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Work in progress/for internal circulation only/not for citation/draft July 7, 2012

The ‘objective,’ the subjective and the comparative in South Asia’s

Democracies: The State, Civil Society and External Actors

by Subrata K. Mitra1 and Radu Carciumaru2

Abstract

Post-industrial liberal democratic states are generally better placed to cope with legitimacy crisis by dent of their institutional arrangements, comprehensive policy process, connecting the actor with the state through a network of articulation and aggregation, and their policy processes capable of strategic reform and credible implementation. States in changing societies, emerging from colonial or communist rule are less well placed to cope with legitimacy deficit because of the absence of the resources of post-industrial liberal democratic states. The states of South Asia are all democracies today, but how democratic? Why have they diverged with regard to democratic transition and consolidation despite common and similar traditions? The paper seeks to overcome the theoretical and methodological difficulty resulting from the India ‘bias’ that afflicts intra-regional comparison of democracy in South Asia. The paper tries to find out whether democracy is a fact (measurable) or an opinion (perception), and whether democracy can be delinked from liberalism. In doing so, the paper uses the conventional objective and subjective criteria to rank South Asian states, and then seeks to develop a rational choice, neo-institutional and path-dependent analysis to explain how South Asian states got where they are, and what policy recommendations can be made to enhance and reinforce their level of democracy. The problem stated The transition to democracy and its consolidation are the function of the aggregated social choices of rational individuals. People are likely to prefer democracy to other regimes if and only if it enhances their view of their own welfare. As such, any model of democratisation must take into account basic drives such as fear (security), greed (interest), anxiety (identity), conviviality (community) and the individual’s sense of the sacred (transcendental values as opposed to mere interests). It follows that any model of democratisation at the point of human history where we stand, must take into account the entanglement of the local, regional and global arenas, memory and path dependency and rational expectations of the future. Based on these premises, and on an analytic narrative of the transition to democracy in India, the paper seeks to lay down the basic parameters of a model of comparative democracy for South Asia. Despite conspicuous exceptions (Ayodhya, Kashmir, Naxalites...), the overall success of India’s democracy can be seen both in terms of indicators of democracy measurements (table 2, below), as well from the social construction of democracy through trust in institutions, sense of efficacy, legitimacy and citizenship. India, seen in the light of these achievements, comes across as an exception to the South Asian norms of democratic collapse (table 1). However, in a comparative perspective, when seen in the light of some salient features of 1. Subrata K. Mitra is Head and Professor, Department of Political Science, South Asia Institute, Heidelberg University. He can be contacted at: js3@ix.urz.uni-heidelberg.de. 2 Radu Carciumaru is lecturer and PhD researcher at South Asia Institute, Heidelberg University. He can be contacted at: carciumaru@sai.uni-heidelberg.de.

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Indian democracy such as secularism (a wall of separation between religion and the state) and endogenous causation (democracy as a function of intra-system variables), the Indian exemplar stands in flagrant contradiction with the core ideals of her neighbouring states, and their security perception. In intra-regional comparison, thus, the Indian ‘model’ entails an invidious choice between national identity, and democracy Indian style, for her neighbour. The implications of this problem have been noted by many, including in particular, Ayesha Jalal (1995). The comparative analysis of democratisation in South Asia has long suffered from remarkable ‘success’ of India’s democracy, which, as Jalal (1995) argues, inadvertently induces an India bias to the lessons one draws from the comparison of the two countries.3 The robustness of India’s political institutions – a federal process sensitive to ethnic differences, strong judicial and political institutions that defend orderly rule, secular values, vigorous political competition, kept free and fair by a powerful Election Commission, and, civilian supremacy over the military – stands in sharp contrast to the fragility of comparable institutions in the neighbouring countries. (See tables 1 and 2, below) This uneven record deeply influences the interpretation of paths to democracy in South Asia. The fact that common origins from British colonial rule have nevertheless led to different outcomes makes one think of the Indian institutions and political culture as an endogenous determinant of the vibrancy of her democracy (Jalal 1995). Juxtaposed to the success of India’s democracy in contrast to the failure of Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka in sustaining democratic rule, the path that India has taken to reach democratic consolidation comes across as a standard for others to follow. This argument is the main contention of Ayesha Jalal’s comparative analysis of democracy and authoritarianism in South Asia (Jalal 1995). However, after a brilliant exposé of the paucity of a proper comparative analysis of democracy in South Asia, Jalal veers off from identifying the theoretical basis of such a comparison and focuses, instead, on an attempt to establish the equivalence between India and Pakistan in terms of structures of authoritarian dominance, explicit and implicit, respectively in both countries.4 Looking back at the stir that this book had created in the community of South Asia specialists at the time of its publication5, one is encouraged to pick up the thread of a comparative analysis of democracy in South Asia where she had left it. With this intention, I argue in this paper that a comparative analysis of democracy in South Asia must begin with a basic question of concept and method. One must ask squarely: what is comparative and what is authentic with regard to democracy, i.e., meaningful to the actor? Is democracy a general variable whose level can be measured with some objective indicators? Or, is the significance of democracy necessarily context-specific? The first question has 3 This, in essence, is the main argument of Jalal (1995). Unlike Kohli (2001) who uses democracy as a conceptual category with measurable attributes Jalal (1995) systematically refers to the ‘success’ of India’s democracy in quotation marks (see, p. 263), suggesting, that either concept of democracy is used inappropriately, or that the application of the concept to India is based on insufficient evidence. 4 See Rajiv Dhavan’s review article, “The Sub-Continent: Academic Analysis” in Social Scientist, vol 23, nos. 7-9, July-September 1995, pp 101-105 is critical of the comparative claims of Jalal (1995). To quote: “…[the book] fails in its comparative intentions because Jalal does not succeed in finding the point of comparative equivalence through which convincing factual statements can be combined with perceptive analysis. Pakistan’s authoritarianism is not to be equated with India’s emergency. “ p. 104 5 See reviews by Asad Sayeed in the Journal of International Development, 10, 408-410 (1998), Rajiv Dhavan in the Social Scientist, vol 23, Nos. 7-9, July-September 1995, pp101-105, Kalim Bahadur, in the South Asia Survey, 1997:4, 188-189, Craig Baxter, The American Historical Review, vol. 102, no. 3 (June 1997), pp. 874-875, Harsh Sethi, “Flawed Visions of History”, in the Economic and Political Weekly, December 30, 1995, pp. 3363-3364, Stanley Kochanek, the Journal of Interdisciplinary History, vol 27, no. 4 (Spring, 1997), pp. 745-746, Yunas Samad, in International Affairs (RIIA), 71 (4), Oct 1995, pp. 908-909.

