the pen is mightier than the sword ma dissertation final
TRANSCRIPT
MA WAR STUDIES
“The Pen is Mightier than the Sword”.
In the ‘Information Age’, why does Civil Resistance Appear to be a more Attractive Strategic Option than Violence to Networked Social Movements?
Nicolas James Carr
Supervisor: Dr. David Betz
Submission: 15 December 2014
Word Count: 14893
This dissertation is the sole work of the author, and has not been
accepted in any previous application for a degree; all quotations and
sources of information have been acknowledged.
I confirm that my research did not require ethical
approval.
Signed: Nicolas James Carr
Date: 15 December 2014
Contents Introduction. ................................................................................................................................ 4
Literature Review. ........................................................................................................................ 6
Vanguardism. ............................................................................................................................. 16
Regime Type............................................................................................................................... 26
International Factors................................................................................................................... 37
Conclusion. ................................................................................................................................ 49
Bibliography. .............................................................................................................................. 53
4
Introduction.
The dawn of the ‘information age’ has seen waves of political tumult sweep across the globe.
Orchestrated by networked social movements, these revolutions are distinct in that they are
characterised by their use of non-violent resistance methods, specifically civil resistance. These
movements have been challenging governments and demanding political change with tactics such as
strikes, go-slows, boycotts, occupations and demonstrations. Good examples would be the colour
revolutions in Eastern Europe such as in Ukraine in 2004, the Arab Spring with the Egyptian and
Tunisian Revolutions in 2011 and finally the Occupy Movement protests. There appears to be an
increasing number of networked social movements that are adopting non-violent civil resistance
tactics where previously we would have expected them to adopt violent action. However, compared
with the literature on violent action, comparatively little academic focus has been placed on non-
violent action. This knowledge gap needs to be rectified, given the dawn of the ‘information age’
where non-violent action and in particular civil resistance appears to be an increasingly popular and
powerful method of challenging the state. The question is why, in the ‘information age’, civil resistance
appears to be a more attractive strategic option than violence to networked social movements? These
movements are not adopting non-violent civil resistance because they have a principled aversion to
violence; they are adopting it because it makes more strategic sense to do so. There must be factors
which are influencing this decision making process. This paper seeks to analyse some of these factors
by analysing three themes which, having examined the pre-existing literature, appear to be influential.
These themes are vanguardism, regime type and international factors.
This paper will be thematic in its approach and we should acknowledge the limitations of this
method. Thematic approaches allows flexibility in allowing for a wide data set, identifying patterns or
themes within a data set and allowing wide ranging conclusions to be drawn. However, thematic
5
treatment does have weaknesses and care must be taken when generalising about any findings due
to the unique contexts and histories of each example selected. Thematic approaches can sometimes
overlook the nuances of any particular example and could limit the reliability of any results garnered.
Because thematic approaches allow a wide range of data to be examined it is important not to cherry-
pick cases that service the hypothesis and as a result it is critical to note the limits of the hypothesis
when analysing examples. Failure to do so, may lead to misleading conclusions. Having taken the
above limitations into account, the overall structure of this paper will consist of five chapters.
Following the introductory chapter, the relevant academic literature will be examined to establish the
conceptual framework. Certain theories attempt to explain social movements behaviour in the
’information age’ and it is imperative that we understand them to place the three case studies
examined within the appropriate theoretical context. This chapter, will therefore, demonstrate the
gaps in the literature, define key terms and establish the key themes which will be used to answer the
research question. The following three chapters will consist of an analysis of the three themes
established in the literature review. Finally, there will be a concluding chapter, which will include a
summary and critique of the paper’s findings and finally areas for future research.
6
Literature Review.
Before examining the key literature surrounding civil resistance it is advantageous to
understand the literature that provides the broad theoretical framework for this thesis. This concerns
the ‘information age’. Drucker, spoke of knowledge workers.1 Touraine, wrote of a programmed
society.2 The origins of the ‘information age’ begin with the work of Bell, who states, “a post-industrial
society rests on a knowledge theory of value. Knowledge is the source of invention and innovation”. 3
The fundamental focus is on how societies were becoming increasingly ori entated around
information, hence the ‘information age’. Manuel Castells, who contends that networks have
transformed human societies, has developed these ideas into the concept of a networked society,
which is “a social structure based on networks operated by information and communication
technology based in microelectronics and digital computer networks that generate, process, and
distribute information on the basis of the knowledge accumulated in the nodes of the networks”. 4 As
Mackinlay explains, the use of digital networks has compressed the space and time between nodes
(and therefore individuals) to almost zero.5 This allows for instantaneous mass communication. Due
to this change, individuals and, importantly, social movements now exercise counter power which is
the capacity of social actors to challenge power for the purpose of claiming representation for their
own values and interests.6 Therefore, individuals and groups now have significant autonomy and
power to orient their own behaviour and the ability to self-organise. Because of the network society,
social movements defined as a “collective challenge to elites, authorities, other groups or cultural
1 Drucker, (1968) 264 2 Touraine, (1971) 3 3 Bell, (1973) xvii 4 Castells and Cardoso, (2005) 7 5 Mackinlay, (2009) 137 6 Castells (2012) 5
7
codes by some significant number of people with common purposes and solidarity”, 7 have been
transformed into networked social movements. Gerlach, explains how now these networked social
movements are segmented with many flexible groups, polycentric with shifting leaderships and
networked in that they have multiple linkages and overlapping memberships.8 Moreover, their
behaviour has been transformed. The space of autonomy allows networked social movements to
organise, mobilise and coordinate campaigns and thus challenge the state. 9 Most importantly, it
allows them to occupy cyberspace, whilst simultaneously occupying physical locations.10 They can
therefore exist both offline and online simultaneously. This new operational environment does not
totally discard older methods of behaviour but offers new tools that networked social movements can
use to organise their campaigns be they violent or non-violent. However, much focus has previously
been on violent insurgency campaigns.
Metz defines insurgency as “an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted
government through the use of subversion and armed conflict”.11 Insurgency has developed into
networked insurgency. This is form of insurgency is best explained by Mackinlay who shows that whilst
older forms of insurgency had a top down hierarchical structure, networked insurgencies have little
defined leadership and are instead held together by horizontally ordered networks.12 All forms of
insurgency employ violence to achieve their strategic objectives. With the change to networked
insurgency, the propaganda of the deed has become the foremost form of this violence. Bolt defines
this as “a terrorist act of political violence aimed at creating a media event capable of energising
populations to bring about state revolution or social transformation”. 13 What can be observed is
7 Tarrow, (1994) 3-4 8 Gerlach (2001) 289-290 9 Castells, (2012) 222 10 Ibid., 222 11 Metz, (2007) 5 12 Mackinlay, (2009) 224 13 Bolt, (2012) xvii-xviii
8
popular mobilisation using violence, with the battle for the narrative. Moreover, Bolt shows that,
insurgency is a form of revolution that uses violence to achieve objectives. Violence, and revolution
have long been considered to be linked concepts. Indeed, much work on revolution stipulates that
revolution must involve the use of or threat of force.14 Mao saw violence as inherent to insurgency
with three stages, with each employing different types and ever increasing levels of violence, ranging
from terrorism to guerrilla warfare and finally utilising combined arms.15 So, whilst gaining the support
of the population first was crucial for Mao, without violence he could not ultimately gain power.
