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T H E N O R T H - S O U T H I N S T I T U T E

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E d i t e d b y M i c h e l l e H i b l e r a n d A n n e C h e v a l i e r


G R AT E F U L LY AC K N O W L E D G E S

T H E G E N E R O U S F I N A N C I A L S U P P O R T

O F T H E F O L L O W I N G D O N O R S I N

T H E P U B L I C AT I O N O F

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

AC K N O W L E D G E M E N T S i

Roy Culpeper

C H A P T E R O N E A I D S , C O N F L I C T, P O V E R T Y : T H E C H A L L E N G E F O R C A N A D A A N D T H E U N 1

Stephen Lewis

CHAPTER TWO PUTTING PEOPLE FIRST: CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY AT THE END OF THE 1990s 11

Michelle Hibler

S TAT I S T I C S 2 0 0 0 4 5John Serieux with Peggy Sun and Tapas Chowdhury

TABLE 1 CANADA AND OTHER HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENTECONOMIES: SELECTED INDICATORS 46

TABLE 2 THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: SELECTED INDICATORS 48

TABLE 3 CANADIAN OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE:BASIC DATA (1997-98) 52

TABLE 4 CANADIAN BILATERAL AID BY CHANNEL AND BY COUNTRY (1997-98) 56

TABLE 5 CANADIAN MULTILATERAL ODA BY AGENCY AND BY COUNTRY (1997-98) 60

TABLE 6 CANADIAN BALANCE OF TRADE WITH DEVELOPINGCOUNTRIES (1998) 64

TABLE 7 TRADE: TOP EXPORTS AND IMPORTS WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1998) 68

TABLE 8 CANADIAN FINANCIAL RELATIONS WITH DEVELOPING COUNTRIES (1998) 72

TABLE 9 MOVEMENT OF PEOPLES 76

TABLE 10 HUMAN LINKAGES BETWEEN CANADA AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD 80

TABLE 11 CANADA-DEVELOPING COUNTRY LINKAGES INDICES 84

TECHNICAL NOTES88

The Institute owes a special thank you toStephen Lewis who graciously took time fromhis hectic schedule to write the eloquentguest essay that follows. Formerly Canada’sAmbassador to the United Nations andspecial advisor to the UN Secretary-Generalon African Economic Recovery, Stephenrecently completed his term as DeputyDirector of UNICEF. Both positions confirmedhis strong belief in the multilateral system,while highlighting how the system—and therich industrialized countries that supportit—have failed the world’s poor. Stephen’spassionate, deeply personal essay is testi-mony to his unflagging zeal to help thevictims of social injustice everywhere. Hischallenge to Canada must not go unheeded.

This report, like its predecessors, required a great deal of effort on the part of theInstitute’s staff and others. The tables in this year’s CDR were assembled byPeggy Sun, formerly with the Policy ResearchSecretariat (PRS) and now a Policy Analyst atHeritage Canada, and Tapas Chowdhury,doctoral student at Carleton University,

under the supervision of NSI SeniorResearcher, John Serieux, who also preparedthe analyses. We are grateful to the PRS forhaving made Peggy available for thispainstaking work.

Statistical and other resource material wasgenerously provided by government officialsfrom the Canadian International DevelopmentAgency (CIDA), Statistics Canada, theDepartments of Finance, Foreign Affairs andInternational Trade (DFAIT), and Citizenshipand Immigration who helped us compile thedata for the tables. In particular, we wouldlike to thank Brian Johnson of Citizenshipand Immigration Canada, Julie Fujimura andDean Beyea of Statistics Canada, Kerry Maxof CIDA (formerly with the NSI), andJoseph Braun of DFAIT.

The review of Canada’s “words and actions”in 1999 was written by NSI’s Director ofCommunications, Michelle Hibler, withcontributions from Jean Daudelin, SeniorResearcher, Conflict and Human Security;John Serieux, Senior Researcher,International Trade and Finance;

i

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

he Canadian Development Report 2000 (CDR 2000) is the fourth

volume in the North-South Institute’s annual series investigating

Canada’s dynamic relationship with the developing world, and the first vol-

ume in its revised format. I am happy to present this brief review of Canada’s

trade, human security, aid, and debt policies at the end of the century, as

well as the up-to-date statistical data on all aspects of Canada’s relations

with developing countries. The CDR remains the only resource available that

annually documents the flow of resources, goods, services, and people between

Canada and the developing world.

T

Ann Weston, Vice-President and Coordinator ofResearch; Gail Whiteman, Senior Researcher, Marketsand Social Equity; and myself. It also draws on thework of a great many individuals and organizations,in both government and civil society: we thank allfor their ideas, facts, and analysis.

Vital support was provided by all members ofResearch, Communications, and Administration who invested a great deal of effort individually and collectively to ensure this volume’s success. In particular, we would like to thank ProductionCoordinator Anne Chevalier who provided logisticaland technical support, coordinated translation andproduction, and undertook a great deal of theproduction editing. Jonathan Wade developed and put the funding and marketing plans into placeand provided valuable comments on an earlier draftof the document. Special mention must also bemade of Eugenia Gallegos who assisted in datacollection and translation; Information SpecialistGail Anglin who was instrumental in findingresearch materials; and Diane Pichette andDina Shadid for administrative support.

The in-house editorial team was expertly assistedagain this year by freelance editor Rowena Beamish,and the translation services of Hervé Rombaut and

Version Plus. Cover design and graphic services were provided by Sylvia Gilfix of ElectronicPublishing Solutions.

Finally, this edition of CDR would not have beenpossible without the painstaking and diligentefforts of Michelle Hibler. In addition to under-taking her role of senior editor of the report, shealso took on the demanding challenge of writingthe overview chapter, surveying the major eventsand policy issues of the last year. The report is atestament to her abilities to deconstruct complexissues for a wider public hungry for informedanalysis and commentary.

We also wish to acknowledge the generous financialcontributions of the CDR donors, listed at thebeginning of this report, for their support for thisimportant endeavour.

Roy Culpeper PresidentThe North-South Institute

ii

AIDS, CONFLICT, POVERTY:THE CHALLENGE FOR

CANADA AND THE UNStephen Lewis

Adjunct professor at York University, Stephen Lewis is

former Deputy Executive Director of UNICEF International

and former Canadian Ambassador to the United Nations.

AIDS, CONFLICT, POVERTY:THE CHALLENGE FOR

CANADA AND THE UN

P

C H A P T E RO N E

I remember the Mbabane General Hospital inSwaziland in July 1999. I was taking a tourof the wards with the supervising doctor, anangel of a man, who had been performinghis role for seven years and was in theterminal stages of despair. We stood at anodd architectural junction of the threemedical wards, male, female, and child. IfDante were alive today, he’d recast theinferno. All about us, in virtually every singlebed, were the dead and the dying, each andevery one AIDS-afflicted. Swaziland is acountry of barely 1 million, with an HIVinfection rate hovering between 20 and30 percent. That scene in the hospital isthe mirror of hospital after hospital in Eastand Southern Africa. What startles thevisitor is the relative quiet: the children rocknoiselessly in their mothers’ arms, vacanteyes staring; the adult wards are punctuatedby a constant low-level strangled coughing,

accompanied by the quiet shuffling ofbare feet as the wives and daughters andmothers hover anxiously, pointlessly,resignedly. The smell is of heat and death,stifling, oppressive. Here a patient tremblesin the last throes, there another, shorn ofdignity, vomits in his bed. A young childwhimpers, a mother offers a withered breast.It’s all too much. There’s such a sense ofdesperation and damnation.

The doctor, eyes down, palms up, says there’sjust nothing he can do—no medicines, nomoney, no hope.

And that is surely the point. HIV/AIDS isnot some recent revelation. Everyone knowsthe current figures for sub-Saharan Africa:14 million dead, 23 million infected (90 per-cent not knowing they’re infected), almost4 million new infections a year, more than2 million deaths a year, 10 million orphans.

erhaps my curmudgeonly genes are clicking in, but I experienced no

pulse of adoration for World Bank President James Wolfensohn when

he made his pronouncements during the April 2000 Washington demonstrations

against the Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) meetings. He indicated

that he would personally ensure there was money available for any worthy

AIDS project, anywhere. Finally, the financial log-jam would be broken. This

is excellent of course, but it does leave a faintly sour taste in the mouth:

after all, AIDS has been around Africa, with a vengeance, for more than 15

years. It might be said that the announcement was bitterly late in coming.

C A N A D I A N D E V E L O P M E N T R E P O R T 2 0 0 02

Canada should become

the unorthodox herald

of a new world order

which sees justice

in dissent, equity in

human rights, and

economic progress in

development without

strings attached.

It is now anticipated that in 2005 therewill be 13,000 funerals every single day.Where has the World Bank been? Where havethe donors been? Is there no shame? Youoffer enough money for the pandemic now,after watching for 15 years as economies,social structures, families, the human com-munity are collectively shredded and shat-tered? You expect accolades for suddenrepentance after abiding a catastrophe bydefault? The world community stood by andwatched the slaughter of up to 800,000during the Rwandan genocide and raisednot a finger. What’s changed? What handshave been raised against AIDS?

And that’s what I was intimating at theoutset. Surely the words out of the mouthof James Wolfensohn should have been prefaced with an apology for benightedinstitutional turpitude. Let’s be clear here. In 1997, the total spent on every aspect ofAIDS treatment and prevention in Africa was$165 million, while the developed worldwas awash in money. Put another way, we’vebeen spending 95 percent of the dollars on5 percent of the pandemic, and 5 percent ofthe dollars on 95 percent of the pandemic. Ifever there was an example of the growingdivide between North and South, HIV/AIDSis it.

What is particularly troubling is the know-ledge that we could have launched theprocess to save millions of lives years ago.While the language of AIDS is invariablyapocalyptic, we don’t have to fall prey toparalysis: there are a great many inter-ventions, small pilot projects, which, if takeneven partially to scale, would make a hugedifference.

Consider the question of mother-to-childtransmission. It is now beyond dispute thatthe application of AZT before birth canreduce transmission by up to 46 percent. Itis now recognized that the administration ofthe new, far less costly, drug Nevirapine onceto the mother during the birthing processand once to the child within 72 hours ofbirth can similarly reduce the transmissionrate. So where’s the money? Why in God’sname aren’t we doing it?

We know that testing and counseling centresestablished across Africa to allow women toknow their HIV status can make all thedifference to the decisions they make andtheir quality of life. There are models fromRwanda to Botswana. Why aren’t theyemulated continent-wide?

We know that prevention in the schools isthe best key to stalling the infection in itstracks, conceivably initiating a downwarddecline, as in Uganda or Senegal or Thailand.What’s stopping the world?

We know that multilateral agencies likeUNICEF, and nongovernmental organizations(NGOs) like Save the Children are strugglingvaliantly with prototype projects for orphans,perhaps the toughest challenge of all. Here’swhere the money is desperately needed sinceit requires dramatic investments in commu-nities. Why wasn’t it offered years ago?Millions of orphans don’t appear overnight.

I’m not suggesting for a moment that thepervasive culture of denial and the abjectfailure of many African leaders to break thesilence is to be excused or countenanced.But had the World Bank and the donorgovernments unleashed a torrent of inter-vention three years ago, five years ago,10 years ago, hundreds of thousands,perhaps millions would not be infectedtoday.

Am I bitter? You’re damn right I’m bitter.Throughout the AIDS pandemic, internationalofficial development assistance (ODA) hasbeen falling, calamitously falling. Canada isa perfect example. In 1991, we were at0.49 percent of our Gross National Product(GNP). By 1999, we had dropped to0.29 percent, below the average of theDevelopment Assistance Committee (DAC)donor countries. The target of 0.7 percentof GNP, established by former Prime MinisterLester B. Pearson, has never been reachedby Canada (unlike Sweden, Norway, Denmark,Finland, and Holland). In his last budget,Finance Minister Paul Martin spoke glowinglyof a $100 billion surplus over the next fiveyears. There seemed to be increased alloca-tions for everything, except of course, for-eign aid. It’s truly one of the great ironies

C H A P T E R O N E T H E C H A L L E N G E F O R C A N A D A A N D T H E U N 3

that former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney’sTories cared far more for the uprooted anddisinherited of the earth than do the con-temporary custodians of the Pearsoniandream.

Alas, it’s been the same for every otherhuman priority, from universal primary edu-cation to poverty itself. It’s no accident that,in an outburst of outrage, OXFAM withdrewfrom the hypocritical meeting of govern-ments and potentates in Dakar in April thisyear, supposedly gathered to resuscitateeducation for all. It would require an invest-ment of $8 billion a year for 10 years—equivalent to four days of global militaryspending. Will it be forthcoming? Don’t holdyour breath.

It was the fall of 1996 when the heads ofthe World Bank and the IMF made a jointcommitment to relieve the debts of thepoorest countries in the immediate future,under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries(HIPC) initiative. The millennium has comeand gone. It’s 2000 AD. So far, a total of 14of 41 eligible countries have qualified for(partial) debt relief. The Bank and the IMFare now engaged in an unlovely scramble toapprove as many debt reductions as theypossibly can by the end of the year. And if ithadn’t been for the worldwide campaign byJubilee 2000, the vast civil society coalitionled by the churches, you can be certain thatwe wouldn’t even have this eleventh-hourrepentance to boast about.

Meanwhile, in Tanzania, with more than2 million children not in school, and onetextbook for every 30 students, the govern-ment is spending six times as much onservicing the debt as on primary education.And Tanzania has a good government; noeasy target here for facile Western criticismsto take our inaction off the hook.

The antidote to all of this should be theUnited Nations of which, in theory if littlein practice, the international financialinstitutions are a part. Alas, it just isn’thappening.

The United Nations Secretariat and itsSecretary-General are caught in a cruel bind.They want to do the right thing, but likeeveryone else, they’re financially strapped.Mostly, they’re flummoxed by the continued

delinquency of the United States in thepayment of its dues. But partly because ofthe financial constraints, partly because of acurious ideological idée fixe, there’s alsosomething far more insidious, and ultimatelypoisonous, at work.

The UN has embraced the private sectoruncritically. It augurs ill for multilateralism.I have actually sat at a luncheon with theSecretary-General, attended by crown jewelsof the corporate establishment and headsof multilateral agencies, and I’ve heard thecorporate representatives say, oozing withsolidarity, that their mission statement isa mirror reflection of the United NationsCharter. I choked on my asparagus. Noone else choked. Indeed, we all seemed(pretended?) to embrace the preposterousassertion until the Secretary-General himself,right at the end of the meal, warned us notto get carried away.

But carried away the United Nations is. Itbegan with Ted Turner and his billion dollarcontribution. It moved to Bill Gates and hisgreater than billion dollar contributions. Andit culminated at Davos in 1999 and 2000,when the Secretary-General made it clear,hand-in-hand with the president of theInternational Chamber of Commerce (whowas, with perfect symmetry, the former CEOof Nestlé, a company arguably in violation ofthe International Code on the Marketing ofBreastmilk Substitutes) that the UnitedNations was open for private business.

Since then, the espousal of private sectorpartnerships is all the rage, including therecent decision, on the part of five pharma-ceutical companies, to sign a letter of“intent” with the UN to contribute drugs atlow cost to fight the AIDS pandemic. It will,of course, plant the delicious imprimatur oflegitimacy on the pharmaceuticals. However,it is not at all clear that the drugs will besufficiently low cost or, indeed, that thepharmaceutical companies haven’t cleverlysurrounded the offer with prohibitive condi-tions. The problem is that the consumingobsession for partnership with the privatesector causes a suspension of criticalacumen. In this case, one of the companiesis Bristol Myers, a major manufacturer ofinfant formula, identified over the years as aviolator of the Code. There is no conceivable


reason why the UN should embrace acompany that breaches international norms,and certainly not a company that compro-mises breastfeeding. Even with the pressureof HIV/AIDS, this wouldn’t be happeningwere it not for the incestuous liaison withthe corporate world.

I’m happy to recognize that there is alegion of companies from whom the UNcould benefit financially, and without theslightest conflict of interest. But when theUN is in financial heat, it suspends judge-ment and accepts funds from all comers.

And the critics are watching. They’re watchingwhen the United Nations DevelopmentProgramme initiates a complex corporaterelationship, gives it the name the GlobalSustainable Development Facility, and invitesa number of corporations with questionablerecords to join, including Dow Chemical(“Agent Orange”), Rio Tinto (controversialmining multinational), Ericsson Cellular (hadinvestments in Burma), the ABB Group (theThree Gorges Dam in China) and Shell Oil(implicated in the events that led to thedeath of the famed Nigerian environmentalistKen Saro-Wiwa). Admittedly, there’s a newadministrator at UNDP who has fashioned acreative and valuable relationship with CiscoSystems, but the damage has been done.

The critics were also watching when the UNwebsite was graced, startlingly enough, withthis quote from the Secretary-General: “Onlythe private sector has the money, the skillsand the management to address the develop-ment issues.” Only the private sector? Whathappened to the United Nations agencies?

The critics were also watching when the UNfashioned a so-called Global Compact, a setof corporate “guidelines” so superficial,generalized, and voluntary as to bring asmile to the most beleaguered entrepreneur.Even so, as of this writing, no significantcorporate entity has felt it necessary to sign.

Above all, the critics are watching when, inthe great debate on globalization, the UNappears to come down on the wrong sidedespite protestations of concern by theSecretary-General about widening povertyand grotesque disparity. It all tends to ringhollow because the early wholesale embraceof the corporate world, and the early

response to the World Trade Organizationmeetings in Seattle, suggest a relationshipwith transnationals too cozy by half.

These are not marginal items. The UN risksthe wrath of the growing body of dissent,particularly young dissent, as the escalatingglobal coalition of protestors makes itsmuscle felt. I believe that the Secretary-General is not well advised. There is apowerful movement emerging, and theUnited Nations can ill afford to be on thewrong side. If one genuinely believes in“civil society,” as the UN volubly protests itdoes, then it’s time to re-think the mindlessentente with the private sector.

But there’s more, much more. It’s time, aswell, for the member states to take their jobsmore seriously. What passes for monitoring,supervision, and participation in the UnitedNations family is more often than not atravesty. Take the way in which abysmalleadership was tolerated for so many years.Let me say what one is never supposed tosay, certainly not in public.

The Director-General of the World HealthOrganization (WHO) for 10 years, HiroshiNakajima, was so limited as to be thesubject of unhappy ridicule. He may havebeen the nicest chap in the world, but hesimply wasn’t up to the job. As a result,WHO ground down in internal acrimonyand external irrelevance at a time whenits expertise was desperately needed. Thenations of the world were comfortablycomplicit: very few were prepared to offendthe Government of Japan by attacking oneof its nationals. It has taken the newDirector-General, former Norwegian PrimeMinister Gro Harlem Brundtland, a significanttime simply to restore confidence and to getthings working again. It should never havehappened.

The Director-General of UNESCO for 10 years,Federico Mayor, gave new meaning to self-aggrandizement. He began life as a pharma-cist-poet, and should have stuck with poetry.He was a charming rhetorician, but duringhis tenure his reputation was that of amaster manipulator, enhancing very littlethe role and worth of UNESCO. As a result,for example, UNESCO’s work in the field of


What passes

for monitoring,

supervision, and

participation in

the United Nations

family is more

often than not

a travesty.

primary education ground to a virtual halt.Even today, the prospect of involvingUNESCO in areas of its own mandate bringssighs of exasperation. The point is that thenations of the world knew exactly what wasgoing on and with the exception of theUnited States, the United Kingdom, andSingapore, they just put up with it. I’ll neverunderstand the agreed conspiracy of silence.

Back in the 1980s when I was representingCanada at the United Nations, MauriceStrong, the high-octane, world-regardedCanadian multilateralist, tried to put anend to the rule (an appropriate word) ofone Edouard Saouma, the then Director-General of the Food and AgriculturalOrganization (FAO). Canada put up a strongfight to have him overthrown. We lost. Hewon. But it was a victory for a man whoviewed the FAO as a personal fiefdom, wholived like royalty, and who abdicated respon-sibility for his portfolio. Again, the worldwas complicit.

Have things changed? Well, not entirely,but they’re certainly changing. MadameBrundtland is everywhere regarded as a great catch for multilateralism. The newDirector-General of the International LabourOrganization (his predecessor was secretiveand hierarchical), Juan Samovia of Chile, isan open, inclusive visionary. Within theappointments governed by Secretary-GeneralKofi Annan, several have been inspired.Mary Robinson, as High Commissioner, hasgiven a new face to the mandate of HumanRights. Mark Malloch Brown will do more forthe UNDP than has been done in years.Sergio Vierra de Mello is a highly accom-plished Undersecretary-General ofHumanitarian Affairs.

One of the fascinating and excellent thingsthat has happened is the emergence of anew multilateral club—a group of womenheads of agencies who have developedclose friendships and intense camaraderie.It consists of Sadako Ogata as HighCommissioner for Refugees; Carol Bellamy,Executive-Director of UNICEF; CatherineBertini of the World Food Programme; NafisSadik, who is near to stepping-down after adistinguished tenure as chief of the Fund forPopulation Activities; Madame Brundtland

and Mary Robinson. They like each other;they’re in constant contact; they’re enor-mously effective. It’s an excellent mix.

I cannot emphasize strongly enough theneed for individual governments to takeUN appointments and policies moreseriously. There is now a network ofSpecial Representatives of the Secretary-General (SRSGs) who vary greatly in quality.And yet, their work is indispensable; theymust not be appointed through sometwisted process of political influence.Bernard Kouchner of France, the SRSG forKosovo, raises eyes heavenward whereverhe goes. In contrast, the choice ofAmbassador Kemal Morjane of Tunisia forthe Democratic Republic of the Congo is astrong ray of hope.

Over the last year and a half, I’ve beeninvolved in an Organization of African Unity-appointed panel investigating the roots andcauses of the genocide in Rwanda. I remem-ber how shocked I was when Jacques-RogerBooh Booh, the then Special Representativefor Rwanda of the then Secretary-General,testified before us. Suddenly I understoodwhy the role of General Romeo Dallaire hadbeen so much more tortured than it shouldhave been. Here was a man, Booh Booh,whose capacity to understand, to reportinsightfully, and to provide leadership waspalpably inadequate. Yet he remained in hisfateful post for almost the entire period.Unforgiveable.

But it’s by no means just a matter of seniorappointments. Policies also get short shrift.Let me provide two examples.

About a year after I formally joined UNICEFin 1995, the Secretary-General launched anambitious UN reform project. It was overseenby Maurice Strong who pursued the mandatewith notable vigour. Along the way, a majordifference of opinion developed betweenStrong and UNICEF. It was his view thatall the agencies on the development sideshould be gradually rolled into one, whileattempting still to maintain an individualprofile wherever possible for purposes ofprograms, media, fundraising, etc. It wasUNICEF’s view that our intrinsic raison d’êtreand significant fundraising capacity woulderode disastrously in a very short time.


...the United Nations

would function far

more admirably, in

the interests of all,

if governments

played their parts

by involving people

who knew what

they were

talking about.

A quite unaccustomed, almost titanic, battleensued. Carol Bellamy, UNICEF’s Executive-Director made a speech to her ExecutiveBoard meeting in June 1997 disavowingin unequivocal language the reformobjectives that were underway. Bellamymade it clear that it wasn’t reform as suchthat UNICEF resisted; it was reform thatwas self-immolating.

In North-South terms, the response wasfascinating. The developing countries onthe Board identified strongly with Bellamy,understanding that any loss to UNICEFwas a loss for programs in their respectivecountries. If there’s any agency which isembraced by the South, it’s UNICEF.Indeed, as this particular debate unfolded,President Yoweri Museveni of Uganda sentan unprecedented letter to the Secretary-General objecting to the treatment thatseemed to be in store for UNICEF. The devel-oped countries on the Board, on the otherhand, were far less sympathetic to UNICEF’sdilemma. For reasons of what they assumedto be cost, an end to duplication, andgreater efficiency, they cautiously chided theExecutive Director (that’s about as extremeas it gets in the UN system), and pressed onwith the reform agenda. What I found dispir-iting in the position of a number of thedonor countries was its abject intellectualpoverty. They neither understood nor caredabout the programmatic implications. Theytalked in Olympian fatuities about the bene-fits of integration. They were rigidly ideolog-ical and disgracefully uninformed. Nor didthey seem to care about the North-Southtension that was developing.

In the end, they lost and UNICEF prevailed.The Secretary-General did not press theintegration argument. It turned out all tothe good because many of the best elementsof reform, without the process of homoge-nization, have followed. There is far greatercoordination at country levels, far greateruse of shared resources and partnerships,and the emerging United NationsDevelopment Assistance Framework, orUNDAF (which is what the reform constructis called), has proved first-rate. In manyways, Maurice Strong should be pleased.The truth is that robbing UNICEF of even ashred of its identity would have done great

damage to the delivery of programs onthe ground, and the compromise whichdeveloped in practice is a benefit to all.(Regrettably, during the course of thereform debate, Maurice Strong and Iexchanged heated words in a privatemeeting. It was sad because we had beenfriends for years. Maurice felt that UNICEFhad overstepped the bounds of internal UNpropriety in taking the debate public beforethe Secretary-General had issued his report.I attempted to argue that it was preciselyin advance of the report, in an attempt toinfluence the report, that we had to makeour views known because so much was atstake. We agreed to disagree. I makemention of this episode because the fracaswas and is widely known, and I’m happy toreport that Maurice and I have restored ourfriendship in the aftermath.)

All of which brings me to the secondexample. The Executive Board meetingsof the various UN agencies are the forumin which policies are explored and programsscrutinized. Unhappily, not many of thedebates were, in my experience, terriblyuseful. Member states grind their axes andpursue avenues of argument that arefrequently extraneous.

The developing world is at a great disad-vantage. They have very small missions tothe United Nations, there’s an intimidatingamount of reading to be done in advance,and they often have several significantmeetings to cover simultaneously. It’s animpossible state of affairs. But they alsohave one considerable advantage: they haveUNICEF programs in their countries aboutwhich they can speak knowledgeably. Thus itwas that the South was often more tellingand relevant than the North.

The industrial world simply doesn’t take theproceedings seriously enough, although ithas the resources and the personnel to doso. There is a surprising tendency to sendrepresentatives who are untutored in thedebates and who are likely to read, withoutso much as the change of a comma, thetext which has been sent from the capital,regardless the tenor or direction of theongoing discussion. Worse, there are ofteninstances where a donor country will throwits weight around, pursuing a position at


once eccentric and absurdist. I recollectthis pattern vividly in a recent case of therepresentatives of France and Switzerlandwho tenaciously, and at length, advancedan alternative critique of the budget whichwas, frankly, incomprehensible. It matterednot. They kept at it, even though one gotthe distinct impression that they thoughta balance sheet had something to do withdrywall.

Alright, I make light of a serious subject. But what I’m attempting to say is that theUnited Nations would function far moreadmirably, in the interests of all, if govern-ments played their parts by involving peoplewho knew what they were talking about.

The agencies, in my limited experience, doknow what they’re talking about. And thatraises yet another matter that I’d like brieflyto address.

There is, within the UN system, a strangedivide between the political and the humani-tarian. Simply put, and so far as I candivine, the political has little time for thehumanitarian. I recognize, of course, thatthe political is vastly more glamorous; afterall, one bitter conflict after another demandspolitical solutions, and the Security Councilreigns supreme.

But there’s a terrible flaw at work. Eventhough the Department of PeacekeepingOperations (DPKO) and the Department ofPolitical Affairs (DPA) have carriage of mostof the world’s trouble spots, the failure toconsult or more seriously to involve thehumanitarian agencies—UNDP, UNHCR, WFP,UNICEF—is a dreadful mistake. The reason issimple: the agencies have an elaborate appa-ratus on the ground, 24 hours a day, beforethe conflict, during the conflict, and afterthe conflict. Their staff members often knowmore about the circumstances of the countrythan any political artisan, no matter howwell-intentioned. This is true whether it’sAfghanistan, Sierra Leone, Burundi, SriLanka, or a host of other countries. But byand large, the agencies are treated with asurly and exasperated impatience. When thefirst draft of the UN “Strategic Framework”for Afghanistan was circulated, there wasbarely a mention of gender! Given thatgender is almost the only basis on which a

rational framework for Afghanistan can bebased, how is that possible? Because thepolitical side of the house paid virtually noattention to the humanitarian, and it wasonly by indefatigable pestering that genderwas given a more appropriate place.

I had a small personal experience which wasillustrative. Just last April, I was sent toBotswana by the Canadian InternationalDevelopment Agency (CIDA) to assist formerPresident Ketumile Masire in his role as“Facilitator” in the inter-Congolese PeaceDialogue. He had been appointed in January,and then pretty well abandoned for a periodof three months by the UN, the OAU, andthose countries that had pledged financialassistance. Since the Peace Dialogue is thecentrepiece of the “Lusaka Agreement,”which was signed in July 1999 and wasdesigned to end the fighting in the Congo,there was something pretty outrageous inleaving President Masire to his own devices.Indeed, almost the only way he was able tofunction at all was by using his personalprivate secretary and receiving cash advancesfrom the Botswana government.

What I found so revealing when I got therewas that no one in New York had thought ofusing the UN agencies resident in Botswana(or for that matter in the Congo). It wastruly absurd because Botswana has a particu-larly effective UN Resident Coordinator whowas happy to help, and a quite respectablefamily of UN agency personnel. But it wouldalmost never strike the political operativesto turn to the humanitarian operatives. Andwho loses? The country—invariably a devel-oping or transitional country—where theconflict is raging or peace is stalled for wantof intervention.

I loved my work at UNICEF. There’s nothingin this world quite like seeing a childreunited with her mother, or a young girlwho finally gets to go to school, or a childsoldier who returns home unarmed, or anorphanage which is rehabilitated, or acommunity health centre with vaccines andmedicines, or a newly turned faucet signi-fying clean water for an entire village. So,too, did I love my years as a diplomat. Oneday, calling upon the mountain of materialwhich I’ve gathered, I intend to write about


“It seems to me

that the consuming

challenge for

the UN [...] is to

defeat poverty and

to introduce a

profoundly altered

measure of equality

into the agenda of

this suffering planet.”

both. I’m a complete patsy for multilate-ralism, and much as I feel achingly frustratedon occasion, I believe that the UN is thebest we could possibly have, and I believeequally—even though I obviously havedifferences of opinion—that we’re blessedby the current Secretary-General.

However, there is a caveat. It seems to methat the consuming challenge for the UN—and that includes both the member statesand the secretariat—is not, as is widelyheld, peacekeeping and conflict. The chal-lenge for the United Nations is to defeatpoverty and to introduce a profoundly alteredmeasure of equality into the agenda of thissuffering planet. The Secretary-General hasbegun this process with his imaginativeMillennium Proposal.

But on its own, it will never succeed. Itneeds protagonists, activists, articulate andcourageous advocates. And one of thoseadvocates must be Canada.

I sometimes feel like a sentimental romanticputting the case that Canada is special. Butas the world knows we belong to theCommonwealth, the Francophonie, and theG-7: indeed, we’re the one and only countrythat belongs to all three. We have the peace-keeping inheritance and we’re a cherubicmiddle power. Curiously, our active participa-tion in NATO seems not to weigh against us.

There was a time, with all these attributes,and enlightened foreign policy to boot,that we were primus inter pares in the eyesof the developing world. We’ve squandered alot of our moral capital because of decliningaid and a generally tepid internationalperformance. We pride ourselves on the land-mines treaty, on our critique of the trade insmall arms and light weapons, on the semi-nal work in the diamond trade handled soably by Robert Fowler, our UN Ambassador,and on our human security agenda before theSecurity Council. But there’s somethingmissing: it’s all too easy. It requires veryfew dollars (something that does not gounnoticed), and it lacks the passionateadvocacy for the South.

What Canada should be doing, throughCIDA and the Department of Foreign Affairs,is to fashion a handful of interventions—immunization, AIDS orphans, the eliminationof polio, girls’ education, reproductivehealth, child labour—which, like our cham-pioning of vitamin A, saves or salvages hugenumbers of lives. We should pursue all of itin single-minded frenzy. Our voice should bethe voice of the developing world, taking onthe World Bank when it’s out of line, blastingthe IMF when it oversteps the bounds,pressing our partners to mobilize around thecrushing debt, energizing the United Nationswhen its spirit flags. Canada should becomethe unorthodox herald of a new world orderwhich sees justice in dissent, equity inhuman rights, and economic progress indevelopment without strings attached. Weshould taunt our former allies and prick theirshabby complacency. We should makeourselves the most valued friend of the fullconstellation of developing countries.

It’s not too late. We still have our reputationwith which to start.


PUTTING PEOPLE FIRST:CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY

AT THE END OF THE 1990SM i c h e l l e H i b l e r

M i c h e l l e H i b l e r i s D i r e c t o r o f C o m m u n i c a t i o n s

a t t h e N o r t h - S o u t h I n s t i t u t e .

PUTTING PEOPLE FIRST: CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY

AT THE END OF THE 1990S

A

C H A P T E RT W O

These are sobering statistics. But more thanjust arresting facts, what these figures tell us is that we have a long way to go tocreate a world in which equity and securityare guiding principles, let alone reality.

This past year Canada took some stepsforward on the road to a fairer world. Earlyin the spring Prime Minister Jean Chrétiendeclared some new initiatives for Canadianforeign policy, reflecting the government’sinterest in human rights, judicial reform, fair trade, and most pressing of all, globalpoverty. In a speech to the Canadian Club of Winnipeg, Mr Chrétien indicated that cutsto foreign aid were at an end and announcedmore generous debt forgiveness measures fordeveloping countries. Debt relief would be

for “countries that increase spending oneducation and health care for their peopleand reduce spending on weapons and the military.”1

This was the signal, oft repeated, thatpeople were to be at the heart of Canadianforeign policy, whether it be in trade, peace-keeping, or development assistance.

The Canadian government has also embracedthe concept of Canadian values as a guide topolicymaking. According to Prime MinisterChrétien, for example, the Ottawa treaty toban landmines and the creation of theInternational Criminal Court bear “the stamp of Canada and represents our values.”Canada’s participation in the NATO mission to Kosovo, he said in Winnipeg last March,

t the end of 1999 — the end of a decade, a century, a millennium

— Canada and the world faced some daunting challenges. One-third

of the world’s population — 2 billion people — lived under repressive

regimes, in countries with little respect for human rights; 20 percent of

the world’s population living in the highest income countries had

86 percent of global Gross Domestic Product (GDP), while more than half of

humanity lived on less than $2 a day; and conflicts flared in some 40 hot

spots around the globe. As a result, some 30 million people were displaced

from their homes and close to 12 million had sought refuge outside

their countries.


“In all our areas of

international activity—

peacekeeping,

development, and

trade—we are

beginning to recognize

the human rights

implications of

our foreign policies.”

The Honourable

Lloyd Axworthy,

Minister of Foreign

Affairs, Address to the

opening of the human

rights NGO consultations,

Ottawa, March 4, 1999.

C H A P T E R T W O P U T T I N G P E O P L E F I R S T 13

Each year the Government of Canada allocates a small portion of its budgetary resources to the provision of developmentassistance to developing countries.1 However, this North-to-South resource flow is by no means the dominant flow betweenCanada and the developing countries. Each year, Canadian private firms, banks, and public agencies reap enormous benefitsfrom their loans to developing-country governments and firms, and from their ownership of securities and capital in thesecountries. The South-to-North flow of resources that this generates each year dwarfs aid flows by a substantial margin.

C A N A D I A N L O A N S A N D I N V E S T M E N T S I N D E V E L O P I N G C O U N T R I E S( $ B I L L I O N S )

1999 1998

Debt owed to public agencies $21.16 $21.28Loans to foreign entities 28.66 28.04Bonds 6.68 4.85Stocks 9.31 7.22Foreign direct investment 58.58 55.87Other investments abroad 57.97 78.49

Total $182.36 $195.75

Sources:

Government of Canada, Public Accounts of Canada; Statistics Canada, Canada’s International InvestmentPosition 1999; Export Development Corporation, 1999 Annual Report; Canadian Wheat Board, 1998-1999Annual Report.

In 1999 Canadians lay claim to $182.4 billion worth of loans, securities, and capital in developing countries. Although thisrepresented a significant decline (6.7 percent or $13.4 billion) from the 1998 total, it remains substantial. The bulk ofthese claims (88.4 percent) resided with the Canadian private sector.

E S T I M AT E S O F I N C O M E F R O M C A N A D I A N L O A N S T O A N D I N V E S T M E N T S I N D E V E L O P I N G C O U N T R I E S( $ B I L L I O N S )

1999 1998

Debt owed to public agencies $0.92 $0.94Loans to foreign entities 2.16 2.17Bonds 0.42 0.32Stocks 0.58 0.48Foreign direct investment 3.27 2.88Other investments abroad 2.84 4.14

Total $10.20 $10.93

Source:

North-South Institute calculations (using information provided by the sources mentioned for the previoustable, as well as other sources).

These assets generated an estimated income flow of $10.20 billion in 1999, a slight decline from the 1998 figure of $10.93 billion. By comparison, the flow of Canadian development assistance for both 1998 and 1999 was only $2.8 billion.

C A N A D I A N I N C O M E P E R D O L L A R O F O D A

1999 1998

Income from all sources ($billions) $10.20 $10.93ODA and official aid ($billions) 2.80 2.80

Ratio 3.64 3.92

Therefore, for each dollar of aid disbursed by Canada to developing countries, Canadian public and private institutionsreceived $3.64 in income from developing countries in 1999, and $3.92 in 1998. In effect, Canada returned less than one-third of the income it received from its activities in developing countries as development assistance or official aid in 1999,and only slightly more than one-quarter in 1998.

— John Serieux

Note1 The definition of developing countries used here is broader than the one used in the tables in the “Statistics 2000” section, p. 45 (and in the 1998 version of this calculation); it refers to all non-OECD countries.

G E T T I N G M O R E T H A N W E G I V E

“is just the most recent example of how ourforeign policy is dictated not only by ourinterests but by our values. Our values asCanadians. Our basic human values.”

Many have asked, however, if Canadianforeign policy is longer on lofty goals thanon practical policies. And more to the point,is Canada willing to back its rhetoric withresources?2 As Toronto Star foreign affairscolumnist Gordon Barthos noted: “Canadacurrently spends $13 billion or more a yearpromoting our values and ideals abroad,through a military equipped for peacekeepingand combat ($10 billion), foreign aid($2.3 billion), and diplomacy and trade($1.3 billion). It is not enough.”3

There are many indications that it certainlyis not enough if Canada is to reach its goals.Canadian peacemaking and peacekeepingtroops are stretched thin, covering close to20 missions on five continents; foreign aidhas declined precipitously during the 1990s, relegating Canada to the bottom half ofdonor countries in terms of generosity; and Canada’s diplomacy and intelligence-gathering capacity is struggling to keep pace with growing demands.

T H E Y E A R I N R E V I E W

This review of Canada’s relations with devel-oping countries in 1999 focuses on threemain foreign policy thrusts—trade, humansecurity, and official development assistanceincluding debt relief—in effect, three of thekey ways in which Canada can promote abetter global community.

TradeCanadian foreign policy priorities in the1990s have been strongly oriented towardextending trade relations and other economicrelations. As journalist David Crane wrote inThe Toronto Star on September 29, trade isimportant “because when we open ourmarkets to the products and services thatpoor countries can produce, we enable them to develop their economies and raisetheir living standard.”4 But although Canadahas pledged to help developing countriesliberalize their economies and is working to ensure their representation at the WorldTrade Organization (WTO), it still imposesbarriers on products that they can make,such as clothing and agricultural products.

Human securityHuman security, a concept that embodies the Canadian values of tolerance, democracy,and respect for human rights, has been elab-orated as a guiding principle for Canada’sforeign policy. It seeks to place the rights ofpeople and the protection of people first inrecognition that “the protection of the indi-vidual is an essential precondition for inter-national peace and security.”5 According toForeign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy,Canada has a unique role to play in leadingthis charge.

Promoting an international human securityregime to protect civilians, however, can leadto difficult choices and difficult lessons. Onesuch lesson is that “a commitment to theprotection of people also requires a commit-ment to back diplomacy with the threat ofmilitary force, and when necessary, with theuse of force.”6 Fully implementing this morecontroversial implication of human securitypolicy will mean putting money and lives onthe line. Are Canadians ready?

Development assistance and debt reliefAlthough the 1999 budget provided someadditional funds for Canada’s official develop-ment assistance (ODA), as a percentage ofGNP, ODA slipped to 0.29 percent, a far cryfrom the official target, set some 30 yearsago, of 0.7 percent. This is but one sign, say international development groups such as the Canadian Council for International Co-operation (CCIC), of Canada’s lack of real commitment to reducing global poverty. Canada did, however, strive at theGroup of Seven meetings to increase debtrelief for the poorest countries. And it advocates making the international financialarchitecture—namely the World Bank andthe International Monetary Fund—moreinclusive and transparent.

Each of the sections that follow reviewssome of the major events and directions ofthe past year. In doing so, they attempt toshow how support seems to be building inCanada for a more proactive, people-centredforeign policy. If the forces of globalizationand civil society are encouraging this trend,“the concept of human security and theprecedents it sets are providing a frameworkfor putting people at the centre of interna-tional relations.”7


Taking Stock After Seattle

According to Statistics Canada, 1999 was abanner year for Canadian merchandise trade.With exports up 12 percent over 1998, ourtrade surplus was almost $34 billion, thethird highest on record.1

Canadian International Trade MinisterPierre Pettigrew considers that those figures“continue to show that Canadian goods arerecognized as amongst the best in theworld,” and reflect “the robust state of theCanadian and American economies, as well as the strengthening of economies world-wide, particularly in much of Asia.”2

Encouraging words, but perhaps not quiteaccurate. Canada’s stellar performance lastyear owes almost all to a boom in auto-motive trade, as well as sales of televisionand telecommunications equipment, to theUnited States and European Union (EU),where strong economies and the weakCanadian dollar have been important. Exportsto all other countries declined in 1999, how-ever. In the case of the poorer countries, thedrop was close to 9 percent (see “Statistics2000,” Table 7, p. 68).

If Canadian exports to developing countriesdropped in 1999, imports from some of thosecountries rose noticeably—by 9.7 percentfrom Asia and 14.2 percent from LatinAmerica.3 In fact, developing countries’merchandise exports expanded by 8.5 percentin 1999, about twice as fast as the globalaverage. Chief beneficiaries of this exportgrowth were oil exporters such as Angola andYemen whose exports increased by more thanone-third. Exporters of manufactured goodslike Bangladesh, Cambodia, Haiti, and Burma(Myanmar) also expanded their exports faster than world trade. And according to the World Trade Organization (WTO), devel-oping countries’ exports have risen fasterthan world trade throughout the 1990s,with the exception of 1998.4

Developing nations also scored a modestpolitical victory at the WTO’s Third MinisterialConference in December in Seattle byinsisting that their agenda be addressedbefore another round of global trade negotia-tions got off the ground. In effect, they—and concerned civil society groups protesting

the talks—triggered a crisis of credibility inthe multilateral trade system. To restorethat credibility, Canada and other developednations will need to take measures toincrease market access for agricultural,textiles, and industrial products fromdeveloping countries. They will also needto ensure that the system is open, inclusive,and transparent.

More fundamentally, international trade willneed to change from a narrow “trade createswealth” perspective to a broader view thatsees trade as one element of a sustainabledevelopment strategy. This is, in effect, areturn to the WTO’s mission and is a goalthat Canada has supported, in words if notalways in action.

I N S E A R C H O F C O N S E N S U S

Preparations for the WTO’s conference and thepossible launch of a new round of negotia-tions dominated Canada’s foreign tradeagenda in 1999. Early in the year, the Houseof Commons Standing Committee on ForeignAffairs and International Trade (SCFAIT)embarked on cross-country consultations withCanadians “to determine a national consensuson what Canada’s trade priorities should benow and for the future.”5 These were, as thecommittee noted, “the largest and mostintensive parliamentary consultation everheld on international trade issues.”6

The desired national consensus provedelusive. Although the HonourableSergio Marchi, then Minister of InternationalTrade and Canada’s ambassador to the WTOsince August 1999, had promised that theprocess would be more transparent, moreresponsive, and more inclusive of Canadians’views,7 civil society groups such as theCouncil of Canadians and the CanadianLabour Congress (CLC) were not convinced.“Why is it,” asked Dick Martin, Secretary-Treasurer of the CLC, “that trade agreementsaffecting hundreds of millions of workersand citizens are being scrutinized only bygovernment and business?”8

On questions of substance, the debates thatraged domestically had clear North-Southovertones. The intensity of the discussionwas a clear presage of what was to transpirein December in Seattle and paralleled theshift in paradigm taking place in the security


“The debate that has

been building over the

last 10 years or so is not

just about trade and

investment: it’s about

what societies want to

become, and what they

want to remain, in an

era of accelerating

change.”

The Honourable

Pierre Pettigrew,

Minister for International

Trade, “Notes for an

Address to the Ottawa

Diplomatic Association

and the Diplomatic Press

Attachés Network,”

February 16, 2000.

arena: just as security was increasinglyfocusing on people rather than just states,so too was trade policy asked to considerpeople, not just the economy, exports,or business.

Liberalization for whose benefit?On one side were business groups, such asthe Business Council on National Issues(BCNI), which clearly stated its position in a January memorandum to Prime MinisterJean Chrétien: “No matter what the topic,our objective must remain worldwide tradeand investment liberalization.”9 Supportersof freer trade, such as the BCNI, argue thatthe WTO—born in 1995 at the conclusion ofthe Uruguay Round Negotiations of theGeneral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade—hasgiven the world a rules-based trading systemand slashed trade barriers.

An opposing view, held by internationaldevelopment advocates such as the CanadianCouncil for International Co-operation (CCIC),is that the WTO is a rich countries’ clubmainly benefiting companies in industrializedcountries and that it has been more adept atopening the developing world to industrial-ized country products than vice versa.10 Theypoint to the fact that the only two productsthat the poorest countries can realisticallyhope to offer the West—agricultural goodsand clothing—are among the areas wherethe WTO has made the least progress.

Also of concern are trade-related intellectualproperty rights and patents which limit howsoon generic drug manufacturers can producecheaper copies of brand-name drugs. Thishardly bodes well for the provision of healthcare in the South. The patenting of crossbredplant varieties and genetically modified

organisms also puts Southern farmers at adisadvantage.

Social and other issuesOn the national front, the Council ofCanadians—among others—argues that,through its powerful dispute-settlementmechanisms, the WTO limits national sover-eignty. A case in point is the WTO rulingagainst measures taken by Canada to protectits magazine industry from “split-runAmerican publications.”11 Equally contentiousis the closed nature of the dispute settle-ment mechanism.

To those arguments are joined those of tradeunionists and environmentalists who contendthat the WTO “upholds no minimum stan-dards to protect the environment, labourrights, social programs or cultural diver-sity.”12 In effect, they accuse the WTO ofgiving multinationals the means to rapidlyshift their operations to whatever countrypays the lowest wages, undercutting workersin rich countries, and enabling them towreak havoc on the environment.13

Canadian civil society organizations, or CSOs,voiced their concerns to both the parliamen-tary committee and the WTO High-LevelSymposia on Trade and Environment andTrade and Development, held in March1999.14 Their calls were for due attention tobe paid to social issues and for discussionsto be framed in the context of how trade cancontribute to overall sustainable develop-ment. Among their demands were greaterinclusiveness in the meetings and concreteaction to break the deadlock on trade, environment, and development.

C A N A D A’ S T R A D E R E L AT I O N SW I T H D E V E L O P I N G C O U N T R I E S

Canada has been a vocal supporter of theWTO mandate—which includes sustainabledevelopment and equitable growth15—and ofthe aspirations of developing nations in theorganization. Early in the year, for example,Canadian officials noted the need “to findways to advance participation in the globaleconomy by less-developed countries. Tomarginalize them now would not onlydeprive them of their greatest hope forfuture prosperity, but it would be also todeny ourselves the future contribution theycan make to the world’s economy.”16


BO

X1 D E V E L O P I N G C O U N T R I E S A N D T H E W T O

• Of 136 WTO members, 101 are developing countries.

• An additional 22 developing countries have applied for accession.

• 29 of the 48 Least Developed Countries (LLDCs) are members of

the WTO.

• Developing countries account for about 36 percent of world trade.

• LLDCs account for one-half of 1 percent of world trade and get less

than 1 percent of foreign direct investment.

Source

DFAIT, “Developing Countries in the World Trade Organization (WTO): Consultations on FTAA and WTO Negotiations, Sectoral Consultations—Trade and Development, Discussion Paper” (May 1999). At www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/discussion/development-e.asp (accessed February 3, 2000).

This echoed the government’s commitmentmade in its foreign policy statement, Canadain the World, of “bringing the developingworld into the international economicsystem.”17 But was Canada genuinely com-mitted to making the new round of tradenegotiations a “development round?”

As the WTO biannual reviews of Canadiantrade policy and practice make clear, therehas been some progress in the opening ofCanadian markets to imports from developingcountries. For instance, Canada removed allnuisance tariffs (of less than 2 percent),reduced its use of antidumping duties, andended quotas on four textiles/clothing prod-ucts (work gloves, special yarns, textilehandbags, and tailor-collar shirts). Butdeveloping countries’ share in Canada’s totaltrade remains quite low (see “Statistics2000,” Table 3, p. 52).

Ann Weston, Vice-President and ResearchCoordinator at the North-South Institute(NSI), explained to the Standing Committeeon Foreign Affairs and International Tradethat this is partly the result of our largebilateral trade with the US, now acceleratedwith the Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and thesubsequent North American Free TradeAgreement (NAFTA).18 The risk of trade diver-sion from developing to other countries isparticularly clear in the case of textiles andclothing. For instance, the US share ofCanadian imports of men’s and boys’ shirtsand underwear grew from 10 percent in1990 to 26 percent in 1997 with thestrengthening of the NAFTA rules of origin,the growing gap between NAFTA and MostFavoured Nation (MFN) tariffs, and thepersistence of quotas on most clothingproducts from many developing countries.Despite some cuts, import tariffs on textilesand clothing remain very high—22 percenton men’s shirts—whereas imports from theUS are duty-free and tariffs on those fromMexico, at 12.5 percent in 1999, will fall tozero by 2003 under NAFTA (see Table 1).