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received more than adequate interest from the rapidly burgeoning democracy literature6 and a whole host of measuring devices that establish the level of democracy on the basis of multiple criteria. The second focuses on the construction of democracy by the population of a country, usually on the basis of survey research. The paper will explain the discrepancies that arise when one compares the results that one gets from both approaches, and illustrate their implications by drawing on the ‘counter-factual’ democracy of India.7 Through this empirical analysis, the paper will raise larger issues. Are there ways other than India’s to reach the goal of democratisation, with a set of institutions different from India’s? Are India’s institutions an Indian specificity – a path-dependent solution, appropriate to the Indian context – which need not, necessarily exclude some other routes to democracy that give a different salience to the roles of the army, majority ethnic identity, dominant religions and the unitary form of government? Are there country-specific routes to the general goal of democracy that combine the efficiency of transition with the authenticity of indigenous culture and tradition? The philosophical and theoretical implications of these general questions are beyond the scope of this paper. Instead, my more limited goal here is to assemble an empirical data base, consisting of a comparative narrative of democratic unfolding and decay (table 1), quantitative measurement of indicators deemed to measure the depth and pace of democratisation (table 2), and, to assess the perception of democracy by the people of South Asia in their respective countries (tables 3a-3e). This empirical evidence is assessed in the light of India’s ‘counter-factual’ democracy in order to glean some insights out of this comparative analysis that might feed into the exploration of a general answer to the comparative analysis of democracy transition and consolidation in South Asia. While reaffirming the fact that India’s democratic institutions are contingent and path dependent – more the consequence of India’s democracy than its cause – the paper nevertheless concludes by casting the Indian model of transforming rebels into stakeholders (Mitra and Singh, 2009) on the basis of a rational choice, neo-institutional model. This has the potential to become the possible core of a research agenda for the comparative analysis of democratic transition and consolidation in the states of South Asia. Authoritarian and democratic regimes in South Asia: Same goal, different paths? Democracy has had a chequered history in South Asia. The brave new world of popular democracy which each of the South Asian states stepped into following the departure of the colonial rulers (in the case of Bangladesh, following the end of its status as a semi-colony) was short-lived, except in the case of India. (See table 1). Elections were replaced by coups (Pakistan, Bangladesh), ethnic exclusion (Sri Lanka), royal manipulation and Maoist mobilisation (Nepal) or persistent one-party-rule (Maldives). However, therein lies a paradox! The rhetoric that often accompanies the ending of democratic regimes justifies the abrogation of democracy in the name of some higher principle, such as the defence of national identity, political unity and territorial integrity, clean and efficient governance, cultural or religious authenticity, pro-people rule, mimicking the very jargon of democracy itself, strategically aiming at enhancing the legitimacy of the non-democratic regime that replaces it.

6 Merkel, Puhle, Linz and Stepan.... 7 A fact, which empirically refutes the theoretical expectation of it. The expression is used to characterize India’s democracy as a phenomenon whose existence could not be anticipated from within classical theories of democracy and democratization.

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Table 1 A Comparative chronology of democracy transition and consolidation in South Asia

Pre-

Independence Legacy

Nations Time

India Pakistan Bangladesh Sri Lanka Nepal

Post

- In

depe

nden

ce P

oliti

cal &

Soc

ieta

l Eve

nts

1947- 1952

1947: India becomes Independent 1948: 1st Indo-Pak Conflict over Kashmir 1950: India becomes a republic, adoption of the constitution 1952: First general elections held, Nehru adopts non-alignment movement

1947: Independence, Jinnah becomes 1st Governor General 1948: 1st Indo-Pak Conflict over Kashmir; Jinnah dies 1951: Jinnah’s successor L.A. Khan assassinated

1948: Ceylon gains full independence, Citizenship act 1949: Indian and Pakistani Residents Act

1947: The Nepali congress comes into being 1949: The Nepali National Congress merges with the Nepali Democratic Congress 1950/51: Increasing popular agitation against the Rana regime

1953- 1958

1957: First general elections. Congress retains power at the national level and in most states

1953: “Anti-Ahmedia” riots 1955: “Muree Pact” signed 1956: 1st constitution adopted 1958: Martial law declared, Gen. A.Khan takes over administration

1956: S. Bandaranaike of the SLFP elected on a wave of Sinhalese nationalism, Sinhala is legislated as the official language 1958: Tamil Language Act

1955: King Mahendra ascends to the throne after King Tribhuvan passes away

1959- 1964

1962: Sino-Indian War over border disputes 1964: J. Nehru dies, Shastri suceeds him

1960: Ayub becomes president, pol. Parties banned 1962: New constitution comes into force ending martial law

1959: Bandaranaike assassinated 1960-1964: Power struggle between SLFP& UNP, changing governments

1959: The Royal Constitution of 1959 adopted 1960: King Mahendra suspends the Parliament, Constitution and party politics 1962: Panchayat Constitution comes into force

1965- 1970

1965: 2nd Indo-Pak War 1966: I. Gandhi succeeds Shastri as Prime minister 1969: Split of the Congress In anti/pro I. Gandhi

1965: 2nd war with India, Bengali nationalism emerges 1969: Ayub resigns, Martial law declared, Gen. M.Y. Khan takes over 1970: 1st general elections for drafting a constitution on the one man-one vote principle

1966: PM D. Senanayake signs an agreement with the federal Party leader promising regional autonomy to Tamils 1969: Formation of the left insurgent organization JVP 1970: SLFP comes to power

1971- 1976

1971: Indo-soviet friendship treaty. India intervenes in East Pakistan. 3rd Indo-Pak War 1973: Kesavandara Bharati” ruling 1974: India conducts 1st nuclear test 1975: I. Gandhi imposes national emergency

1971: Rahman arrested, civil war, India supports East Pakistan, formal declaration of Bangladesh issued 1972: “Shimla agreement” 1973: New Constitution, Urdu becomes national language

1972: Constitution comes into force 1974:, national state of emergency 1975: Presidential System replaces Parliamentary System 1976: Zia becomes President

1972: A new Constitution is promulgated through a Constituent Assembly 1976: TUF formed to campaign for a separate Tamil state

1972: King Mahendra passes away and is succeeded by King Birendra

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1977- 1982

1977: Congress looses parliamentary elections 1980: I. Gandhi returns to power

1977: General Zia-ul-Haq stages military coup 1978: Zia becomes President 1979: Pol. Parties banned

1979: BNP wins elections, after Zia lifts ban on pol. Parties 1981: Zia assassinated

1977: UNP returns to power 1978: The 1972 Constitution is abolished, new Constitution is introduced creating a presidential system of government

1979: Political demonstrations force King Birendra to call for a nationwide referendum to determine the future form of government 1980: Panchayat system was chosen by 54.7 %

1983- 1988

1984: Punjab Insurgency. Assassination of I. Gandhi. R. Gandhi succeeds her 1987: Indian army intervenes in Sir Lanka

1985. General elections, Martial law and ban on pol. Parties lifted, 8th amendment 1988: Benazir Bhutto becomes chief executive

1983: “Student riots”, Ershad becomes President 1985: Upazila system 1987: “Siege of Dhaka” 1988: Islam becomes state religion

1983: Killing of soldiers in an LTTE ambush leads to anti-Tamil riots 1985: First attempts at peace talks between the government and Tamil groups fail 1987: Ino-Sri Lanka Accord, India sends in its army to maintain peace between the government and the Tamil tigers

1985: The Nepali Congress Party begins a civil disobedience campaign for restoration of the multi-party system 1986: Nepali Congress party boycotts national elections

1989- 1994

1989: V.P. Singh forms government with the help of the BJP 1990: Implementation of the “Mandal Commission Report” 1991: R. Gandhi assasianted N.Rao dismantles command economy and moves India towards a free market economy 1992: Demolition of Babri Mosque

1990: Benazir Bhutto dismissed by the President, PPP defeated, ML comes into power (N. Sharif) 1991: Sharif launches economic liberalization plan, Shariah law incorporated into the legal code 1992: MQM party formed 1993: Khan and Sharif resign

1990: General Ershad steps down after politics protests by opposition parties 1991:B.G. Zia becomes first woman PM, Constitution amended, parliamentary form of government reintroduced, President becomes constitutional head of the state

1989: Indian army starts withdrawing from Sri Lanka 1990: After withdrawal of the IPKF, LTTE moved in to take control over nearly the whole Jaffna peninsula 1993: President Premadasa killed in an LTTE attack 1994: New PM Kumaratunge re-opens peace talks with the LTTE