Revolution and violence are seemingly inseparable and consequently civil resistance has been
overlooked as a form of collective action by which power can be created. Is there then, any scope for
a revolution to be non-violent in nature and use non-violence to create power? By examining the
relationship between power and violence, we can observe that there is.
It is worth understanding that there are many types of violence, personal, interpersonal and
collective. This paper is interested in the collective violence of large groups of people, specifically
networked social movements. However, a further complication is that violence is a heavily subjective
concept and contains various definitions, some expansive and others narrower. This paper therefore
needs a definition of what collective violence actually entails. Galtung’s broad def inition sees violence
as “avoidable insults to basic human needs, and more generally life”.16 Contrastingly, Keane argues
that violence should be “the more or less intended, direct but unwanted physical interference by
groups and or individuals with the bodies of others, who are consequently made to suffer a series of
effects ranging from shock…to death”.17 Too broad a definition of violence in which anything could
potentially be considered violent would not allow us to distinguish between social movements that
14 Tompkins, (2012) xvii 15 O’Neill (2005) 50 16 Galtung, (1990) 292 17 Keane, (2004) 35
9
employ violence and those that choose non-violence. Adopting too narrow a definition could mean
that actions such as vandalism and looting could be seen as non-violent simply because there is no
intended threat to a human being. Taking this into account, this paper defines violence as the
intentional use of physical force, designed to cause deliberate harm or damage to either individuals
or property by a group in the pursuit of their stated objectives.
The relationship between power and violence has been widely investigated with much of the
discourse seeing power and violence as linked. This school of thought identifies with Max Weber who
argued that “power is the probability that one actor within a social relationship will be in a position to
carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of the basis on which this probability rests”. 18 As
Goelher points out, this can be achieved through the use of violence. 19 Less studied has been the
normative concept of power usually associated with Hannah Arendt. Arendt argues “power springs up
when people get together and act in concert”.20 Therefore, Arendt adds that “violence can always
destroy power; out of the barrel of a gun grows the most effective command, resulting in the most
instant and perfect obedience. What can never grow out of it is power”.21 Goelher, argues that power
cannot be reduced to one basic concept, but each approach must be seen as coexisting in
complementary relationship to each other because power is both empirical (power over) in the
Weberain sense and normative (power to) in the Arendtian, one potentially violent, the other not.22
The crucial point is that power must be seen as multi -faceted in nature and, therefore, the creation of
power does not necessarily have to involve violence. It is clear, as Arendt has argued, wars and
revolutions are not totally defined by violence,23 and social movements can employ non-violent
18 Weber (1978) 53 19 Goelher, (2000) 41 20 Arendt, (1972) 151 21 Ibid., 152 22 Goelher, (2000) 42-43 23 Arendt, (1963) 9
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methods in the pursuit of their goals. This is supported by Clausewitz who states that strategy is “the
use of engagements for the object of war”.24 The focus has usually been on the violent aspects of
Clausewitz’s approach, particularly his emphasis that the “direct annihilation of the enemy’s forces
must always be the dominant consideration”.25 However, as Burrowes has noted this is qualified by
Clausewitz arguing that that an opponent’s forces must be put into a condition where they no longer
continue to fight, which interestingly can be induced by many forms, and thus the political object can
be potentially be achieved without using armed force.26 Revolutions therefore, from a theoretical
standpoint do not have to be violent to create power and we can adopt Goodwin’s definition that
revolutions are “irregular extra-constitutional and sometimes violent changes of political regime and
control of state power brought about by popular movements”.27
Clearly, there is no theoretical issue with social movements engaging in non-violent
revolution. Given the recent and successful uses of non-violent action by social movements, it also
works in reality. However, there are many forms of non-violent action, and consequently a great deal
of overlap between the concepts within the non-violent resistance literature. The form that this paper
is interested in is civil resistance, which has its theoretical roots within the work of Ghandi who first
demonstrated, with his concept of Satyagraha, that regimes could be vulnerable to concerted
organised campaigns of civil disobedience.28 Building on Ghandi’s work, Gene Sharp is the key theorist.
As Schock shows us, whilst Ghandi’s form of non-violent action is based upon principled pacifism,
Sharp’s form of non-violent resistance is one which sets “aside the question of moral beliefs or codes
to which practitioners must adhere”,29 and is therefore chosen purely as a pragmatic strategic choice.
24 Clausewitz (1976) 128 25 Ibid., 228 26 Burrowes, (1996) 27-28 27 Goodwin, (2001) 9-10 28 Bondurant, (1988) 3 29 Schock (2013) 279
11
Sharp’s work on non-violent resistance is based upon his theory of power that states: “governments
depend on people, that power is pluralistic, and that political power is fragile because it depends on
many groups for reinforcement of its power sources”.30 So what Sharp calls non-violent weapons such
as strikes and boycotts,31 can be used to challenge repressive governments. Such non-violent
campaigns are successful because of the four mechanisms of change. These mechan isms are:
conversion, where the opposition is convinced to make changes, accommodation where opponents
grant changes due to the perceived costs of not doing so, non-violent coercion where the non-violent
movement can implement change because the opponents will is blocked and finally disintegration
where non-violent resistance causes the opponents power to collapse. 32 All forms of non-violent
resistance, including civil resistance, work using mechanisms to effect political change. How then is
civil resistance different from other forms? Civil resistance is:
“a type of political action that relies on the use of non-violent methods…it involves a range of
widespread and sustained activities that challenge a particular power, force, policy or regime-hence
the term resistance. The adjective civil in this context denotes that which pertains to a citizen or
society, implying that a movements goals are civil in the sense of being widely shared in a society; and
it denotes that the action is…non-violent in character”.33
We can observe that we are using the term civil resistance because it shows us that non-
violence is being employed strategically, not for principled reasons and also that it is civic in nature,
being employed by the whole or greater part of a society.
The literature concerning civil resistance has looked principally at the outcomes of civil
resistance campaigns, repression, diffusion and motivations. Roberts has argued that to help
30 Sharp (1973) 8 31 Ibid., 110 32 Sharp (1990) p. 15-16 33 Roberts, (2011) 2
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determine outcomes, civil resistance must be not be considered in isolation, moreover despite its
many successes it can lead to adverse outcomes.34 The most important work that has been carried out
concerning outcomes has been Chenoweth and Stephan’s empirical study that found that non-violent
campaigns are generally more successful than violent ones because they provide various participation
advantages to non-violent campaigns over violence.35
The literature concerning repression focuses mainly on how repression can rebound on the
regime that employs it. Gene Sharp has termed this feature political Ju-Jitsu.36 Aside from Sharp, the
most thorough work done has been by Hess and Martin, who have found that unjust repressive events
can generate a huge public backlash called backfire against those responsible, indeed it becomes a
huge transformative event that can sometimes lead to greater movement mobilisation. 37 Social
movements only gain from backfire, if they can communicate this story past regime censorship and
narratives, thereby highlighting the importance of communication to social movements.38
There has been much focus within the civil resistance literature about how the message of
non-violence is transmitted across state borders. Givan has found that three types of diffusion of social
movements exist, these are relational, non-relational and finally mediated.39 Scholars are examining
all three types to establish just how the doctrine of non-violence is spreading globally. Some, however,
argue against placing too much emphasis on diffusion since it can lead to the importance of local
context being overlooked. Nepstad and Vinthagen in their study of the International Plowshare
34 Roberts, (2011) 1 35 Chenoweth and Stephan, (2011) 7 36 Sharp (1973) 110 37 Hess and Martin, (2006) 249 38 Ibid., 262 39 Givan, (2010) 209
13
Movement show how local movements must shape theories of non-violence to fit the local context, if
mobilisation efforts are to be successful.40
Lastly, the current literature has looked at the motivations behind why violent or non-violent
action is chosen. Pearlman and Cunningham have looked at the internal structure of movements
finding that “actor fragmentation plays a critical role in conflict processes”.41 Cunningham meanwhile,
looks at self-determination disputes, concluding that non-violent action is chosen “when groups are
smaller, are less geographically concentrated, are excluded from political power, face economic
discrimination, make independence demands, and operate in non-democracies”.42 This area of the
factors influencing the choice of civil resistance has been underexplored and requires further study.
