratingthetradeunionsintotheadministrationandsettingofsocialbenefitswould

revitaliseunionisminBritain.Italsodemonstratesthatsocialdemocraticactorshadbecome

pessimisticaboutparliamentaryavenuestoreform,preferringinsteadtoaddresscivilsociety

asasiteofsocialdemocraticrevivalandreform.

In the same publication, however, ErikaWatson argued that ‘unions across Europe have

resistedflexicurity’onthebasisthat‘hard-wonemploymentrightsoncelostwillbealmost

impossible to regain’. 379 She claimed that flexicurity makes greater sense when seen as

‘security for the flexible’ – a more Dutch understanding of the purpose of flexicurity. In

contrast,Wongnotesthatcreatingevergreaterflexibilisationintheworkforceatlargeacts

as‘adisincentiveatfirmleveltoinvestineducationandtraining’.380Hecontendedthat‘at

theheartoftheDanish(orScandinavian)modelisadeeptrustbetweenstateandcitizens

whichputthewelfareofcitizensatthecentreofacompactwhereworkersarepreparedto

foregoconventional jobsecurity for long-termemployability’.381ThisbringsWongcloseto

378WilsonWong,‘TheNewDealforBritain?’,inNewFormsofWork(London:FabianSociety,2013),11.379ErikaWatson,‘SecurityfortheFlexible’,inNewFormsofWork(London:FabianSociety,2012),9.380Wong,‘TheNewDealforBritain?’,10.381Ibid.,11.

185

the classic formulation of flexicurity offered by Wilthagen as a potential model for the

Europeanlabourmarket.Whilehisargumentfittedintoanexistingtraditionwhichsawthe

Nordiccountriesasapotentialmodelforacompactbetweenlabourandcapital,itwasalso

indicativeofawiderattempttoarticulatethesignifier‘security’asanecessaryprecursorto

‘flexibility’andenchain‘flexicurity’withmoretraditionallysocialdemocraticandcorporatist

understandingsofequalityandsteeringinthelabourmarket.

4.4.3TheIPPRandflexicurityfromtheemployers’perspective

The Institute for Public Policy Research had also beenworking on a number of research

projects which tended to see the Nordic countries as a potential answer not just to the

problemsofsocialdemocracy,ortolabourmarketissues,butalsoaspossessingthepotential

tosolvesomeoftheproblemsfacedbycapitalism.Thisshiftedtheemphasisfrom‘security’

towards‘flexibility’,butwithbothsignifiersunderstoodbasedontheirsystemicefficacyin

solvinglabourshortages.Theseapproacheswereheavilyfocussedonthepotentialbenefits

of theso-called ‘activation’pointofMadsen’sGoldenTriangle,with theaimofdrastically

reducingyouthunemploymentandskillsshortagesinBritainandEurope.TessLanningand

KayteLawton’sNoTrain,NoGainfocussedparticularlyonanumberofdifferentmodelsto

questiontheefficacyofsuccessiveskillsandtrainingpoliciesunderLabourandConservative

governments.382TheyarguedthatUKemployershavesystematicallyexternalisedtheircosts

tothestate,labourandconsumers,bywayofextensivegovernmentaltaxcreditprogrammes.

Moreover,inthisview,theUKeconomywascharacterisedbypoorsatisfactionlevelswith

low-skilled,repetitiveworkandtheprovisionoflowqualitygoodsandservicesasaresultof

382 ‘No Train, No Gain: Beyond Free-Market and State-Led Skills Policy’ (London: Institue for Public PolicyResearch,2012).

186

poor training. 383 They noted that this approach creates ‘numerical flexibility’ (a polite

euphemismforMarx’sindustrialreservearmy),384sincederegulationmakesiteasiertofire

people,butthattherearearangeofotherwaystorespondtoeconomiccrisis,includingwage

flexibility.Thiswouldmeanthatwageswouldberaisedconsummatelywithmacro-economic

performance.Afurtheroptionwasfunctionalflexibility,inwhichworkerswouldbegivena

rangeofskillsallowingthemtobere-deployedwithinorbetweenfirms.385

LanningandLawtoncontendedthatbothwageandfunctionalflexibility,althoughespecially

the former, necessitate strong trade unions and good relations between unions and

employers.Furthermore,thesetendtobeareasinwhichtheNordiccountries(andGermany)

are particularly strong, with Denmark typically considered first among equals. 386 This

effectively amounts to a call for diversified skills and training policies along Nordic lines,

includingmeasures,whichhavealsobeenusedintheNordiccountries,toofferassistanceto

firmswhichwantedtorethink‘thenatureoftheirworkprocesses,trainingandjobdesign,

andprovidemoreopportunities for staff’.387Although they conceded that the creationof

partnershipsbetweenemployerandemployeegroupshadhistoricallybeenunpopularinthe

UK,LanningandLawtonnotedthatthishasbroughtsignificantbenefitstoNordicemployers

aswell as employees, not least because it offered avenues to retain profitabilitywithout

short-termlayoffs.

383Ibid.,10–11.384KarlMarx,Capital,trans.BenFowkes,vol.1(London:PenguinClassics,1990),126.385LanningandLawton,‘NoTrain,NoGain:BeyondFree-MarketandState-LedSkillsPolicy’,26.386Ibid.,31.387Ibid.,32.

187

InNoMoreNEETs,GraemeCookeclaimedthatDanishapproachestoyouthunemployment

could be effective at reducing rates of young people ‘not in employment, education or

training’(NEETs).388LanningandLawtonofferedtheimplicitargumentthatgreaterlevelsof

organisationalcorporatismwouldincreaselevelsofflexibilityforemployers.Whilethismay

seemparadoxical toAnglophone liberal ears, this is theexplicit argumentput forwardby

Cooke.HenotedthatintheDanish(andDutch)welfaresystem(s)youngadultsuptotheage

oftwenty-fivearekeptoutoftheadultwelfareinstitutions,andareinsteadgivengenerous

support to complete basic education, if they have not already done so, or a job in the

communityiftheyhave.389Moreover:

The Netherlands and Denmark combine these active youth transition

strategieswithhigh-qualityvocationaleducationandapprenticeshipsystems

thatprovideaclearpathwayfromlearningintoworkEmployersandunions

designcoursesandaccreditqualificationssothatyoungpeopleacquireskills

with labour market value and gain important work experience in the

process.390

ItissignificantthatCookealsohighlightedtheabsenceofemployerorganisations,whichare

common in the Nordic countries, as making it difficult to structure training and skills

programmesefficiently in theUK.391This reiterated thechainof significationwhichplaces

‘security’foremployeesasaprerequisitefor‘flexibility’,whilesimultaneouslyemphasising

thepotentialsystemicbenefittocapitalismofsuchmeasures.

388‘NoMoreNEETs’(London:InstituteforPublicPolicyResearch,2013).389Ibid.390Ibid.,28.391Ibid.,42.

188

InEuropean JobsandSkills,CatherineColebrooketal. identified significant levelsof skills

mismatchingintheUKandthesouthoftheEurozonecomparedtotheNordiccountries,the

NetherlandsandGermany.392Theynotedthatvocationaleducationalsystemsareavailable

inDenmarkforthosealreadyinworkwishingtoimprovetheirskills,aswellassignificantly

greater focus on re-training alongside job search in Denmark, compared to the UK. 393

Prosaically, one reasonwhyUK social democratic governancenetworksmay tend to look

towardstheNordiccountries,aswellastheNetherlandsandGermany,forsolutionstolabour

marketdifficultiesisthatthesecountriesalloutperformtheUKintermsofemploymentrates,

notjustunemploymentrates.394

Colebrook et al.’s approachwas basically consistent with Raikes and Davies’ view of the

questionoftrainingandunemploymentinEuropeanEmployers’Perspectives.395Theyargued

thatnotonlyarecurrentsystemsforprovidingeducationandtraininggenerallyineffective,

butthatemployers‘hadaverydimviewofemploymentpolicyingeneral’.396Theyconcluded

thatgovernmentsacrossEuropehavegenerally failed to incentiviseemployers to takeon

thosewhohaveexperiencedlong-termunemploymentandthatinterventionsonthesupply

sideofthelabourmarkethaveusuallybeenineffective.397Controllingthedurationofstints

ofunemploymentandsupplysideinterventioninthelabourmarket,i.e.education,training

392EuropeanJobsandSkills(London:InstituteforPublicPolicyResearch,2015).393Ibid.,37–8.394Ibid.,61.395LukeRaikesandBillDavies,‘EuropeanEmployers’Perspectives’(London:InstituteforPublicPolicyResearch,2015).396Ibid.,5.397Ibid.,18.

189

andskillsprogrammes,havebeenkeytoflexicurityapproachestakeninDenmarkandthe

otherNordiccountries.398

TheIPPR’semphasisoncorporatistsolutionstogeneralproblemsinthelabourmarketputit

firmlyatoddswithseveralgenerationsofUKemploymentpolicy.However,thisadoptionof

theflexicurityagenda,whetheritwasexplicitlycalledthatornot,andtheuseoftheNordic

countriesasexemplarsdemonstratingtheextenttowhichthinkingaboutpoliticaleconomy

alongNordiclineshadbecomeentrenchedinsocialdemocraticgovernancenetworksinthe

UK.Anincreasingemphasisoncorporatismasapotentialsolutiontoissuesofflexibilityand

security–notjustforemployees,butalsoemployers–demonstratesimportantcontinuities

withdiscussionswhichweretakingplaceinsocialdemocraticcirclesinthe2000s.IntheIPPR

discussionstheNordiccountriesemergeasapotentialstartingpointforsignificantredesigns

totheregulatoryregimeof theUK labourmarket.Thiscould,perhaps loosely,beseenas

possessingconsiderablesimilaritieswiththecorporatistSchumpeterianapproach(see4.6.2,

below).

4.4.4Conclusions

Theearliestperiodofadiscourseonflexicurityinsocialdemocraticgovernancenetworksin

theUKdidnotgenerallyusethetermflexicurity.Ithadhoweverestablishedasignifyinglogic

whichwasconsistentwithaflexicurityagenda.Initsearlyphase,socialdemocraticdiscourse

looked to the Nordic model as a means to resolve the tensions between ‘freedom’ and

‘equality’inthewidereconomy.ThebasicproblematicinAnglophoneliberalpoliticaltheory,

398Colebrooketal.,EuropeanJobsandSkills.

190

that‘positiveliberty’–oftenunderstoodasaprecursortoequality–alwaysendedinviolence

andcoercionmeantthattheonlyavailableoptionwas‘negativeliberty’,understoodasthe

simple absence of coercion. This made a genuinely redistributive social democratic

programme anathema to liberal thought. Articulating the signifier ‘equality’ as consistent

with ‘freedom’ was therefore essential for a social democratic political project to be

successful.

Thewascombinedwithamodernisinglogic,whichappealedtoa‘newSwedishmodel’.Itwas

argued thatwhile this ‘new Swedishmodel’ had undergone significant change, the basic

signifiers throughwhich itwas apprehendedwerenonetheless still social democratic and

corporatist.Thisbasicchainofsignification, inwhichequalityprecededfreedomcouldbe,

andwas,equallywellarticulatedwithaDanish-influencedflexicuritymodelasa‘newSwedish

model’.Thisbecameimportantfrom2010onwardswhenthepoliticalefficacyoftermslike

‘Swedish’or‘Nordic’modelbecameincreasinglyambiguousduetotheirassociationwiththe

UKConservativeParty’sFreeSchoolagenda(seechaptersix).

Intheperiodbetweenthe2008financialcrisisand2010,however,thebasiclogicofflexicurity

in social democratic governance networks became hegemonic. Even visions of a new

economic settlement which did not explicitly use the term flexicurity generally set out

argumentswhichacceptedthefundamentaltenetsofthepolicy,especially itsrejectionof

‘numericalflexibility’asaprimary,orevendesirable,outcomeofregulatorychangesinthe

labourmarket. Active intervention in the supply sideof the labourmarket and structural

reforms to skills and training were widely considered essential planks of a future social

191

democraticpoliticalproject.Aboveall, securitywasarticulatedas the logicalprecursorof

flexibilityandcorporatistsolutionsasthesolutiontolabourmarketissues.

Aseriesofpublications fromthe IPPRsetout thepotential for flexicuritystylereformsto

improvethelaboursupplyfromemployers’perspectives,andmanyofthemcalledforunified

employersgroupswhichcouldmoreactivelyengagewithtradeunionsandinfluencefuture

governmentskillspolicies.WhiletheywereheavilyconcernedwiththeNordiccountriesand

their regulatory regimes and attitudes, they tended to avoid the termNordicmodel and

flexicurity. While this may simply represent a desire to avoid contentious or mystifying

terminology, there is also an emerging sense that by 2015 social democratic governance

networkshaveamorecomplexrelationshipwithaSwedishorNordicmodeldiscoursethan

previously.

This isperhapsreflected intherelative lackofsuccesswhichsocialdemocraticactorshad

propagatingaflexicuritydiscourseoutsidetheirnetwork.Asocialdemocraticunderstanding

offlexicuritycanbefoundinseveralarticlesinTheGuardiannewspaperanditssisterpaper

TheObserver,whichdescribeflexicurityascharacterisedby‘highmobilitybetweenjobs…low

jobsecurityandhighratesofunemploymentbenefits’.399‘Flexicurity’,theyargue,‘isabout

providing security for individuals, not jobs, and protects them as they move between

employers’.400ThegenerallyhigherlevelsofsecurityfeltbyDanescomparedtoworkersin

theUKisalsoathemepickedupbysocialdemocraticcommentators.Thehighunemployment

supportlevelsandactivemeasurestoreturntheunemployedtoemploymentareinvokedas

399DavidGow,‘SansCourage’,TheGuardian,19January2006.400Helm,Asthana,andHarris,‘HowBritain’sNewWelfareStateWasBorn...’

192

reasonsforthesegreaterfeelingsofsecurity,eventhough‘Danishjobtenureisaroundthe

sameasintheUK’.ThecolumnistWillHuttonhasbeenparticularlyactiveinthepushforthe

adoptionofflexicurity-stylepolicies.401HuttonhasstronglinkstotheWorkFoundationthink-

tankandtheLabourPartyandhisinvolvementinarticulatingaflexicuritypolicyshouldbe

seenasanindicationthatflexicuritywasindeedapproachingthestatusofhegemonicnodal

pointinsocialdemocraticgovernancenetworks.Beyondthat,however,flexicuritywasmore

oftenviewedinfree-marketterms,asthenextsectionwillexplorefurther.

401WillHutton,‘TheLessonsWeShouldLearnfromtheWreckageoftheBritishCarIndustry’,TheObserver,31May2009;WillHutton,‘OsborneIsIntellectuallyBrokenandtheRealEnemyofBusiness’,TheObserver,29April2012;WillHutton,‘HowtoLiftEuropeoutofItsUnemploymentCrisis’,TheGuardian,30May2012;WillHutton,‘SeizetheMomenttoRecastEconomicPolicy’,TheGuardian,31May2012.

193

4.5Utopia2.0:Free-MarketSweden

4.5.1TheNewModeratesand‘theBigSociety’

WhenFredrikReinfeldt,thenPrimeMinisterofSweden,gaveatalktotheLondonSchoolof

Economics(LSE)in2008,hesetoutwhatcouldperhapsbeseenastheofficialModerateParty

historyoftheSwedishtwentiethcentury.402Inhistelling,Swedishsuccesshadbeenastory

of free-markets and an open, liberal regulatory regimewhich supported generous public

services.AccordingtoReinfeldt,thesocialdemocraticSwedenofpopularimaginationwasa

myth,andaperniciousone,sinceitwasintheperiodofsocialdemocratichegemonythat

thingsreallybegantogowronginSweden.Thisargumentoriginatedinthe1990sduringCarl

Bildt’spremiership(see2.2.1,above).AsSweden’ssocialdemocraticinternationalimagewas

stronglyassociatedwiththedominantSAP,itisunsurprisingthattheModeratePartywould

beeagertorevisethishegemonicdiscourseoftheSwedishmodelwithinSwedenandabroad.

ComparingpublicationsreleasedbyPärNuderforPolicyNetworkandtheIPPRwiththose

released under the auspices of liberal and free-market think tanks, there is a sense that

domesticSwedishargumentswerebeingplayedoutin,andinfluencing,Britishpublicpolicy

debates.

Indeed,inasense,theoppositionbetweensocialdemocraticandfreemarketdiscourseson

the Swedish/Nordic model correspond relatively closely to the contours of a, naturally

somewhatdifferentandmuchwider-ranging,re-examinationofSwedishpoliticsinSweden.

WherePärNuderpresentedanessentiallysocialdemocraticaccountofSwedishdeclineand

rejuvenation in theperiodeither sideof the1991/2 financial crisiswhichemphasised the

402Reinfeldt,TheNewSwedishModel.

194

modernisationandessentialcontinuityofimportantlabourinstitutions,Reinfeldtarticulated

Sweden’ssuccess,declineandrejuvenationintermsofliberal,free-marketsignifiers.Inhis

speech,Reinfeldtopenedbyquippingthathelearnttwothingsinhisschoolhistoryclasses:

thatSwedenistheonlyworldsuperpowerwithninemillioninhabitants,andthathiscountry

is very modest about its achievements.403 Far from being just a self-deprecating opener

however,thislaidoutadirectionforReinfeldt’svisionofSweden.Hearguedthattherehad

neverreallybeensuchathingasaSwedishmodel,ratheraNordicorScandinavianmodel,

and,furthermore,evenifitdidonceexist,therelevanceofmodelsingeneralhaddeclinedas

aresultofglobalisation.

He added that the most that could be spoken of now were ‘distinctive features’ and

‘institutionalfeatures’.404Inotherwords,Reinfeldtarguedthatthemostthatcanbegained

fromstudyingothercountriesareexamplesofspecificregulationsandregulatoryregimes,

rather than models. A starker contrast with Nuder and Kielos’ arguments that specific

regulations are meaningless without moral and political leadership, which should be

prioritised, would be difficult to find. Further, where Nuder and Kielos discussed the

resolutionofconstitutiveclassandgenderantagonismsastherootofSweden’seconomic

model, Reinfeldt argued that this was primarily a result of: the market economy; the

developmentoffreeenterprise;Sweden’slegalsystemandstrongpropertyrights;modern

bankinginstitutions,andopenattitudetointernationalcompetition.405Whilehearguedthat

thelaterdevelopmentofcompactsbetweenthesocialpartnersensuredSweden’ssuccess,it

403Ibid.404Ibid.405Ibid.

195

isclearthatinthisModeratediscourseSweden’sliberalinstitutionsareprimarilyresponsible

foritsrelativeprosperity.

ForReinfeldt,thingsbegantogowrongduringwhathetermsSweden’s‘madquarterofa

century’,whenthe‘vitalbalancebetweeninstitutions’disappearedand‘socialismsweptover

Sweden’.406Moreover,thisperiodcoincidedwithasharpriseintaxes,combinedwithhigh

inflationandlargebudgetdeficits.Duringthisperiod,Swedenwasalsoexposedtotwooil

crises. According to Reinfeldt, the ‘mad quarter of a century’ effectively ended with the

financial crisis of 1991/2. ‘What took a hundred years to build was nearly dismantled in

twenty-five’,heclaimed.Sweden’sre-emergencefromthisperiod,runstheargument,was

primarily a result of awave of privatisations, deregulation of keymarkets, reformof the

Riksbank,changestothepensionsystem,andtaxcuts.407Movingforwardto2006,Reinfeldt

arguedthatTheNewModerateswere‘electedtodothejobofputtingSwedenbacktowork’.

This was a task which TheModerates articulated as ‘amatter of freedom’, since it is ‘a

freedomissuetostandonyourowntwofeetandbyyourownworkdecideyourfuture’.408

ThedegreeoftractionwhichthisnewarticulationofSwedishsuccesshasgainedintheUKis

noteworthy. It issignificantthatthediscussantofReinfeldt’sspeechtotheLSEwasDavid

Cameron,atthattimeLeaderoftheUKConservativeopposition.Cameron’sinterestinthe

SwedishModeratesreflectedastrategicattempttoreinvigoratetheUKConservativesand,

inmarketingspeak,to‘detoxify’theConservativeParty’sbrand.Despiteitslackoftraction

withthewiderelectorate,oneofthelastinglegaciesoftheBigSocietyera–DavidCameron’s

406Ibid.407Ibid.408Ibid.

196

orientationoftheConservativePartytowardscivilsocietyissues(see2.3.3,above)–wasa

continuingemphasisonSwedenasapotentialmodelforfree-marketliberalpolicymaking.

Inhis response toReinfeldt,Cameronmadeanumberofobservationswhichclearlyecho

portionsofhis‘CompassionateConservatism’and‘BigSociety’agendas,andperhapsjustas

importantly,suggesthowthisdiscoursewouldstructurefuturepublicpolicy.

CameronagreedwithReinfeldt’sclassically liberalarticulationof labourmarketandpublic

serviceissuesintermsof‘freedom’.HearguedthatReinfeldt’s‘“newSwedishmodel”isn’t

justchangeforchange’ssake,itisreal,boldandlastingchange,designedtomakeareal,bold

and lastingchange for [Reinfeldt’s] country’.Headded that importantcomponentsof the

Moderate programme, including: ‘reforming the welfare system to get more people off

benefitsand intowork, reforminghealthcaresotheconsumer is incontrol,not thestate,

gettingtheeducationsystemtorespondtotheneedsofparentsandindividualchildren…are

allthingsthatweareexamininginthiscountry’.409

The level of interest in Sweden in theUKConservative Party began tobe reflectedmore

widely in a free-market governance network, which produced (and produces) significant

amountsofeconomicpolicy.This isdemonstratedparticularlyclearlybypolicydocuments

published by the IEA since 2010. The IEA published a number of documentswhichwere

consistentwiththeNordicmodelasFredrikReinfeldtarticulateditinhisspeechattheLSE,

andsomegosignificantlyfurtherintheirattemptstoreimagineNordic‘success’asdependent

409Ibid.

197

primarilyonfreeenterprise.Thissectionwilllookingreaterdetailatthespecificarticulation

ofSwedenfoundinthisdiscourse.

Although earlier than Reinfeldt’s election as Prime Minister, Johann Wennström’s

provocatively titledTheAwfulTruthAboutSweden,publishedthroughthe IEA,pointedto

many of the same issues as Reinfeldt’s speech. 410 This is perhaps unsurprising, since

Wennströmwasapoliticaladviser inReinfeldt’ssecondgovernment.411Nominallyhis text

aimedtorespondtoanarticlebyPollyToynbee inTheGuardiannewspaper.412Toynbee’s

articlewashighlycriticalofTonyBlair’suseofSwedenasamodelforNPMservicereform

(seechapterfive),andarticulatedrecentchangestoSweden’seconomicsettlementaspurely

afeatureofthe1991Bildtgovernment’sreformagenda.Thisisnotentirelyfair,sincetheSAP

alsobegantoaccepttheemergingfree-markethegemonyinthe1980s(see,2.2,above),but

itdoesreflectanattempttoreclaimtheclassicallysocialdemocraticarticulationofSweden

discussed above. Wennström’s article is relevant because it aimed to refute this by

constructingadiscoursearoundaseriesofsignifierswhichformthecoreofthefree-market

discourseonSweden.

NotonlywasheextremelycriticalofSwedishwelfarepolicieswhichheclaimedhadresulted

in largenumbersofworking-agebenefit claimants, buthis criticismof the Swedish social

compact was also acerbic: ‘the real significance of the “magic” pact between the state,

employersandtheworkforce…isanorderwherethestatetakesawayeveryrightfromthe

410Wennström,‘TheAwfulTruthAboutSweden’.411https://sv.wikipedia.org/wiki/Johan_Wennström412Toynbee,‘TheMostSuccessfulSocietytheWorldHasEverKnown’.

198

employerandgivesthoserightstohisorheremployeesinstead’.413WhatsuccessSweden

did experience, between 1860-1960, ‘sprung from entrepreneurship’. 414 The failure to

producealargecompany,suchasIKEAorEricsson,since1970,demonstratedforWennström

that this entrepreneurial Sweden was gone and Sweden’s success had been slowly

squandered.NotonlywasSwedishsuccessafeatureofitsacceptanceofliberalismthen,but

its failureswere articulated in terms of social democratic signifiers. The quality of public

servicesorganisedalongequallineshadproducedpoorservices,whichcouldonlyberescued

by introducing greater ‘freedom’, and economic dynamism had been destroyed by

corporatismand‘security’forworkers.

GivenWennström’s ties to TheNewModerates, it is probablyworth seeing this piece as

aimedataSwedishasmuchasaninternationalaudience.Whileclearlyintendedasarebuttal

toToynbee’sarticle,andasimilarly laudatorypieceinLeFigaro,aFrenchnewspaper, it is

worthnotingthatthispiecewaswrittenintherunuptoaSwedishGeneralelection,which

waswonbyReinfeldt’sNewModerates. It isnonethelessnoteworthythattheconnection

betweenSwedishfree-marketthinkersandBritishgovernancenetworkscanbetracedback

as far as 2005. This is broadly consistent with a more general concern to rebut social

democraticclaimsaboutthenatureofwelfareservicesindifferentpartsofEuropeandthe

West.

413Wennström,‘TheAwfulTruthAboutSweden’,2.414Ibid.,2–3.

199

4.5.2ConservativevictoryandtheInstituteofEconomicAffairs

The IEAhas beenparticularly interested in andoriented towards Sweden and theNordic

countries since the Conservative victory in the 2010 UK General Election. A significant

quantity of its literatureonpolitical economic issueswasproducedbyNima Sanandaji in

collaborationwithanumberofotherwriters, includinghisbrotherTimo. In twoseparate

publications,SanandajiadvancedbroadlythesamediscourseasthatarticulatedbyFredrik

Reinfeldt at the LSE, though hewas significantlymore concerned tomake amoral case,

argued with reference to classic free-market signifiers about ‘work’ and ‘growth’, than

Reinfeldt.415Inhis longestwork,ScandinavianUnexceptionalism:Culture,Marketsandthe

FailureofThird-WaySocialism,Sanandajiclaimedthat‘Scandinavia’ssuccessstorypredated

thewelfarestate’andthatthesocialdemocraticsystemofeconomicsteeringretarded‘the

coreofthefree-marketmodel:entrepreneurship’.416ForSanandaji,asforReinfeldt:

The phenomenal national income growth in the Nordic nations occurred

beforetheriseoflargewelfarestates.Theriseinlivingstandardswasmade

possiblewhen cultures based on social cohesion, high levels of trust and

strongworkethicswerecombinedwithfreemarketsandlowtaxes.…The

period from around the beginning of the 1960s was characterised by

popularisationofradicalsocialistideas.IntheNordics,previouslypragmatic

socialdemocratsradicalisedandmovedsharplytotheleft.417

Sanandaji’saimwastounderminetheSwedish/Scandinavian,termswhichheusedvirtually

interchangeably,welfarestateasaviablepoliticalproject.HearguedinsteadthatSweden’s

415TheSurprisingIngredientsofSwedishSuccess–FreeMarketsandSocialCohesion(London:TheInstituteofEconomicAffairs,2012);ScandinavianUnexceptionalism.416ScandinavianUnexceptionalism,xiii,21.417Ibid.,20.

200

initial success shouldbe seenas a resultof the introductionof industrialisationand free-

markets into a poor agrarian society, resulting in the highest sustained growth in Europe

between 1870 and 1936. 1936, which Sanandaji somewhat arbitrarily identifies as the

beginningofthesocialdemocraticera,418representsthebeginningofaslowinginSweden’s

growthrate,butthemaintenanceofthemajorityofliberalinstitutionswhichhadcontributed

toSweden’ssuccess.Thereareclearempiricalflawsinthislineofargument.Theenormous

gainsexperiencedbyagrariansocietiesexposedtoindustrialisationarewellunderstoodin

developmenteconomics,andsomedevelopmenteconomistswould inanycasenotagree

with Sanandaji’s claim that free-markets are best placed to stimulate development. 419

Moreover,theimpliedcriticismofsocialdemocraticarticulationsofSwedenhasthewhiffof

thestrawmanaboutit.AlthoughUKsocialdemocraticactors,includingthoseconsideredin

thisstudy,historicallyadmiredSwedishandNordicpublicservices,noneofthemarguedthat

thewelfarestatewasprimarilyormainlyresponsibleforperceivedSwedishsuccess.

Rather than the welfare state, then, culture, religion and climate are articulated as the

primarycausesofSwedishsuccess.Indeed,acorepartofthisargumentisthattheProtestant

ethicandScandinavianculturearesufficientlystrongthattheyhaveledtoevenmorepositive

outcomes for people of Nordic origin in the USA, where conditions which favour freer

enterpriseprevail.420ThisistiedtoaclaimthattheScandinavianworkethichasdeteriorated

overtimeasaresultofthenegativeeffectsofthewelfarestate,anarticulationwhichechoes

418Sanandaji,TheSurprisingIngredientsofSwedishSuccess,10.TheSAPfirstenteredgovernmentin1932andachievedaparliamentarymajorityin1933.ItisthereforeslightlyunclearwhySanandajiidentifies1936asthecriticalyearofthebeginningofthesocialdemocratichegemony.419Ha-Joon Chang, Bad Samaritans: TheMyth of Free Trade and the Secret History of Capitalism (London:Bloomsbury,2007).420Sanandaji,TheSurprisingIngredientsofSwedishSuccess.

201

thoseofFredrikReinfeldtandJohanWennström.Perhapsmorestridentlythaneitherofthe

aforementioned,Sanandajiargues‘inthelongrun,thelargewelfarestateserodedincentives,

andultimatelythesocialnormsthatboundScandinaviansocietiestogether’.421

Partlyasaresultofthisemphasisonthemoralbenefitsofwork,someattentionhasbeen

giventoflexicurityinfree-marketgovernancenetworksintheUK.Free-marketdiscussionsof

flexicuritywereoverwhelminglyinterestedintheflexibilityratherthanthesecurityelement.

Itwasseenasemblematicofthepossibilityforlessregulationalongsidethemaintenanceof

adecent levelofpublicwelfare, although it tended to vaguenessonhow levelsofpublic

welfarecouldbemaintained.422However,Sanandajialsosawflexicurityasameansbywhich

‘the same public choice mechanisms that have encouraged a large public sector can be

harnessed,throughsmartreforms,tofosterstakeholderswithavestedinterestinreducing

thesizeofthestate’.423Inotherwords,flexicuritypolicieshavebeenidentifiedasapotential

meansbywhichtocreateaso-called‘leaveusalone’coalitionwhichwouldaimtocurbstate

interventioninitsinterests.Thisanalysisispossibleasaresultofthearticulationofflexicurity

asapurelysupplysidephenomenon.Inotherwords,thestateshouldretreatfromalldemand

side interventions and focus instead on supporting the unemployed while allowing the

economytofunctioninasunregulatedafashionaspossible.Thiswould,accordingtofree-

markettheorists,discourageanytendencytorelyonthestatetoproduceorprotectjobs.

421Sanandaji,ScandinavianUnexceptionalism,64.422NimaSanandaji, ‘FosteringaEuropean“LeaveUsAlone”Coalition’, inAU-Turnon theRoad toSerfdom:ProspectsforReducingtheSizeoftheState,ed.GroverNorquistetal.(London:TheInstituteofEconomicAffairs,2014),100.423Ibid.,94.

202

Ingeneral,thisanalysisishighlyunderdevelopedcomparedwithfree-marketapproachesto

Swedish healthcare and education reforms, though it is clearly of interest that there is a

possibilityofanascentfree-marketdiscourseonflexicuritywhichprioritisesflexibilityover

thesecurity.Inthisregard,thechargemadebyKeuneandJepsenoftheformofflexicurity

adoptedbytheEuropeanCommission,thatflexicurityisderegulationbyanothername,could

becomeapplicabletoarticulationsofflexicurityinBritain.

Additionally,oneofSanandaji’skeyaimswastodisprovethewidely-heldideathatthehigh

levelsoffemaleparticipationintheNordiceconomiesshouldbeseenaspositive.Whilehe

acknowledgedthatfemaleparticipationintheworkforcefarexceededtheWesternaverage,

henotedthatmuchofthisparticipationwasincaringrolesandthattherewereproportionally

fewer jobs in the private sector whichwere filled bywomen. Perhaps unsurprisingly, he

consideredthis tobea featureof thewelfarestatesincethemajorityof roles in ‘female-

dominatedsectorssuchaseducationandhealthcare’areinthepublicsector.424Indeed,itis

quiteclearthatasfarasSanandajiisconcernedthechiefproblemisnotsomuchthat,for

whatever reason, femaleandmaleprofessionalaspirationsare stubbornly traditional,but

thatfemaledominatedsectorsareinthepublicsector.Thestrongimpressioniscreatedthat

weretheseprofessionssimplytoberelocatedtotheprivatesectortheproblemwouldbe

solved.

ThevariouscriticismsoftheNordicsocialmodelnotwithstanding,itssuccess,inSanandaji’s

terms,intheperiodafterthe1991/2financialcrisisisarticulatedasresultingfromareturn

424Sanandaji,ScandinavianUnexceptionalism,103.

203

to a pre-social democratic social settlement. 425 In common with the general discourse

advancedbyTheModerates,thecontemporaryNordiccountriesare‘morecentristthantheir

reputationsuggests’intheareaof‘economicfreedomandtaxation’and‘havecompensated

fora largepublicsectorbyincreasingeconomicliberty inotherareas’.426Thischimeswith

significantportionsoftheModerateagenda,whichisfocussedon‘puttingSwedenbackto

work’.427Inthefree-marketdiscourse,whatsuccessestherehavebeensincethe1990shave

primarilycomeasa resultofchanges to thestructureofSweden’s regulatory regimeand

movestowardsliberalisation,includingChicagoSchool-inspiredsolutionsinpublichealthand

educationprovision.428Moreover,inthepost-1990erarejuvenationhasoccurredasaresult

of tax reductions and increases in levels of ‘economic freedom’, with Denmark noted

approvinglyashavingovertakentheUKandUSbybecomingthe11thfreesteconomyinthe

world,onametricwhichbasicallymeasureslevelsofregulationandsizeofgovernment.429

This, argued Sanandaji, ‘reinforce[s] the notion that the Nordic nations are tentatively

returningtotheirfree-marketroots’.430ThearticulationofSwedenasafundamentallyliberal

nationwhichisnowreturningtothevalueswhichmadeitsuccessfulagreesverycloselywith

Reinfeldt’sideaofSwedenhavinghada‘madquarterofacentury’.

Thisdiscoursehasalsograduallymadeitswayintothepress,althoughithasbeenfarfrom

systematic or consistent. The Economist has tended to be closest in orientation and

relationshiptothefree-marketgovernancenetworksetoutabove.Thisisincontrasttothe

425Ibid.,110.426Ibid.,114.427Reinfeldt,TheNewSwedishModel.428Sanandaji,‘FosteringaLeaveUsAloneCoalition’,101–2.429Sanandaji,ScandinavianUnexceptionalism,108.430Ibid.,110.

204

relatively ambiguous pseudo-Keynesian approach to political economy adopted as the

editoriallineofTheFinancialTimessincethefinancialcrisisof2008(see4.6.1,below).The

Economisthas recentlycitedpolicypapersproducedby the IEAonNordicancestry in the

UnitedStates,withtheobligatoryreferencetoVikings,431andhashistoricallybeeninterested

intheNordiccountriesasmodelsforpublicchoicereform,ratherthanasamodelofpolitical

economy. Indeed, where The Economist has written about the Nordic countries, it has

typically done sowith relative hostility to the Nordicmodel andmodelling in general.432

Althoughitpraisedtheflexicuritymodelin2006forproducing‘exceptionalperformanceon

jobs’,itgraduallyrevertedtoamorehostileattitudetowardstheNordicmodelandmodelling

morebroadly,which intensified in the leadup to the financial crisisof2008. In2006, the

paper reported approvingly on the liberalising agendaof the SwedishNewModerates.433

DenmarkandFinlandwerewidelyconsideredthetwomostsuccessfulmembersoftheNordic

areaatthetime.However,Denmarkwascriticisedforagrowingintoleranceofimmigration,

leading to labour shortages, and Finland for over-reliance on a singlemajor firm (Nokia),

respectively.434Thearticleconcludedbynotingthat‘[T]hetruthabouttheNordicmodelis

that,wheneverithasworkedbest,ithasdonesochieflybyembracingliberalisationandfreer

markets’.435In2008,Denmark’s flexicuritymodelwaspraised for its ability topushdown

inflationasaresultofitsactivelabourmarketpolicy,althoughitwasnotedthatahousing

busthadtippedtheDanisheconomyintorecession.436

431‘FoundingVikings’.432‘All,orAlmostAll,Change’,TheEconomist,21September1991;‘Farewell,NordicModel’,TheEconomist,16November2006;‘BringoutYourModels’,TheEconomist,31July2008.433‘Farewell,NordicModel’.434‘Flexicurity:AModelThatWorks’,TheEconomist,7September2006.435‘Farewell,NordicModel’.436‘BringoutYourModels’.

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Perhaps thedefining contributionTheEconomistmade todiscourseon theNordicmodel

came in its 2013 Special Report which described the Nordic countries as ‘the Next

Supermodel’.Dølviketal.evencitedthisspecialreportasanexampleoftheextenttowhich

theNordic countries have been embraced by ‘the centre-right’.437The articulation of the

Nordiccountriesasapoliticaleconomicmodelwasbroadlyconsistentwiththediscourselaid

outby the free-marketnetwork. ‘ThestreetsofStockholm’, itnoted, ‘areawashwith the

bloodofsacredcows’andthe‘erstwhilechampionofthe“thirdway”isnowpursuingafar

moreinterestingbrandofpolitics’.438Atthecoreofthis‘interestingbrandofpolitics’were

reductions in levels of public spending as a percentage of GDP; commitments to fiscal

orthodoxy, including running budgetary surpluses; shifts towards a defined-contribution,

rather than defined-benefit pension system; and cuts tomany of the headline tax rates,

includingincome,wealthandcorporatetaxes.439Thesemeasureswerethereforeconsistent

withtheprogrammessetoutbyFredrikReinfeldtandpraisedbyDavidCameron.Theyalso

matchthearticulationofrecentNordicsuccessputforwardbyNimaSanandaji.Denmarkwas

praised for its liberal labour market, Finland for its embrace of venture capitalists and

investorstopromoteentrepreneurship,andNorwayfororientatingitselftowardsapost-oil

future.440

Moreover,theSwedishandDanishschoolsystemswerepraisedandthemodel ingeneral

wasarticulatedashavingreversedits‘leftwardlurch’:‘ratherthanextendingthestateinto

437Dølvik,Andersen,andVartiainen,‘TheNordicSocialModelsinTurbulentTimes’,246.438‘NorthernLights’,TheEconomist,2February2013Note: thevarioussectionsofthespecial reportontheNordic countries are treated as separate articles in the 2nd February 2013 edition of the newspaper. Iwillthereforecitethemaccordingly.439Ibid.440Ibid.

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themarket, the Nordics are extending themarket into the state’.441 Nordic success was

therefore seen not as a function of its social policies, but as a result of the region’s

‘determinationtoreducegovernmentspendingandsetentrepreneursfree’.442Finlandwas

particularlypraisedinthisregard,althoughitwasnotedthattechnologystart-upsproliferate

acrosstheNordicregion,especiallyinFinlandandNorway.

Moreover,thesuccessoftheNordiceconomieswasputdowntotheiropennesstotradein

globalmarketsandwillingnesstoinnovate.Oticon(hearingaids),Mærsk(freight),Lego(toys)

andCarlsberg (drinks)weregivenasexamplesofgloballycompetitivecompanies founded

andbasedinDenmark.443SwedengottheobligatorymentionofIKEAandH&M;Finland,Kone

(lifts)andRovio(developerofAngryBirds);andNorwaywasdescribedasaworldleaderinoil

services,althoughStatoilisnotmentionedbyname(becauseitisinpublicownership?).444

Althoughsomeofthesecompaniesarenotedasbeingsubjecttodifficultiesasaresultof

competitorsabroad, theyarealsoconsideredexamplesofhowtheNordiccountrieshave

succeededasaresultofopennesstointernationaltrade.