1990: Left parties and the NCP give a call for agitation against the Panchayat system, King Birendra bows to pressure and agrees to a new democratic Constitution 1991: NPC wins first democratic elections 1994: New elections lead to the formation of a Communist government

1995- 2000

1998: BJP comes to power. India conducts 2nd nuclear test 1999: “Kargil Crisis”

1997: Sharif becomes PM 1998: Nuclear tests 1999: “Kargil Crisis” 2000: Sharif imprisoned

1996: “Caretaker government”, parliament dissolved, Hasina becomes PM

1995: Peace talks collapse, government retains Jaffna 1996: State of emergency is declared after LTTE attacks in Colombo

1995: The Communist government is dissolved, Maoists begins insurrection in rural areas until 2000 changing PM s

2001- 2006

2002: “Gujarat riots” 2004: Congress retains power with allies, forms UPA

2002: President Musharraf grants himself new powers 2004: Creation of NSC, army penetrates civilian affairs

2001: Hasina steps down, caretaker government takes over

2001: UNP narrowly wins parliamentary elections 2002: The government and Tamil Tiger rebels sign a ceasefire agreement 2003: Tamil Tigers withdraw from peace talks 2005: Deal reached with tamil Tigers to share nearly $3bn in tsunami aid among Sinhalas, Tamils and Muslims

2001: King Birendra and other close relatives are assassinated, General strike called by Maoist rebels 2002: Parliament is dissolved 2005: King Gyanendra dismisses PM Bahadur Deuba and declares a state of emergency 2006: Strikes and stree protests in Kathmandu force the Kig to reinstate parliament

2007- 2012

The resilience of Indian democracy appears to beat the trend of other transitional societies. In comparison to the vast majority of young democracies emerging from British colonial rule, such as Pakistan, which fell by the wayside in the 1950s after emerging from colonial rule, India has kept its course. In addition, India’s transition into democracy was different to that of other nations. Modern democratic societies emerged within the Western world after violent transitions from feudalism to industrial nations. India, in contrast, sought to do this the other way around. In 1947, newly independent India emerged from over a century of British

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colonial rule under a largely peaceful anti-colonial movement where the departing British handed power to the leaders of the Indian National Congress, under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru. With a stagnant economy, mass poverty, and a deeply embedded social hierarchy, one wonders why Indian democracy did not meet the same tragic fate as Pakistan, her South Asian neighbour with which the country shared similar points of departure. An overwhelmingly large percentage of its population – illiterate, poor and steeped in subsistence agriculture – was suddenly catapulted to the world of modern competitive politics. India, despite such conditions nevertheless sought democratic consolidation and industrialization. Given the conditions of India at the time, one is hard put to understand why the transition worked at all. The success of Indian democracy (and the king-led march to democracy in Bhutan) appears as an exception to the norm. But intra-regional variation in the course and content of democracy is not specific to South Asia. Europe provides a good comparative case in point. European states have had their national, industrial and democratic revolutions in different sequences. While England has had a continuous and incremental democratic evolution, Germany, France, Spain, Portugal and Italy have experienced major discontinuity by the way of authoritarian and totalitarian interludes. Eastern Europe has yet another sequence of late industrialisation and the entanglement of the national, communist and democratic revolutions. The current convergence of these different political systems in the EU requires of all of them a basic minimum set of democratic norms. Still, all said and done, Europe’s democratic integration remains deeply problematic. Beyond the real or imagined common European heritage and political norms, the salience of a national ethos – in terms of a certain valorisation of a majority culture, (Leitkultur) specific to the territorial unit – is very much a part of the political discourse. The result is that within the broad framework of a cohesive, active, and resilient European democracy, there are clear national patterns. Within this variegated picture, a form of general acceptance of national political traditions has slowly emerged. Thus, for example, while the continuity of British parliamentary democracy comes in for much praise, it is not seen as the standard by which to measure the success of others. Similarly, the excesses of a Sarkozy or a Berulusconi – of the political and the other kind – produce at best a bemused entertainment, but not moral disapproval! With European diversity in perspective, once the historicity of different regime types, ranging between the democratic and the authoritarian within the framework of a regional space is seen as normal and legitimate in its own right, the next point to secure for a comparative analysis is the choice of the unit of analysis of this variation. An exclusive focus on the post-colonial nation-state as the only unit of analysis runs the risk of lumping together political communities that have not freely chosen to be together. In addition, the nation-state might encompass a level of heterogeneity that surpasses the most diverse of post-industrial, liberal, democratic nation-states. This built-in diversity might then become the basis of an inner constraint on the pace of democratisation. The region, straddling locality and the national state – in post-colonial states as a rule, and, in Europe, as in the case of Corsica, Scotland, Chechnia or Kosovo as an exception – thus emerges as the most effective unit of analysis. The third question regarding the design of analysis refers to the conflicting and conflating roles of structure and agency. Is structure – class and caste, ethnicity, religion, geographic isolation all – or, does the room for manoeuvre and choice on the part of the decision-making elites also play a role in explaining the variation in the pace and direction of democratisation?

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Symmetric structures, asymmetric choices: A neo-institutional, rational choice model of transition to democracy Indian democracy is puzzling. (See table 2 again.) Many democrats and human rights activists around the world, and many in India itself, find it hard to reconcile the country’s democratic achievements with its tragic failures. The Indian constitution, thanks to the presence of a large number of lawyers, politicians and members of the liberal professions inspired by the values of Fabian socialism, rule of law and the values of consensus and accommodation championed by the Freedom Movement, accepted social change as the normative objective of the modern state, and parliamentary democracy based on methodological individualism, as its preferred method of achieving it. Therein lies a paradox: how can a state, based on a prior commitment to modernisation and democracy generate a social programme that would be seen by a society which, at least at the time of the promulgation of the constitution, was still deeply committed to the Indian tradition? Not surprisingly, the paradoxical juxtaposition of the modern state and traditional society has been at the root of problems of governance. The objectives of India's development model were to achieve rapid economic growth, self-reliance, full employment, and social justice. Bureaucratic planning, following independence, however, produced mixed results. Although the Indian economy achieved a considerable degree of self-reliance, growth was sluggish, unemployment intractable and social justice remained a distant goal. But this picture is fast changing with impressive performance in certain sectors of the economy. In view of the generalisations of Barrington Moore, the Indian case appears as a special case, calling for deeper analysis. (Barrington Moore, p 413) During the four decades that have followed the publication of this magisterial study, India’s political system has gone through several paradigm shifts that have seen the transformation of the mixed economy into a more market-savvy, entrepreneurial form that has neatly dovetailed into the global market economy; the transformation of the Congress-led one dominant party system into a competitive multi-party system, the emergence and incorporation of Hindu nationalism into the mainstream, and finally, the emergence of China as a rival and partner than an enemy and the early signs of a similar development with Pakistan. Responses to the Indian puzzle have been varied and numerous. The most celebrated of the pessimistic prognoses are those of Selig Harrison (1965) who predicted the end of parliamentary democracy in a miasma of ethnic strife and balkanisation, Barring Moore (1967) who anticipated peaceful paralysis or worse, and Ayesha Jalal (1995) who saw dangerous common trends of authoritarianism, based either on personal rule or party ideology, in both India and Pakistan. On the positive side, Kothari (1970) saw the steady and incremental expansion of democracy, Rudolph and Rudolph (1987) explained the functioning of India’s democracy in terms of the multiple roles of the state that helped create a level playing field for democratic bargaining to take place8 and Kohli (2001) saw the success of 8 Why has India succeeded in achieving a generally peaceful and orderly transition? Rudolph and Rudolph formulate this in terms of the multiple role of the post-colonial state in India. In their characterisation of the state in India Rudolph and Rudolph (1987: 400-401) show how it has successfully incorporated some apparently contradictory values in order to create a space where different social groups can periodically negotiate the priorities for the politics of the day:

"Like Hindu conceptions of the divine, the state in India is polymorphous, a creature of manifold forms and orientations. One is the third actor whose scale and power contribute to the marginality of class politics. Another is a liberal or citizens' state, a judicial body whose legislative reach is limited by a written constitution, judicial review, and fundamental rights. Still another is a capitalist state that guards the boundaries of the mixed economy by protecting the rights and

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India’s democracy in terms of decentralisation and the lock-in of the powerful and the powerless within the framework of competitive electoral politics. To explain the modality of these changes, I offer a dynamic neo-institutional model of economy-society-state interaction9 where the new social elites, themselves the outcome of a process of fair and efficient political recruitment through democratic elections, play a two-track strategy and institute processes of law and order management, social and economic reform and accommodation of identity as an operationally testable model. The key function of this model is to help establish an agenda for empirical research into the policy process by focusing on the key decision-making elite.

Figure 1 A dynamic neo-institutional model of state-society-economy interaction

The model seeks to explain why structural changes – from colonial, semi-colonial or communist rule to popular democracy, socialism to capitalism or upper caste hegemony to multi-caste competition – do not always result in political anarchy.10 The presence of a decision-making elite firmly ensconced at the core of the institutional arrangement of the state, with firm links to society and an eye for governance, can make the difference. 11 Lest one forgets how complex and hazardous the journey from authoritarian rule to popular democracy is, as we analyse the evolution of India’s democracy since independence, we should do well to constantly keep in view the sceptical comments made by Moore, with regard to the case of India in the 1960s. "...a strong element of coercion remains necessary if a change is to be made. Barring some technical miracle that will enable every Indian peasant to grow abundant food in a glass of water or a bowl of sand, labor will have to be applied much more effectively, technical advances introduced, and means found to get food to the dwellers in the cities. Either masked coercion on a massive scale, as in the capitalist model including

promoting the interest of property in agriculture, commerce, and industry. Finally a socialist state is concerned to use public power to eradicate poverty and privilege and tame private power. Which combination prevails in a particular historical setting is a matter for inquiry."

9 Subrata Mitra, "Effects of Institutional Arrangements on Political Stability in South Asia", Annual Review of Political Science, 1999, 2:405-28 10 The best exposition of the structural change – disorder nexus is to be found in Huntington, p. 51. 11 See Mitra (2005) for an explanation of how things can turn out differently in contexts where an elite is able to intervene with a package of policies that transforms the power of social mobilization into policies of order management, welfare and identity, leading to enhanced legitimacy.

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even Japan, or more direct coercion approaching the socialist model will remain necessary. The tragic fact of the matter is that the poor bear the heaviest costs of modernization under both socialist and capitalist auspices. The only justification for imposing the costs is that they would become steadily worse off without it. As the situation stands, the dilemma is indeed a cruel one." (Moore, 1967: 410) This morally and politically challenging statement will act as a beacon as we go through the analysis of India’s counter-factual democracy. India’s counter-factual democracy: Tradition, Modernity, Hybridity and path-dependency India’s democratic record is mixed. Over the years, sporadic but terrible attacks on members of religious minorities have put a question mark on the quality of Indian democracy. India’s democratic image has taken a further battering with desecration of places of worship, pogroms – sometimes in connivance with employees of the state – and, the persistence of deep pockets of poverty. Violent separatist movements in Jammu and Kashmir and parts of North-Eastern India are a further challenge to the credibility and effectiveness of Indian democracy. However, off-setting these negative images are irrefutable indicators of a vibrant democratic process, balancing the failures of India’s democracy. Elections have been held almost continuously since Independence in 1947 resulting in major political changes. Vigorous parliamentary debate, an active civil society, and an alert media have generally kept the government accountable. There are also increased efforts to deepen democracy down to the level of the localized village community through several innovative constitutional and legislative measures. These promote the upward mobility of the lower social classes and women. The simultaneity of democratic success and failure in India is not an essential feature of the country’s specific culture and context. Instead, both are the outcome of a combination of India’s specific circumstances, and adroit strategic choices by politics-savvy, elected elites, many of whom have risen from the ranks. Working closely with a professional bureaucracy, army and judiciary, India’s new political elites have created a hybrid political system that has become a vital, robust and flexible hinge that holds the modern state and traditional society together. It is an ongoing process that has not yet spread across the whole country. Seen in terms of quantitative indicators (table 2), Indian democracy, contrary to the dark predictions that we have already seen above, comes across as firmly embedded. India’s democratic success makes the country appear as a deviant case when contrasted to the regularity with which post-colonial democracies fail. At the same time, India’s failures question the country’s claim to be the world’s largest democracy. With such contradictory features, India can be viewed as a counter-factual challenge to general models of democratic transition and consolidation. What makes Indian democracy work, and why does it fail, sometimes? What significance does India’s counter-factual democracy hold for general theories of democracy transition and consolidation?

Making democracy work: India’s political capital We learn from Robert Putnam’s social capital theory that the necessary ingredients for liberal democracy are social attributes such as high inter-personal trust, voluntary social networks, and norms that are shared across social group. Caste-bound, hierarchy-ridden traditional

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Table 2 Ranking democracies: the Merkel-Puhle criteria

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society hardly meets these requirements. However, democracy in India has succeeded despite the absence of these, and other classic pre-conditions such as mass literacy, egalitarian society and social cohesion that marked western democracies at their formative stages. India’s anomalous democratic transition can be explained by the country’s political capital more than social capital. India’s political system and process rather than its social structure have become the main agent of change. This rather novel concept subsumes a number of factors such as elections, modern political institutions, and their interaction with traditional society, that create level playing fields, strategic social and economic reform, accountability, and India’s multi-layered citizenship. These democratic capital-generating institutions and processes are briefly described in the arguments that follow. I. Electoral mobilization and appropriate public policy Regular and effective elections, based on universal adult franchise, to all important offices and institutions at the central, regional and local levels of the political system, are one of the most significant factors to explain the success of India’s democracy. An independent Election Commission oversees elections in India. It is ably supported by an independent judicial system pro-active in the defense of human rights and marginal social groups. Elections have helped induct new social elites in positions of power, and replace hereditary social notables. The electoral process from its early beginnings about six decades before Independence has grown enormously, involving a massive electorate of about 600 million men and women, of whom, roughly sixty percent take part in the polls. The fact that in spite of terrorist attacks and insurgency an election could be held in Kashmir in 2008, speaks to the strength of India’s democratic electoral processes. While the constitutional structure of India’s elections has remained more or less constant over the past six decades, the electoral process – evidence of the dynamism of social empowerment – has undergone significant changes. The general elections of the 1950s were dominated by traditional leaders of high castes. However, as the logic of competitive elections sank in, cross-caste coalitions replaced ‘vote banks’ that were based on vertical mobilization, where dominant castes dictated lower social groups. ‘Differential’ mobilization of voters, which refers to the coming together of people from different status groups, and ‘horizontal’ mobilization, where people of the same status group coalesce around a collective political objective, have knocked vertical social linkages out of the electoral arena. Today, sophisticated electoral choices based on calculations that yield the best results for individuals and groups are the rule. Electoral empowerment has brought tribes and religions in all social strata into the electoral fray. The government of Uttar Pradesh, one of the most important states of the Indian federation, led by Ms Mayawati, is a good example of the empowerment of marginal social groups. Born into an untouchable family, Ms Mayawati, who leads the Bahujan Samaj Party, has skilfully drawn support from dalits (former untouchables whose practice of untouchability is now forbidden by law), the upper Hindu castes, and Muslims. Differential and horizontal electoral mobilization of socially marginal groups has resulted in policy changes that further demonstrate the deepening of democracy in India. Successive governments have introduced laws to promote social integration, welfare, agrarian relations and social empowerment. Over the past two decades, broad-based political coalitions have forced more extreme forms of Indian politics, such as the champions of Hindu, Sikh, Muslim, or for that matter, linguistic and regional interests, to moderate their stance. As a result, India