This is where the three key themes can be utilised to explain what motivates networked social
movements to adopt civil resistance instead of violence.
The role of a vanguard in organising a revolution has traditionally been associated with Marxist
theorists such as Lenin who strongly favoured the necessity of a trained professional vanguard to lead
and direct a revolution stating “no revolutionary movement can endure without a stable organisation
of leaders maintaining continuity… such as organisation must consist chiefly of people professionally
engaged in revolutionary activity”.43 This thinking is in line with Marx and Engels in the ‘Communist
Manifesto’ who advocated the use of a vanguard as they have the “theorising edge in understanding
the conditions, heading, and the general results of the proletarian movement”.44 This school of Marxist
thought as a top-down approach to revolution, is naturally suspicious of spontaneous revolution;
hence the great debate between Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg. As Luban notes “Luxe mburg put the
emphasis on the spontaneous action of the masses and on the socialist party’s forward driving
40 Nepstad and Vinthagen, (2008) 39 41 Pearlman and Cunningham, (2012) 11 42 Cunningham (2013) 291 43 Lenin (1988) 185-186 44 Marx (2004) 74
14
agitation, not on the organizational party work and on pure orders of the leadership.45 Obviously, this
theory was problematic for Lenin as it meant that he would not be able to direct the revolution as he
saw fit. The idea of spontaneous revolution has much support in the information age; indeed the very
nature of the network society appears to have enhanced its appeal. Carne Ross’s theory of leaderless
revolution sees that in an interconnected global system, the people and not leaders have the agency
to elicit revolutionary change spontaneously.46 There is no need for a vanguard for a social movement
to adopt non-violent civil resistance campaign. The role of professional vanguards has been
overlooked in favour of views that see the recent spate of civil resistance actions as being entirely
spontaneous. There is therefore a need for a reappraisal of this situation.
Schock states, “it is assumed that there are no special contexts where only violence can be
mobilized and effective. If violent resistance can be mobilized and be effective, then non -violent
resistance can be mobilized and effective”.47 Carter states that Sharp believes that “with good enough
organisation and sufficient courage, popular non-violence always has the potential to succeed”.48
Because of this belief, Sharp overlooks the issue of how different regime types can make civil
resistance more attractive than violence. Ghandi, first demonstrated, with his concept of Satyagraha,
that different types of regime could be vulnerable to concerted organised campaigns of civil
disobedience conducted by social movements.49 However, Ghandi’s example is limited to non-violent
resistance campaigns based upon pacifism and not on civil resistance which is deliberately chosen as
a strategic option. Also, Ghandi’s work is not applicable to the networked social movements
conducting civil resistance campaigns in the information age. In addition, we also need to avoid just
looking at repressive regimes. In the last decade civil resistance campaigns have been conducted
45 Luban (2012) 360 46 Ross, (2013) xx 47 Schock (2013) 282 48 Carter (2005) 51 49 Bondurant, (1988) 3
15
against all types of regime. Most of the work in this area most has focused principally on civil resistance
campaigns conducted against authoritarian regimes and relatively little consideration has been paid
to liberal democracies. It is prudent to rectify this oversight by examining different regime types not
just repressive ones.
Finally, in regards to international factors, the existing literature provides no clear narrative
as to its exact influence on the attractiveness of civil resistance, particularly in regards to the role of
states and non-state actors. Ritter argues that because of liberal expectations placed on autocratic
regimes, they find themselves in an iron cage of liberalism that makes the repression of non-violent
demonstrators politically costly.50 Others are more pessimistic about states. Chenoweth and Stephan
argue that non-violent campaigns can benefit from sanctions, diplomatic support, and allies in
international civil society.51 However, they also argue that support for non-violent campaigns is best
when it comes from multilateral sources rather than from single states, as it is more legitimate and
less politicized.52 Therefore, since the literature provides no clear narrative, this is an area suitable for
further academic study.
50 Ritter (2015) 5 51 Chenoweth and Stephan, (2011) 223 52 Ibid., 225
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Vanguardism.
The networked social movements of the ‘information age’ that employ civil resistance such as
the ‘Orange Movement’ are often seen as entirely spontaneous, leaderless, grassroots movements
that suddenly burst onto the streets and rapidly sweep away long entrenched oppressive regimes.
These spontaneously organised networked social movements comprise many individual digital
activists and networked groups who act as a quasi-leadership attempting to coordinate and organise
the movement. This assortment of actors most likely has no formal training in the real-world
application of non-violent civil resistance as a strategy. However, as Marxist thinker Antonio Gramsci
states, “pure spontaneity does not exist in history…hence in such movements there exists multiple
elements of conscious leadership”.53 Therefore no social movement can ever be entirely spontaneous
and will have some degree of professional leadership. The question is how far do the presence of these
vanguards influence the choice of civil resistance to the networked social movements in the
information age? This chapter establishes that vanguardism plays a decisive role in making civil
resistance attractive to that social movement. Indeed, often it is vanguardism that allows a networked
social movement’s choice of civil resistance to appear entirely spontaneous. Professional training
enables vanguards to achieve this by; pre-protest information campaigns, understanding a regime’s
initial response to public opposition, preparations for the long term occupation of protest locations
and finally through creating dedicated activists and example setting.
Professional training means that vanguards understand techniques to engage with and
mobilise populations long in advance of the civil resistance campaign. This long-term effort prepares
a population to be more likely to support a civil resistance campaign when the vanguard initiates civil
resistance actions because the movement has built up social capital. Consider how the first stage of
53 Gramsci (2005) 196
17
the Pora! civil resistance campaign in Ukraine prepared the population for civil resistance with an
information campaign, Pora! achieved two critical objectives. Firstly, they ensured that the Ukrainian
people thought that change was possible and that their votes truly mattered. Thus, when it became
clear, following two rounds of voting, that the election had been stolen from them, and Yanukovych
was declared the winner with 49.5 per cent of the vote compared to Yushchenko’s 46.6, 54 the people
would be angered and open to the idea of a civil resistance campaign. Secondly, this information
campaign meant that Pora! could build links within communities, build relationships and networks,
emphasise the role and message of the movement. In effect, Pora! would gain huge social capital
ensuring that the Ukrainian people would both recognise Pora! and be more open to support its
message and join the civil resistance campaign when the time came. The informational campaign
actually consisted of the two wings of Pora! running concurrent campaigns, Yellow Pora! connected
more with the political sphere, whilst Black Pora! focused on a grass roots mobilization campaign.