Finally,theNordiccountrieswerecharacterisedasbastionsoffiscalrectitude.AllfiveNordic

countrieshad,atdifferingrates,reducedgovernmentexpenditureasapercentageofGDP.

Theintroductionofprivatefirmsintopublicserviceprovisionwassingledoutforparticular

praise,especiallyinSweden.ItwasnotedthatSweden‘morethananyoneelseintheworld’

had embraced ‘Milton Friedman’s idea of educational vouchers’ and that themajority of

441Ibid.442‘TheSecretofTheirSuccess’,TheEconomist,2February2013.443‘GlobalNichePlayers’,TheEconomist,2February2013.444Ibid.

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healthcarecentresandnurserieswerenowbuiltbyprivatecompanies(seechaptersfourand

five).445ThissuccessinreducingpublicspendingisaresultofNordic‘willingnesstofocuson

resultsratherthanonideologies’.446Initsfinalmovement,then,thisarticulationreturnedto

familiargroundwhen itappealedtopragmatismasthemotivatorofchange intheNordic

countriesexplainingwhysocialsystemsthere ‘canoftenseemtobeamalgamsof left-and

right-wingpolicies’.447WhileTheEconomistnotedthat‘[T]hisspecialreporthassupported

someofthefree-marketers’arguments’,448itissignificantthatitdoessobydeployingarange

offamiliarsignifierswithreferencetotheNordiccountries,mostofwhichareenchainedwith

newmeanings:pragmatismandpoliciesbeyondleftandrightarethereforeunderstoodin

terms of free-market signifiers such as ‘deregulation’, ‘economic freedom’ and

‘entrepreneurship’.

Characteristically, the popular press discourse on flexicurity has been significantly more

fragmented than the discussion in the business press. There have been a number of

interventionsaboutthebenefitsoftheNordicmodelofpoliticaleconomy,butthesehave

typicallybeen fairly superficialandmoredependentonclichés thanthose in thebusiness

press.AdrianWooldridge,who incidentallywasalso theauthorof ‘TheNextSupermodel’

special report,writing inThe Sunday Times in 2014, noted the broadening appeal of the

Nordiccountries.‘SocialistshavealwayspraisedtheNordicworld’sgenerouswelfarestate’,

hewrote,‘[N]oweveryoneisgettinginontheact’.449SwedishFreeSchoolsarenotedasan

inspirationforMichaelGove,thenUKConservativeMinisterforEducation(seechaptersix),

445‘MoreforLess’,TheEconomist,2February2013.446Ibid.447‘TheSecretofTheirSuccess’.448Ibid.449Wooldridge,‘TheVikingsRiseAgain’.

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and flexicurity as a potential model for the pension reforms of then work and pensions

secretary IainDuncanSmith.450Aswellas their impressive recordon ‘international league

tables’theNordiccountrieswerealsoadmiredas‘ruthlesscapitalists’andthereconciliation

ofdecentqualityoflifeandcompetitivenesswasgivenasthereasonwhy‘bothleftandright

areobsessedwiththem’.451ThefactthattheNordiccountrieshave‘transcendedsomeofthe

simple-mindeddualitiesthatdominateBritishpolitics’re-emergesasachiefreasonfortheir

success.452 This should be seen as reflecting the extent to which Anglophone modelling

discourses have tended to articulate the Nordic countries as capable of neutralising the

antagonismsbetween‘freedom’and‘equality’,ratherthanempiricalNordicsuccesses.

Similarly,a2014pieceonMailOnline, thewebsiteaffiliatedtoTheDailyMail,publisheda

piece on flexicurity, noting that the ‘solid safety net’ meant that the government could

‘persuade…unionstoacceptaflexiblelabourmarket…companiescanquicklylayoffstaffers

duringdownturns.Laid-offworkers,inturn,receivetrainingandguidanceinpursuingnew

careers’.453Significantly,thedominantinterpretationofflexicurityinthisarticle,alongwith

those in the business press, is on the hire-and-fire aspects of flexicurity, the ‘numerical

flexibility’whichtendstobeemphasisedinAnglophonelabourmarkets.Asnotedabove,this

is onlypartof flexibility asunderstoodbyNordic firms,whichalso re-deployand re-train

workers, but it is noteworthy that free-market orientated journalists tended to articulate

‘flexibility’assynonymouswith‘hire-and-fire’,numericalflexibility.Thisthemerunsthrough

450Ibid.451Ibid.452Ibid.453 Associated Press, ‘What Wealth Gap? Danish Welfare Narrows Disparity’, MailOnline, 24 June 2014,http://www.dailymail.co.uk/wires/ap/article-2666755/What-wealth-gap-Danish-welfare-narrows-disparity.html.

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anotherarticleinTheSundayTimes,whichsuggestsflexicuritywouldbeausefulsystemgiven

that‘redundancypaymentsarebannedbutunemploymentpayisfarhigherforlonger,and

comeswithautomaticretrainingforjobs’.454

4.5.3Conclusions

The discourse of the free-market governance network modified and expanded upon the

discourseadoptedbyFredrikReinfeldtduringhisfirstperiodasPrimeMinisterinSweden,

butalsoshowstheextenttowhichtheseideashavebecomeimportanttoarticulationsbeing

advancedbyfree-marketgovernancenetworksinBritain.RobertTaylorprefacedhissocial

democraticaccountofSwedenbysayingthat‘thereisanalternative–it’scalledSweden’,in

response toMargaretThatcher’s famousargument that ‘there isnoalternative’ to liberal

reform.455ThediscoursewhichemergesfromReinfeldt,SanandajiandWennström,however,

notonlyre-articulatedcontemporarySweden,post-financialcrisis,withfree-marketsignifiers,

butalsocharacterisedSweden’s‘old’modelasprimarilyafunctionoftheveryfree-market

liberalismwhich Taylor rejected. As noted above, it is clearwhy theModerates found it

necessarytoadvanceanalternativediscoursewhichwouldexplaincontemporarySweden.

Indeed, the very discourse of the Swedish model emerged from the political and social

hegemonyoftheSAP.Nevertheless,theextenttowhichthishasinformedBritishpublicpolicy

debatesisinterestingandshouldnotbeunderestimated.

A significant portion of David Cameron’s ‘Big Society’ and ‘Compassionate Conservatism’

agendas were structured around similar signifiers to those used by Fredrik Reinfeldt’s

454Russell,‘Don’tArgue...’455Taylor,Sweden’sNewSocialDemocraticModel,4.

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Moderates.ItiscertainlynocoincidencethatReinfeldtwasparticularlyconcernedtodiscuss

environmentalissuesandevennotedthatheandCameronhadbothvisitedSvalbardtosee

theextentofice-capmeltingthere.ReinfeldtandCameron,incommonwithSanandajiand

Wennström,articulateworkasafundamentalmoralvirtue.Reinfeldtdescribesworkas ‘a

matteroffreedom’;Cameronas‘anissueoffreedom,ofpeoplepower,ofresponsibility,of

choiceandoflocalcontrol’.456

Thegeneralaimofthefree-marketgovernancenetworkwastoadvanceliberalpolicies,but

also,ashasbeendemonstratedabove, tonixattempts toarticulatea sociallydemocratic

politicalprojectinareasofperceivedstrength.Thisisclearlyonemotivationforpublications

dealingwithissuesofgovernmentalsize,equalityandhappiness.InthecaseofSweden,the

free-market governance network has consistently and concertedly promoted publications

whicharticulateSwedenasaliberal,ratherthansociallydemocratic,successstory.Emphasis

onre-articulatingthosefeaturesofSwedishandScandinaviansocietieswhicharetypicalparts

of social democratic discourse on the Nordic countries, including gender equality and

generousbenefitsystems,aswellastheroleofthesocialcompactinSwedishsuccess,have

characterisedmanyofthepublicationscomingfromtheIEAandCPSsinceDavidCameron’s

Conservative Party began to show interest in Sweden in the late 2000s. This sustained

attempt to re-articulate themeaning of Sweden in the free-market governance network

should therefore almost certainly be seen as an attempt to influence the contemporary

ConservativePartytoretainitsemphasisoneconomicallyliberalreforms,evenasitattempts

to‘learnfromtheSwedishModerates’.457

456Reinfeldt,TheNewSwedishModel.457Ibid.

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4.6Schumpeteriansandneo-Schumpeterians

4.6.1TheliberalSchumpeter

Entrepreneurs, and the best regulatory regimes to encourage them, form a core part of

contemporaryfree-marketdiscourse.Asnotedabove,thisarosefromaparticularreadingof

Schumpeter’s Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy and effectively understands the

entrepreneurastheagentofcreativedestruction.458Indeed,perhapsthemost interesting

part of an extended discussion of entrepreneurialism in SuperEntrepreneurs, a 2014 text

publishedthroughCPSbyNimaandTimoSanandaji,wasitsattempttoestablishadefinition

of entrepreneurs.459Theseweredistinguished from the self-employedbecause theywere

agentsof‘creativedestruction’.Thismeantthatexamplesofentrepreneursincluded:Steve

Jobs,founderandlaterCEOofApple;thecreatorofmicro-loanstodevelopmentprojects;the

USTreasuryOfficialwhodesignedthepolicyarchitectureoftheIMFandtheWorldBank;and,

withoutirony,MichaelMilken,theinventorofsecuritisedbonds,alsoknownasjunkbonds,

whowasfamouslyindictedforinsidertrading,fraudandembezzlementonmarketsforthe

very products he had invented. 460 While Sanandaji and Sanandaji were not particularly

interestedinScandinaviaasamodelforentrepreneurialactivity–indeed,elsewhereNima

SanandajidescribedtheSwedishsystemasanattempttocreate‘amarketeconomywithout

individual capitalists and entrepreneurs [quoting Henrekson]’ – their view of the

entrepreneurinformstheirvisionofcontemporaryScandinavia.461

458JosephSchumpeter,Capitalism,SocialismandDemocracy(London:Routledge,2003).459TinoSanandajiandNimaSanandaji,SuperEntrepreneurs(London:CentreforPolicyStudies,2014).460Ibid.,3,6,61.461Sanandaji,ScandinavianUnexceptionalism,23.

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SanandajiandSanandajisawSchumpeter’s‘creativedestruction’intheorthodoxfree-market

fashion.CriticismoftheSwedishwelfarestatewasthereforestructuredarounditssupposed

inability to foster entrepreneurship, especially given that the largest andmost profitable

Swedish companies, including IKEA, Ericsson, H&M and Volvo started as entrepreneurial

ventures.462ForSanandaji,theSwedishwelfarestatehascreatedmajordisincentivesforthis

kindofbehaviour,resultinginadeclineinsocialmoralsleadingtoasituation‘inwhichethics

relating toworkandresponsibilityarenotstronglyencouragedby theeconomicsystems.

Individualswithlowskillsandeducationhavelimitedgainsfromworking’.463

Perhapsasaresultofthedifficultyofdefiningthenatureofentrepreneursandtheoptimum

field for entrepreneurial activity, Sanandajimade few concrete prescriptions for fostering

greater dynamism. Virtually the only firm conclusion about the structure of a regulatory

regimetofosterentrepreneurshipwasthatitshouldincludestrongpropertyrights,including

intellectual property rights. This was because ‘if property rights are strong, talented

individuals are…more likely to find it attractive to engage in activities that create social

value’.464Characteristically,itisarguedthathightaxratesonprofitsdeterentrepreneurship

and that tax reform, especially reductions in capital gains taxes, can stimulate economic

development.465Sanandaji argued that thiswouldbeparticularlybeneficial for theNordic

countries(andtheUKandIreland)onthebasisthatcapitalgainstaxesarehigherinthese

countries than elsewhere in Europe.466 These articulations of the best way to stimulate

entrepreneurshipstronglymirrorclaimsaboutthebestmeanstostimulategrowthandwork

462Sanandaji,TheSurprisingIngredientsofSwedishSuccess.463ScandinavianUnexceptionalism,76.464SanandajiandSanandaji,SuperEntrepreneurs,28.465Ibid.,30–32.466Ibid.,36.

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generally. The Schumpeterian agenda was therefore articulated as consistent with free-

marketargumentsforreformoftheNordiceconomiesmoregenerallyandclearlyinformed

thediscourseonNordicpoliticaleconomy.

4.6.2ThecorporatistSchumpeter

Many recent academic approaches to Schumpeter have looked at the issue from a

perspectivewhichhopedtocreatetheconditionsforcreativedestructionwithinacorporatist

socialstructure.PeterFlaschelandAlfredGreineranalysedthepotentialforthecreationof

whattheycall ‘flexicuritycapitalism’onthebasisof justsuchaSchumpeteriancritiqueof

contemporary capitalism.467They argued that the form of flexicurity that they aimed to

developwas‘initsessence,comparabletotheflexicuritymodelsdevelopedfortheNordic

welfare states, Denmark in particular’. 468 In this imagining, and throughout the policy

literature, flexicuritythereforesatawkwardlybetweenbeingareplicable,actually-existing

systemof labourmarketmanagement, andan abstract varietyof capitalism. Indeed, one

couldarguethatsomescholars,especiallyFlaschelandGreiner,consideredflexicuritytobe

an updated version of Sweden’s Rehn-Meidner model. The attraction of flexicurity was

primarily itstheorisedabilitytocreatetransformationpressures(i.e.creativedestruction),

without theenormous socialand financial risk to the individual, andhencewider society,

whichentrepreneurialventurestypicallyentail.

ThearticulationofflexicurityasavarietyofcapitalismiswelldemonstratedbyFlascheland

Greiner’scontentionthat:

467PeterFlaschelandAlfredGreiner,FlexicurityCapitalism:Foundations,Problems,andPerspectives(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,2012).468Ibid.,68.

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this form of socioeconomic reproduction may be organized through large

production units and their efficient, though bureaucratic,management, a

formofmanagementdevelopedoutoftheprinciplesundercapitalisminthe

efficient conduct of large (internationally oriented) enterprises [emphasis

added].469

Moreover, Flaschel andGreiner clearly saweducation systemsas subsidiary to ‘flexicurity

capitalism’; they cite the necessity of a well-developed education system as a means to

supporta flexibleeconomic systemanddiscuss variouseducationalmodels, including the

Finnishschoolsystem,aspossibleinspiration.470

Conceptually, Flexicurity Capitalism inverted the problematic developed in Capitalism,

Socialism and Democracy. The thesis is distinctively Schumpeterian, but it reverses

Schumpeter’semphasisonthestultifyingcharacterofthestructure.Moreover,Flascheland

Greinerdevelopedathesiswhichestablishedafirm,thoughoccasionallyporous,distinction

betweenactually-existingflexicurityandanabstractvarietyof‘flexicuritycapitalism’.Ihave

introducedthesedistinctionshereonthebasisthattheywillformanimportant,thoughnot

alwaysacknowledged,partofthearticulationofflexicurityinthissub-section.

AswellastheacademicdiscourseofFlaschelandGreiner,amovementinsocialdemocratic

governance networks also treated the Nordic societies and flexicurity as a variety of

capitalism and explained their ‘success’ with reference to mechanistic concepts. These

approachesdifferedfromthepoliticalfocusofothersocialdemocraticliteraturebyfocussing

469Ibid.,113.470FlaschelandGreiner,FlexicurityCapitalism:Foundations,Problems,andPerspectives.

215

to a significantly greater degree on the regulatory structure of flexicurity systems and

attemptingtounderstandtheNordicModellessasaconsequenceofacontingentpolitical

settlementandmoreasaself-containedsystem,orseriesofsystems,whichamountedtoa

variety of capitalism. The question of the Nordic societies as models for sustainable

developmentinthisrespectwasonewhichwas,explicitlyorimplicitly,concernedwiththe

structuralimplicationsofchange,butwhichsawchangedifferentlyfromthemorepolitically

focussedpublicationsconsideredabove.

A2008PolicyNetworkpaperbyMånsLönnrothentitledTheEUand theManagementof

SustainableDevelopment lookedatthe implicationsofSchumpeteriantheoriesofcreative

destruction for environmental policy in Europe. 471 Lönnroth argued that environmental,

socialandemploymentpolicyshouldbeconsideredasessential,intersectingcomponentsof

the European SocialModel leading to ‘an accelerated cycleof obsolescence’.472While his

focusisontheEuropeanSocialModel(ESM),hefurtherbroketheESMdownintodevolved

models,ofwhichheconsideredtheNordicmodels‘themostsuccessful’.473Whiletheframe

forhisargumentdiffersradicallyfromthosediscussedabove,hisconclusions-thattheNordic

countriesareactiveinmodifyingtheireducation,employmentandsocialpoliciestostimulate

thegrowthofhighproductivityjobs,aswellasavoidingtyingsocialsupportschemestojobs

whichmaylaterbecomeobsolete–weresocialdemocraticorthodoxy.474

471MånsLönnroth,‘TheEuropeanUnionandtheManagementofSustainableDevelopment :TheRoleoftheNordics’(London:PolicyNetwork,2008).472Ibid.,5.473Ibid.,10.474Lönnroth,‘TheEuropeanUnionandtheManagementofSustainableDevelopment :TheRoleoftheNordics’.

216

Such Schumpeterian influenced analyses of ‘varieties of capitalism’ and welfare regimes

tended to look to theNordic countries as amodel of social sustainability. The seemingly

paradoxical conclusion that theydrew,however,was that thisoccurredprimarily through

acceptingtheneedforchange,generallywithastrongemphasisonthecreationofamixed

economywithproactivesocialsupportorganisedalongindividualised,ratherthanfamilial,

lines and strong incentives for female labour force participation. 475 Joakim Palme, for

example,arguedthatthisprocessensuresthat‘theold,inefficientformsofproductionare

destroyed and replaced by more efficient systems’, 476 but that the forces of creative

destructionshouldbematchedwithwell-developedpublicprivatepartnerships(PPPs),which

should be targeted to resolve underlying structural issues with pension and healthcare

systems.Moreover,heclaimedthatgeneraleconomicconditionsintheEuropeaneconomies

pointtosignificantlylowerlevelsofpovertyinthosestateswhichhavegenerallypreferred

anindividualisedformofwelfaredeliveryleadingtolargernumbersof‘dual-earner’families,

asopposedto‘male-breadwinner’or‘market-oriented’familystructures.477

ThemacroeconomicstructuressetoutbyLönnrothandPalmearebroadlyconsistentwith

theactualprioritiesandregimesusedintheNordiccountries,inparticulartheemphasison

‘creative destruction’, which informs the transformation pressures of the Rehn-Meidner

model and flexicurity, and the aim to stimulate high levels of female participation in the

workforce. It is therefore unsurprising that both tended to see the Nordic countries as

characterised by greater sustainability than those states with more market-oriented or

475Ibid.;JoakimPalme,‘SustainableSocialPoliciesinanEraofGlobalisation:LessonsfromtheSwedishCase’,SocialPolicyJournalofNewZealand,no.32(2007):1–16.476Palme,‘SustainableSocialPolicies...’,2–3.477Palme,‘SustainableSocialPolicies...’

217

conservative social models. Both also emphasise the quality of Nordic institutions and

sustainablepublic finances.This isconsistentwithotherpublicationswhichhaveseenthe

Nordic countries as international development models. The mixture of regulation and

protectionusuallyassociatedwithNordiccapitalismformedthebasisforwhatJacobs,Lent

andWatkinsterm‘progressiveglobalization’intheireponymouspublicationfortheFabian

Society.478Theyespousedavisionofabasicallymixedglobaleconomyconstructedalonglines

which are recognisably Nordic, and noted that the success of South Korea,Malaysia and

Singaporehasbeendrivenbyhighlevelsofspendingineducationandhealthcare–amodel

whichtheyexplicitlylikentotheNordiccountries.479

WhatIhaveglossedasthe‘Schumpeterian’or‘varietiesofcapitalism’approachtoasocial

democratic rejuvenation is an interesting counterpoint to the politically focussed social

democraticapproachesconsideredabove.Thisdiscoursefocusesheavilyonstructuralfactors

whichproducebestoutcomes. Inotherwords, it ismechanistic: therearebestandworst

outcomeswhichfollownecessarilyfromparticularstructuralchoices.MuchlikeFlascheland

Greiner’s work on ‘flexicurity capitalism’, however, these texts invert the logic of

Schumpeterianeconomicsinordertodesignasystemwhichallows‘creativedestruction’to

continuewithoutunbearable consequences for individualworkers inparticular industries.

Thisdifferentiatesthemfromorthodoxfree-marketarticulationsofSchumpeteriancreative

destruction.Moreover,therearealsoconsiderablesimilaritiesbetweenthebasicconclusions

of the neo-Schumpeterians and more conventionally socially democratic groups, despite

fundamentaldifferencesofapproach.Palme,forexample,concludeshisarticleonSwedish

478‘ProgressiveGlobalisation:TowardsanInternationalSocialDemocracy’(London:FabianSociety,2003).479Ibid.,20–3,49.

218

socialpolicywiththequestion:‘Therhetoric[ofneoliberalism]appearstohaveloststeam,

but when will employers view co-operation as a possible strategy again?’. 480 Similarly,

Lönnroth sees sustainability in European environmental and industrial policy as emerging

from a movement towards typically Nordic structures in social and employment policy,

including higher levels of negotiation between actors. ‘Creative destruction’, in this view,

requiresare-emphasisontheimportanceofthesocialcompact.Inthissense,itisanalogous

withthe‘neweconomy’putforwardbyTaylor,CoatsandKielosabove.

Tothelimitedextentthataneo-Schumpeteriandiscoursehasemergedoutsidethenetworks

inwhichithasbeendeveloped,theclosestapproximationofithas,perhapssurprisingly,been

inTheFinancialTimes (FT).From2007onwardstheFTpublishedastringofarticleswhich

praisedtheNordicsocialmodelforitsapparentresolutionofthedesireforgreaterflexibility

foremployersand security foremployees.481After the2008global financial crisis, theFT,

alongwithothercommentators,arguedthat labourshortageissuesinDenmarkshouldbe

dealtwithprimarilythroughtaxcutstoencouragetheunemployedandunderemployedback

into work, noting that strains were emerging which the flexicurity model was unable to

resolve without alteration. 482 Parts of the FT’s coverage therefore echoed the neo-

Schumpeterianargumentsetoutabove,reflectingthecautiouslypseudo-Keynesianlinethe

paperadoptedafterthe2008financialcrisis.Anarticlefrom2009mostcloselyapproximated

the articulations of neo-Schumpeterians when it argued that Nordic achievements in

retainingacomparativelycompressedwagestructure‘force[d]unproductivecompaniesout

of business by raising the wage floor, favouring more productive and capital-intensive

480Palme,‘SustainableSocialPolicies...’,15.481RichardDorkin,‘WeAllSeekthePerfectJob:FlexibleandSecure’,TheFinancialTimes,15February2007.482RobertAnderson,‘LabourShortageDimsDenmark’sVision’,TheFinancialTimes,19November2008.

219

methods’, also echoing the arguments set out by Rehn andMeidner (see 1.2.2, above).

Moreover,thissystemisdescribedasthe‘handmaidenofcreativedestruction’.483Itwenton

tonote,however,thatthesystemwasgraduallydecliningandthattheDanishandSwedish

governmentswerelookingtojettisonsomeofthemorecorporatistelementsoftheirmodel.

4.6.3Conclusions

ThissectionhasarguedthatitispossibletoreadSchumpeterinoneoftwoways:eitheras

heintendedhimselftoberead–asavoicearguinginfavourofcapitalistdynamism–or,asa

guideforhowtobringaboutabalancedquasi-corporateformofsocialism,whichretainsa

controlleddynamism–theinversionofSchumpeter’sintention.484Thefree-marketandsocial

democraticgovernancenetworkshavebothproducedarticulationsoftheNordicmodelas

possessingSchumpeteriancharacteristics,althoughtheformertendstoemphasisetheneed

forregulatoryreformoftaxandpropertyrightstocreategreaterdynamism,whilethelatter

aimstoreviveRehnandMeidner’stransformationpressuresunderanewguise.

An increasing emphasis on Schumpeterian economics is therefore important to any

understandingofflexicurityasasystem.Forallthathisconceptof‘creativedestruction’has

come to epitomise the wastefulness of capitalism for many, it is fair to say that Joseph

Schumpeter was actually a sophisticated thinker, who was profoundly aware of the

interrelatednessofsocial,politicalandeconomicforces.Perhapsironically,thisdistinguishes

483‘Editorial:NordicLessonsfortheRestoftheWorld’,TheFinancialTimes,30July2009.484ItisinterestingtonotethatthissameinversionispossibleinareadingofMarx,sinceinanumberofimportantrespectsasacriticofcapitalismMarxgraspeditsradicalpotentialmorereadilythandidsomeofitsproponents.Forexample,itisnotwidelyknownthatMarxwasinfavouroftheintroductionofLimitedLiabilityCompaniesonthebasisthatitwouldgreatlyexpandthepotentialcirculationofcapital.Conversely,AdamSmithopposedthis innovationonmoral grounds.Ha-JoonChang,23ThingsTheyDon’t Tell YouAboutCapitalism (London:Bloomsbury,2010);Chang,BadSamaritans:TheMythofFreeTradeandtheSecretHistoryofCapitalism.

220

him frommanyof hismost ardent admirers, especially those influencedbypublic choice

theory.Schumpeter’sbasicthesiswasthatinthelong-termcapitalismwouldstultify,creating

the conditions for a form of corporatism akin to socialism as the impulse to changewas

graduallyreducedbytheinfluenceof intellectualsandpublicandprivatemonopolies.The

figurewhichwouldalter thiswas theentrepreneur,whowas fundamentally theagentof

historical change.485There is no doubt that this thesis possesses enduring relevance, and

somehavearguedthatSchumpeter’svisionofcapitalismhasalreadyhappened.486

SchumpeterianeconomicsisheavilyreliantonaMarxianconceptionofastructurewhichis

disruptedbythepre-ordainedroleofanagent.Thisisperhapsoneofthereasonswhythere

hasbeensuchdifficultydefiningtheroleoftheentrepreneur.MuchasLaclauarguesofthe

Marxianworkingclass,theSchumpeterianentrepreneur,asagentofcreativedestruction,is

anintuitivecategorytheholderofwhichidentifieswithastructuralrole.Theentrepreneur

does not possess particular empirical qualities. 487 The potential to read Schumpeterian

creativedestructionasaprocedurewhichisrealisedprimarilythroughtheincentivisationof

particularbehavioursbyagentsor,inmutuallyexclusivefashion,asafeaturewhichcanbe

embedded within the structure of a political economic system is an important, though

arguably more marginal, discourse on the Nordic model in contemporary governance

networksinBritain.PerhapsthechiefdifferencebetweenaSchumpeteriandiscourseonthe

Nordicmodel andmore orthodox social democratic and free-market articulations is that

485Schumpeter,Capitalism,SocialismandDemocracy.Schumpeter’sunderstandingoftheentrepreneur(agent)whowoulddisrupttheteleologicalpassagefromcapitalismtobureaucracy(structure)stronglyechoesMarx,inwhich the working-class (agent), disrupts capitalism (structure). This is unsurprising given the admirationSchumpeterhadforMarx.486PeterF.Drucker,‘SchumpeterAndKeynes’,Forbes,23May1983.487Butler,Laclau,andŽižek,Contingency,Hegemony,Universality,296–8.

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Schumpeteriandiscourseisbasicallyambivalentonthequestionofthesignifier‘democracy’.

WhereasthetwolatterarticulationsenchaintheNordicmodelsignifierindifferentordersof

prioritywithreferencetothedemocraticMastersignifier,Schumpeterianeconomistsareless

concernedwithdemocracy, insteadorganisingtheirdiscourseasatechnicalormanagerial

issue.

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4.8Conclusions

Thischapterhaslookedattheemergenceanddevelopmentofparticulararticulationsofthe

Nordic model of political economy, understood either as political projects or regulatory

regimes. Itbeganbypositingtwoidentifiablenetworksofactors,oneprimarilyconcerned

with advancing social democratic articulations and one with promoting free-market

discourses.Itwasarguedthatbothofthesenetworkshaddevelopedparticularnotionsabout

theNordicmodel focusing in themostparton the Swedisheconomy since1990and the

Danishregulatoryregimeknownasflexicurity.

ThesocialdemocraticnetworktendedtoseetheNordicmodelasapoliticalmodelforsocial

democratichegemony,especiallyduringtheNewLabourerainthe2000swhenthisseemed

to be a genuine possibility in European politics. During this era, the Nordic model was

articulatedasameansforsocialdemocratstoreconcilethetensionbetweenfreedomand

equalitywhichhadbeenacentralpartof liberaldiscoursessincetheColdWar,especially

after Isaiah Berlin’s famous essay Two Concepts of Liberty articulated equality as

fundamentallycoerciveandthereforeimpossibletorealiseinafreesociety.Asecondstrain

of socialdemocratic thinking saw theNordicmodelasapotentialmeans to resurrect the

Britishtradeunionmovement,whichhadneverrecoveredfromitsdefeatsatthehandsof

theThatchergovernmentinthe1980s.Thiswasmoreinterestedinspecificpolicyregulations

thanmanyofthosearticulatingtheNordicmodelaspartofaThirdWaydiscourse.

IntheaftermathoftheModerate-ledAlliancevictoryinthe2006SwedishGeneralElection;

the2008financialcrisisandLabour’sdefeatinthe2010UKGeneralElection,theConservative

PartybecameincreasinglyinterestedinSwedenasapotentialmodelforpublicservicereform.

223

While inopposition,theConservative leader,DavidCameron,hadbeguntoestablish links

with the Swedish Prime Minister and leader of the New Moderates, Fredrik Reinfeldt.

Combinedwiththedevelopmentoffree-marketSwedishandNordicmodelsofpublicservices,

thismadeSwedenamuchmoreproblematicmodel for socialdemocratic reformers.Asa

result,therewasagradualmoveawayfromseeingSwedenasapotentialsourceofdiscourses

fromwhich tobuild a social democratic hegemonyduring this period. Itwas replacedby

articulations of Nordic political economy which weremuchmore consistent with Danish

flexicurity. The potential for a resurgence of unions and the foundation of employer

associationswasamajorpartofthisdiscourse.

The free-market network had developed a range of links with the Nordic countries, but

especially Sweden, and these intensified after the Moderate Party’s victory in the 2006

SwedishGeneralElection.ResearchersaffiliatedwiththeModeratePartyspenttimeatthe

Institute of Economic Affairs and published policy documents about theNordic countries

undertheirauspices.TherewerealsoattemptstoformalisetherelationshipbetweentheUK

and the Nordic countries through the creation of a summit in January 2011, called the

Northern Future Forum. The articulations of the Nordic countries which the free-market

networkputforwardaimedtorearticulatetheconventionaldiscourseofSwedenasamodel

ofasuccessfuleconomywithalargewelfarestateandreplaceitwithavisionofSwedenand

theNordiccountriesasprimarilysuccessfulasaresultoftheirliberalcharacteristics,arguing

thatthewelfarestatewasanaberration,andnotresponsibleforNordicsuccess.Reinfeldt

evenreferredtotheperiodfromthemiddleofthe1970suntilaround1990asSweden’s‘mad

quarterofacentury’.There-emergenceoftheNordicmodelfromthemid-1990swasseen

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asafeatureofderegulatoryandliberalisingmeasures,includingreductionsintaxratesand

publicspending.

A third pair of discourses looked to Schumpeter.With reference to theNordic countries,

SchumpeterianeconomicswasinvokedbothasanindictmentofNordicregulatorypolicies

which supposedly discourage entrepreneurship and as its obverse, an argument for the

reintroductionofamorecorporatesystemoftransformationpressures,‘creativedestruction’,

highlyreminiscentoftheRehn-Meidnermodelofthe1960sand1970s.Theformertendedto

articulate the Nordic countries as failing to encourage entrepreneurship and adopting a

model inwhich they had ‘capitalismwithout individual capitalists’, somethingwhichwas

clearlyimpliedasnegative.Thelatterdiscoursesawthisasabroadlypositivedevelopment.

Ithopedtoemulateflexicuritypoliciesandbydoingsomanagethedestructivetendenciesof

themarketeconomywithminimalnegativeconsequencesfortheindividualworker.

ThesearticulationsoftheNordicmodelhavebeenrelativelyconsistentwithintheirrespective

networks,andhavecreatedhegemonicnodalpointswhichhavebeenarticulatedsporadically

inthebusinessandpopularpressinBritain.Notionsofflexicuritywereparticularlydeveloped

in The Financial Times and The Economist, both of which published significantly larger

numbersofpiecesthanthepopularpress. Inthepopularpress,piecesonflexicuritywere

concentrated inThe SundayTimes,TheGuardian andTheObserver.Articles inTheTimes

tendedtomirrorfree-marketdiscourses,whilethoseinTheGuardianandObservertypically

adoptedsocialdemocraticdiscourses.

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The Nordic model of political economy which emerges from these discourses should be

consideredbasicallyambiguous.Whilemostdiscourseswhichemergedcontrasted‘old’and

‘new’modelsinsomefashion,thenatureofthe‘new’modelinparticularishighlycontested.

TheNordiccountriesareseenasbroadlycorporatistinorientationbythesocialdemocratic

network and as highly liberal by the free-market network. The articulation of the Nordic

signifier into chains with ‘freedom’ and ‘equality’ effectively differed along classically

ideologicallines.SocialdemocraticactorstendedtoviewtheNordiccountriesaspossessing

strong redistributive states and institutions, including trade unions and employers’

associations, which guaranteed material equality, allowing Nordic citizens to realise

themselvesasfreeagents.Free-marketactorssawtheopposite.Recentdevelopmentsinthe

Nordiccountrieswerearticulatedintermsofgreatereconomicfreedomandincentivesto

create‘socialvalue’throughworkandentrepreneurialism.Whereequalitywasconsidered

important,itwasgenerallyarguedthatequalityofopportunitycouldonlyberealisedthrough

people’srighttochooseservices, jobs,andsoforthforthemselves.Attemptstoarticulate

Nordicpoliticaleconomicregimesintermsof‘freedom’implicitlymadeclaimsaboutsocial

democraticandfree-marketactors’understandingsoftheMastersignifier‘democracy’.For

the former, democracy would be achieved through the realisation of relative economic

equalitybetweencitizensand throughparticipation incorporatestructures, suchas trade

unions.Forthelatter,itwasfundamentallyassertedthroughtherighttoworkandparticipate

inopenderegulatedmarkets.

Thestudyposited that theveryemergenceofa free-marketdiscoursehadadestabilising

effectontheconsistencyofthesocialdemocraticarticulation,whichwasforcedtoreconsider

itsunproblematisedsocialdemocraticarticulationofSwedeninthefaceofagrowingnetwork

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consisting of free-market actors in theUK and Sweden. These articulations of theNordic

modelwillbefurtherexploredinthecomingchaptersthroughcasestudiesofhealthcareand

educationpoliciesrespectively.Thischapterhasdemonstratedhowevertheextenttowhich

itwasessentialforbothsocialdemocraticandfree-marketactorstobasetheirdiscoursesof

NordicpublicservicereformwithinadevelopeddiscourseofNordicpoliticaleconomy.

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Chapter Five – Taxation or insurance? A Nordic model of

choiceinhealthcare

5.1Introduction

Thepreviouschaptersetoutthreedistincthegemonicnodalpointsaroundwhichdiscourses

onapositedNordicmodelofpoliticaleconomyhavebeenorganisedingovernancenetworks

inBritain,beginningintheearly2000s.Thischapterwillcoverthesamechronologicalperiod,

andsomeofthesameactors,butwiththedifferencethattheseactorswillbetheorisedas

partof a single governancenetwork.Whereas theprevious chapter concluded that there

werebasicallydistinctnetworkswhich,totheextentthattheyinteractedatall,challenged

and destabilised each other’s articulations of theNordic empty signifier, this chapterwill

examine conditions in a governance network in which basic antagonisms between

articulations had to co-exist and be neutralised by a meta-governor, in this case, the

DepartmentofHealth.

ItwasarguedinchapterthreethatSchumpeteriandiscourseshadanambiguousrelationship

withtheMastersignifier‘democracy’.Inthischapter,articulationsofparticularhealthcare

models as ‘democratic’ or ‘undemocratic’ condition the contours of the discourse

fundamentally.Theorder inwhichthesediscourses locktheirsignifiers,generally ‘choice’,

‘freedom’,and‘equality’,intoarelationshipwith‘democracy’makesanimportantstatement

aboutthedirectionofpolicyreformandhadconcreteimplicationsfortheNationalHealth

Service(NHS)inEngland.

228

Thechapterwillthereforeposeandansweraseriesofquestionswhichrunthroughoutthe

study:whoarethekeyactorsinthehealthgovernancenetwork?Howhavetheyarticulated

theNordiccountriesasamodelofhealthcare?Whatstrategieswereusedtomakeparticular

discourseshegemonic?And,finally,whathasthismeantforpublicpolicyintheEnglishNHS?

Thischapterwillthereforebeginbysettingoutthepolicyarchitecturewithwhichnetworked

actorsengagedasameanstoacquaintthereaderwiththeprimaryimperativesandsystems

oftheNHSatthetimeNewLabourenteredgovernmentin1997.Iwillthentheoriseparticular

actorsaspartofahealthgovernancenetworkinordertoconstituteafieldinwhichactors

engagedwithoneanother.Thebulkofthechapterwilltaketheformofacasestudyanalysis,

whichwillexaminethemostimportantarticulationsofhealthcarereformandtheroleofthe

Nordiccountriesandothernationalmodelsininformingthisdiscourse.Thissectionwillspan

aperiodofapproximatelyeighteenyears,fromthepublicationofNewLabour’sfirstWhite

Paperin1997,untilthepassageoftheHealthandSocialCareAct2012andits immediate

aftermath,bringingthechaptertoanendinaround2015.

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5.2HealthcareSystems:anoverviewoftheUK,NordenandEurope

5.2.1TheInternalMarket1989-97

NewLabour’s1997inheritancewasamixedone.TheConservativegovernmentswhichhad

precededLabourhadinstitutedtwodistinctivephasesofreform.Perhapssurprisingly,given

theemphasisonprivatizationandmarketreformunderMargaretThatcher’sgovernments,

the first major turn was towards managerialism. The 1983 Griffiths Report argued that

professionals,inparticulardoctors,shouldbemaderesponsibleforcare.Underthissystem

accountabilitywouldbestimulatedbyamovetowardscollectivisminwhichdoctorsserved

the localcommunity.AsGreenernotes, this isquitedistinct fromaconsumeristmodelof

healthcare.488Thisreformrecognisedtheindispensabilityofprofessionalstothesystemof

healthcare, somethingwhichhasbroadlybeen retained in subsequent reforms,especially

sincepatientsaretypicallynotwellequippedtounderstandwhentheyrequirereferralor

specialistcare.489

ThefirstseriousattemptatachoicereformintheUKbeganin1989duringKennethClarke’s

tenureasHealthSecretary.Tosomeextentthissignalledamoveawayfromthefindingsof

theGriffithsReport.WhereastheGriffithsreportwasultimatelycollectivist inorientation,

Clarke’s internalmarket reforms first asserted the ‘image of the consumer’ identified by

Newman andVidler as central to reforms throughout theNew Labour period.490Greener

notes that the logic of any policy decision typically positions actors ‘in particular roles in

relation to one another’ and that the internal market reform was significant for its

488Greener,‘TowardsaHistoryofChoiceinUKHealthPolicy’,315.489 Ståle Opedal and Hilmar Rommetvedt, ‘From Politics to Management – or More Politics?’, PublicManagementReview12,no.2(2010):191–212.490 Janet Newman and Elizabeth Vidler, ‘Discriminating Customers, Responsible Patients, Empowered CareUsers:ConsumerismandtheModernisationofHealthCare’,JournalofSocialPolicy35,no.2(2006):193.

230

introduction of the ‘rational actor’ as a key role in healthcare. 491 It is possible to take

Greener’sargumenttoits logicalconclusionandcontendthattheinternalmarketreforms

introducedadistinctively free-market liberalnotionofthesubject.Thesubject’srole is to

arbitrate the informationproducedby thesystem,whichshouldbeasclose toperfectas

possible,andmakedecisionsonthisbasis.Withoutthisnotionofthesubjectthepossibility

of a market (and hence policy or society) ordered along rational lines by market forces

disappears.Inotherwords,theintroductionoftherationalactormustunderpinallattempts

atmarketreformsofpublicservices.