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has achieved a minimum of welfare and food security. Inflation and explosive population growth have been tamed. The economy has grown steadily since its liberalization in 1991. The percentage of people under the ‘poverty line’ has decreased from nearly half of the population in the 1960s to a little over a quarter during the past decade. International business confidence in India remains high, particularly in view of the ability of the economy to resist the impact of the global economic crisis. In addition, coalitional politics at the centre has stabilized India’s major policies. The government has managed to maintain the pace of the liberalization of the economy, globalization, dialogue with Pakistan, and nuclearization. II. Institutional arrangement and countervailing forces India’s record at successful state formation and, more recently, the progressive retreat of the state from controlling the economy, but without the ensuing chaos seen in many transitional societies caught in similar situations, speak positively of the validity of her institutional arrangement and political processes. These institutional mechanisms are based on constitutional rules that allow for elections at all possible levels and areas of governance, and therefore promote, articulate and aggregate individual choice within India’s federal political system. Since the major amendment of the constitution in 1993 that created an intricate quota system, India’s six hundred thousand villages have become the lowest tier of the federal system, bringing direct democracy to the door-step of ordinary villagers and guaranteeing the representation of women, former Untouchables and forest dwelling Tribals. The juxtaposition of the division and separation of powers, the fiercely independent media and alert civil rights groups, and a pro-active judiciary, have produced a level playing field to facilitate democratic politics. Many of these are colonial transplants that have been adapted by repeated use and re-use to local custom and need. It is significant to note that India’s main political parties do not question the legitimacy of India’s modern institutions. Although they differ radically in their ideological viewpoints, parties such as the Communist Party, Hindu-nationalist parties like the Shiv Sena, the Bharatiya Janata Party, all share the norms of democracy. Not even parties that draw their strength from mobilizing religious cleavages or class conflict issues object to democracy. Therefore the right to democratic participation is no longer considered an exotic idea. III. Asymmetric but cooperative federalism: Balancing ‘unity and diversity’ India’s federation has simultaneously succeeded in differentiating the political and administrative landscape of India, whilst holding on tightly to the unity and integrity of the state as a whole. The boundaries of the federal states have been re-drawn on the lines of mother tongue, making regions coherent cultural and political units. Within this reorganization a ‘three-language-formula’ has emerged under which the bulk of regional governance is done in the local language but Hindi and English are retained as link languages. This helps to generate support for the national principle of ‘unity in diversity’. The fears of ‘balkanization’ that marked the rise of language movements in the 1950s have not borne out. Meanwhile the economy and the development of political coalitions that strive to accommodate small political groups have helped to promote national unity. The liberalization of the economy in 1991 and the gradual opening of the Indian market to international investors have given the states the incentive to emerge as promoters of regional interests.

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Simultaneously, regions have also emerged as sites of governance in their own right by the transformation of regional movements into parties of power. Coalitions have transformed rebels into stakeholders easing their transition from the jungle to high office. Many partners in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), which is currently the opposition coalition at the centre, form ruling parties in India’s regions. Consequently, the NDA has become a ‘loyal opposition’, committed to the constitution and responsible for reining in the anti-system tendencies of some of its more ardent elements. Similarly, the ruling UPA (United Progressive Alliance) coalition in Delhi has learnt to work with the opposition to gain its support for many of the UPA’s state allies. The Indian state has devised an ingenious system of enhancing stability of the political system through an indigenous scheme of federalisation. By creating new regional and sub-regional governments, federal units can be rearranged. Short term, constitutionally permitted central or even army rule can substitute representative government when the regional political system is unable to sustain orderly rule. Such emergency rule at the regional level is usually withdrawn when the need for the suspension of the normal functioning of parliamentary politics is no longer tenable. The legal responsibility for law and order rests primarily with the regional government, but is under the watchful eye of the centre. While the State governments control the regional police, the Constitution of India provides for their superseding by direct rule from Delhi when they fail to maintain lawful governance. In reality, however, the maintenance of law and order has become more of a joint venture of Delhi and the federal states. After the end of the ‘one dominant party system’ (1947-1967) where the Indian National Congress (INC) ruled both at the centre as well as in the states, states have increasingly acquired autonomy and an authentic political voice in conjunction with Dehli. Successive elections have consolidated India’s transition to a multi-party democracy, national unity and political stability. Within the framework of a national constitution, the Indian political system has managed to safeguard regional identity. The process of regional differentiation is, however, far from over. In view of the difference in time period and in context of their formation, regions experience the problem of governance in different ways. Caste and class conflict challenge orderly rule in Bihar and Jharkhand, for example. There is agitation to create a separate state of Telegana in Andhra Pradesh and there are secessionist movements in the northeast of the country. However, India has evolved a process of center-state cooperation to resolve such conflicts. Many of these regional specificities and vulnerabilities are protected by the constitution of India. Tribal land, for example, cannot easily be transferred to people of non-tribal origin. Special representation is provided to tribal populations and former ‘untouchables’. Backward regions are allocated extra recourses by the national Finance Commission for their economic advancement. National planning and the deployment of regular and paramilitary troops help local and regional governments to maintain orderly rule and the respect for due process. The induction of local elites through elections and cooption into the structure of governance through elections and cooption has strengthened the linkage of India’s traditional society with modern institutions. In contrast with the early years after independence when the Union government, presided over by Jawaharlal Nehru, held all the political cards in its tight grip, regional leaders today have emerged as free-wheeling politicians with independent social bases, keen promoters of regional interests, crucial building blocks of government and opposition coalitions in India’s national politics. Keeping pace with these changes, regional markets have become increasingly attractive for the service industry and business processing, the cultivation and