For example, Canada still collects nearly$20 million in customs revenue annuallyfrom the tariffs on imports from Bangladeshalone (an average tariff of some 16 percent):this is equivalent to more than a fifth ofCanada’s official aid to Bangladesh, which in 1997-98 was almost $98 million. Total

customs revenue on imports from all LeastDeveloped Countries (LLDCs) was $27 million,and on imports from other low-incomecountries some $664 million (see “Statistics2000,” Table 6, p. 64).

Canada imposes lower tariffs on imports fromall developing countries for many products,apart from textiles, clothing, footwear, andsome agricultural goods, under the so-calledGeneral Preferential Tariff (GPT). Burma is anexception: its GPT eligibility was withdrawnin 1997 because of continuing human rightsviolations. These tariffs were lowered (andthe product coverage extended) in 1996 tocompensate for the lower tariffs on Canadianimports from developed countries like Japanand the EU. Even so, despite its name, theGPT leaves many developing-countryproducers at a disadvantage compared tosuppliers in the US or Mexico.

A P L A N O F AC T I O N

Former WTO Director-General Renato Ruggieroand the present Director-General Mike Moorehave repeatedly called on all advancedeconomies and the most dynamic developingcountries to eliminate all tariff barriers toLeast Developed Countries, and to make thisbinding.19 Canada has also supported the


TA

BL

E

1D E V E L O P I N G - C O U N T R Y P R O D U C T S FAC I N G H I G H

TA R I F F S I N C A N A D A ( 1 9 9 8 )

For comparison:Product Tariffs faced by Tariffs faced by

DevelopingCountries LLDCsa US Mexico

(%) (%) (%) (%)

Textiles 9.7 7.8 0 5.7

Clothing 16.1 14.3 0 8.9

Footwear 12.3 10.5 0 6.3

Rubberproducts 5.2 2.5 0 2.2

Food products 27.2 26.1 23.4 23.5

Beverages 10.3 9.6 4.8 2.9

Chicken 7% in quota n/a 0% in quota 7.5% in quota264% out 264% out 264% outof quota of quota of quota

Notes

n/a = not applicableaLLDCs = Least Developed Countries

Source: World Trade Organization, Trade Policy Review. Canada 1998(Geneva: WTO, March 1999), pp. 41, 85.

principle of special initiatives for the LeastDeveloped Countries (LLDCs), and signedonto the WTO’s Plan of Action for Least-Developed Countries, agreed to in December1996. It already provides the 46 LLDCscovered by this agreement with zero tariffsfor products covered by the GPT.

A number of key items remain excluded, however, notably clothing and footwear.International trade in textiles and clothing

has been regulated since 1974 by the restric-tive Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA), a seriesof bilateral agreements that set quotas onimports of textiles and clothing from devel-oping to developed countries (see Box 2).

The Plan of Action further provides fortechnical assistance and capacity-buildingto enable developing countries to bothcope with the implementation of variousWTO rules and increase their export capacity.Canada is already engaged in a number ofinitiatives to help developing countriesintegrate into the world trading system,including providing information about theWTO and the multilateral trading regime,encouraging export development andcapacity building, and matching exportersin developing countries with market oppor-tunities in Canada. For example, Canada contributes:

• $950,000 for the International TradeCentre based in Geneva;

• $3.2 million over five years to theCanadian Trade Facilitation Office;

• $700,000 for the integration of the LeastDeveloped Countries of La Francophonieinto the world trading system; and

• $1.4 million over five years for theCommonwealth Trade and InvestmentAccess Facility, to assist small economiesin the Commonwealth Caribbean.20

Much more assistance is still needed to helpdeveloping countries cope with implementa-tion of the WTO rules: several still have tochange various laws and policies—and evencreate new institutions—to conform with their obligations, many of which fall due in 2000. In fact, World Bank researchersJ. Michael Finger and Philip Schuler havedetermined that implementing WTO reformsin just three areas—sanitary and phyto-sanitary standards, intellectual propertyrights, and customs—would cost many LLDCs more than their total annual development budget.21

Since the end of the Uruguay Round, mostindustrialized countries have provided tech-nical cooperation of some kind to developingcountries. As many as 600 activities wererecorded by the WTO to mid-1998. Some ofthese have been organized and implemented


BO

X2 T H E S L O W D E AT H O F T H E M FA

The garment industry has undergone many changes under globalization

and trade liberalization, but the greatest impact is yet to come with

the rescinding of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) by 2005. The MFA,

which has regulated international trade in textiles and clothing since

1974, consists of a series of bilateral agreements negotiated country by

country that sets quotas on imports of textiles and clothing from

developing to developed countries. The MFA has been one of the most

restrictive sets of trade rules.

The Uruguay Round of trade negotiations resulted in a new agreement

to gradually phase out MFA quotas and moved garments and textiles

under a temporary WTO Agreement on Textiles and Clothing (ATC). At

the end of 2005, textiles and clothing will fall under normal trading

rules. UNCTAD estimates this could generate an additional US$175 bil-

lion in clothing and textiles exports from developing to industrialized

countries by 2006.

The ATC has been widely criticized for being backloaded—49 percent of

the products covered will not be integrated until the last year

of the agreement. The first stage, completed in 1997, for instance,

removed the quotas in Canada only for work gloves and did not

liberalize any restrictions in the EU, Norway, and the US. Most

developed countries have scheduled the removal of quotas for the bulk

of commercially meaningful items toward the end of the phase-out

period. What’s more, developed countries have continued to use

nontariff measures to protect their industries, including temporary

safeguards, rules of origin actions, and customs procedures.

The impact on developing countries of the dismantling of the MFA is

under some dispute. While most experts believe that developing coun-

tries as a whole will benefit, those such as South Korea, the Dominican

Republic, and Morocco with lower labour and production costs, better

input supplies and infrastructure, and proximity to markets, stand to

gain the most, as do newcomers to the textiles trade, including

Pakistan, Bangladesh, China, and India. Others, such as Vietnam, that

have gained a market share as a result of quotas could be disadvan-

taged, as could the Least Developed Countries.

Sources

Julie Delahanty, From Social Movements to Social Clauses: Grading Strategies forImproving Conditions for Women Garment Workers, Briefing 42 (Ottawa: The North-South Institute, 1999) and Consumer Unity & Trust Society, “Textiles andClothing—Who Gains, Who Loses, and Why!” Briefing Paper No 5 (Jaipur, CUTS-India, May 1997).

bilaterally (such as a series of seminarsfunded by the Canadian InternationalDevelopment Agency (CIDA) in Pakistanin 1997). Others have been channeledthrough a group of organizations, such asthe joint, US$8 million program run by theWTO, UNCTAD, and the International TradeCentre for Least Developed and OtherCountries in Africa.

Of the technical assistance offered by theWTO itself, 80 percent relies on ad hoc,voluntary contributions from a small numberof countries, making planning difficult.Recognizing this problem, Canada, Denmark,Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, andSwitzerland submitted a proposal on techni-cal assistance to the WTO on July 21, 1999,recommending that all members share thefinancing of technical cooperation activitiesthrough increases in the regular budget.22

The high cost of part ic ipationAccording to many observers, one of themajor achievements of the Uruguay Roundwas the sharpening of the dispute settlementmechanism and the implementation of rules“to what had been an international free-for-all, with the biggest and richest nationsusually coming out on top.” But despiteassertions that “by making trade subject toclear rules—rules that apply to all, regard-less of size or economic might, we haveleveled the playing field,”23 industrializedcountries retained their advantage.

While it is true that, since 1995, a quarterof all complaints have been brought bydeveloping countries and they have beenthe defendants in 67 disputes,24 they areconstrained from availing themselves ofthe mechanism because of its “prohibitivecosts,” both financial and human.25 “Thehigh costs limit their capacity to know, letalone defend, their rights,” says NSI’sAnn Weston. Another problem is that largercountries are now absorbing retaliativemeasures rather than changing their tradepolicies to comply with rulings against them.

The problem is broader than coping withdisputes. As CCIC pointed out in its Brief tothe Standing Committee in March 1999, “The‘negative consensus’ procedure at the WTOworks against the participation of less devel-oped countries—if they are unable to attend

a meeting, they are assumed to be in agree-ment. Since several WTO meetings may takeplace simultaneously, it is simply impossiblefor poor countries to have delegates at eachone.”26 There is also a question of economicand social adjustment, says NSI’s Weston.Can developing-country industries andworkers cope with further changes—forexample, increased competition fromimports or in export markets, stiffer intellec-tual property rights, or reduced investmentsubsidies?

The underlying assumption that further liber-alization of developing-country economieswill generate further economic growth isincreasingly being challenged. As UNCTAD’sTrade and Development Report, 1999 notes:“developing countries have striven hard, andoften at considerable cost, to integrate moreclosely into the world economy. But in theface of deep-seated imbalances in economicpower and systemic biases in the interna-tional trading and financial systems, theirexpectations of the gains from such integra-tion in terms of faster growth, greateremployment opportunities and reduced levelsof poverty have been disappointed.” In fact,says UNCTAD, “liberalization as a successfulgrowth strategy in an interdependent globaleconomy relies crucially on exports, which inturn are highly dependent on growth inindustrial countries and greater access ofdeveloping countries to their markets.”27

Canada’s posit ionThe Standing Committee’s report, Canada andthe Future of the World Trade Organization,released in June, made 45 recommendationson issues ranging from the social dimensionsof trade to culture, emerging technology, andinstitutional improvements to the WTO. In itsNovember 15 response, the federal govern-ment agreed that “only the full participationof all countries in the multilateral systemwill ensure that the objectives of globalgrowth and sustainable development areachieved.”28

In fact, in October, the government regis-tered a communication at the WTO whichagreed with the developing countries “thatthe new negotiations should address thechallenges facing developing countries inadjusting to an enhanced multilateral tradingsystem.”29 Recognizing that no one measure


or instrument would satisfactorily addressthe legitimate concerns of developing coun-tries, Canada considered that “a balancedapproach that incorporates market accessissues, special measures that contribute tobuilding capacity and promoting economicgrowth, and the targeted application of bothtrade facilitation and TRTA (trade-relatedtechnical assistance) will together helpdeveloping countries participate more fully inthe benefits of membership in the WTO.”30

O N T H E E V E O F A N E W R O U N D

The government’s approach to the WorldTrade Organization has both technical and social objectives. The latter, saysInternational Trade Minister Pettigrew basically “boils down to promoting Canadianvalues.”31 Among Canada’s stated objectivesare:

• to ensure that negotiating groups takeenvironmental considerations fully intoaccount;

• to urge global compliance with theInternational Labour Organization’s (ILO)two main instruments on child labour andworker rights; and

• to ensure that the multilateral tradingsystem supports the international pursuitof other goals, notably sustainable devel-opment and other social objectives.32

Many point out that Canada is well placed to play an active role in this task since it is recognized as one of the “quad”—the four economies (along with the US, EU, and Japan) that dominate the agenda of the WTO.

In the weeks and days leading to themeetings, WTO member countries found itdifficult to agree on an agenda for the newround of negotiations. Canada and others, forinstance, were pushing for major concessionsfrom the EU in opening its protected agricul-tural markets and ending export subsidies.33

Agriculture in general had been considered aspecial case and exempted from many provi-sions of the GATT and Uruguay Round tradeagreements. Developing countries had theirown “spin” on agriculture and servicesissues: high tariff rates on products thatoffer a potential for export diversification inthe South, for instance, and subsidization of

agricultural output in the North that shutsout imports from developing countries.According to UNCTAD, the annual cost ofsupport for agriculture in industrial countriesin 1996-98 was double the level of agricul-tural exports from developing countriesduring those three years.34

Developing countries were also concernedabout continuing protectionism for industrialproducts such as footwear, clothing, andtextiles under the MFA, as well as in otherlow-technology and resource-based industriesthrough antidumping procedures and healthand safety standards. UNCTAD notes thatthere are also signs that the provisions ofWTO Agreements are not always beingproperly adhered to—for example, voluntaryexport restraints continue to be applied.

Further, most developing countries did notwelcome the new issues being pushed bydeveloped countries such as investment,transparency in government procurement,competition, a new round of industrial tariffcuts, and labour and environmental stan-dards. They also called for an increase infunding and human resources for technicalcooperation.

In his opening address to the Seattle WTOMinisterial Meeting, International TradeMinister Pierre Pettigrew urged his counter-parts to “agree that it is not acceptable tomanage a global trading system in whichsome countries are far from being full mem-bers, and whose citizens are not benefitingfrom the advantages of global trade.”35

Among the priorities he cited were greatercoherence and coordination among inter-national organizations.

Canada also announced its support for anagreement creating the Geneva-basedAdvisory Centre on World Trade OrganizationLaw. The independent centre, to whichCanada is contributing $1.5 million, willprovide training and legal assistance toenable developing countries to participate in WTO dispute resolution processes.Observers consider that this contribution is“not only a worthy initiative but also a raresignal that Canada sees multilateral tradeliberalization as an international develop-ment issue, rather than just of interest tothe business lobby.”36


“Trade is better than

aid. If industrialized

countries do more to

open their markets,

developing countries

can increase their

exports by many billions

of dollars per year—far

more than they now

receive in aid. For

millions and millions

of poor people this

could make the

difference between

their present misery

and a decent life.

And yet the cost for the

rich countries would

be minuscule, In fact,

industrialized countries

might even be doing

themselves a favour.”

Kofi Annan,

UN Secretary-General,

Address to the WTO

Ministerial Meeting,

November 30, 1999.

Irreconci lable differences?Outside the meeting doors and on the streetsof Seattle, as many as 50,000 protestors—some 5,000 from Canada—were clamouringfor trade ministers to include social andenvironmental issues in the new round ofnegotiations. They met opposition, not juston the streets from police, but inside theconference halls from delegates from devel-oping countries who considered that linkingsocial standards to trade is a form of protec-tionism against developing countries.37 Theywere also opposed by 100 Third World intel-lectuals and NGOs who signed a “StatementAgainst Linkage” in which they blame bothprotectionist lobby groups and “mistaken”civil society groups for advancing their ownagendas at the expense of developingcountries.38

Attempts to launch a new round of negotia-tions were suspended on December 3.Jonathan Fried, Canada’s Assistant DeputyMinister for Trade and Economic Policy, tolda debriefing session in Vancouver that twokey divides proved irreconcilable for minis-ters in Seattle.39 First, an East-West divideemerged on agriculture, particularly as itrelated to the issue of export subsidies.Second, developing countries were notconvinced that they had realized realbenefits from their participation in the lastround of talks and demanded that attentionfocus on implementing Uruguay Roundcommitments.

Southern commentators cited additionalreasons. South-North Development Monitor,for instance, pointed to the refusal of smalleconomies “to be manipulated, marginalizedand left out of the decisionmaking processesand acquiesce in decisions cooked up in‘secretive’ so-called ‘green room’ processes.”40

According to Canadian WTO AmbassadorSergio Marchi, three broad challenges facedthe world community in the wake of Seattle:remaining positive on the benefits of tradeand the imperative of a rules-based system;civil society engagement; and improving theimage of the WTO through greater trans-parency, communications, and coordinationwith other international organizations suchas the World Bank and the InternationalMonetary Fund, particularly on labour andenvironment issues. These views echoed

those of the Seattle conference chair, USTrade Representative Charlene Barshefsky,who had noted in her closing remarks that“the WTO has outgrown the processesappropriate to an earlier time. [...] weneeded a process which had a greaterdegree of internal transparency and

21

BO

X3G R E E N I N G U P T R A D E ?

On December 16, 1999, the House of Commons Standing Committee on

Foreign Affairs and International Trade tabled its report, Exporting in

the Canadian Interest: Reviewing the Export Development Act, which

responded to a number of key policy issues raised during the statutory

review of the 1993 legislation governing the Export Development

Corporation (EDC). Notable among its recommendations was an over-

arching provision of clear parliamentary guidelines for EDC-supported

activities to ensure that they deliver benefits to Canadians and meet

Canada’s international commitments and obligations, including those

related to environmentally sustainable development and human rights.

Environmentalists such as Probe International have accused the EDC of

using taxpayer dollars to “underwrite foreign megaprojects that are

plundering the planet.”1

The committee’s report recognized that the EDC’s Environmental Review

Framework was insufficient, but did not recommend incorporating

rigorous environmental impact assessments within the EDC Act.2 NSI

Senior Researcher Gail Whiteman sees this as an important omission.

“It is critical that social and environmental considerations clearly enter

into the EDC Act,” she says, recommending that the EDC establish

environmental review procedures consistent with those set out by the

World Bank.

The call for making export development benefit local and global eco-

systems and social systems was also voiced loudly at the WTO talks in

Seattle by thousands of protesters. Canada has declared its commitment

to integrating sustainable development into domestic and foreign

policy. In an October 12, 1999 communication registered at the WTO, it

also stated its intention to conduct a national Strategic Environmental

Assessment of the next round of negotiations. As a first step, the com-

mittee has carried out a Retrospective Analysis of the 1994 Canadian

Environmental Review of the Uruguay Round to help identify areas

where environmental considerations should be integrated into the next

round of negotiations.3

Notes1 Paul MacKay, “Greens denounce federal aid agency,” The Toronto Star, March 25, 2000, p. K5.

2 Gail Whiteman, “Incorporating Sustainable Development into Canada’s ExportDevelopment Act,” Brief submitted to the Honourable Pierre Pettigrew, Ministerfor International Trade and the House of Commons Standing Committee onForeign Affairs and International Trade, October 1999; “Comments on the SecondReport of the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade:‘Exporting in the Canadian Interest: Reviewing the Export Development Act,’December 1999,” March 27, 2000 (mimeo).

3 DFAIT, “Strategic Environmental Assessment Executive Summary, RetrospectiveAnalysis of the 1994 Canadian Environmental Review,” November 1999, atwww.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/resume-e.asp

C H A P T E R T W O P U T T I N G P E O P L E F I R S T

inclusion to accommodate a larger andmore diverse membership.”41

But, warns Third World Network (TWN), theMalaysian-based NGO, top priority must begiven to problems of implementation of theUruguay Round agreements. “There is adanger that after the Seattle failure, theseproblems will again be sidelined as the focusis given to the problems of participation andtransparency. It must be recognized that themain cause of the Seattle failure was thedisillusionment of many developing countrieswith the inequities of the rules and thenegative effects these would have on theireconomies and societies,” said Martin Khor,TWN’s Director.42

As the year drew to a close, negotiations onagriculture and services, scheduled forJanuary 2000, were due to begin as planned,as was the implementation of agreementsreached during the Uruguay Round. Butbecause 2000 is a US presidential electionyear, there can be no serious negotiationsuntil the next president is in power inJanuary 2001 and the new administration isorganized. More important, the new presi-dent will have to secure “fast track” author-ity from Congress to guarantee that anytrade agreement negotiated by the adminis-tration will not be re-opened.

Broadening partic ipationAlso on the agenda for 2000 are negotiationsregarding the admission of other countries,including China. On November 26, Canadasigned a “historic” bilateral agreement withChina on a wide range of market issuesrelated to China’s entry into the WTO.Canada’s 1998 exports to China, valued at$2.5 billion, were composed in large part ofgrains, wood pulp, and fertilizers. The agree-ment doesn’t come into effect until Chinaofficially joins the WTO, however, which willrequire it to reach agreement with the EUand other major economies. Experts believethat could happen before a planned TeamCanada mission to China in November 2000,the first to China since 1994.43

In the meantime, Canada recommendsworking to rebuild national and internationalsupport for the global trading system, partic-ularly in developing countries.44 Targetedareas include promoting greater inclusiveness

in negotiations, consultations to finalizeformulas for technical support, andimproving access to world markets fordeveloping-country products.

But as NSI’s Ann Weston points out, Canadais not showing any leadership in removing all tariffs on all imports from less developedcountries, nor in supporting special rules for them in terms of implementation. In fact, the most recent WTO review of Canada’strade policy revealed that tariffs and tariffescalation “create potential impediments to exports into Canada in sectors wheredeveloping countries could well have a comparative advantage,” such as food products, textiles, and footwear.45

F R O M G L O B A L T O R E G I O N A LN E G O T I AT I O N S

The failure of the Seattle trade talks mayalso affect enthusiasm for other trade nego-tiations, including the Free Trade Area of theAmericas (FTAA). Official negotiations for theFTAA began in April 1998 and are due to becompleted in 2005, creating the largest freetrade zone in the world. Canada, which hasbeen “the principal promoter of the FTAA,”46

chaired the negotiations in 1999.

The FTAA is part of a much wider process,the Summit of the Americas, which has twicebrought together the heads of state of all34 democratically elected governments in thehemisphere. The first summit took place in1994 and the third will be hosted by QuebecCity in April 2001.

At the second summit in Santiago in 1998 aplan of action was adopted covering educa-tion; preserving and strengthening democ-racy, justice, and human rights; economicintegration and free trade (of which FTAA isa part); and eradicating poverty and discrim-ination. But according to the CanadianCouncil for International Co-operation, thetrade agenda has taken precedence oversocial goals. In a Brief presented to SCFAIT,CCIC points to a lack of policy coherence, asa result of which development and socialgoals are not effectively considered in tradeand international agreements. Of greatestconcern to CCIC and other like-mindedCanadians are worsening human rightsrecords in the 1990s, growing food insecurity brought about by poverty and


“Also, while the world

has adopted fairly tough

rules protecting

the property rights of

traders and investors,

it has not as yet been

so firm in protecting

labour standards

or human rights, or

the environment,

or indeed, the poor. No

wonder then that WTO

ministerial conferences

now attract the

attention of such a wide

variety of pressure

groups. Because it

seems that only trade

rules are enforced,

these groups seek to

achieve their objectives—

which in themselves are

often highly laudable—by

writing them into the

trade rules. I am

convinced that this is

the wrong way to go

about it.”

Louise Fréchette, UN

Deputy Secretary-General,

Hendrik Brugman

Memorial Lecture,

“Building a World

Community,” College of

Europe, Bruges, Belgium,

March 14, 2000.

social exclusion, and declining labour condi-tions.47 The need to ensure environmentalconservation and protect hemispheric cultural diversity were also noted.48

These views were echoed during the “OurAmericas: Towards a People’s Vision of theHemisphere” forum which paralleled the FifthAmericas Business forum, held immediatelybefore the FTAA ministerial meeting. OnNovember 3, the Hemispheric Social Alliance,representing more than 50 labour, humanrights, and community organizations, presented the forum’s recommendations toPierre Pettigrew and other trade ministers,“an unprecedented event in the trade negotiation process.”49

The trade ministers’ meeting made modestprogress and produced a 32-point declarationdiscussing progress to date and setting outfuture directions. In addition to businessfacilitation measures, the ministers “man-dated their officials to develop a draft text ofan FTAA agreement” for the 2001 meeting inArgentina.50 It was also decided to continuethe process of consultation with civil society,a move which Canada had advanced. Theministers also agreed to a common approachon agricultural export subsidies for the WTOnegotiations.51

A waning commitmentWhether or not the FTAA proceeds as plannedwill depend largely on the commitment oftwo key players: the United States andBrazil. According to the Canadian Foundationfor the Americas, this is in doubt given otherpriorities and elections in the US and tradedisputes within the Mercosur bloc.52

There are also divergent views on whetherthe FTAA is in Canada’s best interests. Whilethe official position is that it is essential tohave open markets throughout the hemi-sphere, others such as NSI Senior ResearcherJean Daudelin and Maureen Appel Molot,Director of the Norman Paterson School ofInternational Affairs at Carleton University,consider that the limited trade betweenCanada and Latin America does not warrantallocating scarce resources to pushing theprocess forward.

In 1998, Canada exported $5.8 billion worth of products to Latin America and theCaribbean, compared to $4.1 billion in 1994,

an annual increase of 9 percent. Importsgrew 13 percent per year during the sameperiod to reach $13 billion. The region, however, absorbs less than 2 percent of our world exports. Moreover, in 1999,Canadian exports to the region were valuedat $5.2 billion (Mexico accounted for$1.3 billion of the total)—this figure was11.6 percent lower than in 1998 and13.4 percent lower than its peak reached in1997.53 Exports to the US meanwhileincreased 15 percent; Canada’s merchandiseexports to the US reached 86 percent of itstotal exports.54

Proponents of the FTAA consider that takinga back seat “would not only be againstCanada’s economic interests, it would alsoseriously hurt our foreign policy interests forthe region. Without the FTAA, the rest of theSummit of the Americas agenda wouldquickly fall apart.”55 Others, includingDaudelin and Molot, argue that it is not

23

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X4A FAIRER DEAL FOR WORKERS?

In May 1999 the Canadian government yielded to public pressure callingfor a federal task force on sweatshop abuses and established a workinggroup to negotiate a Canadian Base Code of Labour Practice. The codewould be voluntary, defining minimum workers’ rights and labourstandards, as well as principles to ensure these standards are reflectedin the production of consumer goods sold in Canada.

The negotiations involved a coalition of unions and civil societygroups—called the Ethical Trading Action Group (ETAG)—the RetailCouncil of Canada, the apparel federation, and shoe manufacturers. By mid-November, however, code discussions were stalled over the question of whether International Labour Organization core labourrights conventions, particularly freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining, should form the basis of the code, as ETAG proposed.

On March 6, 2000, the Retail Council of Canada declared its intention toadopt and promote its own code of conduct, effectively ending thenegotiation process. ETAG considers the draft code unacceptable for its“lowest common denominator” approach.1

In the marketplace there was good and bad news for fair trade. While itappeared that consumer and political pressure was working—theHudson’s Bay Company announced it would no longer buy from Burma,for instance—late in the year OXFAM Canada’s Bridgehead “fair trade”shops succumbed to market forces and closed.

Note1 See DFAIT, “Trade and Labour Standards. Discussion Paper. Consultations on FTAA and WTO Negotiations,” May 1999, at www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/discussion/labor-e.asp; and Memo from the Maquila Solidarity Network/EthicalTrading Action Group to Ethical Trading Forum participants, “Breakdown in negotiations for a Canadian Base Code of Labour Practice,” May 14, 2000.


clear-cut that Canada has much to gaineconomically, especially given the economicand political problems that many members ofthe region are experiencing and are likely toexperience if they move to liberalize further:“The business sector is not particularly inter-ested; unions, environmentalists, and nation-alists are opposed; the US is not keen;Mexico and Brazil, the two most importantLatin American countries, are reluctantparticipants; and success might well increasetrade tensions that would consolidateCanada’s dependence on the US market.‘Frankly, what is the point?’” they ask.56

Some developing countries outside the FTAAare also concerned that this regional initia-tive—like others such as the EU’s revampedLomé Convention, the US’ AfricanOpportunities Bill, and the enhancedCaribbean Basin Initiative—may undermineefforts to strengthen the governance of the

global trading system through the WTO. Onthe other hand, several analysts argue thatdeepening integration through the negotia-tion of rules within the Americas will preparethe way for negotiations within the WTO. Inany event, it is likely once the WTO launchesinto a new round, that these negotiationswill overshadow the FTAA process, given thelimited capacities that most governmentswould have for pursuing both at once.

I N T O A N E W M I L L E N N I U M

Despite some setbacks, as 1999 drew to aclose both the WTO and FTAA negotiationswere set to proceed. In the case of the WTO,it was clear, however, that some unfinishedbusiness from the Uruguay Round had to bedealt with—abolishing high first worldtariffs and nontariff barriers against exportsof finished products from developing coun-tries, including textiles and clothing stillcontrolled by the MFA; allowing these coun-tries time to adjust to some of the new WTOrules; and providing them with more techni-cal assistance to meet their WTO obligations.Equally important are greater transparencyand inclusiveness in the WTO’s decision-making processes. And as the experiencewith the negotiation and implementation ofthe Uruguay Round has shown, any newround must be more sensitive to the capaci-ties and needs of the poorest countries.

It also appeared that civil society’s some-times boisterous interventions, as well asdeveloping countries’ determination, hadinstigated discussions about the rules underwhich any new trade deals would be negoti-ated. As economist Sylvia Ostry of theUniversity of Toronto told a panel held inToronto early in February 2000, trade policyhad turned into a moral forum for socialissues such as labour conditions, health andsafety concerns, and environmental fears.57

In the words of International Trade MinisterPettigrew, we are now in “an era of trade-plus—trade plus labour, trade plus theenvironment, trade plus democracy, tradeplus reform.”58


BO

X5 R X F O R D E V E L O P I N G C O U N T R I E S

What practical help can Canada and other industrialized countries offer

developing countries in trade negotiations?

• Continue efforts to make the WTO more public and accountable,

with special measures to ensure transparency and accountability in

the South.

• Review the implementation of the Uruguay Round commitments by

developing countries and its impact on them, and allow greater

flexibility, especially for the LLDCs.

• Eliminate the use of special safeguards against developing countries’

goods; allow them domestic policies to meet the needs of food

security and the rural poor; end the use of nonactionable subsidies

by the North.

• Make the global intellectual property regime more supportive of

development efforts and allow developing countries a system of

registering plant varieties that protects the rights of the indigenous

farming and local communities and their knowledge.

• Offer binding duty-free treatment to all products from LLDCs; reduce

tariff peaks for others.

• Severely limit the use of antidumping duties that risk becoming a

new protectionist tool.

• Increase effective technical assistance, especially to the poorest

countries.

• Support complementary measures, for instance to reform and

strengthen the global financial architecture and institutions of

global governance, and improve international labour rights.

Source

“Coming in from the Margins,” —30— (Ottawa, The North-South Institute, 1999).Available online at www.nsi-ins.ca

Human Security in Words and Actions

Peace and security have been cornerstones of Canada’s foreign policy throughout the20th century. In recent years, however, thequest for security has gone far beyond theprotection of the state by mainly militarymeans. As Canada’s Minister of ForeignAffairs, Lloyd Axworthy, said in April 1999:“the safety of the individual—that is, humansecurity—has become both a new measure of global security and a new impetus forglobal action.”1

“Human security” became Canada’s mantra in1999, repeated both at home and abroad—at the UN Security Council, at the Group ofSeven (G-7) Foreign Ministers’ Meeting inCologne in June, at the 54th Session of theUN General Assembly in September, as wellas in a host of other international forums.

On October 12, 1999, the Speech from theThrone affirmed the prominence of humansecurity in Canada’s foreign policy: “As wemove into the 21st century, Canada has themomentum to lead the way toward a saferand more secure world. […] We have theexpertise to advance an agenda of humansecurity—protecting people from threats totheir rights, their safety, and their lives.” Itfurther noted that “The government will giveincreased prominence to human security inits foreign policy, working to achieve mean-ingful progress in the councils of the worldon a global human security agenda.”2

Among notable initiatives cited wereCanada’s “contribution to eliminating land-mines, our work with NATO and the UnitedNations in Kosovo, our development assis-tance to Asia and Africa, our efforts toestablish the International Criminal Court,and our work to renew the internationalfinancial system.”3

But the wide range of issues and actionsincluded under the rubric of “human secu-rity” poses some unique challenges. As NSISenior Researcher Jean Daudelin and CarletonUniversity’s Fen Osler Hampson point out ina 1999 concept paper prepared for theCanadian International Development Agency(CIDA), not the least of those challenges “isthe expansion of the traditional foreign

policy agenda into issue-areas that havetraditionally been viewed in a narrowersocial, economic, and developmental—asopposed to ‘security’—context.”4

Not only is the range of issues large—thereis almost as wide a collection of legitimateplayers. In effect, pursuing such a broadagenda will require the collaboration ofpublic, private, and civil society sectors andstakeholders, and coordination between keygovernment departments, principally theDepartment of National Defence (DND), CIDA,and the Department of Foreign Affairs andInternational Trade (DFAIT). Coordinatingthese many actors, “cannot be easy,” sayDaudelin and Hampson.

The Canadian government considers that, intheir respective ways, DFAIT and CIDA eachcontribute to the promotion of peace inconflict countries, and that their combinedefforts are complementary and mutuallyreinforcing.5 As Diane Marleau, who wasMinister for International Cooperation andMinister Responsible for La Francophonieuntil August 1999, explained: “Internationaldevelopment contributes most broadly byhelping to build the foundations for peace-ful, stable societies.”6

But the proliferation of conflicts around the globe—in 1999, 40 armed conflicts werebeing fought on the territories of 36 coun-tries (see Table 2, p. 32)—has conspired to restrict the human security agenda.Tim Draimin and Brian Tomlinson of theCanadian Council for International Co-operation wrote in late 1999 that “in theory human security sees indivisibilityamong the three pillars of human security,human rights, and human development. Inpractice human security has reflected theinternational community’s disproportionateemphasis on responsiveness to emergenciesat the expense of long-term development.”7

Certainly, responding to crises hinders long-term planning. It is also costly—in recentyears, more than 40 percent of the officialdevelopment assistance (ODA) provided bythe United Nations has been devoted toemergency relief operations. And becauseemergencies are highly visible and call forimmediate action, they may stake a primaryclaim to limited resources, relegating longer-

25

“A humanitarian

operation is, by its

nature, an emergency

operation, where one

is forced to move in to

save people; the question

of alleviating poverty,

working with poor

countries, and trying to

improve their situation

is an ongoing process

that must continue. To

take money away from

development for

emergency relief in one

part of the world and

thus ignore the essential

task of development

in others would be

shortsighted and

unfortunate.”

Koffi Annan,

Secretary-General

of the United Nations,

“Interview” by Djibril

Diallo. Choices,

December 1999 (New

York, UNDP), p.5.


term sustainable poverty reduction anddevelopment initiatives to the back burner.

F R O M C O N C E P T T O P R AC T I C E

A number of Canada’s recent human securityinitiatives have manifested some of thesetensions, as well as a tendency to privilegeconflict-related issues. Among them are thehighly successful campaign to ban landminesand the effort to create an InternationalCriminal Court (see Box 7). In fact, thehuman security agenda owes much to thelandmines campaign and was most clearly setout in May 1998 in the Norway-Canada“Lysoen Declaration and Partnership Agenda”which put conflict and its prevention frontand centre through initiatives aimed atpeacebuilding, peacekeeping, anddisarmament.8

A new minefield?By its nature and process, the landminescampaign gave impetus to Canada’s humansecurity thrust. There is little doubt thatanti-personnel landmines are a clear exampleof a threat to the security of people whilecontributing only marginally to the securityof states. A global coalition of public andnongovernmental organizations (NGOs)played a key role in the process, culminatingin the adoption of the Ottawa Convention onthe Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,Production, and Transfer of Anti-PersonnelMines and on Their Destruction, signed inDecember 1997.

The most rapidly ratified treaty of its kind inhistory, the Convention came into force onMarch 1, 1999. The first meeting of statesparties to the convention took place in Mayin Mozambique, one of the world’s mostseverely mine-affected countries. By the endof 1999, the Convention had been signed oracceded to by 136 countries and ratified by89. According to DFAIT, the signing repre-sented a major victory for Canadian diplo-macy since Canada had taken the lead inconvincing a majority of nations to adhere tothe treaty.9 CIDA was also a staunch sup-porter of the campaign since it considerslandmines to be “an invisible barrier todevelopment.”10

Canada’s leadership has not gone unrecog-nized. In late 1998, Foreign Affairs MinisterAxworthy received the North-South Prize ofthe Council of Europe for his contribution tothe campaign. He also received the firstEndicott Peabody Humanitarian Award inOctober 1999 from the United NationsAssociation of Greater Boston for spearhead-ing the global ban.11 Canada’s actions werealso instrumental in securing its election tothe UN Security Council.

If the landmines campaign was a clear exam-ple of the human security policy in practice,it also revealed some of the challenges thatsuch a policy poses. In terms of coordina-tion, the campaign required that theDepartment of National Defence destroy astockpile of anti-personnel mines—925,551were destroyed in 1996 and 1997.12 To sup-port the implementation of the Convention,in December 1997 Canada announced a$100 million, five-year, Canadian Landmine


H U M A N S E C U R I T Y : A “ N E W ” O L D C O N C E P T

If the term “human security” is recent, its origins are not. As the

Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade explains, a

doctrine based on the security of people has been gathering momen-

tum for more than a century—at least since the founding of the

International Committee of the Red Cross in the 1860s. Core elements

of this doctrine were formalized in the 1940s in the UN Charter, the

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the Geneva Conventions.

In 1994, the UNDP’s Human Development Report first used the term.

“Human security […] means, first, safety from such chronic threats as

hunger, disease, and repression. And second, it means protection from

sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily life—whether

in homes, in jobs, or in community.”1 The World Summit on Social

Development held in Copenhagen the following year failed to endorse

the broad concept, however.

In the years since, developed countries‘ preoccupation with civil

conflict has led to a narrowing of the concept. And although human

security is still considered to include security against economic priva-

tion, an acceptable quality of life, and a guarantee of fundamental

human rights, in practice it favours initiatives that address conflict or

at least violence-related issues—peacebuilding, peacekeeping, and

disarmament. The agenda set out by Norway and Canada in the 1998

Lysoen Declaration and Partnership Agenda includes work on land-

mines, the International Criminal Court, human rights, international

humanitarian law, women and children in armed conflict, small arms

proliferation, child soldiers, child labour, and Arctic and Northern

cooperation.2

Notes1 UNDP, Human Development Report, 1994 (New York, Oxford: Oxford UniversityPress, 1994), p. 23.

2 DFAIT, “Norway-Canada Partnership for Action, The Lysoen Declaration,”Backgrounder to “Canada and Norway form new partnership on human security,”Press Release no. 117, May 11, 1998.

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Fund. Administered by four governmentdepartments—DFAIT, CIDA, DND, andIndustry Canada—the Fund is supportingmine action programs in 19 countries, assist-ing victims and their communities, contribut-ing to the research and development of newtechnologies in Canada, and promoting pub-lic awareness. In 1999, CIDA’s total commit-ment to mine action initiatives reached$15 million, up from $9 million the previousyear.13 DFAIT and the NGO, Mines ActionCanada, are administering another fund, theCanadian Landmine Action Fund, establishedin September 1998 to enable Canadianbusinesses and individuals to donate fundsfor mine clearance and victim assistanceinitiatives.

The other side of the coinWhile significant progress has been reportedin eliminating landmines, some breaches areappearing, however. In February 2000, it wasreported that Canadian Forces sent to EastTimor brought with them a weapon—theClaymore mine—that most anti-personnellandmine activists feel violates the spirit ofthe Ottawa Convention. Defence Minister ArtEggleton argues that Claymores are notbanned by the treaty and those used by theCanadian Forces have been modified to deto-nate only on command. Human Rights Watchreported to the First Meeting of the StandingCommittee of Experts on StockpileDestruction in Geneva in December 1999that Canada had retained 5,400 M18A1Claymore mines that “it states do not have abuilt-in tripwire capability. An additional18,000 C19 Claymores have been orderedfrom a Canadian manufacturer without abuilt-in tripwire capability.”14 CanadianForces took about 100 to East Timor.15 Themines are also reportedly being used byCanadian peacekeepers to protect theircamps in Kosovo,16 a region where CIDA issupporting a number of landmine awarenessand removal activities. In fact, most ofCanada’s support to mine-clearing and victimassistance activities in developing countriesis provided through CIDA.

Canada’s main argument for using theClaymore is that, because the Armed Forcesare instructed to use the mine only in acommand-detonated mode, it does notpresent a threat to noncombatants. But

Rae McGrath, a specialist on the impact anderadication of landmines and co-founder ofthe International Campaign to BanLandmines (ICBL), points out that theClaymore mine is of limited military serviceused this way. “It is fair to question thelogic of risking the credibility of a treaty forwhich Canadian civil society and governmenthave fought so hard in return for so little,”17

he writes. Moreover, if an exception is madefor the modified Claymore mine, many othermines could also be allowed. And as Memberof Parliament Svend Robinson points out, “itcertainly undermines our credibility when itcomes to asking other countries to sign thistreaty.”18

In addition to the Claymore, mines activistsstate that Canada continues to stock othermines and munitions which they consider tofall outside the spirit—if not the articles—ofthe treaty. Among them are mines retainedfor training purposes (in December 1999,Canada held 1,781 out of a maximum of2,000 it has elected to keep for training).19

27

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The Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court (ICC)

was adopted by 120 states in July 1998. Canada, which chaired the piv-

otal Committee of the Whole at the conference, played a central role in

bringing about the ICC which will hold individuals accountable for war

crimes and crimes against humanity. It also holds the promise of pre-

venting the future abuse of people by governments and other parties to

conflicts. The ICC will become operational once 60 nations have ratified

the Statute: 12 have done so to date. Seven nations have so far refused

to sign the treaty, including the US, China, and Iraq.1

Canada is also leading efforts to ensure that the ICC will be an effective

and independent institution. It will be the first permanent interna-

tional court with the power to prosecute individuals for genocide, war

crimes, crimes against humanity, and (eventually) crimes of aggression.

Canada has also taken a strong position in negotiations on the ICC to

ensure that its statute contains a provision to criminalize the recruit-

ment and use of children under 15 years as soldiers.2

On Human Rights Day, December 10, 1999, Canada became the first

country to table legislation to implement the Statute of the ICC within

its national legal system. The Crimes Against Humanity Act would

replace the current war crimes provisions of the Criminal Code.

Notes1 Martin Kettle, “US snubs world court treaty,” The Guardian, June 13, 2000,online at www.guardianunlimited.co.uk/international/sotry/0,,331363,00.html(accessed June 13, 2000).

2 DFAIT, “Children’s rights.” www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/human-rights/chissue-e.asp


Canada also still stocks anti-vehicle mines.The ICBL argues that “according to thetreaty’s definitions, anti-vehicle mines withanti-handling devices that explode from anunintentional or innocent act are consideredanti-personnel mines and therefore prohib-ited.”20 Canada had taken the same positionduring a 1997 Diplomatic Conference on anInternational Ban of Anti-PersonnelLandmines, held in Oslo. Canada has, how-ever, removed and destroyed tilt rod fusesfrom 20,000 M21 anti-vehicle mines which itconcluded were not in compliance with thetreaty since it could cause the mine toexplode from an unintentional act.21

H U M A N S E C U R I T Y AT T H E U NS E C U R I T Y C O U N C I L

The success of the landmines campaignworked in favour of Canada’s election to the UN Security Council. Its two-year termstarted in January 1999, the sixth timeCanada has served on the Council since the UN’s establishment. In October 1998Canada won its seat with an unprecedentedmajority. Among Canada’s responsibilities isto chair a Council committee on sanctionsagainst Angola.

Canada’s stated objectives are to push “theCouncil to broaden its concept of security toinclude conflict prevention and peacebuild-ing, human rights, and humanitarian issues,as well as to be more proactive.”22 As ForeignAffairs Minister Axworthy told The HagueAppeal for Peace in May 1999, “Rather thanavoiding engagement, the Council, as thelegitimate decisionmaking body for peaceand security, should be actively involved insetting the rules—and limits—for inter-national involvement in the new, admittedlymore complex, situations of modern armedconflict.”23

A key element of Canada’s campaign to beelected to the Council was its pledge to work to make it “more open, transparent,and responsive to the membership of the UNas a whole.”24 Canada repeated its calls inFebruary while it presided over the Council,pushing the body to open more meetings to public scrutiny. That month, on Canada’sinvitation, the President of the InternationalRed Cross addressed the Security Council forthe first time. The meeting on the protectionof civilians in armed conflict also includedbriefings by the Executive Director of UNICEFand Secretary-General Annan’s SpecialRepresentative on Children in Armed Conflict.

Other Council members followed suit—Russia, for example, led a public session onglobal terrorism. And in January 2000, theSecurity Council held what was termed an“unprecedented” meeting in the history ofthe UN. For the first time, the closed-doorCouncil held open briefings on the AfricanAIDS epidemic, among other topics, during“Africa month.”25 On January 21, a Note bythe President of the Security Council wasadopted, outlining specific steps to make theCouncil’s working methods more transparentand accessible.26

Smal l arms of mass destructionIn February 1999, Canada had initiated ameeting of the Council devoted to theprotection of civilians in armed conflict27

and requested that Secretary-GeneralKofi Annan prepare a report, includingconcrete recommendations. Released inSeptember, the report—Protection of Civiliansin Armed Conflict – Towards a Climate ofCompliance—urges member states to accelerate the drafting of an Optional


T H E P E AC E B U I L D I N G I N I T I AT I V E

Recognizing the link between security, stability, and development,

DFAIT and CIDA launched the Peacebuilding Initiative in 1996. It has

two main objectives: to assist countries in conflict in their efforts

toward peace and stability; and to promote Canadian peacebuilding

capacity and participation in international peacebuilding initiatives.

The initiative has two components:

• The Peacebuilding Fund supports initiatives that promote dialogue,

develop local leadership, and strengthen local institutions to

contribute to peacebuilding in countries affected by conflict.

Administered by CIDA, the Fund’s budget was $10 million for

each fiscal year (1997-98 and 1998-99). By late 1999 more than

40 projects had been completed or were underway.

• Administered by DFAIT, the Peacebuilding and Human Security

Program supports international action, dialogue, applied research,

and policy development with a focus on war-affected children, small

arms proliferation, strengthening of the civilian components of

peace operations, and multilateral mechanisms set up by regional

and international organizations.

Source

DFAIT, “Peace in Progress—Canada’s Peacebuilding Initiative,” September 25, 1998. At www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/peacebuilding/peace-e.asp(accessed January 7, 2000).

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Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child and recommends specific mea-sures to assist in the plight of war-affectedchildren. Canada is continuing to workwithin the UN to implement the report’srecommendations.

Canada has been at the forefront in callingfor action on the problem of small arms andfor the international community to takeaction.28 It has fostered discussions withinthe UN and its agencies, NATO, theCommonwealth and La Francophonie, theOrganization for Security and Cooperation inEurope, the Organization of American States,and others.29 Canada has also supported“micro-disarmament” efforts in a number ofcountries and the elaboration of a firearmsprotocol within the UN Economic and SocialCouncil. In September 1999 it co-hostedwith Norway a meeting of micro-disarmamentpractitioners from Sierra Leone, El Salvador,Mozambique, and Albania.

In December, the European Union andCanada, at a Summit held in Ottawa, estab-lished a joint Working Group on Small Armsto Tackle the Spread and DestabilisingAccumulation of Small Arms and LightWeapons. They will work together to supportprojects and initiatives in the most affectedregions of the world, with a particular focuson Africa.30

Canada has “one of the world’s strictestsystems for screening potential exports ofmilitary equipment,” according to the 1998annual report on exports of Canadian militarygoods, released in December 1999. TheDFAIT report goes on: “The majority of trans-actions involve modest sales of firearms forcivilian possession and use, which have littlemilitary utility.” Fully automatic firearms,such as assault rifles, can only be exportedfrom Canada to 13 countries with whichCanada has negotiated a reciprocal defencedevelopment relationship.

Total military sales to all countries exceptthe US, for which no permit is required andso statistics are not maintained, reached$421 million in 1998, up 40 percent from1997.31 Combined with estimated sales tothe US, those exports totaled $1.3 billion, apost-Cold War high, reports Ken Epps ofProject Ploughshares.32 In 1998, militaryexports to low-income countries accounted

for less than 0.01 percent of Canada’s totalmilitary exports (see “Statistics 2000,” Table 7, p. 68).

Watchdog agency Project Ploughshares pointsout that despite export control guidelines formilitary exports to countries threatened byhostilities or where there is a risk of useagainst civilian populations, Canada shippedmilitary goods to countries where armedconflicts persisted—Egypt, Israel,Philippines, South Africa, and Turkey—andto states where governments were cited forsevere and persistent human rights viola-tions—Brazil, China, Mexico, Saudi Arabia,and Venezuela, in addition to Egypt, Israel,South Africa, and Turkey where both AmnestyInternational and Human Rights Watch reportstate-sanctioned human rights abuses.

This trade has been declining, however. “Therecent and gradual decline in both the num-ber of states in conflict receiving Canadianmilitary goods and the value of those salessuggests that instructions by Foreign AffairsMinister Lloyd Axworthy to departmentofficials to tighten interpretation of exportcontrol guidelines may be having an effect,”writes Epps. In 1996, eight states affectedby conflict received Canadian military goodsworth more than $100,000, together totaling$17.1 million. In 1998, five countriesreceived $6.4 million of military equipmentfrom Canada.

While Project Ploughshares commendsCanada for its high degree of transparency of arms trade details, it considers that ourmilitary export policy has yet to be fullysquared with a progressive human securitypolicy. That would require, among othermeasures, banning exports to nondemocraticcountries and to countries that did notreport to the latest UN Register ofConventional Arms; greater detailing in itsarms trade reports; harmonizing recordkeeping among government departments thattrack military exports; and including ship-ments of goods that may have a militaryend-use even though they are not on theExport Control List.

29C H A P T E R T W O P U T T I N G P E O P L E F I R S T

“If the world body

entrusted with

overseeing peace and

security matters is

to solve its crisis of

legitimacy, the

developing world

will need to be

accorded a greater

voice in Security Council

decisionmaking.”

The Honourable

David Kilgour,

Secretary of State

for Africa and Latin

America, “An Ethical

Foreign Policy Towards

Africa,” Notes for

an address, Ottawa,

December 14, 1999.

“ G E T T I N G R E A L ” A B O U T H U M A NS E C U R I T Y

Little controversy has been generated inCanada or elsewhere about Canada’s humansecurity policy, or by Foreign Affairs MinisterAxworthy’s activism in promoting his agenda.But there is less unanimity about its imple-mentation. As The Toronto Star reported at the end of December, critics say it hasbeen “long on rhetoric but short onaction.”33 In an interview with Star reporterAllan Thompson, Axworthy countered thathis critics don’t realize the cumulativeimpact of Canada’s campaign. At Canada’sbehest, he says, the human security idealswere inserted this past year into the commu-niqués of virtually every international organi-zation to which Canada belongs, includingthe United Nations.