The internalmarketwastypicalof theNewPublicManagement (NPM)styleoforganising

publicservices.IntheNordiccountriesthiswasalsosometimesreferredtoasthe‘American

Way’. 492 NPM focuses on ‘administrative decentralization and delegation of authority,

managerialautonomyand flexibilityandperformancemeasurement’.493In thecaseof the

internalmarketintheNHS,theaimwastoachievethisthroughaseriesofmeasureswhich

separatedpurchasingandprovision.494Providersbecame independent, at leastnominally,

andmanagedtheirownbudgets,whilepurchaserswerefundedbythestate.Althoughitwas

hopedthatthiswouldstimulateefficiencythroughthepotentialforproviderstocompete,in

reality ‘purchasers and providers still had their freedom severely limited by the central

government’.495Therewereanumberofreasonsforthis,themostimportantofwhichwere

probablythearchitectureofthenewsystem,politicalimperatives,andinstitutionalculture.

491Greener,‘TowardsaHistoryofChoiceinUKHealthPolicy’,309,311–12.492MonicaAndersson,‘Liberalisation,PrivatisationandRegulationintheSwedishHealthcareSector/hospitals’(Göteborg:DepartmentofWorkScience,GöteborgUniversity,2006),4.493OpedalandRommetvedt,‘FromPoliticstoManagement’,192.494Julian Le Grand, ‘Competition, Cooperation, Or Control? Tales From the BritishNational Health Service’,HealthAffairs18,no.3(1999):28–9.495Ibid.,29.

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Failingsinthearchitectureoftheinternalmarketaredemonstratedbytherelativesuccessof

GeneralPractitioner(GP)fundholdingcomparedtotraditionalhealthauthoritiesandtrusts.

GPfundholdinggroupswerecomparabletonot-for-profitHealthMaintenanceOrganizations

intheUSAorGermanKrankenkassen (health insurancefunds) inthattheywererelatively

smallandpurchasedcareonlyfortheirmembers.Healthauthoritiesweremuchlargerand

hadpurchasingresponsibilityfortheentirepopulationofadesignatedcatchmentarea.For

example, Thames Valley health authority was responsible for Oxfordshire, Berkshire and

Buckinghamshire.Trustsoperatedasprovidersofcareandweretypicallydesignedaround

notional geographical catchment areas of particular hospitals or other services (e.g.

ambulanceservices).

ThearchitectureoftheinternalmarketallowedbothGPfundholdersandhealthauthorities

tochangeproviders.However,duetothemuchlargersizeofhealthauthoritiesrelativeto

fundholdersthedifficultieswhichthiswouldhavecausedtoatrustlosingthebusinessofa

healthauthoritywouldhavebeensevere,likelyrequiringabailout.Asaresult,thepolitical

pressureonhealthauthoritiesnottoswitchproviderswashigh.496Moreover,neitherhealth

authoritiesnortrustswereabletokeepanysurplusesthattheymanagedtoproduce;these

werereturnedtotheDepartmentofHealth(DoH),andbecauseoftheircriticalimportance

totheirlocalarea,trustsorhealthauthoritieswhichfailedwerebailedout.497Thisactedasa

disincentiveforcompetitionorseriousattemptstoincreaseefficiency.Finally,boththenew

purchasing and provision organisation were treated as decentralized agents of central

496Ibid.,33–4.497Ibid.,33.

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government;innosenseweretheyabletoactautonomouslyinthewayliberalmarkettheory

suggested.

This is instarkcontrasttoGPfundholdinggroupswhich,whilestillcentrally funded,were

allowedtoretainsurplusesinordertoimprovetheirfacilities,weresmallenoughtochange

providerwithoutcausingserioussystemicinstabilityandwereeffectiveatreducingwaiting

timesforpatients.Despitethis,however,itwasnottypicalforfundholdinggroupstoswitch

providers,althoughJulianLeGrandarguesthatagradualculturalshiftdidtakeplaceasa

resultofthenewpowersgrantedtofundholders.Professionalswereincreasinglysensitiveto

issuesofcosteffectivenessandmoreinformationwasmadeavailableregardingpurchaser-

providerdealsthanhadhistoricallybeenthecase.498Thearchitectureoftheinternalmarket,

then,wasamajorimpedimenttotherealisationofthecompetitionwhichtheConservative

governmenthadhopedtointroduceinthesystem.

5.2.2Nordichealthcaresystems

ThequestionofwhetherthereexistssuchathingasaNordicModelofhealthcareisjustas

vexed as the question of whether there is a NordicModel in general. While the Nordic

countriesshareconsiderablesimilarities,acasecouldcertainlybemadethattheyalsohave

considerable differences. The Norwegian health system, in some respects, more closely

resemblestheNewLabour-eraNHSthanitdoesthelocallyfundedSwedishsystemorthe

significantlymoredecentralisedFinnishsystem.499Ontheotherhand,whenthequestionof

498Ibid.,33–4,32.499JonMagnussenetal.,‘Introduction:TheNordicModelofHealthCare’,inNordicHealthCareSystems,ed.JonMagnussen,KarstenVrangbæk,andRichardB.Saltman(Maidenhead:McGraw-Hill,2009),11–12;OpedalandRommetvedt,‘FromPoliticstoManagement’,195.

233

valuesisconsidered,theconceptualexistenceofaNordicModelofhealthcarebecomesmore

sustainable.Therefore,perhapsnotcoincidentally,JonMagnussenetal.’sdefinition,ofthe

Nordicwelfaresystemsas‘intendedtopromoteanequalityofthehigheststandardsrather

thananequalityofminimalneeds’distinguishestheNordicsystemsfromtheEnglishwelfare

systemmorewidely. Their definition is based onGøsta Esping-Andersen’s argument that

there are three distinct forms of welfare capitalism: conservative, liberal and social

democratic.500While theNordiccountriesareconsideredsocialdemocratic,and theUK is

considered liberal, theNHS fitsnotoriouslypoorly into this schema, since itwasexplicitly

socialdemocraticinconceptionandorigin.501

This suggests significant commonalitybetween theNHSand theNordic systems,which is

demonstratedbythetendencytodescribetheNordicandUKsystemsas‘Beveridgian’.This

assertsacommonalitybetweenthesystemsbasedontheirgeneraltaxationfundedmodel

andthemonikerreferstoWilliamBeveridge,thefoundingthinkerbehindtheUKNHS.Italso

contrasts themwiththetwoothermodelswhichare found inWesternEuropeandNorth

America: universal social health insurance models, and private health insurance models.

Social Health Insurance (SHI) models are found across much of Europe, including

paradigmaticallyGermany,France,andtheNetherlands.Thesesystemsareoftendescribed

as ‘Bismarckian’, denoting their original development and association with the German

politician Otto von Bismarck. The only countries in Europe and North America practising

privatehealthinsurancemodelsareSwitzerlandandtheUSA.Thesesystemsarenotuniversal

–i.e.itisnotmandatorytopurchasehealthinsurance.ThisisincontrasttoSHIsystems,in

500Esping-Andersen,TheThreeWorldsofWelfareCapitalism.501Ibid.

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which it isgenerally illegal to reside in thecountryaboveaminimumperiodwithout first

purchasingsomeformofhealthinsurance.Non-universalhealthcaresystemsaregenerally

excluded from UK policy discourses, given the overwhelming preference of citizens,

politiciansandmostotheractorsinvolvedinhealthprovisionforuniversalcoverage.

ThetermBeveridgian, therefore,establishesaunitybetweentheNordicsystemswhich is

arguablymorehomogenisingeventhanthe‘Nordicmodel’signifier.Thisisintensifiedbythe

factthatBritishgovernancenetworksaretypicallyconcernedprimarilywiththeNHS,with

theresultthattheUKorEnglishhealthcaresystemisusuallybracketedfromdiscussionasthe

object inneedof reform.There isalsoapronouncedtendency tohomogenise theNordic

countriesbyestablishingnationalorregionalmodels–e.g.Swedishmodel,Stockholmmodel

–whilesimultaneouslyelidingnationaldifferences.This isparticularlytrueofSwedenand

Denmark,whichoftenstandmetonymicallyfortheNordiccountriesingeneral.Thistendsto

obscurefairlysignificantdifferencesbetweentheDanishandSwedishsystems(seebelow),

andaddstotheimpressionthatthesetwosystemsareametonymwhichcouldbejustas

easilyglossedbythe‘Nordicmodel’signifier.

Whenconsideredintheseterms,itisclearthattheNordiccountriesdopossesssignificant

similarities. In contrast toCentralEurope,allof theNordic countrieshavehealth systems

whicharefundedthroughgeneraltaxation.Moreover,theirrelatednessisalsosuggestedby

the influenceof similardifficultiesandtrends in theirhealthsystems.TheNordicsystems

displayastrongpreferenceforequalityofaccess,andthisleadstosimilarchallengesacross

allfivestates,mostpressingly:efficiency,changesinlifestyle(e.g.risingobesityrates),and

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geographical and socio-economic equality. 502 A further strain in Nordic approaches to

healthcare is a strong emphasis on participation through decision-making at all levels,

especially as ‘thewelfare statemodel runs the danger of turning individuals into passive

recipientsratherthanactiveconsumersorco-producersofservices’.503

As a result of a number of factors, including the increasing pressure to enact budgetary

constraints,aswellasadesireforgreaterefficiencyandresponsivenesstopatients,allofthe

Nordiccountriesturned,todifferingextents,toNPMsystemsinthe1990s.504Foravarietyof

reasons,eachsystemrespondeddifferentlytothetenetsofNPM.Thepurchaser-provider

split,oneofthekeyplanksofquasi-marketagendasinhealthreform,wasembracedmost

enthusiastically in Sweden. The results were similar to those experienced by the NHS:

purchasersandthepublicweregenerallyloyaltohistoricproviders;thesplitwasweakand

underperformerswerealwaysoffereda routeback topublicownership.Competitionwas

thereforealsoweak,thoughpressurestoreducecostsandboostefficiencywereintense.505

AlthoughMagnussenetalarguethatintheoryFinlandshouldhavebeenmostamenableto

apurchaser-providersplit,duetoitshistoricallyhighlevelofdecentralisation(alegacyofits

subordinationtoSwedenandthenRussia),inpracticethelegalrequirementforcooperation

amonghealthpurchasersandproviderseffectivelyrecentralisedthesystemtoadegree.506

502Magnussenetal.,‘Introduction:TheNordicModelofHealthCare’,5,10.503Ibid.,quotation4,11.504Ibid.,4;MichaelI.HarrisonandJohanCalltorp,‘TheReorientationofMarket-OrientedReformsinSwedishHealth-Care’,HealthPolicy50,no.3(January2000):220–21.505PålE.MartinussenandJonMagnussen,‘HealthCareReform:TheNordicExperience’,inNordicHealthCareSystems,ed.JonMagnussen,KarstenVrangbæk,andRichardB.Saltman(Maidenhead:McGraw-Hill,2009),23–4.506Ibid.,26;Magnussenetal.,‘Introduction:TheNordicModelofHealthCare’,12.

236

Norwayinstitutedapurchaser-providersplitinnursingandcareservicesintheearly1990s,

whichdidgenerateefficiencyandofferedgreater legalprotectionfortheservice’sclients.

However, characteristically, the split was difficult tomaintain as a result of historic links

betweenpurchaserandprovider.507InNorway,thedecentralisationphaseiseffectivelyover.

The systemmore andmore resembles the pre-2010NHS in structurewith large regional

bodies responsible for purchasing healthcare under a collaborative regime. 508 Danish

enthusiasm for a purchaser-provider splitmodelwas and remains extremely limited. The

extentofreforminDenmarkwascontractingbetweenmunicipalitiesandmunicipally-owned

hospitals.509

Choicereformsalsovarysignificantly.SwedenandDenmarkorganisetheirsystemsaround

GPsasthegatekeeperstothewidersystem,anditispossibletochooseyourGP,although,

asintheEnglishsystem,choiceofdoctorinhospitalisnotconsidereddesirablebypoliticians

orpublic.510InSweden,patientchoicewasnotuniversallypopular.Asscepticismaboutthe

efficacy of competitive reforms as a cost-controlling measure grew in the 2000s, some

municipalitiesbegantoopposeitonthebasisthatchoicepreventedregionalisationandother

cost-savingpolicies.511InNorwayandFinlandpatientchoicehasgenerallytakentheformof

declarationsofrights.Norwegiansareentitledtofreechoiceofhospitalaswellasaccessto

medicalrecords;informationandparticipationintreatmentdecision;andspecificrightsfor

507MartinussenandMagnussen,‘HealthCareReform:TheNordicExperience’,25.508Ibid.,32;OpedalandRommetvedt,‘FromPoliticstoManagement’,195.509MartinussenandMagnussen,‘HealthCareReform:TheNordicExperience’,26.510ZeynepOretal.,‘AreHealthProblemsSystemic?PoliticsofAccessandChoiceunderBeveridgeandBismarckSystems’,HealthEconomics,PolicyandLaw,2010,279;Magnussenetal.,‘Introduction:TheNordicModelofHealthCare’,5.511HarrisonandCalltorp,‘TheReorientationofMarket-OrientedReformsinSwedishHealth-Care’,233.

237

children and young people.512 A Finnish Reform of 1993, the first of its kind in Europe,

guaranteedaccesstoinformationandmedicalrecords;informedconsenttotreatment;the

righttocomplainandautonomy.However,despitethis,choiceisrelativelyrestricted.513

Followingonfromthisbriefsummary,forourpurposesthemostsignificantaspectsofNordic

healthcarepolicyareasfollows:

1. theturntoNPMintheearly1990s

2. decentralisationoffundingandprovision

3. emphasisonpatientchoiceinalargelytax-fundedsystem

AlthoughtheabovesketchoftheNordichealthsystemshasstresseddifferenceasmuchas

similarity, the emergence of a policy discourse around the Nordic systems and their

applicability, or lack thereof, to the NHS concerns this thesis, rather than the actual

functioningoftheNordic,orEnglish,systemsofhealthcare.Itisnottheaimofthischapter

toattempttosystematicallyconfirmorrefuteparticulardiscourses,butrathertoexamine

theconstructionofdiscoursesandtheirmaterialeffects.

5.2.3ConvergenceinEuropeanhealthcaremodels

A distinction between Beveridgian and Bismarckian systemswas established above. Both

termsarecommonlyusedinacademicresearchandinthediscourseproducedbythink-tanks.

Althoughpoliticiansrarelyusethetermsexplicitly,probablyonthegroundsthattheywould

proveconfusingtotheuninitiated,thecontoursofthisdistinctionbetweenBeveridgianand

512MartinussenandMagnussen,‘HealthCareReform:TheNordicExperience’,37.513Ibid.,36–7.

238

BismarckiansystemsareclearlyidentifiableinthespeechesofvariousHealthsecretaries.514

Thisdistinctionwillthereforebeusedwidelyinthischapter,sinceit ishelpful infollowing

particular articulations of the Nordic health systems in the health governance network

theorisedhere.

Ontheotherhand,thestrongdistinctionmadebetweenthetwoformsoforganisationmasks

a porous boundary, especially given that general imperatives (e.g. fiscal contraction) and

managementfashionsarenotisolatedtonationalsystems:leanmanagementideasusedin

Swedenmayalsobeused inFranceandviceversa, leading to similar logicsunderpinning

developmentsindifferentlyorganisedsystems.ZeynepOretal.havethereforeremarkedon

significant levels of convergence between Beveridgian and Bismarckian systems in recent

times.Abriefsummaryofsomeofthesedevelopmentswillbegivenheretocontextualise

furtherdiscussionswhichdrawdistinctionsbetweenthetwoformsofpolicyarchitecture.

Costcontainment,choicemeasuresandequityhavebeenthechiefimperativeswhichhave

ledtoconvergence.515Althoughtherearenogreatvariationsbetweenoverallcosts,which

aretypicallybetween7and9percentofGDPacrossEurope,reducingcostshasbeenakey

aimofreformsinBeveridgianandBismarckiansystemsinthelasttwodecades.516Ingeneral,

Beveridgiansystemsaretypicallybetteratrestrainingcosts,whereasBismarckiansystems

514 Alan Milburn, The Contribution of a Modern NHS, 2000,http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/MediaCentre/Speeches/Speecheslist/DH_4000761; John Reid, ‘Choice Speech to the New Health Network’, (Speech, 2003),http://collection.europarchive.org/tna/20040722012352/http://dh.gov.uk/en/News/Speeches/Speecheslist/DH_4071487.515 Or et al., ‘Are Health Problems Systemic? Politics of Access and Choice under Beveridge and BismarckSystems’,270.516Ibid.,271.

239

generallyofferbetteraccesstocare.517Thisclearlyreflectstheunderlyingprinciplesofthe

different systems: Beveridgian systems aim to provide universal affordable coverage;

Bismarckian systemsemphasise ‘plurality, solidarity and freedom’.518However, in the last

twodecadesBeveridgiansystemshavebeenactiveinimplementingchoicereformswiththe

aim of improving accessibility. Contemporaneously, Bismarckian systems have been

attemptingtointroduce‘gatekeeping’measures,whicharecommontotheUK,Swedenand

Denmark,whichpositionGPsas the route into the restof the system through referral to

specialistcare.519TheadoptionofachangedroleforGPsisameanstocutcostsandprevent

themisuseofreferralandspecialistcaresystems.520

Moreover, in infrastructural terms, the introduction of purchaser-provider splits into

Beveridgian systems,most observable in Sweden and theUK, has brought those systems

significantly closer to Bismarckian systems, since the function of the purchaser strongly

resemblestheroleofhealth insurancegroups,whoseprimaryrole is topurchaseservices

fromaprovider.GermanKrankenkassen are considered thearchetypalmodelsof this. Le

GrandnotesthattheGPfundholdinggroupscreatedundertheMajor-era internalmarket

reformoftheNHSfunctionedsimilarlytoKrankenkasseninthisrespect.521Ontheotherhand,

themajor differencebetweenBeveridgian andBismarckian systems remains theultimate

sourceoftheirfunding.Beveridgiansystemsareprimarilyfundedthroughgeneraltaxation,

butmay include some user charges at the point of use. Bismarckian systems are funded

through individual contributions, although in France and Germany these are deducted

517Ibid.,276.518Ibid.,278–9.519Ibid.,281–2.520Ibid.,286.521LeGrand,‘Competition,Cooperation,OrControl?TalesFromtheBritishNationalHealthService’,30–1.

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directly from wages, functioning, in effect, like a payroll tax. This is not the case in the

Netherlands.522

ThedistinctionsbetweentheBeveridgianandBismarckiansystemsshouldthereforenotbe

overstated, given the extent to which their basic objectives and infrastructures have

converged. Nonetheless, the distinction is still meaningful and for present purposes it is

essentialtounderstandarticulationsoftheNordiccountriesas‘Beveridgian’.

522JamesGubbandOliverMeller-Herbert,Markets inHealthCare: TheTheorybehind thePolicy,December(London:Civitas,2009),48–9.

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5.3Constructingahealthgovernancenetwork

Awiderangeofactorsareinvolvedintheproductionandimplementationofhealthpolicy.

Someof thesehavebeenmentionedalready in the foregoingdiscussion, inparticular the

governmental and party political actors which had been involved in the design and

implementationofprevioushealthcarereforms.Thisstudy isonly interested inthehealth

governancenetworkfrom1997onwards,aftertheUKgeneralelectionofthatyearwhich

returned a Labour government. Two of the most important actors in this chapter will

thereforebetheDepartmentofHealth,whichshouldalsobeconsideredthemeta-governor

of thenetwork, and theUK LabourParty. The incumbentMinisters forHealthduring the

period1997-2010wereallfromtheLabourParty,though,aswasarguedinchaptertwo,the

interest of political parties, ministers and theministries of state they run should not be

considered identical: there are important power differentials and conflicts of interests

inherentintheserelationships.

2010markedtheeffectiveendofNewLabourasapoliticalproject,aftertheemergenceof

theConservativesasthelargestpartyintheUKParliamentandtheformationofagoverning

coalitionwiththeLiberalDemocrats.TheMinisterforHealthfrom2010wasAndrewLansley,

aConservative,buttherewasaLiberalDemocratpresenceamongthejuniorministersand

departmental special advisers. This structure was replicated across all government

departmentsforthelifespanofthecoalitionuntil2015.Althoughthismight implygreater

fractiousnesswithinandbetweendepartmentsthanwasthecaseunderthepreviousLabour

government, this is not necessarily a given. The Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition

resolved the potential for conflict across government by centralising decision-making

wherever possible.Many decisionswere therefore taken either in Downing Street at the

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CabinetOffice,i.e.bythePrimeMinister,orattheTreasury,wheretherelationshipbetween

theConservativeChancellor,GeorgeOsborne,andtheLiberalDemocratChiefSecretaryto

theTreasury,DannyAlexander,wasveryclose.NewLabourwasalsonotoriouslyproneto

infighting,with the split between factions led by the PrimeMinister, Tony Blair, and the

Chancellor,GordonBrown,worseningsignificantlybetween1997and2007,whenBlairleft

officeandBrownbecamePrimeMinister.523

Outsidethegovernmentitself,manyoftheactorsremainedrelativelyconsistent.TheKing’s

Fund,ahealthcarethink-tank,isapermanentpresenceinhealthcaredebatesintheUK.Itis

ahighlyresearch-orientatedthink-tankwhichtendstoremainoutsidepartypoliticalstrategic

discussions.ItisprimarilyinterestedinthestateoftheNHSandinterventionsintoit.Attimes,

theKing’sFundhas thereforebeenhighlycriticalof reformsenacted from1997onwards.

Despite the highly-specialised nature of its research, however, it should be considered a

networkedactor,as,althoughitisgenerallynotengagedinadvocacy,itsinterventionsare

well respected and can have meaningful impacts on the political strategies of other

networkedactors.Otheractorswhichshouldbeconsideredasengagedinapositedhealth

governance network remain fairly consistent over time. For example, the Institute of

EconomicAffairs(IEA)andCentreforPolicyStudies(CPS)producedalargenumberofpolicy

documentson the issueofhealthcarebetween the late1990sand2015.Combined, they

producedelevenpolicypublicationsduringthisperiod,whichisparticularlyimpressive,given

thatthecorpusIhaveassembledonlyincludespublicationswhichtalkexplicitlyaboutthe

Nordiccountries.

523AndrewRawnsley,TheEndoftheParty:TheRiseandFallofNewLabour(London:Penguin,2010).

243

The majority of IEA and CPS proposals consider either the introduction of quasi-market

reformsintotheNHSorthereplacementofthecurrenttaxation-fundedmodelwithasingle-

payerinsurancefundedscheme.Thesepositionsarethemostfree-marketorientatedofany

actor in the network and although they are considered to some degree fringe, they are

nonetheless highly influential. Policy Exchange, which has been described as the most

influential think-tank in Britain, 524 is another important actor in the health governance

network.AlthoughthequantityofliteratureproducedbyPolicyExchangeissmallerthanthe

IEA and CPS, it developed broad and deep connections with New Labour, including Alan

Milburn,whowashealthsecretarybetween1999until2003,althoughtheirrelationshipwas

strongestafterhistenurehadended.IncontrasttotheIEAandCPS,PolicyExchangeshould

beseenasmoremoderatelyliberal.WhereasthestrategiesoftheIEAandCPSarearticulated

virtuallyexclusivelyusingfree-marketideology,PolicyExchangeissignificantlymoreeclectic

andtheprimarypolicypublicationwhichwillbeconsideredinthischapterisclosertoaOne

Nation conservative discourse on the Nordic countries. It therefore shares some

commonalitieswiththeCompassionateConservativeandBigSocietydiscourses,pre-empting

thesestrandsofthoughtwithintheConservativePartybyseveralyears.

Civitas and the Social Market Foundation (SMF) are also well integrated into the health

governancenetwork.MuchlikePolicyExchange,theyareliberal,butwithamoreambiguous

relationship to free-markets. Civitas in particular tends towards institutional solutions,

demonstrating a far less atomised visionof civil society than that generally found among

524 ‘The Right’s 100 Most Influential’, The Daily Telegraph, 2 October 2007,http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/1564854/The-Rights-100-Most-Influential-50-26.html.

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membersoftheIEAandCPS.TheSMFisnotaffiliatedtoanypoliticalparty,andisgenerally

not interested in free-market solutions. Rather, it focuses on the potential for markets,

includinginpublicservices,toproducepositiveresultsforwidersociety.Itshouldtherefore

beconsideredliberalinitsorientation.Forthisreason,itwasalsoabletocreateproductive

links with New Labour and has retained some of those connections since Labour left

government. It has alsohad speakers froma rangeof otherbackgrounds, including Jesse

Norman,oneofthechiefdrivingforcesbehindtheBigSocietyagendaandMatthewD’Ancona,

a journalist (The Telegraph (formerly) andTheGuardian)with close connections toDavid

CameronandGeorgeOsborne,isontheboard.

Thischapterwillalsoconsidertherolesofanumberofinternationalandnationalnewspapers,

boththebusinessandpopularpress (foradiscussionof theselectionofsources,seealso

2.4.2above).KeyamongtheseareTheFinancialTimes(FT),TheEconomist,theGuardian,The

DailyTelegraph,TheTimesandtheirvarioussisterpapers.Afurtherkeyactor,whichwillbe

analysedhereprimarilythroughitsengagementwiththepress,isCapio,afor-profitSwedish

healthcareprovider.CapiorunsalargehospitalcalledStGöran’sinStockholmandbecame

involvedintheNHSincompetitivetenderingforcontractstomanagehospitalsandpartsof

hospitals. Capio was involved in the production of particular articulations of Swedish

healthcareandisthereforeanimportantpartofthehealthgovernancenetwork,intermsof

explainingthediscourseswhichpreparedthewayforaSwedishandNordicmodeldiscourse

inhealthcareprovisionintheUKNHS.

Asnotedinpreviousdiscussionsofnetworkedactors,theseactorsshouldbeconsideredsplit

andinconsistentandthenetworkitselfshouldnotbeconsideredreified.Instead,itshouldbe

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seenasaspecifichistoricalconjunctioninwhichtheparticular,fluidinterestsofvariousactors

weretemporarilyarticulatedasconsistentwithoneanother.

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5.4Whatcomesfirst,freedomorequality?TheNewLabourera

5.4.1AnewNHSandhowtodeliverit,1997-2002

AmajorpriorityintheearlyperiodafterNewLabourtookofficewastoreformtheNHS,which

waswidelyconsideredtohavebeensufferingfromsignificantunder-investmentduringthe

Conservativeera.Itwasalsoaperceivednecessitytorespondtotheinternalmarketreform,

whichhadbeencontroversialandnotespeciallypopular.Giventhattheinternalmarkethad

beenarticulatedprimarilywithreferencetopublicchoiceprinciplesandaimedtointroduce

market-likestructuresintohealthcareprovisionintheUK(see4.2.1above),Labour’sattempt

to break from this logic required serious engagement with the hegemonic discourse of

consumerchoice.

InTheNewNHS,publishedin1997,NewLaboursetoutadiscoursewhichbrokefromthe

previous logicof the internalmarket. In the foreword,TonyBlair invokedthe institutional

characteroftheNHSandguaranteednationalstandardisationofcare.Thebodyofthewhite

paper contrasted the ‘fragmentation’ of the internal market with New Labour’s plan for

‘integratedcare’.525This representedamajor shift fromequalityofaccess,whichwas the

coreprincipleoftheinternalmarket,towardsequalityofoutcome.Inotherwords,whereas

theprevioussystemhadarticulated‘equality’primarilyasaquestionofaccessibility,which

assumedthatserviceusers,asconsumers,werebestplacedtodecidewhatconstitutedan

optimaloutcome,TheNewNHSwasconcernedtoarticulate‘equality’asequalityofoutcome.

525DepartmentofHealth,‘TheNewNHS’(London,1997),sec.1.3andpassim.

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Moreover,NewLabour’sinitialreformtotheNHSwassetoutintermsofcollectivismand

collaboration. TheNewNHS argued for a ‘“ThirdWay”of running theNHS’ avoiding the

pitfallsofcommand-and-controlmanagementandtheatomismoftheinternalmarket.This

wouldbe‘asystembasedonpartnershipanddrivenbyperformance’.526In1997,thelogicof

a “ThirdWay”wasprimarilyarticulatedasameansof creatinga steeringprocess for the

healthsystemwhichwasnotbasedincentralgovernment.Thecreationoflocalandregional

commissioning groups was designed to remove steering responsibilities from Whitehall

withouttheneedfortheintroductionofacompetitivemarket.527Thismarkedasignificant

breakwiththelogicoftheinternalmarketwhichwasdesignedtoincreaseefficiencythrough

competition;indeed,theDepartmentofHealth’swhitepaperrejectsthelogicofcompetition

asasourceofefficiencycompletely:‘Fragmentationindecision-makinghaslosttheNHSthe

costadvantagesthatcollaborationcanbring.Cooperationandefficiencygohandinglove’.528

The articulation of Labour’s direction for healthcare reform in The New NHS therefore

engagesdirectlywiththechoice-andmarket-basedlogicoftheinternalmarketdiscourseand

rejects thesearticulationsas incompatiblewith theprinciplesof equalityofoutcomeand

collectivism.

By2000,theprogrammesetoutinTheNewNHSwasalreadybeingrevised.TheNHSPlan

2000whitepaperwasstillcriticaloftheinternalmarketreformandusedmanyofthesame

articulationsofthefailuresofthequasi-marketinhealthcare,includingthatitledto‘more

fragmentation, a lottery in provision and excess bureaucracy’. 529 The struggle over the

526Ibid.,4.15,1.3.527Ibid.,secs3.16–3.21,4,5,6.528Ibid.,1.22.529DepartmentofHealth,TheNHSPlan,2000,57,http://pns.dgs.pt/files/2010/03/pnsuk1.pdf.

248

meaningof thesignifier ‘equality’ thereforepersists fromTheNewNHS,as the ‘lottery in

provision’identifiedbyMilburnreflectsaconcernthatstandardisationofserviceacrossthe

NHShadbeenunderminedbythe‘fragmentation’oftheserviceinresponsetomarketreform.

Theattempttodefendageneraltaxationfundedmodelwasthereforearticulatedasthebest

possiblemeanstocontrolthistendencytowardsa‘lotteryinprovision’.Todothis,Milburn

citedresearchabouthealthcarefundingwithreferencetoothersystems.Notably,majority

tax-financedsystems(i.e.BritishandNordic)arearticulatedasleastregressiveintermsof

social equality and are contrasted with SHI systems (e.g. German and Dutch), which are

slightlymoreregressive,andprivateinsurancesystems(i.e.theUSandSwiss),whicharethe

mostregressive.530AkeyimperativeofMilburn’sarticulationwastodefendtheNHSinterms

of its progressive and equal character, and, as early as 2000, the Nordic countries were

alreadyforminganimportantsignifierwithwhichthisdiscoursecouldbearticulated.

ComparingTheNewNHSandTheNHSPlanthereforerevealsanumberofareasinwhichthe

critiqueoftheinternalmarkethadbecomesignificantlymorecircumspectby2000.Although

thelatterappearedtoofferamuscularcritiqueoftheThatcherandMajoreraNHSpolicies,

whatwasactuallycriticisedwasnottheintroductionofaquasi-marketperse,butratherthe

introduction of a ‘false market’. New Labour’s reform measures were already being re-

articulatedasconsistentwithareturntothelogicofchoiceand,eventually,competitionand

markets. This articulation of the signifier ‘choice’ as consistentwith ‘equality’was clearly

influenced by the Nordic healthcare systems, although it did not explicitly identify these

systemsasamodel.Theshiftinemphasisawayfromcommandandcontroltowardsa‘leaner

530Ibid.,36.

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and more focused centre’, which would be responsible for setting priorities, monitoring

outcomes, and scaling back intervention, suggests significant influence from Nordic

healthcaremodels,whichwereandareoftenassociatedwiththeuseof‘leanmanagement’

techniques.531

Nonetheless, The NHS Plan clearly envisages a system in which care would be designed

aroundtheneedsofthepatient,althoughthepatientwouldnotactuallychooseordecide

whatconstitutedhisorherneeds.Inthisrespect,thewhitepaperacknowledgedthefailure

ofanattempttobreakwiththelogicoftheinternalmarket,whichLabourhadrejectedinThe

NewNHSshortlyaftertakingoffice.Indeed,giventheturnNewLabour’sreformwouldlater

take,re-articulationofBeveridgianhealthcaresystemsintermsofa‘leanerandmorefocused

centre’ marked a significant shift away from the rejection of the internal market which

characterisedNewLabour’soriginalplansforhealthreform.

Despitethisturntowardschoicereforms,thedefenceofthetax-fundedhealthmodelwas

stillamajorconcernforNewLabour.However,by2002therehadbeenamarkedshiftinthe

strategyforretainingatax-fundedmodeloftheNHS.DeliveringtheNHSPlanwasexplicitin

itsappeal totheNordichealthsystems,again,asadefenceagainst thechargethat ‘a tax

fundednationalsystemofhealthcarecanneverdeliverchoiceforpatients’.Itwenton:‘[I]n

SwedenandDenmarkpatientshaveaccesstoinformationonwaitingtimesandoptionsfor

treatment, and patients who have been waiting for treatment have the choice of an

alternativeprovider’.532Although limited in itsoperationat that time, thesituationof the

531Ibid.,56;‘AHospitalCase’,TheEconomist,May2013.532DepartmentofHealth,DeliveringtheNHSPlan:NextStepsonInvestmentNextStepsonReform,April,2002,22.

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patientwithinasystemofpotentialchoiceswasthefirststepinareturntothearticulation

ofpatientasaconsumerintheliberalsense:asarationalactormakingoptimalchoicesina

free market. 533 This is a significant change from The NHS Plan 2000 which effectively

envisaged the NHS as a system made up of groups (doctors, patients, etc.), towards a

discourseinwhichrelationshipsbetweenactorswerearticulatedbasedonmarketprinciples,

usingconceptssuchaspurchaser,provider,consumerandsoon.Thisissignificantbecause

marketreformmustbeunderpinnedbyarationalsubject,sinceifactorscannotfullyidentify

withtheirownintereststhenthemarketdoesnotempowerconsumers,butratherproduces

random,indeterminateeffects.534Theattempttoenchain‘choice’and‘equalityofoutcome’

withtheNordiccountries,representedanattempttodemonstratethatNewLabour’shealth

agendawasrealisablewithinataxation-fundedmodelofhealthcare.

Theshiftfromcollectivismtopublicchoice,whichoccurredgraduallybetween1997and2002

isalsoreflectedinthespeechesofAlanMilburn,HealthSecretaryfrom1999-2003.Ina2000

speech,his aimwas to rebut thepromotionof a SocialHealth Insurance system, though,

interestingly,notwithreferencetothesuccessoftheNordiccountriesatinstitutingatax-

fundedmodel,butratherbyaddressingtheperceiveddeficienciesoftheFrenchandGerman

insurance systems. 535 This mirrored the approach adopted in The NHS Plan 2000.

Conspicuouslyabsentfromthespeechin2000wasanyemphasisontheroleoftheconsumer;

insteadthethrustwascollectivist.Bythefollowingyearinaspeechongenetics,however,

533Greener,‘TowardsaHistoryofChoiceinUKHealthPolicy’,311–2.534For a discussion ofmarket problematics from a free-market perspective, see Gubb andMeller-Herbert,MarketsinHealthCare.Itisinterestingtonotethatinformation,ratherthanthesubjectitself,isidentifiedastheprimarybarriertotheperfectfunctioningofmarkets.535Milburn,TheContributionofaModernNHS.

251

Milburnwasalreadydeployingasubstantiallydifferentarticulationofthesignifier‘choice’

moreinlinewiththechangingaimsoftheNHSPlan:

Theroleofhealthprofessionalswillbetohelppatientschoosewhatisright

forthem.Therewillbeagreateremphasisonprovidingclearinformationto

patientssotheycanmakeinformedchoices.Informedconsentshouldbethe

governing principle here, with a greater sense of partnership between

professionalandpatient.536

Itisclearthatthisshiftwasnotisolatedandthatthegeneralimperativeofintroducinggreater

publicchoicehadfilteredthrougharangeofnetworkedactorsinterestedintheareaofpublic

health.Therewasamarkedincreaseindemandsforchoice-basedreforminthemediafrom

arangeofpositions,frombroadlysociallydemocratic,suchasTheGuardiantoconservative

andliberalorganssuchasTheTimesandTheIndependent.

Thisshiftawayfromacollectivistdiscourse,towardsanarticulationofatax-fundedsystem

consistentwithconsumerchoicebetween2000and2002ismarkedandwasalsoreflectedin

increaseddemandsforchoiceinthemedia.537InTheTimestheDanishandSwedishsystems

weredescribedasplacing‘enormousweightonempoweringdoctorsandindividualpatients’,

despitetheirtax-basedfundingmechanism.538And,inapieceinTheIndependent,thesuccess

of the Swedish and Danish systems at reducing so-called ‘bed blocking’ (by effectively

chargingthelocalorcountycouncilifpatientswerereadytobedischarged,buthadnowhere

to be discharged to) was heralded as a means of increasing provision of care outside

536AlanMilburn,SpeechtotheInstituteofHumanGenetics,2001.537MalcolmDean,‘Society:AnyChanceofNHSChoice’,TheGuardian,24April2002.538NigelHawkes,‘TheoryandPractice’,TheTimes,19April2002.

252

hospitals.539Theintroductionofsuchmeasureswas,inasense,aformofmarketisation,since

itsprimarymeanstoproduceoutcomeswasthecreationofincentivesanddisincentives–i.e.

sanctions for those authorities which failed to produce certain outcomes. It is therefore

significantthatthereformisexplicitlybilledasaNordicinnovation,giventhattheSwedish

andDanishsystemshadbeenestablishedwithinNewLabour’sdiscourseassystemswhich

had achieved a great deal in reconciling issues of standardisation, equality of access and

consumerempowerment.

ThisalsosuggestsasignificantdegreeofelasticityintheNordicemptysignifier,evenwithin

Englishhealthdiscourseto2002.NewLabour’shealthcarediscoursewasarticulatedaround

three key features: ‘equality of outcome’ and ‘taxation-funding’ remain unchanged, but

‘choice’graduallyreplaced‘collaboration’asakeyaimofthesystem.Englishliberalismhad

longsinceestablishedaproblematicinwhich‘freedom’(i.e.choice)wasincompatiblewith

‘equalityofoutcome’,whichcouldonlyresultfromcoercionandthereforereducedpersonal

freedom.540 Reconciling freedom and equality is therefore a more profound and urgent

prioritythanitmightotherwiseappear.TheNordicsignifiercancomfortablyaccommodate

bothcollaborativeandchoicebasedmechanismsandisthereforealogicalchoiceforLabour’s

healthsecretaries,sinceitallowsthepotentialantagonismbetweenchoiceandequalityto

beneutralised.ItsinclusioninNewLabour’shealthcarediscourseallowsLabourtoplausibly

articulatetheseantagonismsasresolvable,sincetheyhavenominallybeenresolvedinNordic

publicserviceswhichcloselyresembletheNHS.

539JeremyLaurance,‘BedBlockingtheScandinavianSolution’,TheIndependent,2002;DavidCharter,‘MilburnActstoEaseBedBlocking’,TheTimes,14March2002.540Berlin,‘TwoConceptsofLiberty’.

253

5.4.2‘Competitors,collaborators,suppliersandcustomers’:541backtothemarket

2003-2007

Theattempttoneutralisetheantagonismbetweenfreedomandequalityrunsthroughthe

speechesofsuccessivehealthsecretaries.WhileexplicitreferencestoNordenaregenerally

absent, with the notable exception of the Patricia Hewitt’s stint as Health Secretary, an

increasinglyconcreteandconsistentdiscourseemergedfromDeliveringtheNHSPlan.For

example,ina2003speechMilburnarguedthat:

TheRight–inthemediaandinpolitics–believethegame’supforservices

thatarecollectively fundedandprovided. Intoday’sconsumerworldthey

arguethattheonlywaytogetservicesthatareresponsivetoindividualneeds

isthroughthemarketmechanismofpatientspayingfortheirtreatment.