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export of cash crops, agri-business and inter-generational renewal of the political class. The regional states, which are currently experiencing a veritable renaissance of regional language and culture thanks to the networking with the Indian Diaspora, have become a major conduit for local aspirants eager to move up to the pan-Indian arena and beyond. This has accelerated the process of both national integration and regional differentiation. In brief, the successful transformation of a colonized population into citizens of a secular, democratic republic, has contributed to the sustainability of democracy. The main strategy has consisted in the encouraging of rebels, the alienated and the indifferent to become national stakeholders. The strategy’s components are: (a) India’s institutional arrangement (the Constitution), (b) laws meant to implement the egalitarian social visions underlying the constitution, (c) the double role of the state as a neutral enforcer and as a partisan supporting vulnerable social groups in producing a level playing field, (d) the empowerment of minorities through law and political practice, including India’s personal law which guarantees freedom to religious minorities to follow their own laws in the areas of marriage, divorce, adoption and succession, and, finally, (e) judicialization which safeguards individual and group rights. When democracy fails Evidence of empowerment of former Untouchables, religious minorities and women, and the recruitment of new local elites into mainstream politics, as well as positive evidence of surveys on legitimacy, efficacy and trust from national attitudinal surveys, all indicate the strength of democracy forces in India. The marketplace of politics continues to operate as an efficient arbiter of the contradictory values of the dignity of the individual and the identity of the group. Competitive politics and redistributive social policies help negotiate the terms of India’s integration with the international political economy, while at the same time, maintaining India’s cultural distinctiveness. However, these images of successful democratic transition and consolidation are contested by some highly publicized cases of violent disaffection of parts of the population. One can see this in inter-community violence, and local support for terrorist groups. This questions the firm belief in the steady, incremental diffusion of the norms of democracy and citizenship that is considered to underpin the Indian state. In considering why democracy in India sometimes fails it is instructive to document a few exemplary incidents to analyze the patterns that cause their outbreak, and the coping mechanisms that India has drawn on in response. For many analysts of Indian politics, Hindu-Muslim conflict is the issue at the top of the list. The destruction of the Babri Mosque in the North Indian city of Ayodhya in 1992 and the outbreak of Hindu-Muslim conflict in 2002 following the fire-bombing of a train killing about sixty Hindu religious activists at Godhra railway station in Gujarat, are frequently cited to exemplify Hindu-Muslim conflicts. The long simmering secessionist movement in Kashmir, which recently burst into a spate of street protests violently quelled by the army and the police, is yet another instance of the Indian state suppressing a Muslim-majority region. Similarly, many attacks on Christian missionaries in various parts of India have taken place. Restrictive legislation was used against Christian missionaries’ attempts to convert tribes living deep in forests of central and Eastern India. Military campaigns have been employed against the secessionist movements in the North-Eastern States, many of them with large Christian populations. Such aggression is seen as yet another facet of a state that is putatively secular but is actually synonymous with a resurgent Hindu majority. Although each of these conflicts has its own genealogy and singular narrative, the religious dimension that underlies them all

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exemplifies the late surge in left-wing extremism, known under the Indian name of Naxalites. They tap into the cleavages of economic classes, are heavily armed and organized along military lines. The general Indian response to these problems has been, in the words of a leading American expert of Indian politics, to ‘first hit them hard over the head, and then to teach them how to play the piano.’ It involves sending out troops to contain the insurgency, and then to prepare the conditions for a political solution, including in particular, the holding of free and fair elections under the supervision of the Election Commission. In response to such cases three points deserve our attention. First, so far, India has been generally successful in containing, if not solving such protracted issues as the secessionist movements in many of India’s regions, including Jammu and Kashmir, within the structure of the democratic constitution. Secondly, the cleavages and conflicts tend to be local and regional rather than national. They also tend to be cross-cutting where those who are opposed to one another on one cleavage might find themselves in alliance on a different issue, rather than cumulative where advantages as well as disadvantages cumulate in specific social groups. Finally, the rhetoric of the leaders of such movements, even when radical and strident, is deeply ensconced within the conceptual framework of liberal and secular democracy. Rather than leaning towards religious fundamentalism, they point more towards power-sharing, in sharp contrast to millenarian-totalitarian movements such as Afghanistan’s Taliban or Sri Lanka’s LTTE. The final point shows that the universal significance of the Indian experiment lies in potential for democracy when it is developed both from ‘above’ by democracy-inducing institutional arrangements, and ‘below’ through social movements and elections. Despite mass poverty or the exogenous provenance of the concepts of liberty and individual rights when a democratic constitution is combined with representative political institutions and tied to political competition and social reform, it can produce results that support and promote democratic transition and consolidation. At the same time, it is important to note that local and regional conflicts are a necessary part of India’s democratic unfolding. Empowerment of the marginal social groups, while crucial to the functioning of the Indian system, is, in India as everywhere in the world, contested by established social groups. But the commitment of India’s key institutions, such as the judiciary, parliament, media, the army, and the national and regional leaders to democracy and secularism remains steadfast. The Indian case shows how, as Nobel prize-winning VS Naipul puts it, her “million mutinies” that are ensconced in a responsive state with elites well versed in the art and science of compromise and governance, can pave the way for liberal democracy despite predictions to the contrary.

The distinctive style of Indian democracy: a not so unique case Modern India is a good example of how tradition can adapt itself to modernity. Under the exotic-looking Indian veneer, there is the same hard-nosed calculation of interests and political manipulation that one finds in any large, complex political system. Like all large and complex societies with a settled, continuous political process stretching over millennia, India has also developed some distinctive features and a style specific to her. The insiders use this idiom as a code, as much to fend off intrusive outsiders as to conduct their internal transactions in an effective way. Familiarity with this veneer of Indian politics will help readers appreciate the complexity, vitality and inner dynamics of the process of empowerment and accountability that underpin India’s democratic political system and process.

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The democratic political system of India is wrapped in layers of traditional rituals and cultural symbols that invoke practices from a bygone feudal and colonial era. Those unfamiliar with Indian politics might find such rituals to be quaint, feudal and democracy-diminishing. The continuity of symbols of tradition in the midst of the modern, democratic state is distinctive to India. Western liberal democratic states and China have experienced large-scale dislocation and discontinuity during their violent transition from agrarian society to the modern world. In contrast, India’s modernization has entailed frequent re-use of the past, and consequently the emergence of a hybrid Indian modernity. Thus, the collective memory of mythical events permeates current politics. For example the Ram Temple of Ayodhya is still a current issue. Visitors to India are often amazed at the apparent ease with which the past and the present live side by side in cities, rural towns and villages. The Dak Bungalows, outposts of the British Raj in the countryside, are still given the same careful attention by the Public Works Department (PWD) as are the post-independence guesthouses of the national and State governments. The departments of religious property such as the Devaswam boards, set up during British rule to regulate religious property in the South and their equivalents in other parts of India, are still in charge of administration of temples. Government ministers of democratic India hold court much like their colonial and pre-colonial predecessors held durbar, and transact state business in a similar style of power display, privilege, pomp, and motley crowds of visitors. Despite their outwardly non-democratic appearance, many of these institutions, particularly when tied to competitive elections, actually enhance the sense of empowerment, entitlement and enfranchisement and help give legitimacy to imported modern institutions. India’s nation-building project is incomplete. The solutions to some of India’s problems such as terrorism and secessionist movements lie beyond her borders. Joint search for solutions in collaboration with neighbouring countries is indispensable for domestic order and social harmony. The muted response to the recent judicial decision to award equal parts of the disputed land to the three parties (one Muslim, the others two different Hindu sects) in the Ayodhya conflict is a hopeful sign. The national elite that has evolved over the years has understood the benefits of cooperation with all sections of the population. In consequence, conciliation has prevailed over conflict. India’s leaders of all political shades increasingly articulate their concerns about national security, unity and prosperity within the framework of national, competitive elections. Beyond India: Comparing popular perception of democratic norms and experiences in South Asian states New comparative data on attitudes towards democracy, not available to previous theorists, help cast our model in a new light. The data are derived from a remarkable South Asian project, conducted by a team of South Asian scholars, using a combination of objective and constructivist criteria. One of the main objectives of this project was to get past both the ‘western bias’ and the ‘Indian bias.’12 Following are some of the highlights of the findings of this project. 12 “… South Asian democracy is much more than an India story, despite the country’s size and centrality to the future of democracy in the region. If India shows greater depth in its support for democracy and pro-diversity policies alongside a multiplicity of institutional arrangements, Bangladesh reflects much deeper political identification and levels of political participation; Pakistan has a higher sense of national pride; Nepal proves the vitality of people’s aspirations and ability to struggle for republican and democratic order; and Sri Lanka,