Both, campaigns sought to reduce people’s fear of the regime, providing important electoral
information and stressing the importance of voting. Both campaigns began well in advance of the
rigged 2004 Presidential election. The Yellow Pora! campaign coordinated heavily with the official
opposition to the extent that Yellow Pora! had access to the financial resources and contacts of the
opposition. By utilising these resources of Yushchenko’s opposition movement, Pora! could build
support networks, and better spread its message wider both within the official opposition and
throughout Ukraine. In effect, they could build on pre-established anti-government support networks.
Simultaneously, Black Pora! the leaderless networked wing of Pora! ran a grassroots anti-Kuchma
campaign. This was popular amongst the Ukrainian youth, known for its humour. As Alina Schpak of
Pora! noted "We mocked the power as much as possible…You can't be afraid of someone you're
laughing at".55 These campaigns by both Yellow and Black Pora! meant that before the election, the
54 Wilson, (2005) 116 55 Traynor, (6 June 2005) http://www.theguardian.com/world/2005/jun/06/iantraynor
18
Pora! website, www.pora.org.ua became Ukraine’s fifth most popular site, and that the organization
had distributed 70 million copies of printed materials.56 Pora! as a whole, had been able voting and
around the country,57 this was despite intimidation from the authorities. As a result, some 11,000,000
Ukrainians cast their ballots for Yushchenko,58 in the 2004 presidential elections. These were votes
not just for Yushchenko, but also for change. When it became clear from the differences between exit
polls that gave the opposition an 11-point lead,59 and the government polls that showed a narrow
government victory, it became clear that the result had been stolen from the people. Thus, the fruits
of this campaign’s success in terms of making civil resistance more attractive than violence can be
seen in the second stage, the rapid mobilization campaign which began when Pora! began to occupy
protest locations weeks before the election result.60 Given the speed and turnout of hundreds of
thousands of Ukrainians,61 especially in freezing winter temperatures, occupying the Maidan
Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) in Kiev and other locations throughout Ukrainian cities and that
there were no outbreaks of violence during the Orange Revolution the information campaign, can be
seen as being highly influential in the choice of civil resistance by the Orange Movement. It is this stage
that made the protests appear to be spontaneous. However, in Ukraine, it must be noted that the
Pora! campaign was limited by Ukraine’s ethnic divide, it was far more successful in Western Ukraine
than in the pro-Yanukovych east, where there were few sympathy protests. This is evidenced by the
Pora! Motorcade of Friendship, which was a last ditch attempt to generate support for the movement
56 Klid, (21 April 2005) https://www.ualberta.ca/CIUS/announce/media/Media%202005/2005-04-21_PORA%20Coordinator%20(eng).pdf 57 Kaskiv et al, (2005) under, ‘Developing the volunteer network and conducting the campaign (Sept.-Nov. 2004)’ 58 Central Election Commission, (2005) http://www.cvk.gov.ua/pls/vp2004/WP0011e 59 Traynor, (26 November 2004) http://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/nov/26/ukraine.usa 60 Kaskiv et al, (2005) under, ‘Developing the volunteer network and conducting the campaign (Sept.-Nov. 2004)’ 61 Khokhlova, (26 November 2004) http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=9C00EEDF123EF935A15752C1A9629C8B63
19
in eastern Ukraine.62 Even despite this limitation, there is evidence that where there is the long-term
preparation of a society for civil resistance by vanguards, then the attractiveness of civil resistance to
social movements is increased.
In terms of protest organisation and coordination, professional training means that vanguards
are able to overcome obstacles; they use their expertise to organise and coordinate protests so that
citizens are able to overcome their fear of the regime to join the physical protests in such large
numbers that they are more likely to reach, and be able to occupy, the protest locations. Once
revolutionary vanguards are trained, they have the ability to organise and coordinate non-violent civil
resistance protests. One of the leaders of the April 6th Movement Mohamed Adel went to Belgrade
where he received training from the Centre for Applied Non Violent Actions and Strategies (CANVAS)
states: “I got trained in how to conduct peaceful demonstrations, how to avoid violence, and how to
face violence from the security forces … and also how to organize to get people on the streets".63
Because of this professional training, the April 6th movement was able to prepare detailed and well-
constructed plans on how to organise and prepare for the protests online. One of the founders Ahmed
Maher recounts how the movement:
“established this ‘operations room’ around 15 days before the beginning of the protests, …to
discuss routine details including assessing the reach of our calls to protest with regards to Internet
websites, looking at the data and information that was being provided to citizens and studying
innovative mechanisms of protesting which aimed to overcome the methods that the state security
services always use to pre-empt demonstrations and protests”.64
62 Kaskiv et al, (2005) under, ‘Protecting the Election: the Orange Revolution (November – December 2004)’ 63 Mohamed Adel, quoted in Rosenberg, (February 17, 2011) http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/16/revolution_u 64 Ahmad Maher, Interview by Arshaq Al-Awsat, (10 February 2011) http://www.aawsat.net/2011/02/article55247577
20
Maher goes on to add that:
“Two days prior to the demonstrations we implemented a new mode of operation which saw
activists being split into separate groups, with each group being made up of between 30 and 50
activists who would be posted to central areas and public squares to incite protests whilst only the
leader of each group would be informed of the precise location of where the protests were scheduled
to begin…meeting his group in a pre-selected location just prior to the beginning of the protest, and
then guiding this group to the main rendezvous point”.65
This demonstrates that the April 6th Movement was prepared to spark the initial protests. By
placing sizeable numbers of dedicated activists onto the streets to incite protests, ordinary citizens
would join, as they would see that they would not be protesting alone and therefore vulnerable to
repression. This stage was crucial in getting people out of their homes onto the streets owing to the
inherent fear that many people felt about openly confronting the regime. We can see that the
movement reduced the physical costs of participation. These activists could then coordinate directing
these groups to the main protest locations where they would be most effective. The planning,
however, went even deeper than this; co-founder of the April 6th movement Ahmed Salah has noted:
“the idea was to start these small rallies in densely populated areas, and to come out from
the back streets and into the main central points in every city. This way the security could not mass
their troops in one particular area, because whatever is happening is happening everywhere. By the
time the numbers reach the central designated areas where the dense police presence is, you already
65 Ahmad Maher, Interview by Arshaq Al-Awsat, (10 February 2011) http://www.aawsat.net/2011/02/article55247577
21
have large numbers of people that can get through these police numbers, and you can take that
ground”.66
The initial protest locations were thus strategically selected in high population areas so that
the protest groups had the best chance of getting to a critical mass. By spreading out geographically
and then converging, the protesters could avoid the massed ranks of the Egyptian security forces until
they had sufficient numbers to outnumber the police and occupy the final protest locations. This is
essentially the civil resistance version of Napoleon’s famous dictum of march divided, fight united. 67
Without sufficient numbers being present, the Mubarak regime would not have hesitated to violently
repress the protesters. By ensuring that the protest groups could get to critical mass, the vanguard
movement cleverly lowered the physical costs of participation, again making civil resistance more
attractive as there is more chance of anonymity for the individual in a large crowd. The costs of
repression for the regime were raised, as the attempted repression of such large groups of peaceful
protesters would, thanks to new information communication technologies, be a huge international
media event. The attempted repression of protesters in Tahrir Square in the Battle of the Camel was
detrimental to the stability of the Mubarak regime by garnering much international and domestic
support for the protesters. Clearly, this preparation of the 2011 protests by the April 6th movement,
which took into account the regime’s response was crucial, for if the protesters had not reached the
protest final locations in large enough numbers then there would have been no protest and the
Mubarak regime could not have been provoked and pressurised non-violently.