ItiseasytodismisstheRight’spoliciesasthelasttwitchoftheThatcherite

corpse.Butifwefailtomatchhighandsustainedinvestmentwithrealand

radicalreformitwillbetheCentre-Left’sargumentthatpublicservicescan

bothbemodernandfair,consumer-orientatedandcollectivelyprovidedthat

willfaceextinction.542

During John Reid’s tenure as health secretary, immediately following Alan Milburn’s

departurein2003,thefocuswasonthechoicecomponentofNewLabour’sreforms.Since

thehealth servicewas still under significant attack from liberal and conservative sources,

includingapublicationbyNormanBlackwellundertheauspicesofCPSandaseriesofpieces

541 Patricia Hewitt, ‘Investment and Reform: Transforming Health and Healthcare’, (Speech, 2007),http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/MediaCentre/Speeches/Speecheslist/DH_4124484.542AlanMilburn,SpeechonLocalism,2003.

254

inTheDailyTelegraphwhich suggested thatprivatehealth insurancewouldbeapopular

optionifincentivisedbyataxrebate,Reidclearlyfelttheneedtoarticulateareformagenda

whichcouldaccommodatedemandsforchoicewithinanationallyfundedhealthsystem.543

Oneofhiskeyaimswasto‘turntheNHSfromatopdownmonolithintoaresponsiveservice

thatgivesthepatientthebestpossibleexperience’.544Todothis itwouldbenecessaryto

empowerpatients‘bothcollectivelyandindividually’.545WhiletheissueofwhethertheNHS

actuallyconstitutesamonolithicsystemasReidsuggestsisopentodebate,546itisclearthat

Reid’s chief aim was to efface the tension between choice and equality. His speech is

thereforeworthquotingatsomelength:

Thatismyanswertothequestionofchoice.Lackofpowerhasalwaysbeen

linkedtoinequity.Itisthesameinhealthcare.Choiceisnothingaslongasit

remainstheoretical.Itismererhetoricunlessitisrootedinreality,practical

in its implication and underpinned by the resources, the information and

power, in the hands of the person you are offering choice to, tomake it

meaningful.ThatiswhyIbelievethatempoweringpatientsisdirectlylinked

totheissuesofinequity.Onlyifweempowerallpatientscanwerealistically

aimforthegoalofequity.547

543NormanBlackwell,TowardsSmallerGovernment(London:CentreforPolicyStudies,2001),19–20;BenedictBrogan,‘VotersWouldBuyHealthInsuranceIfTaxIsCut’,TheDailyTelegraph,14July2003;JanetDaley,‘TheNewBritainWantsMoreChoice’,TheDailyTelegraph,16July2003.Interestingly,thereformsproposedinthesethreearticlesarereminiscentofthestructureofDanishprivatehealthinsuranceschemes.See,5.4.5below.544Reid,‘ChoiceSpeechtotheNewHealthNetwork’.545Ibid.546IanGreenerandMartinPowell,‘TheChangingGovernanceoftheNHS:ReforminaPost-KeynesianHealthService’,HumanRelations61,no.5(2008):618–9.547 John Reid, ‘Equity, Choice, Capacity and Culture’, (Speech, 2003),http://collection.europarchive.org/tna/20040722012352/http://dh.gov.uk/en/News/Speeches/Speecheslist/DH_4066541.

255

Strikingly, Reid makes the argument that only by empowering consumers to choose, by

granting them freedom within the system, can equality be achieved. He proposes some

compellingreasonsforassumingtheimportanceofchoice,inparticularthedifferentneeds

of patients basedon gender, ethnic origin, age, disability, and class, but achieves this re-

orientationtowardschoicebyeffectivelyreversingtheorderofsignificationgenerallyfound

insocialdemocraticdiscourse.Whereastheclassicallysocialdemocraticdiscoursearticulates

equalityaspriortofreedom–onlythroughmaterialequalitycancitizensbefree–Reidargues

the opposite. By implementing choice reform, equality can be achieved even if material

outcomesdifferbetweenpatients,localitiesandsoforth.Althoughscholarshaveoftenbeen

criticalofthisre-orientationawayfromequalityofoutcome,itisconsistentwith‘ThirdWay’

principles, since, as Giddens has it, ‘Third Way politics looks … to maximize equality of

opportunity’and‘socialdiversityisnotcompatiblewithastronglydefinedegalitarianismof

outcome’.548Theideologicallogicofare-orientationtowardsaliberalorderofsignification,

inwhich ‘freedom’precedes ‘equality’, should thereforenotbeconsideredanaberration,

sincethecontoursofapublicchoicediscoursehadbeenlatentwithin‘ThirdWay’political

theoriessincebeforeLabour’s1997electionvictory.

The reintroduction of competition reforms was controversial, especially since among

healthcareprofessionalsandscholarstherewasagrowingconsensusthatcooperation,rather

thancompetition,wasthebestwaytotreatpatientswithlonger-termhealthneedsspanning

morethanoneservice.549Thereisnonethelessastrongthreadofcontinuitylinkingthehealth

secretariesfromAlanMilburntoPatriciaHewitt.Thismaintainedastrongemphasison‘More

548Giddens,TheThirdWayandItsCritics,53.549NicholasMaysandAnnaDixon,‘AssessingandExplainingtheImpactofNewLabour’sMarketReforms’,inUnderstandingNewLabour’sMarketReformsoftheEnglishNHS(London:King’sFund,2011),126.

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choiceandstrongervoiceforpatients’andthefreedomforGPstoinnovateasameansto

tacklehealth inequalities.550Aparticularlygoodexampleof thiscomes inaspeechonthe

introductionofnewprovidersfrom2007.Hewitttellsastoryaboutacomplaintfromafellow

MP, who argued that the commissioning of cytology services from a laboratory at a

FoundationTrust40milesawaywasanegativedevelopment.Hewittcountersthatitwasa

positive to see ‘an NHS Foundation Trust using its independence to expand services and

spreadbestpractice,notonlyinitslocalcommunitybutarounditsregion’.551

Inotherwords,competitionwithintheNHSleadstohigherstandards.However,giventhe

controversy and lack of consensus over a return to a competitive market-based system,

Hewitttriedtomakecompetitionandcollaborationcompatiblebynotingthatcompaniesare

‘often simultaneously … competitors, collaborators, suppliers and customers of each

other’.552This attempted to assuage fears about the return to amarket-based systemby

arguingthattheintroductionofNewPublicManagementmethodsmodelledontheprivate

sectordidnotentailthecreationofafullmarketinhealthcare.

Hewitt’stenureashealthsecretarywasalsomarkedbyaresumptionoftheuseoftheNordic

signifieraspartofLabour’sarticulationofhealthcarereform,incontrasttoJohnReidwho

tended to prefer domestic examples.Hewitt invoked a Swedish social democratic slogan:

550 Patricia Hewitt, ‘Creating a Patient-Led NHS: The Next Steps Forward’, (Speech, 2006),http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/MediaCentre/Speeches/Speecheslist/DH_4126499;Hewitt,‘InvestmentandReform:TransformingHealthandHealthcare’.551 Patricia Hewitt, ‘Commissioning New Providers’, (Speech, 2007),http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/MediaCentre/Speeches/DH_074569.552Hewitt,‘InvestmentandReform:TransformingHealthandHealthcare’.

257

‘proud,butnotsatisfied’asemblematicofNewLabour’sattitudetoreform.553Itissignificant

thatthefacetsofreformwhichweremostfrequentlyassociatedwithSwedenhavelittleto

dowith competition; probably because such reformswere, and are, locally directed and

funded in Sweden. The key facets of the system used in the Nordic countries, especially

Sweden,whichHewitthopedtoapplytotheNHSwerethreefold.Firstly,thepositioningof

GPsasgatekeeperstothewidersystem,whichisnowcommontoSweden,Denmarkandthe

UK.Thisisameanstoreduceworkloadsforconsultantsandotherhospitalstaff.554Secondly,

thecreationofsystemswhichdealwithlonger-termpublichealthissuespreventingpeople

from re-entering the labour market. And thirdly, the greater emphasis on community-

orientatedcarewhichhavereducedthelengthoftheaveragestayinSwedishhospitals.555

None of these reforms followed competitive logics and probably reflected a growing

ambivalenceabout theeffectivenessof competitive reforms in Sweden, andamovement

towardsgreatercollaborationbetweenhealthcareworkers.556Itmayalsobeafeatureofthe

difficultyof isolating the specific regulatorymeasureswhich led to specificoutcomesand

improvements.557

5.4.3 Competition, choice and equality: what did it mean for other networked

actors?

Theprevioussub-section focusedprimarilyonthedevelopmentofhealthpolicydiscourse

withintheDepartmentofHealthandtheLabourParty.Thequestionofotheractorswithin

553Hewitt,‘CreatingaPatient-LedNHS:TheNextStepsForward’.554Hewitt,‘InvestmentandReform:TransformingHealthandHealthcare’.555 Patricia Hewitt, ‘UK Presidency of the EU Summit: Tackling Health Inequalities’, (Speech, 2005),http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20130107105354/http://www.dh.gov.uk/en/MediaCentre/Speeches/Speecheslist/DH_4125537;Hewitt,‘InvestmentandReform:TransformingHealthandHealthcare’.556HarrisonandCalltorp,‘TheReorientationofMarket-OrientedReformsinSwedishHealth-Care’,220–1.557MaysandDixon,‘AssessingandExplainingtheImpactofNewLabour’sMarketReforms’,124–5.

258

the network was examined primarily from this standpoint. Where actors outside the

DepartmentofHealthandtheLabourPartywereconsidered,theyweregenerallyseenas

exerting particular pressure onNew Labour’s articulation of their programme for reform.

Muchofthiscriticismfoundexpressioninthepress.However,therewereotheractorswith

astakeinLabour’sreformsandtheshiftinemphasisawayfromcollaborationandtowards

choiceandcompetitioncreatedthepossibilityofanexpandedrole forotheractors.Since

Labourhadgraduallyembracedmarketprinciples,includingpositioningthepatientintherole

ofconsumer,somecontemporarycommentatorsarguedthatLabour’sreformamountedto

a‘reinvention’oftheinternalmarketinallbutname,althoughthereweresomedifferences,

including that pricing was set centrally and emergency care was excluded from

competition.558SomecommentatorsarguedthatLabour’sreformswentfurthertowardsthe

creationofaninternalmarketthanthoseofthepreviousConservativegovernment.559

The introduction of greater competition and a split betweenpurchaser and providerwas

retained, but altered, from the architecture of the internal market. The introduction of

Primary Care Trusts (PCTs), which were responsible for purchasing care, primarily from

FoundationTrusts,themainprovidersofhealthcareinEngland,createdtheconditionsfor

independent providers to enter the system. This was articulated in terms of a similar

purchaser-providersplitwhichhadbeencreatedinSwedishhealthcareinthe1990s.From

withinthebroaderhealthgovernancenetwork,themajorcriticismofthisreformwasthat

thereformswere‘borrowingthelanguageof…Sweden…butnotthesubstance’,asLiam

558JeremyLaurance,‘WelcometotheInternalMarket,ReinventedbyLabour’,TheIndependent,19April2002.559NicholasMays, AnnaDixon, and Lorelei Jones, ‘Return to theMarket : Objectives and Evolution of NewLabour’sMarketReforms’,inUnderstandingNewLabour’sMarketReformsoftheEnglishNHS,ed.AnnaDixon,NicholasMays,andLoreleiJones(London:King’sFund,2011),1–15.

259

Fox,theConservativeShadowMinisterforHealth,putit.560Themorefree-marketsectionsof

the health governance network were therefore arguing for the intensification of market

reforms.AmajorpointofcontentionwasthatinSwedentheequivalentsofFoundationTrusts

wereable toborrowcommerciallyon theopenmarket inorder to invest inand improve

services. Moreover, the general orientation of the Conservative Party was towards the

GermanSHImodel,ratherthanataxation-fundedmodel.561

AlthoughNewLabourmovedcautiouslytowardstheintroductionofindependentprovisions,

itisclearthatHealthSecretariesfromAlanMilburnonwardsactivelycourtedprivatehealth

providersandthattheSwedishandDanishintroductionofindependentcareactedasamodel

forthis.562Thisissignificantnotjustbecauseoftheimpliedchangeinthepolicyarchitecture

oftheNHS,butbecausetheintroductionofindependentprovidersalsoentailedchangesin

thestructureofthegovernancenetworkwhichwasconcernedwithsteeringLabour’shealth

policy.OneofthebiggestindependententrantsintotheNHSduringthisperiodwasCapio,a

Swedishfor-profitfirm,evenifmuchofthediscussionwasaboutSwedishnon-profithealth

providers. 563 It provides a range of services and notably runs St. Göran’s hospital in

Stockholm.564Themajority of participants in governance networks in the UK viewed this

changepositively,notingthattheentranceofprivateproviderswasthe‘spearhead’foranew

approachtotheprovisionofhealthcareintheNHS.565Thepreponderanceofreferencesto

560DavidCharter,‘ToriesInspiredbyGermanHealthService’,TheTimes,10July2002.561Ibid.562JohnCarvel,‘MilburnWoosForeignHealthFirmstoUK’,TheGuardian,26June2002;MartinIvens,‘CrossDressingCouldSuittheTories’,TheSundayTimes,26May2002.563JohnWaples,‘SwedesLeadRaceforCommunityHospitals’,TheSundayTimes,22April2001;OliverWrightandSimonCrisp,‘TheChosenCompanies’,TheTimes,20December2002.564‘StockholmSyndrome’,TheEconomist,28February2002.565‘InternationalHospitalManagementFirmsHaveBeenShortlistedtoBidforaSliceofBritain’sNationalHealthService(NHS)’,TheBusiness,4May2003.

260

Swedishhealthcareinheadlinesandsub-headlines,maybeafeatureofthereassuringquality

ofthe‘Swedishmodel’signifier,butitmayequallyrepresentthehighlevelofpenetration

CapiohasinEuropeanhealthmarkets.566

Moreover, in the initial rounds of tendering for contracts, foreign firms performed

significantlybetterthantheirBritishcounterparts,leadingtotheformationofanumberof

jointbidsbetweenBritishfirmsandCapio.567EvenTheGuardian,asocialdemocraticpaper

whichwasnonethelesspositiveaboutthepotentialofNPMreformstothehealthservicein

theearlyandmid-2000s,wasenthusiasticaboutthe‘Stockholmmodel’.A2001articlenoted

thatSwedishunionsweresupportiveoftheprivatisationofStGöran’sHospitalinStockholm

asitsexpansionhadallowedstafftostayonwhomightotherwisehavelosttheirjobsorbeen

downgradedtopart-timework.568

The general positivity and widespread discussion of the new policy architecture of the

introductionofindependentprovidersintotheNHSisademonstrationthatthelogicofchoice

and competition discourse had beenwidely accepted in the health governance network.

While free-market sectionsof thenetworkwere still focusedon thepotential foramove

towardssocialhealthinsurance,evenintheConservativePartyandtheliberalsectionsofthe

presstherewaswidespreadacceptanceofthelogicofadoptingaNordicapproach.Thisled

totheexpansionofthehealthgovernancenetworktoincludeindependentprovidersandthe

hegemonisationofadiscoursearticulatedaround‘choice’and‘competition’.

566Ibid.;NigelHawkes,‘SwedenMayGiveFailingNHSaShotintheArm’,TheTimes,December2002.567‘PublicMoney,PrivateCare’,TheEconomist,17June2004.568AudreyGillan,‘Election2001:PublicBackingforSweden’sPrivateSuccess’,TheGuardian,29May2001.

261

On theotherhand, the later extensionof the roleof privatenetworkedactors did cause

significantcontroversy.Capio’sdecisiontobegintoadvertiseservicestoGPs in2006,and

canvassingoftheideaofadvertisingtopatients,arousedsignificantopposition.569Italsofed

intoarelativelywidespreadfear,whichwascommontobothEnglandandSwedenthatthe

governingparty(by2006,Reinfeldt’sNewModeratesinSweden,andNewLabourinBritain)

was, as The Economist put it, ‘intending to dismantle public health-care’, amidst further

charges that this was ‘motivated by (perish the thought) ideology’. 570 Accusations of

ideologicalmotivationwereextremelydifficult forNewLabour to refute.TheThirdWay’s

emphasisonthepost-ideologicalcharacterofitspolicypositionsmeantthatsuchchallenges

hadtoberefutedwithreferencetothepragmaticnatureofitsreformprogramme.Thiswas

demonstratedbyHewitt’spresentationofitthus:

Yes, we are giving patients and users more choice. Yes, we are giving

providersmorefreedomtoinnovateand,whereitisappropriate,tocompete

against eachother.Andwherewemean 'competition',we should say so,

insteadofpretendingthat'contestability'issomethingdifferent.Yes,money

willfollowthepatient.Butwhyshouldchoice,innovation,competitionand

financialdisciplinebeconfinedtoprivatemarkets?Whyshouldtheuseof

theprivatesector,whenitgivesusnewhospitals,whenitbenefitspatients

andthepublic,havetomean'privatisation'?571

569NicholasTimmins,‘HealthcareGroupAdvertCampaigntoTargetNHSStaff’,TheFinancialTimes,16February2006.570‘StockholmSyndrome’.571Hewitt,‘InvestmentandReform:TransformingHealthandHealthcare’.

262

WhatHewitt’s speechand, indeed, the ironic line fromTheEconomistdemonstrate is the

falsity of the ‘ThirdWay’ claim to be post-ideological, or somehow outside ideology. Ian

GreenerandMartinPowellgosomewaytowardsidentifyingthiswhentheyarguethat:

New Labour’s pragmatism rests upon a common set of assumptions; that

privatefinanceandmanagementisbetterthanitspublicequivalent,andthat

marketsandmorechoicerepresentsthekeytopublicsectorreform.572

AsGreenerandPowellimplicitlyobserve,theclaimtobeoutsideideologyrestsonacommon

setofprincipleswhicharehighlyideological.TheforceoftheThirdWayideologyisinitsvery

obfuscation of its own politico-ideological character, to which The Economist teasingly

alluded.Theintroductionofarangeofactorsintothehealthgovernancenetwork,including

private health consortiums, while justified in terms of pragmatism, can only be properly

understood with reference to the ideological logic by which ‘choice’, ‘equality’ and

‘competition’werearticulatedtogether.Moreover,itisclearlynoteworthythatadeveloped

discourse,inwhichtheNordichealthsystems,inparticularDenmarkandSweden,wereused

asmodelsfortheintroductionofindependentserviceproviders,becamehegemonicwithin

agovernancenetworkatthesametimeasSwedishfor-profithealthcarefirmswereentering

thenetworkasstrategicactorsinvolvedintheimplementationanddeliveryofservices.

5.4.4Localists,free-marketersandtheNordicmodel

TheprecedingdiscussionlookedindepthatchangesinNewLabour’sdiscourseonhealthcare

andhowthiswaschained toaparticularconceptionof theNordiccountries. I repeatedly

alludedtopressureonNewLabour’sdiscoursefromportionsofahealthgovernancenetwork

572GreenerandPowell,‘TheChangingGovernanceoftheNHS:ReforminaPost-KeynesianHealthService’,629.

263

which saw the introductionofmarketsandhealth insuranceas thebestdirection for the

future of the NHS. This school of thought was, and remains, influential within the UK

ConservativeParty.Thissub-sectionwillthereforeexaminetwopositionswhichwereheldby

coreactorsinthehealthgovernancenetwork,whichdisagreedwithimportantarticulations

ofhealthcarepolicyunderNewLabour.LinkedtothisaredivergentconceptionsoftheNordic

healthcaresystemswhichdifferfromthosecommonlyassociatedwiththeThirdWay.

Animportantsourceofafree-marketdiscoursewastheCentreforPolicyStudies,whichwas

very active in advocating supply side reform to public services between 2001 and 2003.

Notably,CPSalsohashistoriclinkstotheConservativeParty.IntotalcontrasttoNewLabour’s

articulationof‘equality’asthemostimportantfeatureoftaxation-fundedhealthcaresystems,

CPSreportstypicallyarguedthatnationalisationofthesupplyofhealthcareprovisionwasthe

primarycauseofinequitableoutcomes.InBetterHealthcareforAll,NormanBlackwelland

Daniel Kruger argue that the key predictor of improving health outcomes for the poor is

economic growth. 573 Blackwell and Kruger, following orthodox free-market economics,

argued that inequality is a necessary product of growth, and innovation occurs most

intensivelyintimesofgrowth.574Thismechanisticarticulationofthenecessarycharacteristics

ofgrowthallowsthemtoposittheparadoxicalargumentthatrisingincomeinequalityleads

togreaterdiffusionofhealthtechnologyandtherefore improvedhealthoutcomesforthe

poor.575Since a further contentionof free-market economics is that nationalised systems

573NormanBlackwellandDanielKruger,BetterHealthcareforAll(London:CentreforPolicyStudies,2002),19–22.574Ibid.575Ibid.,20.

264

necessarilystifleinnovation,thelogicalconclusionofthisargumentisthatpubliclyprovided

healthcareactuallyworsensoutcomesforthepoor.

Withinitsownhighlymechanisticparametersthispositioncanbesustained,sincestructural

argumentsinwhichcauses(e.g.growth)andeffects(e.g.inequality)necessarilyfollowfrom

oneanothercannotgenerallyberefutedempirically,sincethesearenotempiricalconcepts,

butstructuralpointsinanabstractsystem.Indeed,thedifficultyemergesforBlackwelland

Krugerwhen the abstractmechanism of these concepts confronts empirical phenomena,

although structurally there are objections which cannot be accounted for within this

argument. For example, it is unclear why nationalisation of health provision should

disproportionatelyaffectthepoor.Publicprovisionstiflinginnovationinauniversalsystem

should, by definition, create universal effects – i.e. it should create worse outcomes for

everyone.Theonlyplausibleexplanationforthisisthatextra-systemicfactorsareresponsible

for the worse effects experienced by the poor or in certain regions, in which case the

necessarycausallogicwhichblamesthisonanationalisedpublichealthserviceiscalledinto

question.

Nonetheless, for Blackwell and Kruger, the solution to this stasis in health provision is

diversificationofsupply.Inthefirstinstance,thiswouldentailashiftintheroleofthestate

fromprovisiontocommissioning,allowingtheentranceofprivatesuppliersintoaregulated

market withminimum standards.Within the existing architecture of the NHS the report

imaginedthisrolefallingtoPCTs.576AlthoughtheNordicmodelwasnotacorepartofthis

576Ibid.,52.

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discourse, it is nonetheless worth noting the similarities between some of the specific

measuresforincreasingprivateparticipationintheNHSproposedbyBlackwellandKruger

and systems in the Nordic countries, in particular Sweden and Denmark. Most clearly,

BlackwellandKruger’sproposalofavoucherforelectivecareisclearlyinfluencedbythesame

intellectualcurrentswhichledtotheintroductionofarangeofvoucherreformsinSweden.

Thissystem,influencedbyMiltonFriedman’sandAlbertO.Hirschmann’stheoriesofvoucher

andNPMreform,ledtothegradualintroductionofvouchersinSwedishhealthcare,elderly

careandeducation(forthelatter,seechaptersix).577AfurtherpaperauthoredbyBlackwell

through CPS argued for the introduction of tax incentives for the purchase of private

healthcare,aproposalwhichgainedsomeattentioninTheDailyTelegraphandwhichJohn

Reidrespondedtoinaspeechin2003.578

A corollary to these arguments about the privatisation of public services was that the

distinctionitselfis‘artificial’.579Giventhisposition,however,itisclearhowanincreasingly

mixedmodel of public service provision in the Nordic countries appealed to free-market

reformers aiming to articulate discourses which hoped to encourage the introduction of

independentprovisionintopublicservicesandarguedagainstthe‘ineffectivenessofmuch

governmentintervention’byarguingthat‘biggovernmentultimatelycorruptsthemoralbasis

of society’. 580 The invocation of a ‘moral basis’ to free-market reforms was frequently

articulatedintermsofindividualfreedom.InthehighlypolemicalManagingNottoManage,

577Ibid.,51.578Seesection4.4.3above.579Blackwell,TowardsSmallerGovernment,19–20.Apositionwhich, incidentally,seemstounderminemanyothernecessarydistinctionsmadebetweentheefficiencyoftheprivateandpublicsectorswhichinheretofree-marketeconomics.580Ibid.,6.

266

HarrietSergeantarguedthat‘politicalcorrectness,thepoweroftheunionsandcentrallyset

targetsalltakeprecedenceoverthewell-beingofpatients’.581Aboveall,thereportfocused

ontheeliminationof ‘a large,self-protectedbureaucracy’.582Theterms ‘bureaucracy’and

‘bureaucratic’appearsixteentimesinaninety-five-pagedocument.Thesolutiontothiswas

the replacementof centrally set targetswith large informationdatabaseswhich couldbe

accessedonline.Thisideawasarticulatedwithdirectreferencetoasimilarreformenacted

in Denmark. 583 How the creation of detailed databases could be achieved without

bureaucraticimplicationswasnotexplained,norregrettablywerethenegativeconsequences

of‘politicalcorrectness’forpatients.

Whilethefirstofthesepositionswasfree-marketorientated,andoriginatedprimarilyfrom

CPS, a second position, which was much less popular in the early-2000s, but became

increasinglywidespreadafterDavidCameron’selectionasleaderoftheConservativeParty

and the creation of the Compassionate Conservatism/Big Society agendas. The foremost

exampleofthisstrandofconservatismfromtheearlytomid-2000swasBigBangLocalism,

publishedthroughPolicyExchangebySimonJenkins,formerlyeditorofTheEveningStandard

andTheTimes.584WhereasNewLabourand free-marketdiscoursesenchained theNordic

model with ‘choice’ and ‘competition’ solutions to public service reform, One Nation

conservativediscoursewassignificantlylessmechanisticinitsoperation.Indeed,theposition

setoutby Jenkinswasalmostentirely incompatiblewith the logicof theThirdWay,and,

581HarrietSergeant,ManagingNottoManage(London:CentreforPolicyStudies,2003),5.582Ibid.,18.583Ibid.,95.584BigBangLocalism:ARescuePlanforBritishDemocracy(London:PolicyExchange,2004).

267

though the report’s title alludes to the Thatcherite ‘Big Bang’ deregulation of the City of

Londoninthe1980s,itsatequallyawkwardlyalongsidestructuralfree-markettheories.

RatherthananattempttoenchaintheNordicsignifierwithparticularreformagendasand

programmesthen,Jenkins’primaryinterestintheNordiccountrieswasasamodeloflocalism,

andrelatedly,forare-assertion,ashewouldseeit,oflocalformaldemocracy.Forthisreason,

hisarticulationoftheNordiccountriesdivergedsignificantlyfromthosefoundinmuchofthe

restofthehealthgovernancenetwork.Whereasfree-marketandThirdWayexplanationsof

thedeclineoftheNordicmodelintheearly1990stendedtoarguethathightaxationlevels

and excessive regulation were the chief causes of Nordic crises, Jenkins argued that the

problemwasnottherateoftaxationperse,butratheritscentralisednature.Hewrites:‘[I]n

1991Sweden’shigh-taxsystembegantocrack…theburdenofwelfarefinancingpassingto

localauthorities’.585Thiswascontrastedwiththereformprogrammeofthethenincumbent

Labour government, which had increased the tendency towards centralisation with the

introductionoftargetsfornurses,doctors,wards,hospitalsandsoon.AccordingtoJenkins,

theNordiccountrieshadresistedthistendencyandinsteadarangeofdifferentprogrammes

hadbeenintroducedacrossSwedishmunicipalitiesrangingfrom‘traditionalsocialdemocracy

toThatcheriteneo-liberalism’.586

BigBangLocalismprovidedarangeofanecdoteswhichcontrastedthestultificationofthe

British systemand thenarrownessofBritishpoliticianswith the supposeddynamismand

vibrancyofNordicdemocracy.Forexample,Jenkinsrecalledelicitingtheresponse‘Idon’t

585Ibid.,26.586Ibid.,27.

268

believeyou’,whentalkingtoaBritishgovernmentofficialaboutthedegreeoflocalisationin

Danish healthcare.587The report concluded with a lengthy story about the creation of a

commissionintothestateofNorwegiandemocracytomarktheapproachofthemillennium:

Norway’s favoured forum of democracy, the municipality, was being

railroadedbythestate.Themediaraisedpublicexpectationsbutleft local

government with too little backing to deliver. Government, increasingly

concentratedinOslo,wasfallingintothehandsofanetworkofunelected

technocrats, lawyersand journalists. Thoughoutside theEuropeanUnion,

NorwaywasfindingitselftrammelledbytheneedtoacceptEuropeanlaws

andregulations,overwhichithadnocontrolatall.588

FromJenkins’perspective,thiswasanindicationthatNorwaywas‘sharingtheexperienceof

allEuropeinthe1980sand1990s’.589ThechiefdifferencebetweenNorwegianandBritish

politicians, in his view,was thatwhile British politicians attempted to centralise at every

opportunity,‘Scandinaviahasshownthateventhesmallestcommunitiescanrunasuccessful

andequitablewelfarestate’.590Indoingso,theNordiccountriesretainedthedemocraticand

accountablecharacterofimportantinstitutions.

Theemphasisonthequalityandnatureofinstitutionswasastapleoftraditionalconservative

thought.Thefocuson institutionscontrastedwiththeaimsofThirdWayandfree-market

discourses,whichwerearticulatedonthebasisthattheindividualwastheprimaryunitof

consumption of public services and that there were a priori best outcomes. One Nation

587Ibid.,19.588Ibid.,131–2.589Ibid.,132.590Ibid.,106.

269

conservativediscourse instead focusedon thepotential for some formsof taxation tobe

decentralised,administeredandspentat local level.Thiswould lead to the retreatof the

state, and the empowerment of local governance structures. The Nordic countries were

thereforeseenascharacterisedbyinstitutionswhichhadresistedcentralisation.

However,thekeydifferencebetweenthetwodiscourseslayinthewayinwhichtheytryto

neutralise the source of social antagonisms in welfare provision by appeal to particular

signifiers. Despite the shift in New Labour’s articulation between 2000 and 2002, the

emphasison‘equality’persisteddespiteareorientationfrom‘collaboration’to‘choice’and

‘competition’ and sanctions for hospitals and councils which did not discharge patients

quickly enough. The theoretical implications of this shiftwere the acceptance of a public

choicelogicofdemocracyinwhichconsumerchoicesinmarketswerejustasprofoundan

exerciseofdemocracyasavoteinanelection.Inthisrespect,thechoiceoftheNordicsystem

asamodelwasapposite,sinceitsuggeststhatequalityandchoice,andthereforedemocratic

outcomesconformingtobothsocialistandliberalprinciples,couldbedeliveredwithinthe

frameworkofatax-fundedmodel,withouttheadoptionofa‘regressive’insurancesystem.

InBigBangLocalism,aquitedifferentdiscourseemerged.Jenkinswasconcernedwiththe

assertion (or as he would see it, re-assertion) of local democratic traditions in Britain.

Generallyspeaking,hisconcernswerelimitedtospecifictechnicalmeasures,ratherthanthe

inherentbenefitsofthechangesthemselves,adiscoursewhichgainedsomepopularity in

moretraditionallyconservative(i.e.notfree-market)organs,suchasTheTimes.591Putslightly

591DavidSmithandDavidCracknell,‘MinistersWillOrderNHStoShiftPowertoLocalHospitals’,TheTimes,2December2001.

270

differently,Jenkinshadnomechanisticsenseofcauseandeffect;forhimlocalempowerment

through democratic means was an end in itself. Even so, his articulation of the Nordic

countries,especiallySwedenandDenmark,wasnonethelessstructuredaroundtheabilityof

the Nordic signifier to neutralise antagonisms which other European countries had been

unabletoresolve.Jenkinsconceivesdemocracyasaformalprocessdeliveringaccountability

throughvoting,hencetheirrelevanceofchoiceasasignifier.Rather,theNordiccountries

representedthepotentialforademocratisationofBritishpublicservices.

5.4.5Conclusions

Theperiod from1997 tomid- to late-2000swasaperiodof intenseactivity in thehealth

governancenetwork.NewLabour’sreformsfromthisperiodmovedfromarejectionofthe

internalmarket,toacollaborativemodelofhealthprovisiontoagradualreintroductionof

choiceandcompetitionreform.AteachstageofthesereformstheNordicsignifierwasused

asameanstodefendataxation-fundedhealthcaremodelandasasignifierwhichsuggested

thepossibilityofneutralisingtheantagonismbetween ‘choice’and ‘equality’.Whilesome

scholars have suggested that the introduction of competitive market reforms and the

introductionof independentproviders into theNHS,was fundamentally inconsistentwith

New Labour’s programmatic goals, it was argued here that this was consistent with the

political theories of ‘Third Way’ scholars, such as Anthony Giddens, whose thought

underpinnedmanyoftheassumptionsofNewLabour.

The introductionof independentprovidersandtheirarticulationasconsistentwithNordic

healthcareprogrammesentailedchangestothestructureofthehealthgovernancenetwork.

Inparticular,theintroductionofCapio,aSwedishfor-profithealthcareprovider,ledtothe

271

appearance of a number of articles in the business and popular press discussing the

implicationsofprivateprovidersenteringthehealthsystem.Morethanonearticleexamined

Capio’smanagementofSt.Göran’shospitalinStockholmwithgenerallypositiveconclusions.

Whereas the Swedish and Nordic signifiers had been somewhat ambiguous in health

governancediscoursetothatpoint,theintroductionofprivateactorsenchainedtheNordic

signifiermorestronglywith‘choice’and‘collaboration’.

Althoughthemaintenanceofataxation-fundedsystemalongsidetheintroductionofchoice

reformsshouldbeseenasthehegemonicpositionofthehealthgovernancenetworkfrom

1997until themid- to late-2000s, therewereothernodalpointsaroundwhichdiscourses

emerged. A free-market nodal point within the network had a strong influence on the

ConservativePartyandwassufficientlycredibleastorequireadefencefromLabour’shealth

secretariesofthatperiod.Thefree-marketdiscoursewashighlymechanisticinitsoperation

and tended to prefermarket solutions and the long-term reorientation towards a health

insurance system rather than a tax-funded model. The preference for insurance

notwithstanding,theNordiccountriesofferedapotentialmodeltofree-marketthinkerswho

foundtheintroductionofchoiceandcompetitionreformsconsistentwiththeiremphasison

deregulatoryagendaandmoralargumentsforreductioninthesizeofthestate.

A final discourse, which pre-empted the resurgence of a more widespread One Nation

conservative discourse in the later 2000s, saw the Nordic countries as a model for the

retention of strong democratic institutions. This discourse, which rejected notions of

democracyasconsumerchoicesinmarkets,differsfundamentallyfromthemechanisticlogic

of‘ThirdWay’andfree-marketarticulationsofhealthcarereformandtheNordichealthcare

272

systems.Thisarguedforapluralityofpositionsinwhichformal,localdemocracywouldbe

(re-)asserted, including in revenue raising and spending on health services. This logic is

incompatiblewiththeothertwodiscourses,sinceitrejectstheideathatthereareoptimal

outcomes, instead arguing that formal democracy, rather than any particular systemic

outcome, should be an end in itself. It is somewhat ironic that themost self-consciously

conservativearticulationofhealthcarereformandtheNordicmodelthereforerepresentsthe

mostradicalbreakwiththehegemonicdiscourseswhichhadunderpinnedmorethanthree

decadesofBritishhealthcarereform.

Thediscourseof theNordicmodelwhichemerges fromthis suggests theelasticityof the

Nordicsignifier.Inasinglegovernancenetwork,theNordicmodelcanandhasbeenmade

consistent with calls for equality of outcome, equality of opportunity, public choice,

collaboration,competition,theintroductionofprivateprovisionintoapublicsystem,anda

returntoformaldemocracy.Ithascrossedideologicallinestodothis,althoughitmightbe

arguedthat‘ThirdWay’discoursehadalreadysetoutaliberallogicbywhich‘equality’and

‘choice’couldlogicallybereconciled.

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5.5BismarckorBeveridge?TowardstheLansleyPlanandtheHealth

andSocialCareAct

5.5.1ThedeclineoftheNewLabourcoalition

Following the end of the New Labour-era health reforms, the key nexus in the health

governancenetworkremainedtheoppositionbetweenactorsfavouringtheretentionofa

‘Beveridgian’,tax-fundedsystemandthosefavouringamanagedtransitiontoa‘Bismarckian’,

socialhealthinsurancemodel.Thissectionwillidentifythekeypolicyactorsinthissplitfrom

around2007onwardsandanalyse theirarticulationsofhealthcare, theNordicmodeland

alternativemodelsforreformingtheNHS.ItwillfocusonarticulationsoftheNordicmodelas

partofthisdiscourseandcontrastthatwiththesignifiersusedinpolicydiscoursesfavouring

ahealthinsurancesystem.

ThereweresignificantchangestoBritishpoliticsfrom2007.TonyBlairsteppeddownasPrime

MinisterandwasreplacedbyGordonBrown,formerlyChancelloroftheExchequer.There

wassignificantspeculationthatBrownmightcallanelectionbeforetheendofLabour’sterm

in2010.This ledtoan intenseperiodofpolicycreation inthehealthgovernancenetwork

designed to influenceboth the LabourParty,whichwas inpower, but also the resurgent

Conservative Party, now led by David Cameron. Under Cameron, the Conservative Party

beganlookingtowardsolderformsofConservatism,influencedbyEdmundBurkeandAdam

Smith,aspotentialmodelsforreform.Theprimaryconsequenceofthiswasthedevelopment

of‘CompassionateConservatism’and,later,the‘BigSociety’agenda.(Forafulldiscussion,

see2.3.3,above.)Thesestrainsofthinkingarguedforareorientationtowardscivilsociety

andnon-stateactorsinpublicservices.Furthermore,the2008globalfinancialcrisis,which

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ledtoabankingcrisisfollowedbyasevererecessionintheUK,hadmajorconsequencesfor

publicpolicyagendasinBritain.ThehighlevelsofprivatedebttakenonbyBritishbanksand

borrowers,especiallyinpropertymarkets,weretransferredontothepublicbalancesheets

byabailoutorganisedbytheLabourgovernment.ThelevelofBritishpublicdebtbecamea

centralpointofdiscussioninthehealthgovernancenetworkandintherun-uptothegeneral

electionwhichwaseventuallycalledin2010.

Acharacteristicofthe2010generalelectionwasatendencyforasignificantlylargernumber

ofpoliciestakenfromotherplacesandstatesthanhashistoricallybeenthecaseinBritish

politics,perhapsreflectingageneralisedlackofvisioninamongUKpoliticalactorsfollowing

thefinancialcrisis.PoliciestakenfromabroadintheConservativemanifestoaloneinclude:

NewYork-stylepolicingreform;Swedishfree-schoolpolicies(seechapterfive);andeco-cities

modelled on the German city of Freiburg.592Moreover, the logic of ‘choice’ had become

dominantinthehealthgovernancenetworkbythistime.Callsforquasi-marketreformshad

expandedbeyond the IEAandCPSandnow includedmoderately liberal andconservative

institutionslikeCivitasandtheSocialMarketFoundation(SMF).Althoughthefundamental

logic of choice had become hegemonic, reflected in New Labour’s gradual acceptance of

quasi-markets,therestillwereanumberofmodelsavailableforrealisingtheintroductionof

choice reform. Commonly, publications advocated supply-side reform, a single-payer

insurancemodel,andgreaterlocalisationindecision-making.Theseaimswerenotnecessarily

mutuallyinconsistent,butwerenotalwaysarticulatedtogethereither.Indeed,localismwas

often seen as a step towards the introduction of markets, even though localism can be

592TheConservativeManifesto,2010,http://media.conservatives.s3.amazonaws.com/manifesto/cpmanifesto2010_lowres.pdf.

275

imaginedasentailingnomovetowardsmarketreform,orevenmovesawayfrommarkets

(seesection5.4.5,above).

WilliamMasonandJonathanMcMahon, inFreedomforPublicServices,publishedthrough

CPS,arguedfortwoofthesethreepositions.Theyarguedthatcentralregulationshouldbe

removed‘bytransferringaccountabilitytothelocallevel’.593Theyalsostatedthattheexisting

architectureoftheNHSshouldbemadedemocraticallyaccountable,andthatlocalresidents

shouldbeallowedtoelectthechairsofStrategicHealthAuthorities(SHAs)andPCTs.594Such

localisationwouldallowthesebodies to set ‘locallyappropriatewages’.595Thismixtureof

localisationandsupply-sidereformwouldliberalisetheNHSlabourmarketbyallowingfor

greaterdownwardpressureonwages,underminingthelogicofcentrallysetpricesandwages

in British healthcare. The localisation agenda therefore introduced the potential for

introductionofmarketstructuresinareasmorediversethanthepurchasingandprovisionof

care.