Moreover, he said, Canada’s actions on theSecurity Council have led to the approval of“new missions in Sierra Leone and East Timorwith mandates that, at Canada’s insistence,explicitly include the protection of civiliansfor the first time.”34 For Axworthy, the mostconcrete example of the application of thispolicy was NATO’s intervention in Kosovo.

But NSI’s Jean Daudelin considers that it’stime to “get real” about where this policy isheading. If action is to live up to rhetoric,he says, “some principles, money, jobs,corporate earnings, and even lives will be onthe line.” To date, Canada’s human securitylandmarks—the landmines convention, theInternational Criminal Court, and the proto-col on children in conflict have been “with-out cost—little contested public money isinvolved, few jobs risk being lost, and noCanadian life is at stake.”35

Kosovo: A crucibleFuture implementation of the human securityagenda is not likely to run as smoothly.Daudelin points to Canada’s participation inNATO’s operation in Kosovo. Althoughpresented as an expression of the humansecurity policy in privileging people’s rightsover those of the state that was violatingthem, the coalition’s actions in bombingnonmilitary infrastructure in Serbia and thekilling of Serb civilians have since provedmore controversial. Canada’s contribution tothe campaign was significant: Canadianpilots flew 682 combat sorties, or nearly

10 percent of the missions against fixedground targets, and they led about half thestrike packages they took part in. “We werealso among only five countries deliveringprecision guided munitions,” DefenceMinister Eggleton told an audience atHarvard University in September.36

There is no contradiction in official eyesbetween human security and the use of“hard power.” “Pursuing human securityinvolves using a variety of tools,” Axworthytold an audience at Princeton University inApril. “Some rely more on persuasion—aswith the campaign to ban anti-personnelmines, or with peacebuilding initiatives—while others are more robust, such as sanc-tions or military intervention.”37 As Eggletonput it: “we must see human security andhumanitarian intervention as part of acontinuum—one with both civil and militarydimensions—and allocate our resourcesappropriately.”38

But Jean Daudelin warns “the idea that theprotection of human rights might lead tokilling innocent people does not fit readilyinto the starkly black and white moraluniverse in which the human security agendawas originally framed.” In blunt words,Defence Minister Eggleton conceded atHarvard that “maintaining that [Canadianpublic opinion] support would have becomemore difficult had the mission beenprolonged or the casualty list grown.”

Kosovo put the dilemmas of using militaryforce for humanitarian purposes into sharprelief. This ambiguity, says Daudelin, is likely to become the norm rather than the exception.

The test of the marketplaceOther omens foretelling future difficulties inreconciling human security considerationswith other agendas are already surfacing.One such impasse which came to the forethis past year marked the uneasy tradeoffbetween human security ideals and the harshrealities of the marketplace.

Canada’s policy on Sudan includes supportingthe multilateral peace process, maintaininglimited engagement with the Government ofSudan, addressing human rights concerns,supporting civil society, and continuingdialogue with the private sector and NGOs.


“To build a culture for

peace, Canada must

develop and extend

policies that promote

human security,

new coalitions and

negotiations, the rule

of law, initiatives at

peacemaking, democratic

decisionmaking,

and humanitarian

intervention mandated

by the Security Council.

Finally, there must

be a reversal of present

global policies in which

billions of dollars are

spent on arms and

militarization while

worthwhile development

initiatives and programs

for peace and human

security are starved for

lack of funds.”

Senator Douglas Roche,

Senate Statement on

National Vision,

“Canada and a Culture

of Peace,” Reply to

the Speech from the

Throne Opening the

Second Session of the

Thirty-Sixth Parliament,

November 30, 1999.

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“Today we have well over 4,000 members of the forcesdeployed on peace support operations on every continent ofthe globe, except Antarctica. We are operating at one of thehighest tempos since the Korean War—and of course theCanadian Forces are a much smaller organization than theywere then. To put this into perspective, from 1948 to 1989,the Canadian Forces were deployed on 25 operations. In justthe last ten years, we have been deployed no fewer than65 times.”

General Maurice Baril, Chief of the Defence Staff,

November 24, 1999.1

Peacekeeping is an important component of Canada’s foreignpolicy and its contribution to the multilateral security system.In addition to supervising cease-fires and the withdrawal of forces, peacekeepers now perform a variety of tasks such as repatriating refugees, distributing relief supplies, and organizing elections.

On March 17, 2000 3,725 members of the Canadian Forcesdeployed were on 20 overseas operations in addition to otherinternational tasks.2 Additional personnel had been deployedon missions that ended in 1999: OP (Operation) Noble, Bosnia(4 personnel); OP Guarantor, Macedonia (56); OP Connection,CARE Canada (1); OP Augmentation, Arabian Gulf (305); andOP Prudence, Central African Republic (82).3

TheatreLocation Mission personnel

Bosnia NATO Stabilization Force (OP Paladium) 1,399Bosnia-Herzegovina

UN Mission of Observers in Prevlaka 1Croatia

NATO Kosovo Force (OP Kinetic) 1,374Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY)

UN Mine Action Centre (OP Quadrant) 1Kosovo, FRY

Air Support to NATO Forces (OP Echo) 111Aviano, Italy

TheatreLocation Mission personnel

Middle UN Disengagement Observer Force 189East Golan Heights

UN Forces in Cyprus (OP Snowgoose) 2Cyprus

UN Truce Supervision Organization 11(UNTSO) Jerusalem

Multinational Force and Observers 28(OP Calumet) Sinai

OP Forum 2New York City/Iraq

UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission 6(OP Record) Iraq, Kuwait

United States Air Force 5Monitor Iraq no-fly zone

Africa UN Observer Mission in Sierra Leone 5(OP Reptile) Sierra Leone

UN Organization Mission in the 1Democratic Republic of Congo (OP Crocodile)

UN Mine Action Centre (OP Module) 3Mozambique

Asia/ International Force for East Timor 272Pacific (OP Toucan)

East Timor

Cambodian Mine Action Centre 7Cambodia

UN Command Military Armistice 0CommissionKorea

Americas UN Civilian Police Mission in Haiti 14(OP Compliment)Haiti

UN Mission in Guatemala (OP Quartz) 1

Others NATO Standing Naval Force Atlantic 285HMC Athabascan

NATO Airborne Early Warning 8force, Germany

CARE Canada (OP Connection) 0


Notes1 DND, “Speaking notes for General Maurice Baril, Chief of the Defence Staff at the Canadian Club of Ottawa, November 24, 1999. Atwww.dnd.ca.eng/archive/speeches/24novBaril_s_e.htm (accessed February 11, 2000).

2 DND, “Current Operations,” March 17, 2000. At www.dnd.ca/menu/ Operations/index_e.htm3 DND, “Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Operations Cost Estimates,” June 30, 1999. At www.dnd.ca/costchrt.htm (accessed March 17, 2000).

As part of its efforts, in October, DFAIT andCIDA announced several Canadian initiativesto help bring about a settlement to the 17-year civil war in Sudan, including theappointment of Senator Lois Wilson as special envoy to the Sudan Peace Processand the launch of a mission, led byJohn Harker, to investigate whether Sudan’soil industry is linked to human rights abuses.

The October 26 Policy Statement stressedCanada’s concern for the forced relocation ofpopulations living around the oil fields so asto provide a more secure environment for theGovernment of Sudan and its partners, whichinclude Talisman Energy Inc. of Calgary,Alberta. Canada’s largest independent oil andgas company,39 Talisman holds a 25 percentinterest in the US$1.2 billion Greater NilePetroleum Operating Co. Canada threatenedto apply economic and trade sanctions if oilrevenues were found to have exacerbated theconflict or caused human rights violations.

The report of the mission, released onFebruary 14, 2000, concluded that “oil isexacerbating conflict in Sudan.”40 The reportdid not, however, advocate sanctions againstTalisman or Sudan. Instead, it called on theMinister of Foreign Affairs to pressureTalisman to respect human rights. Ironically,in December, Talisman had signed the

International Code of Ethics for CanadianBusiness, spearheaded by Axworthy in 1997.

In releasing the report, the governmentstated it would not impose sanctions, norwould it help set up a trust fund for oilrevenues, a scheme outlined in the Harkerreport that would keep these revenues ”neutral” and away from the Sudanesegovernment. Instead Axworthy announcedsupport for a return visit to southern Sudanby Leonardo Franco, the UN SpecialRapporteur on Sudan; financial assistance to combat the abductions of women andchildren; an undertaking to use Canada’sposition as president of the UN SecurityCouncil in April 2000 to address the humani-tarian impact of this conflict; and the open-ing of a Canadian office in Khartoum.41 Thegovernment also “strongly encouraged”Talisman to “make a positive contribution tothe human rights situation within theirsphere of influence” and to develop aneffective mechanism for monitoring itsoperations in Sudan.

Later that month, writing in The TorontoStar, Lloyd Axworthy adopted a slightlyfirmer tone, stressing that “no sanctionsdoes not mean no responsibility. […] IfTalisman is found to be avoiding the strin-gent responsibilities and duties I have laidout, it will be made to answer for its actions


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A R M E D C O N F L I C T S I N 1 9 9 9

% of countries# countries # conflicts # countries in region % of world

Region in region in region hosting conflict hosting conflicts conflicts

Africa 50 16 17 34% 40%

Asia 42 14 9 21% 35%

Europe 42 2 2 5% 5%

The Americas 44 2 2 4% 5%

Middle East 14 6 6 43% 15%

World totals 192 40* 36 * 19% 100%

*40 armed conflicts in 36 countries:

• India and Indonesia each host three conflicts.

• Philippines and Iraq each host two conflicts.

• Israel and Lebanon together host the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.

• Eritrea and Ethiopia together host the Eritrea/Ethiopia war.

Source

Ernie Regehr, “The 2000 Armed Conflicts Report,” in Ploughshares Monitor (March 2000), Project Ploughshares atwww.ploughshares.ca/content/MONITOR/monm00d.html

or lack thereof. The imposition of sanctionsis not, nor has it ever been off the table.”42

Talisman has continued to insist that “wehave operated in an ethical and conscien-tious way over there,” as Peter Widdrington,Talisman’s chairman put it.43 In February2000, Talisman’s intransigence led to the ter-mination of talks between the company anda coalition of NGOs—the United Church ofCanada, Project Ploughshares, World VisionCanada, and the Steelworkers HumanityFund—to develop some form of internationalmonitoring of the company’s activitiesin Sudan.

Analysts judge the government’s weaker-than-hoped-for response predictable. “He[Axworthy] was defeated by a strong lobby-ing campaign from the company,” wroteGlobe and Mail columnist Madelaine Drohan,“a lack of support among his cabinetcolleagues, an apparent weakening in resolveby the US administration and realities on theground in Sudan.”44 And if Ottawa tookaction against Talisman, it would also haveto act against other Canadian companiesoperating in Sudan and other countries inconflict.45 Among them would be FostersResources Ltd, a Calgary-based junior oilcompany which in March 2000 signed an oilexploration and production agreement in anarea close to rebel-held territory. A USChristian relief agency claims Sudan wroughtdeath and destruction on the region toenable Fosters to acquire the concession.46

American response to the Harker report wasfar less tempered. On February 16, the USTreasury Department added the Greater NilePetroleum Operating Co. to the 124 Sudanesecompanies and government agencies on itsunilateral sanctions list.47

N E X T S T E P S

These examples raise the question of“whether a policy that is essentially irrele-vant to Canadians’ hard interests or sense ofsecurity can be sustained in the face ofmoral ambiguity, high costs, and the loss ofhuman lives,” says NSI’s Jean Daudelin. AsDefence Minister Art Eggleton says, “it is onething to mobilize public opinion when thedanger is close or the threat immediate. It isquite another to put our forces in harm’s way

when the operations are far from home andour national security is not imperiled.”48

Moreover, says Daudelin, beyond generalstatements of support, such as the Speechfrom the Throne, neither the Prime Ministernor any other government department hasstrongly supported the human securityagenda. If Foreign Affairs Minister Axworthyintends to pursue his crusade, the Canadiangovernment and the Canadian public willneed to accept that this policy entails signif-icant expenses, that Canadian companies andworkers will bear costs, that soldiers willneed to be protected—sometimes by deadlymeans—and that lives will be lost onall sides.

Above all, Canadians will need to decidewhere they stand on the issue of humansecurity. With its actions to date Canada hastaken a small first step toward placing theindividual—individual rights, dignity, andwell-being—at the centre of the interna-tional agenda. It now needs to decidewhether to take a second.

33

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10R X F O R D E V E L O P I N G C O U N T R I E S

• Given the wide range of issues and actions included under the defin-

ition of human security, Canada needs to set clear priorities for its

human security agenda.

• Tackling human security situations will require effective coordina-

tion of government departments and agencies in planning, imple-

mentation, and resource allocation.

• While national interests and sovereignty should not become shields

behind which human rights are violated, the preoccupation of devel-

oping countries with unwarranted interference in national affairs

should be considered. These countries must also be involved in the

development of the criteria and safeguards that govern challenges to

state sovereignty.

• The Government of Canada must ensure that growing involvement in

short-term, conflict-related emergencies does not reduce the

resources available for long-term poverty alleviation and sustainable

development.

• Canada should explore ways of increasing its contribution to human

security measures. This will require reassessing the levels of military

spending required, and exploring increased ODA funding for broader

security-building activities.

• Canada should review its defence policy to ensure that it is consis-

tent with the primacy of human security in its foreign policy.


A Dual Attack on Global Poverty

The Speech from the Throne opening theSecond Session of the Thirty-Sixth Parliamentof Canada in October 1999 committed thegovernment to “increase international devel-opment assistance and work in innovativeways to enable countries to improve thequality of life of their citizens.”1

That an increase is sorely needed has beenpainfully obvious to international develop-ment cooperation agencies, which for yearshave been clamouring for the federal govern-ment to reverse the dramatic drop in Canada’sofficial development assistance (ODA).Between 1992 and 1999, Canadian aiddropped by more than 30 percent. In 1991-92, Canada’s ODA stood at 0.49 percentof GNP. This fell to 0.29 percent in 1997-98(see “Statistics 2000,” Table 3, p. 52). Andalthough ODA from other members of theOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)’s DevelopmentAssistance Committee (DAC) also fell, thecontraction in Canada’s ODA disbursementsoutpaced that of the DAC group in the 1990s.

As a result, “Canada’s reputation as a gener-ous and enlightened aid donor has greatlysuffered,” NSI President Roy Culpeper notedin a letter to Prime Minister Jean Chrétien.2And it is likely to continue to suffer, as theOECD pointed out in a 1998 review ofCanadian ODA: “The reach and depth ofCanada’s international involvement—clearlyrooted in the country’s values, interests, andcapabilities—have not been matched bycommensurate levels of resources allocatedfor development cooperation in recent years.[…] The reductions in ODA raise concernsabout Canada’s ability to meet expectations,both at home and internationally.”3 It alsosheds doubt on Canada’s real commitment toreducing poverty in developing countries, agoal being pursued on many fronts.

One step forward, one step backThe budget delivered on February 16, 1999brought no real respite. It announcedretroactive increases to the 1998-99 budgetand a small one-time increase of $50 millionand $25 million respectively to the 1999-2000 and 2000-01 ODA budgets. The Realityof Aid 2000 stated that “without similar

retroactive increases to 1999-2000 ODA inthe February 2000-01 Federal Budget, ODAfor 1999-2000 will be less than 1998-99 andthe possible diversion of funds for theKosovo crisis and its aftermath may limitthese retroactive increases to ODA for thisyear.”4 As Barbara McDougall, a formerMinister of External Affairs and InternationalTrade and current President and CEO of the Canadian Institute of InternationalAffairs (CIIA), commented in a post-budgetrelease: “It appears to reinforce a disturbingtrend toward the marginalization of foreignpolicy, national defence, and developmentassistance.”5

By CCIC’s and CIIA’s analysis, this putprojected ODA below that of the previousyear, to about 0.26 percent of GNP, a level“well below those of our Western Europeanand Nordic partners, substantially less thanthe 0.46 percent reached in the early 1990s,and nowhere near the long-term target of0.7 percent.” And as Roy Culpeper pointedout, the infusions to the 1998 and 1999budgets, largely one-off and retroactive,“were ad hoc in nature and did not put theaid program on a new, sounder footing.”6

CCIC and NSI recommended that Canada setitself a more achievable goal of 0.35 percentof GNP by 2005-06 and indicate that itwould continue to move toward the 0.7 percent target. An increase averaging$200-250 million in new resources wouldhave to be invested in Canadian ODA eachyear, starting with the 2000 budget.

However, the 2000-01 budget increased ODAonly by a modest $115 million, bringinguncommitted resources for the InternationalAssistance Envelope to $2,091 million. Butas CCIC notes, because Canada’ s dues to UNagencies were not prepaid as in the previoustwo budgets, CIDA will have to find an addi-tional $68 million for multilateral programsfrom new resources.

D E E P E R A N D D E E P E R I N D E B T

More encouraging, the 2000 budgetannounced that Canada will cancel 100 per-cent of the debts owed to Canada (to theExport Development Corporation and theCanadian Wheat Board) for 19 of the highlyindebted poorest countries (HIPCs). It is,says CCIC, a substantial improvement on the


“The 1990s have seen

a major decline in aid

volume […]And the

world’s richest and most

powerful countries—the

G7—have been at the

forefront only as far as

reneging on their

promises is concerned.

The choice by OECD

governments to cut

aid and to ignore

pledges that they have

given at a series of

summit meetings to put

human development

higher up the political

agenda effectively

symbolizes the attitude

of so many governments

to global poverty.”

Tony German and

Judith Randel,

“Trends towards the

new millennium,” in

The Reality of Aid 2000

(London: Earthscan

Publications Ltd, 1999)

p. 23.

35

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11P O V E R T Y : N O E N D I N S I G H T

In 1995, member countries of the OECD’s DevelopmentAssistance Committee (DAC), including Canada, adopted a new strategy, Shaping the 21st Century: The Contribution of Development Cooperation, centred on the eradication of poverty.

But although Canada adopted the DAC strategy, endingpoverty has never been the sole focus of its aid program.1

The 1995 foreign policy statement, Canada in the World, setsthree objectives for the aid program—enhancing Canadianprosperity, contributing to a more secure world, and reflectingCanadian values on the world stage. Within this broaderframework, ODA is “to support sustainable development indeveloping countries, in order to reduce poverty and tocontribute to a more secure, equitable and prosperous world.”2

Since then, CIDA has developed a set of policies on povertyeradication and on the agency’s programming priorities whichhave generally been endorsed by NGOs and others interestedin Canadian development cooperation. But, says the CanadianCouncil for International Co-operation (CCIC), there is a widegap between these policies and their implementation in theform of strategic, focused programs. And as pointed out in areview of CIDA’s poverty reduction efforts, carried out by theNorth-South Institute for the DAC’s Informal Network onPoverty Reduction, the agency has “a ‘culture of compromise’resulting from the political and fiscal realities that inform itsoperational environment. Thus, although CIDA is federallymandated to pursue poverty reduction, it is also seen by someto be responsible for contributing to global prosperity.”3

The DAC-CIDA case study further highlights the large budgetcuts suffered by the agency in recent years. All of CIDA’sprograms have had to contend with reduced spending inresponse to these cuts. Among funding trends that suggestthat poverty remains a low priority:

• between 1990-91 and 1995-96, CIDA disbursements for agriculture, food, and nutrition fell by 49 percent, and by80 percent in Africa;

• poverty focused project spending declined by 50 percentbetween 1992-93 and 1996-97;

• food security funding fell 87 percent between 1991-92 and96-97; and

• Canadian commitments to the World Bank and otherinternational financial institutions increased by 1 percentbetween 1992-93 and 1997-98, while aid to other multi-lateral institutions (such as the UNDP and UNICEF) fell by29 percent.4

A policy paper developed by CCIC, released in March 1999, alsoargues that Canada is drifting further and further from thepoverty agenda.5 It cites, for instance, that in 1997-98 14 ofthe top 20 recipients of Canadian bilateral aid were “lowincome countries” in World Bank terms, and six were “mediumincome” countries. Only seven were among the 48 LeastDeveloped Countries (LLDCs).6 In 1990 Canada agreed toincrease aid to the LLDCs: instead, it fell by 33 percentbetween 1992-93 and 1996-97, compared to 21 percent forODA as a whole. Moreover, CIDA aid for sub-Saharan Africa, a

region where the number of people living in absolute povertyhas increased in the 1990s, was cut by 30 percent between1992-93 and 1996-97. It should also be noted that 68 percentof Canada’s bilateral aid commitments are tied to the purchaseof goods and services from Canada.

There are signs that CIDA may pursue its poverty reductionagenda more assiduously in future. In August, the governmentappointed a new Minister for International Cooperation,Maria Minna, to replace Diane Marleau. Mrs Minna’s statedpriorities are to focus the agency on children and women, keytargets of poverty alleviation programs. A new CIDA president,Leonard Good, was also appointed in October 1999. But asnoted earlier in this report, emphasis on conflict-relatedassistance in pursuit of human security could increasecompetition for CIDA’s resources.

Notes1 Brian Tomlinson, “A Call to End Global Poverty: Renewing CanadianAid Policy and Practice,” A Policy Background Paper. CCIC, March 1999.At http://fly.web.net/ccic/devpol/a_call_to_end_global_poverty.htm(accessed February 11, 2000).

2 Government of Canada, Canada in the World. Government Statement(Ottawa: Canada Communication Group—Publishing, Public Works andGovernment Services, 1995), p. 42.

3 Kerry Max, “DAC Informal Network on Poverty Reduction—TheCanadian International Development Agency (CIDA) Case Study.”(Ottawa: The North-South Institute, 1999), p. 2. Available online atwww.nsi-ins.ca

4 See Max, “DAC Informal Network on Poverty Reduction” and CCIC,“Strategies for Renewing Canadian Aid: Key Messages,” athttp://fly/web/net/ccic/devpol/CA15Key_Messages_ODA.htm(accessed February 11, 2000).

5 Tomlinson, “A Call to End Global Poverty: Renewing Canadian AidPolicy and Practice.”

6 The designation of a country as “least developed” by the UnitedNations is based on a number of criteria. These are: per capita GDP ofUS$765 or less; low physical quality of life (life expectancy, caloricsupply, literacy rates, and school enrollment); and economic diversifi-cation measured by manufacturing, industrial labour force, per capitaelectricity consumption, and export concentration. The country mustalso have a population of 75 million or less. See United NationsConference on Trade and Development, “Criteria for Identifying LDCs,”at www.unctad.org/en/subsites/ldcs/document/criteria.htm


Canadian ODA Allocations 1998-99 ($ millions)

0

$100

$200

$300

$400

$500

$600

$700

$800

UpperMiddle-Income

Countries

Lower Middle-Income

Countries

OtherLow IncomeCountries

LeastDevelopedCountries

$603.80

37%41%

18%

4%

$672.40

$298.70

$73.50

Source: CIDA, Statistical Report on ODA, 1998-99, Table I, pp. 30-34.

list of countries announced by the PrimeMinister a year earlier. Moreover, the bilateraldebt cancellation will not affect the Inter-national Assistance Envelope: the fullamount—approximately $1 billion—will bewritten off against nonbudgetary provisions.The full cancellation will take place in theyear that the country reaches its completionpoint under the HIPC process.7

The 2000 announcements were strong mani-festations of Canada’s debt relief strategy,announced a year earlier.8 Recognizing thatin the heavily indebted poor countries exces-sive debt has aggravated economic andsocial problems, the strategy calls forbroader, more generous, and more timelydebt relief under the HIPC Initiative. Canadaalso calls on other industrialized countries tofollow its lead on two bilateral measureswhich it implemented a number of years

ago—forgiveness of ODA debt for the poorest, heavily indebted countries; and theprovision of new development assistance asgrants rather than loans. The strategy furtherproposes greater transparency and goodlending practices to help prevent future debt crises.

Bangladesh was the first country to benefitfrom the Canadian debt initiative. While notconsidered a HIPC under the criteria of theInternational Monetary Fund (IMF) or WorldBank, Bangladesh was included “because itis an impoverished country that has a goodrecord of economic reform and has succeededin significantly reducing poverty, but hassuffered a series of devastating floods inrecent years.”9 Bangladesh is the largestrecipient of Canadian assistance, averagingmore than $66 million a year from 1996to 1998: its ODA debt owed to Canadawas $600,000.

Many of Canada’s recommendations were alsobeing advanced by Jubilee 2000, an interna-tional coalition of NGOs pressing for radicaldebt relief in the new millennium. Their callswere heeded by the G-7 finance ministersmeeting in Cologne in June 1999 and led tothe launching of an Enhanced HIPC Initiativein September. This was significant becausethe G-7 heads of state had discussed butsharply disagreed on measures to provideeven limited debt relief the previous year.10

A smal l measure of re l iefAt their annual meetings in September 1999,both the IMF and its Financial Committeeand the Development Committee of the WorldBank endorsed the new poverty reductionframework recommended by the G-7. TheEnhanced HIPC Initiative offers a moregenerous interpretation of debt sustainabilityand formally links debt reduction withpoverty reduction efforts.11 Under the initia-tive, the Bank and IMF proposed an averagedebt reduction rate of about 54 percent, overthe next three to five years, for 33 to 36 ofthe world’s poorest 41 countries. These coun-tries owed US$201 billion at the end of1997, 85 percent of which was owed to mul-tilateral and bilateral creditors. (The totaldebt of developing countries has risen fromUS$84 billion to 1971 to US$2.5 trillionin 1998.12)


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12 W H AT D O C A N A D I A N S T H I N K ?

According to a poll carried out by Environics in October 1998,

Canadians remain committed to foreign aid. The survey found that

75 percent of Canadians support the aid program and 58 percent think

Canada spends the right amount, or not enough, to assist developing

countries. This latter figure represents a decline of 10 percent over

the previous year. But, says Environics, two-thirds of Canadians over-

estimate aid expenditures or don’t know how much Canada spends.

When told that we spend only between 1 and 2 cents of every tax

dollar on development assistance, support for the aid budget increases

to 71percent.

Why do Canadians support the aid program? Support is based mainly

on the desire to assist the poorest and for humanitarian reasons

(46 percent); to help during emergencies (15 percent); and because of

a sense of moral obligation (17 percent). Only 3 percent of Canadians

support aid because it provides economic benefits to Canada—Canada,

however, ties more than 68 percent of its bilateral aid to the purchase

of Canadian goods and services, a proportion that is among the highest

of the donor countries.

Canadians are also willing to put their money where their mouths are.

The OECD reports that, in 1996, Canadian private voluntary agencies

transferred $412 million to developing countries, over and above the

funds received from CIDA. This represents an increase of 26 percent

for these transfers from 1992, reflecting an increase in individual

Canadian donations.

Sources

CIDA, Communications Branch, “Canadians and Development Assistance:Environics Poll Results, October 1998 and Trends Analysis;” and CCIC, ”Renewing Canadian Aid: A CCIC in common Fact Sheet.” Athttp://fly.web.net/ccic/devpol/CA13_Renewing_Cnd_Aid_fact%20_Sheet.htm(accessed February 11, 2000).

Estimates of the Enhanced HIPC Initiativeput the cost of debt forgiveness at US$27.4 billion, of which US$13.3 billion will be borne by the international financialinstitutions (IFIs)—the World Bank, the IMF,the regional development banks, and othermultilateral creditors—and US$14.2 billionby bilateral and commercial creditors.Canada’s 1999 contribution to the HIPCInitiative consists of $40 million to the HIPCTrust Fund, plus some $24 million pledgedfrom its refund on the IMF’s Second SpecialContingent Account (SCA-2).13 Canada madean additional substantial contribution—$175 million—to the Trust Fund in its 2000-01 budget.

But, says NSI Senior Researcher JohnSerieux, these measures don’t go far enough:the amount of debt relief needed to have anyappreciable impact on economic growth isalmost certainly more than 60 percent andcould be as high as 85 percent.14 This is allthe more important, says Serieux, becausethe debt crisis facing the poorest countrieswas initially caused by changes in the globaleconomy that placed new, permanent, limitson these countries’ debt-carrying capacities.This was exacerbated by continued lendingthat emphasized restructuring rather thandebt relief, followed by “absurdly insuffi-cient” amounts of debt relief through overlycomplicated procedures.15

As NSI President Roy Culpeper points out,the agreed measures merely recognize thefact that less than 50 percent of the debtwas being serviced at any rate. They there-fore provide very little—if any—real reliefsince forgiving debts that were not beingpaid makes no difference.

Countdown to Jubilee 2000Even the debt relief measures proposed bySerieux would not be sufficient, according tothe international Jubilee 2000 Coalitionwhich notes that only about 25 of the HIPCsare likely to benefit before the end of 2000.

Jubilee 2000 and Southern CSOs were quickto condemn the Enhanced HIPC Initiative,not only for the “meanness of the plan,” butfor the conditions attached to debt relief andthe increased powers accorded the interna-tional financial institutions. According toNicola Bullard, Deputy Director of Focus on

the Global South, the new Poverty Reductionand Growth Facility (which replaces theEnhanced Structural Adjustment Facility),allows national governments to shape theirown plans, but retains “the right to vetoloans unless the plans meet the IMF’s andthe Bank’s standards of a ‘sound macroeco-nomic framework’ and ‘good governance’.”16

What’s more, those countries eligible for debtrelief will have to prove to the IMF that thefunds saved through reduced interest pay-ments will be transferred to social spending.“This is a cruel irony,” writes Bullard, “giventhat in many of these countries debt hascontinued to accumulate despite years ofIMF structural adjustment programs.” Ineffect, says Jubilee 2000, the measuresstrengthen the role of the IMF in povertyalleviation, “an area in which the IMF hasneither a positive track record nor significantexpertise.”17

The Jubilee Coalition applauds American,British, and Canadian announcements of100 percent debt cancellation “because theypromise action independent of the collectiveagreement of all creditors” and “put pressureon the other G-7 creditors to cancel 100 per-cent of their bilateral debts.”18 If all bilateralcreditors were to follow suit for the HIPCs,about 40 percent of total debts owed wouldbe written off. Canada is owed approximately$1.2 billion by the countries on the Jubileelist—most of these debts are owed to theExport Development Corporation and theCanadian Wheat Board (see “Statistics 2000,”Table 8, p. 72).

But since less than half these debts arebeing serviced, it is unlikely that even fullcancellation would make much difference tothe beneficiary countries and their citizens,argues Culpeper. What’s more, he cautions,increased debt relief may result in a reduc-tion in development assistance available forprogramming, even if the ODA budget isincreased. “While debt relief counts asforeign aid,” he says, “it is unacceptable ifa significant portion of the increased aidbudget takes this form.”19 Debt relief anddevelopment assistance are complementary,not substitutable.


“From access to trade,

to credit and debt

forgiveness—from

maintaining and

increasing overseas

development assistance

to providing technical

assistance—these are

real and proven steps

that the developed

world can take and

which can make the

difference between

success and

failure in the efforts

of the developing

world to escape the

cycle of poverty and

violence. […] if

globalization is

to succeed, it must

succeed for poor and

rich alike. It must

deliver rights no

less than riches.

It must provide

social justice

and equity no

less than economic

prosperity and

enhanced

communication.”

Louise Fréchette, UN

Deputy Secretary-General,

“Inequality ‘stark and

undeniable’ feature of

today’s world order,”

Speech to annual United

Nations International

Schools (UNIS)—

UN conference,

March 2, 2000.

T H E N E E D F O R R E F O R M

Most agree that enhancing the HIPCInitiative is not sufficient to meet the chal-lenge of poverty reduction. Among additionalneeded elements are greater investments inpeople and basic social services, such ashealth and education, particularly for womenand girls; a recognition that there are vari-ous paths to development; increasing theeffectiveness of ODA, including buildingcapacity to develop and use knowledge andtechnology; reinforcing effective economicpolicies on the ground by transparent andcommitted governance and institutionalstructures; and placing developing-countrygovernments and peoples in the driver’s seat,an approach now being adopted by the WorldBank through its ComprehensiveDevelopment Framework.20

More fundamental perhaps is reforming theglobal financial architecture so that, inCulpeper’s words, “developing countries areadmitted as full and equal participants tothe world’s economic decisionmaking coun-cils.”21 Reform is also needed to preventrecurring financial crises such as that whichswept Asia and other countries in 1997-98.Canada showed leadership in promotingreforms in the G-7 and other internationalforums and set about in 1999 to implementsome of the measures announced in its 1998six-point plan to foster greater financial stability and promote sustainable growth.The plan, outlined by the HonourableJames Scott Peterson, Secretary of State(International Financial Institutions), seeksto ensure appropriate monetary policy; renewcommitment to strong policy foundations;provide a “road map” for safe capital liberal-ization; focus more on the needs of thepoorest; strengthen financial sector liberal-ization; and improve private sector involve-ment in crisis resolution.22 Yet, according toCulpeper, some of these measures are quitecontentious in developing countries.

To strengthen national financial systems andinternational oversight, Canada has recom-mended the use of peer reviews and hasagreed to be the first country to undergo theprocess. It has also proposed developingrules of the game for dealing with privatecapital flows. But as Peterson noted inOctober, “getting emerging market countriesto ‘buy in’ to these rules is another part ofthe challenge.”23

From G-7 to G-20A significant step forward in the evolution ofinternational financial governance was thecreation in late September of the Group ofTwenty (G-20) forum which brings togetherfinance ministers and central bank governorsfrom the G-7 countries (the United States,Canada, Britain, Germany, France, Italy, andJapan), Russia, and some developing coun-tries, under the chairmanship of FinanceMinister Paul Martin. The G-20, which repre-sents 85 percent of the global economy, wasestablished to provide a new mechanism forinformal dialogue within the framework ofthe Bretton Woods institutional system, tobroaden the discussions on key economicand financial policy issues among systemi-


A C A L L F O R G R E AT E R C O H E R E N C E

Increasing aid effectiveness requires action on many fronts. Coherence

among different policy strands and programming is called for by the

Canadian aid community. The calls for greater coherence are also heard

in the halls of the OECD, the World Bank, and the WTO.

To determine the nature of Canada’s various relationships with develop-

ing countries and assess how they are contributing to reducing poverty,

in 1999 the NSI undertook studies of Canada’s aid, trade, investment,

financial, diplomatic, and other relations in Bangladesh, Jamaica, and

Mali. The research also looked at policy coherence within the federal

government and other donors’ poverty reduction efforts.

Preliminary findings indicate that many government departments are

now engaged internationally—Agriculture Canada, Environment

Canada, Health Canada, and Natural Resources, among them. Most

departments have a particular interest in working closely with CIDA,

which they consider a potential source of funds, but are unclear about

poverty reduction goals.

The researchers found great interest in the concept of policy coherence

in the countries studied, but encountered some skepticism about

Canada’s commitment. Declining ODA also meant that there was less

concern about creating mechanisms for coherence with the recipient

governments. It also appeared that CIDA policies and priorities were

not always reflected in the field.

How to ensure greater coherence? Holding genuine consultations with

recipients is a first step. Other measures include providing a central

locus of information on Canadian activities in particular countries,

ensuring that policy coherence is among project criteria, and coordi-

nating the activities of all Canadian organizations involved in CIDA-

funded projects.

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13

cally significant economies, and promotecooperation to achieve stable and sustain-able world economic growth.24

Canadian NGOs welcomed the creation of theG-20 as an important extension of policydialogue beyond the major industrial powers.“It presents an opportunity to bridgeNorth/South interests in a more regulatedglobal economic order, which has the poten-tial to sustain more equitable patterns ofgrowth,” said CCIC.25 It noted, however, thatit was far from clear that arrangementsarrived at through the G-20 would serve theinterests of the poorest.

Indeed, the relatively narrow orientation ofthe G-20 was evident during its inauguralDecember meeting in Berlin, recounts NSI’sRoy Culpeper. G-20 members agreed to speedup reforms so as to prevent a recurrence offinancial crisis, such as what swept throughAsia in 1997. This includes better bankingregulations and more transparency innational financial matters. Among the pointsagreed to: common standards in key areassuch as transparency, data dissemination,and financial sector policy and the need forfurther work on exchange rate regimes sothat countries have a clear understanding ofpolicies needed to maintain fixed or floatingexchange rates.26 However, issues relating tothe institutional aspects of the internationalfinancial architecture were not addressed.

“Addressing domestic vulnerability to finan-cial crises precipitated by capital flowsappears to be the prevailing focus of theG-20,” says Culpeper. “It is hard to resist theconclusion that, so far, the G-20 is acting asa sounding board for reforms endorsed by theG-7 and carried out with its blessing in theBretton Woods institutions and the FinancialStability Forum. […] While this approach isno doubt necessary to help countries copewith financial crises, it hardly seems suffi-cient either to help prevent future crises orto help manage them.”27

The G-20’s next meeting will be held inCanada in October 2000.

A N E W C U LT U R E O F D E V E L O P M E N T

Whether in development assistance, debtrelief, or financial architecture reform, it isclear that a shift in thinking—in the “cul-ture of development”—is needed if poverty

is to be overcome. In offering her thoughtsabout the future of Canada’s aid program atthe end of 1999, Minister for InternationalCooperation Maria Minna reiterated Canada’scommitment to the targets set in Shapingthe 21st Century and to CIDA’s programmingpriorities. “To eliminate poverty, I think youhave to tackle both ends at once,” she said,“focus on education and other social issues,but also promote growth with equity.”28

This is much the same formula as that proposed by Finance Minister Martin: “Inmore prescriptive terms, to overcomepoverty, we need greater participation, socialempowerment, and expanded opportunity.”29

Also important is the need for greater coor-dination—for increased coherence—betweengovernment programs (see Box 13). Canada’said program appears to lack an overarchingstrategic framework to implement its com-mitments to reduce poverty globally. Thechallenge is to integrate the goals of the aidprogram with other government initiatives intrade, finance, and environmental policy.These policies must work coherently to endglobal poverty.30

39

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14R X F O R D E V E L O P I N G C O U N T R I E S

• The Canadian government needs to commit to a long-term plan to

rebuild official development assistance to 0.35 percent of GNP by

2005-06 and indicate that it will continue to move toward the

0.7 percent target.

• The Canadian International Development Agency needs to ensure

that poverty reduction is the central purpose of Canada’s aid

program.

• The goals of Canada’s aid program need to be integrated strategically

with government initiatives in trade, finance, human security, and

environmental policy at home and abroad.

• Canada should continue to push for significantly more generous debt

reduction terms on the debt owed to multilateral institutions by the

50 poorest countries on the Jubilee 2000 list and ensure that cancel-

lation is not tied to stringent structural adjustment measures.

• The Canadian government must ensure that funds set aside for debt

cancellation are additional to increases in the international assis-

tance envelope for ODA.

• Canada must continue to push for reforms of the global financial

architecture so that it becomes more transparent, accountable, and

inclusive. Notably, the G-20 needs to address the institutional

aspects of the international financial architecture.


Notes

This review was compiled by Michelle Hiblerwith contributions from members of NSIresearch staff: Roy Culpeper, Jean Daudelin,John Serieux, Ann Weston, and GailWhiteman. It also draws on the work of agreat many individuals and organizations.Any errors of fact or interpretation are thoseof the author.

For reading ease, the notes are grouped by section, each section beginning withnumber 1.

I N T R O D U C T I O N1 Jean Chrétien, Prime Minister of Canada. “Speech to a

Luncheon of the Canadian Club of Winnipeg,” March 25,1999, Winnipeg. At http://pm.gc.ca/cgi-win/pmo_view.d11/English?957+0+NORMAL

2 David Crane, “Canada must back rhetoric with resources,”The Toronto Star, September 29, 1999.

3 Gordon Barthos, “Put Year 2000 ideals into practice,” TheToronto Star, January 7, 2000.

4 Crane, “Canada must back rhetoric with resources,”September 29, 1999.

5 DFAIT, “Notes for an address by the HonourableLloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to theMiddlebury College 200th Anniversary Symposium,” New York, NY, March 30, 2000.

6 Paul Heinbecker, “Human Security: The Hard Edge,”Canadian Military Journal, vol. 2, no. 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 7-8, at www.journal.dnd.ca/vol1/no1_e/policy_e/pol11_e,html.

7 Ibid, p. 14.

TA K I N G S T O C K A F T E R S E AT T L E1 Statistics Canada, “Canadian international merchandise

trade, December 1999,” The Daily, February 18, 2000. Atwww.statcan.ca/Daily/English/000218/d000218a.htm.(accessed February 22, 2000).

2 DFAIT, “Canada’s 1999 Exports at Record Levels,” News Release no. 30, February 18, 2000. Athttp://198.103.104.118/minpub/Publication.asp?FileSpec=Min_Pub_Docs/103041.htm (accessed February 21, 2000).

3 DFAIT, “Trade Update 2000: First Annual Report onCanada’s State of Trade,” Trade and Economic AnalysisCommentary, May 2000, p. 16.

4 WTO, “Developing Countries’ Merchandise Exports in 1999Expanded by 8.5%—about twice as fast as the global aver-age,” Press/175, April 6, 2000. At http://www.wto.org//wto/news/Press175.doc.

5 DFAIT, “A statement by the Honourable Sergio Marchi,Minister for International Trade, to the House of CommonsStanding Committee on Foreign Affairs and InternationalTrade: Canada and the World Trade Organization: OpeningOpportunities to the World.” Statement 99/7, Ottawa,February 9, 1999.

6 Canada, House of Commons, Canada and the Future of theWorld Trade Organization: Advancing a Millennium Agendain the Public Interest, Report of the Standing Committeeon Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Ottawa, June1999, p. xii.

7 DFAIT, “A statement by the Honourable Sergio Marchi,Minister for International Trade to the House of CommonsStanding Committee on Foreign Affairs and InternationalTrade,” February 9, 1999.

8 Canadian Labour Congress, “Labour and NGOs left out oftrade ministers’ meeting on WTO and FTAA,” News release,Ottawa, February 23, 1999.

9 Business Council on National Issues, “Memorandum for theRight Honourable Jean Chrétien, P.C., M.P., Prime Ministerof Canada: Confronting Global Economic Uncertainty:International Trade and Investment Priorities for Canada,”January 19, 1999. At www.bcni.com/memos/jan99.html(accessed January 28, 2000).

10 CCIC, “Bringing the WTO Back to InternationalHumanitarian Values,” Brief to the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade on the WorldTrade Organization (WTO), March 18, 1999. Athttp://fly.web/ccic/devpol/CF4_CCIC_Issues_WTO_Brief.html (accessed February 11, 2000).

11 Council of Canadians, “The World Trade Organization: What is the WTO?” At www.canadians.org/campaigns/campaigns-tradepub02.html (accessed February 22, 2000).

12 Maude Barlow and Tony Clarke, “A WTO Primer: AnActivist’s Guide to the World Trade Organization,” (Ottawa: Council of Canadians, 1999).

13 See Julie Delahanty, From Social Movements to SocialClauses: Grading Strategies for Improving Conditions forWomen Garment Workers, Briefing B-42 (Ottawa: TheNorth-South Institute, 1999).

14 CCIC, “Joint Civil Society Statement on the WTO High-Level Symposia on Trade and Environment and Trade and Development,” March 1999. At http://fly.web.ccic/devpolicy.htm (accessed February 11, 2000).

15 CCIC, “Bringing the WTO Back to InternationalHumanitarian Values.”

16 DFAIT, “A statement by the Honourable Sergio Marchi,Minister for International Trade to the House of CommonsStanding Committee on Foreign Affairs and InternationalTrade.”

17 Government of Canada. Canada in the World, GovernmentStatement (Ottawa: Canada Communication Group –Publishing, Public Works and Government Services, 1995),p. 20.

18 Ann Weston, “Remarks to the Standing Committee onForeign Affairs and International Trade,” March 18, 1999(Ottawa: The North-South Institute, 1999). At www.nsi-ins.ca (accessed January 10, 2000).

19 Ibid.

20 DFAIT, “Canada and the future of the World TradeOrganization: Government Response to the Report of theStanding Committee on Foreign Affairs and InternationalTrade.” At www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/Canwto-e.asp(accessed January 12, 2000).

21 J. Michael Finger and Philip Shuler, “Implementation ofUruguay Round Commitments: The DevelopmentChallenge,” (Washington, DC: World Bank, undated).Available online at http://wblen0018.worldbank.org/research/workpapers.nsf/

22 DFAIT, “Canadian Proposal on Technical Assistance,” in Canadian Proposal on Trade and Development,Consultations on FTAA and WTO Negotiations, October 11, 1999. At www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/tna-nac/discussion/development_pr-e.asp.

23 DFAIT, “A statement by the Honourable Sergio Marchi,”February 9, 1999.

24 WTO, “WTO’s unique system of settling disputes nears 200 cases in 2000,” Press/180, June 5, 2000. Athttp://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres00_e/pr180_e.htm (accessed June 27, 2000).


25 Heather Forton, “Defusing Conflicts in International Trade:Making the WTO Rules Work,” in Fen Osler Hampson;Michael Hart; and Martin Rudner, eds, Canada AmongNations 1999. A Big League Player? (Don Mills: OxfordUniversity Press, 1999), p. 66.

26 CCIC, “Bringing the WTO Back to InternationalHumanitarian Values.”

27 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development(UNCTAD), “Overview,” Trade and Development Report,1999, August 1, 1999, p. V-IX. At www.unctad.org/en/docs/tdr99_overview.pdf. See also Martin Khor,“Rethinking Liberalisation and Reforming the WTO:Presentation at Davos,” (Third World Network, January 28,2000). At www.twnside.org.sg.title/davos2-cn.htm(accessed April 18, 2000).

28 DFAIT, “Canada and the Future of the World TradeOrganization: Government Response to the Report of theStanding Committee on Foreign Affairs and InternationalTrade.”

29 DFAIT, “Canadian Proposal on Trade and Development,”October 11, 1999. Registered with the WTO under thecode: WT/GC/W/349.

30 Ibid.

31 DFAIT, “Notes for an address by the Honourable Pierre S.Pettigrew, Minister of International Trade During aConference Luncheon by the Société des relations interna-tionales du Québec on Canada’s Contribution to the WTONegotiations,” Quebec City, November 10, 1999.

32 DFAIT, “Pettigrew Announces Canada’s Position on WTONegotiations,” News Release no. 245 and Backgrounder,November 15, 1999.

33 Neville Nankivell, “After Seattle, there’s still hope for theWTO,” The Financial Post, March 2, 2000, p. C7.

34 UNCTAD, p. IX.

35 DFAIT, “Notes for an address by the HonourablePierre S. Pettigrew, Minister for International Trade, at the World Trade Organization Ministerial Meeting,”99/60, Seattle, Washington, November 30, 1999.

36 Jim Storey and Yuen Pau Woo, “Open our markets to theworld’s poor,” The National Post, March 27, 2000, p. C7.

37 Steven Edwards, “UN chief says WTO no place for socialissues.” The National Post, November 30, 1999. Athttp://www.nationalpost.com/news/asp?s2=world&f=991130/140283.html (accessed January 12, 2000).

38 “Third World Intellectuals and NGOs Statement AgainstLinkage” (TWIN-SAL), mimeo. See also ChakravarthiRaghavan, “Developing Nations Reject Labour Issues inWTO,” South-North Development Monitor (SUNS), Seattle,December 1, 1999, available through Third World Networkat www.twnside.org.sg/title/reject2-cn.htm (accessedApril 19, 2000).

39 Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada, “The Global TradeAgenda After Seattle: De-briefing on the 3rd WTOMinisterial Meeting,” organized by the Asia PacificFoundation of Canada in partnership with the Centre forAsia-Pacific Initiatives, University of Victoria, Vancouver,December 4, 1999. At http://www.canadaasiaonline.com/analysis/pubs/summary.htm

40 Chakravarthi Raghavan, “Seattle WTO Ministerial Ends inFailure,” South-North Development Monitor, (SUNS-issueno. 45676) at www.twnside.org.sg/title/deb2-cn.htm

41 Quoted in Chakravarthi Raghavan, “Seattle SummaryRecord has some Material Changes,” South-NorthDevelopment Monitor (SUNS), Geneva, January 19, 2000.At www.twnside.org.sg/title/deb1-cn.htm (accessed April 18, 2000).

42 TWN, “Rethinking Liberalisation and Reforming the WTO:Martin Khor’s Presentation at Davos,” January 28, 2000.At www.twnside.org.sg/title/davos2-cn.htm (accessedApril 18, 2000).

43 Heather Scoffield, “Team Canada juggles trade, humanrights in mission to China,” The Globe and Mail, January 13, 2000, p. B5.

44 DFAIT, “Notes for an address by the HonourablePierre S. Pettigrew, Minister for International Trade, onWhere do we go after Seattle: Some thoughts.” Paris,Zurich, London, January 2000. At http://198.103.104/minpub/Publication.asp?FileSpec=Min_Pub_Docs/103002.htm (accessed February 15, 2000).

45 WTO, “Canada’s Trade Initiatives Enhance Overall OpennessBut Little Progress Made in Sensitive Sectors,” PressRelease, December 19, 1998. At www.wto.org/wto/reviews/tprb98.htm (accessed April 26, 2000).

46 Jean Daudelin and Maureen Appel Molot, “Canada and theFTAA: The hemispheric bloc temptation,” Policy Options(March 2000), p. 48.

47 CCIC, “Linking Globalization to Human Development in theAmericas: CCIC Americas Policy Group Brief on the FreeTrade Area of the Americas,” Ottawa, 1999. Athttp://fly.web.net/ccic/devpol/APG2_FTAA_Brief.htm(accessed February 11, 2000).

48 Canada, House of Commons, “The Free Trade Area of theAmericas: Towards a Hemispheric Agreement in theCanadian Interest.” First Report of the StandingCommittee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade.First Report of the Sub-Committee on International Trade,Trade Disputes and Investments, Ottawa, October 1999.

49 DFAIT, “Minister Pettigrew Announces SuccessfulConclusion to FTAA Trade Ministers Meeting,” NewsRelease no. 242, November 4, 1999. Athttp://webapps.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/minpub/Publication.asp?FileSpec+/Min_Pub_Docs/102808.htm(accessed March 7, 2000).