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Question: What is democracy, is understood differently by different people. According to you what is democracy? (Record up to two responses exactly.) (Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, State of Democracy in South Asia: A Report (Delhi: Oxford University Press; 2008, p. 243)

Table 3a Meaning of democracy as understood by people in cross-national comparison ( %)

South Asia/ Individual countries

Attributes South Asia

Bangladesh India Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka

Popular rule 23 21 36 17 34 14 Election 12 20 22 10 0 4 Rule of law 2 3 4 2 4 1 Freedom 40 27 22 52 41 54 Justice/welfare 29 23 50 25 15 28 Peace/security 11 12 8 8 5 18 Negative 5 2 8 9 8 1 Others 13 26 11 14 4 10 In the above table, remarkably, whereas both India and Pakistan score comparable percentages with regard to popular rule as an important content of democracy, election gets no mention in Pakistan. Freedom, on the other hand, emerges as an important aspect of democracy in Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Understandably, in India, where freedom is not that salient an issue, it is justice and welfare that catch the imagination of the interviewees. (See diagram 1 for the visualisation of these findings.) In the assisted questions, however, it is equality and basic necessities that emerge as the core contents of democracy, with the freedom to change the rulers emerging as a second most item in India and Sri Lanka. Question: People often differ in their views on the characteristic that is essential to democracy. If you have to choose only one of the things that I am going to read, which one would you chose as the most essential element to democracy? 1. Opportunity to change the government through elections, 2. Freedom to criticise those in power, 3. Equal rights to everyone, 4. Basic necessities like food, clothes and shelter for everyone 8. No opinion (Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, State of Democracy in South Asia: A Report Delhi: Oxford University Press; 2008, p. 244)

arguably trapped in a seemingly intractable civil war, has a civil society wedded to peace. In this sense, the story of democracy in South Asia goes much beyond a narrative of democracy in India, it becomes a truly South Asian story. It need not surprise us if the more exciting developments shaping the practice of democracy in the region take place outside India in the near future.” Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, State of Democracy in South Asia: A Report (Delhi: Oxford University Press; 2008), p. 6

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Diagram 1

Multiple Meanings of Democracy in South Asia13

Table 3b Most essential elements of democracy in cross-national comparison in South Asia (‘%)

Attributes

South Asia/ countries

Opportunity to change government

Freedom to criticise

Equal rights

Basic necessities

No opinion

South Asia 14 5 28 30 23 Bangladesh 11 3 27 44 15 India 20 4 20 37 19 Nepal 9 4 21 35 31 Pakistan 11 6 33 19 31 Sri Lanka 19 6 40 17 18

13 Note: The figures for this and other charts (where any other source is no specified) are for per cent of responses (one responded was permitted up to two responses) to the open-ended question: “What, if anything, does democracy mean to you?” The responses were noted verbatim and then coded into various categories that were further regrouped for this presentation. Source: State of Democracy in South Asia. A Report. SDSA Team. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, p.27.

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The most important aspect of the results presented in table 3c is that despite the objective differences in the macro, structural attributes of the political systems of South Asian states, when asked about the ontological evaluation of democracy, the freedom to speak out gets the pride of place in all of them. Sri Lanka, with the specific issue of the Tamil conflict, does yield the treatment meted out to minorities also as an important parameter. Question: Different people give different answers about what they like about democracy. I will read out a few of these. Tell me which one of these do you like most about democracy. 1. Everyone is free to speak and act, 2. People have control over the rules, 3. The weak are treated with dignity, 4. The interest of minorities are protected 5. Any other. (Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, State of Democracy in South Asia: A Report (Delhi: Oxford University Press; 2008, p. 245)

Table 3c Most liked attributes of democracy in cross-national comparison in South Asia (%)

South Asia/ Individual countries

Attributes of democracy

South Asia

Bangladesh India Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka

Everyone is free to speak and act

38 26 39 41 31 54

People have control over the rulers

8 6 12 4 7 13

The weak are treated with dignity

25 54 27 11 26 7

The interest of minorities are protected

6 3 7 4 5 12

No opinion 16 0 2 39 20 13 As the less attractive features of democracy are concerned, corruption and majority authoritarianism get mentioned among the important features. (table 3d) Question: Now let me talk about anxieties that many people have about democracy. Tell me which of these do you dislike most about democracy? 1. Too many parties divide the people, 2. Rulers keep changing, 3. Corruption increases, 4. Those who have more votes dominate over others, 5. Any other (Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, State of Democracy in South Asia: A Report (Delhi: Oxford University Press; 2008, p. 245)

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Table 3d Most disliked attributes of democracy in cross-national comparison in South Asia (%)

South Asia/ Individual countries

Attributes of democracy

South Asia

Bangladesh India Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka

Too many parties divide the people

14 8 19 14 14 18

Rulers keep changing

10 13 9 6 14 10

Corruption increases 35 29 43 36 22 49 Those who have more votes dominate over others

16 23 13 8 20 12

Any other 10 27 13 1 10 0 No opinion 15 0 3 35 20 11 As political trust is concerned, the most interesting feature of the findings (table 3e) is the mention of army, which fares better than all others, with Bangladesh and India giving top scores, and Pakistan trailing closely behind. The Election Commission does well everywhere except Pakistan (where elections have not come through as credible). In Pakistan, where the average trust is rather low, the army emerges as the most trusted public institution. Question: I am going to name a number of institutions. For each one, could you tell me how much trust you have in them? Is it a great deal of trust, some trust, not very much trust or none at all? (Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, State of Democracy in South Asia: A Report (Delhi: Oxford University Press; 2008, p. 247 - 253)

Table 3e

Level of trust in cross-national comparison in South Asia (‘Great deal of trust...’/ %) South Asia/ Individual countries

Institutions South Asia

Bangladesh India Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka

National Government

20 39 26 15 8 12

Provincial Government

10 - 24 - 8 8

Local Government

20 32 30 22 10 8

Civil service 16 24 18 15 8 12 Police 16 22 17 18 6 14 Army 40 56 55 22 38 31 Courts 25 38 27 23 9 26 Parliament 15 30 19 12 5 8 Political Parties

11 22 13 11 5 5

Election Commission

20 26 29 18 6 20

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Taking general thrust of these findings into consideration, one can see a reflection of the state of play in macro-level institutions in public opinion and attitudes. One can also notice a yearning for representation and governance, though the institutions that could constitute the leading elements to lead the system in that direction vary across the states.

Conclusion: the implications of intra-South Asia comparison for democracy transition and consolidation The project of a comparative analysis of democracy in South Asia can help ‘democratise’ the democracy discourse. I have argued in this paper that the reconsideration of the performance of South Asian states in the light of the European experience – with its Nazi, Fascist and collaborative interludes, battles over secularism, republican excesses and orthodox religiosity and more recently, the battle lines between national, European and immigrant values and identities – can help us see the performance of South Asian states in a different, and more positive light, and open up the requisite comparative and theoretical space for a theory that does not automatically privilege the quantitative over the constructive, the western over the non-western or, closer home, the Indian variant compared to the Sri Lankan, Pakistani or Bangladeshi variants. A general theory on those lines can help in a more realistic assessment of the problems and prospects of democratisation in South Asia.14 The Indian experience can contribute vital insights to the making of a general theory of democratisation. With its continental dimensions, massive elections, its social context of ethnic and conflict-ridden diversity, deeply embedded inequalities based on caste, gender, religion and tribe, India has nevertheless succeeded in achieving the status of an embedded democracy. This has been brought about through a political process ensconced in a hybrid political culture that dovetails modernity and tradition. At the heart of the political process are hinge institutions like the Supreme Court, the Election Commission, the Parliament and a few others that seek to generate a level playing field where power can be shared by a constantly increasing body of stakeholders who constitute India’s political community. Naturally, neither the political process itself nor the system that it underpins it is free of blemishes. But, going by the past record, the national leadership has adroitly engaged with the failures, enhancing legitimacy and efficacy, without over-stepping the limitations on power that is the essence of democracy. This is how this new, post-colonial democracy where the system, rather than the being the product of the national, industrial and confessional revolutions that generated western democracy, has had to be at the forefront of these very processes, and has successfully tackled the conflicts arising from them – a process that this paper has sought to explain with the help of a rational choice, neo-institutional model. By current reckoning, the likelihood of the collapse of the Indian state and its democratic political system is slim. Indian democracy has become self-sustaining. Despite short-term, local difficulties, India’s democracy on the whole will continue to strengthen in the