Furness andGoughmake a similar argument in their report From Feast to Famine. Their

approachowedsignificantlymoretoNordicapproachestohealthcaredeliverythanMason

andMcMahon’s.ThereportechoesNewLabour’sgeneralarticulationoftax-fundedsystems

as more ‘progressive’, on the basis that social health insurance systems encounter

redistributive limits, due to the cap on individual contributions, something which is

593WilliamMasonandJonathanMcMahon,FreedomforPublicServices(Surrey:CentreforPolicyStudies,2008),6.594Ibid.,25.595Ibid.,26.

276

theoreticallylimitlessinsystemsfundedthroughtaxation.596However,thereportconsidered

it necessary to set potential reforms within a context of the perceived need for fiscal

retrenchmentinresponsetotheglobalfinancialcrisis,arguingthat‘robustmechanismsfor

localaccountability’weretheonlywaythatcontractionsinpublichealthspendingcouldbe

justified.597Inthisrespect,NorwayandSwedenwerepresentedasamodel,sincefinancing

from local sources is significantly more common in the Nordic countries.598 Furness and

Goughclaimedthataround70%offundingwasraisedlocallyinSweden,forexample,with

the remaining 30% coming from state sources. 599 More controversially, the report also

recommended the introductionof user charging for certain services,which is common in

SwedenandNorway.600Thereportexplainsthatsincedemandforhealthcarewasintheory

elastic, nominal user charges deterred unnecessary andmissed appointments. Given the

totemiccommitmenttomaintaininganNHSwhichisfreeatthepointofuse,suchachange

wouldbeanathematoBritishpoliticians.Thereportattemptedtomitigatethisintwoways,

firstlybysuggestingthatfeesshouldbeforconsultationratherthantreatment,andsecondly

byarguingthatsuchfeescouldbemeans-tested,preventingpeoplewithlowincomesfrom

avoidingseekingtreatmentonthegroundsofcost.601

It was also concerned to establish a path for institutional reform which resembles the

Norwegian and Swedish health systems. This would mean that the NHS would operate

primarilyasacommissionerratherthanaproviderofservices.Thiswouldinevitablymeana

596DavidFurnessandBarneyGough,FromFeasttoFamine-ReformingtheNHSforanAgeofAusterity(London:SocialMarketFoundation,2009),48.597Ibid.,36.598Ibid.,89.599Ibid.,145.600Ibid.,89.601Ibid.,108.

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majorretreatfromday-to-dayoperationofservicesandtheentryofprivateprovidersrather

than state-funded provision. While Furness and Gough eschewed outright calls for an

insurance-payersystem, it isnotablethatthetotalseparationofpurchasingandprovision

apesthestructureofaninsurancesystemineveryway,exceptrevenueraising.

DespiteNewLabour’sarticulationof‘choice’and‘equality’asmutuallycompatible,Furness

andGoughdemurredonthispoint,notingthat:

EvidencefromFinland,NorwayandDenmarkshowsthatlocalcontrolover

health sector decision-making has led to increased disparities in services

provided, and it has been those individuals from lower socio-economic

groupswhohavebeenadverselyaffected.602

Theargumentthatlocalisationhasledtodecliningstandardisationreassertstheantagonism

between‘equality’and‘choice’whichNewLabourhopedtoneutralise.FromFeasttoFamine

wasclearthatitpreferredachoicemodel,evenonewheretaxation-fundingwasmaintained,

andarguedthat,sincechoicenecessarilyreducesequalityofoutcome,theNHSmustchoose

a path. 603 Significantly, therefore, Furness and Gough attempted to detach the Nordic

signifierfromitsarticulationwithequalityofoutcome.EventheNordiccountries,theyargued,

cannotneutralisetheantagonismbetweenfreedomandequality,at leastnot inaneraof

fiscalretrenchment.

602Ibid.,140.603Ibid.,246.

278

EmphasisonthelocalcharacteroftheSwedishhealthcareprogrammecontinuedinthe2010-

2015 period. Eliot Bidgood publishedHealthcare Systems: Sweden and Localism, through

Civitasin2013.604MuchlikeFromFeasttoFamine,thisreportdemonstratedtheextentto

whichhealthcarediscoursehadchangedsincetheNewLabour-eraandtheelasticityofthe

Swedish/Nordic signifier in the health governance actors’ articulation of policy models.

Bidgood argued that markets, competition and choice could be compatible with the

introduction of greater local accountability. In contrast to Jenkins’ Big Bang Localism,

however,itisunclearexactlyhowthisassertionoflocalaccountabilitytohealthcarewasto

be achieved.Whereas Jenkins’ report argued that only formal democracy could fulfil this

function,thiswasatbestimplicitinBidgood’sreport,sinceLabour’sattemptstoregionalise

decision-making structures were implemented through Primary Care Trusts which were

removedfromformaldemocraticaccountability.Moreover,despitesupportingthecauseof

localism,itisclearthatBidgoodwaspessimisticabouttheconditionsfortheintroductionof

localising reforms. He noted that the inherent tendency for localism to produce variable

resultswouldnecessitatetherenewalofcentralgovernment’strustintheeffectivenessof

localgovernment.ThiswouldbeaverysignificantcultureshiftinBritishpolitics.605

Thereport is,however,positiveaboutthepotential forthecreationofcompetition inthe

NHS and the transition towards a more mixed public-private health system. In Sweden,

Bidgood argues, the split between purchaser and provider had become increasingly

entrenchedandthedesiretousethismodelfortheNHSmeantthatBritishpoliticianshad

carefullyobservedtheperformanceofCapioinSweden.Indeed,demonstratingthetendency

604HealthcareSystems:Sweden&Localism–anExamplefortheUK?(London:Civitas,2013).605Ibid.,27.

279

fornetworkedactorstobemutuallyinfluencing,significantportionsofthereportarebased

onarticlesfromTheEconomistandTheGuardian(see5.4.4,above).606

By2013then,theSwedishsystemwasnolongerseenprimarilyasameanstodefendgeneral

taxationfundingintheNHS,butratherasamodelforamixtureoflocalism,competition,and

choiceinasysteminwhichprivate,not-for-profitandpublicproviderscompetedforpublic

funding.ThiswasbroadlyconsistentwithmanyoftheargumentsbeingmadebyNewLabour

andassociatedhealthpolicyactorsbyaround2007,buthadshiftedmoresignificantlyfrom

articulationsoftheSwedishhealthcaresystemfrom1997to2002.Theattempttoarticulate

theNordicsignifierasapotentialmodelfortheneutralisationoftheantagonismbetween

‘choice’and‘equality’hasbeenmoreorlessabandonedinfavourofanarticulationofSweden,

and to a lesser degree, the other Nordic countries, as a model for the introduction of

competitionreforms.

5.5.2Theorisingthefailureofthetaxation-fundedmodel

Bythelate-2000sandtheearly2010sachoice-orientatedpositionofhealthcarereformhad

become hegemonic in the health governance network and a range of more theoretical

publicationsbegan toemergewhichsetoutproblematics justifyingproposedattempts to

movetowardsintensifiedmarket-likestructuresandaninsurancebasedsystemonthemodel

ofBismarckianhealthcaremodels.TheargumentsputforwardbyBlackwellandKrugerinthe

early2000s,arguingthatnationalisedhealthcarewasinherentlystultifying,werebecoming

606Ibid.,19;‘AHospitalCase’;RandeepRamesh,‘SpecialReport:HealthService:PrivateEquityTakeoverLaudedbytheRightasModelforBritain’,TheGuardian,19December2012.

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increasinglyestablishednodalpointsintheirownright,evenatmoremoderatethink-tanks

suchasCivitas.

Thispositionarticulatedtarget-orientedsingle-suppliermodelsasproblematicinthemselves,

bothintermsofoutcomesandonmoralgrounds.Theonlysolution,inthisdiscourse,wasthe

introductionofmarketsorquasi-markets.607ThisargumentwasputforwardbyJamesGubb

and Oliver Meller-Herbert inMarkets in Healthcare, published by Civitas. Although they

almostentirelyruledoutthecreationofafunctioning,yetpoliticallyandsociallyacceptable,

consumermarketinpublichealthcare,theysetoutthetheoreticaljustificationforpursuing

justsuchanagenda.GubbandMeller-Herbertarguedthatinhealthcaresystems‘consumers’

are‘underpowered’forthefollowingreasons:608

• theenormouscostofhealthcare

• thecreationofmoralhazardaspeoplenolongerbearthefullconsequencesoftheir

decisions

• the tendency for insurers to dump or provide ‘sub-optimal’ cover to high risk

individuals

• ‘informationisimperfect’,dataonoutcomesandeffectivenessisnotwidelyavailable

oreasytointerpret,usuallyrequiringtheinterventionofaprofessional.609

Not only were consumers ‘not sovereign’ in health markets therefore, but, in addition,

monopolyprovision(thiscouldalsobeaprivatemonopoly)mightbepreferredasaresultof

607GubbandMeller-Herbert,MarketsinHealthCare,10–23.608Ibid.,6.609Ibid.,6–7.

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thecreationofeconomiesofscale,thepotentialerosionofthemassbenefitsofhealthcare

in non-compulsory systems and on compassionate grounds.610However, for a number of

important reasons, they claimed this did not limit the possibility of the introduction of a

market.Theoverwhelmingmajorityoftransactions,theynoted,occurbetweencompanies

andotherorganisations,ratherthanbetweencompaniesandconsumers,apatternwhichis

mirrored inhealthcaresystems.611Thesedrawbacks,whichthereportargued inheretoall

markets, notwithstanding, the benefits of greater efficiency outweigh their limitations in

otherareas. Indeed,despitequestionsaboutthequalityof information,GubbandMeller-

Herbert would no doubt agree with Kristian Niemetz, based at the IEA, that due to the

complexityofsupply-demandstructuresinhealthcareonlythemarketcanactasanarbiter

ofinformation.612ThisisapropositionheavilyinfluencedbyFriedrichvonHayek’stheoryof

markets,andbearsastrongresemblancetohisclassicarticle‘KnowledgeinSociety’.613

Gubb and Meller-Herbert therefore argue that markets are appropriate for healthcare

systems, but that these should be limited primarily to transactions occurring between

purchasersandprovidersofhealthcare.614Thisproposedmovetowardsamarketwhich is

insulatedfromtheconsumerinformsasummaryofanumberofdifferenthealthcaresystems

laterinthereport.KeytothisdiscussionisthedistinctionbetweenNordicandBismarckian

systems. Since the Nordic countries acted as a model for earlier UK health reforms, the

610Ibid.,8.611Ibid.;Thisalsostrongly resembles theargumentsetout inHewitt, ‘CreatingaPatient-LedNHS:TheNextStepsForward’.612KristianNiemetz,‘HealthCheck:TheNHSandMarketReforms’(London,2014),48.613FriedrichA.Hayek,‘KnowledgeinSociety’,AmericanEconomicReview35,no.4(1945):519–30.614GubbandMeller-Herbert,MarketsinHealthCare,39–40.

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similaritybetweenthetwosystemswasnoted,althoughthereportstressestheperceived

limitationsofNorthernEuropeanschemes:

PossiblythemostrestrictiveuseofmarketsisintheNHSinEnglandwhere

thegovernmentlargelycontrolsthefunding,provision,resourceallocation

andregulationofhealthcare.themarket,instead,is‘mimicked’througha

splitbetweenorganisationsthatpurchasecareandthosethatprovideit….

Interestingly,NordiccountriessuchasSwedenandDenmarkhavefollowed

asimilarpath,althoughthemajordifferencehereisthatfundsarelargely

raised through local taxes and health care is the responsibility of local

authorities.615

ThiswascontrastedwiththeBismarckiansystems(France,Germany,theNetherlandsetc.)in

whichtherearemuchhigherlevelsofnon-stateprovision(around50%)andgreaterchoice

of doctors, specialists, hospitals and so forth. Additionally, given that purchasing is

administeredbyindependenthealthinsurancefunds,Bismarckiansystemswerenotseenas

‘mimicked’,butgenuinemarkets.Inspiteoftheinclusionofgenuinemarkets,itwasargued,

thesesystemsallguaranteeuniversalcoverage.616

Within this articulation, the NHS was contrasted negatively with European systems on a

numberofcounts.Itscorporatestructurewithanartificialquasi-marketdidnotpossessthe

democraticmandateoftheNordiccountries;didnotallowchoiceofpurchaser,asinGermany,

615Ibid.,47.GubbandMeller-HerbertimplythattheNordiccountriesfollowedBritaininadoptingandinternalquasi-market.AlthoughNPMideasoriginatedintheUKandUS,itisanover-simplificationtosuggestastraightadoptionoftheinternalmarket.See;Magnussenetal.,‘Introduction:TheNordicModelofHealthCare’,11–14;MartinussenandMagnussen,‘HealthCareReform:TheNordicExperience’,passim.616GubbandMeller-Herbert,MarketsinHealthCare,48–9.

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the Netherlands and Switzerland; and did not link customer and insurer directly through

financial transfer as in the French system.As a result of this, theNHSwas articulated as

curtailing patient choice, and limiting the potential for efficiency and innovation, while

providingworseoutcomes.617Elsewhere,Gubbarguedthatthesolutiontosystemicissuesin

thehealthservicewasauniversalmodel(i.e.precludingtheUSsystem)inwhichthestate

actedasunderwriterandregulatorofa‘socialmarket’,butnotasamajorfunderorprovider.

ThiswouldessentiallyentailamovetowardsaBismarckianmodel.618Itwasalsoconsistent

withthegeneralaimtodiversifyprovisiontoincludeindependentfor-profit,not-for-profit

andstateproviders.619

ThisdiscoursewasmostclearlyarticulatedinKristianNiemetz’sHealthCheck,a2014working

paper released through the IEA. 620 In this report, Niemetz outlined the NHS metrics in

comparison to other Europeanhealthcare systems.Henoted that itwas belowall of the

Nordiccountriesincancersurvivalrates,andrankedclosertoEasternthanWesternEuropean

healthsystemsonthesemeasures.621Hewentontoofferapracticalapproachwhichwould

alterthecurrentinfrastructureoftheNHStomakeitmorecloselyresembleasocialhealth

insurance system. Niemetz claimed that Clinical Commissioning Groups (CCGs), which

purchasethemajorityofhealthcareintheNHS,couldbechangedtoresemblethestructure

of German Krankenkassen, the chief purchasers of healthcare in Germany.622Under this

model, providers would be paid by results, although as Pauline Allen notes, payment by

617GubbandMeller-Herbert,MarketsinHealthCare.618JamesGubb,‘WhytheNHSIstheSickManofEurope’,CivitasReview5,no.1(2008):8.619Ibid.,9;GubbandMeller-Herbert,MarketsinHealthCare.620‘HealthCheck:TheNHSandMarketReforms’.621Ibid.,13–15.622Ibid.,42.

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resultsissomethingofamisnomer:providersareusuallypaidbyactionduetothedifficulty

ofmeasuringresults.623InNiemetz’sfree-marketbasedschema,thiswouldallowhospitalsto

failas,wereaprovidertobecomeinsolvent,provisioncouldsimplybefoundelsewhere.An

importantcorollarytothisargumentwasthatsupplywouldnotcontractifaproviderwere

togobust.Instead,failingproviderswouldbeboughtoutbymoresuccessfulones,effectively

mirroringtheflawintheoriginalNHSinternalmarket,whichalwaysretainedaroutebackto

publicownershipforfailinghealthproviders(see4.2.1,above).624

Ifimplemented,thesystemssetoutbyGubbandMeller-HerbertandNiemetzwouldentail

profound changes to the functioning of the NHS in England. The elimination of public

provisionwouldremoveanyfunctionaldifferencebetweenNHSprovidersand,sayBUPAor

Capio, British and Swedish independenthealthproviders respectively.625Amajor focusof

Niemetz’s free-market discourse of healthcare systems was an attempt to articulate the

entranceofprivatehealthcaresuppliersastheonlymeansbywhichchoice,efficiencyand

improved outcomes could be achieved. The introduction of private providers andmarket

mechanismswasalsoanormativegood:‘themortalfrightofmarketmechanismsandprivate

initiative in healthcarewhich characterises British debate is entirely unwarranted’.626This

representsanimportantfree-marketnodalpointinthehealthgovernancenetwork,which

hashadsignificanteffectsonthediscoursesincetheNewLabourera.Itisalsoacontinuation

ofhistoricarticulationsofNewPublicManagementpolicies,whicharguedfortheartificiality

623 Pauline Allen, ‘Restructuring the NHS Again: Supply Side Reform in Recent English Health Care Policy’,FinancialAccountabilityandAccountability24,no.4(2009):377–8.624Niemetz,‘HealthCheck:TheNHSandMarketReforms’,41–2.625Ibid.,42.626KristianNiemetz,‘WhatAreWeAfraidOf?UniversalHealthcareinMarket-OrientedHealthSystems’(London,2015),36.

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ofpublic-privatesplitsinserviceprovisionandthepotentialforthereformofpublicservices

alongmarket lineswithconsumersabletochoose inmarkets. Inthisrespect, free-market

actorscleavedtothediscoursesputforwardbyMiltonFriedman,JamesBuchananandAlbert

O. Hirschmann, although in other important respects, especially theories of information,

thesearesupplementedbytheargumentsofHayek.627

From a relatively fringe position, the free-market nodal point became significantly more

popularinthehealthgovernancenetworkfromthemid-2000s.Itisthereforeinterestingto

note the crossover between Eliot Bidgood’s Healthcare Systems and Gubb and Meller-

Herbert’s and Niemetz’s work. Even though Bidgood was interested in the Swedish,

Beveridgian,system,andarticulatedSwedenasamodeloflocalism,thedegreetowhichhis

useofsignifiersmirrorsthoseoffree-marketactorsisstriking.Althoughnominallydiscussing

quitedifferentsystems,theirarticulationsof‘choice’,‘equality’and‘competition’coincideto

asignificantdegree,andthelogicof‘equalityofoutcome’isvirtuallyentirelyreplacedbythe

logic of ‘equality of opportunity (access)’. The basic principle of the introduction of a

competitivemarketandthearticulationof‘choice’,aproxyfor‘freedom’,astheprimarygoal

ofsystemre-designintheEnglishNHShadbecomehegemonic.Significantly,thislogicwas

sustainedbothwithreferencetotheBismarckianmodel,whichwasinherentlymarket-based,

andtheSwedishandotherNordiccountries,whichhadinstitutedquasi-market,NPMreforms.

627MiltonFriedman,CapitalismandFreedom(Chicago:TheUniversityofChicagoPress,1982);BuchananandTullock,CalculusofConsent;Hirschmann,Exit,Voice,andLoyalty.

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5.5.3‘Unintelligiblegobbledygook’:628TheHealthandSocialCareAct2012

TheintroductionoftheHealthandSocialCareActin2012wasunderstoodbyallpartiesasa

watershedmomentinthehistoryoftheNHS.Itwasintroducedwithreferencetomanyof

the free-market signifiers which had gradually displaced earlier social democratic

articulationsoftheNHSinthehealthgovernancenetwork.Althoughthe2010Departmentof

Health White Paper Equity and Excellence: Liberating the NHS does not make specific

referencetoanyinternationalsystem,itisclearthatthediscussionconductedinthehealth

governance network forms the core ofmuch of the so-called Lansley Plan.629In essence,

LiberatingtheNHSarticulatedthepatientasthecoreoftheNHS,placingthemfirmlyinthe

roleofconsumerandnotingthat‘patientswillbeattheheartofeverythingwedo’.630The

reportwentontoarguethatpatientswillhave‘greaterchoiceandcontrol’,andglossedthis

usingtheaxiom‘nodecisionaboutmewithoutme’.631

ThislogicranthroughtheWhitePaper,whichaimedtoabolishPCTsinfavourofthecreation

ofGPcommissioninggroups,inorderto‘devolvepowerandresponsibilityforcommissioning

servicestothehealthcareprofessionalsclosesttopatients’,theaimofwhichwas‘toshift

decision-makingascloseaspossibletoindividualpatients’.632Intermsofitsstructure,this

amountedtoamovebacktowardstheoriginalinternalmarketasproposedbyKennethClarke

inthelate1980s.Thisreinforcedthelogicof‘choice’.Thereportnotedthat‘[p]eoplewant

choice, and evidence at home and abroad shows that it improves quality’.633 While the

628Chris Smyth, Rachel Sylvester, andAlice Thomson, ‘NHS ReformsOurWorstMistake, Tories Admit’,TheTimes,13October2014.629‘EquityandExcellence:LiberatingtheNHS’,WhitePaper(London:DepartmentofHealth,July2010).630Ibid.,1.631Ibid.,3.632Ibid.,30,4,27.633Ibid.,16.

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previous LabourGovernmentwas applauded for its introductionof patient choice, itwas

arguedthatthiswastoonarrow,sinceitfocusedonlyonchoiceofprovider.634Thisperceived

deficiencywould be rectified by the introduction of choice of provider, but as part of an

expandedchoiceoftreatmentinmostareasoftheNHSinEngland.635

Theproposedchangestoprovisiondidnotendwiththeintroductionofchoiceforpatients.

Inaddition,thestructureoftheNHSwouldbealteredtoabolishNHStrustsandreplacethem

withfoundationtrusts.636Thiswouldaidtheintroductionofmarketstructuresonthebasis

thatproviderswouldbetotallyindependentofanyassociationwiththeNHS.Thiswouldhave

twofurtherconsequences,bothofwhichhadbecomehegemonicpositionswithinthehealth

governancenetwork.Firstly,itwoulddevolvehealthcareworkers’contractsfromthestate,

somethingwhichisexplicitlyacknowledgedlaterinthereport.637Healthcareworkerswould

thereforenegotiatewiththeirindividualemployer,ratherthanwiththestate.Implicitly,this

wouldreducethepowerofthemedicalunions.638Furthermore,thereformwouldcreatea

system inwhich ‘inmost sectorsof care, anywillingprovider canprovide services, giving

patients greater choice and ensuring effective competition stimulates innovation and

improvements,andincreasesproductivitywithinasocialmarket’.639

634Ibid.635Ibid.,18.636Ibid.,36.637Ibid.,41.638TheimplicationsoftheHealthandSocialCareActformedicalpractitioners’employmentconditionsremainhighlytopicalatthetimeofwritinginFebruary2017.Inlate2016,juniordoctorscalledfive-daystrikesinthreeconsecutivemonthsin2016inprotestattheimpositionofnewcontractswhichhadearlierbeenacceptedbytheBritishMedicalAssociation,butrejectedonamembers’ballot.Theendof2016andbeginningof2017wasmarkedbya‘crisis’intheNHS,aneventualitywhichNHSstaff,theirunionsandNHSbosseshadwarnedthegovernmentaboutforseveralyearsprior.639‘LiberatingtheNHS’,37.

288

TheintroductionoftheHealthandSocialCareAct2012waswidelyconsideredtohavebeen

atotalpoliticaldisaster.Itwasdescribedas‘unintelligiblegobbledygook’byoneanonymous

seniorConservative,andamuchmorefar-rangingreportchronicledthepoliticalerrorswhich

ledtoitsfailureinpainstakingdetail.640Nonetheless,thebasicstructureoftheWhitePaper,

andtheActitself,closelymatchedthehegemonicdiscoursewhichhademergedinthehealth

governancenetworkfavouringtheintroductionofamarketcharacterisedbycompetitionand

choice. This brought themovement in this direction begun by New Labour to its logical

conclusion.ThearticulationoftheNordichealthcaresystemsasconsistentwiththese‘choice’

modelsfacilitatedthecreationofthisdiscourse,especiallygiventhegradualassociationof

theNordicsignifierwith‘equalityofopportunity’,andthedeclineofadiscoursebasedonthe

achievementof ‘equalityofoutcome’. Indeed, it isparticularly striking that there isnota

singleuseofthewordequality,ineithersense,inLiberatingtheNHS.

TheperiodbetweenthepublicationoftheWhitePaperandthepassageoftheHealthand

SocialCareActwasalsoaperiodofintenseactivityinthenetworkatlarge.Thedeepeningof

market-basedstructuresandchoicereformledtoaseriesofpiecesarguingthattheSwedish

healthcaresystemwasapotentialmodelforthesechanges.Italsosawthere-emergenceof

piecesidentifyingCapioandSt.Göran’sHospitalasamodelfortheEnglishNHStoemulate.

Thiswasgenerallyreferredtoeitherasthe‘Swedishmodel’orthe‘Stockholmmodel’.The

entranceofCapiointotheNHSmarketduringtheNewLabourerameantthatSwedishfirms

hadaninterestinpromotingthismodelasameansforprivatemanagerialcompaniestoenter

640Smyth,Sylvester,andThomson,‘NHSReformsOurWorstMistake,ToriesAdmit’;NicholasTimmins,‘NeverAgain?TheStoryoftheHealthandSocialCareAct2012’(London:King’sFund/InstituteforGovernment,2012).

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thehealthserviceandtheyhadbuiltproductivelinkswiththeEnglishmedia,especiallyThe

Economist,duringthisperiod.

Duringthisperiod,Nordicactors,notjustinhealthcare,werefrequentlyarticulatedinterms

whicheitheravoidedideologicaldesignationorappealedexplicitlytofree-marketsignifiers.

In this vein, readers of The Economist were bidden ‘[w]elcome to health care in post-

ideologicalSweden’,whilereadersofTheGuardianwerewarnedthat‘[d]espiteitsreputation

asaleftwingutopia,Swedenisnowalaboratoryforrightwingradicalism’.641Theassociation

ofSwedenandtheNordichealthsystemswithsocialdemocracyhadbeenallbutabandoned;

rather, the aimwas to rearticulate the Swedishmodel in order to ‘change the politics of

tomorrow’,asKarinSvanborg-Sjövall,CEOofTimbro,theSwedishfree-marketthink-tank,put

it.642The engagement of Swedish actorswith British public policy debates as ameans to

advance particular articulations of Sweden, and/orNorden, has been a consistent thread

throughoutthisstudy.Althoughthiswaslesssustainedinthecaseofthehealthgovernance

network, comparedwith thesustainedengagement in the fieldsofpoliticaleconomyand

education (see chapter five), it is nonetheless significant, especially given that these

interventionstypicallyoccurredattimeswhenpublicpolicywhichpresentedopportunities

forSwedishfirmswasbeingdevelopedorimplemented.Despiteitsenormousunpopularity

inEngland,andthesymboliccharacterwhichittookoninthedevolvednations(Scotland,

WalesandNorthernIreland)whichhaveresponsibilityfortheirownhealthcaresystems,the

HealthandSocialCareActshouldbeseenastheculminationofarticulationsofhealthcareto

whichmodelsoftheNordicandotherEuropeancountries,especiallyGermany,wereakey

641Ramesh,‘SpecialReport:HealthService’;‘AHospitalCase’.642KarinSvanborg-Sjövall,‘Society:PublicManager:SwedenProvesThatPrivateProfitImprovesServicesandInfluencesPolicy’,TheGuardian,6February2013.

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part.Thedevelopmentofhegemonicdiscourses,whichemphasisedchoiceandcompetition,

aswellaslocalism,inthehealthgovernancenetworkmirrorchangesindiscoursebypolitical

partiesandhealthsecretaries.

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5.6Conclusions

The fundamental argumentof this chapterwas that successivehealth reforms inEngland

since 1997 have adopted the logic of ‘choice’ and articulated significant portions of this

agendaasconsistentwithaNordicmodelofhealthcare,basedonfundingthroughgeneral

taxation, a split between purchaser and provider and increased choice for the consumer

(patient).Thechapteralsotheorisedarangeofactorsaspartofahealthgovernancenetwork,

concerned with policy steering in the area of public healthcare. These included the

Department of Health, various Ministers for Health, the three major political parties in

England/theUK,policythink-tanks,andprivatehealthcareproviders.

Itwasargued that from thebeginningof theNewLabourera,ministerial strategieswere

conditionedbythediscoursescurrent inthehealthgovernancenetwork.AlthoughLabour

attemptedtomoveawayfromcompetitionandmarket-basedreform,by2000itwasalready

re-articulatingpreviousdiscoursesasconsistentwiththelogicof‘choice’and‘competition’.

Labour Health Secretaries of this era were concerned to implement choice reformwhile

defending the basic principles of a taxation-funded system. To do this, they frequently

appealedtothe‘Beveridgian’tax-fundedsystemsoftheNordiccountries,arguingthatthe

perceived success ofNewPublicManagement reforms in theNordic countries vindicated

theirapproachtohealthcarepolicy.

The theme of a Nordicmodel of healthcare based on ‘choice’ logics became one of two

importanthegemonicnodalpointsinthehealthgovernancenetwork.Theothernodalpoint

was also structured around the logic of ‘choice’, but favoured the introduction of an

insurance-funded ‘Bismarckian’ healthcare system, paradigmatically modelled on the

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Germansocialhealthinsurancesystem.Forthefree-marketactorsinthenetwork,equality

wasimpossibletoachievewithinamoralframeworkwhichprivilegedpersonalfreedom.On

the other hand, the Nordic countries remained attractive to moderate liberals and New

Labouronthebasisthatitseemedtoofferameanstoreconcile‘freedom’and‘equality’;an

antagonismwhichappearedotherwiseimpossibletoresolve.

Athirdpositiondevelopedaroundlocalismandpre-emptedtheresurgenceofOneNation

conservativethinkingintheUKConservativePartyitselfbyseveralyears.Thisrepresenteda

challenge to the mechanistic logics of the Third Way and free-market ideas about the

democratic logicofconsumerchoiceswithinmarkets.Thechiefexponentofthisviewwas

SimonJenkins,whoarguedthattheprimarycharacteristicoftheNordiccountrieswastheir

emphasis on thequality and accountability of public anddemocratic institutions.While a

localistdiscoursediddevelopinthehealthgovernancenetwork,Jenkins’emphasisonformal

democracyandaccountabilityastheprimarygoalofreformwasnotwidelypopular,given

thatitdidnotpromiseparticularresults,andarguablydidnotengagewithotherarticulations

whichhopedtoresolvetheantagonismbetween‘freedom’and‘equality’.

Labour’s accommodation of equalitywith New PublicManagementmarket theorieswas,

however, difficult to sustain.While the articulation of ‘choice’ with the Nordic countries

becamehegemonicwithinthehealthgovernancenetwork,theemphasisondefendingatax-

fundedsystemwaseffectivelydroppedafterthereturnofaConservative-LiberalDemocrat

coalitioninthe2010UKGeneralElection.Subsequentreformsweremoreconcernedtomove

theNHStowardstheadoptionof ‘Bismarckian’structures,andthe introductionofprivate

provisionintotheNHS,intensifyingatrendwhichhadbeeninitiatedunderNewLabour.

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NordicactorswerealsokeytothearticulationofaparticularNordicmodelofhealthcare.

Capio, a Swedish for-profit health provider, entered the network in the mid-2000s and

receivedseveralcontractsduringtheNewLabourera.Itsentryintothenetworkledtothe

development of a discourse which argued for a Nordic, in particular Swedish, model of

healthcareemphasisingcompetition,marketstructuresandprivateprovision,althoughthis

remained controversial. The expansion of the health governance network to include

transitional private firms alsomade it less amenable to steering, a problemwhich began

underNewLabourandhaspersistedunderitsConservative-ledsuccessorgovernments.

This period saw a discourse emerge in which the Nordic countries were enchained with

classicallyliberal,free-marketsignifiers,suchas‘choice’and‘freedom’.Thiswascombined

withaparticularnotionofdemocracywhichwasviewedasarighttochooseinmarkets.The

Nordicmodelwhichemergesfromthehealthgovernancethereforeischaracterisedbymixed

public-privateprovision,consumerchoiceandNewPublicManagementstructures.

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Chapter Six – The ‘c-word’ and the ‘v-word’: Choice and

voucherreformintheEnglishschoolsystem

6.1Introduction

Thepreviouschapterlookedatasetofreformsintroducedinhealthcarewithreferencetoa

hegemonic policy discourse based on Hayekian problematics. In particular, discussions

focusedonhow information couldbeproducedwhichallowed for the creationofproper

marketsignalsconducivetotheintroductionofamarketintheEnglishNHS.Muchofthiswas

articulated with reference to either the Nordic countries or the so-called ‘Bismarckian’

healthcaresystemsofWesternandCentralEurope.

Thischapterwillexaminethedevelopment–andportionsoftheimplementation–ofapolicy

which was modelled on a school reform introduced in Sweden in 1991, but which was

originallyenvisagedwithreferencetotheDanisheducationsystem.Theunderlyinglogicof

thisdiscourserestsnotonHayek,butratheronNewPublicManagement(NPM)andpublic

choicetheories,whichoriginatedwiththeChicagoSchoolanditsfellowtravellers,agroup

which was founded around Milton Friedman, who was professor of economics at the

UniversityofChicagoformanyyears.

Theaimsofthischapterwillbethreefold.Firstly,itwillexaminehowaNordic-inspiredreform

discoursedevelopedinapositededucationgovernancenetworkinEngland,beginninginthe

early2000suntilaround2014.Todothis,Iwillsketchoutthecontoursofthenetworkand

examine a range of policy documents which put forward Nordic education policies as

programmes foranEnglish reform.Secondly, thechapterwill link thesediscourses to the

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chiefprinciplesofNPMmarketreformandexaminetheimpactofthisontheNordicsignifier.

Finally,thechapterwilldiscusshowthehegemonicdiscourseintheeducationgovernance

networkwastransmittedoutwardsthroughpoliticalspeeches,WhitePapersandthemedia.

Thechapterwillbestructuredalongsimilarlinestochaptersthreeandfour.Firstly,itwillset

outtheinstitutionalcontexttothereforminSwedenandEnglandpriortothepassageofthe

Academies Act 2010. Next, it will set out the primary actors involved in the education

governancenetwork,includinggovernmentdepartments,politicalparties,think-tanksandso

forth,whichhavehadanimpactonthereform.Thefollowingtwosectionswillofferadetailed

discourseanalysisofthetextswhichhavebeenproducedinthenetwork.Thechapterwill

concludewithsomesummaryremarks,whichwillintroducesomebroaderargumentsabout

the process of signification in modelling and how this case study can help theorise this

operation.

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6.2TheSwedishVoucherReformandtheEnglishschoolsystem

6.2.1NewPublicManagementandSweden’svoucherreform

Thefirstarticulationofavoucherreformasamodelfordeliveringpublicserviceswasput

forwardbyMiltonFriedmanina1955essaycalled‘TheRoleofGovernmentinEducation’.643

Friedmanarguedthatpubliceducationshouldbeconsideredamandatorypublicgood,but,

ratherthandeliveringeducationthroughpublicsupply,educationcouldbedeliveredthrough

thecreationofamarketinwhichvouchersforthevalueofschoolingcouldbeused.Hewrites:

Governmentscouldrequireaminimumlevelofschoolingfinancedbygiving

parents vouchers redeemable for a specifiedmaximum sumper child per

yearifspenton"approved"educationalservices.Parentswouldthenbefree

to spend this sum and any additional sum they themselves provided on

purchasingeducationalservicesfroman“approved”institutionoftheirown

choice.644

Thispositionwaswidelyconsideredattractiveinfree-marketcircles,butitbecamepractically

influentialwhen itwasadaptedbyAlbertO.Hirschmann inhis1970bookExit,Voiceand

Loyalty. Hirschmann attempted to carve out a practical means by which public choice

arguments,suchasFriedman’s,couldbeintroducedasapracticalprogrammeofreform.645

Asthetitlesuggests,Hirschmann’sconcernwastosystematicallydescribetheimplicationsof

a systemsuchas Friedman’s inwhichexit frompublicprovisionwasa seriouspossibility.

AlthoughHirschmanniscriticalofwhathedescribesas‘theeconomists’biasinfavorofexit

643SeeFriedman,CapitalismandFreedom,75–101.644Ibid.,77–8.645Exit,Voice,andLoyalty.

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andagainstvoice’,hisschemaisthefirstrealattempttoimagineapublicsysteminwhich

exit is a theoretical and practical possibility.646 Hirschmann is correct to identify that in

Friedman’sarticulationtheonlyoptioninthecaseofsub-standardsupplyisexit.Hirschmann

argues thatFriedman’sassertionthat, ‘for therest, [parents]canexpress theirviewsonly

throughcumbrouspoliticalchannels’,whichundervaluesthepotentialforpartiestoexercise

‘voice’asacorrectivetosub-standardoutcomes.647Thisisespeciallytrueonthebasisthat

‘voice’is‘theonlywayinwhichdissatisfiedcustomersormemberscanreactwheneverthe

exitoptionisunavailable’.Inthecaseofpublicservices,theexitoptionisfraughtwithgreater

difficulties,asnotonlydotheusualcostsandpenaltiesofexitapply,butmasswithdrawal

frompublicservicescouldcausethedeteriorationofservicesresultinginwidersocialeffects

whichimpacttheindividual.648

Hirschmann’sworkwaswidelyinfluentialinthecreationofNPMsystemsandsupplemented

many of the perceived deficiencies in Friedman’s plan for the introduction of markets

structured around state-backed vouchers. It also introduced many concepts which had

previouslybeenthoughtofasprimarilyeconomicinapplicationintothesphereofpolitical

theoryandpublicpolicy.

The introduction of the Swedish voucher reform strongly resembles the programme put

forwardbyHirschmann.Indeed,NPMreformsaresometimesreferredtoas‘theAmerican

Way’inSweden.649AschoolvoucherreformhadbeenpartoftheSwedishModerateParty’s

646Ibid.,16–17.647Friedman,CapitalismandFreedom,91;Hirschmann,Exit,Voice,andLoyalty,16.648Hirschmann,Exit,Voice,andLoyalty,30–54.649Andersson,‘Liberalisation,PrivatisationandRegulationintheSwedishHealthcareSector/hospitals’,4.

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manifestoforsometimebefore1991,butbecameinfluentialintheearly1980satatimeof

concertedopposition to SocialDemocraticParty (SAP)policies, including thewage-earner

funds, from a broad coalition of actors, ranging from liberal and conservative parties,

employers groups, sectionsof the SAP itself and themedia (see 1.2 and2.2.1, above).650

AlthoughtheSAPwonthe1985Swedishgeneralelection,therewasnonethelesswidespread

discontentabout thestateofSwedishpublic services,and in thisclimate thegovernment

begantointroducederegulatorypoliciesincapitalandcurrencymarketsandmovetowards

achoiceagendainpublicprovision.Thisfundamentallyrepositionedthestateasaservice

providertoanationofconsumers.Bytheendofthe1980stheSwedishSocialDemocrats

wereendorsingquasi-marketpoliciesandsomeofthecentralcontrolsonschoolshadalready

been dismantled before the introduction of the voucher policy by a Moderate-led

governmentin1992.651ThevoucherreformtransformedSweden’seducationsystemfroma

highlybureaucraticcentralisedmodeltooneofthemostliberalintheworld.652

Inpracticalterms,theimplementationofthevoucherreformoccurredintwoprimaryphases.

Inthefirstphase,the1991-94Moderate-ledcoalitionintroducedareforminwhichthestate

fundedavouchertothevalueof85%ofthecostofaschoolplace,basedontheaveragecost

inthestudent’slocalarea,shouldparentswishtosendtheirchildrentoaschoolotherthan

themunicipalschool.653Parentswishingtosendtheirchildrentosuchaschoolwouldhave

650PaulaBlomqvist,‘TheChoiceRevolution:PrivatizationofSwedishWelfareServicesinthe1990s’,SocialPolicyandAdministration38,no.2(2004):139–55Seealsochapteroneabove.651Ibid.,144–5.652Ibid.,148.653MartinCarnoy,‘NationalVoucherPlansinChileandSweden:DidPrivatizationReformsMakeforBetterEducation?’,ComparativeEducationReview42,no.3(1998):331,doi:10.1086/447510.