The Pora! Movement, meanwhile provides an excellent example of a revolutionary vanguard
that prepared protesters to be able to occupy a protest location for an extended period of time and
in extreme conditions. Through extensive preparations, Pora! helped to ensure that protest locations
66 Ahmad Salah, Interview by International Centre on Non-violent Conflict, (3 March 2011) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=HfFnpVBxQdA 67 Smith, (2006) 37
22
such as the Maidan in Kiev could be occupied by large numbers of protesters f or long periods of time
thereby lowering the costs of participation for participants. Pora! had pre -prepared tents for protest
locations across Ukraine in cities such as Kharkiv, Donetsk, Cherkassy, Dnipropetrovsk and Ternopil
and most importantly Kiev.68 In Kiev alone, some 1,500 tents were provided to help protesters to
continue to occupy the Maidan despite the extremely low winter temperatures. 69 By ensuring that the
protesters could continue to occupy the square, even in winter temperatures, it enabled the pressure
on the Kuchma regime to be continuous. This type of pressure then forces regimes to respond either
by backing down or with violent action which allows the social movements to portray themselves as
victims, which gains support and raises the costs of further repression.
Finally, the presence of a vanguard ensures that civil resistance is more attractive through
teaching and example setting. Professional training such as that provided by the CANVAS organisation
creates activists dedicated to using civil resistance. Through such training, activists become convinced
of the values of using civil resistance instead of violence and the dangers of not doing so. Entsar Qadhi,
a Yemeni activist, after attending American training sessions in Yemen stated that “It helped me very
much because I used to think that change only takes place by force and by weapons…but now, it is
clear that results can be achieved with peaceful protests and other non-violent means.70 Crucially,
once trained, they can train other activists about both the importance of non-violence and the use of
non-violent strategies and then those activists can set examples of using non-violence to protesters
during protests thus guiding the movement as a whole towards civil resistance. This teaching
behaviour can be observed in movements like Kefaya and the April 6th movement in Egypt and Pora!
in Ukraine. They had memberships which had received extensive professional civil resistance
68 Kaskiv et al, (2005) under, ‘Protecting the Election: the Orange Revolution (November – December 2004)’ 69 Ibid., 70 Entsar Qadhi, quoted in Rosenberg, (February 17, 2011) http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/16/revolution_u
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training.71 Consider April 6th activist Adel, who took a week-long course in the strategies of non-violent
revolution in Belgrade where he learned how to organize people… and most importantly, he learned
how to train others. Afterwards, he went back to Egypt and began to teach others the same methods.72
This transmission of knowledge created a large number of dedicated civil resistance activists.
Once trained, these individuals could be strategically placed in the protest locations, to ensure
that the protests were as non-violent as possible with the activists leading by example. In Ukraine,
Pora! activists Andriy Husak, Andriy Rozhniatovsky, Ihor Kotsiuruba, and Mikhaylo Plotnikov were
present to organize and coordinate the activities of the tent camp in Kiev to ensure that they stayed
peaceful.73 Indeed, such was the penetration of the Pora! values of non-violence that the Orange
Movement as a whole attempted to avoid violence by ensuring that police lines were protected by
lines of older demonstrators facing the crowds, to keep out hot-heads and possible infiltrators planted
by the authorities.74 In addition, to further reduce tensions, they used young girls to place flowers in
riot policeman’s shields.75 Indeed, Roman Zvarych, a pro-Yushchenko MP commented, “It's very hard
to be angry when beautiful Ukrainian girls are pushing flowers into your riot shield”.76 These activists
could also distribute civil resistance literature to protesters at protest locations. In Egypt, trained
activists distributed thousands of copies of Sharp’s 198 methods of non -violent civil resistance to
protesters.77 However, such measures and behaviour can never be totally effective due to the
enormity of the crowds and as emotions in such environments are hard to keep in check and can easily
71 Rosenberg, (February 17, 2011) http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/02/16/revolution_u 72 Ibid., 73 Kaskiv et al, (2005) under, ‘Protecting the Election: the Orange Revolution (November – December 2004)’ 74 Wagstyl and Turner, (2 December 2004) http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/43aae19c-4406-11d9-af06-00000e2511c8.html#axzz3LDw3xa75 75 Ibid., 76 Roman Zvarych, quoted in Wagstyl and Turner, (2 December 2004) http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/43aae19c-4406-11d9-af06-00000e2511c8.html#axzz3LDw3xa75 77 Arrow, (21 February 2011) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12522848
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escalate towards violence. Indeed, in Egypt, there are numerous cases of vi olence being used in self-
defence when violent repression was used by the regime, most notably during the Battle of the Camel.
Moreover, there are cases of pro-active violence, for example, in Suez and in the northern Sinai area
of Sheikh Zuweid, several hundred Bedouins and police exchanged live gunfire, killing a 17-year-old
man.78 So obviously, there are limits to what even a professional vanguard can achieve. Nevertheless,
the handing out of civil resistance literature and the example set by professional activists undoubtedly
helped ordinary protesters to understand the importance of using civil resistance and not violence.
What emerges is that when professionally trained vanguards are present the likelihood of
networked social movements adopting civil resistance instead of violence is greatly magnified. Firstly,
they are capable of conducting large scale information campaigns which prepares a civil society to be
receptive towards a campaign. Effectively, these campaigns create social capital meaning that citizens
are more likely to support the vanguard when they choose to begin the protests. However, in states
with sectarian divides, information campaigns by vanguards are likely to be less effective as they may
be seen to only represent the interests of only one section of a society, thereby making their message
less appealing to other demographics. Secondly, we can also observe that civil resistance is made more
attractive by the way in which vanguards organise and coordinate the initial stages of protests so as
to be able to overcome the targeted regime’s initial response. Consequently, the movement can more
easily make the initial difficult transition from being a virtual protest to also being a physical one. This
is achieved because vanguards have an understanding of the regime’s repressive response to public
confrontation. These can then be overcome, which lowers the costs of participation thereby allowing
more citizens to overcome their natural fear of the regime to join the protests thus protests have more
chance of getting to critical mass and a greater chance of being able to actually occupy protest
78 Al-Jazeera (14 February 2011) http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/01/201112515334871490.html
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locations which exerts pressure on the regime. Moreover, once those anti -government forces have
reached the protest locations, vanguards make preparations so that those locations can be occupied
for extended periods of time even in adverse conditions that enables the pressure on the regime to
be applied continuously. Finally, vanguards are best able to ensure that non-violence is adopted
through teaching and example setting. Overseas training creates dedicated civil resistance activists
who understand the costs of employing violence. They can then return home to teach other members
of the vanguard movement these same values, thereby ensuring that all members will adhere to the
non-violent doctrine. These trained activists can then be placed in strategic locations to prevent
violence from occurring by setting an example to ordinary protesters. They can also distribute civil
resistance literature to the crowds. However, with emotions so high in such environments there are
limits to how far these measures can be effective
26
Regime Type.