50 DFAIT, “Notes for an address by the Honourable DavidKilgour, Secretary of State (Latin America and Africa) tothe Canadian Council for the Americas on “Moving Forward with the Free Trade Area of the Americas,”Calgary, Alberta, November 26, 1999.

51 DFAIT, “Minister Pettigrew Announces SuccessfulConclusion to FTAA Trade Ministers Meeting.”

52 Pierre Bouchard, “The FTAA after Toronto and Seattle: WhyIt Still Matters.” (Ottawa: Canadian Foundation for theAmericas, January 21, 2000), p. 6. See also “Statistics2000,” Table 6, p. 64.

53 Industry Canada, Strategis. Trade Data Online. Atwww.strategis.ic.gc.ca/cgi-bin/tdst-bin/wow/wow.codeCountrySelectionPage (accessed April 17, 2000).

54 Statistics Canada, “Canadian international merchandisetrade, December 1999.”

55 Bouchard, p. 6.

56 Daudelin and Molot, “Canada and the FTAA,” p. 51.

57 Bruce Little, “Rules have changed for WTO: Experts,” TheGlobe and Mail Report on Business, February 10, 2000.

58 Nankivell, “After Seattle, there’s still hope for the WTO.”

H U M A N S E C U R I T Y I N W O R D S A N D AC T I O N S1 DFAIT, “Human Security: Safety for People in a Changing

World” (Ottawa: Government of Canada, April 1999), p. ii.

2 Government of Canada, Governor General, “Building aHigher Quality of Life for All Canadians: Speech from theThrone to open the Second Session of the Thirty-SixthParliament of Canada,” 1999. At www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/stt-ddt/doc/fulltext_e.htm (accessed March 8, 2000).

3 Ibid.

4 Jean Daudelin and Fen Osler Hampson, “Human Securityand Development Policy.” A concept paper prepared forthe Canadian International Development Agency, PolicyBranch, Strategic Planning Division, Ottawa, March 1999(mimeo).


5 CIDA, “Canadian Peacebuilding Experience.” At www.acdi-cida.gc.ca

6 CIDA, “CIDA, Sustainable Development and the HumanSecurity Agenda: Notes for an Address by the HonourableDiane Marleau at the Canadian Centre for Foreign PolicyDevelopment,” Vancouver, January 29, 1999.

7 Tim Draimin and Brian Tomlinson, “A Scan of the GlobalPolicy Environment Facing Canadian NGOs” (Ottawa: CCIC,October 1999). At http://fly.web.net/ccic/

8 The agenda for action agreed to by Foreign AffairsMinister Axworthy and his Norwegian counterpart, MrKnut Vollebaek, includes: the landmines issues; the estab-lishment of an international criminal court; human rights;international humanitarian law; women and children inarmed conflict; small arms proliferation; child soldiers;child labour; and Northern and Arctic cooperation. SeeDFAIT, “Canada and Norway for new partnership on humansecurity,” News Release no. 111, May 11, 1998. Athttp://198.103.104.118.minpub/Publication.asp?FileSpec=/Min_Pub_Docs/100581.htm

9 The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy and Knut Vollebaek, “Now for a New Diplomacy to Fashion a Human World,”International Herald Tribune, October 21, 1998, at www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreignp/humansecurity/tribu-e,htm (accessed January 7, 2000).

10 CIDA, “Anti-personnel landmines and development: CIDA’sapproach” (Backgrounder), November 1997, at www.acdi-cida.gc.ca (accessed May 1, 2000).

11 Government of Canada, “Peace and Security: Canada’sHallmark in World Affairs.” Canada World View, Issue 6,1999 (Ottawa: DFAIT, 1999), p. 11.

12 Mary Wareham, “Anti-personnel Landmine Stockpiles andTheir Destruction,” Fact Sheet, Human Rights Watch, pre-pared for the First Meeting of the Standing Committee ofExperts on Stockpile Destruction, Geneva, December 9-10,1999.

13 CIDA, “Canada Announces $3.4 Million to Help Reduce theThreat of Landmines in Kosovo, Cambodia, and Africa,”News Release 99-74, December 3, 1999.

14 Wareham, 1999.

15 Dennis Bueckert, “Canadian Forces issued mines despitecampaign,” The National Post, February 14, 2000, p. A8.

16 Allan Thompson, “Axworthy probes use of landmines,” TheToronto Star, February 15, 2000, p. A6.

17 Rae McGrath, “Canada and Claymore mines: A DiscussionPaper,” February 2000, mimeo.

18 Dennis Bueckert, “Claymores will stay, defence ministersays,” The National Post, February 15, 2000, p. A9.

19 Wareham, 1999.

20 Mark Hiznay and Stephen Goose, “Anti-vehicle Mines withAnti-handling Devices,” Human Rights Watch Fact Sheet,prepared for the First Meeting of the Standing Committeeof Experts on the General Status and Operation of theConvention, January 10-11, 2000. At www.icbl.org/resources/documents/hrwiscejan00b.html (accessed March 16, 2000)

21 Wareham, 1999.

22 DFAIT, “Interview with Minister Axworthy,” Canada WorldView, Issue 2, 1999 (Ottawa: DFAIT, 1999), p. 2.

23 DFAIT, “Message from the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy,Minister of Foreign Affairs, to The Hague Appeal for Peace,The Hague, Netherlands, May 13, 1999, at www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/foreignp/humansecurity/hague-e.htm(accessed January 7, 2000).

24 DFAIT, “Interview with Minister Axworthy,” Canada WorldView, pp. 2-3.

25 Kathleen Kenna, “Secretive U.N. body opens its doors,”The Toronto Star, January 10, 2000, p. A8.

26 DFAIT, “Axworthy welcomes increased transparency at theUN Security Council,” News Release no. 7, January 21,2000.

27 DFAIT, “Notes for an address by the Honourable LloydAxworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the UnitedNations Security Council—‘The Protection of Civilians inArmed Conflict’” (New York: United Nations, February 12,1999), Statement 99/8 (docs/100211.htm).

28 DFAIT, “Notes for an Address by the Honourable LloydAxworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the UnitedNations Security Council Session on Small Arms and LightWeapons,” New York, September 24, 1999. Statement99/50. See also DFAIT, “Notes for an address by theHonourable Lloyd Axworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, atthe Asean Regional forum,” Singapore, July 26, 1999,Statement 99/44.

29 DFAIT, “Small Arms and Light Weapons: What are they andwhy do they matter?” Conventional Weapons (IncludingSmall Arms), Non-Proliferation, Arms Control &Disarmament Division – Conventional Weapons. Atwww.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/arms/convweap3-e.asp

30 DFAIT, “EU-Canada Statement,” at the EU-Canada Summitin Ottawa on December16, 1999. At www.dfait-maeci/gc/ca/english/geo/europe/EU/lightarmsE.htm

31 DFAIT, “Axworthy announces release of annual report on exports of Canadian military goods,” News Release no. 271, December 15, 1999. At http://198.103.118/minpub/Publication.asp?FileSpec=Min_Pub_Docs/102663.htm

32 Ken Epps, “1998 arms exports reach post-Cold War high,” in Ploughshares Monitor, March 2000. Atwww.ploughshares.ca/content/MONITOR/monm00c.html

33 Allan Thompson, “The world according to Axworthy,” TheToronto Star,” December 27, 1999, p. A7.

34 DFAIT, “Notes for an address by the Honourable LloydAxworthy, Minister of Foreign Affairs, to the NGOPeacebuilding Consultations,” Ottawa, February 29, 2000,Statement 2000/9.

35 Jean Daudelin, “Let’s stick to our guns,” The Globe andMail, February 28, 2000, p. A13.

36 “Canadian Lessons from the Kosovo Crisis,” Speaking Notesfor the Honourable Art Eggleton, Minister of NationalDefence, Harvard University, Boston, September 30, 1999.(accessed February 11, 2000). At www.dnd.ca/eng/archive/speeches/30SepHarvard_s_e.htm

37 DFAIT, “Kosovo and the Human Security Agenda,” Notesfor an address by the Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, Ministerof Foreign Affairs, to the Woodrow Wilson School of Publicand International Relations, Princeton University,Princeton, New Jersey, April 7, 1999, 99/28. Atwww.dnd.ca/eng/archive/speeches/30SepHarvard_s_e.htm(accessed January 7, 2000).

38 Ibid.

39 DFAIT, “Human Security in Sudan: The Report of aCanadian Assessment Mission,” prepared for the Ministerof Foreign Affairs, Ottawa, January 2000.

40 Ibid, p. 14.

41 DFAIT, “Axworthy Outlines New Initiatives to FurtherPeace in Sudan,” News Release no. 26, February 14, 2000.

42 The Honourable Lloyd Axworthy, “Walking away fromSudan would be immoral,” Letter of the Day, The TorontoStar, February 28, 2000, p. A19.

43 “On the eve of federal report, Talisman chairman sees noreason to leave Sudan,” The National Post, February 2,2000, p.A4.

44 Madelaine Drohan, “Why Axworthy stopped talkingtough,” The Globe and Mail, February 15, 2000, p. A1.

45 These include Sherritt International in Cuba; CanadianOccidental TransAtlantic Petroleum in Nigeria; Ranger Oilin Angola; Oilexco and Ranger Oil in Iraq; and CarmanahResources, Equatorial Energy, Gulf Canada, Talisman, andTrace Petroleum in Indonesia.. See Keith McArthur andDawn Walton, “Protecting what’s right,” The Globe andMail, February 15, 2000, p. B15.


46 Claudia Cattaneo, “Agency says Sudan attacked south tobenefit Fosters,” The Financial Post, March 15, 2000, p. C11. In May 2000, Fosters withdrew from the Sudan oildevelopment, blaming a campaign by human rights groupsthat caused its financial backers to pull out. See Cattaneo,“Fosters bows out of Sudanese mine,” The Financial Post,May 16, 2000, p. C1.

47 J. Fraser Field, “A wretched nation made worse,” TheNational Post, February 17, 2000, p. A18.

48 Eggleton, “Canadian Lessons from the Kosovo Crisis.”

A D UA L AT TAC K O N G L O B A LP O V E R T Y1 Government of Canada. Governor General, “Building a

Higher Quality of Life for All Canadians: Speech from theThrone to open the Second Session of the Thirty-SixthParliament of Canada,” 1999. At www.pco-bcp.gc.ca/stt-ddt/doc/fulltext_e.htm (accessed March 8, 2000).

2 Roy Culpeper, Letter to the Right Honourable JeanChrétien, Prime Minister of Canada, February 7, 2000. Atwww.nsi-ins.ca.ensi/news_views.opend10.html

3 OECD, “DAC Aid Review of Canada,” OECD News Release,Paris, January 26, 1998. At www.oecdwash.org/PRESS/PRESRELS/news9806.htm (accessed March 22, 2000).

4 The Reality of Aid 2000, Table 49, “The outlook for aid.”(London: Earthscan Publications Ltd. 2000).

5 Barbara McDougall, “1999 Budget comes up short in sup-porting Canada’s place in the world,” (Toronto: CanadianInstitute of International Affairs, February 17, 1999).News release on Canada NewsWire at www.newswire.ca/releases/February1999/17/c/7210.html (accessed January 12, 2000).

6 Culpeper, Letter to the Right Honourable Jean Chrétien,Prime Minister of Canada, February 7, 2000.

7 CCIC, “The Federal Budget Plan 2000. CCIC’s Analysis ofInternational Commitments.” At http://fly.web.net/ccic/devpol/CA16_analysis_federal_bidget_2000.htm

8 The Right Honourable Jean Chrétien, Prime Minister ofCanada. “Speech To a Luncheon to the Canadian Club ofWinnipeg,” March 25, 1999, Winnipeg, Manitoba, athttp://pm.gc.ca/cgi-win/pmo_view.dII/ENGLISH?957+)+Normal. See also Finance Canada, “Canada AnnouncesDetails of Debt Relief Strategy for Helping the PoorestCountries,” News Release 99-032, March 25, 1999, atwww.fin.gc.ca/newse99/99-032e.htm, and “Helping thePoorest—Canada’s Debt Relief Initiative,” Backgrounder,Finance Canada, November 1999. At www. fin.gc.ca/newse99/99-032e1.html (accessed February 17, 2000).

9 Finance Canada, “Canada Forgives Bangladesh’s Debt,”News Release 99-107, December 9, 1999, atwww.fin.gc.ca//newse99/99-1007_1e.htnl (accessedFebruary 17, 2000).

10 Jubilee 2000/USA, “Overview of G-7 June 1999 Debt ReliefInitiative,” Washington, DC, 1999. At www.j2000usa.org/debt/cologne.html (accessed March 29, 2000).

11 Under the proposed terms, debt levels are considered to beunsustainable if the net present value of debt-to-incomeratio is 150 % or more; or—if the export-to-income ratiois 30 % or more and government revenue-to-income ratiois 15 % or more—the net present value of debt-to-revenueratio is 250 % or more. Under previous terms, unsustain-able debt was defined as a net present value of debt-to-income ratio of 200-250 % or more and debt service-to-export ratio of 20-25 % or more. An alternative criteria(given export-to-income ratio of 40 % or more andgovernment revenue-to-income ratio of 20 % or more)was a net present value of debt-to-revenue ratio of 280 %or more.

12 World Bank, Global Development Finance 2000; Country andSummary Data (Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2000);Madelaine Drohan, “Why you should care about worldpoverty,” The Globe and Mail, April 15, 2000, p. B9.

13 The Honourable Paul Martin, “Statement Prepared for the Development Committee,” Washington, D.C.,September 27, 1999. At www.fin.gc.ca/newse99/99-082e.html

14 John E. Serieux, “Reducing the Debt of the Poorest:Challenges and Opportunities.” (Ottawa: The North-SouthInstitute, October 1999). Available online at www.nsi-ins.ca

15 Ibid.

16 Nicola Bullard, “Trick or treat: The new sugar-coated IMF,” Focus on Trade, no. 39, October 1999. Atwww.focusweb.org/focus/pd/apec/fot/fot39.htm (accessed April 18, 2000).

17 Jubilee 2000/USA, “Overview of G-7 June 1999 Debt ReliefInitiative.”

18 Jubilee 2000 Coalition, “Who’s dropped what? 2000 – the Jubilee year,” February 25, 2000. Atwww.jubilee2000uk.org/reports/dropped.html (accessedMarch 29, 2000)

19 Roy Culpeper, Personal comments, April 2000.

20 The Honourable Paul Martin, “Statement Prepared for theDevelopment Committee.”

21 Roy Culpeper, “The New Economy.” Statement to theHouse of Commons Standing Committee on Finance,November 30, 1999. At www.nsi-ins.ca/ensi/news_views/oped08.html

22 Finance Canada, “Harnessing the Forces of Globalization.”Remarks by the Honourable James Scott Peterson, P.C.,M.P., Secretary of State (International FinancialInstitutions), to the Annual Policy Conference of theGroup of 78, Cantly, Quebec, October 1, 1999. Atwww.fin.gc.ca/g20/news/001-e.html (accessed February 17, 2000).

23 Ibid.

24 Finance Canada, “G-20. Finance Ministers and CentralBank Governors Meeting, December 15-16, 1999.” Atwww.fin.gc.ca/g20/news/001-3.html (accessed February 17, 2000).

25 Tim Draimin and Brian Tomlinson, “A Scan of the GlobalPolicy Environment Facing Canadian NGOs,” (Ottawa: CCIC,October 1999). At http://fly.web.net/ccic

26 Shawn McCarthy, “Developing nations agree to acceleratereforms,” The Globe and Mail, December 17, 1999, p. B1.

27 Roy Culpeper. “Systemic Reform at a Standstill: A Flock of‘Gs’ in Search of Global Financial Stability” (Ottawa: TheNorth-South Institute, June 2000) at www.nsi-ins.ca

28 CIDA, “Launch of the Reality of Aid 2000 report, Speechby Minister of International Cooperation, the HonourableMaria Minna,” Ottawa, December 7, 1999.

29 The Honourable Paul Martin, “Statement Prepared for theDevelopment Committee,” September 27, 1999.

30 CCIC, “As more than 3 billion people live on less than $2 a day,” incommon Alerts, December 7, 1999. Atwww.incommon.web.net/alerts/how.cfm?id=209


STATISTICS2000

John Serieux

with Peggy Sun and Tapas Chowdhury

T h e d a t a i n t h e s e t a b l e s f o r t h e

C a n a d i a n D e v e l o p m e n t R e p o r t 2 0 0 0 w a s

a s s e m b l e d a n d a n a l y z e d b y a t e a m o f

r e s e a r c h e r s a n d a s s o c i a t e s f r o m t h e

N o r t h - S o u t h I n s t i t u t e , l e d b y S e n i o r

R e s e a r c h e r J o h n S e r i e u x .

46

By presenting a profile of high human development index countrieswith respect to their levels of human development, income, andeconomic relations with developing countries, Table 1 provides acontext for examining Canada’s economic relations with developingcountries.

The human development index (HDI), developed by the UnitedNations Development Programme (UNDP) and presented in Column 2,is a composite measure of average levels of life expectancy, educa-tion, and income that attempts to provide a “quality of life” mea-sure at the country level. The gender-related development index(GDI) in Column 1 is also constructed from measures of lifeexpectancy, education, and income, but it takes the gender gap intoaccount. Despite data revisions and changes in the measurementtechniques between 1997 and 1995, Canada maintained the highestscore for both indices for the sixth year running for the HDI andsince 1994 for the GDI.

The per capita income figures in Column 3 are in purchasing powerparity dollars (PPP$). A PPP$ can best be thought of as one US dollar converted to and from other currencies using purchasingpower parity (PPP) ratios instead of exchange rates. Such a conver-sion would ensure that the US dollar translates into the amount oflocal currency needed to purchase exactly the same amount of goodsin a given country as that dollar can purchase in the US. For exam-ple, in 1998 Canada’s per capita income was $28,586, which trans-lated into US$19,170 at the exchange rate of C$1=US$0.67. However,one Canadian dollar could actually purchase in Canada what US$0.80could purchase in the US, implying a PPP ratio of 0.8. Canada’s percapita income in 1998, therefore, translated into PPP$22,814—amore accurate basis for gauging relative opulence.

Total net official development assistance (ODA) from high HDIcountries increased from US$47.6 billion in 1997 to US$51.5 billionin 1998, the first increase since 1994 but still well below the high ofUS$62.7 billion (in current dollars) reached in 1992. ODA alsoincreased as a proportion of the total Gross National Product (GNP)of these countries (from 0.22 percent to 0.23 percent). The increasein ODA was, however, not uniform across countries. While the major-ity of countries recorded an increase in ODA contributions, at leastsix countries recorded declines in both absolute amounts and as aproportion of GNP. Canada was the worst of these, with an 11.4 per-cent decline in its ODA between 1997 and 1998 (from US$2.1 billionto US$1.7 billion, or from 0.34 to 0.29 percent of GNP). Thus, whencountries are ranked according to ODA performance, Canada slipsfrom seventh to ninth if the ranking is based on absolute amounts,and from eighth to eleventh if GNP proportions are used.1

In delivering official development assistance, countries can choosedifferent channels (bilateral versus multilateral), different forms(grants versus loans), and different country groups (low-incomeversus middle and high-income countries). Columns 8 to 10 indicatehow these choices were made. Slightly less ODA was channeledthrough multilateral institutions in 1998 than in 1997 (32.3 com-pared to 33.0 percent). The proportion of ODA delivered as grants(rather than loans) increased slightly (from 78.9 percent in 1997 to79.8 percent in 1998).

The low income country (LIC) share of ODA is an indicator of thedegree to which ODA is directed at those most in need—the poorestcountries. At 56.7 percent that proportion is well below the LICshare of developing-country population (70.3 percent). However, thisapparent under-representation is due largely to the effect of China

and India. Because these countries are exceptionally populous, evenlarge amounts of aid are small relative to their share of developing-country population. In fact, low income countries other than Chinaand India receive 46.7 percent of ODA but account for only 23.6 per-cent of developing-country population, meaning that, as a group,they received twice the average per capita level of ODA.

As is obvious from Figure 1.1, Canada’s direct trade with developingcountries is very small when compared to that of other high HDIcountries, and that trade is dominated by imports from developingcountries. Countries such as Singapore, Japan, and Australia haveboth more active and more balanced trade regimes with developingcountries.

With respect to private financial flows, however, Canada is closer to the middle of the pack, providing US$5.5 billion worth of foreigndirect investment and other long-term private flows to developingcountries. However, as was the case for most countries, that amount represented a decline from the previous year’s total ofUS$7.3 billion—a result of the Asian financial crisis that, despite acontinued increase in foreign direct investment, resulted in the firstdecline in private financial flows to developing countries since 1990.

1 The rankings for 1997 are based on the latest (revised) OECD data and are slightly different from last year’s CDR.

TABLE 1 CANADA AND OTHER HIGH HUMAN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMIES: SELECTED INDICATORS

0 10 20 30 40 50 60

Singapore Japan South Korea United States Australia Barbados Cyprus New Zealand Greece Italy Germany Finland Bahamas Austria France Netherlands United Kingdom Spain Sweden Israel Switzerland Denmark Belgium Ireland Portugal Norway Canada Iceland Luxembourg

Imports from DCs as % Total Trade Exports to DCs as % Total Trade

Figure 1.1

Trade Relations with Developing Countries

S TAT I S T I C S 2 0 0 0 47

T A B L E 1 C A N A D A A N D O T H E R H I G H H U M A N D E V E L O P M E N T E C O N O M I E SSelected indicators of relations with developing countries

Australia 0.921 0.922 21,795 960 6.3 0.27 14 21.7 100.0 39.7 46.2 32.7 1,280Austria 0.898 0.904 23,145 456 (13.3) 0.22 19 36.0 85.4 40.9 24.5 19.2 306Bahamas 0.849 0.851 13,990 na na na na na na na 14.4 24.8 ~Barbados 0.854 0.857 ~ na na na na na na na 47.3 30.1 ~Belgium 0.918 0.923 23,622 883 15.1 0.35 7 39.2 98.4 71.8 14.1 15.5 6,727Canada 0.928 0.932 22,814 1,691 (11.0) 0.29 11 28.6 99.8 67.4 5.4 14.1 5,469Cyprus ~ 0.870 17,599 na na na na na na na 51.9 22.2 ~Denmark 0.904 0.905 23,855 1,704 4.1 0.99 1 40.5 100.0 70.8 17.1 14.8 (60)Finland 0.908 0.913 20,641 396 5.2 0.32 9 47.3 99.3 62.2 28.7 20.5 1,219France 0.916 0.918 21,214 5,742 (8.7) 0.40 6 27.1 78.5 41.0 21.8 20.4 2,851Germany 0.904 0.906 22,026 5,581 (4.2) 0.26 16 37.5 87.8 59.2 30.5 43.0 14,349Greece 0.861 0.867 13,994 ~ ~ ~ na ~ ~ ~ 38.3 22.9 ~Iceland 0.918 0.919 24,774 ~ ~ ~ na ~ ~ ~ 6.9 11.2 ~Ireland 0.892 0.900 17,991 199 8.6 0.30 10 37.8 100.0 83.1 10.2 19.1 ~Israel 0.879 0.883 16,861 na na na na na na na 21.4 15.4 ~Italy 0.894 0.900 20,365 2,278 78.4 0.20 20 69.4 93.0 80.8 27.1 25 11,061Japan 0.917 0.924 23,592 10,640 22.6 0.28 12 19.6 42.6 62.5 45.7 52.4 810Luxembourg 0.894 0.902 36,703 112 18.1 0.65 5 31.3 100.0 59.1 7.9 3.2 ~Netherlands 0.916 0.921 22,325 3,042 3.2 0.80 3 29.9 100.0 63.5 16.1 25.5 8,540New Zealand 0.900 0.901 16,084 130 2.6 0.27 15 24.3 100.0 50.5 33.5 24.3 11Norway 0.927 0.927 26,196 1,321 8.4 0.91 2 28.1 99.5 70.7 9.5 14.1 535Portugal 0.853 0.858 14,569 259 2.7 0.24 18 31.8 78.2 91.7 9.4 14.1 1,333Singapore 0.883 0.888 25,295 na na na na na na na 52.7 47.7 ~South Korea 0.845 0.852 13,286 ~ ~ ~ na ~ ~ ~ 51.8 38.7 ~Spain 0.888 0.894 15,960 1,376 11.2 0.24 17 39.1 73.6 44.6 19.8 21.3 10,297Sweden 0.919 0.923 19,848 1,573 (6.2) 0.72 4 33.8 99.8 70.3 21.4 18.1 1,221Switzerland 0.909 0.914 26,876 898 (2.6) 0.32 8 29.5 100.0 66.7 20.5 12.3 3,604United Kingdom 0.915 0.918 20,314 3,864 8.6 0.27 13 44.8 96.2 72.5 20.5 20.9 7,919United States 0.926 0.927 29,240 8,786 26.5 0.10 21 31.8 98.2 37.4 43.4 46.5 35,685

Average or Total 0.910 0.913 23,291 51,888 9.6 0.24 32.3 79.8 56.5 26.1 23.8 113,159Note: Last year's Column 14 (Official Bilateral Debt Stocks Owed by Developing Countries) was produced from Eurodad's World Credit Tables 1996, which has not been updated, thus no newdata can be provided under that heading.

Sources: OECD, Development Assistance Committee (DAC), International Development Statistics 2000 (Online); World Bank, World Development Report 2000; UNDP, Human Development Report1999; IMF, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook 1999.

1997 1997 1998 1998 1997/98 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998 1998

Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

Net

Pri

vate

Fin

anci

al F

low

s to

Dev

elop

ing

Coun

trie

s(l

ong-

term

)(U

S$ m

illio

ns)

Shar

e of

Tot

al I

mpo

rts

from

De

velo

ping

Cou

ntri

es

Shar

e of

Tot

al E

xpor

ts t

o De

velo

ping

Cou

ntri

es

Shar

e of

Net

ODA

to

Low

Inc

ome

Coun

trie

s

Gran

t Sh

are

of T

otal

ODA

Mul

tila

tera

l Sh

are

as %

of

Net

ODA

ODA/

GNP

Rank

Am

ong

DAC

Coun

trie

s

ODA/

GNP

Rati

o

% C

hang

e Ov

er P

revi

ous

Year

(re

al t

erm

s)

Tota

l N

et O

DA (

US$

mill

ions

)

GNP

Per

Capi

ta (

PPP$

)

UN

DP H

uman

De

velo

pmen

t In

dex

UN

DP G

ende

r-Re

late

dDe

velo

pmen

t In

dex

48

By offering two composite indices of human development andseveral summary measures of economic, demographic, social, andenvironmental conditions in developing countries, Table 2 allows usto compare developing-country performances both generally andaccording to specific criteria.

Among the developing countries, Slovenia scores highest in boththe gender-related development index (GDI) and the human devel-opment index (HDI), while Ethiopia scores lowest on the GDI andSierra Leone (which was not covered by the GDI) has the lowestHDI score. Notably, the GDI and HDI score for the LLDCs (leastdeveloped countries) are nearly half those of the middle and highincome developing countries (Remaining Countries), but the differ-ence in scores between the other low income countries (OLICs) andthe Remaining Countries is quite small. This is particularly true ofthe GDI. To some degree, this is a natural consequence of the factthat the same measures that lead to low HDI scores (low levels ofincome, literacy, and life expectancy) also lead to classification asan LLDC. However, these scores also indicate that many low incomecountries have achieved relatively high levels of human andgender-related development despite low average income levels.Quite obviously, although most human development indicatorsmove in tandem with income, as Figure 2.1 suggests, low incomelevels need not constrain significant improvements in the qualityof life.

Column 3 presents the most commonly cited economic indicator forindividual countries—Gross National Product (GNP) per capita—inpurchasing power parity dollars (PPP$) for 1998.1 The range of scoresin this column demonstrates the tremendous difference in economicprosperity within the so-called developing world, from PPP$18,871for the United Arab Emirates (UAE) to PPP$445 for Sierra Leone. Acomparison of Column 3 with the previous two columns again makesit clear that income is a less-than-perfect predictor of human devel-opment as measured by these indices. The high income UAE, forexample, has a lower HDI score than Antigua and Barbuda, whichhas less than half its per capita GNP, and a lower GDI score thanCosta Rica, which has less than one-third its per capita GNP.

The data on child mortality (Column 8) shows a degree of variationwithin the developing world as wide as the variation in per capitaincomes. At the top of the scale, Slovenia has only six child deathsper thousand live births while Niger’s rate is 320 per thousand—aloss of nearly one out of every three children before the age of five!Slovenia’s position near the top of the economic ladder (PPP$14,400per capita) and Niger’s position near the bottom (PPP$729 percapita) might at first suggest a close negative link between childmortality and average income, but that association does not appearto be very pervasive. The correlation coefficient for child mortalityand per capita GNP (a measure of the degree to which those vari-ables move together) is only -0.643. However, it is -0.757 for childmortality and literacy, -0.902 for child mortality and the HDI, and-0.912 for child mortality and the GDI. This reinforces the pointmade earlier that the relationship between economic and humandevelopment is far from singular.

The debt ratios in Columns 9 and 11 give some idea of how foreigndebt constrains developing countries’ attempts to make needed

social and investment expenditures. The ODA/GNP ratio in Column 10shows the extent to which this and other constraints may have beenpartly mitigated through official development assistance (ODA).Eritrea perhaps faced the least constraints with a debt/income ratioof less than 20 percent, an ODA/GNP ratio of more than 20 percent,and a debt service/education spending ratio of zero, but it is theexception rather than the rule. On average, developing countriesappear to spend more on debt service than on education, and theyreceive less than 1 percent of their collective GNP in aid flows (ODA,incidentally, is an even smaller percentage of the GNP of donorcountries). The LLDCs, most of which are heavily indebted, have thehighest debt burden, which suggests that no major change in theircircumstances is likely in the absence of substantial debt relief. TheOLICs have the lowest debt burden but receive much less aid thanthe LLDCs and spend much more on debt service relative to educa-tion. The Remaining Countries receive even less aid than the OLICsbut fall between the other two groups in terms of their debt burdenand debt service to education spending.

The figures on carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions per capita are anarrow but useful gauge of the environmental stress countries facedue to energy production and consumption choices. In that respect,developing countries generally place much less strain on the globalenvironment than the developed countries. This is due both to theirlower per capita energy consumption and the more limited use offossil fuels. However, there are exceptions. The relatively highincome countries of the Middle East are responsible for very highlevels of CO2 emissions because of their high energy and fossilfuel use.

1 See the analysis for Table 1 (paragraph 3), for a brief definition of PPP$.

T A B L E 2 T H E D E V E L O P I N G C O U N T R I E S : S E L E C T E D I N D I C AT O R S

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

120%

CO2 EmissionsPer Capita

Adult LiteracyRate

HumanDevelopment

Index

GNPPer Capita

Developed Countries

Remaining Countries

Other Low IncomeCountries

Least Developed Countries

Figure 2.1

Some Developing-Country Indicators asa Proportion of Developed-Country Levels

S TAT I S T I C S 2 0 0 0 49

UN

DP G

ende

r-Re

late

d De

velo

pmen

t In

dex

1997

UN

DP H

uman

Dev

elop

men

tIn

dex

1997

GNP

Per

Capi

ta 1

998

(PPP

$)

GNP/

Capi

ta G

row

th A

vera

gePe

r Ye

ar (

1997

-98)

(%

)

GDP

1998

(U

S$ m

illio

ns)

Popu

lati

on (

mill

ions

) 19

99

Adul

t Li

tera

cy

Rate

199

7 (%

)

Und

er-5

Mor

talit

y Ra

te 1

997

(per

1,0

00liv

ebi

rths

)

Exte

rnal

Deb

t/GN

P 19

98 (

%)

Aid/

GNP

1998

(%

)

Debt

Ser

vice

Pai

d as

% o

fEx

pend

itur

e on

Edu

cati

on 1

996a

CO2

Emis

sion

s Pe

r Ca

pita

(met

ric

tons

) 19

96

T A B L E 2 T H E D E V E L O P I N G C O U N T R I E S : S E L E C T E D I N D I C A T O R S

Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

AFRICAAlgeria 0.642 0.665 4,595 5.0 47,347 30.8 60.3 39 67.5 0.8 186.0 3.29Angola ~ 0.398 999 4.8 7,472 12.5 45.0 292 297.1 9.7 ~ 0.45Benin 0.405 0.421 857 1.5 2,306 5.9 33.9 167 72.2 9.2 ~ 0.12Botswana 0.606 0.609 5,796 3.5 4,876 1.6 74.4 49 11.8 1.9 34.2 1.37Burkina Faso 0.291 0.304 866 3.8 2,581 11.6 20.7 169 54.5 15.6 129.6 0.09Burundi 0.317 0.324 561 2.2 885 6.6 44.6 176 119.1 8.1 86.2 0.03Cameroon 0.527 0.536 1,395 3.8 8,701 14.7 71.7 99 119.4 5.1 ~ 0.26Cape Verde 0.667 0.677 3,192 1.7 ~ 0.4 71.0 73 49.8 28.9 ~ 0.31Central African Republic 0.365 0.378 1,098 2.6 1,057 3.6 42.4 173 88.8 11.6 ~ 0.07Chad 0.378 0.393 843 ~ 1,694 7.5 50.3 198 65.5 9.9 ~ 0.01Comoros 0.500 0.506 1,400 (1.5) ~ 0.7 55.4 93 103.3 18.0 ~ 0.11Congo-Brazzaville 0.527 0.533 846 8.9 1,961 2.9 76.9 108 208.2 3.9 ~ 0.05Congo-Kinshasa (Zaire) ~ 0.479 733 0.7 6,964 50.3 77.0 207 306.9 2.0 ~ 1.88Côte d’Ivoire 0.404 0.422 1,484 3.6 11,005 14.5 42.6 150 145.4 7.8 279.2 0.94Djibouti ~ 0.412 ~ ~ ~ 0.6 48.3 156 68.8 16.3 ~ 0.59Egypt 0.603 0.616 3,146 3.3 82,710 67.2 52.7 73 37.3 2.4 108.8 1.65Equatorial Guinea ~ 0.549 ~ 32.5 ~ 0.4 79.9 172 75.7 3.9 217.2 0.35Eritrea ~ 0.346 984 (6.7) 650 3.7 25.0 116 19.5 20.6 0 ~Ethiopia 0.287 0.298 566 (3.2) 6,544 61.1 35.4 175 160.4 10.0 147.4 0.06Gabon ~ 0.607 5,615 3.2 5,518 1.2 66.2 145 90.7 0.9 ~ 3.28Gambia 0.384 0.391 1,428 2.0 416 1.3 33.1 87 116.7 9.1 147.1 0.19Ghana 0.540 0.544 1,735 1.9 7,501 19.7 66.4 107 91.8 9.3 169.3 0.23Guinea 0.381 0.398 1,722 1.9 3,598 7.4 37.9 201 102.0 10.3 158.6 0.16Guinea-Bissau 0.318 0.343 573 (30.4) 206 1.2 33.6 220 503.6 50.5 ~ 0.21Kenya 0.517 0.519 964 (0.9) 11,579 29.5 79.3 87 61.5 4.5 143.0 0.24Lesotho 0.570 0.582 2,194 (5.4) 792 2.1 82.3 137 64.7 6.2 34.1 ~Liberia ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 2.9 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0.12Libya 0.732 0.756 ~ ~ ~ 5.5 76.5 25 ~ ~ ~ 7.99Madagascar ~ 0.453 741 1.6 3,749 15.5 47.0 158 119.5 13.4 ~ 0.09Malawi 0.390 0.399 551 (0.7) 1,688 10.6 57.7 215 137.5 27.2 ~ 0.07Mali 0.367 0.375 673 2.2 2,695 11.0 35.5 239 120.4 13.2 201.0 0.05Mauritania 0.438 0.447 1,500 2.4 989 2.6 38.4 183 272.5 18.3 ~ 1.23Mauritius 0.754 0.764 8,236 3.5 4,199 1.2 83.0 23 59.6 1.0 101.2 1.54Morocco 0.565 0.582 3,188 (1.0) 35,546 27.9 45.9 72 60.6 1.5 170.9 1.04Mozambique 0.326 0.341 740 9.2 3,893 19.3 40.5 208 223.0 27.9 ~ 0.06Namibia 0.633 0.638 5,280 (1.2) 3,092 1.7 79.8 75 2.7 5.7 1.9 ~Niger 0.286 0.298 729 0.8 2,048 10.4 14.3 320 82.1 15.0 109.3 0.12Nigeria 0.442 0.456 740 (1.7) 41,353 108.9 59.5 187 78.8 0.5 ~ 0.73Rwanda ~ 0.379 ~ 7.1 2,024 7.2 63.0 170 60.8 16.9 ~ 0.07São Tomé and Principe ~ 0.609 1,289 0.2 ~ 0.1 75.0 78 684.7 72.9 ~ 0.57Senegal 0.417 0.426 1,297 3.1 4,682 9.2 34.6 124 83.1 10.6 165.3 0.36Seychelles ~ 0.755 10,185 (2.5) ~ 0.1 84.0 18 36.3 4.5 39.3 2.20Sierra Leone ~ 0.254 445 (2.9) 647 4.7 33.3 316 197.7 16.9 ~ 0.10Somalia ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 9.7 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0South Africa 0.689 0.695 8,296 (1.2) 133,461 39.9 84.0 65 18.9 0.5 43.3 7.33Sudan 0.453 0.475 1,240 2.7 10,366 28.9 53.3 115 182.7 2.3 75.9 0.13Swaziland 0.636 0.644 4,195 (1.3) ~ 1.0 77.5 94 18.8 2.3 43.7 0.37Tanzania 0.418 0.421 483 0.6 8,016 32.8 71.6 143 94.3 12.9 ~ 0.08Togo 0.450 0.469 1,352 (3.5) 1,510 4.5 53.2 125 97.4 8.6 90.0 0.18Tunisia 0.681 0.695 5,169 3.9 19,956 9.5 67.0 33 52.7 0.7 117.9 1.78Uganda 0.397 0.404 1,072 2.9 6,775 21.1 64.0 137 58.2 7.1 ~ 0.05Zambia 0.425 0.431 678 (4.0) 3,352 9.0 75.1 202 217.4 11.0 ~ 0.27Zimbabwe 0.555 0.560 2,489 (2.2) 6,338 11.5 90.9 80 79.8 5.1 97.0 1.64Total Africa 0.474 0.482 1,850 1.2 512,742 765.6 57.5 143 63.7 3.2 114.7 1.18

➤

50

AMERICASAntigua and Barbuda ~ 0.828 8,890 1.2 ~ 0.1 95.0 21 ~ 1.7 ~ 4.91Argentina 0.814 0.827 11,728 2.7 298,131 36.6 96.5 24 49.5 0.0 138.0 3.69Belize ~ 0.732 4,367 (1.8) ~ 0.2 75.0 43 51.9 2.4 128.5 1.60Bolivia 0.641 0.562 2,205 2.3 8,586 8.1 83.6 96 72.8 7.6 115.5 1.33Brazil 0.733 0.739 6,460 (1.4) 778,209 168.0 84.0 44 30.7 0 ~ 1.69Chile 0.832 0.844 8,507 6.5 78,738 15.0 95.2 13 47.6 0.2 273.1 3.38Colombia 0.765 0.768 5,861 3.7 102,896 41.6 90.9 30 33.4 0.2 158.6 1.66Costa Rica 0.795 0.801 5,812 3.1 10,479 3.9 95.1 14 38.9 0.3 122.6 1.37Cuba 0.762 0.765 ~ ~ ~ 11.2 95.9 8 ~ ~ ~ 2.83Dominica ~ 0.776 4,777 0.2 ~ 0.1 94.0 20 29.8 8.8 ~ 1.09Dominican Republic 0.716 0.726 4,337 4.6 15,853 8.4 82.6 53 29.8 0.8 174.5 1.62Ecuador 0.728 0.747 3,003 0.2 18,360 12.4 90.7 39 82.5 0.9 215.3 2.09El Salvador 0.667 0.674 4,008 1.4 11,870 6.2 77.0 36 30.8 1.5 132.7 0.70Grenada ~ 0.777 5,557 0.9 ~ 0.1 96.0 29 55.3 2.0 66.2 1.70Guatemala 0.608 0.624 3,474 2.1 18,942 11.1 66.6 55 24.3 1.2 137.5 0.66Guyana 0.691 0.701 3,139 (2.6) ~ 0.9 98.1 82 248.6 14.1 319.6 1.14Haiti 0.426 0.430 1,379 1.1 3,871 8.1 45.8 132 49.1 13.0 ~ 0.15Honduras 0.631 0.641 2,338 1.0 5,371 6.3 70.7 45 96.9 7.1 ~ 0.69Jamaica 0.731 0.734 3,344 (1.9) 6,418 2.6 85.5 11 63.1 0.3 170.8 3.96Mexico 0.778 0.786 7,450 3.0 393,508 97.4 90.1 35 42.0 0 ~ 3.75Nicaragua 0.609 0.616 1,896 ~ 2,007 4.9 63.4 57 317.6 30.2 353.9 0.63Panama 0.786 0.791 4,925 2.0 9,144 2.8 91.1 20 75.5 0.2 212.9 2.50Paraguay 0.717 0.730 4,312 (2.1) 8,608 5.4 92.4 33 26.6 0.9 63.7 0.75Peru 0.726 0.739 4,180 ~ 62,745 25.2 88.7 56 52.9 0.8 167.8 1.09St Kitts and Nevis ~ 0.781 9,790 3.7 ~ 0 90.0 37 43.4 2.6 68.4 2.51St Lucia ~ 0.737 4,897 3.0 ~ 0.2 82.0 29 32.5 1.1 ~ 1.21St Vincent/Grenadines ~ 0.744 4,484 1.6 ~ 0.1 82.0 21 239.3 7.5 ~ 1.12Suriname ~ 0.757 ~ 2.4 ~ 0.4 93.5 30 34.3 8.6 ~ 1.12Trinidad and Tobago 0.790 0.797 7,208 5.5 6,382 1.3 97.8 17 48.3 0.2 253.5 17.15Uruguay ~ 0.826 8,541 5.8 20,578 3.3 97.5 21 37.3 0.1 110.9 1.74Venezuela 0.786 0.792 5,706 (2.4) 95,023 23.7 92.0 25 39.6 0 ~ 6.48Total Americas 0.744 0.751 6,387 1.0 1,955,719 505.4 86.9 39 39.5 0.2 169.2 2.47

ASIAAfghanistan ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 21.9 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0.05Armenia 0.726 0.728 2,074 ~ 1,900 3.5 98.8 30 42.3 7.6 156.3 0.98Azerbaijan 0.691 0.695 2,168 8.1 3,926 7.7 96.3 45 16.9 2.2 8.2 3.97Bahrain 0.813 0.832 11,556 (1.3) ~ 0.6 86.2 22 54.5 0.9 195.8 17.66Bangladesh 0.428 0.440 1,407 3.4 42,702 126.9 38.9 109 37.1 2.8 76.5 0.19Bhutan 0.444 0.459 1,438 ~ ~ 2.1 44.2 121 32.1 15.9 ~ 0.36Burma (Myanmar) 0.576 0.580 ~ ~ ~ 47.6 83.6 114 ~ ~ ~ 0.17Cambodia ~ 0.514 1,246 (2.3) 2,871 10.9 66.0 167 77.7 11.7 10.9 0.05China 0.699 0.701 3,051 6.5 959,030 1,266.8 82.9 47 16.4 0.3 84.1 2.77Georgia ~ 0.729 3,429 ~ 5,129 5.0 99.0 29 31.9 3.2 ~ 0.55India 0.525 0.545 2,060 4.2 430,024 998.1 53.5 108 23.0 0.4 106.4 1.05Indonesia 0.675 0.681 2,407 (16.2) 94,156 209.3 85.0 68 172.5 1.3 706.7 1.24Iran 0.696 0.715 5,121 ~ 113,140 66.8 73.3 35 12.7 0.1 ~ 4.45Iraq ~ 0.586 ~ ~ ~ 22.5 58.0 122 ~ ~ ~ 4.29Jordan ~ 0.715 2,615 (2.5) 7,393 6.5 87.2 24 116.0 5.9 126.2 ~Kazakhstan 0.738 0.740 4,317 (2.0) 21,979 16.3 99.0 44 27.4 1.0 33.0 10.92Kuwait 0.825 0.833 ~ ~ 25,171 1.9 80.4 13 25.4 0 181.1 ~Kyrghzstan ~ 0.702 2,247 2.8 1,704 4.7 97.0 48 69.4 13.1 53.0 1.34Laos 0.483 0.491 1,683 1.4 1,261 5.3 58.6 122 199.1 21.8 63.9 0.07Lebanon 0.734 0.749 4,144 2.7 17,229 3.2 84.4 37 38.7 1.4 89.7 3.47Malaysia 0.763 0.768 7,699 (8.4) 72,489 21.8 85.7 11 65.3 0.3 170.3 5.64Maldives 0.711 0.716 3,436 ~ ~ 0.3 95.7 74 58.1 7.7 ~ 1.19Mongolia 0.616 0.618 1,463 3.2 1,042 2.6 84.0 150 74.7 19.6 77.9 3.56Nepal 0.441 0.463 1,181 (0.1) 4,783 23.4 38.1 104 54.2 8.8 57.0 0.07

Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Table 2 (continued)

➤

UN

DP G

ende

r-Re

late

d De

velo

pmen

t In

dex

1997

UN

DP H

uman

Dev

elop

men

tIn

dex

1997

GNP

Per

Capi

ta 1

998

(PPP

$)

GNP/

Capi

ta G

row

th A

vera

gePe

r Ye

ar (

1997

-98)

(%

)

GDP

1998

(U

S$ m

illio

ns)

Popu

lati

on (

mill

ions

) 19

99

Adul

t Li

tera

cy

Rate

199

7 (%

)

Und

er-5

Mor

talit

y Ra

te19

97(p

er 1

,000

live

birt

hs)

Exte

rnal

Deb

t/GN

P 19

98 (

%)

Aid/

GNP

1998

(%

)

Debt

Ser

vice

Pai

d as

% o

fEx

pend

itur

e on

Edu

cati

on 1

996a

CO2

Emis

sion

s Pe

r Ca

pita

(met

ric

tons

) 19

96

S TAT I S T I C S 2 0 0 0 51

North Korea ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 23.7 ~ ~ 0 ~ ~ 8.96Oman 0.686 0.725 ~ ~ 14,962 2.5 67.1 18 39.1 0.2 150.9 6.97Pakistan 0.472 0.508 1,652 2.5 63,369 152.3 40.9 136 50.2 1.7 184.2 0.75Papua New Guinea 0.564 0.570 2,205 0 3,746 4.7 73.7 112 76.9 10.3 ~ ~Philippines 0.736 0.740 3,725 (2.1) 65,107 74.5 94.6 41 70.1 0.9 192.3 0.88Qatar 0.796 0.814 ~ ~ ~ 0.6 80.0 20 ~ ~ ~ 42.02Saudi Arabia 0.703 0.740 10,498 ~ 128,892 20.9 73.4 28 19.0 0 32.4 13.80Sri Lanka 0.712 0.721 2,945 ~ 15,707 18.6 90.7 19 54.9 3.2 89.4 0.39Syria 0.640 0.663 2,702 1.8 17,412 15.7 71.6 33 102.9 1.0 11.2 3.05Tajikistan 0.662 0.665 1,041 ~ 2,164 6.1 98.9 76 39.3 4.9 2.5 0.99Thailand 0.751 0.753 5,524 (8.5) 111,327 60.9 94.7 38 76.4 0.6 111.6 3.42Turkey 0.722 0.728 6,594 ~ 198,844 65.5 83.2 45 50.2 0 ~ 2.84Turkmenistan ~ 0.712 ~ ~ 2,367 4.4 98.0 78 87.7 0.6 ~ 7.45United Arab Emirates 0.790 0.812 18,871 (8.9) 47,234 2.4 74.8 10 36.1 0 115.9 33.30Uzbekistan ~ 0.720 2,044 1.2 20,384 23.9 99.0 60 15.6 1.0 15.2 4.09Vietnam 0.662 0.664 1,689 2.8 27,184 78.7 91.9 43 82.3 4.7 58.6 0.50West Bank and Gaza ~ ~ ~ ~ 3,589 1.1 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Yemen 0.408 0.449 658 4.6 4,318 17.5 42.5 100 104.8 7.9 21.9 ~Oceania ~ 0.658 3,410 ~ ~ 1.8 72.8 33 27.4 8.1 ~ 0.73Total Asia 0.621 0.633 2,769 2.4 2,532,535 3,451.5 71.0 74 36.4 0.6 109.8 2.08

EASTERN EUROPEAlbania 0.696 0.699 2,864 ~ 3,047 3.1 85.0 40 26.4 8.9 ~ 0.59Belarus 0.761 0.763 6,314 ~ 22,555 10.3 99.0 18 4.3 0.1 15.5 6.00Bosnia Herzegovina ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 3.8 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 1.38Bulgaria 0.757 0.758 4,683 ~ 12,258 8.3 98.2 19 83.0 2.3 414.6 6.61Croatia 0.769 0.773 6,698 ~ 21,752 4.5 97.7 9 39.4 0.2 ~ 3.68Czech Republic 0.830 0.833 12,197 ~ 56,379 10.3 99.0 7 45.5 0.9 90.6 12.28Estonia 0.772 0.773 7,563 ~ 5,202 1.4 99.0 14 14.8 1.7 13.6 11.18Hungary 0.792 0.795 9,832 ~ 47,807 10.1 99.0 11 62.2 0.5 413.4 5.83Latvia 0.743 0.744 5,777 ~ 6,396 2.4 99.0 20 11.7 1.6 20.0 3.73Lithuania 0.759 0.761 6,283 5.9 10,736 3.7 99.0 15 21.1 1.2 29.2 3.73Macedonia, FYR 0.742 0.746 4,224 2.2 2,492 2.0 94.0 23 92.6 3.5 29.6 6.42Moldova 0.681 0.683 1,995 ~ 1,615 4.4 98.3 31 62.1 1.9 31.0 2.80Poland 0.800 0.802 7,543 5.4 158,574 38.7 99.0 11 30.6 0.6 26.8 9.24Romania 0.750 0.752 5,572 (5.3) 38,158 22.4 97.8 26 25.3 1.1 97.8 5.28Russian Federation 0.745 0.747 6,180 (6.3) 276,611 147.2 99.0 25 69.4 0.3 ~ 10.69Slovak Republic 0.811 0.813 9,624 ~ 20,362 5.4 99.0 11 49.0 0.8 172.3 7.42Slovenia 0.842 0.845 14,400 ~ 19,524 2.0 99.0 6 20.4 0.2 ~ 6.55Ukraine ~ 0.721 3,130 ~ 43,615 50.7 99.0 24 29.8 0.9 ~ 7.77Ex-Yugoslavia ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 10.6 ~ ~ ~ ~ 2.2 ~Total Eastern Europe 0.760 0.756 6,113 (2.1) 747,083 341.2 98.7 21 48.0 0.6 104.4 8.71

Total Developing Countries 0.622 0.630 3,219 1.3 5,748,079 5,063.7 72.4 77 41.1 0.7 123.8 2.46Of which:LLDCs 0.410 0.428 1,008 2.1 147,599 634.6 50.8 154 96.3 8.2 97.7 0.27Other Low Income Countries 0.611 0.622 2,444 4.1 1,748,493 2,979.0 69.8 80 32.4 0.7 186.4 1.76Remaining Countries 0.726 0.730 5,797 (0.3) 3,851,987 1,450.1 86.9 40 42.7 0.4 117.6 4.75

Total High Human Development Countries 0.910 0.913 23,291 1.2 22,273,669 893.0 98.6 7 na na na 10.04Notes: Bold-italicized countries are not ODA eligible (see Technical Notes) but official assistance (OA) to these countries was used in constructing Column 10.a Regional and country-group averages are unweighted.