299

to invest15%of the costof the year themselves.654In this respect, theoriginal reform is

reminiscentofasimilarprogrammeinDenmark,datingbacktothenineteenth-century, in

whichparentswishingtoeducatetheirchildrenoutsidethepublicsystemaregrantedupto

75%ofthecostofaschoolplaceandmust‘top-up’thedifference.TheSwedishreformalso

introducedanewnationalcurriculumand letschoolsdecidehowspecificgoalsshouldbe

reached.655

ThereformswerealteredsignificantlyaftertheSAPreturnedtogovernmentin1994.Itwas

considered unacceptable for private schools to accept money from the state and

simultaneouslychargefees.Toremedythis,theSAPincreasedthevalueofthevoucherto

covertheentirecostofanygivenschoolyear.Pricingwasdeterminedbasedonthevalueof

a school year in eachmunicipality. This limited the development of a quasi-market with

stratifiedpricestructuring,butretainedthepotentialforchoiceandexit,whichwerecentral

totheoriginallogicofthereform.

6.2.2EducationinEngland2000-2010

UnderpinningtheConservativeschoolreformof2010wasastructurewhichdatedbackto

JohnMajor’ssecondtermasPrimeMinister(1992-97).Inmuchthesamewayastheprevious

chaptercontextualisedNewLabour’shealthcarereformsandtheHealthandSocialCareAct

2012withreferencetotheinternalmarketwhichcamebeforeit(seechapterfour,above),

the fundamental education system which the Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition

654ÅsaAhlin,‘DoesSchoolCompetitionMatter?EffectsofLargeScaleSchoolChoiceReformonStudentPerformance’(Uppsala,2003),5.655Carnoy,‘NationalVoucherPlansinChileandSweden:DidPrivatizationReformsMakeforBetterEducation?’,331.

300

inherited was still primarily understood by policy actors through articulations which first

becamecurrentinthe1990s.

GrantMaintained(GM)schools,whichwereoutsidetheoversightoflocalauthorities,were

firstcreatedin1988.TheEducationReformActofthatyearprovidedforthecreationofGM

schoolsandCityTechnologyColleges(CTCs),ofwhichtherewerefarfewer.656StephenBall

arguesthatGMschoolsshouldbeseenastheforerunnerofLabour’sacademiesprogramme

and Free Schools, given the shared emphasis of independence from local authorities and

direct central funding.657The creation of an autonomous school system rearticulated the

relationshipbetweenschooling,parentsandpupils.Whereascomprehensiveschoolinghad

historicallybeenorganisedalongcommunityandgeographicallineswithlimitedchoiceasa

resultofcatchmentareas, theGMschoolsandCTCprogrammearticulatedschoolingasa

process inwhich educationwas consumed, and parents and pupilswere consumerswith

choices between local authority run ‘controlled schools’, and independent maintained

schools.658Althoughan incrementalstep,this increasinglypositionedactors inwayswhich

wereconsistentwiththeprinciplesofNPMreforms.

NewLabourabolishedGMschoolsin1998,buttheLearningandSkillsAct2000expandedthe

basiclogicofCTCs.ThisprocesscontinuedintheEducationAct2002andtheEducationAct

2005;allthreepiecesoflegislationwereintroducedtomodifyprovisionsintheEducationAct

656StephenJ.Ball,‘TheReluctantStateandtheBeginningoftheEndofStateEducation’,JournalofEducationalAdministrationandHistory44,no.March2015(2012):94–5.657Ibid.,94.658EducationReformAct,1988.

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1996,whichhadinturnupdatedprovisionsintheEducationAct1988.659Akeyfeatureofthe

GM and CTC programme was the introduction of specialisms for participating schools,

primarily in music, art, drama, and sport for GM schools, and science, technology and

mathematicsforCTCs.UnderLabour’sAcademyplanthiswasexpandedtoincludeallschools,

not justAcademies,andawider rangeof subjects, including foreign languages.660Despite

significantanxietyaboutthepotentialfortheschools’intakestosegregate,especiallyalong

classlinesifschoolsweregivencontrolovertheirownadmissionspolicies,itwasarguedthat

theintroductionofspecialisationwouldleadmiddle-classparentstoseekoutschoolswhich

suitedtheirchild’s interests. Itwasevenarguedthatsuchamovecouldenhancelevelsof

inclusion by disrupting the tendency for middle-class parents to behave in self-selecting

fashionbychoosingschoolswithlargernumbersofmiddle-classstudents.661

AnneWest and Hazel Pennell argue that while the ConservativeMajor government was

motivatedbyabeliefinthepowerofmarketforcestoorganisesocietyandpublicservicesin

general,New Labour, although still committed to the principles of the quasi-market,was

concernedtoreducethepotentialforstratificationandamelioratesomeoftheimpactsofa

relativelyunregulatedquasi-marketstructure.662Thisisobviousintheimperativetoreduce

theimpactofmiddle-classself-selection.However,itisinterestingtonotethatthesolution

to this problem is located firmly on the supply-side: schoolswhich cater to the needs of

middle-classconsumersshouldbecreated.This is incontrasttodemand-side intervention

659EducationAct2002,2002,http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2002/32/pdfs/ukpga_20020032_en.pdf;EducationAct2005,2005,http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2005/18/pdfs/ukpga_20050018_en.pdf.660AnneWestandHazelPennell,HowNewIsNewLabour?TheQuasi-MarketandEnglishSchools1997to2001(London:LSEResearchOnline,2002),6–7,http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/archive/00000214.661Ibid.,15–16.662Ibid.,1–5,14–15.

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whichwouldactivelystrengthenordampendemandforschoolplacesinparticularareasor

among certain sections of the population. The logic of comprehensive schooling is also

effectivelyforeigntothisdiscourse.WestandPennellnotethatthismayevenrepresentan

intensification of market logic compared to the Conservative reform. 663 In this respect,

education discourse stronglymirrors the order of signification identified inNew Labour’s

healthdiscourse in chapter four.Themosteffectivemeans toachieve ‘equality’ inhealth

outcomeswasthrough‘choice’and‘competition’,anarticulationwhichpersistsinLabour’s

understandingofeducationreform.

Thismove towards an articulation of ‘choice’ and ‘competition’ shifted the logic of state

intervention in education, and public services in general. The state’s role became one of

purchaser, entailing a retreat from provision. Rather than being involved in day-to-day

runningofservices,thestatewasinsteadprimarilychargedwithsettingbenchmarkswhich

independenttrusts,schoolfederations,orothersponsorswerechargedwithdelivering.664

Thisapproachreliedonthecreationofnewrelationshipsbetweenactorsalongsimilarlines

to thoseconsidered in thepreviouschapteronhealthcare,and, ingeneral, thismeansof

organisingeducationprovisionwasinlinewithtrendsinallareasofpublicservicesduring

periods ofNPM reform. These relationships often requiredhigh levels of trust, especially

betweensponsorsandschools involvedinpartnerships,althoughtheserelationshipswere

alsoconstitutedalonglinesmorefamiliarinbusiness.665

663Ibid.,15–16.664StephenJ.Ball,‘AcademiesinContext:Politics,BusinessandPhilanthropyandHeterarchicalGovernance’,ManagementinEducation23,no.3(2009):103.665Ibid.,106.

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FollowingtheUKGeneralElectionofthatyear,theAcademiesAct2010wasoneofthefirst

piecesofbusinesstocomebeforeParliamentaftertheformationoftheConservative-Liberal

Democratcoalition.Thecoalitionwasofficiallyformedon11thMay2010andthebillreceived

royalassentandpassedintolawon27thJuly2010.Themainpurposeoftheactwastoexpand

thepowersofschoolswithAcademystatus,includingFreeSchools,whichtheBillintroduced

intotheEnglishsystem.TheexpansionoftheAcademysystemwasseenasameanstoexpand

‘choice’and‘exit’mechanismsintheschoolsystem.FreeSchoolswerekeytothis,asthey

wouldallowparentswhoweredissatisfiedwithlocalschoolstofoundtheirown,effectively

dealingwithsomeoftheproblemsof‘exit’identifiedbyHirschmanninhisdiscussionofpublic

servicemarkets.Thegovernmentthereforehopedtodealwithoneofthekeylimitationsof

previous markets and competition in education: the difficulty of allowing unsatisfactory

suppliers to leave the market. It was therefore logical that academy status should be

expandedtoincludeasmanyschoolsaspossible,whichdulyhappened,alteringthepolicy

from its originsunderNewLabour, inwhich academy statuswasonly granted to schools

failingtomeetagreedtargets.DuringMichaelGove’stenureintheDepartmentforEducation

(DfE) (2010-14), this was expanded to include schools which were ‘coasting’. 666 Initial

expansionwas rapid,with 224 applications submitted and80 (64 academies and16 Free

Schools)acceptedbytheendof2010.667

666CoastingSchoolsMeeting,2012,https://www.gov.uk/government/news/coasting-schools-meeting.667Ball,‘TheReluctantStateandtheBeginningoftheEndofStateEducation’,98.

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6.3Theeducationgovernancenetwork

Theeducationgovernancenetworkiscomprisedofalargenumberofactors,includingsome

whichhavebeenconsideredaspartoffree-marketandhealthnetworksintheprevioustwo

chapters.Themeta-governorof theeducationgovernancenetwork is theDepartment for

Education,whichproposesandpassespolicy.Duringtheperiodconsideredinthischapter,

theDfEwasrunbyNewLabourandtheConservatives,althoughthebulkofthechapterwill

beconcernedwiththedevelopmentandpassageoftheFreeSchoolspolicyoutsidetheDfE

itself.Therefore,althoughchronologicallythisanalysiswillbeginduringNewLabour’stenure

intheDfE,thechapterwillprimarilyconsideractorsengagingwiththeUKConservativeParty

in opposition and then later in government. However, it is clear thatmany policy actors

envisagedtheirinterventionsmorebroadlythansimplyappealingtotheConservativeParty;

indeed,thesepolicydiscourseswereclearlyintendedtoapplytoarangeofactorsincluding

NewLabour,theDfE,andothernetworkedactors.Forthisreason,theeducationgovernance

networkwillbeconsideredbroadly,muchlikethehealthgovernancenetworkinchapterfour.

Nonetheless, the development of the Free Schools policy was heavily conditioned by

intellectualandstrategicissueswithintheUKConservativeParty.Althoughportionsofthe

HealthandSocialCareAct2012werearticulatedwithreferencetothe‘BigSociety’agenda,

withtheLiberatingtheNHSwhitepapernotingthat‘theNHSisanintegralpartoftheBig

Society’,668thedevelopmentandarticulationoftheFreeSchoolspolicyisabetterbarometer

ofideologicalchangewithintheUKConservativePartyfromtheearly2000suntiltheirentry

intogovernment.Aswill bediscussed inmuchgreaterdetail below, therewas significant

668‘LiberatingtheNHS’,7.

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tensionbetweenarticulationsoftheFreeSchoolspolicyaspartofamoral‘choice’agenda

andnascentarticulationsoftheSwedishmodelasameanstostimulatecivilinstitutionsand

enhancelocaldemocracy.669

DavidCameron’selectionasleaderoftheConservativeoppositionin2005initiatedastruggle

betweenthefree-markettendencywhichbecamedominantduringtheThatchereraanda

moreOneNationconservativevision.Thegrowthofthelatterledtoare-orientationtowards

civilsocietyundertheCompassionateConservativeandlaterBigSocietyagendas(see2.3.3,

above).TheFreeSchoolsprogrammeanditsdevelopmentshouldbeseenasanimportant

partofthismovementanditsdevelopmentintheeducationgovernancenetworkisdefined

by the struggle between free-market and Compassionate Conservative discourses for

hegemonyinthenetwork.

As in previous chapters, a range of think-tanks participated in the education governance

networkduring thisera.Among themostprolificwas theCentre forPolicy Studies (CPS).

Given the strong historic links between the Conservative Party and CPS, many of its

interventionsshouldbeconsideredprimarily,butnotexclusively,aimedataffectingpolicy

change in theConservativeParty. The Instituteof EconomicAffairs (IEA) also contributed

researchintothepotentialfortheintroductionofquasi-marketreformalongNordiclinesinto

the English school system, as did the Adam Smith Institute (ASI). The Centre forMarket

ReforminEducation(CMRE)alsopublishedonthepotentialbenefitsoftheintroductionof

thevoucherreform,althoughitisrelativelynewandsmall.Think-tankactors’articulationsof

669NeighbourhoodEducation:TheLocalistPapers,2(London:CentreforPolicyStudies,2007);DirectDemocracy:AnAgendaforaNewModelParty(London:direct-democracy.co.uk,2005).

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the Free School reform generally align it with its free-market origins in the thought of

Friedman,and,toalesserextent,Hirschmann.

Arangeofotherthink-tanks,withmoreambivalentattitudestothefree-marketcharacterof

school vouchers, also participated in the education governance network. These included

think-tankssuchasCivitasandPolicyExchange,whichtendtowardsanalysesofcivilsociety,

but which are widely influential in producing policy for government, Labour and the

Conservatives. The Social Market Foundation (SMF) has also published influential pieces

about the Swedish voucher reform, discussing the potential for the creation of a ‘social

market’ineducation,astancewhichiscloserto‘CompassionateConservatism’thanmostof

theargumentsputforwardbyCPSandtheotherfree-marketthink-tanks.Ontheotherhand,

thesediscoursesshareimportantcommonalities,whichwillbediscussedbelowinthebody

ofthechapter.

Reform,athink-tankwithlinkstoallthreemajorparties(Conservative,LabourandLiberal

Democrat) including longstanding ties to New Labour figures, has argued for education

reformalongSwedishlinessinceatleast2004.Indeed,inthatyearReformhostedAnders

Hultin,founderandatthattimeCEOofKunskapsskolan,aSwedishfor-profitschoolprovider,

at a conference in London. It had been arguing for the introduction of ‘choice’ and

deregulationintheEnglishschoolsystemforanumberofyearsbeforethat.Reformconsiders

itself‘liberal’,andshouldnotbeseenasanadopterofthefree-marketdiscoursescommon

to other think-tanks. That said, aswith Civitas and Policy Exchange, therewas significant

crossover between Reform’s articulation of school reform and those emanating from

ideologicallyfree-marketthink-tanks.

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Independent schools and school chains are another important actor in the education

governancenetwork.DuringtheNewLabour-eraanumberoflargeacademychainsjoined

theeducationgovernancenetwork,andatthesametime,independentchainsalsoentered

thegrowingeducationmarketinEngland.Forthisstudy,themostrelevantisKunskapsskolan,

which engaged actively with think-tanks and newspapers involved in the process of

developingeducationpoliciesinEngland.Kunskapsskolan’sengagementwiththepresswas

mostsignificantintheperiodafterthepassageoftheAcademiesAct2010,but,asAnders

Hultin’s engagement with Reform demonstrates, it was already well-integrated into the

educationgovernancenetworkfromamuchearlierstage.KunskapsskolanenteredtheUK

educationmarketaspartoftheLearningSchoolsTrust(LST),whichmanagesanumberof

academies across the country, and which, as of 2014, has been banned from further

expansiononthegroundsthatitwas‘notfocusingonlearning’.670In2014,IpswichAcademy

wasratedinadequatebytheschoolsinspectorate,Ofsted,andremovedfromLST’scontrol.671

Education,perhapsevenmoresothanhealth,isacontroversialtopicandarangeofmedia

actorsareengagedinthearticulationanddisseminationofdiscoursesoneducationreform.

These include the major organs of the business and popular press, the latter covering

broadsheetandtabloidnewspapers.ThisalsoincludesTheTimesEducationSupplement(TES),

whichhastypicallymaintainedarelativelymoderateliberalpositionontheissueofschool

reform,buthasattimesbeensupportiveandcriticalofeducationreformunderNewLabour

670WilliamStewart,‘ProblemAcademyChains“NotFocusingonLearning”,as14AreBannedfromExpanision’,TheTimesEducationalSupplement,20March2014,https://www.tes.com/news/school-news/breaking-news/problem-academy-chains-not-focusing-learning-14-are-banned-expansion.671‘IpswichAcademy’,Schoolreport(Ofsted,10July2013).

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andtheConservative-LiberalDemocratcoalition.Additionally,someimportantmediafigures

were heavily involvedwith the Conservative Party andwith the creation of Free Schools

during this period. In particular, Toby Young, a columnist at The Spectator, has been

supportiveofMichaelGove,ConservativeMinisterforEducation2010-14,andfoundedthe

WestLondonFreeSchoolinTwickenham.Forafullerdiscussionofnewspapersourcessee

2.4.2,above.

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6.4 ‘Won’topponentsdismiss thisasprivatisation?’:672Articulatinga

politicallyacceptable‘schoolchoice’agenda

6.4.1Wewillforceyoutobefree!

SomeofthefirstarticulationsofSwedenasamodelforquasi-marketreformoftheEnglish

educationsystemappearedintheearly2000s.StephenPollard’sAClassAct:WorldLessons

forUKEducation,publishedthroughtheASIin2001,consideredtheexamplesoftheUSA,

NewZealand,DenmarkandSwedenasmodelsfor‘choice’reformintheeducationsystem.673

PollardnotedthatDenmarkhad‘alongtraditionofalarge,publiclysupportedindependent

sector,withvoucherssupportedbyallparties’.674PollardarticulatedtheDanishsystemas

characterisedby‘thebeliefthatparentalauthorityovereducationshouldbeparamount’.675

Further,he stated that three-quartersofDanisheducation spendinggoes to independent

schools; thatDanesbelieve a financial contribution to independent schooling is essential,

except in caseswhere thiswouldcause financialhardship,and that competitionbetween

schoolsrestrainsprices.676

Nonetheless,thereportnotedthatthemajorityofDanishchildrenattendedstate-runschools,

andthemajorityoptingforindependentschoolsdoso,notasaresultof‘theusual,British

reasons’,whichPollardunderstoodasadesireforasociallyaffluentpeergrouporacademic

approachtoeducation,butforspecificpedagogicalapproaches,teachersorprincipalsoran

alternativeeducationalenvironment.677Thereportomittedtomentionthatamajorpartof

672Blackwell,BetterSchoolsandHospitals,17.673AClassAct:WorldLessonsforUKEducation(London:AdamSmithInstitute,2001).674Ibid.,13.675Ibid.676Ibid.,14.677Ibid.

310

theoriginal logicof the reformwas toguarantee the right to independent schoolingasa

means to safeguard religious freedoms. It went on to note that the strength of the

independentsectorisbeneficialtothemajorityofthepopulationattendingstate-runschools,

becauseitallowsforthepossibilityofexit:‘Danishmunicipalschoolsaresuccessfulbecause,

iftheyarenot,theyfacethethreatofamassexodus’.678

TheDanishsystemwasalsoheldtohavebeen‘abeneficialinfluence’onSweden.679Pollard

arguedthatthetransformationinSwedenhasbeenoneofthebiggestchangesinaWestern

education system: the 1991 voucher reform radically decentralised education to

municipalities and localities, giving parents choice of any school in their area, whether

municipallyrunorindependent.680InPowertoParents,JohnRedwood,ConservativeMPfor

Wokinghamfrom1987,describedtheSwedishschoolsysteminsimilar fashion.Much like

Pollard,akeyconcernwas ‘liberatingdemand’asmeans to ‘promptagreatexpansionof

supply’.681Redwood argued for the implementation of demand- and supply-side reform,

althoughthisamountedtoacallforderegulationofsupply,allowingexpansionindemand.

HeandPollardarguedthattheSwedishreformhadledtomajorgrowthinschools‘started

by teachers, parents and educators’, and both argued that fears about ‘profit-driven

commercialism’wereunfounded.682

678Ibid.679Ibid.,15.680Ibid.681JohnRedwoodandNickSeaton,PowertoParentsandTheTrueCostofStateEducation(London:CentreforPolicyStudies,2002),9.682Ibid.,9–10.

311

PowertoParentsalsodemonstratedRedwood’snotionofdemocracyinpublicservices.While

hearguedthat‘choice’and‘freedom’liberatedschoolsandparents,henotedthattheGM

schoolinitiativefailedpartlyasaresultofthenecessityofballotingparentsonwhethersuch

achangeofstatusshouldbeinitiated.Hearguedthatthisformaldemocraticprocess‘allowed

localpoliticianstoscaresomeparentsoff,andslowedtheprocessdown’.683Insteadofthis,

he argued, freedom should bemandatory: ‘All state schools should be set free byAct of

Parliament’ and ‘reconstitutedaspublic interest,not-for-profitprivate companies’.684This

wouldmakethelegalformofstateschoolsvirtuallyidenticalwiththoseofprivatefee-paying

schools,mostofwhichhavecharitablestatusbylaw.Thecreationof‘choice’(i.e.‘freedom’)

waspredicatedonaveryparticularnotionofdemocracy, towhichformaldemocracywas

considered extraneous. Redwood’s argument implicitly considered atomised consumer

choices inmarkettransactionstheproperexpressionofdemocracy,since, forhim, formal

democracywassubjecttoirrationality,unlikedecisionsmadeinmarkets.

Onthedemand-side,Redwoodconsidereditimperativethatparentscontrolthemoneyspent

ontheirchild’seducation.Thebestwaytoachievethiswasthroughthe introductionofa

voucherreform.Giventheextenttowhichvoucherreformwouldlaterbearticulatedasa

Swedishphenomenon,itisnotablethatRedwoodonlymentionedvoucherreformsinNew

Zealand,inwhichvouchersaregrantedtotheparentsofpoorchildren,andDenmark,where

aparentalcontributionisrequired.685Henotedthatsuchsystemswerealsousedbysome

independentfee-payingschoolsinBritain.686

683Ibid.,11.684Ibid.685Ibid.,22.686Ibid.,22–3.

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6.4.2‘Votersdon’tseemespeciallykeenonfreedom.’687

Intheperiodprecedingthe2005UKGeneralElection,twopolicypublicationsenteredthe

educationgovernancenetwork,whichdealtmoreexplicitlywithstrategicconcerns,rather

thanthetheoreticalandempiricalmeritsofchoiceandvoucherreform.NormanBlackwell’s

2004publicationBetterSchools,BetterHospitals,releasedthroughCPS,setoutasystemof

single-payerfundedschoolingandhealthcare.688Indoingso,itmadereferencetoanumber

ofeducationalsystemsinNorthernandWesternEurope,includingDenmark,theNetherlands

andSweden.689LikePollardandRedwood,BlackwellwasasinterestedintheDanishsystem

astheSwedish.Thisinterestwasdirectedtowardstheinclusionoftop-upfeesintheDanish

system, which were explicitly prohibited in the Swedish system. The moral tenet that a

personalfinancialcontributionincreasesthelevelofcommitmenttoaparticularindependent

school was clearly attractive to free-market thinkers. And, considered in terms of

Hirschmann’s theoryofquasi-market structures, the inclusionof amandatory cost to the

consumer created greater likelihood that dissatisfied parentswould choose ‘voice’ rather

than‘exit’.

Blackwellwasalsoveryconcernedaboutthepotentialpoliticalcontroversyofasinglepayer

scheme. Indeed, a section of the report poses and answers such questions as ‘Won’t

opponentsdismissthisasprivatisation?’;and‘Doesitworkanywhereelse,orisitjustfancy

theory?’.690Akeyaimwasthereforetoarticulatethepolicyinawaywhichwasconsistent

687NeighbourhoodEducation,5.688BetterSchoolsandHospitals.689Ibid.,17–18.690Ibid.,17.

313

withfree-marketsignifiers,butavoidedalienatingtermssuchasprivatisation.Inthisvein,he

concludedthat‘thisistheonlypolicythatcanbeadvocatedwithconvictionbythosewho

believeinsmallgovernmentandinencouragingpersonalfreedomandresponsibility’.691

AsecondreportpublishedinthesameyearthroughPolicyExchangehadaprefacebyStephen

Dorrell,formerlyConservativeMPforCharnwood(1979-1997)andthenforLoughborough

(1997-2015) and Shadow Secretary for Education inWilliam Hague’s Shadow Cabinet.692

Dorrell’s introduction noted that ‘others have been bolder in their approach’ and ‘that

universal school choice… is delivering daily benefits to hundreds of thousands of Dutch,

AmericanandSwedishchildren’slives’.693Thereportitselfcontainedtwoarticulationswhich

becamehegemonicinlaterliberal,conservativeandfree-marketdiscoursesontheSwedish,

andtoalesserextent,Danish,schoolsystem(s).Firstly,that‘ownershipofschoolgroupsby

profit-makingcompanies isaparticularfeatureoftheSwedishsystem’,andsecondly,that

‘independentschoolscanreinforcequalityinstateschools,providedthatallschoolshavethe

necessaryfreedomofoperation’.694

The firstmajorarticulationofschoolchoiceafter the2005UKGeneralElectioncame ina

policy document produced by the Reform think-tank. 695 The discourse advanced in this

documentwasclearlyintendedasameanstopressureNewLabourtointroducemeasuresto

broaden independent school provision, to which it had committed itself in its 2005

691Ibid.,18.692TonyHockleyandDanielNieto,HandsupforSchoolChoice!LessonsfromSchoolChoiceSchemesatHomeandAbroad(London:PolicyExchange,2004).693Ibid.,6.694Ibid.,11–12.695Reform,ThePotentialBenefitsofRealEducationReforminEngland(London:Reform,2005).

314

manifesto.696ThereportcitedatalkgivenbyAndersHultin,thenCEOofSwedishfor-profit

educationchainKunskapsskolan, inwhichhearticulatedthepossibilityof‘choice’notonly

overwhich schoola child shouldattend,buta tailorededucationbasedon the individual

needs of students. 697 The report concluded that there was significant potential for the

introductionofsuchreformsinEnglandandthattheremovalofrestrictionswouldleadtoa

massiveincreaseinsupply.Thereportestimatedthatitwouldamounttoaroundtwenty-five

newschoolsperLocalEducationAuthority(LEA).698Suchanexpansionofsupplyisconsistent

withtheaimofcreatingamarketinwhich‘exit’wouldbeameaningfulstrategyforparents

unhappywiththeirlocalschools.

ThedegreetowhichtheNewLabourgovernmentwasreceptivetothediscoursescurrentin

theeducationgovernancenetworkwasdemonstratedbytheappearancethefollowingyear

of a Cabinet Office document which summarised international experiences of school

reform. 699 The Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit report was, however, significantly more

circumspectabouttheSwedishreform.Itnotedthat‘choice’hadreceivedlimitedsupportin

many parts of Sweden; that the opening of new schools had been patchy and generally

concentratedinurbanareas,andthatthecompetitivepressuresintroducedbythereform

had generally been minor. 700 Although the basic assumption - that school choice and

expansionofschoolsupplyisagoodinitself-isshared,enthusiasmfortheSwedisheducation

modelismoremuted.And,despitetheenthusiasmforDenmarkasamodelamongmanyof

696BritainForwardNotBack,TheLabourPartyManifesto,2005,33–5.697Reform,ThePotentialBenefitsofRealEducationReforminEngland,7.698Ibid.699PrimeMinister’sStrategyUnit,‘SchoolReform:ASurveyofRecentInternationalExperience’(London,2006).700Ibid.,9,12–14.

315

thefree-marketactorsintheeducationnetwork,thegovernmentreportwasdamningofthe

Danisheducationsystem,notingthatitperformedpoorlyininternationalrankingsonliteracy

andnumeracy,hadlowlevelsofaccountability,andthatpreferencesforsegregationalong

ethnicandclasslineswerestrong,especiallyinurbanareas.701

AlthoughthismighthaveunderminedthelogicofthecreationofNordicmodelforeducation

reform,sincethePrimeMinister’sstrategyunitwassolukewarmabouttheempiricalqualities

oftheSwedishandDanisheducationsystems,thiswasnotreflectedinsubstantialchanges

tothearticulationsintheeducationgovernancenetwork.Thisisatleastpartlybecausethe

attractionoftheSwedishandDanishsystemsrestsonahighlymechanisticformofreasoning,

inwhichsingle-payersystemsonthedemand-sideandderegulationonthesupply-sidelead

toimprovedoutcomesandenhancefreedom,conceivedherebroadlyastheabilitytochoose

and ‘exit’ substandardproviders. The increased supplymeans that ‘exit’ doesnot lead to

systemicfailure.Theintroductionofcontributoryprincipleswouldalsoencouragetheuseof

‘voice’,asitwasconceivedbyHirschmann,sincefinancialcostsdeter‘exit’strategies,leading

toanintermediateoptionwhichcanalsoleadtoimprovedoutcomesforserviceconsumers.

Although the Prime Minister’s Strategy Unit is an important actor in the education

governancenetwork,itsambivalenceaboutthepotentialoftheSwedishorDanishsystems

asmodelsdidnothaveany significanteffecton the successof theNordic signifier in the

network at large. Indeed, the discourse of Sweden andDenmark as potentialmodels for

publicservicereforminEnglandhadalreadybeguntofilteroutwardsintothemediaasearly

701Ibid.,43–47.

316

as2005.Inthatyear,AlanMilburn,LabourMPandformerMinisterforHealth,calledforthe

introductionofschoolsmodelledalongthelinesofSwedishFreeSchools,notingthatthiswas

‘acriticaltestofNewLabour’sabilitytosetthefutureagenda’.702Thisdiscoursebegantobe

echoedinthespecialistpress,undertheinfluenceofactorsinvolvedinthethink-tanks.An

article by Andrew Haldenby, director of the think-tank Reform, in the Times Education

Supplement, argued that England should be adopting the ‘forward-lookingmodel’ of the

Netherlands,SwedenandDenmark,inresponsetothedeclineofgovernment’srolein‘the

massproductionofservices’.703Itechoedfree-marketargumentscallingfortheremovalof

the‘artificialbarrierbetweenpublicandprivateprovision’,andarguedthatthesuccessof

largeschoolchainssuchasKunskapsskolaninSwedendemonstratedtheobsolescenceofa

publicmonopoly in education.704The elevation of the signifier ‘choice’ to a guarantee of

universal satisfaction is demonstrated by Haldenby’s formulation that ‘greater parental

choice,schoolsreleasedfromcentralinterferenceandpoliticiansabletoconcentrateonthe

bigpicture–theworldof2025lookslikeahappyplace’.705

AlthoughthePrimeMinister’sPolicyUnitremainedambivalentabouttheparticularbenefits

of theSwedishandDanishsystems, itwas fundamentallyconvincedof the logicofschool

choice. The articulation of Sweden and Denmark as reformist models, however, was

particularly developed among political actors affiliatedwith theUK Conservative Party. If

therewas general agreement that theNordic countries presented amodel for increased

702AlanMilburn,‘Phew!WeMightFaceaBattlefortheCentreGround’,TheIndependent,18October2005.703AndrewHaldenby,‘GreaterParentalChoice,SchoolsReleasedfromCentralInterference’,TheTimesEducationalSupplement,21January2005.704Ibid.705Ibid.

317

choice and the implementation of an NPM-style quasi-market, there was less strategic

agreementabouthowthisshouldbeachievedpolitically.

Thisstrategicdisagreementismadeparticularlyclearbyapamphletproducedbyagroupof

Conservativefigures,someofwhomwere,orbecame,MPs.‘NeighbourhoodEducation’,part

ofaseriestitledTheLocalistPapers,waspublishedin2007throughCPS.Althoughitaccepts

the logic of supply-side reform and the introduction of parental ‘choice’, understood as

‘freedom’,itiscriticalofthepoliticalpositionsadoptedbyPollard,RedwoodandBlackwell.

ItalsosituatesitselfinoppositiontoareportpublishedthroughtheAdamSmithInstitutein

the same year which advanced NPM arguments for the adoption of a Swedish ‘choice’

model.706Theirsummaryofvoucherreformprogrammesisworthquotingatsomelength:

Foralongtime,conservativescalledthispolicy“vouchers”.Then,findingthat

voters found the v-word intimidating and wonkish, they shifted their

language.Today,theyprefertotalkabout“choice”.

V-wordorc-word,thepolicyhasobviousattractions.Ineveryothersphere

oflife,theremovalofgovernmenttendstoleadtoenterprise,diversityand

growth…[A]lltheseargumentshavemerit.Butthepolicyof“schoolchoice”

has two seriousdrawbacks, one strategic andone tactical…. The strategic

drawback is that is that any national voucher scheme is open to being

manipulated,distortedorterminatedbyanilldisposedgovernment….The

706JamesStanfieldetal.,TheRighttoChoose?-Yes,PrimeMinister!RoadMaptoReform:Education(London:AdamSmithInstitute,2006).

318

tacticalobjectionis,quitesimply,thatvotersdon’tseemespeciallykeenon

freedomwhenappliedtothefieldofeducation.707

As the Localists see it, the problem is neither the policy itself, nor its basic aims, but its

deploymentaspartofapoliticalstrategybyfree-marketactors.

The Localistswere therefore concerned to articulate a ‘school choice’ policy as part of a

politicalprojectwhichembeddedindependentprovisionaspartofaconservativearticulation

of civil society institutions. It is therefore not surprising that Neighbourhood Education

understood British schooling as part of a tradition of ‘private initiative of religious and

charitablefoundations’.708Thisarticulationofschoolsaslinkedtocivilinstitutionswasfurther

expanded:‘state-fundedschoolstoday,eveniftheyaresubjecttodirectionfromcentraland

local government, are nominally owned and run by independent institutions, including

churches, charities and private businesses’. 709 This is clearly influenced by the

‘Compassionate Conservative’ agenda (see 2.3.3, above), and it is significant that Jesse

Norman, theauthorofCompassionateConservatism,wasacontributor toNeighbourhood

Education.IncommonwithNorman’sarticulationofcivilsocietyinstitutionsassiteswhich

canhelpfurtheratraditionallyconservative,anti-statepoliticalproject,theLocalistsargued

thatthisfocusonthetraditionalcommunitariancharacterofinstitutionscouldbereconciled

withtheintroductionofNPMreforms.Theyclaimedthatschools‘needtobeliberatedonce

again–andsubjectedtothehealthycompetitionofnewentrants’.710Itisinterestingthatthis

agendacanreconcilevoucherreformswithamoretraditionalmoralconservatism,especially

707NeighbourhoodEducation,5.708Ibid.,10.709Ibid.710Ibid.

319

giventhatNormanhadsoforcefullyrejectedFriedmanandtheChicagoSchool,andwould

laterexpandhiscritiquetoincludepublicchoicetheoristsmoregenerallyfollowingthe2008

financial crisis.711In this discourse, then, the communitarian logic of moral conservatism

couldbereconciledwiththeatomisticlogicofvouchersandchoice,throughtheargument

thatconservativeinstitutionsrequirecompetitiontoretaintheirdynamism.

The report goeson to cite theexperiencesof the Swedish andDanish school systems. In

commonwithRedwoodandPollard,theLocalistsfoundmuchtorecommendintheDanish

school system. Inkeepingwith theargument thatmanygroupsprovidingeducationwere

motivated by religious belief, theDanish systemwas articulated as a feature of late 19th

century Lutheranism. 712 Moreover, the Localists were impressed that the scheme had

survivedlongperiodsofsocialdemocratichegemonyinDenmark.Theyareconcernedthat

any school choice programme be embedded at the local level in order that it not be

‘manipulated, distorted or terminated by an ill-disposed [read: social democratic]

government’.713The Danish system therefore represented a model both in terms of the

reformitself,butalsostrategically.Notonlywasthenatureofthepolicyitself,inparticular

theinclusionoftop-upfees,consistentwithmoralargumentsforfinancialcontributionsand

theintroductionofquasi-marketstructures,butthedurabilityofthereformwaspartofits

appeal, since central government acted purely as regulator of outcomes in an otherwise

entirelyindependentlyprovidedsystem.714

711Norman,CompassionateConservatism,58;Norman,CompassionateEconomics,26;Norman,TheBigSociety,59–77.712NeighbourhoodEducation,9.713Ibid.,5.714Ibid.,9.

320

AccordingtotheLocalists,asanelectoralcalculationtheSocialDemocratscouldnotafford

toalienatethoseparentswhouseindependentschools,explainingtheirsurvival.Asimilar

argumentwasmadeoftheSwedishexperienceofvoucherreform.Thereportnotedthatits

introductionbyCarlBildt’sModerate-ledcoalitionincludedtop-upfees,butthatthisaspect

ofthereformwasreversedbytheSocialDemocrats,whoincreasedthevalueofthevoucher

from85%to100%ofthevalueofschoolfees.Ontheotherhand,theSAP‘founditpolitically

impracticaltoscrap[thevoucherreform]wheninpower’.715Thereportthereforerevealed

anxietyaboutthepotentialtoimplementreformsinconditionsofsocialdemocraticpolitical

hegemony,somethingwhichwasclearlyofconcernforaConservativePartywhichhadbeen

outofofficeforalmostadecadeatthetimeofthereport’spublication.Ontheotherhand,

this articulation of the Nordic countries arguably misrepresented them as primarily

characterised by state intervention by Social Democratic governments hostile to civil

provision.IntheDanishcaseespecially,thisisnotnecessarilytrue.Theimportanceofcivil

society organisations such as tradeunions andother non-governmental actors is omitted

fromthisdiscourse.Moreover,theLocalistsdonotcountenancethepossibility,whichmany

Nordicactorshavearguedfor,thattheexistenceofastrongandinterventioniststatecan

actuallysafeguardlocalautonomyandhighlevelsofpersonalfreedom.716Thisdemonstrates

theextenttowhichthearticulationoftheNordicsignifierwith‘choice’inBritishgovernance

networks can misrecognise or ignore important features of Nordic discourses about the

Nordic social compact, in favourofdistinctivelyBritishunderstandingsof the relationship

betweenstate,institutionsandindividuals.

715Ibid.716See,forexample,Trägårdh,‘StatistIndividualism’;Kielos,‘FlightoftheSwedishBumblebee’.

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Thereportnotestheentranceof‘chainsofprofit-makingschools’isa‘particularfeatureof

the system’ in Sweden. 717 This was something in which the Localists were particularly

interested,notleastbecausetheextensionofindependentstructureswould‘allowtheall-

important freedom to fail’.718The articulation of schools as institutions, understood in a

traditionalconservativesense,wasnonethelessdependentonaproposedsystemwhichwas

consistentwithquasi-marketreform.ThedifficultyfortheLocalistswasthereforethatthe

policyhadbeenpoorlypackaged,notarejectionoftheunderlyinglogicofthepolicyitself.

Ratherthanusingthe‘v-orc-words’orothersuch‘wonkish’language,thereportasserteda

‘moral right to decide’ on the part of parents. 719 It was thus intentionally aligned with

traditional Thatcherite discourses, but also with the articulation of the Danish education

systemasanaugust,religiouslyinspiredreform.720

NeighbourhoodEducationshouldbeseenasanattempttore-articulatefree-marketideasas

part of a traditionally conservative political project, while retaining, through intellectual

sleightofhand,muchoftheunderlyinglogicofNewPublicManagementreforms.Thiswas

consistent with the at that time nascent Compassionate Conservative agenda. The

enchainment of both ‘choice’ and the traditional ‘conservative’ signifier with the Nordic

countries is therefore an interesting strategic choice, and one which would be much

expandedwhentheConservativesenteredagoverningcoalitionin2010.Thisarticulationof

theNordiceducationsystemsimaginedtheirreformsasfundamentallyliberal,butdurablein

717NeighbourhoodEducation,10.718Ibid.719Ibid.,11.720See,forexample,MargaretThatcher,TheRightApproach(ConservativePolicyStatement)(London,1976),http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/109439;MargaretThatcher,SpeechtoConservativeWomen’sConference(London,1988),http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107248.

322

thefaceof‘ill-disposed’socialdemocraticgoverningcoalitions.GiventhattheLocalistsand

free-marketersagreedthattheprimaryfeatureoftheNordicsystemswhichsafeguardliberal

reformislocalism,itiseasytoseetheattractionoftheNordicsignifierasamodelforthe

implementationofliberalconservativereform.