Throughout the last decade, networked social movements have carried out civil resistance
campaigns against regimes with diverse natures. In places as diverse as Egypt, Ukraine, Tunisia and
the United States, civil resistance appears to have become the tool of choice for networked social
movements. The regimes targeted are all so different that the reasons for civil resistance being more
attractive than violence must be many and varied. The question is whether regime type affects why
networked social movements are adopting civil resistance? By examining two types of regime; liberal
and repressive, it will be argued that regime type is influential in the choice of civil resistance by
networked social movements. However, before embarking on an examination of the effects of regime
type on the attractiveness of civil resistance it is important to first classify the re gime types being
examined. This chapter uses a dichotomous classification of regime type, these being liberal and
repressive. Liberal democratic regimes are defined as regimes that are based upon two principles.
Firstly, “political liberties exist to the extent that the people of a country have the freedom to express
a variety of political opinions in any media and the freedom to form or to participate in any political
group”.79 Secondly, “democratic rule (or political rights) exists to the extent that the national
government is accountable to the general population, and each individual is entitled to participate in
the government directly or through representatives”.80 Repressive regimes are therefore regimes that
seek to deny the liberties and freedoms that are available to citizens in liberal regimes through the
use of, or threat of, force in the maintenance of their own power.
Liberal democratic regimes increase the attractiveness of civil resistance for several reasons.
Firstly, they make it is exceedingly simple for networked social movements to organise and coordinate
multiple campaigns of civil resistance, not just nationally but globally. This is achieved through
79 Bollen, (1993) 1208-1209 80 Ibid., 1209
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guaranteeing the freedoms of speech and of association. Both types of freedom are often enshrined
in law. Article 11 of the Human Rights Act allows for the freedom of assembly that grants citizens the
legal right to join together for the purposes of collective action.81 Therefore, the creation of networked
social movements critical of the government is not illegal. Furthermore, Article 10 allows for the
freedom of public expression,82 which means that the social movement organisations and individuals
within the entire networked social movement can openly communicate with each other to coordinate
civil resistance actions without fear of government interference. The ‘Occupy Movement’ was able to
openly organise numerous well-supported rallies and action across the globe against numerous liberal
regimes because it had free access to social media networks via the Internet. The first of the
constituent movements, the ‘Occupy Wall Street Movement’, inspired copycat movements globally
such as ‘Occupy Melbourne’ and ‘Occupy London’. All the independent movements used the Internet
and social media such as Facebook and Twitter to plan and coordinate local Occupy protests whilst
simultaneously coordinating globally so that cities in 25 countries could all be simultaneously occupied
on October 15th, 2011.83 Alex Gard of ‘Occupy Melbourne’ stated, “We are inspired by what's
happening on Wall Street and loosely liaising with each other, but it's not organized in any central
way".84 This level and ease of communication and coordination was to some extent possible because
of the freedoms guaranteed by liberal democratic regimes. The measures that more repressive
regimes use to prevent networked social movements organising are not permissible. The prospect of
the British and American governments employing an Egyptian style Internet blackout is unthinkable.
Secondly, liberal regimes create very low costs for citizens to participate in civil resistance
campaigns meaning, that in theory, the mobilisation of participants is not a problem. Again, this stems
81 BBC News, (29 September 2000) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/946400.stm 82 Ibid., 83 Voigt, (October 7, 2011) http://edition.cnn.com/2011/10/07/business/wall-street-protest-global/index.html 84 Ibid.,
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from the provision of certain freedoms and protections. Freedom of speech ensures that networked
social movements can influence public opinion by freely broadcasting their message across the
Internet and social media to attract support from sympathetic citizens. Therefore, they can potentially
influence huge swathes of society to engage with their campaigns. However, in a media environment
where everybody can express their opinion and ideas it is possible that the message of a movement
can be drowned out in such a ‘noisy environment’. Secondly, owing to freedom of association, citizens
are free to join and support such movements without penalty. However, free riding is a problem
because of the low costs of joining a Facebook group or following a Twitter hash tag and high potential
benefits if the movement succeeds. Of the 13,000 likes,85 that ‘Occupy London’ had prior to the 2011
protests only about 200 tents were actually pitched in the piazza outside St. Pauls,86 suggesting that it
is more likely that people will passively support a movement online then actually physically join the
protests. Furthermore, citizens are most likely to take to the streets and protest against the
government if they have grievances. For example, Article 11 of the Human Rights Act in the UK
provides for the right to protest, thereby making many civil resistance tactics legal. Legislation exists
which curtails the behaviour of the police, meaning that liberal democratic regimes generally have a
very low capacity for the coercion of the population. As a result, when protests do take place, there
are restrictions on police behaviour in dealing with large groups of protesters and the public in general.
Police in the United Kingdom may only use “force as is reasonable in the circumstances”.87 Police are
held to a certain code of conduct, indeed, as the 1984 Police and Criminal Evidence Act states, “officers
are subject to the same rules as the rest of society, but must meet higher standards than the public
because police forces are public bodies, officers have a duty under the Human Rights Act not to use
85 Waldram, (14 October 2011) http://www.theguardian.com/news/blog/2011/oct/14/occupy-england-protests-gather-momentum-via-facebook 86 Kingsley, (20 October 2011) http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2011/oct/20/occupy-london-st-pauls-protesters 87 BBC News Online, (8 March 2007) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/6430073.stm
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force that might constitute "inhuman and/or degrading treatment".88 This is not to say that police
forces in liberal regimes are incapable of brutality, it is just that if it does occur it is not used as a
systematic tool of repression designed to create an environment of fear. As a result, the costs of
participation are very low, which as a result means that citizens are more likely to come out onto the
streets and support a peaceful protest as they have less fear of being violently repressed by the police.
Most definitely, media freedom in liberal regimes encourages the use of non-violent tactics
because it is very simple for the media to demonstrate to the public social movements using violent
methods. Consequently, the movements may lose public support if the cause is delegitimised by
violence. According to a YouGov poll in the UK 64% of adults believe television to be the most
trustworthy news source.89 Therefore, the media can easily sway public opinion for or against a
movement. Civil resistance activist Naomi Klein of Occupy Wall Street recognised the values of using
non-violence because of the influence that the media wields. Indeed, she wrote, “You have refused to
give the media the images of broken windows and street fights it craves so desperately”. 90 Clearly,
Klein recognises the key danger of using violent tactics that elements of the media can seize upon to
delegitimise the movement. For example, consider the clashes in the City of Oakland between the
Occupy movement and the police in November 2011 which turned violent. Daniel Halper of the right-
wing American media magazine ‘The Weekly Standard’ wrote “Given the choice between siding with
the law or with a protest made up of hooligans who place police officers in headlocks, who would you
pick?”91These words demonstrate that when violence does occur it is invariably seized upon and
emphasized by elements of the media, often to the detriment of the non-violent elements of the
88 BBC News Online, (8 March 2007) http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/magazine/6430073.stm 89 Thompson, (14 November 2011) https://yougov.co.uk/news/2011/11/14/trust-media/ 90 Elliot, (17 October 2011) http://www.salon.com/2011/10/17/occupy_wall_streets_struggle_for_non_violence/ 91 Halper, (16 October 2011) http://www.weeklystandard.com/blogs/does-obama-endorse_595959.html
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movement. This means that non-violence is more attractive if movements wish to avoid negative
publicity that can damage vital support for the movement, as people will not wish to be associated
with a violent organisation.