Sources: World Bank, World Development Report 1999/2000; World Bank, Global Development Finance 2000 (Online); World Bank, World Development Indicators 2000 (Online); OECD,Development Assistance Committee, International Development Statistics (Online); UNDP, Human Development Report, 1999; United Nations Secretariat, The World at Six Billion.

Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

ASIA (continued) UN

DP G

ende

r-Re

late

d De

velo

pmen

t In

dex

1997

UN

DP H

uman

Dev

elop

men

tIn

dex

1997

GNP

Per

Capi

ta 1

998

(PPP

$)

GNP/

Capi

ta G

row

th A

vera

gePe

r Ye

ar (

1997

-98)

(%

)

GDP

1998

(U

S$ m

illio

ns)

Popu

lati

on (

mill

ions

) 19

99

Adul

t Li

tera

cy

Rate

199

7 (%

)

Und

er-5

Mor

talit

y Ra

te19

97(p

er 1

,000

live

birt

hs)

Exte

rnal

Deb

t/GN

P 19

98 (

%)

Aid/

GNP

1998

(%

)

Debt

Ser

vice

Pai

d as

% o

fEx

pend

itur

e on

Edu

cati

on 1

996a

CO2

Emis

sion

s Pe

r Ca

pita

(met

ric

tons

) 19

96

52

Canadian official development assistance (ODA) was only 18 percentof net long-term financial flows between Canada and developingcountries in 1997-98, but it accounted for 99 percent of financialflows between Canada and low income developing nations. ODA is,therefore, the almost exclusive channel for financial flows fromCanada to the poorest countries. However, while private flowsbetween Canada and emerging market economies soared from$400 million in 1988 to $8.1 billion in 1998, ODA has declined by all measures.

Canada’s ODA in 1997-98 totaled just over $2.5 billion. This repre-sents a 5.3 percent decrease from the previous year (1996-97) whennet ODA disbursements were just under $2.7 billion. As a share ofGross National Product (GNP), Canadian aid fell from 0.33 percentin 1996-97 to 0.30 percent in 1997-98.1 As Figure 3.1 indicates,this fall reestablished an overall declining trend dating from themid-1980s. This mirrors a similar decline in total aid disbursementsas a share of GNP from the member countries of the DevelopmentAssistance Committee (DAC) of the OECD. However, Canada’s aid con-tracted more rapidly in the 1990s: Canada’s aid effort ranking fellfrom sixth (out of 21 DAC countries) in 1993 to eleventh in 1998.

Of this year’s ODA, 38 percent ($901 million) was delivered throughmultilateral channels, such as the UN system. The remaining 62 per-cent was delivered on a country-to-country (bilateral) basis byCanadian government agencies and nongovernmental and privateorganizations.

The decline in ODA was exclusively in bilateral aid disbursements,which fell $195 million (or 10.8 percent) between 1996-97 and1997-98. On the other hand, ODA disbursed through multilateralinstitutions increased by $54 million (or 6.3 percent). Africa,although it continued to receive more than 40 percent of Canada’s allocable aid, bore the lion’s share of the decline, losing $122.3 million (or 13.9 percent). Eastern Europe suffered the second largest percentage decrease at 5.6 percent ($1.9 million),and the Americas absorbed the second largest absolute decrease at $13 million (4.2 percent). Asia registered only a 0.6 percentdecrease ($3.6 million).

Canada’s ODA in 1997-98 was apportioned in roughly equal quantities between the Least Developed Countries (LLDCs), other low income countries (OLICs), and the other developing countries(ODCs)—$607.9 million or 33.3 percent, $463.2 million or 31.2 percent, and $640.0 million or 35.7 percent, respectively (see “Technical Notes” on page 88 for income groupings). That distribution is very close to the DAC (weighted) average for 1998 of 31 percent, 34 percent, and 35 percent.

When evaluated in per capita terms, however, aid distribution isnot as “even” as it appears. The LLDCs, with an average income ofapproximately US$225 and 13.2 percent of the developing-countrypopulation (630 million people) in 1998, received approximately$0.96 per capita from Canada. The OLICs, with an average per capita income of approximately US$581 and 57.8 percent of thedeveloping-country population (2.98 billion people), received$0.16 per capita. The ODCs, with an average per capita income ofapproximately US$2,544 and 29 percent of the developing-countrypopulation (1.45 billion people), received $0.44 per capita.

Canada thus allocated more aid to the poorest countries in percapita terms, but allocated far less to the OLICs than it did to middle and high income developing countries (the ODCs). Thisdisparity is somewhat exaggerated by the “large country” effect ofChina and India.2 When these two countries are excluded from theOLIC group, per capita aid increases to $0.44—equal to, though nothigher than, per capita aid disbursements to the middle and highincome countries.

Geographic destinations for Canadian aid have remained relativelystable over the years. Eight of the countries ranked in the top 10 in1996-97 (Bangladesh, China, India, Vietnam, Haiti, Pakistan, Ghana,and Côte d’Ivoire) retained their top 10 placements in 1997-98. Infact, four of these countries (Bangladesh, China, India, and Pakistan)were ranked in the top 10 a decade earlier. Egypt, one of Canada’sfavorite aid recipients in 1996-97, slipped to eighteenth place in1997-98 because of a sharp decline in bilateral assistance; Cameroonclimbed from twenty-fifth in 1996-97 to sixth in 1997-98 because ofa $30 million debt relief package (see Table 5). Ethiopia rounded outthe top 10 in 1997-98, rising from its previous rank of seventeenth ayear earlier due to an increase in bilateral aid.3

When compared to other DAC donors, Canada falls in the middle interms of the concentration of ODA disbursements. In 1997-98, thetop five destination countries received 20.5 percent of Canada’sallocable ODA and the top 10 countries received 33.6 percent. Bycomparison, the top five countries received 31.4 percent of theUnited States’ ODA in 1998, and the top 10, 37 percent. Sweden,on the other hand, disbursed only 11.9 percent of its ODA to thetop five countries and 18.8 percent to the top 10 in the same year.

1 These figures are slightly different from (and suggest a less dramatic decline than)those for the calendar years which were 0.34% in 1997 and 0.29% in 1998 (seeTable 1).

2 The “large country effect” refers to the depressing effect on per capita measures thatoccurs when a country with a large population is included. This is because, evenwhen that country receives large amounts of ODA, the sheer size of its populationcauses per capita measures to be low. That same population size also means that thecountry’s statistic has a strong effect on the weighted average (i.e., it causes a largedownward bias).

3 Poland receives the largest amount of assistance from Canada, but official financialflows to Poland do not qualify as ODA, hence that country is not considered in thecomparison (see “Technical Notes”).

T A B L E 3 C A N A D I A N O F F I C I A L D E V E L O P M E N T A S S I S T A N C E : B A S I C D ATA ( 1 9 9 7 - 9 8 )

0.00

0.10

0.20

0.30

0.40

0.50

0.60

Canada DAC Median Total DAC

1984 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 19981986

Perc

ent

of G

NP

Figure 3.1

Fifteen Year Trend in ODA Disbursements(Canada and the DAC)

S TAT I S T I C S 2 0 0 0 53

AFRICAAlgeria 2.56 3.91 (4.1) 8 0.47 3.03Angola 2.30 3.75 (4.8) 14 3.92 6.22Benin 5.86 1.98 11.5 9 7.53 13.39 35Botswana 1.06 10.42 (20.4) 10 1.32 2.38Burkina Faso 10.98 16.00 (3.7) 9 6.92 17.90 27Burundi 3.22 2.18 4.0 10 4.94 8.16Cameroon 41.99 18.59 8.5 5 4.23 46.22 6Cape Verde 0.33 0.49 (3.9) 15 1.04 1.37Central African Republic 0.36 1.39 (12.6) 6 2.19 2.55Chad 0.41 0.94 (8.0) 7 10.36 10.77 42Comoros 0 0.78 ~ ~ 1.02 1.02Congo-Brazzaville 5.50 0.54 26.1 3 4.04 9.54 48Congo-Kinshasa (Zaire) 13.48 26.92 (6.7) 9 0.99 14.47 32Côte d’Ivoire 7.25 12.09 (5.0) 7 35.53 42.78 9Djibouti 0.15 0.15 0.0 6 1.19 1.34Egypt 23.84 46.70 (6.5) 8 5.83 29.67 18Equatorial Guinea 0.12 0.18 (4.0) 4 0.07 0.19Eritrea 1.94 na ~ 11 0.58 2.52Ethiopia 14.78 42.97 (10.1) 10 23.60 38.38 10Gabon 2.93 3.99 (3.0) 2 0.52 3.45Gambia 0.47 1.31 (9.7) 10 1.81 2.28Ghana 26.63 31.77 (1.7) 7 18.57 45.20 8Guinea 14.64 8.31 5.8 5 4.10 18.74 26Guinea-Bissau 0.33 1.06 (11.0) 12 2.70 3.03Kenya 10.89 32.81 (10.4) 9 18.10 28.99 19Lesotho 0.73 5.36 (18.1) 13 1.97 2.70Liberia 0.52 0.73 (3.3) ~ 0.29 0.81Libya 0 0 ~ ~ 0 0Madagascar 0.71 11.24 (24.1) 14 6.97 7.68Malawi 10.38 8.75 1.7 7 11.11 21.49 25Mali 17.59 19.40 (1.0) 6 12.30 29.89 17Mauritania 1.86 5.93 (10.9) 8 6.81 8.67Mauritius 0.18 0.42 (8.1) 7 0.78 0.96Morocco 6.09 18.98 (10.7) 7 1.40 7.49Mozambique 22.53 21.18 0.6 14 14.70 37.23 12Namibia 1.08 0.23 16.7 17 0.71 1.79Niger 2.24 25.17 (21.5) 11 5.25 7.49Nigeria 1.53 4.87 (10.9) 8 5.16 6.69Rwanda 18.86 9.48 7.1 3 6.35 25.21 23São Tomé and Principe 0.13 0.09 3.7 7 0.75 0.88Senegal 23.57 32.85 (3.3) 5 14.44 38.01 11Seychelles 0.24 0.25 (0.4) 8 1.00 1.24Sierra Leone 3.20 1.77 6.1 3 7.40 10.60 43Somalia 0.65 0.63 0.3 13 0.60 1.25South Africa 16.44 5.76 11.1 10 0.40 16.84 29Sudan 5.32 18.01 (11.5) 9 2.60 7.92Swaziland 0.55 2.45 (13.9) 6 0.19 0.74Tanzania 10.29 38.72 (12.4) 13 21.37 31.66 13Togo 0.81 2.79 (11.6) 10 3.49 4.30Tunisia 3.65 7.84 (7.4) 8 0.64 4.29Uganda 5.62 8.65 (4.2) 13 21.61 27.23 22Zambia 19.61 32.76 (5.0) 10 8.76 28.37 20Zimbabwe 9.00 17.49 (6.4) 10 1.58 10.58 44Regional Africa 49.45 76.09 (4.2) na 9.42 58.87Sub-Saharan Africa subtotal 388.71 569.69 (3.8) 9 321.28 709.99Total Africaa 424.85 647.12 (4.1) 9 329.62 754.47

Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

T A B L E 3 C A N A D I A N O F F I C I A L D E V E L O P M E N T A S S I S T A N C E : B A S I C D A T A ( 1 9 9 7 - 9 8 )

(In millions of Canadian dollars) Bilateral

Tota

l Bi

late

ral

(all

sour

ces)

199

7-98

Tota

l Bi

late

ral

(all

sour

ces)

198

7-88

Perc

ent

Chan

ge

Per

Year

198

8-98

Rank

of

Cana

da A

mon

gDA

C Bi

late

ral

Dono

rs i

nRe

cipi

ent

Coun

try

(199

7)

Tota

l M

ulti

late

ral

(all

agen

cies

) 19

97-9

8

Tota

l Ca

nadi

an A

id

(all

sour

ces)

199

7-98

Rank

of

Reci

pien

t Co

untr

y fo

r To

tal

Cana

dian

Aid

(inc

ludi

ng m

ulti

late

ral)

(if

in t

op 5

0) 1

997-

98

➤

54

AMERICASAntigua and Barbuda 0.20 0.90 (14.0) 3 0.94 1.14Argentina 1.25 2.63 (7.2) 5 5.40 6.65Belize 0.26 5.71 (26.6) 4 0.40 0.66Bolivia 7.87 6.52 1.9 11 22.31 30.18 15Brazil 5.83 8.23 (3.4) 9 7.46 13.29 36Chile 2.48 5.75 (8.1) 10 0.43 2.91Colombia (3.40) 14.40 ~ ~ 6.22 2.82Costa Rica 1.58 21.56 (23.0) 9 0.57 2.15Cuba 10.76 0.09 61.3 3 0.21 10.97 41Dominica 1.11 1.95 (5.5) 3 0.93 2.04Dominican Republic 0.69 3.19 (14.2) 9 1.55 2.24Ecuador 5.24 2.71 6.8 12 3.50 8.74El Salvador 7.41 8.00 (0.8) 6 2.26 9.67 47Grenada 0.07 6.40 (36.3) 5 0.41 0.48Guatemala 7.42 2.71 10.6 10 1.69 9.11 50Guyana 5.21 3.23 4.9 5 8.67 13.88 34Haiti 41.60 15.49 10.4 2 9.53 51.13 5Honduras 8.64 7.87 0.9 6 7.97 16.61 30Jamaica 5.85 35.96 (16.6) 3 0.88 6.73Mexico 4.00 2.74 3.9 7 0.77 4.77Nicaragua 6.42 15.27 (8.3) 11 9.22 15.64 31Panama 1.01 1.02 (0.1) 4 1.26 2.27Paraguay 0.35 0.74 (7.2) 10 1.45 1.80Peru 22.76 27.93 (2.0) 7 7.87 30.63 14St Kitts and Nevis 0.02 1.62 (35.6) 4 0.14 0.16St Lucia 0.41 3.46 (19.2) 4 0.21 0.62St Vincent/Grenadines 0.03 2.63 (36.1) 4 0.29 0.32Suriname 0.22 0.03 22.0 4 0.04 0.26Trinidad and Tobago 0.49 0.29 5.4 4 0.32 0.81Uruguay 1.47 2.39 (4.7) 5 0.63 2.10Venezuela 0.89 0.15 19.5 5 0.39 1.28Regional Caribbean 13.88 ~ ~ na 0 13.88Regional Latin America 17.26 ~ ~ na 2.11 19.37Other Americas 4.69 ~ ~ ~ 3.21 7.90Total Americas 183.97 211.57 (1.4) 6 109.24 293.21

ASIAAfghanistan 9.71 0.20 47.4 3 2.45 12.16 40Armenia 0.10 na na 12 12.24 12.34 39Azerbaijan 0.06 na na 10 1.37 1.43Bahrain 0 ~ ~ ~ 0 0Bangladesh 65.76 133.45 (6.8) 4 32.07 97.83 1Bhutan 0.36 0.63 (5.4) 10 0.47 0.83Burma (Myanmar) 0.08 1.41 (24.9) 9 0.96 1.04Cambodia 4.69 0 ~ 10 5.00 9.69 46China 49.06 42.76 1.4 6 39.84 88.90 2Georgia 0.04 na na 14 17.76 17.80 28India 22.44 76.15 (11.5) 10 37.42 59.86 3Indonesia 25.13 48.66 (6.4) 7 3.07 28.20 21Iran 0.15 ~ ~ 15 0.95 1.10Iraq 0 0.03 (100.0) 12 1.81 1.81Jordan 3.47 6.37 (5.9) 8 5.81 9.28 49Kazakhstan 0.78 na na 8 0.43 1.21Kuwait 0 0 ~ ~ 0 0Kyrghzstan 0.14 na na 14 7.56 7.70Laos 0.86 0.02 45.7 12 7.83 8.69Lebanon 3.55 5.18 (3.7) 6 3.33 6.88Malaysia 5.16 4.67 1.0 4 0.74 5.90Maldives 0.22 0 ~ 6 0.50 0.72

Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Bilateral

Tota

l Bi

late

ral

(all

sour

ces)

199

7-98

Tota

l Bi

late

ral

(all

sour

ces)

198

7-88

Perc

ent

Chan

ge

Per

Year

198

8-98

Rank

of

Cana

da A

mon

gDA

C Bi

late

ral

Dono

rs i

nRe

cipi

ent

Coun

try

(199

7)

Tota

l M

ulti

late

ral

(all

agen

cies

) 19

97-9

8

Tota

l Ca

nadi

an A

id

(all

sour

ces)

199

7-98

Rank

of

Reci

pien

t Co

untr

y fo

r To

tal

Cana

dian

Aid

(inc

ludi

ng m

ulti

late

ral)

(if

in t

op 5

0) 1

997-

98

Table 3 (continued)

➤

S TAT I S T I C S 2 0 0 0 55

Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Bilateral

Tota

l Bi

late

ral

(all

sour

ces)

199

7-98

Tota

l Bi

late

ral

(all

sour

ces)

198

7-88

Perc

ent

Chan

ge

Per

Year

198

8-98

Rank

of

Cana

da A

mon

gDA

C Bi

late

ral

Dono

rs i

nRe

cipi

ent

Coun

try

(199

7)

Tota

l M

ulti

late

ral

(all

agen

cies

) 19

97-9

8

Tota

l Ca

nadi

an A

id

(all

sour

ces)

199

7-98

Rank

of

Reci

pien

t Co

untr

y fo

r To

tal

Cana

dian

Aid

(inc

ludi

ng m

ulti

late

ral)

(if

in t

op 5

0) 1

997-

98

ASIA (continued)

Mongolia 0.35 0.10 13.3 13 3.58 3.93Nepal 7.85 15.49 (6.6) 11 6.26 14.11 33North Korea 5.60 0 ~ 6 4.76 10.36 45Oman 0 0 ~ ~ 0 0Pakistan 12.08 45.87 (12.5) 4 33.24 45.32 7Papua New Guinea 0.17 2.26 (22.8) 8 0.74 0.91Philippines 21.32 29.66 (3.2) 8 3.83 25.15 24Qatar 0 0 ~ ~ 0 0Saudi Arabia 0 0 ~ ~ 0.94 0.94Sri Lanka 2.21 37.46 (24.7) 9 10.53 12.74 38Syria 0.22 0.83 (12.4) 9 2.17 2.39Tajikistan 0.65 na ~ 14 1.09 1.74Thailand 12.07 40.15 (11.3) 5 0.86 12.93 37Turkey (1.72) (0.86) 7.2 13 0.45 (1.27)Turkmenistan 0 na na ~ 0.07 0.07United Arab Emirates 0 0 ~ ~ 0 0Uzbekistan 0.02 na na 10 0.20 0.22Vietnam 18.06 0 ~ 9 41.11 59.17 4West Bank and Gaza 7.76 0.83 25.0 12 na 7.76Yemen 0.26 0.41 (4.5) 8 4.04 4.30Oceania 5.17 4.44 1.5 8 4.16 9.33Asia Regional 23.15 14.88 4.5 na 6.49 29.64Other Asia 6.67 0.13 48.3 ~ 12.08 18.75Total Asia 313.65 511.18 (4.8) 6 318.21 631.86

EASTERN EUROPEAlbania 0.03 ~ ~ 14 1.31 1.34Belarus 0 na na na na 0Bosnia Herzegovina ~ na na 9 na ~Bulgaria 0.04 ~ ~ 14 na 0.04Croatia ~ ~ ~ 11 ~ ~Czech Republic 1.85 na na 7 na 1.85Estonia 0.48 na na na na 0.48Hungary 2.35 na na na na 2.35Latvia 0.78 na na na na 0.78Lithuania 0.80 na na na na 0.80Macedonia, FYR ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Moldova 0.01 na na na 4.92 4.93Poland 167.00 na na na na 167.00Romania 2.96 na na na na 2.96Russian Federation 18.42 na na na na 18.42Slovak Republic 1.11 na na na na 1.11Slovenia ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Ukraine 17.27 na na na na 17.27Ex-Yugoslavia 14.80 ~ ~ ~ 15.16 29.96 16Other Europe 0.03 0 ~ ~ 0.21 0.24Total Eastern Europe 14.86 0 ~ ~ 16.68 31.54

Total Allocated 937.33 1,369.87 (3.7) 773.75 1,711.08Countries not Specified 260.57 143.19 6.2 127.25 387.82Unallocable by Country 420.71 159.82 10.2 0 420.71

Total Developing Countries 1,618.61 1,672.88 (0.3) 901.00 2,519.61Of which:LLDCs 328.04 501.03 (4.1) 10 279.88 607.92Other Low Income Countries 221.79 410.91 (6.0) 9 241.40 463.19Remaining Countries 387.50 457.93 (1.7) 11 252.47 639.97

Notes: Bold-italicized countries are not included in Canadian aid totals (see Technical Notes).a Due to rounding, column totals may not match row totals.

Sources: CIDA, Statistical Report 1997-98; CIDA, Annual Report 1987-88; OECD, Geographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients, 1993-97.

56

Canada’s bilateral aid is the part of total ODA that is disburseddirectly by the Government of Canada to developing-country gov-ernments, institutions, or individuals, or to Canadian institutionsengaged in various types of international development activity. AsTable 4 shows, approximately one-third of bilateral ODA was directgovernment-to-government aid in 1997-98. The other two-thirdswas channeled through a plethora of governmental and nongovern-mental organizations (NGOs) and directed at both governmentaland nongovernmental institutions and individuals. The CanadianInternational Development Agency (CIDA) is the most activeinstitution in the delivery of bilateral aid (both government-to-government assistance and, through its Partnership Branch, aidthrough other institutions). However, other government depart-ments such as the Department of Finance and the Department ofForeign Affairs and International Trade also disburse ODA, as dospecialist agencies such as the International Development ResearchCentre and the International Centre for Human Rights andDemocratic Development.

Beyond administrative costs, most of the spending classified asgovernment-to-government ODA makes its way into developingcountries in the form of goods (food aid), services (technical assis-tance), or financial flows. But not all government-to-governmentODA makes its way to developing countries. The part of debt reliefthat is used to write off non-performing loans, for instance, has no material impact in developing economies: a large part of debtrelief falls in that category.1 Similarly, assistance to developing-country refugees living in Canada has no material impact on developing countries—that spending accounted for 8.7 percent of bilateral ODA in 1998.2

Two-thirds of Canadian bilateral aid is tied (i.e., it is conditionalon the purchase of Canadian goods or services). While this form ofassistance is justified by its impact on the Canadian economythrough the creation of export demand, it has no positive impacton developing economies. Moreover, it can have significant delete-rious effects. When the goods and services purchased are pricedhigher than the lowest cost alternative, for example, each aiddollar purchases less than it could. When the purchases are notthe most appropriate, project results are compromised.

It is clear from Figure 4.1 that the allocation of Canada’s bilateralaid, by type, differed substantially from the DAC (weighted) aver-age for 1998.3 Canada has been providing its ODA wholly in theform of grants since 1987, but in 1998 the DAC countries, as agroup, still provided 7.8 percent of their aid in the form of loans,equity acquisition, etc.4 Canada also allocated a smaller propor-tion of its aid to projects, programs, and technical assistance andmore to food aid, emergency relief, and support to NGOs than theDAC average, exhibiting more balance in its distribution of ODAfunds. However, with respect to development education, Canadawas exactly at the DAC average (0.2 percent of bilateral aid). Thisrather meagre level of funding for development education isinadequate if Canada and other DAC countries hope to make theircitizens more aware of the need for, and importance of, develop-ment assistance within the larger spectrum of financial flows in anincreasingly global economy.

In 1997-98 Canada’s bilateral aid, in terms of its allocation bycountry income group, was quite regressive when compared to the allocation of total ODA. The Least Developed Countries (LLDCs)received just slightly more than one-third of allocable bilateral aid(a similar proportion to that for total ODA), but the other lowincome countries (OLICs) received only 23.7 percent of allocablebilateral aid (much less than the proportion of total ODAreceived). The other developing countries (ODCs) received41.3 percent. This translates into per capita bilateral aid of $0.54 to LLDCs, $0.08 to OLICs, and $0.35 to ODCs. When Chinaand India are excluded (to reduce the “large country” effects),per capita bilateral aid to OLICs increases to only $0.22, still wellbelow the level of aid provided to the better-off ODCs.5

The 10 most favoured destination countries for Canadiangovernment-to-government aid in 1997-98, in order of preference,were: Bangladesh, Cameroon, China, Haiti, Ghana, Mozambique,Indonesia, Egypt, Senegal, and Zambia. This group is not verydifferent from the top 10 group for overall aid disbursements; infact, five of these countries are in both groups. It is even less dif-ferent from the top 10 group for 1996-97—seven of the 10 coun-tries carried over from the previous year. Cameroon, Mozambique,and Zambia are new to that group, replacing Côte d’Ivoire, Peru,and the Philippines.

The concentration of government-to-government aid by countrywas, however, significantly stronger than for overall ODA. The top five countries received 26.6 percent of allocable government-to-government aid, and the top 10, 39.4 percent (see the analysisfor Table 3 for comparison). This degree of concentration was,nevertheless, an improvement over that for the previous year when the top five countries received 35.1 percent of total allocablegovernment-to-government aid and the top 10, 46.2 percent.

1 However, if debt relief is sufficient to eliminate the debt overhang (that part of thedebt that cannot be repaid), then the economic impact can be significant. SeeJohn Serieux, “Reducing the Debt of the Poorest: Challenges and Opportunities”,(Ottawa, The North-South Institute, November 1999) (mimeo).

2 Using annual data.3 The calendar year was used here because of absence of comparable fiscal year data for

the DAC countries.4 The negative amount of nongrant aid for Canada reflects loan repayments.5 See Table 3, Footnote 2.

T A B L E 4 C A N A D I A N B I L AT E R A L A I D BY C H A N N E L A N D BY C O U N T R Y ( 1 9 9 7 - 9 8 )

Figure 4.1

Allocation of Bilateral Aid(Canada and the DAC)

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S TAT I S T I C S 2 0 0 0 57

T A B L E 4 C A N A D I A N B I L A T E R A L O F F I C I A L D E V E L O P M E N T A S S I S T A N C EB Y C H A N N E L A N D B Y C O U N T R Y ( 1 9 9 7 - 9 8 )

(In millions of Canadian dollars) Partnership Branch

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AFRICAAlgeria 2.18 0 0 0.01 0 0.36 0 0 0 0 2.56Angola 0.28 0 0 0 0.02 0 1.86 0.13 0 0 2.30Benin 5.32 0 0.03 0 0 0.03 0 0.51 0 0 5.86Botswana 0.92 0 0 0 0 0.03 0 0.01 0 0.10 1.06Burkina Faso 8.85 25 0 0 0.31 0.12 0.85 0 0.84 0 0 10.98Burundi 0.36 0 0 0 0 0 2.84 0 0.02 0 3.22Cameroon 41.76 2 0 30.14 0.10 0.04 0.06 0 0.01 0 0.02 41.99Cape Verde 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.33Central African Republic 0.36 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.36Chad 0.37 0 0 0 0 0.04 0 0 0 0 0.41Comoros 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Congo-Brazzaville 4.86 0 4.73 0 0 0.14 0.50 0 0 0 5.50Congo-Kinshasa (Zaire) 5.44 0 0 0 0.49 0 7.47 0 0.09 0 13.48Côte d’Ivoire 5.52 0 0 0 0.11 1.06 0 0.57 0 0 7.25Djibouti 0.15 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.15Egypt 20.49 8 1.99 0 0 0.13 3.11 0 0.10 0 0 23.84Equatorial Guinea 0.12 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.12Eritrea 1.90 0 0 0 0 0.02 0 0.03 0.01 0 1.94Ethiopia 14.36 15 9.64 0 0.01 0.05 0 0.17 0.20 0 0 14.78Gabon 2.93 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2.93Gambia 0.30 0 0 0.01 0.10 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.47Ghana 25.58 5 7.01 0 0.36 0.24 0 0 0.23 0 0.21 26.63Guinea 13.77 17 0 0 0.15 0 0.59 0.10 0.02 0 0 14.64Guinea-Bissau 0.33 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.33Kenya 9.09 24 2.97 0 0.24 0.17 0.03 0.29 0.78 0.07 0.21 10.89Lesotho 0.36 0 0 0 0.31 0 0 0 0 0.06 0.73Liberia 0 0 0 0.02 0 0 0.50 0 0 0 0.52Libya 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Madagascar 0.61 0 0 0.01 0.08 0 0 0 0 0 0.71Malawi 9.81 22 1.09 0 0.15 0.10 0 0 0.24 0 0.08 10.38Mali 17.09 13 1 0 0.01 0 0.12 0 0.36 0 0 17.59Mauritania 1.06 0 0 0 0 0.8 0 0 0 0 1.86Mauritius 0.11 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.07 0.18Morocco 4.87 0 0 0.20 0 0.83 0 0.19 0 0 6.09Mozambique 21.33 6 5.34 0 0.06 0.19 0.09 0.12 0.74 0 0 22.53Namibia 0.66 0 0 0.15 0 0.10 0.14 0 0 0.02 1.08Niger 2.23 0.02 0 0 0.02 0 0 0 0 0 2.24Nigeria 0.67 0 0 0.24 0 0 0 0.35 0.06 0.21 1.53Rwanda 9.73 23 0 0 0 0 0 8.97 0.12 0.05 0 18.86São Tomé and Principe 0.13 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.13Senegal 20.41 9 0 0.04 0 0.43 1.07 0 1.67 0 0 23.57Seychelles 0.21 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0.24Sierra Leone 2.27 2.23 0 0.23 0 0 0.60 0 0 0.10 3.20Somalia 0.25 0 0 0 0 0 0.40 0 0 0 0.65South Africa 11.64 19 0 0 0.11 0.24 1.39 0.45 2.53 0 0.08 16.44Sudan 0.35 0 0 0 0 0 4.97 0 0 0 5.32Swaziland 0.48 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.08 0.55Tanzania 7.62 28 0 0 0.15 0.03 0.31 0.98 1.01 0 0.19 10.29Togo 0.44 0 0 0 0.01 0.28 0 0.06 0.03 0 0.81Tunisia 3.18 0 0 0.01 0 0.47 0 0 0 0 3.65Uganda 3.47 0 0 0.01 0.43 0.13 0.95 0.51 0 0.12 5.62Zambia 19.25 10 0.01 9.09 0 0.06 0.17 0 0.03 0 0.10 19.61Zimbabwe 8.35 26 0.03 0 0 0.01 0.05 0 0.34 0 0.25 9.00Regional Africa 44.75 0 0 0.47 0.11 0 0.65 3.40 0.08 0 49.45Sub-Saharan Africa subtotal 326.18 29.34 44.03 2.79 3.36 7.36 31.96 14.69 0.41 1.98 388.71Total Africaa 356.90 31.33 44.03 3.01 3.49 12.13 31.96 14.98 0.41 1.98 424.85

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AMERICASAntigua and Barbuda 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.20 0 0 0.02 0.22Argentina 0.26 0 0 0.04 0 0.61 0 0.34 0 0 1.25Belize 0.20 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.05 0.26Bolivia 7.23 30 0 0 0 0.02 0.28 0 0.33 0 0 7.87Brazil 2.91 0 0 1.13 0.43 0.82 0 0.55 0 0 5.83Chile (0.18) 0 0 0.34 0.19 1.12 0 0.97 0.03 0 2.48Colombia (5.71) 0 0 0 0 0.92 1.00 0.39 0 0 (3.40)Costa Rica 0.50 0 0 0.09 0.09 0.49 0 0.42 0 0 1.58Cuba 8.08 27 4.79 0 1.02 0.31 1.33 0 0.02 0 0 10.76Dominica 1.08 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.04 1.11Dominican Republic (0.09) 0 0 0 0.41 0.04 0 0.32 0 0 0.69Ecuador 4.54 3 0 0.09 0.04 0.31 0.15 0.12 0 0 5.24El Salvador 6.41 0 0 0.11 0 0.72 0 0.04 0.03 0 7.41Grenada 0 0 0 0.02 0 0.02 0 0 0 0.04 0.07Guatemala 5.43 0 0 0.01 0.41 0.33 1.09 0.09 0.06 0 7.42Guyana 4.87 0 0.45 0 0.08 0 0.20 (0.04) 0 0.11 5.21Haiti 38.21 4 17.21 0 0.79 1.66 0.48 0.30 0.08 0.09 0 41.60Honduras 6.87 0 0 0.17 0.15 1.43 0 0.02 0 0 8.64Jamaica 5.32 0 0 0.02 0.33 0.02 0 0 0 0.17 5.85Mexico 0.47 0 0 0.58 0.11 2.22 0.06 0.48 0.08 0 4.00Nicaragua 5.55 0 0 0.07 0.16 0.31 0 0.35 0 0 6.42Panama 0.28 0 0 0 0.07 0.65 0 0 0 0 1.01Paraguay 0.23 0 0 0 0.03 0 0 0.09 0 0 0.35Peru 18.74 12 1.95 0 0.23 0.13 1.27 0.50 1.78 0.13 0 22.76St Kitts and Nevis 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.02 0.02St Lucia 0.27 0 0 0 0 0.10 0 0 0 0.04 0.41St Vincent/Grenadines 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.03 0.03Suriname 0.20 0 0 0 0 0.02 0 0 0 0 0.22Trinidad and Tobago 0.22 0 0 0.06 0 0.12 0 0 0 0.09 0.49Uruguay 0.33 0 0 0.09 0 0.62 0 0.44 0 0 1.47Venezuela 0.25 0 0 0.05 0 0.51 0 0.08 0 0 0.89Regional Caribbean 12.81 0 0 0.30 0.53 0.13 0.13 0 0 0 13.90Regional Latin America 16.1 0 0 0 0 0.06 0.42 0.69 0 0 17.27Other Americas 3.73 0 0 0.05 0 0 0.50 0.17 0.09 0.16 4.54Total Americas 151.09 26.95 0.45 5.26 5.15 14.93 4.55 7.73 0.51 0.77 183.87

ASIAAfghanistan 4.81 4.21 0 0 0 0 4.90 0 0 0 9.71Armenia 0.04 0 0 0.04 0 0 0.03 0 0 0 0.10Azerbaijan 0.06 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.06Bahrain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Bangladesh 64.92 1 27.99 0 0 0.11 0.17 0 0.23 0 0.34 65.76Bhutan 0.35 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0.36Burma (Myanmar) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.08 0 0.08Cambodia 1.48 0 0 0.24 0.04 0 1.84 1.08 0 0 4.69China 41.64 3 0 0 0.98 0.01 5.81 0.05 0.57 0 0 49.06Georgia 0.04 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.04India 15.58 14 9.64 0 0 2.02 2.37 0.30 1.52 0 0 22.44Indonesia 21.22 7 0.97 0 0.17 0 3.23 0.30 0.17 0.04 0 25.13Iran 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.15 0 0 0 0.15Iraq 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Jordan 2.53 0 0 0.23 0 0.43 0 0.27 0 0 3.47Kazakhstan 0.78 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.78Kuwait 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Kyrghzstan 0.14 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.14Laos 0.24 0 0 0 0.18 0.21 0 0.23 0 0 0.86Lebanon 1.88 0 0 0.18 0.02 0.21 1.18 0.07 0 0 3.55Malaysia 2.16 0 0 0.10 0.06 2.84 0 0 0 0 5.16Maldives 0.04 0 0 0 0 0.18 0 0 0 0 0.22Mongolia 0.18 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.16 0 0 0.35

Partnership BranchTable 4 (continued)

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S TAT I S T I C S 2 0 0 0 59

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Nepal 6.22 0.35 0 0.01 0.63 0.56 0 0.43 0 0 7.85North Korea 5.60 5.60 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 5.60Oman 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Pakistan 10.52 20 0.90 0 0 0.07 0.28 0.60 0.13 0.07 0.42 12.08Papua New Guinea 0 0 0 0 0.06 0 0.07 0 0 0.04 0.17Philippines 19.08 11 2 0 0.04 0.16 1.34 0.06 0.65 0 0 21.32Qatar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Saudi Arabia 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Sri Lanka 0.14 0 0 0.14 0 0.37 1.20 0.12 0 0.25 2.21Syria 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.22 0 0 0.22Tajikistan 0.65 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.65Thailand 9.88 21 0 0 0 0.09 1.10 0.58 0.34 0.09 0 12.07Turkey (2.04) 0 0 0 0 0.32 0 0 0 0 (1.72)Turkmenistan 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0United Arab Emirates 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Uzbekistan 0.02 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.02Vietnam 14.22 16 0 0 1.56 0.21 1.01 0.10 0.96 0 0 18.06West Bank and Gaza 7.40 29 0 0 0 0.04 0.30 0 0.02 0 0 7.76Yemen 0.15 0 0 0.03 0 0.03 0 0.05 0 0 0.26Oceania 5.09 0 0 0.02 0.01 0 0 0 0 0.04 5.16Asia Regional 19.03 0 0 0.47 0 0 0 3.42 0.22 0 23.15Other Asia 4.01 0 0 0 0 0 2.15 0.51 0 0 6.67Total Asia 258.06 51.66 0 4.21 3.71 20.76 13.51 11.16 0.50 1.09 313.64

EASTERN EUROPEAlbania 0.02 0 0 0 0.01 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.03Belarus 0 na na na na na na na 0 na na 0Bosnia Herzegovina 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Bulgaria 0.04 na na na 0.01 na na na 0.04 na na 0.04Croatia ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Czech Republic 1.85 na na na na na na na na na na 1.85Estonia 0.48 na na na na na na na na na na 0.48Hungary 2.35 na na na na na na na na na na 2.35Latvia 0.78 na na na na na na na na na na 0.78Lithuania 0.79 na na na na 0.01 na na na na na 0.80Macedonia, FYR ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Moldova 0.01 na na na na na na na na na na 0.01Poland 167.00 na na 163.52 na na na na na na na 167.00Romania 2.96 na na na 0 na na na na na na 2.96Russian Federation 18.30 na na na na na na 0.12 na na na 18.42Slovak Republic 1.11 na na na na na na na na na na 1.11Slovenia ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Ukraine 17.20 na na na 0.05 na na 0.02 0 na na 17.27Ex-Yugoslavia 13.08 18 0 0 0.24 0 0 1.49 0 0 0 14.80Other Europe (0.03) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.06 0.03Total Eastern Europe 13.07 0 0 0.25 0 0 1.49 0 0 0.06 14.86

Country not Specified 25.15 10.82 0 62.47 118.71 1.35 4.00 43.74 3.26 1.90 260.57Refugee Costs in Canada na na na na na na na na na na na 155.25Scholarships na na na na na na na na na na na 8.40Imputed Foreign Student Costs na na na na na na na na na na na 53.72Administrative Costs na na na na na na na na na na na 156.64Other (See Technical Notes) na na na na na na na na na na na 46.70Total not Allocable by Country 420.71

Total Developing Countries 804.27 120.76 44.48 75.20 131.06 49.17 55.51 77.61 4.68 5.80 1,618.50Of which:LLDCs 270.67 69.09 9.12 2.21 4.64 5.09 36.97 6.92 0.37 1.18 328.03Other Low Income Countries 185.44 23.51 0.45 3.93 3.25 18.00 3.04 5.60 0.24 1.66 221.79Remaining Countries 323.01 17.34 34.91 6.59 4.46 24.73 11.50 21.35 0.81 1.06 387.40

Notes: Bold-italicized countries are not included in Canadian aid totals (see Technical Notes).a Due to rounding, column totals may not match row totals.

Source: CIDA, Statistical Report 1997-98.

Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Multilateral official development assistance (ODA) is disbursedthrough institutions such as the World Bank Group and UnitedNations agencies. In choosing this route, Canada cedes some controlover the nature and targeting of its ODA, but that transfer is neverabsolute: Canada retains a voice in decisions regarding the allocationand targeting of its multilateral ODA through its participation in thegoverning bodies of the disbursing multilateral institutions.

Canada gains several advantages by allowing some of its ODA to be channeled through multilateral institutions. As a donor, it is able to employ the informational and jurisdictional advantages that these institutions have in targeting and managing their ODA.Perhaps more important, participation in these institutions raisesCanada’s profile and influence in forums where important decisionsare taken regarding the present and future development of theglobal economy, and its effects on Canada and other countries.

Although there is significant overlap in the roles played by multi-lateral institutions in the delivery of aid, there is some division oflabour among them. Aid delivered by the World Bank Group, theInternational Monetary Fund (IMF), and the regional developmentbanks is generally delivered in the form of loans, with varyingdegrees of concessionality, and is mainly justified by economiccriteria. The most concessional loans (offering a 40-year repaymentperiod, a 10-year grace period, and a zero interest rate) are directedat the poorest countries and come from the InternationalDevelopment Association (IDA)—a member of the World Bank Group. Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) loans from theIMF are directed at the same group of countries but are less conces-sional. Loans from the International Bank for Reconstruction andDevelopment (IBRD), another member of the World Bank Group, are generally directed at middle income countries and are even less concessional.

Financial assistance from the regional development banks variesfrom grants to loans at nearly commercial terms, depending on thenature of the loan, the source of funds, and the recipient. The UNagencies almost invariably provide grant-based aid, with both eco-nomic and noneconomic objectives that vary from agency to agency.That aid more often takes the form of technical assistance, research,and information than financial assistance. The other multilateralinstitutions that dispense aid (e.g., The Commonwealth Fund forTechnical Co-operation and L'Agence intergouvernementale de laFrancophonie) also tend to specialize in grant-based aid, but it more often takes the form of advocacy and technical support forspecific initiatives.

The allocation of multilateral aid by region is quite different fromthat for bilateral aid and overall ODA. Africa received the largestamount of allocable Canadian multilateral ODA in 1997-98 ($330 million or 42.6 percent of the total). Asia was a close second,receiving 41.1 percent ($318 million). The remainder was dividedbetween the Americas ($109 million or 14.4 percent) and EasternEurope ($16 million or 2.1 percent). The regional distribution ofmultilateral aid in 1997-98 does not represent a significant changefrom the previous year. However, there has been a net increase in

multilateral aid for all regions, from an increase of more than$10 million for Asia (the highest) to $500,000 for Eastern Europe(the lowest).

Figure 5.1 shows how the different institutional groups allocatedtheir aid by region on a per capita basis. The international financialinstitutions showed a marked preference for Africa, disbursing$0.33 per capita to that region. This is because most IDA- and PRGF-eligible countries are in that continent. Eastern Europe received thesecond highest per capita allocation at $0.23, reflecting the activi-ties of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. TheUN agencies, as a group, were even less even-handed in their dis-bursement of aid. They provided more than four times as much ODAper capita ($0.43) to Eastern Europe than to any other region. The other multilateral agencies, reflecting their smaller budgets, providedmuch less aid per capita than the other groups of institutions, andmost of that went to Africa and the Americas. Noticeably, per capitaODA levels for China and India were small (even though the absoluteamounts were not) because of their large populations.

The division of per capita multilateral aid by income group was quite similar to that for total aid. The Least Developed Countries(LLDCs), other low income countries (OLICs), and other developingcountries (ODCs), received close to equal amounts of Canada’s multi-lateral ODA (36 percent, 31.5 percent, and 32.5 percent, respec-tively). In per capita terms, however, the rates of funding were verydifferent: the LLDCs received $0.46 while the OLICs received only$0.08, much less than the ODCs ($0.23), which have significantlyhigher per capita incomes. This apparently low funding rate for theOLICs is largely due to the country-size effects of China and India.1

When these countries are excluded, multilateral ODA is $0.24 percapita, still less than the LLDCs but slightly more than the ODCs.