6.4.3Conclusions

Whiletheeducationgovernancenetworkwasinrelativeagreementduringthisperiodabout

thenecessityfortheintroductionof‘choice’intotheEnglishschoolsystem,therewasmuch

morelimitedagreementabouthowthisshouldbeachieved.CPShadproducedanumberof

policyreportswhicharguedforthecreationofaNPMstructureandproposedvariousreforms,

includingderegulationofsupplyanddemand,aswellastheintroductionofavoucherand

personalfinancialcontributioninordertocreateconditionsfor‘exit’and‘voice’alongthe

linesdevelopedbyNewPublicManagementtheorists.Intheearly2000sthefocuswason

theDanisheducationsystem,notleastbecauseofthemoralandpro-marketargumentthat

financialcontributionscreatecommitmenttoaschoolandfinancialcostswhichrestrain‘exit’

andpromote‘voice’asanimportantstrategy.Aparticularfeatureofthisarticulationwasits

ambiguousrelationshipwithdemocracy.Proponentsofa‘choice’agendaineducationtended

toimplicitlyviewindividualconsumerchoicesasmoremeaningfulexpressionsofdemocracy

thanvoting.TheseargumentsarethereforeenchainedwiththeMastersignifier‘democracy’

inawaywhichre-articulatesdemocracyasafeatureofrationalchoicewithinmarkets,rather

than in society at large, since irrational forces, such as ‘local politicians’, can distort the

rationalityofdecision-makingoutsidemarkets.

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Wheretherewasdissent fromthisviewwithinthenetwork, itwasgenerallyonstrategic,

rather than ideological grounds. In fact, the level of agreement among actors, fromNew

LabourandthePrimeMinister’sOfficetotheConservativePartyandthevariousthink-tank

actors with which they engaged, is striking. Although the Downing Street Strategy Unit

questionedthesuccessofDanishandSwedishreforms,itdemurredonthebasisthatthey

either did not produce improved outcomes or choice (or both). If anything, this criticism

intensified the hegemonic logic of ‘choice’. Outside Downing Street there was basic

agreementthattheNordiccountriesrepresentedagoodmodel.However,especiallyinthe

UKConservativeParty,Denmarkwasarticulatedinamuchmoreconservativeinstitutional

fashion,andSwedenwasbyfarthelesspopularmodelofthetwo,althoughthepresenceof

profit-makingschoolchainswasgenerallyconsideredaparticularlyattractivefeatureofthe

Swedisheducationsystem.

324

6.5‘It’sabitlikeIKEA:everythingissimpleandthesame.’:721Creating

standardisedbespokeeducation

6.5.1Fromproposaltopolicy

TheattempttoarticulateanddesignaFreeSchoolspolicybecamemoreintenseafter2008.

Therewasasharpincreaseinthevolumeofworkproducedbyestablishedthink-tanksand

thelevelofinterestinthebusinessandpopularpressalsorose.Between2008and2010,the

think-tankactorsintheeducationgovernancenetworkpublishedtenseparatepolicyreports,

whichusedtheSwedishvoucherreformasamodelorwereotherwiseinfluencedbysome

aspectof the reform.TheEconomist published five articlesdevoted to the subjectof the

Swedish Free School reform, the FT a further four, while many liberal and conservative

nationalnewspapersbegantopublishdetailedfeaturepiecesabouttheSwedisheducation

system,includingitsschoolchains,particularlyKunskapsskolan.Thisperiodmarkstheentry

of Kunskapsskolan as a more active participant in the education governance network,

especiallyinitsinteractionswiththeprintmedia.Toagreaterorlesserdegree,theaimwas

toelaborateapolicywhichhadbecomehegemonicintheeducationgovernancenetworkand

whichwouldbeadoptedbytheConservativeParty intheleaduptothe2010UKGeneral

Election.722

Generallyspeaking,thediscoursewasstructuredaroundfiveprimarysignifierswhichwere

chainedtogetherinaparticularorderofpriority.ThesewerethataSwedish/Nordicmodelof

educationcomprised:

1. Increasedchoiceforparents

721HilaryDouglas,‘WhyWeCouldLearnfromSweden’sIKEAEducation’,TheSundayExpress,22March2009.722Ibid.

325

2. theliberationofdemand,leadingto

3. increasedsupplyandcompetition,whichwould

4. pushupstandardsinindependentandpubliclyrunschools,butwouldcause

5. noincreaseininequalityandbetteroutcomesforstudents

ThisarticulationoftheSwedishschoolsystemwasconsistentnotonlywithNPMtheoriesof

marketsinpublicservices,butalsoenchaineditselfwiththeMastersignifier‘democracy’.

NPMtheoriesassumeacorporatestructureintheprovisionofpublicserviceswhichstifles

individualchoices.Forfree-markettheoriststhesechoicesaredemocracy,andanyattempt

to suppress ‘choice’ not only decreases personal freedom, but is also undemocratic. The

introductionofmarketstructuresisthereforetheonlyacceptablewaytodemocratisepublic

services.Theiconoclasticnatureofthisextensionof‘choice’isemphasisedbytherefusal‘to

tolerate a system that restricts choice to those who can afford private education or a

mortgageonanexpensivehouseinthecatchmentareaofaso-calledgoodstateschool’.723

Theimplicitargument,thatlackof‘choice’restrictsdemocracytothosewhocanaffordit,is

clear.Moreover, thisarticulationof schoolchoicewith ‘democracy’createsadiscourse in

whichallpartiescouldpotentiallybesatisfiedbythedivisionofresponsibilitiesentailedby

marketreforms.

InSwedishLessons,publishedin2008throughCivitas,NickCowensummarisedthispossibility

asfollows:

723NickCowen,SwedishLessons(London:Civitas,2008),xii;BrianMonteith,‘Sweden’sPathtoRealParentChoice’,February2005.

326

Essentially, different responsibilities are delegated to those in a better

position to uphold them. The government has the responsibility to fund

schools;teachersandeducationalistsareresponsibleformanagingschools;

andparentsarerequiredtochoosebetweentheavailableschools.Solongas

thesystemispermittedtoberesponsivetothechoicethatparentsmake,no

childneedgowithoutaplaceatadesiredschool.724

By chaining the signifier Swedish signifier with ‘choice’ conceived in this way, Cowen

positionedSwedenasaguaranteeoftheutopianpossibilityofarationalorderingofEnglish

schooling along these lines. Sweden also offered the possibility for a reconciliation of

egalitarianismandfreedom,neutralisingtheantagonismwhich isusually implied in liberal

thoughtsystems.Significantly,SwedenemergedasaNorthernutopiainmuchthesameway

as ithadbeenhistoricallyunderstoodby socialdemocrats.However, in this case itwasa

liberalutopia,whichhasrealisedaformofdemocracy,atleastinitseducationsystem,which

positionedactorsinparticularroleswithreferencetooneanotherandindoingsoallowed

forthecreationofademocracyofmarketchoices.

Moreover, the common feeling in Sweden that the education system had entered a

generalisedcrisiswasacknowledgedwithdisbelief,725since,atleaststructurally,theSwedish

system appeared to safeguard freedom and equality. This scepticism of market failure

demonstratesthemechanisticsenseoftherelationbetweensignifierswhichinformsfree-

marketdiscourses.Duringthisperiod,articulationsoftheSwedishschoolsystemasasource

724Cowen,SwedishLessons,6.725CherylLim,ChrisDavies,andSamFreedman,HelpingPublicSchoolsSucceed(London:PolicyExchange,2008),74.

327

ofmarket-basedsolutionsbegantoappearinthebusinesspress,asignthatithadbecome

hegemonicwithintheeducationgovernancenetwork.

AseriesofarticlesinTheEconomistarguedthattheintroductionofaFreeSchoolreformin

Englandcould‘raisestandardsforall’,‘increaseparents’choice’,loosen‘thebureaucraticgrip

onthepowertoopennew[schools]’,and‘informdecisionsaboutwhattoteach’.726Although

the association of ‘choice’ models with Sweden was a core part of the structure of the

signifyingchain,itisinterestingthat,giventhemechanisticnatureoftheoperation,Sweden

itselfisincidental.ItsstatusasanemptysignifiercouldjustaseasilybeassumedbyDenmark,

orindeedanywhereelse.Thecreationof‘choice’initself,wouldachievethesegoals,since

theintroductionofgreaterfreedomthroughtheimplementationofmarketstructures isa

necessaryconsequenceaccordingtothiskindofformallogic.

Thesignifier‘competition’formedanequallyimportantpartofthedevelopingdiscourse.Not

onlywouldcompetitionresultnecessarilyfromtheintroductionoftheprofitmotive,italso

generatedpositiveoutcomes.Theformallogiccouldbeglossedbythecliché‘therisingtide

liftsallboats’,sinceasnewFreeSchoolsimprovedsowouldotherschoolsasaresultofthe

competitivepressurescreatedbythepossibilityof‘voice’and‘exit’.Theintroductionofthe

profit motive had therefore been generally accepted within the education governance

network,butwasasourceofanxietyfornetworkedactorsgivenitscontroversialnaturewith

thegeneralpublic.

726‘FreetoChoose,andLearn’,TheEconomist,5May2007;‘AClassroomRevolution’,TheEconomist,24April2010;‘TheSwedishModel’,TheEconomist,14June2008;‘CuttingtheKnot’,TheEconomist,29May2010.

328

Discussionofthepotentialforgreaterefficiencyasaresultoftheintroductionoftheprofit

motiveformedanimportanttenetoftheargumentforreformasawayofjustifyingprofit-

makingeducationproviders.Thiswasgenerallyconfinedtothebusinesspress,asdiscussion

oftheprofitmotivewithregardtopublicservicesgenerallycausedalarmandledtoresistance

amongthegeneralpopulation.TheEconomistandtheFTbothpublishedarticlesaboutthe

introduction and implications of for-profit companies in the Swedish school system. The

formernotedthat‘Big-StateSocialDemocraticSweden’isanunusualplacetofinda‘free-

market revolution’ but was nonetheless interested in the implications for businesses of

enteringpublicservicemarketsintheseareas,notingthatreturnoninvestmentwasgenerally

5-7%peryear.727BoththeFTandTheEconomistreportedtheopeningoftwonot-for-profit

academyschoolsinLondon(schoolingfor-profitisillegalinthestatesectorinEngland)and

theFTarguedthatSwedendemonstratedthattheintroductionoffor-profitprovidersinto

theeducationsystemneednotnecessarilyentail‘arip-off’.728

Givenitscontroversialstatus,conventionalarticulationsofSwedenasasocialdemocraticand

equal societyweredeployedas ameans todefend the introductionofprofit intoEnglish

schooling.ThiswasvirtuallyexplicitinTheEconomist,butitwasputforwardfarmoresubtly

inthepopularpress.729Thesecondmeanstodefendtheprofitmotivewaswithreferenceto

a‘commonsense’propositionofliberaleconomics.TheEconomist,forexample,citedAnders

HultinofKunskapsskolanclaimingthat‘[lackofprofitmotive]willsurelymeanfewerschools

727‘TheSwedishModel’.728JaneBird,‘CommercialLearning:BusinessSeeksRewardsforResults’,TheFinancialTimes,4November2010.729‘AClassroomRevolution’;CatherineNixey,‘ASwedishBlueprintforOurSchools’,TheDailyTelegraph,6March2010;SoniaExleyandStephenBall,‘SomethingOld,SomethingNew...UnderstandingConservativeEducationPolicy’,inTheConservativePartyandSocialPolicy,ed.HughBochel,2011,105,http://www.social-policy.org.uk/lincoln/ball_exley.pdfadvanceasimilarargumentabouttheuseofSwedishschoolsasamodel.

329

opening’.730TwoarticlesinthesameissueofTheDailyTelegraphmadethesameargument,

notingthat‘thedecisiontoharnesstheprofitmotiveisexpectedtoboosttheprogramme’s

chancesofsuccess’.731Inmanyways,thiswasalogicalcorollarytotheargumentthatparents

shouldbeallowed to choose their child’s schooling. If parentsneeded tobe incentivised,

throughchoiceandpersonalcontributionstoengagewiththeeducationmarket,companies

alsorequiredsimilarincentivestoexpandsupply.Afurtherargumentgiveninfavourofthe

introductionofprofit-makinginschoolprovisionwastheexistinguseof largesecurityand

estatesmanagement firms, such as Serco. The provision of some educational services by

privatefirmswasusedtodemonstratethattheexpansionofprivateprovisioninteachingwas

not ideologically inconsistent with existing regimes for the provision of other services in

Englishschools.732

Thestrategyhereisclear.TheassociationofSwedenandtheexplicitequationoftheprofit

motivewithexpansioninsupplyandimprovedoutcomesallowquasi-marketpoliciestobe

articulatedinsuchawaythatoppositionisdismissedasirrationalandmotivatedpurelyby

ideology,especiallygiventhecommonideathatprivate-publicsplitsareartificial.Thishasthe

additionalbenefitofmaking the ideological functioningof thediscourse itself transparent

due to the ‘common sense’, necessary nature of its propositions. Moreover, the use of

SwedenandtheretreatfromtheuseoftheDanishsystemasamodelwasprobablyaresult

oftheSwedishprovisionofavouchertothefullvalueofaschoolyear,giventheunpopularity

ofuser-charginginpublicservices.TheuseofSwedenavoidedthiscontroversy.

730‘MakingThemHappen’,TheEconomist,26September2009.731IsabelOakeshott,‘I’llGetEveryChildReading-ThenI’mGone’,TheDailyTelegraph,11April2010;JackGrimstonandIsabelOakeshott,‘ConservativestoLetFirmsRunStateSchoolsataProfit’,TheDailyTelegraph,11April2010.732Bird,‘CommercialLearning’.

330

A common theme in this discourse was the comparison of chain school education with

Swedish companies with which casual readers were familiar. This generally meant

comparisonwiththefurnituregiant IKEA,whichappearstohavebeenencouragedbyPer

Ledin,CEOofKunskapsskolan.InaninterviewwithTheEconomist,Ledincomparedhischain’s

education programme with a McDonald’s Big Mac burger. 733 This created a rather

contradictory description of a form of schooling tailored to the needs of each individual

student,734which simultaneouslyprovided total standardisationof thecurriculumthrough

theintroductionoflearningviaawebportal.735Theemphasisoncommonstandardsisfurther

demonstrated by the removal of lesson planning from the remit of individual teachers.

Instead,‘allthelessonplanscoveringthenationalcurriculumaremeticulouslyworkedoutby

thebestexperts ineach subject’.736Thiswouldallow teachers to spendmore time in the

classroom,27hoursinsteadofanaverageof17(alsogivenas20inadifferentarticlefrom

2010)inSwedishmunicipalschools.737Theimplicationsofthisareinteresting.Ratherlikethe

simplificationofmanual jobs intosinglemonotonoustasks,whichbeganinthe1980s,the

Kunskapsskolanmodel suggested thatasimilaroperationmightbepossible in intellectual

professions,atleasttosomedegree.

Furthermore, although the model argued that it was bespoke for the student, the

introduction of a rigid curriculumwould remove all teacher discretion over how subjects

should be taught. In effect, therefore, the expert or experts compiling such a curriculum

733‘TheSwedishModel’.734Douglas,‘Sweden’sIKEAEducation’;Nixey,‘ASwedishBlueprintforOurSchools’.735‘TheSwedishModel’.736Douglas,‘Sweden’sIKEAEducation’.737Ibid.;HilaryDouglas,‘ToriesTakeaPeekatSweden’sSchoolRevolution’,TheSundayExpress,23May2010.

331

would,intheory,havecompletecontroloverthecontentoflessonsforallstudentsatchain

schools.Asearlyas1993,StephenBallidentifiedaconflictovercurriculumcontentsbetween

‘culturalrestorationists’and‘modernisers’overwhatshouldbetaughtinschools.738Asimilar

conflictbrokeoutduringMichaelGove’stenureattheDfEoverchangestothecurriculumin

favourofmore‘traditional’subjectsandmodesofanalysis.CatherineNixey,writinginThe

Daily Telegraph, argued that laissez-faire attitudes to schooling, such as those found in

SwedishFreeSchools,werealientotheConservativeParty,butgiventhedegreeofcontrol

whichcouldbegainedover thecurriculumthroughthe implementationofsuchareform,

perhapstheinterestamong‘culturalrestorationists’iseasiertoexplain.

More generally, the tension between the ability to offer a completely bespoke learning

experience,yettotallystandardisedresults,isnotreallyexplored,butitsuggestsanattempt

to resolve the antagonism between equality of opportunity and equality of outcome.

However,itremainedunclearhowasystemwhichsorigidlyprescribeswhatstudentsshould

know could be considered bespoke. Taken together, this exposes the emptiness of the

Swedishsignifier.Discursively, it functionsbyhelpingneutralisetheantagonismsbetween

particularsignifiers,suchas‘choice’,‘profit’,and‘equality’.ThepresenceofKunskapsskolan

executivesarticulatingtheSwedishmodelissignificant,sinceitdemonstratesthatSwedish

actorswereactiveinEnglishgovernancenetworksandhadanimportantroleincreatingnew

meaningfortheSwedishmodelsignifier.

738Ball,‘Education,Majorismand“theCurriculumoftheDead”’,197.

332

6.5.2TheConservativeManifestoandtheAcademiesAct2010

TheAcademiesAct2010wasthethirdlegislativeactionoftheincomingConservative-Liberal

Democratcoalitiongovernment.GiventhespeedwithwhichtheActwaspassed,muchofthe

process of justifying the Act took place after its passage into law.While there had been

significantactivitywithintheeducationgovernancenetworkbefore2010,therefore,itwas

necessaryfortheConservativePartyandtheSecretaryofStateforEducation,Conservative

MPMichaelGove,toexpendconsiderableenergyjustifyingtheintroductionofthereformto

boththewiderpublicandactors,suchasteachersandtheirunions,whohadbeenexcluded

from the policy creation process. This effectively continued until 2014, when Gove was

removedfromhispostandthebattlewhichhehadbeenwagingagainsttheteachers’unions

over the substanceof the reformwaseffectivelydeclared lostbyhis inner circle and the

governmentatlarge.

Theperiodfrom2010onwardsmightbebestcharacterisedbytheattempttoresolvethe

tensionsbetweendifferentimperativesembeddedwithintheFreeSchoolreform.Although

major portions of the reform agenda had been developedwith reference to free-market

theoriesarguingfortheintroductionofchoice,competitionandtheprofitmotive,therewas

also the logic of the Big Society/Compassionate Conservatism agenda around which the

Conservative Party had developed portions of the logic of its policy. However, this was

problematicfromastrategicperspective,as,evenwithintheConservativeParty,thelogicof

theBigSocietyreformwasnotuniversallyaccepted.Thissectionwillthereforecomparethe

hegemonicnodalpointsfoundinthe2010ConservativeManifestoandDavidCameronand

MichaelGove’sspeechesfromhisperiodwiththefree-marketarticulationsoftheFreeSchool

policysetout in theprecedingsections.Whatemerges isadiscourse inwhich theNordic

333

countriesdonot featurestrongly,but theworkofassociating thepolicywith them,using

signifierssuchas‘[real]choice’,‘freedom’andtheassociationoftheseemptysignifierswith

themastersignifier‘democracy’hasalreadybeensubstantiallyaccomplished.

ArticulationsofthepolicywhichbecamecommonplaceinPrimeMinisterialandMinisterial

speeches in thiseraalso formaportionof the2010ConservativeManifesto. Inwhatwill

becomeathemeinthediscourseonthispolicywhenarticulatedbyConservativepoliticians,

this includes ideological signifying chains originating in both the free-market liberal and

CompassionateConservativestrains.Ideologicallyspeaking,oneofthekeypointsoftension

arose between the aims to grant freedom and impose particular values. This should be

consideredthelegacyofthepolicy’sarticulationintheeducationgovernancenetworkfrom

asearlyas2002.

TheConservativeManifestofocusedextensivelyonthepotential for improvementstothe

schoolsystembydelivering‘higherproductivityandbettervalueformoneyfortaxpayers’.739

Thiswouldbeachievedby ‘increasingdiversityofprovision,extendingpaymentbyresults

and giving more power to consumers’. 740 This mirrored the free-market arguments put

forwardintheeducationgovernancenetwork,butwascouchedinmutedterms,probablyfor

fear of alienating voters with alarming ‘wonkish’ language such as that described by the

Localists.

739TheConservativeManifesto,4–5,27.740Ibid.,27.

334

Despitethedevelopeddiscourseonschool‘choice’foundintheManifestoandtheexplicit

invocationofSweden’sFreeSchools,thereisonlyonementionofSwedeninthemanifesto.

Tellingly,thecriticaland,tothefree-marketers,mostattractivecomponentofthereform,

the introduction of for-profit firms is oblique in themanifesto. This portion of Sweden’s

reformisvirtuallyeuphemised:

[TheFreeSchools]havebeenfoundedbyfoundations,charitiesandothers–

and they have attracted pupils by offering better discipline and higher

standards.BecauseanyparentcantakethemoneytheSwedishGovernment

spendsontheirchild’seducationandchoosetheschooltheywant,standards

haverisenacrosstheboardaseveryschooldoesitsbesttosatisfyparents.741

ThisarticulationofSwedenisconsistentwiththeimagecreatedintheprecedingdiscussion

of the voucher reform, but important portions are removed, added or euphemised. For

example,theclaimherethatSwedishFreeSchoolsoffer‘betterdiscipline’isextraneousto

the discourse as elucidated by the policy networks and contradicts some established

stereotypesaboutthepositivebehaviourofSwedishpupils.742Moreover,inthediscussionof

groupswhichhavefoundedFreeSchools,the‘others’arearathersignificantcategory,given

thattheyarefor-profiteducationalchains,whichhadbeenparticipatingactivelyinEnglish

educationgovernancenetworks.

Despite this, the Free Schools policy found in the 2010 Conservative Manifesto is not

heterodox and there is significant continuity between the manifesto and the Academies

741Ibid.,50.742Nixey,‘ASwedishBlueprintforOurSchools’;Douglas,‘Sweden’sSchoolRevolution’.

335

WhitePaperwhichwasreleasedinthesameyear.743Importantly,giventheextenttowhich

theFreeSchoolspolicyhadbeenassociatedwithSweden,andasimilar,earlier,policywith

Denmark,thereisnomentionofeitherintheWhitePaper.Finland,however,ismentioned,

even though it hadnot appearedbefore thenandhadnot implemented choiceorquasi-

marketreformsinitseducationsystem,.744ThisnodoubtreflectedSweden’sslidedownthe

OECD’sProgrammeforInternationalStudentAssessment(PISA)rankingstable.Finlandwas

thehighestEuropean(andNordic)performer,whileShanghai,SouthKoreaandHongKong

performed best overall. 745 This was rather inconvenient from the perspective of the

educationgovernancenetwork,sinceSweden’srankingwouldcontinuetofall inthe2012

PISArankings.746Furthermore,allofthebestperformingsystemswerecomprehensive,not

basedonparentchoiceorNPMstructures.TheConservativeParty’spreferenceforaFinnish

model, arguing for improved teacher training, 747 rather than a Swedish one which de-

emphasisedtheroleofteachers,probablyreflectedthischange.

Thisstrategicchangenotwithstanding,theFreeSchoolsreformwasarticulatedthroughout

the2010WhitePaperasanargument in favourof ‘freedom’and ‘autonomy’ for schools.

TherewereseveralcasestudiesofNorthAmericanschoolsystemsintheUSAandAlberta,

Canada,aswellasstudiesofvoucher-basedCharterSchoolsinLosAngelesandNewYork.748

Swedenwasconspicuousbyitsabsence,despitethenameofthepolicyoriginatinginSweden.

Therewerenonethelessobviousechoesof theSwedish reform in thepresentationof the

743DepartmentforEducation,TheImportanceofTeaching:TheSchoolsWhitePaper2010,2010.744Ibid.,3–7.745OECD,‘PISA2009Results:ExecutiveSummary’(OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment,2010),http://www.oecd.org/pisa/pisaproducts/46619703.pdf.746OrganisationforEconomicCo-operationandDevelopment,‘PISA2012ResultsinFocus’,2014,1–44.747DepartmentforEducation,TheImportanceofTeaching,24.748Ibid.,51,58.

336

policyforEnglishschools.Inparticular,theuseofnon-purposebuiltschoolbuildings,akey

featureoftheSwedishFreeSchoolsmodel,wasincluded,withassurancesofsupportfrom

theDepartmentforEducationwherenecessary.749Significantly,perhapstoassuagefearsthat

the Academies Act 2010 was likely to introduce entirely new principles into the English

educationsystem,articulationsof‘freedom’and‘autonomy’weremadewhereverpossible

withreferencetoexistingacademiesfoundedduringtheNewLabourera.750ExistingEnglish

academieswerealsousedtosupportclaimstypicallyassociatedwithSwedenintheeducation

governancenetwork,suchasargumentsaboutlooserregulationofsupplybeingbetterable

tomeetparentaldemandincertainareas.751

Thepivot fromSweden toFinlandand, toa lesserdegree, theUnitedStatesandCanada,

exposes an important feature of economic and public servicemodelling. Given Sweden’s

status as an empty signifier surrounded by other signifiers articulated in necessary

relationshipswithoneanother,itcouldeasilybereplacedbyanyothersignifierwhichwas

elasticenoughtoreceivenewideologicalcontent.Thefundamentalideaofmodellingisthat

by articulating ideological claimswith reference to particular signifierswhich exist in-the-

world,sotospeak–suchasSweden,FinlandorNorden–these‘models’standasguarantors

of the ideological claims,which, by dint of this process, are cleansed of their ideological

natures.

749Ibid.,59.Indeed,theConservativesoriginallymaintainedthatfinancialsupportfromtheDfEwouldnotbepartofthepolicy,butitwasnonethelessincludedintheWhitePaper.ThiselicitedseriouscriticismlaterwhenfinancialsupportbegantobegrantedtoFreeSchoolsinpractice.750Ibid.,54–55.751Ibid.,63.

337

TheelasticityoftheNordicsignifierisalsoevidentinarangeofspeechesbyDavidCameron

andMichaelGovefrom2010onwards.Forexample,in2011,DavidCamerondescribedthe

ConservativeParty’saimsinaspeechataFreeSchoolinNorwichthus:

One:rampingupstandards,bringingbackthevaluesofagoodeducation.

Two:changingthestructureofeducation,allowingnewprovidersintostart

schools – providing more choice, more competition, and giving schools

greaterindependence.

Andthree:confrontingeducationalfailurehead-on.752

Summarisedabstractlyinthisfashion,itisalreadypossibletosenseanimpliedcontradiction

betweenaimsoneandthree,andaimtwo.Howwillthepolicyintroducegreaterchoiceand

bringbackspecificvalues?ThistensionincreaseswhenCameronmovesontogivefurther

detailsaboutthepolicy.Althoughthepolicyentailsfreedomforschools,hesays,itisalsoa

questionof‘thevaluesyoubringtotheclassroom’.753Thisreferredtoanemphasisonbasic

attainmentandcoresubjects,usingprescribedmethodssuchassyntheticphonics,754aswell

asgreaterdisciplineintheclassroom.Thepropositionthatthepolicywouldenhanceschools’

freedomwhilesimultaneouslyimposingspecificteachingmethodsbecameratherdifficultto

sustain,755especially as thiswas to be introduced alongside shakeups to the structure of

assessmentandmeasurestoincentivise‘rigorous’,‘coreacademicsubjects’suchasEnglish,

mathsandthesciences.

752DavidCameron,‘FreeSchoolSpeech’,(Speech,2011),http://www.huffingtonpost.co.uk/2011/09/09/david-cameron-speech-on-f_n_955264.html.753Ibid.754ThemeritsofsyntheticphonicsasameansforimprovingliteracyarenotasclearasimpliedbyrecentConservativeeducationpolicyandthemethodhasbeenaccusedoflackingasubstantialevidentialbasis.SeeExleyandBall,‘SomethingOld,SomethingNew...UnderstandingConservativeEducationPolicy’,103.755Ibid.;H.HolmlundandS.Mcnally,‘InBrief...ASwedishModelforUKSchools ?’,CentrePiece14(2010):21.

338

Nevertheless,inotherwaysCameron’sspeechwasconsistentwiththeideologicalframework

putinplacebytheeducationgovernancenetwork.Thiswasespeciallytrueinhisdeployment

ofthesignifier‘realchoice’.

Everything I’ve spoken about so far is about driving up standards.

But the truth is this:Thewaywemakesure these thingshappen inevery

classroom,ineveryschoolisbychangingthewayeducationisdeliveredin

our country. It’s about changing the structure of education – spreading

choice, giving schools more independence, recognising the need for

competition so we create real and permanent pressure in the system to

encourageschoolstodriveimprovements.

That’swhatwe’redoing.

Insteadofparentshavingtotakewhattheyaregiven,wearegivingthem

realchoiceinwheretheirchildgoestoschoolandbackingthatdecisionwith

statemoney,withanextrapaymentforthosefromthepoorestbackgrounds.

Andtomakethatchoicereallymeaningful,wearemakingeverythingthat

mattersaboutoureducationsystemtransparent.756

Thisassertionof‘realchoice’echoesthearticulationofthesignifierusedbytheeducation

governance network, but does so in a waywhich is also reminiscent of John Redwood’s

mandatoryfreedom(seesection6.4.1above).

756Cameron,‘FreeSchoolSpeech’.

339

Theassertionthattheintroductionof‘competition’istheonlymeansbywhich‘choice’can

be‘real’andthatparentsshouldnothavetoaccept‘whattheyaregiven’,radicallyaltersthe

frame of how English education would be provided under this revised system. In this

articulation,freedomcouldonlybeachievedthroughentranceintothemarket,sinceonlya

competitivemarketcouldallocateresourcesefficientlyandeffectively.Whilethis,intheory,

givesparents‘realchoice’,moreoftenthechoiceappearstobemadeinsomesectionofthe

educationgovernancenetwork,whetherbytheSecretaryofStateforEducation,atrust(or

companyaspartofatrust),itsstakeholders,investorsorwhoever.Despitethesupposedly

radicalnatureofthischoice,suchanarticulationnarrowsthepoliticalframeworkinwhich

choicesaremade to thoseacceptablewithinNPMmarket theories: theonechoicewhich

becomesunavailableinthisschemaisthatofawell-fundedcomprehensiveschoolrunbythe

Local Education Authority. Indeed, within this discourse only a consumer without

appreciation of his or her own best interests wouldmake such a choice, since decisions

arrivedatthroughnegotiationinaformaldemocracyarenotrational,apositionarticulated

muchmoreexplicitlybyJohnRedwood.

Itistherefore,inasense,analogouswithSlavojŽižek’selaborationofSoviet‘realdemocracy’,

whichhearguesisjustanothernamefor‘non-democracy’.757HenotesthatinSovietelections

candidateswerevettedinadvance,sincethe‘trueinterestsofthePeople’maybe‘subjected

to all kinds of demagogy and confusion’. 758 This is an exact corollary of the argument

advancedbyRedwood,andmadeimplicitlybyCameron.In‘realdemocracy’thePartytakes

757Žižek,TheSublimeObjectofIdeology,166.758Ibid.,166–67.

340

suchdecisions,inanNPMsystemthesedecisionsaretakenbythemarket(ortheactorsin

theeducationgovernancenetwork,whichisthenextbestthing).

MichaelGove’sspeechesareformallystructuredalongsimilarlines,althoughtheyarereplete

withdistinctiverhetoricalflourishes.Govewouldcomfortablyfitthe‘culturalrestorationist’

designationdevelopedbyBall,andhisspeechesarethereforetingedwithnostalgiaandtread

alinebetweenarticulationofeducationasamoralimperativeandappealsto‘choice’based

mechanisms,reflectingthetensionbetweenCompassionateConservativeandfree-market

impulses at work in the Free School reform. This comes through clearly in a speech at

CambridgeUniversityfrom2011.Govepolemicizes‘liberallearning’asa‘civilisingmission’

and a ‘moral duty’, which invokes, apparently intentionally, high imperial, paternalistic

language.759Thisisverydifferentfromtheblandidiomgenerallyadoptedbycontemporary

Britishpoliticians.Heclearlyrevelledinthisappealtoliberalandconservativestatesmenof

thenineteenth-century,notingthatheadmired‘theirintellectualandculturalself-confidence,

andinparticularthegreatambitionstheyharbouredfortheBritishpeople’.760Hewentonto

inveighagainst‘structuralism,relativism,andpost-modernism’andinvokedthepleasuresof

Wagner.761

759MichaelGove,SpeechtoCambridgeUniversity,2011,2,http://www.cpp.csap.cam.ac.uk/media/uploads/files/1/gove-lecture-to-cambridge-university-.pdf.760Ibid.761Ibid.,3–4.Giventhepenchantforsuchinvectiveagainst‘degenerateintellectuals’amongmid-twentiethcenturyEuropeandictators,andtheirwellnotedfondnessforWagner,itisunclearwhyGovewouldconsciouslyorunconsciouslyechotheintellectualpositionsoffascistsandNazis.Ontheunrelated,butinterestingissueofRomanticismandthe‘degenerateart’ofJewssuchasSchönberg,seeMaxHorkheimerandTheodorAdorno,DialecticofEnlightenment,ed.GunzelinSchmidNoerr,trans.EdmundJephcott(Stanford,CA:StanfordUniversityPress,2002).Especiallychapterson‘TheCultureIndustry’and‘ElementsofAnti-Semitism’.

341

Returning to the themes of ‘liberal learning’ as a ‘civilizingmission’,Gove argued for the

powerofeducational reformthroughanappeal to JadeGoody,aBritishcelebrityandBig

Brothercontestant,whodiedofcervicalcancerin2009.Beforeherdeath,Goodysetaside

themoneyforherchildrentoreceiveanelite,privateeducation,athemewhichGoveplayed

withinhisspeech.HeusedtheexampleofGoody,along-timesinglemotherfromaworking-

classbackground,asanargument in favourof theexpansionofeliteeducationtoall,but

implicitlytotheEnglishworkingclasses.Perhapsintentionally,thismadehisarticulationof

educationpolicyevenmore reminiscentof themid- to latenineteenthcenturybourgeois

attemptto‘civilise’theworkingclass.InwhatbecameacommonthemeofGovespeeches,

hepraised ‘innovative approaches to liberal learning’; the ‘entitlement to knowledge and

culturalcapital’and‘rigorouseducationalachievement’.762

Indeed,inaspeechhostedattheSocialMarketFoundation,acorememberofgovernance

networks in health and education, Gove returned to the theme of traditional forms of

educationinadiscussionoftheworkoftheItalianMarxistthinker,AntonioGramsci.763Gove

summarisedGramsciasanopponentof‘progressiveeducation’,notingthatGramscifeltthis

‘riskeddeprivingtheworkingclassesofthetoolstheyneededtoemancipatethemselvesfrom

ignorance’.764Inotherwords, the competitiveelitismof traditional education created the

necessaryconditionsforegalitarianism,or,atleast,socialadvancement.Theaccommodation

ofGove’sconservativearticulationofeducationreformwiththefree-marketrationalebehind

762MichaelGove,MichaelGoveSpeechtotheNationalCollegeofTeachingandLeadership,2013,https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/michael-gove-speech-to-teachers-and-headteachers-at-the-national-college-for-teaching-and-leadership;MichaelGove,SpeechtotheSocialMarketFoundation,2013,http://www.smf.co.uk/michael-gove-speaks-at-the-smf/;MichaelGove,SpeechtotheRSA,2009.763Gove,SpeechtotheSocialMarketFoundation.764Ibid.

342

thepolicythereforebecameclear.Justastheactorsintheeducationgovernancenetwork

arguedthatfreedomtochooseandcompetitionwouldimproveoutcomes,notjustforthe

parentsofchildreninindependentschools,butinstate-runschools,soGoveclaimedthatthe

freedomtoenjoyatraditionalliberaleducationisthekeytosocialadvancement.

Gove’s idiosyncratic idiomaside, the underpinning ideological frameof the discourse still

revolvedaroundthesignifiers‘freedom’,‘choice’andtheMastersignifier‘democracy’.Inthe

earliest phase of the reform this generally operatedwith reference to a Nordic signifier,

usuallyeitherDenmarkorSweden,asamodel todemonstrate theconcretequalitiesand

practicabilityofsuchareform.CameronandGove’sspeechesarticulatethesetraditionally

free-market signifiers, arguing in favour of ‘parental choice’ and ‘pluralism of supply’ as

consistentwithatraditionalconservativenotionofeducationalpractices.765Theycontended

thattheextensionoffreedomwouldleadtotheintroductionofmoreeffectivedisciplineand

‘liberallearning’.

Acorollarytothiswastheargumentthatsuchautonomyshouldnotbe ‘restricted justto

those schoolswhich exercise the new freedoms’ and that freedomand choice should be

extendednotjusttoparents,butalsoteacherswhowouldbegiven‘greatercontroloverhow

they teach’ in academy schools.766The strategicmovement towards control for teachers

probably reflected the extent towhichGove and theDfE found themselves embroiled in

conflictswiththeteachers’unions,especiallytheNationalUnionofTeachers(NUT)andthe

765Gove,SpeechtotheRSA.766MichaelGove,MichaelGoveSpeechonStrikesandPensions,2011,http://www.michaelgove.com/news/michael-gove-speech-strikes-and-pensions.

343

NationalAssociationofSchoolmastersUnionofWomenTeachers(NASUWT).767Significantly,

theconflictbetweenGoveandtheDfEandteachers’unions,reflectedthestructureofthe

educationgovernancenetwork.Althougha‘choice’discoursehadbecomehegemonicinthe

network,itisnotablethatteachersandtheirunionshadbeenalmostentirelyexcludedfrom

thenetwork,whichfavouredthink-tanks,educationproviders,andmembersofthenational

media. The hegemony of the position within the network therefore excluded important

stakeholdersinthepolicyarchitectureitself,leadingtosignificantdifficultiesandconflictsof

interestarisingaftertheAcademiesAct2010hadbeenpassed.Thisideaissupportedbythe

fact that most articulations of a Free Schools discourse by Conservative Party and

governmentalactors, includingthemajorityofspeechescited inthisstudy,occurredfrom

2011onwards.

6.5.3Conclusions

Choiceandvoucherreformhadbecomehegemonic in theeducationgovernancenetwork

before its adoption by the Conservative Party. Its inclusion in the 2010 Conservative

Manifestoandpropagationinthebusinessandpopularmediashouldbeseenasanindicator

ofitssuccess.Ontheotherhand,Conservativepoliticiansrecognisedthatportionsoftheplan

werecontroversialandwerethereforeeagertominimisethepotentialforcriticismonthis

basis.Paradoxically,thismeantminimisingtheassociationwithSwedenandde-emphasising

theemergenceoffor-profitschoolingthere,somethingwhichhadbeenamajorattractionof

thereform inthe firstplace.Sweden’sdecline in thePISArankingsandtheemergenceof

767JaymiMcCann,NearlyHalfofAllParentsDon’tTrusttheCoalitionwithTheirChild’sEducation,2013;DanMilmoandJeevanVasagar,‘Teachers’UnionsPlanJointProtestinAutumn:NUTandNASUWTJoinForcesagainstPoliciesGove’sInnerCircleMayWelcomeDistraction’,May2012;TobyYoung,Left-WingJournalistGetsAlmostEveryFactWronginHystericalAttackonMichaelGove,2012.

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Finland,acountrywithahighlycomprehensivesystemofeducation,wasprobablyalsopartly

responsible for the shift towards a non-Nordic discourse. The potential for a reform

constituted alongDanish lines hadbeendropped entirely by 2010.Despite this, the Free

SchoolsassociationwiththeNordiccountriesneverreallydisappeared.

MichaelGove’sarticulationoftheFreeSchoolpolicywasnotableforitsattempttoreconcile

thefree-marketargumentsforincreasedsupplytoproducethepossibilityof‘voice’and‘exit’

andaconservativediscoursewhichemphasisedtraditionalvaluesand‘liberallearning’.Akey

strategicfailureofGove’stenurewashisarticulationofschoolreformasbasicallyinconsistent

withtheinterestsofteachers.Asaresult,theDfEwasforcedtofightanumberofpitched

battleswithteachersandtheirunions,groupswhichhadbeenbasicallyexcludedfromthe

policycreationprocessintheeducationgovernancenetwork.Theresultwasthatachoice

policywhichhadbeenhegemonic in thenetworksinceat least2005gained little traction

amongteachersandparents,leadingtoadifficultperiodafterthepassageoftheAcademies

Act 2010. Moreover, Gove’s tendency to invoke ‘elite education’ and inveigh against

‘progressive education’ only served to alienate teachers and unions further, creating an

impasse which may ultimately have been responsible for the failure of the policy. The

exclusion of essential stakeholders from the network made the process of achieving

hegemonyinthenetworkitselfmorestraightforward,sincetheGovernmentDepartments,

including Downing Street and the DfE, themajor political parties, think-tanks, interested

corporateactorsandthemediaallagreedwiththefundamentallogicofthepolicy.Atthe

implementationstage,however,thepolicymetsignificantresistancefromactorswhohad

beenexcludedfromthisprocess,creatingconflictandultimatelyfailure,whichintervention

fromtheDfEandtheMinisterofStatewereunabletoresolve.