Liberal democratic regimes also make civil resistance less attractive to networked social
movements. Firstly, the minimal coercive state capacity for repression ensures that highlighting the
barbarity of the regime is generally not a tactic that can be employed against liberal democratic
regimes. This prevents a social movement from mobilising domestic and international support for the
movement. Consequently, liberal democratic regimes will not face any increased pressure to accede
to the movement’s demands. It is largely impossible to present a liberal democratic regime as
repressive if protesters are unlikely to be violently treated. Secondly, because of the existence of
formal mechanisms of change, people’s willingness to join civil resistance actions will be reduced since
they have a belief in the change that can be effected by the system. Free and fair elections in which
citizens can freely and secretly vote for any political party of their choice means that civil resistance is
not the most effective way to effect political change. They provide citizens with a strong official
alternative to the government of the day along with the reality of getting that opposition into office.
Independent watchdogs such as the Electoral Commission in the UK oversee elections to prevent fraud
and to ensure the correct result is reached. Therefore, when change does occur, it is likely to be free
and fair and therefore, less open to challenge. Options such as civil resistance will be less effective as
they cannot guarantee real change, therefore people are less likely to support the movement. The
majority (60%) of the British population still believe that voting is the only way to have their say. 92
Civil resistance appears, at first, to be an unattractive prospect to use against repressive
regimes. This is because the use of repression constructs what can best be termed ‘fear environments’.
92 Arnett, (20 February 2014) http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2014/feb/20/is-russell-brand-right-are-we-disenchanted-by-politics
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This environment presents a major obstacle to traditionally organised social movements, but it allows
networked social movements to flourish. Indeed, such regimes employ many mechanisms to limit
social movements from organising and mobilising support for a civil resistance campaign. At first
glance, it is extremely difficult to convince people to join such campaigns for fear of violent repression.
In Egypt, police brutality, and the use of torture were common tools of repression; one only has to
observe the death of Khaled Saeed at the hands of two policemen in an Alexandrian cybercafé in June
2010 to observe the extent of violent state repression. It is, therefore, unsurprising that in Egypt some
common proverbs used by ordinary Egyptians during the Mubarak era were “walk quietly by the wall
(where you cannot be noticed) and whoever is afraid stays unharmed”.93 It is more difficult to organise
campaigns if your prospective audience has an innate fear of the regime. Clearly, there are high
participation costs that must be overcome. However, convincing people to do this is extremely difficult
when there are few public mechanisms to express dissent. However, in reality the following sections
will demonstrate this is not the case with the networked social movements operating against
repressive regimes in the ‘information age’.
Where repressive regimes dominate the traditional media environment, it forces dissenting
voices and public opinion to shift into the digital online sphere. This is attractive to social movements
because they can more easily organise and mobilise a population ripe for a civil resistance campaign
in a way not possible offline. Indeed, within this sphere they are able to organise and mobilise almost
as freely as in liberal regimes. The Internet and cellular communications played a key role in the
Orange Revolution. Pora! was also able to use the Internet to set up an online network of NGOs from
whom they received support such as legal advice and communications technology.94 Also, anti-
government websites sprung up, such as Gongadze’s ‘Ukrayinska Pravda’ which spread an alternative
93 Ghonim, (2012) 3 94 Kaskiv et al, (2005) under ‘Who Created Pora’ http://pora.ua/index.php?option=com_content&task=blogcategory&id=141&Itemid=206
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message to that of the regime. Likewise in Egypt, grievances were expressed freely and opinions
concerning democratic change shared infinitely to likeminded individuals and groups in an anonymous
environment. This was highlighted by activist Noha Atef who said of the online aspects of the
revolution “to have a space, an online space, to write and talk to people, to give them messages, which
will increase their anger, this is my favourite way of online activism”. 95 Facebook groups such as ‘We
are all Khaled Saeed’ were created, which called for Egyptians to gather in protest on January 25. “As
one Egyptian activist succinctly tweeted during the protests there, we used Facebook to schedule the
protests, twitter to coordinate, and YouTube to tell the world”. 96 This was only possible because
people could be more easily mobilised and organised online, as the personal costs for joining these
groups were low. The fear barrier was overcome as online personas offered anonymity and, moreover,
it was not possible for the security services to arrest or intimidate every blogger or online journalist.
The availability of such tools increases the attractiveness of civil resistance to networked social
movements as it allows the campaigns to actually be organised and mobilised even in the most
repressive political environments.
The second effect of regimes repressing the traditional media is that it can be extremely
successful in its purpose in that it creates an overreliance on using those methods. However, the result
of this is that the regime can become blind to changes in societal structure and complacent to the
emergence of the new forms of organisation and mobilisation taking place in the online sphere. They
unwittingly allow social movements to organise and mobilise almost unchallenged mass protests in
the online sphere. Traditional methods of repression are very effective in creating public
environments based on fear where traditional methods of organisation for social movements can be
almost unworkable. However, as a result of this success, these regimes have little understanding of
95 Noha Atef, quoted in Aouragh and Alexander, (2011) 1348 96 Tilley and Wood, (2003) 97
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how to the confront novel threats to their power presented by the Internet and social media except
by using these trusted methods or by resorting to drastic measures both of which are ineffective.
Indeed, in many cases they do not appreciate the nature of the threat posed by protests organised
through digital networks can pose until it is too late; Egypt in 2011, is a prime example of this. Although
the Mubarak regime had set up an online ‘Electronic Commission’ to try to influence online opinions97
and routinely arrested online bloggers,98 it totally underestimated the power that the Internet could
give to dissident groups and individuals to organise and mobilise protests. This can be seen further
from the experience of activist Wael Ghonim. After an interrogation, during the 2011 protests, Ghonim
noted that he was asked questions regarding his religious beliefs but not his Internet experience.99
This demonstrates that the regimes’ priorities concerning the control of dissent in the population lay
in long-established methods of repression. Similarly in Ukraine, the laws concerning the Internet under
President Kuchma were relatively liberal, demonstrating the regime’s lack of awareness of its potential
for mass organisation and mobilisation. That many repressive regimes simply resort to shutting down
the Internet to combat protests, is further evidence of their lack of comprehension concerning both
the new information communication technologies and how they could be used by social movements
to effect change via civil resistance. Again, examine Mubarak in Egypt, where the Internet was shut
down for five days. This was a totally ineffective measure because the networked social movements
and activists behind the protests had been using the Internet to organise the protests long before this
was implemented. This increases the attractiveness of civil resistance for networked social
movements since they can exploit a repressive regime’s slothful approach to countering such novel
methods of protest organisation and mobilisation.