1 See Table 3, Footnote 2.

60

T A B L E 5 C A N A D I A N M U LT I L AT E R A L O D A BY A G E N C Y A N D BY C O U N T R Y ( 1 9 9 7 - 9 8 )

$0.00

$0.10

$0.20

$0.30

$0.40

$0.50

$0.60

$0.70

E. EuropeAmericasOther AsiaChina-IndiaAfrica

International Financial Institutions

UN Agencies

Other Multilateral Channels

Figure 5.1

Per Capita Distribution of Canadian Multilateral Aid(by channel and by region)

S TAT I S T I C S 2 0 0 0 61

AFRICAAlgeria 0 0 0 0 0.44 0 0.02 0.02 0.40 0.02 0.46Angola 1.19 1.17 0 0.02 2.05 0.06 0.13 0.29 1.57 0.70 3.94Benin 7.05 1.25 3.70 2.10 0.44 0 0.18 0.04 0.22 0.04 7.53Botswana 0.31 0 0 0.31 0.17 0 0.10 0.02 0.05 0.84 1.32Burkina Faso 5.02 1.56 1.79 1.67 0.55 0 0.21 0.08 0.26 1.34 6.91Burundi 2.04 0.53 0 1.51 2.55 0 0.13 0.13 2.29 0.35 4.94Cameroon 2.67 2.62 0 0.05 0.28 0 0.03 0.03 0.22 1.30 4.25Cape Verde 0.77 0.23 0 0.54 0.09 0 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.17 1.03Central African Republic 0 0 0 0 1.36 1.36 0 0 0 0.82 2.18Chad 9.00 2.11 4.49 2.40 0.34 0 0.15 0.06 0.13 1.01 10.35Comoros 0.20 0.20 0 0 0.20 0 0.05 0.01 0.14 0.63 1.03Congo-Brazzaville 3.84 0.06 3.78 0 0.14 0 0.01 0.02 0.11 0.06 4.04Congo-Kinshasa (Zaire) 0.01 0 0 0.01 0.62 0 0.25 0.18 0.19 0.38 1.01Côte d’Ivoire 34.73 7.26 25.91 1.56 0.48 0 0.03 0.04 0.41 0.31 35.52Djibouti 0.92 0.04 0 0.88 0.11 0 0.03 0.02 0.06 0.16 1.19Egypt 3.89 2.54 0 1.35 1.81 0 0.33 0.10 1.38 0.13 5.83Equatorial Guinea 0 0 0 0 0.05 0 0.03 0.02 0 0.02 0.07Eritrea 0 0 0 0 0.59 0 0.23 0.16 0.20 0 0.59Ethiopia 15.72 4.37 3.99 7.36 7.57 5.53 1.03 0.32 0.69 0.30 23.59Gabon 0 0 0 0 0.07 0 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.43 0.50Gambia 1.33 0.31 0 1.02 0.26 0 0.08 0.02 0.16 0.21 1.80Ghana 17.32 7.53 7.46 2.33 0.78 0 0.13 0.12 0.53 0.47 18.57Guinea 2.45 1.48 0 0.97 1.14 0 0.12 0.06 0.96 0.52 4.11Guinea-Bissau 2.28 0.43 0.58 1.27 0.18 0 0.08 0.03 0.07 0.24 2.70Kenya 16.06 4.82 6.77 4.47 1.53 0.50 0.05 0.12 0.86 0.51 18.10Lesotho 1.31 0.37 0 0.94 0.24 0 0.10 0.02 0.12 0.43 1.98Liberia 0 0 0 0 0.27 0 0.10 0.09 0.08 0.02 0.29Libya 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Madagascar 6.25 2.40 3.70 0.15 0.62 0 0.21 0.08 0.33 0.10 6.97Malawi 10.02 4.37 4.16 1.49 0.91 0.10 0.30 0.14 0.37 0.19 11.12Mali 10.06 2.60 5.63 1.83 0.98 0 0.38 0.10 0.50 1.28 12.32Mauritania 6.07 1.11 3.89 1.07 0.53 0 0.13 0.05 0.35 0.20 6.80Mauritius 0.01 0 0 0.01 0.06 0 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.71 0.78Morocco 0.53 0 0 0.53 0.57 0 0.10 0.04 0.43 0.30 1.40Mozambique 13.20 6.83 3.43 2.94 1.29 0 0.51 0.26 0.52 0.20 14.69Namibia 0.22 0 0 0.22 0.41 0 0.05 0.07 0.29 0.10 0.73Niger 3.74 1.03 2.64 0.07 0.58 0 0.14 0.09 0.35 0.93 5.25Nigeria 3.49 2.79 0 0.70 1.39 0 0.65 0.26 0.48 0.28 5.16Rwanda 2.21 1.31 0 0.90 3.49 0 0.59 0.40 2.50 0.65 6.35São Tomé and Principe 0.62 0.25 0 0.37 0.10 0 0.05 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.74Senegal 11.07 3.40 6.48 1.19 1.13 0 0.09 0.09 0.95 2.25 14.45Seychelles 0.05 0 0 0.05 0.02 0 0.01 0 0.01 0.93 1.00Sierra Leone 6.31 1.09 2.78 2.44 0.58 0 0.20 0.06 0.32 0.51 7.40Somalia 0 0 0 0 0.52 0 0.25 0.25 0.02 0.07 0.59South Africa 0 0 0 0 0.39 0 0.09 0.04 0.26 0 0.39Sudan 0.56 0 0 0.56 1.72 0 0.20 0.51 1.01 0.30 2.58Swaziland (0.23) 0 0 (0.23) 0.09 0 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.33 0.19Tanzania 16.23 4.16 7.00 5.07 4.16 2.49 0.27 0.20 1.20 0.99 21.38Togo 2.45 1.74 0 0.71 0.47 0 0.14 0.03 0.30 0.58 3.50Tunisia 0 0 0 0 0.27 0 0.04 0.02 0.21 0.37 0.64Uganda 18.97 3.83 11.84 3.30 1.82 0 0.49 0.23 1.10 0.83 21.62Zambia 7.04 5.60 0 1.44 0.87 0.10 0.17 0.15 0.45 0.85 8.76Zimbabwe 0.37 0.37 0 0 0.64 0 0.12 0.11 0.41 0.57 1.58Regional Africa 1.86 0.70 0 1.16 4.21 0 0.88 0.02 3.31 3.34 9.41Total Africa 249.21 82.46 110.02 56.73 52.13 10.14 9.75 5.27 26.97 28.29 329.63

T A B L E 5 C A N A D I A N M U L T I L A T E R A L O F F I C I A L D E V E L O P M E N T A S S I S T A N C EB Y A G E N C Y A N D B Y C O U N T R Y ( 1 9 9 7 - 9 8 )(Estimated in millions of Canadian dollars)

Wor

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IMF

(PRG

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Regi

onal

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Agen

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UN

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OF WHICH OF WHICH

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sCountry 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

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62

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UN

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OF WHICH OF WHICH

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sAMERICASAntigua and Barbuda 0 0 0 0 0.62 0 0 0 0.62 0.32 0.94Argentina 1.18 0 0 1.18 4.18 0 3.77 0.05 0.36 0.04 5.40Belize 0.01 0 0 0.01 0.08 0 0.03 0.01 0.04 0.31 0.40Bolivia 15.59 3.08 9.16 3.35 6.64 5.39 0.42 0.18 0.65 0.07 22.30Brazil 2.19 0 0 2.19 5.16 0 3.21 0.39 1.56 0.11 7.46Chile 0.09 0 0 0.09 0.31 0 0.20 0.01 0.10 0.02 0.42Colombia 0.53 0 0 0.53 5.67 3.76 1.66 0.09 0.16 0.02 6.22Costa Rica 0.10 0 0 0.10 0.37 0 0.07 0.02 0.28 0.09 0.56Cuba 0 0 0 0 0.20 0 0.04 0.05 0.11 0 0.20Dominica 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.92 0.92Dominican Republic 1.27 0 0 1.27 0.26 0 0.15 0.02 0.09 0.02 1.55Ecuador 1.28 0 0 1.28 2.21 1.29 0.48 0.08 0.36 0.02 3.51El Salvador 1.42 0 0 1.42 0.81 0 0.47 0.06 0.28 0.02 2.25Grenada 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.40 0.40Guatemala 0.89 0 0 0.89 0.75 0 0.32 0.05 0.38 0.04 1.68Guyana 7.59 0.51 4.88 2.20 0.11 0 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.98 8.68Haiti 7.82 2.05 4.12 1.65 1.13 0.66 0 0.16 0.31 0.57 9.52Honduras 6.62 1.60 0 5.02 1.30 0.61 0.32 0.04 0.33 0.04 7.96Jamaica 0.06 0 0 0.06 0.12 0 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.68 0.86Mexico 0.14 0 0 0.14 0.56 0 0.08 0.08 0.40 0.07 0.77Nicaragua 4.26 2.13 0 2.13 4.87 4.08 0.39 0.06 0.34 0.09 9.22Panama 0.08 0 0 0.08 1.16 0 1.13 0.02 0.01 0.02 1.26Paraguay 1.05 0 0 1.05 0.40 0 0.33 0.02 0.05 0 1.45Peru 0.31 0 0 0.31 7.42 4.80 2.10 0.15 0.37 0.13 7.86St Kitts and Nevis 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.13 0.13St Lucia 0.02 0.02 0 0 0.01 0 0 0 0.01 0.19 0.22St Vincent/Grenadines 0 0 0 0 0.02 0 0.01 0 0.01 0.27 0.29Suriname 0.03 0 0 0.03 0.01 0 0 0 0.01 0 0.04Trinidad and Tobago 0.09 0 0 0.09 0.03 0 0 0 0.03 0.20 0.32Uruguay 0.05 0 0 0.05 0.54 0 0.46 0.01 0.07 0.02 0.61Venezuela 0.10 0 0 0.10 0.26 0 0.16 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.38Regional Caribbean 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Regional Latin America 0.80 0 0 0.80 1.30 0.99 0.07 0.02 0.22 0 2.10Other Americas 0 0 0 0 1.42 0 0.37 0.01 1.04 1.76 3.18Total Americas 53.57 9.39 18.16 26.02 47.92 21.58 16.31 1.66 8.37 7.57 109.06

ASIAAfghanistan 0 0 0 0 2.23 0 0.51 0.16 1.56 0.22 2.45Armenia 11.88 2.69 9.19 0 0.35 0 0.01 0.03 0.31 0 12.23Azerbaijan 1.11 1.11 0 0 0.26 0 0.03 0.05 0.18 0 1.37Bahrain 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Bangladesh 21.82 8.63 0 13.19 10.12 7.98 0.28 0.44 1.42 0.12 32.06Bhutan 0.16 0.04 0 0.12 0.26 0 0.13 0.03 0.10 0.04 0.46Burma (Myanmar) (0.02) (0.02) 0 0 0.91 0 0.15 0.14 0.62 0.07 0.96Cambodia 2.81 1.41 0 1.40 2.19 0.51 0.98 0.16 0.54 0 5.00China 25.06 25.06 0 0 14.52 11.98 0.75 0.33 1.46 0.26 39.84Georgia 17.45 2.36 15.09 0 0.31 0 0.03 0.04 0.24 0 17.76India 28.02 28.00 0 0.02 8.44 5.21 0.58 1.13 1.52 0.96 37.42Indonesia 1.54 0 0 1.54 1.40 0 0.32 0.25 0.83 0.13 3.07Iran 0 0 0 0 0.94 0 0.06 0.02 0.86 0 0.94Iraq 0 0 0 0 1.82 1 0.02 0.29 0.51 0 1.82Jordan 0 0 0 0 5.76 0 0.06 0.03 5.67 0.04 5.80Kazakhstan 0.26 0 0 0.26 0.17 0 0.03 0.04 0.10 0 0.43Kuwait 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Kyrghzstan 7.42 1.89 4.38 1.15 0.15 0 0.07 0.02 0.06 0 7.57Laos 7.16 1.83 1.60 3.73 0.60 0 0.30 0.07 0.23 0.07 7.83

Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Table 5 (continued)

➤

Tota

l

S TAT I S T I C S 2 0 0 0 63

Wor

ld B

ank

IMF

(PRG

F)

Regi

onal

Deve

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Bank

s

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cies

WFP

UN

DP

UN

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Othe

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ulti

late

ral

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OF WHICH OF WHICH

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al F

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cial

Inst

itut

ions

Lebanon 0 0 0 0 3.31 0 0.16 0.05 3.10 0.02 3.33Malaysia 0 0 0 0 0.16 0 0.10 0.01 0.05 0.57 0.73Maldives 0.35 0.08 0 0.27 0.08 0 0.02 0.01 0.05 0.07 0.50Mongolia 3.37 0.33 1.52 1.52 0.19 0 0.08 0.02 0.09 0 3.56Nepal 5.05 1.91 0 3.14 1.08 0 0.22 0.15 0.71 0.13 6.26North Korea 0 0 0 0 4.74 4.46 0.10 0.06 0.12 0.02 4.76Oman 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Pakistan 25.67 8.65 0 17.02 7.45 5.66 0.19 0.18 1.42 0.13 33.25Papua New Guinea 0.30 0 0 0.30 0.25 0 0.08 0.07 0.08 0.21 0.76Philippines 2.64 0.45 0 2.19 1.09 0 0.16 0.14 0.79 0.11 3.84Qatar 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Saudi Arabia 0 0 0 0 0.92 0 0.13 0 0.79 0.02 0.94Sri Lanka 9.73 3.22 0 6.51 0.61 0 0.15 0.08 0.38 0.19 10.53Syria 0 0 0 0 2.14 0 0.06 0.01 2.07 0.02 2.16Tajikistan 0.94 0.94 0 0 0.15 0 0.06 0.05 0.04 0 1.09Thailand 0 0 0 0 0.75 0.30 0.13 0.05 0.27 0.11 0.86Turkey 0 0 0 0 0.41 0 0.09 0.05 0.27 0.04 0.45Turkmenistan 0 0 0 0 0.08 0 0.03 0.03 0.02 0 0.08United Arab Emirates 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Uzbekistan 0 0 0 0 0.20 0 0.08 0.06 0.06 0 0.20Vietnam 39.95 5.84 32.85 1.26 1.05 0 0.31 0.22 0.52 0.13 41.13West Bank and Gaza 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0.00Yemen 2.95 2.95 0 0 0.94 0 0.18 0.07 0.69 0.15 4.04Oceania 0.73 0.20 0 0.53 0.36 0 0.10 0.05 0.21 3.06 4.15Asia Regional 0 0 0 0 4.54 0 0.92 0.02 3.60 1.95 6.49Other Asia 0 0 0 0 12.09 0 1.44 0.07 10.58 0 12.09Total Asia 216.35 97.57 64.63 54.15 93.02 37.10 9.10 4.68 42.12 8.84 318.21

EASTERN EUROPEAlbania 1.00 1.00 0 0 0.33 0 0.06 0.04 0.23 0 1.33Belarus na na na na na na na na na na naBosnia Herzegovina ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Bulgaria na na na na na na na na na na naCroatia ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Czech Republic na na na na na na na na na na naEstonia na na na na na na na na na na naHungary na na na na na na na na na na naLatvia na na na na na na na na na na naLithuania na na na na na na na na na na naMacedonia, FYR ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Moldova na na na na na na na na na na naPoland na na na na na na na na na na naRomania na na na na na na na na na na naRussian Federation ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Slovak Republic na na na na na na na na na na naSlovenia ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Ukraine na na na na na na na na na na naEx-Yugoslavia 4.76 4.76 0 0 10.39 0 0.55 0.42 9.42 0 15.15Other Europe 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0Total Eastern Europe 5.76 5.76 0 0 10.72 0 0.61 0.46 9.65 0 16.48

Country not Specified 70.94 0 (0.04) 0 43.97 27.51 2.49 0.08 13.89 12.34 127.25Total Developing Countries 595.83 195.18 192.77 136.90 247.76 96.33 38.26 12.15 101.00 57.04 900.63Of which:LLDCs 202.16 69.45 65.34 67.37 57.32 18.79 9.93 5.57 23.03 20.38 279.86Other Low Income Countries 190.51 94.00 51.96 44.55 46.05 28.04 4.40 3.07 10.54 4.87 241.43Remaining Countries 132.22 31.73 75.51 24.98 100.42 21.99 21.44 3.43 53.54 19.45 252.09Note: Bold-italicized countries are not included in Canadian aid totals (see Technical Notes).

Source: CIDA, Statistical Report 1997-98.

Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11ASIA (continued) To

tal

64

The Asian crisis, and the ensuing slowdown in much of the worldeconomy outside North America in 1998, slowed the previouslyrapid growth of Canada’s trade with developing countries. In the1988-97 period the value of Canada’s total trade (exports plusimports) with developing countries grew at an average rate of10.2 percent a year—nearly a percentage point higher than therate of growth of trade with the US (9.4 percent). Trade withemerging market (EM) economies in Asia, Latin America, andEastern Europe grew most rapidly (11.8 percent), but the value oftrade with the other developing countries also grew at a brisk6.7 percent during the same period. However, the value of Canada’strade with developing countries in 1998 was only 4.2 percenthigher than in 1997 (rising from $44.5 to $46.4 billion). Thus,although the slowdown may have originated in the financial crisesin emerging market economies, Canada’s trade with those countriessuffered less than its trade with other developing countries.

The total value of Canada’s trade with emerging market economiesin 1998 ($35.2 billion) was 7.1 percent higher than in 1997,whereas the value of its trade with the other developing economies($11.1 billion) was 4.1 percent lower than in 1997. In actuality, thedecline in Canadian exports to emerging market economies wasgreater than the decline in exports to other economies (5.3 percentversus 4.8 percent). For emerging market economies, however, thiswas offset by continued robust growth in their exports to Canada(12.7 percent)—an outcome probably engendered by large currencydepreciations that made their exports cheaper to Canadians. Bycomparison, imports from the nonemerging market developingeconomies fell by 3.5 percent.

While both exports to and imports from developing countries haveincreased over the past decade, the average annual rate of exportgrowth between 1988 and 1998 was a modest 3.7 percent: imports,on the other hand, grew by a phenomenal 14.2 percent. As shownin Figure 6.1, Canada thus moved from a $1.6 billion trade surpluswith developing countries in 1988 to a $17.4 billion deficit in 1998.Not surprisingly, most of that deficit is related to trade with emerg-ing market economies, with which Canada recorded a trade deficitof $16.1 billion. This apparent imbalance in developing-countrytrade is not as odd as it seems. As Table 7 shows, Canada’s exportprofile is not radically different than that of many developingcountries—primary products and unfinished goods, such as wheatand wood products, make up a substantial proportion of exports—and thus does not naturally complement the typical developing-country import profile.

Although Canada has a trade deficit with all major developingregions, the trade patterns differs from region to region. In the last decade, the Americas and Asia increased their share of totaltrade with Canada (36.6 to 40.1 percent, and 41.4 to 46.4 respec-tively), while Africa’s share dropped by 30 percent (from 11.9 to8.3 percent). The situation for Eastern Europe is more difficult todiscern because previous trade figures are not available for themany new countries in that region. However, if trade with formerUSSR states is excepted, and trade with the former Czechoslovakiaand Yugoslavia is counted, Eastern Europe’s share of developing-country trade drops from 3.1 to 2.7 percent.

Canada’s trade with the developing world has become increasinglyconcentrated. In 1988, Canada’s top five developing-country tradingpartners accounted for 46.2 percent of total trade with developingcountries. In 1998 the top four countries (China, Mexico, Brazil,and Malaysia) accounted for 52.3 percent of the total. The concen-tration was greatest for imports: two countries (Mexico and China)accounted for 48.1 percent of total imports from developing coun-tries. The next three highest ranking countries (Malaysia, Brazil,and Thailand) together accounted for only an additional 14.6 per-cent. On the export side, the top three destination countries(China, Mexico, and Brazil) accounted for 35.5 percent of totalexports to developing countries while the next two highest rankingcountries (Algeria and Indonesia) together accounted for anadditional 7.6 percent only.

After increasing by 15.7 percent between 1996 and 1997, Canada’stariff revenues from trade with developing countries increased byonly 5.6 percent the subsequent year. This was due, in largemeasure, to the fall in the average tariff rate from 3.4 percent to3.2 percent.1 That decline appears to have benefited the better-offcountries more than the Least Developed Countries (LLDCs). Theaverage tariff rate for the LLDCs changed only marginally (from6.52 to 6.45 percent) while the tariff rate for the other low incomecountries (OLICs) fell from 6.66 to 6.25 percent, and that for theother developing countries (ODCs) fell from 1.72 to 1.57 percent.Clearly, not only do imports from the low income countries face thehighest average tariff rates, but these imports were also not themain beneficiaries of the general decline in tariff rates. This situa-tion is directly at odds with the general principle of encouragingeconomic activity within those countries through freer trade.

1 The average tariff rate is the total tariff revenue divided by the total value of goods(i.e., a weighted average).

T A B L E 6 C A N A D I A N B A L A N C E O F T R A D E W I T H D E V E L O P I N G C O U N T R I E S ( 1 9 9 8 )

-20,000 -10,000 0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000

Nonemerging MarketEconomies 1998

Emerging Market Economies 1998

Developing Countries 1998

Nonemerging MarketEconomies 1988

Emerging MarketEconomies 1988

Developing Countries 1988

Figure 6.1

Developing-Country Trade Patterns (1988 and 1998)

Imports Trade BalanceExports

($ millions)

S TAT I S T I C S 2 0 0 0 65

AFRICAAlgeria 563,705 542,473 21,232 287,823 17,253 270,570 7.0 41.2 2.40 0

Angola 9,327 16,374 (7,047) 4,169 82,765 (78,596) 8.4 (15.0) 0.02 0

Benin 1,897 6 1,891 1,623 0 1,623 1.6 ~ 0 0

Botswana 12,695 785 11,910 6,955 293 6,662 6.2 10.4 154.57 19.69

Burkina Faso 2,406 135 2,271 2,215 88 2,127 0.8 4.4 5.91 4.38

Burundi 108 819 (711) 251 624 (373) (8.1) 2.8 0 0

Cameroon 17,587 14,556 3,031 20,497 19,521 976 (1.5) (2.9) 10.60 0.07

Cape Verde 354 2 352 6 0 6 50.3 ~ 0.30 14.90

Central African Republic 16 234 (218) 244 93 151 (23.8) 9.7 0.12 0.05

Chad 120 64 56 351 49 302 (10.2) 2.7 0.80 1.25

Comoros 27 54 (27) 151 1,913 (1,762) (15.8) (30.0) 1.03 1.90

Congo-Brazzaville 4,123 19,539 (15,416) 652 57 595 20.3 79.3 0.25 0

Congo-Kinshasa (Zaire) 6,919 0 6,919 32,003 8,567 23,436 (14.3) (100.0) 0 ~

Côte d’Ivoire 12,020 115,955 (103,935) 14,595 31,571 (16,976) (5.6) 13.9 167.54 0.14

Djibouti 389 49 340 1,141 421 720 (10.2) (19.4) 0 0

Egypt 153,091 34,726 118,365 71,133 25,153 45,980 7.4 3.3 3,730.31 10.74

Equatorial Guinea 112 194 (82) 45 0 45 9.5 ~ 0.04 0.02

Eritrea 0 0 0 na na na na na 1.16 ~

Ethiopia 47,770 10,428 37,342 42,474 6,700 35,774 1.2 4.5 0.39 0

Gabon 4,053 326 3,727 3,978 1,148 2,830 0.1 (11.8) 2.09 0.64

Gambia 906 127 779 299 717 (418) 11.6 (15.9) 0.14 0.11

Ghana 62,020 16,184 45,836 39,653 7,252 32,401 1.9 8.4 10.97 0.07

Guinea 13,824 27,559 (13,735) 8,756 15,416 (6,660) 3.6 6.0 0.55 0

Guinea-Bissau 179 0 179 640 14 626 (12.0) (100.0) 0 ~

Kenya 23,529 19,140 4,389 6,877 16,752 (9,875) 13.1 1.3 160.61 0.84

Lesotho 208 5,679 (5,471) 228 1,637 (1,409) (0.9) 13.2 1,132.21 19.94

Liberia 2,827 932 1,895 8,309 3,970 4,339 (10.2) (13.5) 0.69 0.07

Libya 114,508 0 114,508 56,287 5,176 51,111 7.0 (100.0) 0 ~

Madagascar 2,244 6,157 (3,913) 603 1,855 (1,252) 14.0 12.7 279.54 4.54

Malawi 4,426 3,733 693 1,474 2,416 (942) 11.6 4.4 0.25 0.01

Mali 9,313 19,489 (10,176) 1,589 9,013 (7,424) 19.9 8.0 54.77 0.28

Mauritania 362 233 129 3,029 0 3,029 (18.7) ~ 24.65 10.58

Mauritius 4,800 20,737 (15,937) 721 23,685 (22,964) 20.8 (1.3) 3,246.39 15.66

Morocco 188,751 87,838 100,913 277,892 46,326 231,566 (4.1) 6.6 1,123.78 1.28

Mozambique 16,730 1,456 15,274 20,474 2,647 17,827 (2.0) (5.8) 0.29 0.02

Namibia 5,114 60,627 (55,513) 2,368 9,491 (7,123) 7.9 20.4 6.17 0.01

Niger 1,690 3,350 (1,660) 5,491 13,767 (8,276) (11.2) (13.2) 24.29 0.73

Nigeria 54,698 301,245 (246,547) 22,653 310,512 (287,859) 1.5 (0.3) 41.40 0.01

Rwanda 1,400 2,118 (718) 633 782 (149) 8.3 10.5 1.11 0.05

São Tomé and Principe 30 15 15 0 0 0 ~ ~ 0.01 0.08

Senegal 23,310 976 22,334 14,157 643 13,514 1.7 4.3 4.50 0.46

Seychelles 542 216 326 394 307 87 3.0 (3.5) 0.98 0.46

Sierra Leone 2,146 2,403 (257) 344 11,572 (11,228) 19.7 (14.5) 69.54 2.89

Somalia 33 43 (10) 446 97 349 (22.9) (7.8) 1.36 3.16

South Africa 310,218 514,129 (203,911) 124,519 158,617 (34,098) 9.0 12.5 5,842.42 1.14

Sudan 38,350 640 37,710 15,263 204 15,059 1.3 12.1 0.04 0.01

Swaziland 2,849 329 2,520 1,474 39,328 (37,854) 2.0 (38.0) 11.97 3.64

Tanzania 19,779 1,170 18,609 25,231 2,687 22,544 (2.4) (8.0) 1.84 0.16

Togo 21,923 70,632 (48,709) 5,911 41,518 (35,607) 5.0 5.5 1.52 0

Tunisia 37,643 8,521 29,122 74,527 3,893 70,634 (6.6) 8.1 528.92 6.21

Uganda 7,578 7,422 156 1,647 6,301 (4,654) 19.7 1.7 4.62 0.06

Zambia 5,776 51,613 (45,837) 20,004 26 19,978 (11.7) 113.7 1.08 0

Zimbabwe 8,819 19,644 (10,825) 21,120 14,354 6,766 (8.4) 3.2 67.25 0.34

Total Africa 1,823,244 2,011,076 (187,832) 1,253,319 947,191 306,128 3.8 7.8 16,721.36 0.83

T A B L E 6 C A N A D I A N B A L A N C E O F T R A D E W I T H D E V E L O P I N G C O U N T R I E S ( 1 9 9 8 )

(In thousands of Canadian dollars)

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AMERICASAntigua and Barbuda 7,711 2,698 5,013 10,544 452 10,092 (3.2) 19.6 1.89 0.07

Argentina 299,104 258,842 40,262 57,971 123,258 (65,287) 16.9 7.7 3,325.99 1.28

Belize 3,698 8,257 (4,559) 7,355 13,169 (5,814) (6.6) (4.6) 70.04 0.85

Bolivia 16,201 13,840 2,361 5,556 22,678 (17,122) 10.7 (4.8) 136.98 0.99

Brazil 1,255,329 1,377,045 (121,716) 507,945 1,192,854 (684,909) 9.4 1.4 28,259.84 2.05

Chile 328,870 360,318 (31,448) 135,798 160,415 (24,617) 8.7 8.4 1,649.82 0.46

Colombia 436,092 364,224 71,868 181,340 138,187 43,153 6.8 10.2 5,654.17 1.55

Costa Rica 47,588 201,341 (153,753) 27,851 50,830 (22,979) 5.2 14.8 5,325.48 2.65

Cuba 431,706 333,467 98,239 229,413 87,115 142,298 6.2 14.4 2,139.89 0.64

Dominica 2,904 1,983 921 3,730 1,065 2,665 (2.5) 6.4 51.40 2.59

Dominican Republic 92,925 116,034 (23,109) 60,073 36,646 23,427 3.9 12.2 7,930.70 6.83

Ecuador 201,541 192,330 9,211 43,719 85,233 (41,514) 10.0 8.5 1,584.52 0.82

El Salvador 33,188 33,015 173 20,362 41,730 (21,368) 1.1 (2.3) 2,784.41 8.43

Grenada 4,791 1,066 3,725 4,225 1,193 3,032 (2.3) (1.1) 2.98 0.28

Guatemala 138,667 156,701 (18,034) 18,623 36,587 (17,964) 14.0 15.7 2,783.08 1.78

Guyana 9,703 203,107 (193,404) 5,539 15,267 (9,728) 5.6 29.5 1,883.39 0.93

Haiti 24,138 4,452 19,686 18,739 7,484 11,255 2.3 (5.1) 314.18 7.06

Honduras 17,982 78,682 (60,700) 19,683 27,895 (8,212) (1.4) 10.9 17,417.97 22.14

Jamaica 95,065 256,387 (161,322) 126,529 150,615 (24,086) (3.5) 5.5 3,928.55 1.53

Mexico 1,402,230 7,680,939 (6,278,709) 489,002 1,327,726 (838,724) 10.3 19.2 68,897.59 0.90

Nicaragua 12,247 22,221 (9,974) 21,177 64,533 (43,356) (6.4) (10.1) 1,280.00 5.76

Panama 47,632 55,748 (8,116) 34,936 30,882 4,054 2.6 6.1 95.64 0.17

Paraguay 12,951 3,727 9,224 2,031 466 1,565 20.4 23.1 17.29 0.46

Peru 185,463 171,295 14,168 65,000 86,044 (21,044) 9.7 7.1 2,012.24 1.17

St Kitts and Nevis 5,590 4,493 1,097 2,819 90 2,729 6.4 47.9 13.05 0.29

St Lucia 9,998 1,594 8,404 12,786 261 12,525 (2.5) 19.8 16.53 1.04

St Vincent/Grenadines 3,613 200 3,413 2,885 822 2,063 2.3 (13.2) 0 0

Suriname 4,103 87,023 (82,920) 1,593 86 1,507 9.8 99.8 4.11 0

Trinidad and Tobago 99,669 34,157 65,512 51,707 52,875 (1,168) 5.9 (4.3) 609.74 1.79

Uruguay 2,398 60,880 (58,482) 11,270 11,241 29 7.3 18.4 847.15 1.39

Venezuela 433,473 841,702 (408,229) 375,499 459,015 (83,516) 1.2 6.3 793.82 0.09

Total Americas 5,666,570 12,927,768 (7,261,198) 2,555,700 4,226,714 (1,671,014) 8.3 11.8 159,832.41 1.24

ASIAAfghanistan 81 499 (418) 772 244 528 (20.2) 7.4 19.31 3.87

Armenia 1,090 953 137 na na na na na 104.37 10.95

Azerbaijan 10,179 370 9,809 na na na na na 0.08 0.02

Bahrain 9,177 5,831 3,346 3,994 7,396 (3,402) 8.6 (2.3) 214.99 3.69

Bangladesh 128,605 140,278 (11,673) 127,103 30,357 96,746 (1.5) 16.5 22,439.92 16.00

Bhutan 0 4 (4) 4 201 (197) (100.0) (32.4) 0.69 17.15

Burma (Myanmar) 969 22,935 (21,966) 806 2,985 (2,179) 1.4 22.6 ~ ~

Cambodia 665 6,355 (5,690) 70 74 (4) 25.2 56.1 1,189.94 18.72

China 2,477,289 7,655,336 (5,178,047) 2,599,707 995,919 1,603,788 (2.0) 22.6 453,057.94 5.92

Georgia 14,197 1,564 12,633 na na na na na 13.98 0.89

India 414,429 898,601 (484,172) 388,197 204,581 183,616 (1.2) 15.9 66,270.80 7.37

Indonesia 541,805 921,889 (380,084) 317,173 179,015 138,158 5.4 17.8 57,846.42 6.27

Iran 262,788 153,759 109,029 140,166 70,105 70,061 6.0 8.2 545.12 0.35

Iraq 3,034 81,984 (78,950) 191,444 8,774 182,670 (32.3) 25.0 3.69 0

Jordan 21,368 1,004 20,364 13,078 183 12,895 4.8 18.6 20.49 2.04

Kazakhstan 23,967 13,630 10,337 na na na na na 317.68 2.33

Kuwait 63,852 2,606 61,246 22,319 2,297 20,022 10.9 1.3 532.15 20.42

Kyrghzstan 2,935 28 2,907 na na na na na 0.84 3.01

Laos 2,617 1,581 1,036 1,147 664 483 8.6 9.1 242.22 15.32

Lebanon 41,709 7,972 33,737 13,948 6,372 7,576 11.5 2.3 617.61 7.75

Malaysia 474,153 1,997,579 (1,523,426) 179,205 323,533 (144,328) 8.2 20.0 32,547.69 1.63

Maldives 7,856 3,438 4,418 13 354 (341) 89.7 25.5 651.79 18.96

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Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Table 6 (continued)

➤

S TAT I S T I C S 2 0 0 0 67

Mongolia ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Nepal 5,162 3,616 1,546 2,945 1,755 1,190 5.8 7.5 395.43 10.94North Korea 5,408 691 4,717 5,955 1,278 4,677 (10.7) (6.0) ~ ~Oman 14,342 692 13,650 7,867 189 7,678 6.2 13.9 ~ ~Pakistan 87,567 227,598 (140,031) 86,583 78,437 8,146 (0.3) 11.2 28,376.76 12.47Papua New Guinea 22,437 4,442 17,995 11,175 46 11,129 7.2 57.9 0.41 0.01Philippines 247,998 958,040 (710,042) 131,014 178,248 (47,234) 3.3 18.3 25,890.10 2.70Qatar 16,382 9,626 6,756 5,687 0 5,687 11.1 ~ 14.83 0.15Saudi Arabia 304,135 393,521 (89,386) 202,773 95,389 107,384 4.2 15.2 ~ ~Sri Lanka 35,026 96,757 (61,731) 26,893 33,252 (6,359) (1.3) 11.3 12,064.72 12.47Syria 26,417 11,554 14,863 4,133 296 3,837 20.4 44.3 246.90 2.14Tajikistan 19 5,986 (5,967) na na na na na 1.83 0.03Thailand 299,595 1,273,114 (973,519) 262,611 343,890 (81,279) 0.9 14.0 48,993.39 3.85Turkey 212,076 249,761 (37,685) 181,250 72,198 109,052 1.5 13.2 16,109.97 6.45Turkmenistan 1,137 12 1,125 na na na na na 0.12 0.99United Arab Emirates 283,566 11,942 271,624 23,622 46,622 (23,000) 27.6 (12.7) 867.42 7.26Uzbekistan 4,543 12,997 (8,454) na na na na na 8.47 0.07Vietnam 53,806 181,782 (127,976) 4,548 10,566 (6,018) 27.9 32.9 21,347.13 11.74West Bank and Gaza na na na na na na na na na ~Yemen 5,951 136 5,815 5,469 204 5,265 (1.3) (4.0) 0.47 0.35Oceania 2,971 3,768 (797) 3,862 12,933 (9,071) (2.6) (11.6) 137.02 3.64Total Asia 6,131,303 15,364,231 (9,232,928) 4,965,533 2,708,357 2,257,176 2.1 19.0 791,092.64 5.15

EASTERN EUROPEAlbania 3,403 192 3,211 1,343 90 1,253 9.7 7.9 ~ ~Belarus 1,294 1,883 (589) na na na na na 132.70 7.05Bosnia Herzegovina 3,370 403 2,967 na na na na na ~ ~Bulgaria 7,590 49,338 (41,748) 25,677 11,916 13,761 (11.6) 15.3 2,597.18 5.26Croatia 12,409 14,219 (1,810) na na na na na 793.22 5.58Czech Republic 60,611 124,143 (63,532) na na na na na 4,782.40 3.85Estonia 5,558 28,532 (22,974) na na na na na 215.75 0.76Hungary 94,016 95,226 (1,210) 6,469 51,394 (44,925) 30.6 6.4 3,825.11 4.02Latvia 13,144 3,125 10,019 na na na na na 112.03 3.58Lithuania 8,193 22,032 (13,839) na na na na na 502.76 2.28Macedonia, FYR 1,026 5,436 (4,410) na na na na na 732.68 13.48Moldova 577 1,822 (1,245) na na na na na 230.70 12.66Poland 184,504 170,841 13,663 19,105 83,420 (64,315) 25.4 7.4 6,086.88 3.56Romania 53,771 121,540 (67,769) 54,624 70,291 (15,667) (0.4) 5.6 8,274.66 6.81Russian Federation 276,402 730,562 (454,160) na na na na na 14,917.64 2.04Slovak Republic 17,228 68,593 (51,365) na na na na na 3,131.02 4.56Slovenia 88,576 61,964 26,612 na na na na na 1,431.48 2.31Ukraine 20,455 68,990 (48,535) na na na na na 2,377.22 3.45Ex-Yugoslavia 8,505 5,940 2,565 na na na na na ~ ~Total Eastern Europe 860,632 1,574,781 (714,149) 107,218 217,111 (109,893) 23.2 21.9 50,143.43 3.18

Total Developing Countries 14,481,749 31,877,856 (17,396,107) 10,081,916 8,441,305 1,640,611 3.7 14.2 1,017,789.84 3.19Of which:LLDCs 410,879 420,977 (10,098) 372,929 273,407 99,522 1.0 4.4 27,153.78 6.45Other Low Income Countries 3,952,030 10,682,898 (6,730,868) 3,630,936 1,983,488 1,647,448 0.9 18.3 663,557.48 6.21Remaining Countries 10,118,840 20,773,981 (10,655,141) 6,078,051 6,184,410 (106,359) 5.2 12.9 327,078.58 1.57Total Other Countriesa

(excluding US) 31,875,544 62,956,119 (31,080,575) 26,292,137 36,709,490 (10,417,353) 1.9 5.5 1,874,256.46 2.98Total Emerging Market Economiesb 9,564,272 25,652,312 (16,088,040) 6,027,938 6,017,423 10,515 4.7 15.6 777,934.87 3.03United States 251,094,033 203,547,901 47,546,132 97,530,434 86,020,888 11,509,546 9.9 9.0 312,202.20 0.15

Total World 297,451,326 298,381,876 (930,550) 133,904,487 131,171,683 2,732,804 8.3 8.6 3,133,701.09 1.05Notes: Bold-italicized countries are not ODA eligible (see Technical Notes).a Export and Import totals for the former Czechoslovakia, USSR, and Yugoslavia have been added to the developing-country total for 1988.b See the Technical Notes for a description of the country group.

Sources: Statistics Canada, Imports by Country January-December 1989 & 1999; Government of Canada, Public Accounts of Canada 1997-98; Statistics Canada, Statistical Database.

Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

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ASIA (continued)

68

This table provides a glimpse of the composition of Canada’s tradewith the developing countries by inventorying the top three cate-gories of goods (in terms of value) among Canadian exports to, andimports from, these countries. It also profiles Canada’s militaryexports to developing countries. Canada’s trade in services and“intangibles” is not covered.

The data for 1998 shows a continuation of trends from the previousyear. Used clothing continued to be Canada’s number one export toeight African countries—a testimony both to the level of poverty inthese countries and the rather limited scope of Canada’s trade withthem. Used clothing was also the second or third most importantCanadian export to 15 other African countries. Among Asian coun-tries, it was the top export to Afghanistan and Cambodia, and wasamong the top three for Georgia, Laos, and Tajikistan. It does notfigure at all among the top three exports to the Americas but,surprisingly, takes the top spot for Ukraine, the only country inEastern Europe for which it shows among the top three.

New clothing and textiles, on the other hand, dominated Canadianimports from developing countries: 22 countries in Asia had textilesand garments listed among the top three exports to Canada, and for12 of these it was their top export. The same number had differentcategories of clothing or textiles listed in two of the top threeexports. A clothing or textile product was also the top import fromfive African countries, three Eastern European countries, and twocountries in the Americas. This data clearly shows the predominanceof Asia in Canadian clothing and textile imports.

Overall, primary commodities—mainly wheat, mineral ores, meats,seeds, and wood products—continued to dominate Canadian exportsto developing countries. For 14 countries in Africa, two of the topthree exports were primary commodities, and for two countries allthree were primary commodities. A primary commodity was one ofthe top three imports from Canada for another 15 African countries.A primary commodity was, in fact, the top import for 20 Africancountries.

The figures for the Americas and Asia are similar. In the Americas,14 countries had a primary commodity as the leading Canadianimport, eight had primary commodities as two of the top threeimports listed, and one listed a primary commodity for all top three spots. In Asia, 13 countries had a primary commodity as thehighest valued import from Canada, nine had one as the secondhighest, and five had one as the third highest valued import. FiveEastern European countries had a primary commodity as the highestvalued import from Canada, three had one as the second highest,and five had one as the third highest. However, despite the domi-nance of primary commodities, Canada also exported several high-valued manufactured items, such as airplanes and transformers, todeveloping countries.

Primary products were even more predominant in Canada’s importsfrom developing countries. A primary commodity was at least oneof the top three imports from 38 of the 53 African countries listed,two of the top three from 20 countries, and all of the top three from13 countries. Canada imported at least one primary product amongthe top three imports from 31 countries in the Americas, two out ofthe top three from 16, and all three imports from nine countries

were primary commodities. Of 41 Asian countries, a primary productwas one of the top three imports for 19, two of the top three foreight, and all of the top three for two countries. Nine of 19 EasternEuropean countries had a primary commodity as one of the topthree exports to Canada and four had two out of three. The primarycommodities in question included coffee, tea, and precious metalsfrom Africa; gold, spices, and mineral ores from the Americas; crudepetroleum and shrimp from Asia; and fruit from Eastern Europe.

Canada’s military exports to developing countries, which stood at 43 percent of Canada’s total military exports in 1998, were 16.8 percent higher in value than the previous year. That growthwas, however, lower than the growth of Canada’s total militaryexports, which grew by 38.5 percent in the same period. Amongdeveloping countries the bulk of exports went to the middle andhigh income countries (97.2 percent), the Least Developed Countries(LLDCs) accounted for 2.1 percent, and other low income countriesjust 0.8 percent. Asia received the largest proportion of theseexports (93.3 percent), the bulk of which went to Malaysia,Thailand, and Saudi Arabia (Figure 7.1). Exports to the Americasdropped by more than 30 percent, primarily owing to a reduction in exports to Venezuela (from $4.7 million to about $0.5 milliondollars). Military exports to Africa dropped sharply (76 percent) due largely to reduced exports to Botswana. Czech Republicpurchases in 1998 caused military exports to Eastern Europe toincrease almost four-fold.

1 Direct exports understate Canada’s involvement in the trade of military goodsbecause many Canadian firms produce parts for US military goods that are eventually exported.

T A B L E 7 T R A D E : T O P E X P O R T S A N D I M P O R T S W I T H D E V E L O P I N G C O U N T R I E S ( 1 9 9 8 )

Malaysia51%

($92 million)

Other12%

($22 million)

Saudi Arabia16%

($30 million)

Thailand21%

($37 million)

Figure 7.1

Canadian Military Exports to Developing Countries, 1998

S TAT I S T I C S 2 0 0 0 69

AFRICAAlgeria durum wheat lentils newsprint crude petroleum & non-crude oils preparations low value transactions 0

bituminous oils & commoditiesAngola used clothing iron & steel structures asbestos crude petroleum & gears fish 0

bituminous oilsBenin used clothing hair preparations telecommunications live animals & fishing audio disks medicines 0

instruments & apparatus baitBotswana radio/TV/radar parts glass airplane/helicopter parts woven men's shirts upholstered seats returned goods 3,728,231 aircraft partsBurkina Faso contraceptives stamps/cheque forms/ human vaccines chocolates wood articles percussion musical

banknotes/bond certificates instruments 0Burundi lentils used clothing canola, colza or mustard oil coffee black tea in >3kg packets office machines 0Cameroon wheat & meslin rail car/locomotive parts diesel engine parts cotton non-crude oils preparations cocoa paste 0Cape Verde beans kidney beans electrical machinery shoes with rubber soles electronic ICs & diodes 0

micro-assembliesCentral African Republic lumber - coniferous wood wheat or meslin flour special trade with institutions lumber - tropical new tires used stamps 0Chad vaccines used clothing used tires plants for pharmaceutical plywood - tropical wood computers 0

useComoros petroleum bitumen data processing machine used clothing pasta cloves essential oils 0

partsCongo-Brazzaville used clothing iron & steel products balloons/spacecraft parts cobalt & cobalt products manioc or cassava vermiculite, perlite 0

& chloriteCongo-Kinshasa (Zaire) used clothing low value transactions cotton vests ~ ~ ~ 0

& commoditiesCôte d'Ivoire meslin & wheat sack kraft paper used clothing cocoa beans cocoa butter veneer plywood sheets 0Djibouti low value transactions used clothing microscopes data processing dried fish ~ 0

& commodities machine partsEgypt newsprint sack kraft paper lentils knitted cotton garments men's woven shirts – carpets 622,403 aircraft parts,

synthetic electronic partsEquatorial Guinea helicopter/airplane parts bulldozer/ angledozer blades telephone/telegraphy veneer plywood sheets bananas woven clothing

apparatus parts accessories 0Eritrea ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0Ethiopia airplanes meslin & wheat durum wheat coffee - not roasted oil seeds & oleaginous fruits coffee- roasted 0Gabon wheeled tractor electric circuit apparatus urea/thiourea resins veneer plywood sheets plywood - tropical wood peaches 0Gambia iron & steel articles used clothing radar apparatus parts automatic data processing

(excluding wire) machine parts used stamps gramophone records 0Ghana meslin & wheat used clothing petroleum & bituminous cocoa beans veneer plywood sheets - veneer plywood sheets - 0

oils other than tropical woods tropical woodsGuinea hydraulic turbine parts zinc ores & concentrates diesel engine parts aluminum ores aluminum oxides coffee 0Guinea-Bissau ~ used clothing printed matter funfare articles ~ ~ 0Kenya used clothing meslin & wheat lentils coffee black tea in >3kg packets black tea in <3kg packets 11,820 aircraft partsLesotho boring/sinking machinery medicaments alkaloids woven women's garments woven men's garments knitted cotton vests 0

partsLiberia canola, colza or mustard oil used clothing wheat or meslin flour natural rubber latex diamonds - industrial diamonds - unsorted, 0

worked, not mounted not mountedLibya milk & cream cheese processed cheese natural gas non-crude oils preparations low value transactions 0

& commoditiesMadagascar used clothing turbo jets/propellers parts ~ vanilla beans women's knitted cotton men's woven shirts 0

underwearMalawi vaccines used clothing kidney beans & white tobacco black tea in >3kg packets coffee 0

pea beansMali treated wood poles/posts not treated wood poles/ boring/sinking machinery cotton monolithic digital ICs - Monolithic digital ICs 0

posts parts mos technologyMauritania durum wheat motor vehicles used clothing brassieres men's woven cotton trousers octopus 0Mauritius helicopters lentils line telephone/telegraphy woven men's shirts woven women's garments -

apparatus parts knitted synthetic men's woven cotton trousers 0Morocco durum wheat sulfur meslin & wheat citrus hybrids fluorspar tomatoes 171,652 aircraft parts, simulator

partsMozambique durum wheat meslin & wheat used clothing cashew nuts - shelled cashew nuts - in shell twine 0Namibia meslin & wheat surveying instrument cigarettes uranium & compounds crude petroleum & machine tools 0

parts bituminous oilsNiger refrigeration equipment low value transactions ~ electric work trucks thermocopying apparatus returned goods 0

& commoditiesNigeria durum wheat meslin & wheat electric conductors crude petroleum & crude petroleum & low value transactions 0

bituminous oils bituminous oils & commoditiesRwanda used clothing peas electrical measuring apparatus coffee black tea in >3kg packets crabs 0São Tomé and Principe seats parts drilling tools metal furniture microtomes construction machine parts switching apparatus 0Senegal meslin & wheat rendered animal fats sulfur airplane/ helicopter parts fish printed books & materials 0Seychelles soil preparation machinery data processing machine bovine semen computers cinnamon peaches 0

partsSierra Leone canola, colza or mustard oil lentils used clothing screw drivers DC motors/generators glassware 0Somalia telephone switching modems transmission/reception new tires woodworking knives & iron & steel flat products 0

apparatus apparatus bladesSouth Africa airplanes meslin & wheat sulfur platinum vanadium oxides & ferro-chromium 368,204 firearms parts, ammunition,

hydroxides aircraft parts, navigation equipment

Sudan meslin & wheat medicine machine parts flower seeds coconuts avocados 0Swaziland meslin & wheat used clothing iron/steel articles woodworking machines data processing machine chemical products 0

partsTanzania meslin & wheat used clothing lentils coffee black tea in >3kg packets sisal fibres 0Togo meslin & wheat line telephone/telegraphy electric static converters natural phosphates coffee hair for wigs 0

apparatus partsTunisia sulfur durum wheat injection molding machines spectacles dates olive oil 0Uganda used clothing medicaments plastic self-adhesive articles coffee copper ash coffee - roasted 0Zambia medicaments used clothing printed matter copper ash monolithic digital ICs monolithic digital ICs - mos 0Zimbabwe transmission/reception self-propelled graders/ low value transactions copper tobacco granite 0

apparatus levelers & commoditiesTotal Africa 4,902,310

T A B L E 7 TRADE : TOP EXPORTS AND IMPORTS WITH DEVELOP ING COUNTRIES (1998)

➤

Top Three Domestic Exports from Canada, 1998 Top Three Imports into Canada, 1998 Total Military Top Military

Exports 1998 Exports from

Country 1 2 3 1 2 3 (C$) Canada

70

AMERICASAntigua and Barbuda processed articles low value exports milk & cream airplanes salmonide seeds of forage plants 0Argentina telephone parts newsprint durum wheat bovine & equine leather returned goods copper ores 137,389 firearmsBelize concentrated milk & cream low value exports optical fibres & cables cane sugar sea fish & lobster papayas 0Bolivia fax/television/radio wheat & meslin telephone/telegraphy zinc ores silver ores tropical lumber 0

transmitters apparatus parts Brazil newsprint potassium chloride transmission/reception coffee radio receivers for motor iron/steel semi-finished 3,363,152 large calibre ammunition

apparatus vehicles products components, aircraft & helicopter parts, simulator

Chile bituminous coal durum wheat gas/liquid filtering grapes copper ores grape wines 597,776 firearms & parts, fireapparatus parts control system, aircraft

enginesColombia meslin & wheat copper wire bars newsprint coffee - not roasted bananas coffee - not roasted, 0

decaffeinatedCosta Rica newsprint corsets, braces, suspenders malt bananas coffee -not roasted pineapples 0Cuba peas fowl offals discharge lamps & cathodes cane sugar metallic ash cane molasses 0Dominica milk & cream low value transactions copper sanitaryware monolithic digital ICs bolts & screws medical surgical instruments 0

& commoditiesDominican Republic newsprint smoked herring printed matter men's garments - automatic circuit breakers gold 0

woven cottonEcuador durum wheat meslin & wheat newsprint bananas shrimps cocoa paste 0El Salvador meslin & wheat potassium chloride sack kraft paper coffee - not roasted women's knitted cotton knitted cotton vests 0

underwearGrenada meslin & wheat low value transactions ~ nutmeg mace cocoa beans 0

& commoditiesGuatemala meslin & wheat newsprint potassium chloride coffee cane sugar lemons 0Guyana ammonium nitrate not available potatoes gold aluminum ores rum & tafia 250 firearms Haiti milk & cream swine offal low value transactions & knitted cotton vests guavas & mangoes copper waste & scrap 0

commoditiesHonduras newsprint fluting paper potatoes coffee knitted cotton vests lemons 0Jamaica salted fish low value transactions ~ aluminum oxides rum & tafia knitted cotton vests 0

& commoditiesMexico canola, colza seeds meslin & wheat other motor vehicle parts motor vehicles wiring sets colour televisions 1,671,730 magazines, large calibre

ammunition components, aircraft parts

Nicaragua canola, colza or mustard oil newsprint noncellular polymer/ coffee men's woven cotton women's woven cotton 0ethylene film trousers garments

Panama medicaments cigarettes lentils gold crude petroleum & coffee 0bituminous oils

Paraguay cigarettes video games low value transactions & monolithic digital ICs - hybrid ICs cane sugar 0commodities mos technology

Peru meslin & wheat durum wheat zinc ores & concentrates coffee lead ores unwrought lead 69,550 radar partsSt Kitts and Nevis plastic articles salted fish ~ electrical switches amino acids other switching apparatus 0St Lucia milk & cream low value transactions ~ tin articles peppers coaxial cables 0

& commoditiesSt Vincent/Grenadines ~ low value transactions ~ nutmeg fish fruits & nuts 0

& commoditiesSuriname bovine meat pebbles & stones/ballast used clothing gold gold waste fish 0Trinidad and Tobago newsprint low value transactions transmission/reception iron & steel bars non-crude oils preparations pig iron 1,000 firearms