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6.6Conclusions:NotSwedishEnough!

Itwasnotedintheprecedingsectionthatoneofthefunctionsofmodellingwasameansto

establishideologicalpositionswithreferencetoanexternalsignifier,inthiscase‘Sweden’,

whichwouldactasguarantorofapolicy,andwhichwouldeffacetheideologicalcharacterof

the policy discourse. This is well demonstrated by a movement within the education

governancenetworkwhichrejectedthegovernment’sreformonthebasisthatitdidnotgo

farenough. Inparticular,thecreationofactualFreeSchools, includingseveralhigh-profile

schools in West London, one of which was founded by the journalist and Conservative-

supporterTobyYoung,madethepossibilityoftheintroductionofvoucherreformandprofit-

makingseemmoreachievable,leadingtoafurtherpushfromsomeactorsintheeducation

governance network to gain acceptance for it in the network and across the political

parties.768

This positionwaswell summarised by the report School Vouchers for England, published

throughtheASIin2012.Inthisreport,JamesCroft,GabrielSahlgrenandAntonHowesargued

that‘theFreeSchoolspolicy,whichwasborrowedfromSweden,shouldbemoreSwedish’.769

The reformwas therefore accused of introducing a kind of decaffeinatedmarket reform,

whichfailedtointroducetheprofitmotiveandothermarketfeatures.Significantly,thisalso

allowedpolicyactorswhohadsupportedthepolicytodisavowit,sinceitwasnotSwedish

enough.Thisisnottheonlypolicydocumenttohaveadvancedsuchanargumentsincethe

passageofthereformin2010.AnumberofsuchpieceshavebeenpublishedbyGabrielHeller

768Bird,‘Twickenham:AmbitiousSwedesPutAcademytotheTest’;‘CuttingtheKnot’.769JamesCroft,GabrielH.Sahlgren,andAntonHowes,SchoolVouchersforEngland(London:AdamSmithInstitute,2012).

346

Sahlgren, incollaborationwithanumberofotherscholars, throughvariousorganisations,

including the Centre forMarket Reform of Education (CMRE),which is effectively a two-

personoperation.Theseargumentshavetendedtofocusontheintroductionoftheprofit

motiveintoeducation,arguingthatthefailuretodothisinEnglandhasmadethepolicya

failure. InDis-location, published throughCMRE,heargued thatprofit isessential for the

stimulationofexpansioninsupply.Moreover,FreeSchoolsfoundedonafor-profitbasis,he

claimed,havebeenmoresuccessfulatreflectingthegeneralsocialmakeupthanthosewhich

operateonanot-for-profitbasis.770

Sahlgren advanced similar arguments in a paper for the IEA in 2010, called Schooling for

Money,inwhichhesummarisedanddefendedtheSwedishreform,andarguedthat‘without

theprofitmotive,theUK’sreformmayfail’.771Thisargumentrestedontheclaimthatwithout

the introductionof theprofitmotive therewouldbeno incentive for increases in supply.

According to free-market logic, this would have two related consequences. Firstly, there

wouldbeinsufficientcompetitiontoallowfor‘exit’and‘voice’,andsecondly,therewouldbe

nowiderpressureon the state system to improve.He claimed that the Swedish voucher

reformhadbeensuccessfulprimarilyasaresultoftheintroductionoftheprofitmotive,and

argued that the introduction of the reform in England had not gone far enough. School

VouchersforEnglandadvancedthesamebroadargumentintheseareas,buthopedforafar

widerseriesofmeasures.Thisincluded:theintroductionoffor-profitproviders;theabolition

ofgeographicalcatchmentareasaltogether;theintroductionof‘schoolperformance’data,

which‘themarketshoulddecidehowtouse’;theextensionofthePupilPremiumtobenefit

770GabrielH.Sahlgren,Dis-Location(London:TheCentreforMarketReformofEducation,2013),22.771GabrielH.Sahlgren,‘SchoolingforMoney:SwedishEducationReformandtheRoleoftheProfitMotive’,inIEADiscussionPaper,vol.33(London:InstituteofEconomicAffairs,2010),5.

347

low-attainingpupils;andtheexpansionofvouchersintoexistingindependentschools.The

report also rehashes classic NPM arguments about the need to deregulate demand as a

meansofencouragingimprovementsinsupply.

Thedownsideof themodellingoperationpresents itself here. Sahlgren, inparticular, has

several timesadoptedapositionwhicharticulatestheSwedishFreeSchoolsasbasicallya

success, a view which is not necessarily shared in Sweden or by other organisations.772

However,thedefenceofasomewhatunpopularordecliningsystemonwhichamodelhad

been created became a strategic necessity. Even in cases where policy actors evaluated

reforms positively an appeal to the logic of ‘choice’ and ‘competition’ as mechanistic

signifyinglogicscanstillbeinvoked.773Onthisbasis,Croftetal.thereforeclaimthat:

Researchdoesnotalways take intoaccount thatmostsystemsworldwide

suffer from significant flaws; the ability of choice programmes to deliver

strongpositivecompetitioneffectsisthereforehighlydependentontherules

by which schools must compete with one another. The results of cross-

national research therefore most likely represent only the lower-bound

positiveeffectsthatchoiceprogrammesmightbringtoeducation.774

772RichardOrange,‘SwedenUrgedtoRethinkParents’ChoiceoverSchoolsafterEducationDecline;OECDRecommendsComprehensiveReformIncludingRevisedSchoolChoiceArrangementsandMoreEffectiveRegulation’,TheGuardian,4May2015.773Itisworthnotingthatotheracademicstudiesnotcitedinthesepolicypublicationshavebeensignificantlymoreambivalentaboutthepositiveeffectsofschoolchoicereform.Theformofanalysischosen,andthemetricalweightattachedtoparticularindicatorscanbeastrongpredictoroftheoutcomesofstudiesofschoolchoicereforms.AndersBöhlmarkandMikaelLindahl,‘EvidencefromSweden’sVoucherReform:DoesSchoolPrivatizationImproveEducationalAchievement?’,IZADiscussionPaperSeries,no.3691(2008):34;AndersFredriksson,‘OntheConsequencesoftheMarketisationofPublicEducationinSweden:For-ProfitCharterSchoolsandtheEmergenceofthe“Market-OrientedTeacher”’,EuropeanEducationalResearchJournal8,no.2(2009):299–310;Anne-LiseArnesenandLisbethLundahl,‘StillSocialandDemocratic?InclusiveEducationPoliciesintheNordicWelfareStates’,ScandinavianJournalofEducationalResearch50,no.3(2006):285–300.774Croft,Sahlgren,andHowes,SchoolVouchersforEngland,14.

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Inotherwords,evenwherechoicereformshadbeenimplemented,thepotentialbenefitsof

‘choice’and‘competition’mayhavebeenunderestimated,itwasargued.Whereresultshad

been underwhelming, it was the result of systemic flaws, since, within the structural

mechanisticlogicofthepolicy,positiveoutcomesandimprovedsupplyfollownecessarily.

The Academies Act 2010 was widely considered a failure. Although it did lead to the

foundation of a significant number of new academies and Free Schools, it was generally

thoughttohavebeenflawedinitsimplementation.Itarousedsignificantoppositionfromthe

majorteachingunions,localgovernment,schoolsandparents,anddidnotprovidemanyof

thebenefitswhichitclaimed.Fromtheperspectiveoftheeducationgovernancenetwork,

however, it represented a failure to fight hard enough for the logic of school choice and

competition.Indeed,thefailureofthepolicyinpracticeledtorenewedcallsforNPMmarket

reformstobroadensupplyandarguments infavourofthe introductionofvouchersalong

Swedishlines.

TheideologicallogicwhicharticulatedtheSwedishvoucherreformasasignifierintoachain

with‘choice’and‘competition’wasthereforeimmunetotheempiricalfailureofthereform

inEnglandandthequestionswhichwerebeingposedaboutitsefficacyinSweden.This is

becausetheformalmechanisticlogicwhichinformschoicediscourseisintuitive.Thatisto

say,itisnotpossibletogooutintotheempiricalworldandidentify‘choice’inthesensein

whichitiscommonlyunderstoodinNPMtheory.Thelogicofmodellingobscurestheintuitive

natureofthediscourse.Theveryfactthatitispossibletotracetheformalnecessarylogicsof

thediscourseinthefashionIhavedonehereissuggestivethattheresultsimpliedbythese

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signifying chains do not follow empirically. Returning to the quote from Lacan offered in

chapter two, above, it is clear that ‘the valueof theoperation’ is clearly in this fact. The

introductionofamodel,ofwhichtheNordicmodelisperhapsthebestexample,allowsthe

formalnatureofthereformtobehidden.

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Conclusion

7.1Researchquestionsandmainfindings

7.1.1Questions

MythesishassoughttoanswerthreeresearchquestionsrelatedtotheuseoftheNordic

modelinBritishpolitics:

1.HowistheNordicmodelarticulatedinBritishgovernancenetworkstoday?How

hasitdevelopedandchangedovertime?

2.Whichactorshavearticulatedthesediscoursesandwhyhavetheydoneso?

3.Whateffects,ifany,hasthisprocesshadonUKpublicpolicy?

ThesequestionsweregeneratedbasedonananalysisofliteratureontheNordicmodel

stretchingbacktothe1950s.ItwasarguedthatwhiletheNordicmodelhadbeenrelatively

stablefromthe1950suntiltheendofthe1980s,themodelwasshakenbythreemajor

eventsinthe1990s:firstly,theendoftheColdWaranditsensuingglobalpolitical

reconfigurations;secondly,theSwedishfinancialcrisisof1991/2;thirdlyandfinally,the

SocialDemocraticParty’sdefeatinthe1991SwedishGeneralElectionandthegradual

declineofitsinstitutionalandpoliticalhegemonyinSweden.

Aviewdeveloped,whichwaswidespreadinthe1990s,thattheNordicmodelassuchwas

dead.However,itwasalsonotedthat,tomisquoteMarkTwain,reportsoftheNordic

model’sdeathhadbeengreatlyexaggerated.Bythe2000s,articulationsoftheNordic

modelborepreciouslittleresemblancetothesocialistutopiaofthe1950sand1960s.

Rather,Nordicandnon-NordicenthusiastsforthemodelunderstoodNordenasaplace

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whereNewPublicManagement(NPM),quasi-marketsandeconomicliberalismcouldbe

reconciledwithsocialequalityandhighstandardsofliving.

TheperceivedsuccessofthesereformsintheNordiccountrieswaswatchedintentlybyUK

policymakers.Itwasfromthisperspectivethatthethesissetoutitsproblematicwiththe

aimofidentifyinghegemonicdiscoursesofthecontemporaryNordicmodelinUK

governancenetworks;whotheprimaryactorsinvolvedinthisprocesswere;andthe

consequencesofthisintermsofpublicpolicy.

7.1.2Summaryconclusions

Theargumentpresentedinthisstudyhasbeenwide-rangingandcoveredsignificantbodies

ofliterature.Thisthesisbeganbysituatingitselfinrelationtoacademicdiscussionsaboutthe

natureoftheNordiccountries,someofwhichstretchbacktothe1970sorevenearlier.The

researchquestionsdrivingthethesisemergedfromacriticalanalysisoftheliteraturefrom

the1970stothe1990swhichtendedtoviewtheNordicmodelasasociallydemocraticform

oforganisationandnotedthattherewasconsensusonthispointbetweensocialdemocrats,

socialists and conservatives, although interpretations ofwhether theNordic socialmodel

constitutedutopiaordystopiawerecontentious.

ThisarticulationoftheNordicmodelwasheavilyconditionedbythepoliticalhegemonyof

theSwedishSocialDemocrats,whichbegantodeclineinthe1980sandfinallybrokeinthe

aftermathof the1991/2Swedish financial crisis.Theelectionofagovernment ledby the

Moderate Party (Moderata samlingspartiet) under the leadership of Carl Bildt, led to the

creation of new articulations of the Nordic countries which were in line with liberal

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discourses. This intensive period of re-articulation in Sweden was a key factor in the

temporarybreakdownoftheNordicmodelmoregenerally.

Alteredpoliticalcircumstancesinternationallyanddomesticallynecessitatedare-formulation

ofidentitiesfortheNordicmodelandtheindividualNordiccountries,especiallySweden.This

wasexaminedthroughconsiderationofamixtureofacademic,popular,andpartypolitical

literaturefromthaterawhichexaminedthecurrentswhichunderpinnedthecreationofa

newNordicidentity.

Whatemergedfromthisanalysisofacademicinterpretationsofrecenthistoricalandpolitical

developments comparing European countries and political partieswas that scholars have

tended to consider phenomena as nationally discrete or, alternatively, as passively

conditionedbyoutsideforces,suchasglobalisation.Iarguedthat,whilethesecontributions

are valuable, they tend to obscure the political agency of actors and the national and

transnationalsteeringnetworks inwhichtheyoperate. I thensetout the ‘ThirdWay’and

‘Compassionate Conservative/Big Society’ agendas of successive British Labour and

Conservative governments respectively. This was informed by the argument that the

ideological currents which conditioned these approaches to society were essential to

understandingthemodelsoftheNordiccountrieswhichsuccessiveLabourandConservative-

ledgovernmentsproduced.

TherelevanceoftheideologicalarticulationsoftheNordicmodelbecameclearthroughmy

analysis of three keypolicy debates. The first of these analyses looked at the creationof

Nordicmodelsofpoliticaleconomyintwotheorisednetworks,oneofwhichwasprimarily

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comprisedofsocialdemocraticactorsandtheotheroffree-marketactors.Itarguedthatthe

social democratic network was concerned with the possibility of the creation of a social

democratichegemony.ThistendedtofocusonthecreationofcorporatestructuresinBritish

industrialrelations,buteschewedtheideaofmodellingspecificregulationsfromtheNordic

countries in a British context. It was much more interested in the potential for the

neutralisationoftheantagonisticsignifiers‘freedom’and‘equality’,arguingthattheNordic

countrieshadresolvedthissocialantagonismthroughcorporatiststrategies.Thearticulation

ofSwedenasafree-marketsuccessfromthemid-2000sandthedeclineofsocialdemocracy

in Europe and the New Labour political project in the UK meant a redirection of social

democraticinterestawayfromSwedentowardsDenmark.

The free-market network argued the opposite. Free-marketers generally argued that

‘globalisation’mademodellingobsolete,andattemptedtore-articulateNordicsuccessasa

featureof liberalisation, deregulation andopenness to trade. The structureof theNordic

welfare states was a particular site of attack. Free-market actors generally argued that

corporate structures amounted to both a moral and democratic hazard, and that the

introductionofgreaterfreedomandchoiceintotheNordiceconomiessincethe1990shad

reversedwhattheysawasanaberrational‘madquarterofacentury’,beginninginthe1970s.

Finally, two competing Schumpeterian discourses were examined. One argued for free-

market,entrepreneurialregimeswhichloweredtaxratesandincentivisedrisk-taking,while

theotherarguedforaformofbureaucraticsocialism,consistentwithmanyofthetenetsput

forwardbysocialdemocraticactors.

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ThesecondpolicydebateunderconsiderationwasaNordicmodelofreformintheEnglish

NHS.ItarguedthatduringtheNewLaboureratheNordicsignifierwasseenasameansto

reconcile theantagonismsbetween ‘choice’ (i.e. freedom)and ‘equality’,whichwasakey

concern of Labour’s health reforms. The difficulty of breaking with quasi-market logic

necessitateda gradual change in thearticulationofhealth reformback towards, ‘choice’,

‘competition’,and‘markets’.However,theuseoftheNordiccountries,especiallySweden,as

apotentialmodelforthesereformspersisted.

Thehegemonic logicof ‘choice’ in thehealth governancenetworkwas seenas aprimary

causeforthis.IcontendedthatitalsostemmedfromNewLabour’sneedtodefendataxation-

fundedhealthcaremodelwhichwasunder increasingattack fromConservativepoliticians

andfree-marketorientatednetworkedactors,manyofwhomhopedtointroduceaso-called

‘Bismarckian’socialhealthinsurancesysteminEngland.Theentranceofnewactors,including

aSwedishfor-profithealthcarecompany,assistedthearticulationofSwedenasapossible

modelformarketreformoftheNHS.Thelogicof‘choice’andtherejectionof‘equality’was

intensified with the creation of Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition which deepened

competitivemarketlogicsintheNHSinEnglandinlinewiththehegemonicdiscoursewhich

haddevelopedintheNewLabourera.

Finally, I examined the development, propagation and implementationof a Swedish-style

Free School reform in England. This theorised thedevelopment of a governancenetwork

whichincludedtheDepartmentforEducation,theMinisterforEducation,politicalparties,

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think-tanks, the media, and Kunskapsskolan, a Swedish chain of for-profit education

providers.ItnotedthatmostcallsforreformwerestructuredalongthelinesofNewPublic

Managementmarket reforms, which aimed to deregulate supply, ‘liberate’ demand, and

createthepossibilityof ‘exit’and‘voice’ inpublicservices.Whileearly incarnationsofthe

policy favoured Denmark, because, it was argued, personal financial contributions

incentivised commitment, and therefore the use of ‘voice’ as a strategy, this was later

dropped as politically unacceptable. Similarly, while policy actors had initially beenmost

positiveabouttheintroductionoffor-profiteducationprovidersintheSwedishsystem,these

had virtually disappeared by 2010. Strategic disagreements about the free-market or

conservativearticulationofthepolicymaskedthegeneralconsensusthattheintroductionof

marketsandcompetitionconstitutedtheproperexpressionofdemocracyinpublicservices.

The exclusion of important political actors, such as teachers and their unions, from the

educationgovernancenetworkwassuggestedasareasonwhythereformwassubjecttosuch

high levels of resistance during its implementation phase and why it was eventually

consideredafailurebyactorsacrossthegovernancenetwork.

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7.2Limitationsofthisstudy

Thisempiricalportionofthisthesisbeganbyidentifyingseveralnetworksandattemptingto

theorise networked actors’ relationships to one another. The majority of the empirical

discussioninthepreviousthreechaptersanalysedvariousdifferentformsoftextualmaterial

producedinthesenetworks.Thereweretwosignificantlimitationstothis.Firstly,thatthe

thesis limited itself to networks operating primarily, but not exclusively, in the UK. And

secondly,thatthevastmajorityofthesourcematerialconsideredherewastakenfromofficial

publications.

UKgovernancenetworksarewelldeveloped,adaptableandhaveastartlinglylargerangeof

interests.Partofthelimitationwasthereforeapurelypracticalone.Giventhesheerquantity

of material produced in the UK alone, it would have been impractical to include Nordic

material as well, notwithstanding the difficulty of collecting, archiving and examining

publicationsproducedinfivelanguages,twoofwhich–FinnishandIcelandic–Icannoteven

read.Ontheotherhand,thismeansthatthethesisprobablyunderestimatestheextentof

the reach of Nordic actors. For example, three highly significant Swedish actors -

Kunskapsskolan,theFreeSchoolchain,Timbro,aStockholm-basedthink-tank,andCapio,the

privatehealthcareprovider-appearedinthestudyonlywhentheyengagedwithUK-based

actors,oroperated independently in theUK.However, it isclear that therearedeepand

productivenetworksoperatinginSwedenandthatdomesticSwedishconnectionshelpactors

gain influence transnationally. Timbro, for instance, has longstanding connections to the

SwedishEmployersAssociation,andtheIEAinLondon.

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Thesubstanceofthethesiswasdrawnalmostexclusivelyfrommaterialwhichcanbefound

inthepublicdomain.Giventhattheaimofthethesiswastoidentifyandexaminethecreation

ofhegemonicdiscourses,thiswasalogicalchoice.Necessarily,however,thismeansthatthe

analysisofpoliticalstrategiesgivenheredoesnotincludeprivatecorrespondence,internal

discussions of aims and the like. Insight into the strategic discussions behind specific

articulations, whether in government, think-tanks or in news rooms, to give just three

possible examples, would be inherently interesting for any study preoccupied with the

creationofpoliticalstrategies.Whatwereactors’goalsforparticulararticulations?Howdid

actors relate to each other? Did they possess wider systemic goals or narrow sectional

interests?Etc.etc.

Inessence,however,thisisathesisabouttheNordicmodelintheUKratherthangovernance

and transnational political networks. For this reason, I focusedon conducting adiscourse

analysiswhichwouldanswerresearchquestionsabouttheNordicmodel,insteadoffocusing

onthenetworkswhichcreatedthosediscourses,althoughnaturallythesewereintegralto

the study. I am however convinced that conducting a more thorough network analysis

focusedonlinksbetweentheUKandtheNordiccountrieswouldyieldinterestingresultsand

furthersubstantiateclaimsIhavemadeaboutthenatureoftransnationalpoliticalrelations,

nationalandtransnationalgovernancestructuresandpotentiallyraiseinterestingquestions

aboutthenatureofcontemporarydemocracyinNorthernEurope.

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7.3Implicationsandfuturedirections

7.3.1TheNordiccountries

The Nordicmodel which emerges from public policy governance networks in Britain is a

complexone.Itisrivenwithtensionsbetweenliberal,free-marketarticulations,emphasising

deregulationandconsumerchoice,andsocialdemocraticdiscourseswhichhaveattempted

to reconcile this deregulatory tendencywith notions of equality in public services. A key

featureoftheNordiccountriesasseeninBritishgovernancenetworksisthetendencyfor

Norden,Sweden,Denmark,and toa lesserextent,NorwayandFinland, todisappearand

reappearhaphazardlyfromdiscourses.Thishaslittletodowiththequalitiesoftheirsocial

systems, andmuchmore to dowith the potential strategic consequences for networked

actors.ThepoliticallyproblematicnatureofDenmark’stop-upfeesinschooling,orSweden’s

slidedowninternationalattainmentrankings,forexample,mightnecessitatethetemporary,

orpermanent,removalofthemfrompublicpolicyarticulationsinEngland.

OnethingthatcanbesaidisthatthediscourseontheNordiccountrieswhichhasdeveloped

inEnglishgovernancenetworkshastendedincreasinglytoseetheNordicmodelasasystem

whichischaracterisedbytheneutralisationofparticularantagonisms.TheNordiccountries

haveapparentlysolvedthetensionbetweenflexibilityandsecurityintheirlabourmarkets,

through a mixture of corporate structures or supply-side reform, depending on which

governancenetworkyoubelongto.TheNordicmodelhasalsobeenseenasproofthatthe

introductionof ‘choice’policiescanbereconciledwith improvedoutcomesandexpanded

supply. The mixed public service provision which has been implemented in the Nordic

countries,especiallyDenmarkandSweden,sincetheearly1990swasseenasproofthatthe

imperativesofpublicchoice,privateserviceprovisionandequalitycouldbereconciled.Less

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widelyacknowledged is theenduringly controversialnatureof thesedevelopments in the

Nordiccountries.

Where antagonisms and political conflict over NPM in countries in Norden were

acknowledged, this was often greeted with disbelief, since, from the perspective of the

hegemonicdiscourseinthegovernancenetworksconsideredhere,thenecessarycharacter

of improvementwas consideredwell provided for byNordic regulatory regimes. For this

reason,IwouldarguethattheNordicmodelassuchdoesnotexist.Thatistosay,theNordic

signifierisconstitutivelyemptyandappropriatesmeaningprimarilythroughitsenchainment

withothersignifiers.Intheexamplesconsideredinthisstudytheseweregenerally‘choice’,

‘freedom’,‘equality’,and‘democracy’.

There is a sense in which the re-importation of NPM policies from the Nordic countries

representssomethingofaparadox.Asnotedinchapterfive,market-basedpublicservices

aresometimesreferredtoas‘theAmericanWay’inSweden.Suchpoliciescouldequallybe

referredtoastheBritishWay,giventheextenttowhichBritishactorswereinstrumentalin

thepropagationoftheseprogrammesinthe1980s.Itisthereforetemptingtopointoutthat

Britishpolicyactorsareusingforeignmodelsofpolicieswhichtheythemselvesdevelopedin

previousdecades.However, inmyview,thiswouldrepresentadrasticover-simplification.

Nordicactorshavebeeninvolvedintransnationalnetworkspropagatingfree-market ideas

sincethefoundationoftheMontPelerinSocietyin1947.Moreover,Nordicperformanceon

wellbeingandothermetricsisclearlyaprimarymotivatorofinterestforBritishgovernance

networks. On the other hand, British governance networks are particularly prone to

mechanisticunderstandingsofeconomicandsocialdevelopmentsandtendtotreatsocial

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systemsasdiscrete,andacteduponbyglobalforces,makingitdifficulttoknowtheextentto

whichsuchideasaboutpolicytransferwouldbeinfluentialeveniftheywerethinkablewithin

thefree-marketthoughtsystem.

In chapter one, I quotedMagnus Ryner askingwhether theNordicmodel could ‘provide

effective mythologies for politics elsewhere’. My answer to this is unequivocally, yes.

However,ashasbeendemonstratedinthethreecasestudiesgivenabove,theassumption

that this be a social democratic model is highly questionable. The Nordic model which

emerges from public policy governance networks in Britain is at best ambiguous, but is

arguablyenchainedmoreextensivelywithclassically liberal, free-market signifiers suchas

‘choice’and‘competition’.TheNordicsignifier,inBritainatleast,isthereforeusedasameans

toreinforceparticularnotionsofmarketdemocracywhichareconsistentwiththepolitical

philosophicalpropositionsoffree-marketthinkerssuchasMiltonFriedmanandFriedrichvon

Hayek.Inthisview,‘democracy’isconsideredafeatureofrationalchoicesinmarkets.Indeed,

someactorsinBritishgovernancenetworks,includingMembersofParliament,suchasJohn

Redwood, have been explicit in their rejection of the possibility that formal democratic

structurescanproduce‘rational’outcomes.

OnecriticismthatIsometimesreceiveaboutmyworkfromscholarsworkingontheNordic

countriesisthatmyconclusionsaboutthechangestotheNordicmodelarealreadywell

understood.ThemovetowardsNPMreformsandchangestotheNordiceconomieshave

beengoingonsincethe1990s,itisargued,andtheNordicmodelhaschangedtoreflectthe

higherlevelsofpoliticaldisagreementaboutpoliticaleconomyandpublicservicesinthe

Nordiccountries.AsIhaveimplicitlyarguedthroughoutthisthesis,inmyview,changesto

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thehegemonicdiscourseoftheNordicmodelarefarmorecomplexthanthat.Political

actorshaveemployedstrategiesoversignificantperiodsoftimewhichhavere-articulated

previouslystableidentitiesinlinewithpolicieswhich,inextremecases,flatlyoppose

historicalNordicassumptionsaboutsocialorganisation.

HowcansuchcontradictoryunderstandingsoftheNordicmodelco-exist?Atsomelevel,this

questionisratherchildish.Clearly,differencesinunderstandingofparticularobjectsoccuras

a result of political disagreements. So far, so naïve. But if the question is really so

straightforward,thenitshouldbesimpletotheorisethesedisagreements.Whatisthefield

inwhichsuchdisagreementsoccur?Whoisinvolved?Why(andwhere)doesitmatter?When

putinthisway,though,thequestionissurprisinglydifficulttoanswercoherently,although

thereareseveralgoodattemptsatdoingso.775Iwouldliketoconcludethissub-sectionby

notingthatmyapproachtounderstandingandtheorisingtherelationshipbetweenNordic

and extra-Nordic discourses on political economy have ledme tomake two prosaic, but

nonethelessimportantobservations:firstly,politicalconflictoverthecontentoftheNordic

model increasingly occurs on a transnational basis. Secondly, the actors involved in this

processmayormaynotberepresentativeofwiderNordicsocieties,but,partlyasaresultof

the strength and influenceof formal and informal governancenetworks in contemporary

Western politics, the discourses which they articulate have concrete effects within and

withoutNorden.

775JennyAndersson,‘GrowthandSecurity:SwedishReformisminthePost-WarPeriod’,inTransitionsinSocialDemocracy: Cultural and Ideological Problems of the Golden Age, ed. John Callaghan and Ilaria Favretto(Manchester:ManchesterUniversityPress,2006),118–34;KazimierzMusial,‘ReconstructingNordicSignificanceinEuropeon theThresholdof the21stCentury’,Scandinavian JournalofHistory 34,no.3 (2009):37–41; J.Magnus Ryner, Capitalist Restructuring, Globalisation and the ThirdWay: Lessons from the SwedishModel(London:Routledge,2002).

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7.3.2Socialsteering

Thisstudywasconcernedtomakeanumberofobservationsabouttheoperationofsocial

steeringincontemporaryBritish/Englishsociety.Itarguedthattheproductionofpolicyand

social steering was generally conducted by well-integrated actors with established

relationshipstooneanother.Manyofthoseconsideredherehavebeenresearchersinpublic

policy think-tanks, but there has also been amotley cast of politicians, business leaders,

journalists,thirdsectorgroupsandleaders,andotherpublicfigures.ThecharacterofBritish

governancenetworksisheavilyconditionedbythenatureofitsactorsandthequalityoftheir

relationships.

Thisstudytheoriseddifferentgovernancenetworksindifferentareasofpublicpolicy.This

wasfoundedonacriticismofconventionalassumptionsaboutthefieldinwhichpublicpolicy

iscreated.Althoughthisstudyisbynomeansdefinitive,Ihopethatithasdemonstratedsome

ofthepossiblebenefitsofadoptingsuchanapproachtoanalysetheproductionofsocialand

economicsteering,especiallyiftheobjectofstudyisnotthenetworksthemselvesbuttheir

relationshiptootherobjects,inthiscasetheNordicmodel.

Chapterthreearguedthatnetworkanalysisisessentialtocontentanalysis,althoughasnoted

above(see7.2)therewerepractical limitstothedepthofthisanalysis.Havingconducted

suchananalysis,Ithinkitisworthmakingseveralobservationsabouthowtheconstitution

ofnetworksrelatestothepolicypublicationsanddiscourseswhichtheyproduce.Thefirstis

thatnetworkshave symbiotic relationshipswith the ideologieswhich theypropagateand

sustain.Forexample,itisonlypossibletoargueforsuchnetworksinthefirstplacebecause

363

theactorsthemselveshaveconstitutedtheiractionsaroundtheacceptanceofpublicservices

asdiscretephenomena.Theideologicalposition,acceptedbysuccessivegovernmentsfrom

the Thatcher era onwards, that industrial policy was anathema to the operation of free

markets,hascreatedandsustainedgovernancestructureswhichareprimarilyinterestedin

public services as distributive structures,which they either support, unreservedly orwith

qualifications,oroppose.

In terms of the networks which were theorised and analysed here, it is therefore not

surprisingthatintheareaofpoliticaleconomytherewasbarelyevenengagementbetween

actorsholdingdifferentviews.ThebasiccompactwhichsustainedtheNewLabourera,and

whichfellapartintheaftermathofthe2008financialcrisis,wasthatmarketsshouldbefree,

would produce rational outcomes, and should therefore be allowed to operate without

interferencewhichriskeddistortingmarketsignals.Therewasbasicagreementthat,since

thelabourmarketisalsoamarket,itshouldbeopenandclearing,and,atmost,intervention

should be made to ameliorate the consequences of market forces. As a result, while

substantial agreement was possible about the running and operation of public services,

discourses which argued for labour market intervention and stimulation of demand in

‘unproductive’partsofthecountryandthosewhicharguedforfreemarketscouldnotbe

integratedwithoneanother.

ToreturntothebriefdiscussionoftheBritishvotetoleavetheEuropeanUnion,giveninthe

introduction,therehasbeenbelatedacknowledgementinsomequartersthatthearticulation

of parts of the country as inherently unproductive produced anger and appalling social

consequences.ThisfoundakindofexpressionintheEuropeanreferendum,althoughithas

364

notbeenwidelyarticulatedassuchinthemainstreamatthetimeofwritinginFebruary2017.

Nonetheless, there are clear signs that the consensus is gradually fracturing and the

ideologicalcurrentswhichsustaineditwithreferenceto,amongotherthings,necessarylogics

andeconomicmodelling,arebeginningtocrackinthefaceoftheimpotentrageunleashed

bythereferendum.

ThoughIamnounqualifiedcheerleaderfortheEUasitiscurrentlyconstituted,itisprimarily

domesticsteeringnetworkswhichhavebeenresponsibleforthecreationofthishegemonic

ideologyinBritain,andattemptstoblametheOtherastheblockageofBritain’srealisation

ofitselfasafullidentity,whetherthatOtherbetheEUorimmigrantsandrefugees,misstheir

mark.Furtheranalysisintothenetworkswhichhavedeveloped,sustainedandpropagated

these discourses and effaced their ideological character should be an urgent priority for

futureresearchonBritishgovernancestructures.

7.3.3Modellingasanideologicaloperation

Whataretheimplicationsofthisstudyformodellingoperationsmoregenerally?Although

implicitlythisstudyhasofferedacritiqueoftheoperationofmodellingasaformalprocess,

itisworthmakingthiscriticismexplicit.Throughoutthisthesis,Ihaveofferedtheargument

that the Nordic model gains its meaning primarily through articulation with other social

signifiers.Thisoperationisgenerallyusedasameanstoempiricallysupportthecreationof

politicaleconomicorpublicserviceagendaswhichareconstructedaroundnecessarylogics.

That is tosay,particular inputsrequireparticularoutputs:choiceandcompetition leadto

expansion of supply; growth leads to inequality; markets are best placed to arbitrate

information and/or price signals. These propositions are mechanistic and intuitive. Their

365

articulationwithamodel,whetherthatbeNordic,GermanorAntipodean,providesthese

necessarylogicsaconcretegroundinwhichtheyhavealreadybeenempiricallyrealised,even

though,withintheirtheoreticalformallogic,theyhavealwaysbeentrue.

Modelling therefore takes ideological propositions, which do not necessarily follow

empirically, and cleanses them of this ideological content, asserting them as pragmatic,

successful,andempiricallyrealisable.TheNordicmodelisaparticularlygoodexampleofthis,

giventhattheNordiccountriesperformwellonmostwellbeingmetricsandhavehistorically

beenadmiredfortheirsocialoutcomes,incontrasttotheUSA,or,indeed,Britain.

This is particularly well demonstrated by claims, made in both health and education

governancenetworks in Britain, thatNPM reformsmodelledon Sweden are not Swedish

enough.Indeed,inthecaseoftheEnglishfreeschoolreform,manyfree-marketactorsinthe

educationgovernancenetworkconcludedthatitwasthefailuretoimplementatruemarket

whichledtothefailureofthereform.Itwasarguedthat‘mostsystemsworldwidesufferfrom

significantflaws’:itisrealitythatistheproblem,thetheoryisfine.Unintendedconsequences

aretheresultnotofthefailureofthetheoreticalframework,butstructuralflawsinpublic

policysystems.

Formaltheoreticalframeworkscomprisedofnecessaryrelationsbetweenintuitiveconcepts

are synchronic. Consider the tension between historical (The Communist Manifesto) and

structural(Capital:Volume1)readingsofMarx.Asaresult,suchoperationsalmostalways

produce static models, which map regulations and imply causation. This compounds a

tendencyinmodel-makingtodesignsystemswhichare‘perfect’.

366

Thereissignificantroomforalargerprojectconcernedwiththestudyofpoliticalmodelling.

GiventhatoneofthefoundinggoalsoftheCentreforPolicyStudies(CPS) in1974wasto

study theWestGermanWirtschaftswunderof the1960s, it is clear thatmodellinghasan

augusthistory.Themultiplelevelsatwhichmodelsarecreatedandunderstoodalsosuggests

fertilegroundforfurtherinvestigation.ExcludingtheNordicmodel,offthetopofmyheadI

canthinkof:theEuropeanSocialModel,theGermanMittelstand,theDutch‘poldermodel’

(ofconsensualsocio-economicdecision-making),andthe‘Chileanmodel’ofpublicservices,

sometimesassociatedwithChile’srapidderegulationunderGeneralAugustoPinochet.Inthe

field of social policy, the Portuguese model of drug policy could be included. There are

presumablymore.Whatarethesemodelsandhowdotheywork?Dotheyfunctioninthe

samewayastheNordicmodel?Whydopoliticalactorssometimesseemtoprefermodelling

totheadoptionofclearethico-politicalpositions?

Iwouldargue that thisalso reveals the futilityofoperationswhicharestructuredaround

formulationssuchas, ‘theNordiccountriesarecommonlythoughtofas…,but,actually…’.

Firstly,suchoperationsmisrecognisetheemptycharacterofmodels.JustasBritain is,the

Nordiccountriesareconstitutedbytheirantagonisms,theiridentitiesandstructuresarenot

static.Moreover,attemptstorefuteintuitivecategorieswithreferencetoempiricalreality

cannotbesuccessful.Secondlyandrelatedly,suchattemptsrisksustainingthelogicswhich

appeal to modelling in the first place. To argue that Swedish voucher reforms have not

broughtthebenefitsofchoice,orhaveledtogreaterinequalityfordisadvantagedgroups,

doesnothing tochallenge the logicof ‘choice’andvouchers, since the intuitivenecessary

logicswhichsustainthesepositionsareimmunetoempiricalcriticism.Aproperengagement

367

would therefore seek to disestablishmodels from a position which exposes their formal

characterandrevealsthemasideological.

My argument is at some level reminiscent of Slavoj Žižek’s re-writing of Lacan’s famous

designationof the ‘right-wing intellectual’asa ‘knave’and the ‘left-wing intellectual’asa

‘fool’.ForLacan,theknaveisarealist,whoacceptstheconsequencesofhisorherrealism

and therefore admits, when necessary, that he is a crook. The ‘fool’ is foolish in the

Shakespeareansense,heorsheisnaïve,but‘truthsissuefromhismouth’.776ForŽižek:

Today,afterthefallofSocialism,theknaveistheneoconservativeadvocate

of the free market who cruelly rejects all forms of social solidarity as

counterproductive sentimentalism, while the fool is a deconstructionist

culturalcriticwho,bymeansofhisludicproceduresdestinedto‘subvert’the

existingorder,actuallyservesasitssupplement.777

The proper response to the operation ofmodelling is therefore neither its refutation on

specific empirical grounds, nor its subversion through qualification, or deconstructive

operation,but thesystematicexposureof its ideologicalandphantasmatic character.The

questionbecomes then,not ‘what is the [Nordic]model today?’,but ‘why is the [Nordic]

modelnecessary?’.

776JacquesLacan,TheEthicsofPsychoanalysis:TheSeminarofJacquesLacanVII,trans.DennisPorter(London:W.W.Norton&Company,1992),182–3.777SlavojŽižek,ThePlagueofFantasies(London:Verso,1997),45–6.

368

Eight–Backmatter

A–ListofAbbreviations

ASI AdamSmithInstitute

CMRE CentreforMarketReforminEducation

CPS CentreforPolicyStudies

CTC CityTechnologyCollege

DfE DepartmentforEducation

DoH DepartmentofHealth

EC EuropeanCommission

ERM EuropeanExchangeRateMechanism

EU EuropeanUnion

EFTA EuropeanFreeTradeArea

FT TheFinancialTimes

GM GrantMaintained(school)

GP GeneralPractitioner

IEA InstituteofEconomicAffairs

IMF InternationalMonetaryFund

IPPR InstituteforPublicPolicyResearch

LOSwedishTradeUnionConfederation

(LandsorganisationeniSverige)

LSELondonSchoolofEconomicsandPolitical

Science

369

MPS MontPelerinSociety

NHS NationalHealthService

NPM NewPublicManagement

OECDOrganisationforEconomicCooperationand

Development

PCT PrimaryCareTrust

PISAProgrammeforInternationalStudent

Assessment

SAFSwedishEmployersAssociation(Svenska

Arbetsgivereföreningen)

SAPSwedishSocialDemocraticParty(Sveriges

socialdemokratiskaarbetareparti)

SHA StrategicHealthAuthority

SHI SocialHealthInsurance

SMEs SmallandMediumEnterprises

SMF SocialMarketFoundation

TES TimesEducationSupplement

370

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