14 This sense of unease about an ‘essential, western perspective’ underpins the CSDS project on democracy in South Asia. To quote, “The project began with an unease with the global discourse on democracy, in particular the dominance of a one-dimensional check-list model of democracy abstracted from the experience of a tiny part of the globe. Even more disturbing is the tendency, as democracy spreads to different parts of the globe, towards a shrinking of our notions of what it means to be democratic. In some measure it is because our thinking about democracy is anything but democratic. This then becomes our first challenge, to democratise the thinking about democracy in more than one way.” Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, State of Democracy in South Asia: A Report (Delhi: Oxford University Press; 2008), p. 2

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foreseeable future.15 The main responsibility for the continuity of this process rests with India’s elites. For the deepening and broadening of India’s democracy, it is important that they pay attention to the problem of disaffection. India needs to promote collective identity by re-inventing the fundamental basis of her nation-hood, and renewing the political consensus. The steps being taken by the government to achieve ‘inclusive development’ – not merely as an electoral tactic, but as an integral part of the ‘Indian model’ – need to be communicated to the population at home, and the world. Similarly, one needs to remember that India’s valued and vaunted secularism is the consequence of her tolerant pluralism that accommodates religious difference rather than denying the vital role of religion in society. The success of India’s democracy, properly understood, has important significance for democracy in South Asia, as well as for broader democracy theory. It shows that strategic reform, accountability, and social policies that balance efficiency with justice, can sustain the progress in democracy and development in a post-colonial context. India’s successful conflict-resolution, compared to other new democracies has been immensely helped, by the fact that social groups tend to overlap, and that key intermediaries for conflict-resolution such as the judicial system and party politics have been available for a considerable length of time prior to Independence. India’s social and economic cleavages sometimes manifest themselves in complex combinations of ethnic conflict, secessionist movements, inter-community violence and terrorist attacks. Students of comparative politics, equipped with the knowledge that competition over scarce resources usually underlies social conflict, might look askance at India where such potential conflicts are articulated in a form and an idiom that are deeply embedded in traditional culture. From their location in villages, urban localities and peripheral regions, India’s national, regional and local elites, leaders of ethnic groups and all manners of social activists have mastered the art of political manipulation and power-sharing. Through a deft combination of protest and participation, they have formulated political strategies that combine cultural, symbolic and religious values with material interests. Despite its periodic failures, India’s democracy shines on the whole in cross-national comparison. Innovative policy, hybrid institutions and the re-use of traditional practices for modern functions explain the transformation of this ancient civilization and its social hierarchy into a level playing field.16 Glorious as this shining case of third world democracy is, in a comparative perspective, one must still ask if there are institutional arrangements other than that of India to facilitate transition to democracy. More particularly, are the Indian institutions of secularism, federalism, a multi-party system and civilian control over the military an Indian specificity – challenged by the feasibility, even inevitability of a Buddhist, Islamic or Bhutanese democracy where the majority ethnic identity becomes the basic foundation stones of democratic institutions? A democracy counter-factual, India stands alone among the major powers of the world as a country that has made its change from tradition to modernity without the terrible cost in human lives that has generally marked the violent history of modernisation. India has achieved 15 For details of this argument, see Mitra (2011) 16 However, India’s struggles are not yet over. As one can see in the ongoing insurgency in Kashmir and the North East, Maoist violence in Central and Eastern India, and sporadic Hindu-Muslim conflict, India still faces the challenge of how to reconcile democracy, governance and collective identity. To attribute such democracy failures to merely the ‘misguided youth’, or to assume that ‘things will somehow work themselves out’, instead of focussing on the structural problems and institutional shortcomings that lead to them, would be, as Barrington Moore warned in his magisterial Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy (Boston: Beacon Press; 1967) the “acme of intellectual and moral irresponsibility” (p. 410)

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this remarkable feat by strategically combining elements of the three classic routes of transition from tradition to modernity – liberalism, socialism and fascism – with its indigenous political culture and tradition. Beyond the much vaunted norms of modern, liberal and secular values paraded by Indian politicians for partisan purposes, the essence of the Indian model of democratisation is a levelling process which leads, simultaneously to the creation of a tolerant and accommodative pluralism that recognises differences without privileging them, and a level playing field that seeks to balance enterprise and justice. However, although democracy might offer the best solution to political competition within India’s political system, one still needs to consider whether India’s democratic political process has the requisite strength to address the politics of the system, particularly of the core values and norms that underpin it. Based on the Indian example, one can ask more generally, does the democratic process, particularly in a post-colonial context, have the historic depth and the strategic room to manoeuvre to reform the political system of which it is a part? What additional resources might the post-colonial states of South Asia need to ‘repair the ship, while keeping it afloat’ as storm clouds gather in the horizon? In the Indian case, the enormous momentum necessary to effectuate and maintain the pace of change is generated by the dynamics of India’s hybrid political structure and the electoral process that underpins it. These are the motors of India’s multi-party democracy and sustained economic growth. The challenge for the states of South Asia is to stay the course, and enhance the capacity of the system by holding steadfastly on to the rule of law at home, and balancing their essentially introverted national cultures with global norms of equity and freedom. From a policy perspective, the comparative analysis of democracy in South Asia should take into account good practices and institutions from other regions of the world, engaged in similar experiments. One of the more important issues to emerge from this paper is that ‘democracy in one country’ is a chimera. A general model of democracy that takes into account the local conditions as well as the regional parameters can certainly help link up the domestic parameters with the security dimensions. This is of obvious interest to the smaller states. Even India would stand to benefit from this new perspective, for the prospects of democracy in Kashmir, or the North-East can improve if the neighbouring states where factored in with regard to a possible solution. Here, the emergence of the EU as the core of a process of regional integration holds important lessons for South Asia. The asymmetry built into South Asia in view of India’s massive size, population, wealth and firepower has been a negative influence on the growth of endogenous democratic processes in her neighbouring countries which have often relied on undemocratic forces such as the army, sectarian leaders or foreign entanglements to meet real or imaginary threats emanating from India. A strong regional organisation capable of conflict resolution – which is how the SAARC was originally conceptualised for – can give the necessary support to mainstream political forces and process to emerge in the smaller South Asian countries. Similarly, regional norms of justice, representation, welfare, basic human rights, including cultural identity, and institutions for their effective policing – rather like in the EU – can bring that much needed sense of being stakeholders rather than helpless onlookers that can go a long way towards reinforcing democracy in South Asia. In the final analysis, more than pious homilies and offer/threat of massive aid/intervention, it is rational calculation, innovative institutional arrangements that extend legitimacy to differences and aim at creating a level playing field, and the incorporation of regional entanglements within the domestic arenas of national states which would enhance the prospects of democratisation in South Asia.

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