& commodities apparatus & rodsUruguay newsprint line telephone/telegraphy injection moulds leather worsted wool fabrics worsted wool fabrics - 0

apparatus parts >200g/m2Venezuela meslin & wheat newsprint durum wheat crude petroleum & non-crude oils bitumen & asphalt 523,106 aircraft parts

bituminous oils preparationsTotal Americas 6,363,953

ASIAAfghanistan used clothing petroleum & bituminous elevator/escalator parts lamb furskins carpets dried grapes 0

mineral oilsArmenia meat products swine cuts woven cotton fabrics copper ores woven men's garments woven men's underwear 0Azerbaijan printed matter machine parts for working cranes granite lettuce pepper 0

rubber or plasticBahrain wood pulp articles processed abroad low value transactions & ammonium phosphate non-crude oils preparations woven women's garments 5,857 ammunition, gas mask

commodities (mono-/di-) partsBangladesh wheat & meslin durum wheat peas men's garments (shell) knitted sweaters knitted vests 0Bhutan bulldozer/angledozer blades wooden furniture aerials woven women's garments clogs stamps used/not current 0Burma (Myanmar) asbestos medicine special trade with shrimps women's garments - knitted women's garments (shell) - 0

institutions synthetic knitted syntheticCambodia used clothing liquid transformers lumber men's garments (shell) - women's garments (shell) - men's woven cotton shirts 0

woven synthetic woven syntheticChina rape or colza seeds potassium chloride chemical wood pulp toys data processing machine bags & containers 814,170 aircraft parts, rudder

parts simulatorGeorgia undenatured ethyl alcohol other ethyl alcohol used clothing combines - harvesters - automatic data processing printing ink 0

threshers machine partsIndia peas newsprint chemical wood pulp men's knitted cotton shirts knitted cotton vests diamonds - worked, 0

not mountedIndonesia meslin & wheat chemical wood pulp semi-chemical wood pulp natural rubber video recording apparatus technically specified

natural rubber 3,559 aircraft partsIran meslin & wheat soybeans machines crude petroleum & carpets grapes - dried 0

bituminous oilsIraq medicaments beans hydraulic engines crude petroleum & non-silver jewelry gas masks & breathing 0

bituminous oils appliancesJordan sack kraft paper maize hydraulic engines airplanes/helicopters parts taps, cocks, valves storage units for computers 187,795 firearms, aircraft parts,

radio parts, battery analyzer

Kazakhstan low value transactions boring/sinking machinery heat treatment equipment titanium ores iron & steel flats - iron & steel flats - 0& commodities parts parts 3-4.75mm thick 3 mm thick

Kuwait heat treatment equipment taps, cocks, valves mixing machines women's garments (shell) - women's garments (shell) - women's garments overcoats - 492 ammunition, test cotton synthetic synthetic equipment, data

Kyrghzstan machine parts machines boring/sinking machines measuring instruments electric motors electricity measuring 0parts instruments

Laos transmission/reception boards & panels used clothing men's shirts - knitted cotton men's garments (shell) - men's garments (shell) - 0apparatus synthetic cotton

➤

Table 7 (continued) Top Three Domestic Exports from Canada, 1998 Top Three Imports into Canada, 1998 Total Military Top Military



S TAT I S T I C S 2 0 0 0 71

Lebanon low value transactions & aluminum alloy lentils vegetables knitted cotton vests nuts & seeds 14,000 ammunitioncommodities

Malaysia potassium chloride electric rail cars meslin & wheat monolithic digital ICs - monolithic digital ICs monolithic nondigital ICs 91,792,358 rockets, helicopter parts, mos technology simulators, technical data,

softwareMaldives airplanes airplane/helicopter parts special trade with men's trousers - woven knitted garments women's woven cotton 0

institutions cotton trousersMongolia ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ 0Nepal airplanes helicopter/airplane parts mustard seeds men's garments (shell) - carpets silver jewelry 0

syntheticNorth Korea meslin & wheat chemical wood pulp optical instruments woven men's overcoats woven men's trousers woven women's garments 0Oman pumps parts of pumps telephone sets men's knitted cotton shirts knitted garments men's woven cotton shirts 467,940 rockets, switchesPakistan meslin & wheat bituminous coal low value transactions men's knitted cotton shirts cotton yarn woven fabrics 1,800 aviation related equipment

& commoditiesPapua New Guinea airplanes transmission/reception articles processed abroad airplanes coffee black tea in >3kg packets 0

apparatusPhilippines meslin & wheat copper ores electronic IC parts monolithic digital ICs - monolithic nondigital ICS storage units for computers 1,069,175 aircraft parts

mos technologyQatar demonstration instruments refractory ceramic goods boiler parts urea women's garments - bananas 0

& models woven cottonSaudi Arabia airplanes lumber radar apparatus parts crude petroleum & acyclic ethers noncrude oils preparations 29,800,192 LAV parts, helicopter

bituminous oils aircraft parts, radio equipment & parts, simulator parts

Sri Lanka meslin & wheat printed matter asbestos men's garments (shell) - black tea in >3kg packets bags & containers 250 mine detectorsynthetic

Syria wooden poles/posts textile fabrics taps, cocks, valves crude petroleum & knitted cotton vests men's woven cotton shirts 0bituminous oils

Tajikistan vaccines used clothing multi-ply paper aluminum - alloyed aluminum - not alloyed cotton fabrics 0Thailand chemical wood pulp potassium chloride transmission apparatus shrimps tunas I/O units for computers 37,174,639 firearms, artillery parts,

ammunition, APC & tank parts, helicopters aircraft parts, radio & simulator parts

Turkey bituminous coal airplanes line telephone/ iron & steel bars worsted wool fabrics tiles & cubes 3,531,616 mine detector, aircraft telegraphy apparatus parts & rods parts, simulator parts

Turkmenistan transmission apparatus boring/sinking machinery machines sweet potatoes electrical relays guavas & mangoes 0parts

United Arab Emirates meslin & wheat helicopters flight simulators stainless steel bars nonsilver jewelry women's garments - 4,123,639 ammunition, aircraft parts& rods woven cotton

Uzbekistan textile fabrics line telephone/telegraphy printed matter uranium & compounds coniferous wood cotton fabrics 0apparatus parts

Vietnam potassium chloride semi-chemical wood pulp medicaments shoes with rubber soles coffee shrimps 0Yemen boring/sinking machinery articles processed abroad paper rolls coffee recorded media - not molluscs 0

image or soundTotal Asia 168,987,482

EASTERN EUROPEAlbania textile fabrics parts of pumps lentils woven blouses & shirts pharmaceutical plants women's woven coveralls 0Belarus perfumes medicine data processing machines woven glass fibre fabrics synthetic staple fibres women's woven coveralls 0Bosnia Herzegovina liquid transformers ~ prefabricated buildings perfumes strawberries shoes 0Bulgaria audio visual equipment textiles lentils copper ores grape wines animal feeds preparations 450 firearms

partsCroatia low value transactions iron & steel products asphalt articles ferrochromium furniture parts amino compounds 0

& commoditiesCzech Republic low value transactions dog/cat food medicaments electrical capacitors boring machines wheeled tractors 794,061 firearms, rockets

& commoditiesEstonia swine cuts radio/television parts transmission apparatus shrimps ski footwear ophthalmic instruments 0Hungary electric static converters data processing machine swine cuts storage units for grape wines electric lamp parts 29,511 firearms parts

parts computersLatvia fish line telephone/telegraphy iron/steel structures iron & steel bars shrimps plywood 0

apparatus parts & rodsLithuania boards & panels fish medicaments non-crude oil preparations shrimps whey 0Macedonia, FYR turkey cuts & offal swine cuts levels for surveying shoes with rubber soles shoes with leather soles women's woven shirts

& blouses 0Moldova aqueous synthetic paints DC motors/generators nonaqueous synthetic iron & steel bars women's anoraks - women's overcoats -

paints & rods woven woven 0Poland heat treatment equipment low value transactions durum wheat turbo-propeller parts power transmission bulldozers & angledozers 750 firearms

parts & commodities equipment partsRomania bituminous coal linseed transmission/reception iron & steel coils iron & steel coils - iron & steel tubes 0

apparatus other & pipesRussian Federation tobacco line telephone/telegraphy swine cuts crude petroleum & iron & steel flats - cod 0

apparatus parts bituminous oils 4.75 -10 mm thickSlovak Republic chemical wood pulp gas metres boring/sinking machinery iron & steel flat products iron & steel flat products iron & steel flat products

(1-3mm. thick) -3mm. thick (3-4.75mm. thick) 0Slovenia airplanes low value transactions asphalt articles swine leather airplanes forging machines 0

& commoditiesUkraine used clothing low value transactions metal bending machines meslin & wheat ammunition iron & steel flat products 1,600 ammunition

& commodities 10 mm. thickEx-Yugoslavia whiskies chassis with engine for ~ men's garments - synthetic furniture parts new tires 0

motor vehiclesTotal Eastern Europe 826,372

Total Developing Countries 181,080,117Of which:LLDCs 3,728,231Other Low Income Countries 1,454,252Remaining Countries 175,897,634Total Other Countries (Other than US) 240,274,368

Total World (Other than US) 421,354,485

Note: Bold-italicized countries are not ODA eligible (see Technical Notes).

Sources: Industry Canada, Strategis - Trade Data Online; Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Export and Import Control Bureau.

Top Three Domestic Exports from Canada, 1998 Top Three Imports into Canada, 1998 Total Military Top Military



ASIA (continued)

72

By providing data on the nature and degree of exposure of Canadianpublic and private institutions in developing countries, and viceversa, Table 8 outlines the nature of financial interrelations betweenCanada and developing countries. However, the picture provided isonly partial: the data is not complete for some countries, and notall institutions are covered. For example, the holding of nonbankclaims from portfolio investments in developing countries is notincluded (although, admittedly, it is not yet large). Nonetheless,the table does give some indication of Canada’s expanding financialrelationship with developing countries through extra-nationalfinancial obligations.

As reflected in the table, Canadian exposure to developing countries(or Canadian claims on developing-country institutions) can be sub-divided into three basic types: debt held by public institutions (onboth public and private entities in developing countries); debt heldby the Canadian banking system; and Canadian ownership of privatecapital in developing countries. Figure 8.1 gives some indication ofthe distribution of these claims among Canadian institutions.

Canadian public institutions held 13.1 percent more claims ondeveloping-country governments and private sector institutions atthe end of March 1999 than they did a year earlier. However, thatwas not universally true of all the lending institutions. The CanadianInternational Development Agency continued to reduce the value of its claims on developing-country institutions through debt reliefand the retirement of existing debt—it ceased to be a net lender inthe mid-1980s. The Export Development Corporation, however,increased its claims on developing-country institutions by 21.4percent ($1.6 billion). Most of that increase came from increases in Corporate Account exposure to Colombia ($557 million), Brazil($221 million), Indonesia ($285 million), Venezuela ($128 million),and Peru ($107 million).1 The Canadian Wheat Board increased itstotal exposure to developing countries by 8.9 percent ($568 million).

The distribution of public institutions’ claims on developingcountries is highly uneven. Least Developed Countries (LLDCs)account for only 1.9 percent of developing-country debt.2 Most ofthat debt (61.2 percent) is owed by the Remaining (middle and highincome developing) Countries, and the remainder (36.9 percent) isowed by other low income countries (OLICs). This is not necessarilybad since the poorest countries have limited (if any) debt carryingcapacity. The nature of this distribution also adds some perspectiveto the issue of bilateral debt relief. Heavily indebted poor countries(the countries eligible for consideration under the current enhancedHeavily Indebted Poor Country Initiative—HIPC) owe only 5 percentof publicly held developing-country debt. Thus, even 100 percentbilateral debt relief to these countries (without government compen-sation to the relevant institutions) would pose no threat to thefinancial integrity of any of Canada’s public lending institutions.

Canadian commercial banks’ claims on developing-country institu-tions are even more unevenly distributed than publicly held debt. Ofthe 92 percent of commercial bank claims that could be allocated tospecific countries, none was assigned to LLDCs. Only 8.7 percentwere claims on OLICs, and the remaining 91.3 percent constitutedclaims on the Remaining Countries. Given these banks’ desire tominimize risk, their aversion to lending in low income countries (inwhich financial, legal, and other infrastructure is usually poor) is

not surprising. However, the resulting limited availability of bothpublic and commercial bank credit to low income countries accentu-ates the importance of grants and multilateral debt in bridging thegap between domestic savings and needed investment in these coun-tries.

The stock of Canadian foreign direct investment (FDI) in developingcountries barely increased between 1997 and 1998 (1.2 percentonly). However, there appears to be an ongoing regional concentra-tion of FDI. The Americas’ share of Canadian-owned capital in devel-oping countries increased from 68 to 77 percent, while the otherthree regions experienced net divestment (Africa, 74 percent; Asia,25 percent; and Eastern Europe, 8 percent).

Purveyors of development financing, such as the World Bank, haverepeatedly emphasized the importance of well functioning bureau-cratic, financial, legal, and material infrastructure in attractingsignificant levels of (nonmining-sector) FDI. The distribution ofCanadian FDI by country income group supports that view.3

Canadian FDI to the LLDCs—countries with extremely limited infra-structure—is insignificant. The OLICs, with slightly better but stilllimited infrastructure, account for 15 percent of Canadian FDIstocks, leaving 85 percent to the Remaining Countries.

A good indicator of the increasing integration of Northern andSouthern economies (part of what is referred to as “globalization”)is the increasing value of developing-country FDI in Canada. In1998, $1.9 billion of the FDI stock in Canada originated from devel-oping countries. This total was only about 8 percent of Canadian FDIin developing countries, and is less than 1 percent of total FDI inCanada from all sources. Nevertheless, it represents an 86 percentincrease over the previous year. However, that FDI comes from a verysmall group of emerging market economies (Brazil, Mexico, China,and Malaysia) and an offshore banking centre (Panama).

1 The Corporate Account refers to a portfolio of loans, insurance guarantees, etc. provided at market rates and funded through the sale of debt instruments on inter-national capital markets. The Canada Account refers to a portfolio of both market-rate and concessional loans funded from resources provided by the Governmentof Canada.

2 This does not include the Canadian Wheat Board’s (CWB) claims and a small amount of EDC’s Corporate Account claims because of the limitations of availabledata. However, given the sample of countries with CWB exposure, there is little reason to believe that the CWB’s claims are not similarly distributed.

3 Only FDI whose specific country destination could be ascertained is counted here(96.5 percent of the total).

T A B L E 8 C A N A D I A N F I N A N C I A L R E L AT I O N S W I T H D E V E L O P I N G C O U N T R I E S ( 1 9 9 8 )

FDI StocksAbroad29%

Bank Claims48%

Publicly Held Debt

23%

CIDA 2%

EDC CanadaAccount

3%

Canadian Wheat Board

9%EDC

Corporate Account

9%

Figure 8.1

Distribution of Canadian Claimson Developing Countries

S TAT I S T I C S 2 0 0 0 73

T A B L E 8 C A N A D I A N F I N A N C I A L R E L A T I O N S W I T H D E V E L O P I N G C O U N T R I E S ( 1 9 9 8 )(In millions of Canadian dollars)

AFRICAAlgeria 48.69 65.20 10.88 523.00 >zero 881.00 ~ ~ 27 908 ~ ~Angola 0 0 0 4.90 0 4.90 ~ ~ ~ 5 ~ ~Benin 0 0 0 ~ 0 0.70 ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ ~Botswana 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Burkina Faso 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Burundi 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Cameroon 0 6.58 20.53 433.00 0 440.10 ~ ~ ~ 440 ~ ~Cape Verde 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Central African Republic 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Chad 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Comoros 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Congo-Brazzaville 0 1.24 3.09 55.00 0 58.30 ~ ~ ~ 58 ~ ~Congo-Kinshasa (Zaire) 0 0 0 ~ 0 36.80 ~ ~ ~ 37 ~ ~Côte d’Ivoire 0 0 0 250.90 0 250.90 ~ ~ ~ 251 ~ ~Djibouti 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Egypt 45.00 0 16.29 ~ >zero 316.60 ~ ~ ~ 317 ~ ~Equatorial Guinea 0 0 0 ~ 0.50 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Eritrea 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Ethiopia 0 0 0 ~ 0.50 0.50 ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ ~Gabon 0 21.63 14.98 ~ 0 108.40 ~ ~ ~ 108 ~ ~Gambia 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Ghana 0 0 0 18.20 0 18.20 ~ ~ ~ 18 ~ ~Guinea 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Guinea-Bissau 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Kenya 0 9.57 10.72 62.60 0 82.90 ~ ~ ~ 83 ~ ~Lesotho 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Liberia 0 0 0 ~ 0 4.50 ~ ~ ~ 5 ~ ~Libya 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Madagascar 0 34.90 10.22 ~ 0 34.90 ~ ~ ~ 35 ~ ~Malawi 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Mali 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Mauritania 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Mauritius 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Morocco 12.49 104.48 152.34 38.30 0 308.10 ~ ~ ~ 308 ~ ~Mozambique 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Namibia 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Niger 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Nigeria 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Rwanda 0 5.50 6.08 ~ 0 5.50 ~ ~ ~ 6 ~ ~São Tomé and Principe 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Senegal 0 0 0 5.00 0 5.00 ~ ~ ~ 5 ~ ~Seychelles 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Sierra Leone 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Somalia 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~South Africa 0 0 0 ~ 0 243.80 ~ ~ 754 998 170 ~Sudan 0 14.00 0 ~ 0 14.00 ~ ~ ~ 14 ~ ~Swaziland 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Tanzania 0 70.00 0.95 ~ 0 70.00 ~ ~ ~ 70 ~ ~Togo 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Tunisia 83.09 0 0 ~ 0 97.00 ~ ~ ~ 97 ~ ~Uganda 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Zambia 0 25.90 0 10.10 52.70 88.70 ~ ~ ~ 89 ~ ~Zimbabwe 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ 32 ~Africa Unspecified 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ 18 562 562 ~ ~Total Africa 189.27 359.01 246.07 1,401.00 >zero 3,070.80 0 18 1,343 4,414 202 0

31-Mar-99 31-Mar-99 31-Mar-99 31-Dec-98 31-Jul-98 31-Mar-99 30-Sep-98 31-Oct-98 30-Sep-98 1998 1998 1998

Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

Stoc

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Gross Exposure(Designated LDCs only)

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Non

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PUBLIC OR OFFICIAL DEBT PRIVATE OR COMMERCIAL DEBT TOTAL FDI

➤

AMERICASAntigua and Barbuda 0 0 0 ~ 0 54.60 ~ ~ ~ 55 ~ ~Argentina 0.35 89.02 0 ~ 0 529.70 988 240 5,028 5,558 2,239 ~Belize 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Bolivia 0.98 0 0 ~ 0 5.60 ~ ~ 5 11 52 ~Brazil 5.16 6.59 0 707.00 >zero 923.60 623 591 2,698 3,622 2,827 349Chile 1.83 0 0 ~ 0 471.80 769 ~ 1,444 1,916 4,221 ~Colombia 0.51 0 0 557.00 0 556.40 363 ~ ~ 919 796 ~Costa Rica 13.63 0 0 ~ 0 16.50 ~ ~ ~ 17 ~ ~Cuba 9.55 61.13 0 ~ 0 78.20 ~ ~ ~ 78 ~ ~Dominica 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Dominican Republic 5.87 0 0 ~ 0 1.30 ~ >zero ~ 1 133 ~Ecuador 6.94 3.05 0 ~ 0 39.50 ~ >zero ~ 40 55 ~El Salvador 0.73 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Grenada 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Guatemala 2.83 0 0 ~ 0 22.80 ~ ~ ~ 23 ~ ~Guyana 0 0 0 ~ 0 2.90 ~ ~ ~ 3 ~ ~Haiti 0 0 0 ~ 2.40 2.40 ~ ~ ~ 2 ~ ~Honduras 0 0 0 ~ 0 29.20 ~ ~ ~ 29 ~ ~Jamaica 22.40 5.60 10.91 57.10 5.10 101.10 ~ ~ ~ 101 ~ ~Mexico 0.05 1.72 18.15 625.00 0 676.70 858 ~ 4,667 5,344 2,246 464Nicaragua 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Panama 0 0 0 ~ 0 2.10 ~ >zero 675 677 160 97Paraguay 0.36 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Peru 0.06 3.30 0 758.50 24.20 786.00 ~ >zero 298 1,084 1,271 ~St Kitts and Nevis 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~St Lucia 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~St Vincent/Grenadines 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Suriname 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Trinidad and Tobago 0 0 0 ~ 0 14.30 ~ ~ 1,378 1,392 ~ ~Uruguay 0 0 0 ~ 0 0.80 ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ ~Venezuela 0 24.37 0 500.00 0 538.80 38 300 682 1,221 401 ~Caribbean Unspecified 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 1,593 45 ~ 1,638 ~ ~Latin America Unspecified 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 45 217 ~ 262 ~ ~Americas Unspecified 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ 8,839 262 ~ ~Total Americas 71.23 194.78 29.05 3,204.60 31.70 4,854.30 5,277 1,393 25,714 30,568 14,401 910

ASIAAfghanistan 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Armenia 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Azerbaijan 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Bahrain 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Bangladesh 0 0 0 ~ 0 0.60 ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ ~Bhutan 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Burma (Myanmar) 8.31 0 0 ~ 0 8.30 ~ ~ ~ 8 ~ ~Cambodia 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~China ~ 89.07 673.47 1,221.00 >zero 2,415.70 40 ~ 994 3,410 464 178Georgia 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~India 508.35 0 77.06 ~ 0 879.30 ~ ~ 973 1,852 226 ~Indonesia 216.63 0 48.57 845.00 >zero 1,131.50 15 ~ ~ 1,147 1,887 ~Iran 0 0 0 ~ >zero 160.60 ~ ~ ~ 161 ~ ~Iraq 0 0 0 ~ >zero 702.10 ~ ~ ~ 702 ~ ~Jordan 0 0 0 ~ 0 27.70 ~ ~ ~ 28 ~ ~Kazakhstan 0 4.90 0 ~ 0 24.40 ~ ~ ~ 24 223 ~Kuwait 0 0 0 ~ 0 13.20 ~ ~ ~ 13 ~ ~Kyrghzstan 0 0 0 ~ 0 69.20 ~ ~ ~ 69 ~ ~Laos 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Lebanon 0 0 0 ~ 0 1.70 ~ ~ ~ 2 ~ ~Malaysia 5.10 0 0 ~ 0 5.00 28 ~ 834 839 216 161Maldives 0 0 0 ~ 0 12.30 ~ ~ ~ 12 ~ ~Mongolia 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~


Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12

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Non

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74

Table 8 (continued)

➤

S TAT I S T I C S 2 0 0 0 75

Nepal 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~North Korea 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Oman 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Pakistan 447.51 0 10.52 ~ >zero 637.90 ~ ~ ~ 638 ~ ~Papua New Guinea 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Philippines 2.61 0 0 145.40 0 148.10 ~ ~ 594 742 370 ~Qatar 0 0 0 ~ 0 53.00 ~ ~ ~ 53 ~ ~Saudi Arabia 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ 485 485 ~ ~Sri Lanka 123.10 0 0 ~ 0 123.10 ~ ~ ~ 123 ~ ~Syria 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Tajikistan 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Thailand 25.83 0 25.42 ~ 0 899.10 160 ~ 897 1,796 ~ ~Turkey 3.71 0 164.66 >zero 0 434.60 ~ ~ ~ 435 ~ ~Turkmenistan 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~United Arab Emirates 0 0 0 ~ 0 10.10 ~ ~ ~ 10 ~ ~Uzbekistan 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Vietnam 0 0 0 ~ 0 2.90 ~ ~ ~ 3 ~ ~West Bank and Gaza 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Yemen 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Oceania 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Asia Unspecified 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 50 ~ 914 914 ~ ~Total Asia 1,341.14 93.97 999.71 2,066.00 >zero 7,760.40 293 0 5,691 13,451 3,386 339

EASTERN EUROPEAlbania 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Belarus 0 0 0 ~ 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Bosnia Herzegovina 0 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Bulgaria 0 0 0 ~ 0 32.70 ~ ~ ~ 33 ~ ~Croatia 0 0 0 ~ ~ 55.50 ~ ~ ~ 56 ~ ~Czech Republic 0 0 0 ~ 0 1.20 ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ ~Estonia 0 0 0 ~ 0 2.80 ~ ~ ~ 3 ~ ~Hungary 0 0 0 ~ 0 7.20 ~ ~ ~ 7 ~ ~Latvia 0 0 0 ~ 0 3.20 ~ ~ ~ 3 ~ ~Lithuania 0 2.33 0 ~ 0 2.30 ~ ~ ~ 2 ~ ~Macedonia, FYR 0 0 0 ~ ~ 0.80 ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ ~Moldova 0 0 0 ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Poland 0 0 0 ~ >zero 3,523.80 ~ >zero 70 3,594 ~ ~Romania 0 275.52 0 ~ 0 339.30 ~ ~ ~ 339 ~ ~Russian Federation 0 96.98 0 120.00 >zero 2,514.90 ~ ~ 134 2,649 648 ~Slovak Republic 0 0 0 ~ 0 18.30 ~ ~ ~ 18 ~ ~Slovenia 0 0 0 ~ ~ 15.20 ~ ~ ~ 15 ~ ~Ukraine 0 0 0 ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Ex-Yugoslavia 0 0 0 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Europe Unspecified 0 0 0 ~ 0 ~ ~ 34 658 34 ~ ~Total Eastern Europe 0 374.83 0 120.00 >zero 6,517.20 0 34 862 7,379 648 0

Developing Country Unspecified 6,933.56 6,933.56 3,019 9,953 3,887 684Total Developing Countries 1,601.64 1,022.59 1,274.83 6,791.60 6,933.56 22,202.70 5,570 1,445 36,629 58,832 22,524 1,933Of which:LLDCs 8.31 150.30 17.24 15.00 >zero 284.10 ~ ~ 0 284.10 0 0Other Low Income Countries 1,340.59 98.64 836.65 2,146.80 >zero 5,640.20 ~ ~ 1,967.00 7,622.20 2,609 178Remaining Countries 252.74 773.65 420.95 4,629.80 >zero 9,344.84 ~ ~ 20,670.00 39,200.84 16,028 1,071

Note: Bold-italicized countries are not ODA eligible (see Technical Notes).

Sources: Canada, Public Accounts of Canada 1998-99; Export Development Corporation, 1998 Annual Report; Canadian Wheat Board, 1997-98 Annual Report; Royal Bank of Canada, 1998Annual Report; Bank of Nova Scotia, 1998 Annual Report; Statistics Canada, Balance of Payments Division; Department of Finance, International Finance and Economic Analysis Division; Bank of Canada Review, Spring 1999.


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76

Developing countries continue to account for an increasing pro-portion of Canada’s immigration intake. In doing so, not only dothey provide needed human capital in the context of an aging work-force, but the resulting filial and cultural ties offer potentialeconomic, social, and political opportunities for Canada. Averageannual immigration into Canada in the 1996-98 period was 204,708,of which the developing countries’ share was 69.8 percent (142,894).Over the previous decade (estimated from 1988 to the 1996-98 aver-age) immigration into Canada increased at an average annual rateof 2.3 percent. Immigration from developing countries, however,increased at an average annual rate of 4.2 percent, while immigra-tion from developed countries other than the United States declinedat an average rate of 0.7 percent a year. Immigration from theUnited States fell at an average rate of 3.7 percent.

Asia, Eastern Europe, and Africa accounted for all the growth inimmigration over the past decade, while the Americas, the UnitedStates, and other developed countries (Western Europe and Japan)registered declines. The disparity in average growth rates betweenregions was much smaller for the 1988 to 1996-98 period than forthe 1987 to 1995-97 period, however, indicating that the moredramatic shifts in the regions of origin of immigrants to Canada took place before 1988. The growth rate for Asia fell from 7.3 to6.2 percent, for Eastern Europe from 7.6 to 4.7 percent, and forAfrica from 5.0 to 3.9 percent. The rates of decline were similarlyless dramatic, falling to 2.8 from 4.2 percent for the Americas,3.6 percent from 4.0 for the United States, and 0.7 from 2.2 percentfor the other developed countries.

Table 9.1 Immigration to Canada by Region

Number of Immigrants % of World Region Immigrants (%) Population (1997)

Africa 14,433 7.1 13.2Americas 16,307 8.0 8.4Asia 90,267 44.1 57.6Eastern Europe 21,887 10.7 5.8

Table 9.1 shows the regional imbalance that still existed in Canada’simmigrant intake in 1996-98. Africa clearly remained considerablyunder-represented, and Asia—although it accounted for a largeabsolute percentage of total Canadian immigration—also made upmuch less than its share of the world population would indicate.Eastern Europe, on the other hand, accounted for nearly twice aslarge a percentage of Canadian immigration as its share of worldpopulation.

The four broad classes of immigrants—independent, business,refugee, and family—constituted 36.7, 9.1, 13.8, and 40.3 percentof immigration, respectively. Figure 9.1 shows how these classeswere distributed across regions. Immigrants from Africa were nearlyequally distributed between the family, refugee, and independentclasses (33.3, 32.3, and 31.0 percent, respectively) while businessclass immigrants accounted for only 3.4 percent. Family class immi-grants were the dominant group from the Americas (65.6 percent);refugee and independent class immigrants accounted for most of the

remainder. Asian migrants came in mostly through the family andindependent categories (42.6 and 37.8 percent, respectively) withrefugees and business migrants together accounting for less than20 percent (15.1 and 4.5, respectively). Independent class migrantsmade up the largest group from Eastern Europe (41.3 percent). Therewas also a substantial proportion of refugees (31.6 percent) andfamily class migrants (26.2 percent), but almost no business classimmigrants.

The regional specialization suggested in Figure 9.1 also translatesinto country income group specialization for some classes of immi-grants. Refugees came overwhelmingly from developing countries(96.5 percent), while business class immigrants came mainly fromthe US and other developed countries (72.3 percent). Family andindependent class immigrants were more proportionately distributedacross country income groups (with the exception of LLDCs thataccounted for less than their share of all classes except refugees).

The overall gender distribution of immigrants from developingcountries is remarkably close (48.9 percent male, 51.1 percentfemale) but this hides significant differences among classes andregions. Male immigrants predominate in the refugee, independent,and business classes (and particularly so in the refugee class) while female immigrants predominate in the family class. Thismigration pattern is quite common. Male migrants are more likely to seek immigration or refugee status in Canada and, once viableresidency is established, spouses and other family members follow.Among the regions, women and girls make up a significant majorityof immigrants from the Americas and Eastern Europe (54.2 and53.2 percent, respectively), and are a slight majority among Asianimmigrants (50.5 percent). However, men and boys account for morethan half (52.1 percent) of immigrants from Africa. Since genderand class combinations of migrants differ from region to region (forexample, the class distribution of migrants is similar for Africa andEurope but the gender distribution is opposite), the gender and classassociations at the overall level do not readily translate into pre-dictable regional patterns.

T A B L E 9 M O V E M E N T O F P E O P L E S

0%

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EasternEurope

Asia AmericasAfrica

Independent Business Refugee Family

Figure 9.1

Immigration to Canada by Class and Region

S TAT I S T I C S 2 0 0 0 77

TABLE 9 M OV E M E N T O F P E O P L E S : I M M I G R AT I O N TO C A NA DA F R O M D E V E L O P I N G C O U N T R I E SBY I M M I G R AT I O N C L A S S A N D G E N D E R

(Average of last three years available, 1996-98)

AFRICAAlgeria 71 123 194 381 219 600 8 9 17 509 415 924 969 766 1,736 277 20.14Angola 2 1 3 21 9 29 0 0 0 1 1 2 24 10 34 47 (3.19)Benin 6 5 10 2 0 3 0 0 0 5 3 7 13 8 21 20 0.33Botswana 2 2 4 1 0 1 0 0 0 15 14 28 18 15 33 31 0.63Burkina Faso 2 3 5 3 1 4 0 0 0 2 1 3 7 5 12 12 (0.28)Burundi 4 5 9 117 115 232 0 0 0 2 1 3 123 121 243 32 22.49Cameroon 22 21 43 17 12 29 2 2 4 33 20 53 75 54 129 20 20.49Cape Verde 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 5 3 4 7 0 ~Central African Republic 3 2 5 2 0 2 1 1 2 2 2 4 8 5 12 5 9.45Chad 3 2 6 17 5 22 0 0 0 1 0 1 22 7 29 4 21.77Comoros 1 0 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 4 2 7.18Congo-Brazzaville 5 2 6 10 5 15 0 0 0 1 2 3 16 8 25 2 28.56Congo-Kinshasa (Zaire) 48 57 105 300 270 570 3 3 6 15 10 24 366 339 705 100 21.57Côte d’Ivoire 30 22 52 14 6 20 1 1 2 25 16 42 70 46 116 106 0.91Djibouti 8 11 19 14 14 28 0 2 2 1 0 2 23 27 50 13 14.50Egypt 231 316 547 137 109 246 69 65 134 603 379 981 1,039 869 1,908 1,076 5.90Equatorial Guinea 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2.92Eritrea 17 28 45 5 7 12 0 0 0 1 0 1 23 35 58 1 50.09Ethiopia 143 264 406 171 152 322 0 0 0 23 19 42 336 435 771 1,531 (6.63)Gabon 6 5 11 1 1 1 1 0 1 2 2 4 10 7 17 10 5.65Gambia 3 8 11 1 2 3 1 1 2 5 2 7 10 13 23 2 27.48Ghana 365 419 784 124 90 214 1 1 2 77 55 132 567 565 1,132 380 11.54Guinea 12 12 25 18 12 30 0 0 0 6 4 10 37 28 65 12 18.47Guinea-Bissau 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 1 7.18Kenya 83 119 202 68 65 133 5 6 11 44 52 96 201 242 443 1,321 (10.35)Lesotho 1 0 1 1 1 2 0 0 0 2 1 3 3 3 6 11 (5.88)Liberia 7 1 8 32 19 51 1 0 2 2 0 3 43 21 64 10 20.40Libya 16 26 42 21 4 25 6 6 12 73 60 133 116 96 212 58 13.82Madagascar 3 6 9 2 1 2 0 1 2 11 12 22 16 20 36 44 (2.08)Malawi 4 2 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 7 8 5 13 25 (6.57)Mali 12 11 23 4 3 8 0 0 0 7 3 10 24 18 41 6 21.29Mauritania 2 1 3 2 2 4 0 0 0 2 0 2 6 3 9 4 8.45Mauritius 30 41 71 0 0 0 4 3 8 31 24 55 65 68 134 478 (11.96)Morocco 168 210 378 7 6 13 55 54 109 300 211 512 530 482 1,012 734 3.26Mozambique 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 2 4 19 (15.17)Namibia 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 4 2 6 5 3 8 12 (3.58)Niger 4 1 4 1 1 2 2 0 2 3 2 5 9 4 13 2 20.58Nigeria 100 100 200 134 90 223 9 8 17 108 85 193 351 283 634 234 10.49Rwanda 8 11 19 73 80 152 0 0 0 5 6 11 85 96 182 71 9.85São Tomé and Principe 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 0Senegal 25 15 41 8 8 16 6 7 14 22 15 37 62 45 107 28 14.38Seychelles 4 6 10 2 2 4 0 0 0 3 3 6 9 11 20 17 1.81Sierra Leone 10 14 24 13 13 26 1 1 2 10 9 19 33 36 70 26 10.36Somalia 84 108 192 431 499 930 0 1 1 15 10 24 530 617 1,148 226 17.64South Africa 275 327 602 1 2 3 49 49 98 543 500 1,043 868 878 1,745 1,666 0.47Sudan 16 39 55 376 208 584 3 1 4 33 23 57 429 271 700 92 22.50Swaziland 1 2 3 1 4 6 1 1 1 0 0 1 3 7 10 13 (2.27)Tanzania 53 68 121 5 5 10 4 6 11 23 25 48 85 105 190 460 (8.48)Togo 6 7 13 21 11 32 0 0 0 7 3 10 34 21 55 14 14.73Tunisia 40 46 86 8 6 14 5 3 8 94 43 137 148 98 246 144 5.49Uganda 7 11 18 9 8 17 0 0 0 5 3 8 21 22 43 152 (11.93)Zambia 16 17 33 7 10 16 2 1 3 28 28 56 53 56 109 179 (4.87)Zimbabwe 10 10 20 2 2 4 1 1 2 11 10 20 23 23 46 147 (11.03)Total Africa 1,971 2,509 4,479 2,588 2,077 4,666 243 239 482 2,722 2,084 4,806 7,524 6,908 14,433 9,879 3.86

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78

AMERICASAntigua and Barbuda 10 12 21 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 4 11 14 25 39 (4.35)Argentina 64 81 146 31 29 60 43 38 81 98 87 185 236 236 472 429 0.96Belize 8 10 19 1 1 2 2 2 4 2 2 5 14 15 29 54 (6.03)Bolivia 12 19 31 8 10 18 0 0 0 3 5 8 22 34 56 60 (0.63)Brazil 73 142 215 3 5 8 34 31 65 158 131 289 269 308 577 432 2.94Chile 70 114 184 29 34 63 1 0 1 32 29 61 132 177 309 952 (10.64)Colombia 62 122 184 23 24 47 30 28 59 174 150 324 289 324 613 369 5.21Costa Rica 31 48 79 11 10 21 0 0 1 13 11 25 56 70 126 184 (3.74)Cuba 105 202 307 117 81 198 1 0 1 13 10 23 236 293 529 88 19.65Dominica 22 19 41 0 0 0 1 1 2 4 9 13 27 29 56 76 (2.95)Dominican Republic 109 132 241 5 5 10 0 0 0 5 3 9 119 141 260 362 (3.26)Ecuador 102 129 231 24 28 52 2 2 4 15 15 29 143 173 316 259 2.02El Salvador 129 189 318 115 105 220 1 1 1 26 24 50 270 319 589 2,716 (14.17)Grenada 109 125 234 2 5 7 0 0 0 33 71 104 145 201 346 169 7.42Guatemala 86 112 198 154 142 296 2 1 4 17 15 32 259 270 529 695 (2.69)Guyana 688 921 1,609 10 12 22 2 3 5 43 61 104 743 996 1,739 2,833 (4.76)Haiti 569 670 1,239 113 142 255 0 0 0 42 54 96 725 865 1,590 1,781 (1.13)Honduras 34 56 90 53 48 101 2 3 5 16 15 31 105 122 227 106 7.93Jamaica 1,146 1,229 2,375 1 3 4 3 5 8 126 221 347 1,276 1,457 2,733 3,878 (3.44)Mexico 282 429 712 60 56 116 42 41 82 290 239 529 674 766 1,439 928 4.49Nicaragua 31 46 76 37 42 79 0 0 0 14 13 27 81 101 182 987 (15.55)Panama 15 20 35 10 5 15 1 1 2 7 8 14 32 34 66 22 11.67Paraguay 10 10 20 2 2 4 13 17 30 4 2 5 29 31 60 130 (7.44)Peru 109 151 261 144 154 297 6 4 11 32 45 77 291 355 646 1,271 (6.55)St Kitts and Nevis 8 3 10 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 3 4 10 6 16 42 (9.01)St Lucia 27 40 67 1 0 1 0 0 0 9 15 23 36 55 91 85 0.72St Vincent/Grenadines 68 95 163 0 3 4 0 0 0 15 47 62 83 146 229 128 5.97Suriname 9 12 21 2 2 4 1 0 1 3 6 10 15 21 36 26 3.31Trinidad and Tobago 601 695 1,296 7 10 16 15 10 25 179 186 365 802 901 1,702 2,229 (2.66)Uruguay 22 21 43 21 15 36 2 2 5 21 19 39 66 57 123 100 2.09Venezuela 84 144 227 76 81 157 11 12 23 100 85 185 271 322 593 330 6.03Total Americas 4,695 5,997 10,693 1,060 1,054 2,114 218 204 422 1,496 1,583 3,079 7,469 8,838 16,307 21,760 (2.84)

ASIAAfghanistan 73 114 187 869 773 1,643 1 1 2 30 24 55 974 913 1,887 1,033 6.21Armenia 9 19 27 11 13 24 1 1 2 20 17 37 41 49 89 na naAzerbaijan 3 5 7 14 12 26 1 0 1 8 5 12 25 21 46 na naBahrain 32 32 65 1 1 2 8 6 14 128 110 237 169 149 318 104 11.83Bangladesh 355 435 790 497 338 835 10 8 18 460 328 787 1,321 1,109 2,430 454 18.27Bhutan 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 0Burma (Myanmar) 16 16 32 60 34 94 2 0 2 5 3 8 82 53 135 57 9.03Cambodia 61 152 213 5 8 13 2 1 3 2 2 3 69 163 232 1,556 (17.32)China 2,142 3,838 5,980 1,136 928 2,063 488 490 978 4,954 4,596 9,550 8,720 9,851 18,572 2,783 20.90Georgia 5 7 12 11 13 24 0 1 1 11 12 24 27 33 61 na naIndia 6,111 7,041 13,152 668 437 1,106 123 106 229 2,543 1,632 4,175 9,445 9,216 18,661 10,316 6.11Indonesia 26 50 76 1 0 1 32 34 66 18 16 34 77 101 178 263 (3.85)Iran 634 837 1,471 965 738 1,703 380 352 732 1,506 1,256 2,761 3,485 3,182 6,667 3,750 5.92Iraq 106 184 290 788 427 1,215 30 29 59 78 72 150 1,003 712 1,715 531 12.44Jordan 153 203 356 44 41 85 111 93 203 313 231 544 621 567 1,188 146 23.32Kazakhstan 15 27 43 79 89 168 1 3 4 173 176 349 268 295 563 na naKuwait 90 94 184 83 60 143 175 141 316 386 333 719 734 628 1,362 783 5.69Kyrghzstan 2 5 8 3 5 9 1 1 2 11 13 25 18 25 43 na naLaos 4 20 24 2 1 3 0 0 0 1 1 1 6 22 28 848 (28.98)Lebanon 269 493 762 146 92 238 32 30 61 229 130 359 676 745 1,421 3,141 (7.63)Malaysia 58 108 166 7 8 15 6 6 12 43 39 82 114 160 275 1,671 (16.52)Maldives 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 2 0 na

Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

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Table 9 (continued)

➤


S TAT I S T I C S 2 0 0 0 79

Country 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

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ASIA (continued)

Mongolia 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 2 3 2 2 4 0 naNepal 13 14 28 3 1 4 2 3 4 47 36 84 65 54 120 14 23.93North Korea 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 (3.97)Oman 35 30 65 1 1 2 4 2 6 77 71 149 117 104 221 44 17.52Pakistan 1,372 1,500 2,873 484 342 827 322 284 605 2,920 1,777 4,696 5,098 3,903 9,001 1,236 21.96Papua New Guinea 2 2 5 0 1 1 2 1 3 6 6 12 11 10 21 15 3.42Philippines 2,931 2,953 5,884 6 5 11 28 30 58 1,681 2,992 4,672 4,645 5,980 10,625 8,265 2.54Qatar 23 22 45 2 2 4 14 12 25 99 79 178 138 115 253 147 5.58Saudi Arabia 195 172 367 18 14 32 144 117 262 1,061 875 1,936 1,419 1,178 2,597 873 11.52Sri Lanka 531 1,092 1,623 1,626 1,269 2,895 5 3 8 163 139 302 2,325 2,503 4,828 2,405 7.22Syria 105 168 273 48 36 84 47 42 89 178 124 302 379 370 749 590 2.41Tajikistan 0 1 1 19 15 34 0 0 0 2 0 2 21 16 37 na naThailand 38 96 134 21 12 33 6 5 11 17 31 47 81 144 225 158 3.61Turkey 130 166 295 87 52 139 22 21 43 129 92 221 367 331 698 339 7.49Turkmenistan 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 2 4 3 3 6 na naUnited Arab Emirates 300 273 572 11 12 23 125 113 238 793 671 1,464 1,229 1,069 2,297 927 9.50Uzbekistan 4 11 14 10 16 26 0 1 1 22 22 44 36 50 86 na naVietnam 557 1,342 1,899 20 20 40 0 0 0 9 12 21 587 1,374 1,961 6,289 (11.00)West Bank and Gaza 10 15 24 2 1 3 2 2 3 8 5 13 21 22 43 na naYemen 14 22 36 19 17 35 7 7 14 24 19 43 63 64 127 19 20.95Oceania 208 252 460 3 5 8 7 11 17 6 5 11 223 272 496 568 (1.35)Total Asia 16,635 21,812 38,447 7,770 5,842 13,612 2,139 1,954 4,094 18,162 15,954 34,117 44,707 45,563 90,270 49,329 6.23

EASTERN EUROPEAlbania 16 27 43 34 27 61 0 0 0 102 98 200 152 152 304 1 77.15Belarus 16 25 41 4 3 7 0 0 0 164 152 316 184 180 364 na naBosnia Herzegovina 42 67 109 2,096 1,974 4,069 0 0 0 12 13 25 2,150 2,053 4,203 na naBulgaria 64 93 156 84 72 156 3 2 5 208 191 399 359 358 717 26 39.33Croatia 58 93 151 487 464 951 1 2 3 40 43 83 586 601 1,188 na naCzech Republic 22 70 92 8 6 14 2 2 3 29 52 80 60 130 190 13 30.76Estonia 8 14 22 19 21 40 1 1 2 33 31 64 62 67 128 na naHungary 67 116 183 7 7 14 7 6 12 78 65 143 159 193 352 1,206 (11.58)Latvia 15 23 38 12 8 20 1 1 2 80 71 151 107 103 210 na naLithuania 16 30 46 1 3 4 3 3 7 16 15 32 36 52 88 2 46.05Macedonia, FYR 28 46 73 4 5 9 1 0 1 12 7 19 45 58 102 na naMoldova 18 24 41 67 70 136 3 3 6 38 41 79 126 137 263 na naPoland 475 1,582 2,057 17 15 32 4 5 9 193 153 346 689 1,754 2,444 9,198 (12.41)Romania 326 539 866 119 66 185 9 10 19 1,268 1,170 2,438 1,723 1,785 3,508 1,423 9.44Russian Federation 235 384 620 207 201 408 35 36 70 1,264 1,126 2,390 1,741 1,747 3,488 623 18.80Slovak Republic 22 54 76 2 2 4 2 3 5 59 103 162 85 162 247 1 73.51Slovenia 4 9 13 11 11 22 1 2 3 7 4 11 23 26 49 na naUkraine 251 421 672 82 107 190 22 18 41 868 816 1,684 1,223 1,362 2,586 na naEx-Yugoslavia 167 277 444 335 251 586 1 3 5 223 197 420 727 728 1,455 1,336 0.86Total Eastern Europe 1,849 3,892 5,742 3,597 3,313 6,910 96 96 192 4,696 4,347 9,043 10,238 11,649 21,887 13,829 4.70

Total Developing Countries 25,150 34,211 59,361 15,016 12,286 27,302 2,696 2,493 5,189 27,077 23,968 51,045 69,939 72,958 142,896 94,797 4.19Of which:LLDC's 1,802 2,395 4,197 3,223 2,767 5,990 49 51 101 854 660 1,514 5,928 5,873 11,801 9,488 2.21Other Low Income Countries 12,281 16,851 29,132 4,518 3,470 7,988 1,059 1,004 2,064 11,524 8,841 20,365 29,383 30,166 59,549 30,376 6.96Remaining Countries 11,067 14,965 26,032 7,275 6,049 13,324 1,587 1,437 3,024 14,698 14,468 29,166 34,628 36,919 71,546 54,933 2.68Total Other Countries(excluding US) 9,687 11,081 20,769 469 443 913 6,736 6,565 13,301 11,444 10,852 22,296 28,336 28,942 57,278 61,416 (0.70)United States 855 1,504 2,359 33 42 75 105 94 199 981 918 1,900 1,974 2,559 4,533 6,561 (3.63)

Total World 35,693 46,796 82,489 15,518 12,772 28,290 9,536 9,152 18,689 39,502 35,739 75,241 100,249 104,459 204,708 162,774 2.32Note: Bold-italicized countries are not ODA eligible (see Technical Notes).

Source: Canada, Department of Citizenship and Immigration.

80

Canada has a wide variety of relationships with developing coun-tries. Some are defined mainly by commercial interests—the move-ment of goods (raw materials or finished products) or the provisionof services (tourism, education, etc.). Others revolve largely aroundthe provision of official development assistance and/or humanitar-ian assistance through nonofficial channels. Still other relationshipsare based on the presence of Canadian peacekeeping missions in thecountry. Counterpart to all these relationships is a set of humanlinkages shown by the significant number of Canadians who chooseto live and work in those countries; regular visits to these countriesby Canadians and by these countries’ nationals to Canada; the pres-ence of large numbers of these countries’ citizens studying inCanada; and the exchange of diplomatic personnel. Table 10attempts to quantify these human linkages.

As of September 1999, 103,429 Canadians were registered with 77 Canadian embassies or consulates and 26 offices abroad. This is almost 13,000 more than the number registered 17 months earlier (April 1998). However, because Canadians are generally not required to register with their country representatives when living or working abroad, this number is almost certainly well below the actual number. The five countries with the largest num-ber of registered Canadians either have relatively closed societies(Paraguay, China, Saudi Arabia), or experience major security issues(Lebanon, Haiti): of these five, only China and Haiti have strongcommercial, political, or cultural links with Canada (see Table 11).This suggests that securing access to the social networks andinstitutional protections provided by Canadian officialdom abroadmay be the main reason for registration.

For obvious reasons, the United States remains by far the mostfrequent destination for Canadians travelling abroad. However,between 1997 and 1998, despite a net increase in absolute num-bers, developing countries lost ground against other non-US desti-nations (mainly Western Europe) in the market for Canadian visi-tors. In 1997 developing countries accounted for 27.7 percent ofCanadian visits to non-US destinations; in 1998 that proportion was26.9 percent. In terms of visits to Canada by developing-countrycitizens, both the absolute and relative numbers dropped duringthat period. The number of visitors to Canada from developingcountries fell from 782,090 in 1997 to 705,871 in 1998 (a 10 per-cent decline). This was largely the result of a 27 percent decline inthe number of Asian visitors to Canada, a likely consequence of theeconomic recession in East Asia following the Asian financial crisis.

The 12 percent decline in the number of developing-countrystudents in Canada between the 1995-96 and 1996-97 academicyears did not carry into 1997-98. Their numbers were virtuallythe same in both years (14,793 in 1997-98 compared to 14,720 in1996-97). These students make up 45 percent of Canada’s foreignstudent population, the same percentage as students originatingfrom developed countries other than the US (Figure 10.1). Mostdeveloping-country students came from Asia and Africa (20 and16 percent, respectively). The Americas (7 percent) and EasternEurope (2 percent) retain limited representation.

Canadian diplomatic missions exist, of course, to represent Canadianinterest abroad. Similarly, other countries’ diplomatic missions inCanada are here to represent these countries’ interest. As mentionedearlier, those interests may have one of several motivations: givenCanada’s position as a middle power, however, one would expect tofind economic motivations dominant. As Table 10.1 suggests, thatappears to be the case: the staff complement of Canada’s diplomaticoffices abroad is quite closely correlated with Canada’s economicinterest in these countries. The five countries with the most staffare all rated in the top 10 in at least one of four areas of bilateraleconomic activity examined. Some countries, such as China andMexico, are near the top in all four categories. Economic motivesalso appear strongest for most developing countries: four of the fivecountries with the largest Canadian missions rank in the top five interms of the size of their missions in Canada.

T A B L E 1 0 H U M A N L I N K A G E S B E T W E E N C A N A D A A N D T H E D E V E L O P I N G W O R L D

OtherDevelopedCountries

45%

UnitedStates10%

DevelopingCountries

45%

Africa16%

Americas7%

Asia20%

Eastern Europe 2%

Figure 10.1

Origin of Canada’s Foreign Student Population

Table 10.1 Diplomatic Missions and Economic Activity

Rank (among developing countries) in terms of the size of:

Canada’s Canadian Foreign DirectDiplomatic Canada’s Canada’s Foreign Direct Investment in

Country Mission in Exports to Imports from Investment in Canada from

China 1 1 1 9 3India 2 9 8 12 -Russian Federation 3 15 10 8 -Philippines 4 22 6 11 -Mexico 5 2 2 3 1

S TAT I S T I C S 2 0 0 0 81

AFRICAAlgeria 555 1,200 1,577 81 28 109 • 12 • 13Angola 208 ~ 184 8 2 10 Zimbabwe 0 • 7Benin 114 2,500 270 73 35 108 Côte d’Ivoire 0 • 7Botswana 230 4,600 263 37 13 50 Office 0 ConsulateBurkina Faso 325 2,300 287 45 35 80 • 2 • 4Burundi 92 ~ 111 21 11 32 Kenya 0Cameroon 440 400 606 145 81 226 • 6 • 5Cape Verde 11 500 20 0 0 0 Senegal 0 ConsulateCentral African Republic 41 ~ 14 8 6 14 Office 0 ConsulateChad 42 300 45 24 4 28 Cameroon 0 ConsulateComoros 13 ~ 8 9 1 10 Tanzania 0 USACongo-Brazzaville 9 ~ 262 22 11 33 Gabon 0 ConsulateCongo-Kinshasa (Zaire) 432 ~ 210 111 34 145 • 3 • 5Côte d’Ivoire 921 2,300 910 219 97 316 • 12 • 10Djibouti 53 ~ 97 10 1 11 Office 0 USAEgypt 1,032 18,500 5,893 98 35 133 • 18 • 17Equatorial Guinea 29 ~ 23 0 0 0 Gabon 0 USAEritrea 78 ~ 0 0 0 0 Office 0 Office 1Ethiopia 449 500 627 24 8 32 • 6 • 2Gabon 302 800 617 119 58 177 • 2 • 5Gambia 70 1,000 48 195 50 245 Senegal 0 ConsulateGhana 349 900 1,229 138 54 192 • 13 • 5Guinea 488 1,100 621 85 49 134 • 3 • 6Guinea-Bissau 9 ~ 19 0 1 1 Senegal 0 ConsulateKenya 2,106 12,300 3,054 152 99 251 • 21 • 7Lesotho 62 700 57 7 2 9 Office 0 ConsulateLiberia 8 300 47 9 3 12 Côte d’Ivoire 0 ~ ~Libya 504 ~ 1,846 220 27 247 Tunisia 0 USAMadagascar 104 200 242 25 20 45 Office 0 • 7Malawi 320 500 182 19 9 28 Office 0 • 5Mali 258 1,100 431 60 31 91 • 2 • 3Mauritania 14 ~ 102 25 7 32 Office 0 • 3Mauritius 95 ~ 1,098 76 47 123 Office 0 ConsulateMoroccoa 1,039 36,700 6,800 532 187 719 • 8 • 16Mozambique 327 700 197 8 0 8 • 0 USANamibia 44 1,300 229 4 0 4 South Africa 0 ConsulateNiger 152 700 58 37 20 57 • 0 • 3Nigeria 1,246 1,600 1,811 88 50 138 • 3 • 8Rwanda 268 ~ 225 14 18 32 • 3 • 2São Tomé and Principe 5 ~ 0 0 1 1 Gabon 0 ConsulateSenegal 421 6,300 833 153 91 244 • 8 • 6Seychelles 26 ~ 75 5 5 10 Tanzania 0 ConsulateSierra Leone 20 ~ 40 15 7 22 Guinea 0 USASomalia 24 ~ 113 47 34 81 Kenya 0South Africa 2,038 25,500 22,411 50 25 75 • 18 • 10Sudan 217 500 178 12 9 21 Ethiopia 0 • 3Swaziland 82 1,100 55 5 5 10 South Africa 0 • 5Tanzania 542 8,300 921 89 39 128 • 6 • 4Togo 42 1,300 147 45 21 66 Office 0 • 6Tunisia 527 20,700 2,665 332 96 428 • 8 • 11Uganda 463 1,200 605 27 19 46 Office 0 • 3Zambia 377 3,800 436 20 6 26 • 2 USAZimbabwe 578 11,700 1,406 36 31 67 • 13 • 5Other Africa ~ 1,000 ~ ~ ~ ~Total Africa 18,201 174,400 60,205 3,584 1,523 5,107 23, plus 11 offices 169 31+13

consulates, plus 1 office 193

T A B L E 1 0 H U M A N L I N K A G E S B E T W E E N C A N A D A A N D T H E D E V E L O P I N G W O R L D

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AMERICASAntigua and Barbuda 140 65,700 1,321 14 18 32 Barbados 0 •b 3Argentina 2,574 22,800 22,347 50 49 99 • 13 • 14Belize 852 10,400 423 7 8 15 Office 0 ConsulateBolivia 1,904 6,800 942 11 2 13 • 1 • 3Brazil 2,890 26,300 60,581 190 173 363 • 16 • 16Chile 1,240 21,900 8,680 52 30 82 • 12 • 10Colombia 1,308 24,900 11,869 69 60 129 • 15 • 9Costa Rica 760 36,800 6,063 16 8 24 • 8 • 8Cuba 145 180,500 3,306 44 18 62 • 12 • 15Dominica 99 19,800 697 9 16 25 Barbados 0 •b

Dominican Republic 367 193,800 3,000 5 3 8 • 1 • 2Ecuador 679 6,700 2,246 65 30 95 • 2 • 5El Salvador 514 3,000 1,789 4 2 6 • 1 • 7Grenada 125 34,800 1,926 6 8 14 Barbados 0 •b

Guatemala 1,118 18,900 2,074 5 4 9 • 8 • 8Guyana 376 5,800 4,471 16 11 27 • 5 • 7Haiti 4,206 22,800 5,984 64 59 123 • 13 • 6Honduras 483 6,900 1,035 8 3 11 • 1 • 6Jamaica 654 85,800 17,098 40 48 88 • 14 • 8Mexico 2,349 710,100 119,583 318 287 605 • 25 • 44Nicaragua 261 2,500 588 4 7 11 • 1 ConsulatePanama 458 22,800 1,666 3 4 7 • 2 • 7Paraguay 7,984 4,100 833 6 8 14 Office 0 • 3Peru 1,203 18,100 4,813 33 26 59 • 12 • 11St Kitts and Nevis 106 47,300 435 7 6 13 Barbados 0 •b

St Lucia 157 55,900 1,661 22 36 58 Barbados 0 •b 1St Vincent/Grenadines 153 8,000 1,867 7 7 14 Barbados 0 •b

Suriname 36 700 148 0 1 1 Office 0 USATrinidad and Tobago 3,515 22,800 17,022 80 105 185 • 13 • 13Uruguay 499 5,900 2,569 10 7 17 • 2 • 3Venezuela 1,681 45,700 10,833 64 67 131 • 12 • 15Other Americas 0 17,900 ~ 19 11 30Total America 38,836 1,756,200 317,870 1,248 1,122 2,370 22, plus 3 offices 189 23, plus 224

2 consulates

ASIAAfghanistan 15 ~ 275 3 6 9 0Armenia 4 ~ 133 4 2 6 Office 0 • 4Azerbaijan 12 600 97 0 1 1 Turkey 0 USABahrain 197 400 974 24 16 40 Saudi Arabia 0 ConsulateBangladesh 323 1,800 1,963 85 17 102 • 9 • 4Bhutan 1 ~ 25 7 4 11 0Burma (Myanmar) 32 900 238 2 2 4 Thailand 0 • 4Cambodia 305 1,900 260 8 5 13 • 1Chinac 6,278 82,100 56,104 1,075 656 1,731 • 91 • 105Georgia 21 ~ 181 0 3 3 Turkey 0 USAIndia 1,692 38,600 48,283 538 182 720 • 48 • 23Indonesia 1,623 30,900 8,850 251 132 383 • 16 • 23Iran 213 2,400 5,506 455 105 560 • 10 • 15Iraq 50 ~ 211 9 5 14 Jordan 0 • 4Jordan 820 7,600 1,413 71 22 93 • 11 • 3Kazakhstan 134 2,000 526 5 9 14 • 2 Consulate 1Kuwait 2,181 1,100 2,767 80 32 112 • 4 • 4Kyrghzstan 154 400 122 1 1 2 Office 0 Consulate 0Laos 84 3,100 110 0 1 1 Thailand 0 USA 0Lebanon 7,390 5,400 4,889 89 30 119 • 7 • 3Malaysia 826 31,200 17,581 587 432 1,019 • 14 • 7Maldives 44 900 63 0 0 0 Sri Lanka 0Mongolia 38 300 180 0 0 0 Office 0 Consulate 1Nepal 139 4,900 449 27 11 38 India 1 ConsulateNorth Korea 11 ~ 71 67 67 134 0

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Table 10 (continued)

➤

S TAT I S T I C S 2 0 0 0 83

Oman 202 1,800 828 26 1 27 Office 0 USAPakistan 1,309 2,800 10,057 232 44 276 • 22 • 7Papua New Guinea 253 200 323 4 0 4 Office 0 ConsulatePhilippines 2,611 45,600 26,891 48 43 91 • 27 • 14Qatar 516 300 977 8 1 9 Kuwait 0 USASaudi Arabia 4,955 4,500 12,019 333 48 381 • 12 • 13Sri Lanka 267 3,400 2,004 78 55 133 • 7 • 6Syria 933 1,000 1,108 15 3 18 • 20 • 4Tajikistan 19 ~ 37 2 5 7 Kazakhstan 0Thailand 955 43,700 9,230 70 114 184 • 17 • 17Turkey 770 47,400 5,607 62 47 109 • 12 • 2Turkmenistan 8 ~ 19 0 0 0 Turkey 0 USAUnited Arab Emirates 3,044 4,900 6,489 17 7 24 • 7 • 0Uzbekistan 16 200 91 1 1 2 Office 0 USA 0Vietnam 265 11,100 2,050 71 44 115 • 9 • 9West Bank and Gaza 2,608 ~ ~ 6 3 9 0Yemen 274 400 320 2 0 2 Office 0 • 7Oceania 134 21,400 1,596 8 5 13 Office 0 ConsulateOther Asia ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~Total Asia 41,726 405,200 230,917 4,371 2,162 6,533 20, plus 8 offices 347 22 + 7 290

consulates

EASTERN EUROPEAlbania 85 ~ 255 4 2 6 Italy 0 ConsulateBelarus 3 1,400 1,139 3 1 4 Russia 0 • 3Bosnia Herzegovina 118 ~ ~ 1 2 3 • 2 • 1Bulgaria 39 6,000 1,447 32 24 56 Office 0 • 5Croatia 379 8,900 2,935 9 10 19 • 2 • 5Czech Republic 497 36,300 11,132 31 12 43 • 9 • 10Estonia 120 13,400 1,038 2 3 5 • 0 ConsulateHungary 565 35,600 14,896 30 15 45 • 8 • 7Latvia 150 3,100 871 3 4 7 • 2 • 3Lithuania 244 4,700 918 3 5 8 • 0 • 3Macedonia, FYR 108 ~ ~ 0 0 0 Office 0 • 4Moldova 6 ~ 98 0 1 1 Romania 0 ConsulatePoland 494 18,300 22,276 58 47 105 • 15 • 29Romania 466 7,400 6,093 66 70 136 • 10 • 14Russian Federation 516 27,400 13,267 123 84 207 • 41 • 44Slovak Republic 32 14,500 4,284 6 3 9 Office 1 • 6Slovenia 28 5,800 3,602 4 9 13 Office 0 • 3Ukraine 367 12,900 5,419 41 32 73 • 11 • 16Ex-Yugoslavia 449 5,900 6,217 24 19 43 • 20 • 6Total Eastern Europe 4,666 201,600 95,887 440 343 783 12 + 4 offices 121 16 + 3 159

consulates

Total Developing Countries 103,429 2,537,400 704,879 9,643 5,150 14,793 77+ 26 offices 826 93 + 4 862consulates,

1 officeOf which:LLDCs 11,444 90,200 16,515 1,315 606 1,921 51 92Other Low Income Countries 17,884 229,100 146,872 2,787 1,408 4,195 268 228Remaining Countries 74,101 2,218,100 541,492 5,541 3,136 8,677 507 547Total Other Countries(excluding US) 32,882 4,360,400 3,501,658 7,510 7,288 14,798 24 397 24 386United States 1,841 42,768,000 43,857,000 1,558 1,756 3,314 1 177 1 93

Total World 138,152 49,665,800 48,063,537 18,711 14,194 32,905 102 1,400 117 1,341Notes: Bold-italicized countries are not ODA eligible (see Technical Notes). a One student from Western Sahara has been included into the figure for Morocco.

b Antigua and Barbuda, Dominica, Grenada, St. Lucia, St. Kitts and Nevis and St. Vincent/Grenadines are represented by the Canadian Offices of the Organisation of Eastern Caribbean Statesc The increase in diplomatic personnel in China is attributed in part to the inclusion of the Hong Kong offices.d Does not include Consular Representatives in Canada.

Sources: Statistics Canada; Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Diplomatic, Consular and Other Representatives in Canada, 2000.

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ASIA (continued)

84

Data from previous tables has been used to construct a set ofindices that reflect developing-country shares of Canadian immi-gration, trade, and official assistance. A second set of indices hassimilarly been constructed to reflect migration to Canada, trade,and aid as proportions of each country’s population, GDP, andtotal aid receipts, respectively. The first three indices have beenused to construct a single composite index that is used to establishthe relative economic, social, and political importance of eachdeveloping country to Canada. The next three indices havesimilarly been merged into a composite index that indicates therelative importance of Canada to each developing country. Allthese are presented in Table 11.

The first composite index (Column 4) indicates that, among devel-oping countries, China is of greatest relative importance to Canada.China ranks among the top five countries in all three relevantindices (see Table 11.1). It is the second most important source ofimmigrants (an average of 18,572 in 1996-98), the most importanttrading partner ($10.1 billion worth), and the second most impor-tant aid recipient ($49.1 million). Mexico ranks second, largelybecause of its trading relationship with Canada ($9.1 billionworth), but its score on the composite index is much lowerthan that of China because it is not highly ranked in the othercategories. India, the Philippines, and Pakistan are ranked third,fourth, and fifth because of their importance as sources ofnew immigrants.

Ties to Canada appear to be of greatest importance for Jamaica.It receives 23.8 percent of its aid from Canada (and thus ranksfirst on the second aid index, Column 7) and its trade withCanada is equivalent to 5.5 percent of its GDP (giving it a rankof third on the second trade index, shown in Column 6). A signifi-cant proportion of that country’s population also immigrated toCanada in 1998 (it ranked sixth on the second immigration index).Guyana is second in terms of the perceived importance of Canadabecause of its second rank on the second immigration index andtop rank on the second trade index. Mexico, Cuba, and Cameroonround out the top five in that group, largely because of the impor-tance of Canada as an aid donor relative to other donors.

Mexico is the only country in the top five of both compositeindices, indicating the strong mutual relationships between itand Canada. From Canada’s perspective, Mexico’s importancederives largely from the trade relationship, but for Mexico, Canadais important largely because of the aid it provides. Although asan oil-exporting, middle-income country Mexico receives littleaid relative to its population, Canada contributed 17.1 percentof the aid it did receive in 1998.

Noticeably, the countries with high scores on the first immigrationindex are all large, with populations of more than 60 million in1998. Thus, despite the fact that Canada’s immigration intake fromthese countries is relatively large, this does not translate intosimilarly high scores on the second immigration index. Instead,the countries with high scores on that index are small, with 1998populations of less than 4 million: four—Grenada, Guyana,St. Vincent, and Trinidad and Tobago—have populations of less

than 1 million. In effect, the largest absolute numbers of immi-grants come from large countries, but the largest relative amountscome from small countries.

Malaysia is the only country that ranks in the top five on bothtrade indices, indicating its strong, mutually important, tradingrelationship with Canada. Valued at $2.5 billion, that relationshipaccounts for 5.3 percent of total Canadian trade with developingcountries and 3.4 percent of Malaysia’s GDP. Imports from Malaysia(mostly electronic equipment) are valued at just over $2 billionand exports of both primary and manufactured goods from Canadaare worth just under $0.5 billion (see Tables 6 and 7).

T A B L E 1 1 C A N A D A - D E V E L O P I N G C O U N T R Y L I N K A G E S I N D I C E S

Table 11.1

Rank Importance to Canada

(1) Immigration Trade Aid

1 India China Bangladesh

2 China Mexico China

3 Philippines Brazil Côte d'Ivoire

4 Pakistan Malaysia Cameroon

5 Iran Thailand Haiti

Canada’s Importance to the Country

(2) Immigration Trade Aid

1 Grenada Guyana Jamaica

2 Guyana Togo Mexico

3 St. Vincent Jamaica Cuba

4 Trinidad and Tobago Maldives Cameroon

5 Bosnia Herzegovina Malaysia Costa Rica

S TAT I S T I C S 2 0 0 0 85

1 China 12.997 21.857 4.333 13.062 1 Jamaica 1.068 3.911 23.755 9.5782 Mexico 1.007 19.593 0.210 6.937 2 Guyana 2.034 22.858 3.323 9.4053 India 13.059 2.832 1.173 5.688 3 Mexico 0.015 1.649 17.129 6.2644 Philippines 7.435 2.601 1.204 3.747 4 Cuba 0.047 ~ 11.149 3.7325 Pakistan 6.299 0.680 1.333 2.771 5 Cameroon 0.009 0.264 9.325 3.1996 Bangladesh 1.701 0.580 4.433 2.238 6 Costa Rica 0.032 1.697 6.454 2.7287 Brazil 0.404 5.678 0.283 2.122 7 Côte d’Ivoire 0.008 0.831 5.705 2.1818 Malaysia 0.192 5.332 0.318 1.947 8 Haiti 0.197 0.528 5.501 2.0759 Iran 4.666 0.899 0.000 1.855 9 Congo-Brazzaville 0.009 0.862 5.109 1.99310 Indonesia 0.124 3.157 1.530 1.604 10 St Lucia 0.601 1.465 3.770 1.94611 Côte d’Ivoire 0.081 0.276 3.774 1.377 11 Congo-Kinshasa (Zaire) 0.014 0.071 5.407 1.83112 Thailand 0.158 3.392 0.460 1.337 12 Trinidad and Tobago 1.321 1.498 1.968 1.59513 Bosnia Herzegovina 2.942 0.008 1.018 1.323 13 Dominica 0.793 ~ 3.957 1.58314 South Africa 1.221 1.778 0.864 1.288 14 Bangladesh 0.019 0.450 4.275 1.58115 Sri Lanka 3.379 0.284 0.180 1.281 15 Grenada 3.717 ~ 0.980 1.56616 Algeria 1.215 2.386 0.049 1.217 16 Togo 0.012 4.378 0.218 1.53617 Cameroon 0.090 0.069 3.273 1.144 17 Malaysia 0.013 2.436 1.901 1.45018 Saudi Arabia 1.818 1.505 0.000 1.108 18 North Korea 0.000 ~ 4.175 1.39219 Venezuela 0.415 2.751 0.069 1.078 19 Panama 0.024 0.808 3.174 1.33520 Jamaica 1.913 0.758 0.364 1.012 20 Mali 0.004 0.763 3.161 1.30921 Haiti 1.113 0.062 1.856 1.010 21 Gabon 0.014 0.057 3.795 1.28922 Egypt 1.335 0.405 1.221 0.987 22 Philippines 0.143 1.323 2.395 1.28723 Cuba 0.370 1.651 0.736 0.919 23 Sudan 0.024 0.269 3.567 1.28724 Vietnam 1.372 0.508 0.759 0.880 24 Guinea 0.009 0.822 2.979 1.27025 Colombia 0.429 1.726 0.432 0.862 25 Colombia 0.015 0.556 3.146 1.23926 Peru 0.452 0.770 1.292 0.838 26 Peru 0.026 0.406 3.109 1.18027 Ghana 0.792 0.169 1.410 0.790 27 Uruguay 0.037 0.220 3.274 1.17728 Guyana 1.217 0.459 0.256 0.644 28 Zambia 0.012 1.223 2.245 1.16029 Chile 0.216 1.487 0.093 0.599 29 Burundi 0.037 0.075 3.345 1.15230 Afghanistan 1.320 0.001 0.398 0.573 30 Ecuador 0.025 1.532 1.755 1.10431 Morocco 0.708 0.597 0.361 0.555 31 Venezuela 0.025 0.959 2.268 1.08432 Argentina 0.330 1.204 0.075 0.536 32 Ghana 0.058 0.745 2.427 1.07633 Ethiopia 0.539 0.126 0.899 0.521 33 Afghanistan 0.086 ~ 3.119 1.06834 Trinidad and Tobago 1.191 0.289 0.022 0.501 34 Rwanda 0.025 0.124 2.887 1.01235 Iraq 1.200 0.183 0.000 0.461 35 Honduras 0.036 1.286 1.697 1.00636 Turkey 0.488 0.996 -0.109 0.459 36 Croatia 0.265 0.087 2.639 0.99737 Guatemala 0.370 0.637 0.336 0.448 37 China 0.015 0.755 2.216 0.99538 Ecuador 0.221 0.850 0.256 0.442 38 Guatemala 0.048 1.114 1.741 0.96839 Nigeria 0.444 0.768 0.071 0.428 39 Maldives 0.007 2.602 0.280 0.96340 Lebanon 0.994 0.107 0.142 0.414 40 Senegal 0.012 0.371 2.444 0.94241 Sudan 0.490 0.084 0.618 0.397 41 Indonesia 0.001 1.110 1.468 0.86042 Ex-Yugoslavia 1.018 0.031 0.125 0.392 42 Belize 0.123 1.314 1.130 0.85643 Senegal 0.075 0.052 1.017 0.381 43 South Africa 0.044 0.441 2.034 0.84044 Mozambique 0.003 0.039 1.067 0.369 44 Bosnia Herzegovina 1.095 ~ 1.403 0.83345 Jordan 0.831 0.048 0.193 0.358 45 Ethiopia 0.013 0.635 1.676 0.77446 Congo-Kinshasa (Zaire) 0.494 0.015 0.563 0.357 46 El Salvador 0.096 0.398 1.808 0.76747 Guinea 0.046 0.089 0.887 0.341 47 St Vincent/Grenadines 2.024 ~ 0.049 0.69148 Mali 0.029 0.062 0.915 0.335 48 Zimbabwe 0.004 0.321 1.657 0.66149 Croatia 0.831 0.057 0.085 0.325 49 Pakistan 0.059 0.355 1.533 0.64950 Rwanda 0.127 0.008 0.837 0.324 50 Malawi 0.001 0.345 1.600 0.64951 Kenya 0.310 0.092 0.559 0.320 51 Algeria 0.056 1.669 0.152 0.62652 Zambia 0.076 0.124 0.649 0.283 52 Benin 0.003 0.059 1.787 0.61653 El Salvador 0.412 0.143 0.269 0.275 53 Thailand 0.004 1.009 0.804 0.60654 Somalia 0.803 0.000 0.018 0.274 54 Nicaragua 0.037 1.227 0.486 0.583

T A B L E 1 1 C A N A D A - D E V E L O P I N G C O U N T R I E S L I N K A G E S I N D I C E S

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IMPORTANCE OF DEVELOPING COUNTRY TO CANADA

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55 Honduras 0.159 0.209 0.448 0.272 55 Chile 0.021 0.625 1.072 0.57356 Costa Rica 0.088 0.537 0.146 0.257 56 Kenya 0.015 0.263 1.422 0.56757 Tanzania 0.133 0.045 0.580 0.253 57 Namibia 0.005 1.519 0.172 0.56558 Bolivia 0.039 0.065 0.598 0.234 58 Burkina Faso 0.001 0.070 1.542 0.53859 Dominican Republic 0.182 0.451 0.016 0.216 59 Nepal 0.005 0.131 1.444 0.52760 Syria 0.524 0.082 0.012 0.206 60 Mozambique 0.000 0.334 1.238 0.52461 Malawi 0.009 0.018 0.575 0.201 61 Ex-Yugoslavia 0.137 ~ 1.425 0.52162 Nepal 0.084 0.019 0.484 0.196 62 Vietnam 0.025 0.619 0.788 0.47763 Burkina Faso 0.008 0.005 0.508 0.174 63 Morocco 0.036 0.556 0.825 0.47264 Kazakhstan 0.394 0.081 0.036 0.171 64 Bolivia 0.007 0.250 1.148 0.46865 Zimbabwe 0.032 0.061 0.385 0.159 65 Tunisia 0.026 0.165 1.180 0.45766 Cambodia 0.163 0.015 0.282 0.153 66 Lebanon 0.439 0.206 0.725 0.45767 Nicaragua 0.127 0.074 0.226 0.143 67 Argentina 0.013 0.134 1.186 0.44468 Tunisia 0.172 0.100 0.145 0.139 68 Sri Lanka 0.259 0.599 0.443 0.43469 Libya 0.148 0.247 0.000 0.132 69 Brazil 0.003 0.242 1.036 0.42770 North Korea 0.001 0.013 0.376 0.130 70 Cambodia 0.021 0.175 1.009 0.40171 Burundi 0.170 0.002 0.212 0.128 71 Dominican Republic 0.031 0.942 0.158 0.37772 Oceania 0.347 0.015 0.004 0.122 72 India 0.019 0.218 0.888 0.37573 Slovenia 0.034 0.325 0.001 0.120 73 Sierra Leone 0.015 0.502 0.546 0.35474 Uganda 0.030 0.032 0.287 0.116 74 Nigeria 0.006 0.615 0.422 0.34775 Congo-Brazzaville 0.017 0.051 0.273 0.114 75 Angola 0.003 0.246 0.785 0.34476 Benin 0.014 0.004 0.312 0.110 76 Jordan 0.183 0.216 0.571 0.32377 Panama 0.046 0.223 0.057 0.109 77 Egypt 0.028 0.162 0.769 0.32078 Angola 0.024 0.055 0.218 0.099 78 Uganda 0.002 0.158 0.735 0.29879 Uruguay 0.086 0.136 0.065 0.096 79 Tanzania 0.006 0.187 0.702 0.29880 Togo 0.039 0.200 0.023 0.087 80 Gambia 0.018 0.177 0.688 0.29481 Grenada 0.242 0.013 0.005 0.087 81 Niger 0.001 0.176 0.683 0.28782 Bahrain 0.223 0.032 0.000 0.085 82 Lesotho 0.003 0.531 0.257 0.26483 Albania 0.213 0.008 0.033 0.085 83 Mauritius 0.116 0.434 0.227 0.25984 Suriname 0.025 0.197 0.000 0.074 84 Turkmenistan 0.001 0.035 0.724 0.25385 Oman 0.155 0.032 0.000 0.062 85 St Kitts and Nevis 0.419 ~ 0.305 0.24186 Niger 0.009 0.011 0.165 0.062 86 Macedonia, FYR 0.051 0.185 0.457 0.23187 Namibia 0.006 0.142 0.026 0.058 87 Antigua and Barbuda 0.373 ~ 0.304 0.22688 St Vincent/Grenadines 0.160 0.008 0.001 0.056 88 Slovenia 0.024 0.551 0.025 0.20089 Gabon 0.012 0.009 0.140 0.054 89 Bhutan 0.001 0.001 0.575 0.19290 Mauritius 0.094 0.055 0.007 0.052 90 Swaziland 0.011 0.171 0.395 0.19291 Burma (Myanmar) 0.095 0.052 0.005 0.050 91 Mauritania 0.003 0.043 0.514 0.18792 Macedonia, FYR 0.072 0.014 0.035 0.040 92 Papua New Guinea 0.004 0.513 0.039 0.18593 Yemen 0.089 0.013 0.015 0.039 93 Oceania 0.275 0.275 0.001 0.18494 Dominica 0.039 0.011 0.064 0.038 94 Bahrain 0.525 ~ 0.000 0.17595 Uzbekistan 0.060 0.038 0.012 0.037 95 Eritrea 0.016 0.000 0.506 0.17496 St Lucia 0.064 0.025 0.019 0.036 96 Saudi Arabia 0.124 0.387 0.000 0.17097 Eritrea 0.041 0.000 0.066 0.036 97 Seychelles 0.264 0.105 0.129 0.16698 Sierra Leone 0.049 0.010 0.048 0.036 98 Liberia 0.022 ~ 0.468 0.16399 Paraguay 0.042 0.036 0.016 0.031 99 Guinea-Bissau 0.002 0.062 0.366 0.143100 Georgia 0.042 0.034 0.012 0.030 100 Azerbaijan 0.006 0.192 0.226 0.141101 Armenia 0.063 0.004 0.018 0.028 101 Paraguay 0.011 0.138 0.250 0.133102 Papua New Guinea 0.015 0.058 0.012 0.028 102 Somalia 0.119 ~ 0.274 0.131103 Liberia 0.045 0.008 0.028 0.027 103 São Tomé and Principe 0.007 0.089 0.283 0.126104 Mauritania 0.006 0.001 0.073 0.027 104 Equatorial Guinea 0.003 0.054 0.321 0.126105 Azerbaijan 0.032 0.023 0.017 0.024 105 Kazakhstan 0.035 0.122 0.212 0.123106 Botswana 0.023 0.029 0.012 0.022 106 Iran 0.100 0.263 0.000 0.121107 Kyrghzstan 0.030 0.006 0.027 0.021 107 Laos 0.005 0.238 0.117 0.120108 Belize 0.020 0.026 0.014 0.020 108 Botswana 0.021 0.197 0.141 0.120

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109 Laos 0.019 0.009 0.027 0.019 109 Albania 0.098 0.084 0.165 0.116110 Madagascar 0.025 0.018 0.011 0.018 110 Tajikistan 0.006 0.198 0.143 0.116111 West Bank and Gaza 0.030 ~ 0.022 0.017 111 Georgia 0.012 0.219 0.092 0.108112 Tajikistan 0.026 0.013 0.012 0.017 112 Syria 0.048 0.156 0.096 0.100113 Djibouti 0.035 0.001 0.007 0.014 113 Kyrghzstan 0.009 0.124 0.153 0.095114 Antigua and Barbuda 0.017 0.022 0.002 0.014 114 Armenia 0.025 0.077 0.159 0.087115 Gambia 0.016 0.002 0.022 0.013 115 Cape Verde 0.017 0.052 0.162 0.077116 Chad 0.020 0.000 0.015 0.012 116 Central African Republic 0.003 0.017 0.200 0.073117 St Kitts and Nevis 0.011 0.022 0.002 0.012 117 Madagascar 0.002 0.160 0.026 0.063118 Maldives 0.001 0.024 0.006 0.011 118 Djibouti 0.080 ~ 0.099 0.060119 Lesotho 0.004 0.013 0.014 0.010 119 Turkeya 0.011 0.166 na 0.059120 Guinea- Bissau 0.001 0.000 0.029 0.010 120 Yemen 0.007 0.101 0.058 0.055121 Central African Republic 0.009 0.001 0.020 0.010 121 Uzbekistan 0.004 0.061 0.097 0.054122 Bhutan 0.001 0.000 0.027 0.009 122 Oman 0.090 0.072 0.000 0.054123 Swaziland 0.007 0.007 0.010 0.008 123 Chad 0.004 0.008 0.108 0.040124 Cape Verde 0.005 0.001 0.017 0.008 124 Burma (Myanmar) 0.003 ~ 0.102 0.035125 Seychelles 0.014 0.002 0.002 0.006 125 Suriname 0.087 ~ 0.000 0.029126 Mongolia 0.003 ~ 0.014 0.006 126 West Bank and Gaza 0.040 ~ 0.045 0.028127 Turkmenistan 0.004 0.002 0.010 0.005 127 Mongolia 0.002 ~ 0.084 0.028128 Equatorial Guinea 0.001 0.001 0.007 0.003 128 Iraq 0.076 ~ 0.000 0.025129 São Tomé and Principe 0.001 0.000 0.007 0.002 129 Libya 0.039 ~ 0.000 0.013130 Comoros 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.001 130 Comoros 0.006 0.029 0.000 0.012131 Belarus 0.255 0.007 ~ ~ 131 Belarus 0.035 0.010 ~ ~132 Bulgaria 0.502 0.123 ~ ~ 132 Bulgaria 0.087 0.332 ~ ~133 Czech Republic 0.133 0.399 ~ ~ 133 Czech Republic 0.019 0.234 ~ ~134 Estonia 0.090 0.074 ~ ~ 134 Estonia 0.091 0.468 ~ ~135 Hungary 0.247 0.408 ~ ~ 135 Hungary 0.035 0.283 ~ ~136 Kuwait 0.953 0.143 ~ ~ 136 Kuwait 0.718 0.189 ~ ~137 Latvia 0.147 0.035 ~ ~ 137 Latvia 0.088 0.182 ~ ~138 Lithuania 0.062 0.065 ~ ~ 138 Lithuania 0.024 0.201 ~ ~139 Moldova 0.184 0.005 ~ ~ 139 Moldova 0.060 0.106 ~ ~140 Poland 1.710 0.766 ~ ~ 140 Poland 0.063 0.160 ~ ~141 Qatar 0.177 0.056 ~ ~ 141 Qatar 0.430 ~ ~ ~142 Romania 2.455 0.378 ~ ~ 142 Romania 0.157 0.328 ~ ~143 Russian Federation 2.441 2.172 ~ ~ 143 Russian Federation 0.024 0.260 ~ ~144 Slovak Republic 0.173 0.185 ~ ~ 144 Slovak Republic 0.046 0.301 ~ ~145 Ukraine 1.809 0.193 ~ ~ 145 Ukraine 0.051 0.146 ~ ~146 United Arab Emirates 1.608 0.637 ~ ~ 146 United Arab Emirates 0.958 0.447 ~ ~

Notes: Bold-italicized countries are not ODA eligible (see Technical Notes).

The numbers in italics for the second trade index indicate that GNP was used instead of GDP because GDP data was not available.a Net ODA to Turkey in 1998 was negative (due to debt repayment) resulting in a negative (and therefore uninterpretable) index.

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Virtually all data in these tables is available or derived fromexisting, publicly accessible information issued by the Governmentof Canada, the Organization for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment (OECD), the World Bank, and United Nations agencies.The North-South Institute’s selection of the data for these tables isbased chiefly on its development interest. However, data availability,including annual updates, was also an important factor. Some addi-tions (and deletions) have been made to this year’s report, and wehope future editions of the Canadian Development Report (CDR) willcontain expanded and more complete statistics.

Selection of Developing Countries Tables 2 through 10 list a common set of developing countries. Wehave classified countries as “developing” if their United NationsDevelopment Programme (UNDP) human development index (HDI)in 1995 was below 0.890. For comparability with previous CanadianDevelopment Reports, Antigua and Barbuda, and Chile, whose HDIsare above 0.890, have been retained in this year’s report. Theselection of the HDI cut-off point is necessarily arbitrary, butconsideration is given to having a list that broadly includescountries commonly identified as part of the developing world. The use of the HDI index as a development indicator was thoughtpreferable to an indicator based only on per capita income, whichwould have excluded a number of oil-rich developing countries.Our list also includes 16 countries that are ineligible for officialdevelopment assistance (ODA) according to the criteria of the OECDDevelopment Assistance Committee (DAC). The treatment ofthese countries is discussed below.

None of the countries on the list are dependent or colonial territo-ries. However, three entities listed in these tables and identified initalics—the West Bank and Gaza, ex-Yugoslavia, and Oceania—arenot, strictly speaking, “independent countries.” The West Bankand Gaza, at the time of writing, had not yet been granted indepen-dent status under the Palestinian Authority. Although some coun-tries that used to be part of Yugoslavia (Bosnia-Herzegovina,Croatia, Macedonia, and Slovenia) are now treated separately,many sources continue to aggregate information on these countrieswithin the category of ex-Yugoslavia. Therefore, where data forthese countries is provided separately, it can be assumed that ex-Yugoslavia refers to Serbia-Montenegro (what remains ofYugoslavia); otherwise it includes all of the former Yugoslavia.Finally, Oceania comprises eight Pacific-island microstates with atotal population of 1.9 million. These are Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, theSolomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and Western Samoa.

ODA Ineligible CountriesThere are 16 countries categorized as “developing” that wereineligible for official development assistance in 1997-98. These areKuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Belarus, Bulgaria, theCzech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova,Poland, Romania, the Russian Federation, the Slovak Republic, andUkraine. (Moldova became eligible in 1997, but that change is notacknowledged in this year’s CDR. It will be reflected in future years.)Although these countries may receive “official assistance” fromCanada and other donors, that aid (more specifically titled “official

aid”) is not included in calculations of official development assis-tance. Statistics for these countries are excluded from regional,world, and income-based totals in Tables 3, 4, and 5.

Year of CoverageData is generally given for the latest calendar year for whichcomplete information exists—normally 1998. In a few caseswhere 1999 data is available, it is presented. However, in the case of official development assistance in Tables 3, 4, and 5, the figuresare for fiscal year 1997-98 (April 1, 1997 to March 31, 1998). Inother cases where the data is not for the calendar year 1998, therelevant date is indicated.

Symbols na = “not applicable”

~ = “not available”

0 = zero

Unless otherwise indicated, figures are in Canadian dollars.

Income-Grouped TotalsSub-totals for country income-groupings have been added to thebottom of columns in Tables 2 through 10. These groupings followthe United Nations’ classification of countries by income level, aslisted in the UNDP Human Development Report and in CIDA’s“Statistical Report on Development Assistance” for fiscal year 1997-98. The list of least developed countries (LLDCs), and other low income countries (originally termed less developed countries orLDCs) is provided below. Remaining recipient countries refer to allother countries (generally, middle and high-income developing coun-tries), except for Tables 3, 4, and 5 in which the 16 ODA-ineligiblecountries have been excluded.

LLDCs: Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Botswana,Burkina Faso, Burma (Myanmar), Burundi, Cambodia, Cape Verde,Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo-Kinshasa (ex-Zaire),Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guinea,Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, Laos, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar,Malawi, Maldives, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger,Rwanda, São Tomé and Principe, Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands,Somalia, Sudan, Tanzania, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, Vanuatu, Zambia,and Yemen.

Other low income countries: China, Egypt, Ghana, Guyana,Honduras, India, Indonesia, Kenya, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan,Sri Lanka, Tajikistan, Vietnam, and Zimbabwe.

Note that totals by income-group may differ from totals for alldeveloping countries because income-group totals are based oncountry specific information only, while overall totals for developingcountries also include allocations to regions that cannot be attrib-uted to specific countries.

Emerging Market EconomiesIn Table 6 this country grouping is included alongside the income-based grouping. This grouping is not, strictly speaking, incomebased because it includes low, middle, and high-income countries(but no LLDCs). These are countries that are considered to havefairly dynamic economies, have already undergone significant levels

T E C H N I C A L N O T E S G E N E R A L C O M M E N T S

S TAT I S T I C S 2 0 0 0 89

of industrial and financial development, and achieved substantialintegration into international capital markets. The countries inthat group are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt,Hungary, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Philippines, Poland,South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, and Venezuela. The Czech Republicand the Russian Federation are usually counted in that group (seethe “Emerging Market Indicator” section in recent issues of TheEconomist) but were not included here because of the absence of1988 data for these countries since they were then part of largerentities—Czechoslovakia and the USSR, respectively.

T A B L E 1Canada and other High Human Development Economies: Selected Indicators

Countries included in this table had a HDI in 1995 of 0.890 orgreater. The HDI and gender-related development index (GDI) arefrom the UNDP’s Human Development Report 1999. The GNP percapita (PPP$) figures are from the World Bank’s World DevelopmentReport 2000. Data on foreign aid and net private financial flows istaken from the OECD’s DAC International Development Statistics(Online). Numbers on export and import shares to and fromdeveloping countries are from the IMF’s Direction of Trade StatisticsYearbook 1999.

This year, per capita incomes are reported in PPP$s (purchasingpower parity dollars) rather than US$ and this will continue into thefuture. The PPP$ is a more accurate standardization of the “value inconsumption” of income across all reporting countries. This denomi-nation, therefore, forms a better basis for comparing incomes acrosscountries. In addition, exchange rate changes can significantly alterthe recorded US$ incomes of countries from year to year, even whenit is averaged (as in the Atlas method), and can therefore givemisleading information about actual changes in domestic income.

As noted in the Table notes, last year’s Column 14 (Official BilateralDebt Stocks Owed by Developing Countries) was not included in thisyear’s table because no up-to-date data was available.

T A B L E 2The Developing Countries: Selected Indicators

Figures on the GDI, HDI, Adult Literacy, and Under-5 Mortality ratesare taken from the UNDP’s Human Development Report 1999. Figureson GNP per capita (PPP$), annual growth rate, and total GDP aretaken or derived from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators2000. Aid-to-GNP ratios are taken, or derived, from the OECD’s DACInternational Development Statistics (Online). Population figuresare taken from the United Nation’s Secretariat Report: The Worldat Six Billion. The external debt-to-GNP ratio comes from GlobalDevelopment Finance 2000 (a World Bank publication). Debt servicepaid as a percentage of expenditure on education was derived fromdata published in the World Bank’s World Development Indicators1999. CO2 emissions per capita for 1996 were also taken from theWorld Bank’s World Development Indicators 1999.

As in Table 1, per capita estimates are also reported in PPP$, for thereasons cited above.

T A B L E 3Canadian Official Development Assistance: Basic Data (1997-98)

T A B L E 4Canadian Bilateral Aid by Channel and by Country (1997-98)

T A B L E 5Canadian Multilateral ODA by Agency and by Country (1997-98)

The basic data on Canadian official development assistance inTables 3, 4, and 5 is taken or derived from the “Statistical Reporton Development Assistance” for fiscal year 1997-98, published byCIDA’s International Development Information Centre. Most ofthe information in the tables is taken from “Table M: TotalDisbursements by Country.” To ensure conformity with CIDA totals,aid allocations for developing countries which do not match NSIcriteria (such as South Korea and Bahamas) are included as RegionalAfrica, Caribbean, Latin America, and Asia, and as Other Americas,Asia, and Europe. Information on Canada’s rank among other bilat-eral donors in recipient countries is derived from the OECD’sGeographical Distribution of Financial Flows to Aid Recipients 1993-97. Included under the classification “Other,” at the bottom ofTable 4, are imputed interest costs, other government departmentcosts and services, provincial government support to development,and CIDA’s Public Outreach (Development Information) Program.

Finally, the imputed shares of Canadian Multilateral Assistance byAgency and Country were computed from supplementary informationprovided to the North-South Institute by CIDA. These figures onlyestimate the allocation of Canadian funds to particular countries bymultilateral agencies. The figures understate the amount of multi-lateral aid going to relatively small developing countries. Note that,except for Albania and ex-Yugoslavia, countries in Eastern Europeare not eligible for ODA and are classified as “countries in transi-tion” rather than developing countries.

T A B L E 6Canadian Balance of Trade with Developing Countries (1998)

The data on exports and imports was obtained from StatisticsCanada Catalogues # 65-003 and # 65-006 for 1999 and 1989.The Department of Finance provided the information on customsrevenue on imports from developing countries, while RevenueCanada provided rough estimates of comparable United Statesfigures. The world total of customs revenue was taken from ThePublic Accounts of Canada 1997-98, prepared by the Receiver Generalfor Canada. The North-South Institute calculated the average tariffrate by dividing the total tariff revenue collected by total importsfor each country and expressing the results as a percentage.

In Table 6, other unallocated costs include: services received withoutcharges from other departments, Public Works and GovernmentServices Canada fees, public outreach programs, provincial govern-ments, imputed interest costs, Heritage Canada, and CommonwealthScholarships (DFAIT). Government to Government Aid includes:Geographic Programs, Canada Fund, EDC Section 23, Official DebtRelief, and Food Aid, less loan repayment.


90

T A B L E 7Trade: Top Exports and Imports with Developing Countries (1998)

The information on the top three exports and imports was obtainedfrom Industry Canada’s Strategis: Trade Data Online. Some of thecategory names have been simplified for presentation purposes. Thedata on military exports is taken directly from the Department ofForeign Affairs and International Trade’s 1999 annual report, TheExport of Military Goods from Canada.

T A B L E 8Canadian Financial Relations with Developing Countries (1998)

Data on the stock of Canadian government debt and the debt of the“Canada Account” of the Export Development Corporation (EDC) istaken directly from Public Accounts of Canada 1997-98, Volume 1,Chapter 9, on Loans, Investments and Advances. Data on theCorporate Account of the EDC is derived from the EDC’s 1998 AnnualReport. Data on the developing-country debt stock of the CanadianWheat Board is derived from the Wheat Board’s 1998 Annual Report.The information on the debt stocks of the Royal Bank of Canada andthe Bank of Nova Scotia is from their annual reports for 1998.

Statistics Canada’s Balance of Payments Division provided the figureson Canadian Direct Investment Abroad (CDIA) in developing coun-tries and foreign direct investment (FDI) by developing countriesin Canada.

T A B L E 9Movement of Peoples

The Department of Citizenship and Immigration provided informa-tion on immigration to Canada from developing countries by immi-gration class and gender. For presentation purposes the North-SouthInstitute simplified the immigration classes into four categories. Our“Family Class” includes “Assisted Relatives.” Our “Refugee Class”covers: “Convention Refugees,” “Designated Class,” “CR8 depen-dents,” “PDRCC class,” and “DROC.” Our “Business Class” includesthe “Entrepreneur,” “Investor,” and “Self-employed” groups. Our“Independent Class” covers “Retired persons,” “Provincial Nominees,”and “Other Independents.” In order to smooth out year-over-yearfluctuations, average immigration levels were calculated for the lastthree years: 1996-1998.

T A B L E 1 0Human Linkages between Canada and the Developing World

Statistics Canada provided data on Canadian visitors to developingcountries and visits to Canada from developing countries, as well ason foreign student enrollment. Data on Canadians registered abroadwas provided by the Department of Foreign Affairs and InternationalTrade, directly and through Diplomatic, Consular, and OtherRepresentatives in Canada, 2000.

T A B L E 1 1Canada-Developing Country Linkages Indices

Two composite indices have been designed to encapsulate the manyand complex linkages between Canada and developing countries. Thefirst composite index measures the “importance” of a given develop-ing country to Canada; the second composite index measures the“importance” of Canada to a given developing country. Countriesare then ranked according to each index. Both indices are a simpleaverage of three sub-indices: one for trade, one for immigration, andone for aid relations, which are also indicated in the table for eachdeveloping country.

The sub-indices for the first composite index are calculated as fol-lows: the immigration index is the country’s immigration to Canadaas a percentage of total immigration from developing countries toCanada for the period 1996-98. The trade index is the country’s two-way trade with Canada as a percentage of total developing-countrytwo-way trade with Canada in 1998. The aid index is Canada’s bilat-eral aid with that country as a percentage of Canada’s total bilateralaid for 1998.

The sub-indices for the second composite index are calculated asfollows: the immigration index is the country’s annual averageimmigration to Canada from 1996-98 as a percentage of the coun-try’s total population in 1999. Ideally the denominator for this indexwould be total migration from that country, but such data is notreadily available. Because the resulting number is so small—and inorder for the immigration index to have an impact on the compositeindex rankings—the immigration index for each country was multi-plied by 10.

The trade index is total two-way trade of a country with Canada as ashare of that country’s GDP in 1998. The aid index measures totalbilateral aid from Canada to that country as a share of the total aidreceived by that country in 1998.

Both immigration and trade indices are based on data presented inprevious tables, but the aid indices were constructed from annualdata (from the OECD’s DAC International Development StatisticsOnline) which is slightly different from the data presented inTables 3, 4, and 5.

As was done last year, to facilitate readability and use, all indices(including the already grossed up second immigration index) havebeen multiplied by 100. For ODA eligible countries, where figuresfor GDP, immigration, or aid are lacking (or inapplicable) a ~ hasbeen entered and the composite index derived from the remainingindices. The 16 ODA ineligible countries have been excluded fromcalculations of the composite indices and moved to the bottom ofthe table.


CANADIAN DEVELOPMENTREPORT 2000

A review of Canadian foreign policy toward developing countries at the turn of thecentury, the Canadian Development Report 2000 examines whether Canada’s actionshave lived up to its rhetoric in the areas of trade, human security, development assistance, and debt relief. It also shows how support seems to be building in Canada for a more proactive foreign policy.

In a special guest essay, Stephen Lewis, former Deputy Executive Director of UNICEFand former Canadian Ambassador to the UN, exposes the failings of the multilateralsystem. He challenges Canada to assume a leadership role in the fight against povertyand to “make ourselves the most valued friend of the full constellation of developingcountries.”

The fourth volume in the North-South Institute’s annual series, CDR 2000 alsoincludes more than 40 pages of up-to-date statistical data and analysis of the flow of resources, goods, services, and people between Canada and the developing world.

The North-South Institute55 Murray Street, Suite 200Ottawa, Canada K1N 5M3

$25 ISBN 1-896770-30-4

Printed in Canada

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