97 Ghonim, (2012) 36-37 98 Greenberg, (2 February 2011) http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2011/02/02/mubaraks-digital-dilemma-why-egypts-Internet-controls-failed/ 99 Ghonim, (2012) 27
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As in more liberal regimes, the use of violence delegitimises a social movement’s cause
because of the media coverage. In Egypt, after the violence of the 2008 riots in El-Mahalla El-Kubra,
the April 6th Movement, seeing how using violence had led to negative media coverage which had
undermined their domestic and international support, instead chose to adopt strict non-violent civil
resistance and received professional overseas training in this regard.100 The situation was similar in
Ukraine in 2004 where the protests following the Kuchma gate crisis are also indicative of this process.
This crisis, created protests from social movements such as ‘Ukraine without Kuchma’ and ‘For Truth’.
They occupied the Maidan in Kiev’s Independence Square with 5000 activists and soon gained the
support of opposition groups.101 However, the protests, ended when there was violence between the
protesters and the security services meaning that the protesters lost the support of the people.102 So
clearly, the media is a factor in making civil resistance more attractive than violence regardless of
regime type. However, repressive regimes will use any example of violence as a pretext for violent
crackdowns, which raises the physical costs of participation, making it harder for social movements to
get support onto the streets. In Ukraine, the social movement Pora! learnt this lesson. Indeed,
Zolotariov a Pora! coordinator stated that “If we were not violent, we could compete. If we were
violent, they could have resorted to force. This was the only efficient strategy within the current
environment”.103
It is well established that networked social movements use the Internet and social media to
highlight a regime’s brutality. Non-violence is necessary for this to be effective as, if violence is used,
social movements cannot portray themselves as the victims. If they can claim this status, then they
100 Frontline, (February 22 2011) http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/revolution-in-cairo/inside-april6-movement/ 101 Olearchyk, (21 December 2000) http://www.kyivpost.com/content/ukraine/ukraine-without-kuchma-leader-yury-lutsenko-6683.html 102 Solodko, (9 March 2011) http://www.istpravda.com.ua/videos/2011/03/9/30212/ 103 Zolotariov, quoted in Binnendijk, (2006) 416
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gain domestic and international sympathy and support that then raises the costs of further repression,
making it less likely and thus the protesters can continue to occupy protest locations and putting
continued pressure on the regime. However, this is only possible if a regime employs violent
repression, which is more likely to happen in repressive regimes than in liberal ones. The Battle of the
Camel in Tahrir Square on February 2nd 2011 is an example of what can happen when repression can
be highlighted. Prior to this, the regime appeared to be caving in to the protestor’s pressure. Indeed,
Mubarak’s speech on February declared “I have tasked the vice -president with holding dialogue with
all political groups over all of the issues at hand for political and democratic reform”. 104 Ghaly
described this speech, as “slick and dividing public opinion”.105 However, after the battle, Ghaly states
“the one good thing to come out of that day, was that all those who had wanted to give Mubarak a
‘chance’ changed their minds within hours…The divide that was palpable the day before
disappeared”.106 This change had occurred due to the extensive media coverage that the battle had
received both domestically and internationally, which had highlighted the brutality of the regime.
Consequently, the regime was on the receiving end of a domestic and international backlash, which
allowed the movement as a whole to generate further support, which increased the pressure on
regime. This is demonstrated by the Friday after the battle, where estimates of 700,000 protesters
came to Tahrir Square spontaneously.107 However, it should be noted that this could only be effective
if communication with the outside world can be maintained by overcoming regime censorship. As will
be seen in the third chapter, this is contingent on the support of the online international community.
Regime type certainly does affect the attractiveness of civil resistance to networked social
movements over violence. Liberal democratic regimes somewhat increase the attractiveness of civil
104 Kortam, (3 February 2013) http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/02/03/the-battle-of-the-camel-the-final-straw-for-mubaraks-regime 105 Ghaly, (2011) 150-151 106 Ghaly, (2011) 151 107 Sioufi, (2011) 249
36
resistance by making them simple to organise and mobilise on a global scale. Moreover, the presence
of a free media makes the use of non-violence tactics imperative, due to the media’s ability to
delegitimise a social movement’s cause. However, they also ensure that civil resistance tactics are less
attractive because the tactic of highlighting the barbarity of the regime, to harness international and
domestic support, cannot be employed. Most importantly the system has inbuilt mechanisms
(elections) which provide real change, unlike civil resistance which cannot guarantee any change will
actually occur. Certainly, it makes it difficult for any of Sharp’s mechanisms to be effective. So,
evidently liberal regimes ability to increase the attractiveness of civil resistance is somewhat mixed.
In contrast, repressive regimes increase the attractiveness of civil resistance to networked social
movements. Most critically, they force dissenting opinions into the online sphere, where networked
social movements can freely organise and mobilise large scale civil resistance campaigns. This is a
realm that the regime cannot effectively police for two reasons. Firstly, the infinite and flexible nature
of the digital environment means that it is impossible to control everything that exists on it. Secondly
by dominating the traditional media environment, regimes are likely to underestimate the potential
of the digital sphere for mass organisation and mobilisation, thereby disregarding it as threat until it
is too late, only then implanting ineffective drastic measures such as Internet blackouts. As in more
liberal regimes, the use of violence delegitimises a movement’s cause. However, in repressive regimes
the use of violence can also justify the use of violent repression, which makes future mobilisation
efforts much more difficult as the costs of participation are raised. Finally, repressive regimes allow
for the brutality of the regime to be highlighted using the Internet and social media, which can garner
much international and domestic support.
37
International Factors.
In the ‘information age’ many social movements are choosing to employ non-violent civil
resistance over violence. This form of non-violent resistance appears to be in vogue given events such
as the Arab Spring, where social movements dedicated to civil resistance appear to spread acros s
borders from state to state in an almost contagion like fashion. Interestingly, these campaigns are
occurring in an international environment that, because of globalisation, is one full of paradoxes. As
the French economist Jacques Attali has noted “We l ive in a world that is simultaneously shrinking and
expanding, growing closer and farther apart...National borders are increasingly irrelevant. And yet
globalism is by no means triumphant. Tribalisms of all kinds flourish. Irredentism abounds”. 108 Thus
this international environment is one where the relevance of the established paradigm of Realist
Westphalian sovereignty is being challenged and the importance of non-state actors is growing. Non-
state actors (NSAs) are “a broad category of actors in global pol itics who represent interests and exert
influence but who do not exhibit the distinguishing state characteristics of legal sovereignty and
control of territory and people”,109 who have in recent decades exploded onto the international scene
in many forms. Non-governmental organisations (NGOs), multinational corporations, international
global media organisations and hacktivist organisations are self -activating popular political action
groups within cyberspace that seek to influence the offline world. 110 All now play a key role in a
multidimensional international environment. Therefore, both states and NSAs are influential parts of
the current international environment. Indeed, states do appear to be diminished as actors wielding
direct influence. In fact, when states attempt direct involvement what results does not increase the
attractiveness of civil resistance. As a result, it is non-state actors who now wield the ability to directly
108 Attali, (1991) 117 109 Calhoun, (2002) 338 110 Jordan and Taylor, (2004) 1
38
influence the international arena. However, as established by Manuel Castells, although states have
lost sovereignty, and can only create wield influence in international arena of shared sovereignty, they
still wield considerable influence,111 which can be observed by states providing funding for non-state
actors, through which civil resistance campaigns can be funded and professional activists trained,
whose effectiveness we observed in chapter one.
States, as independent actors, make civil resistance less attractive to networked social
movements when they intervene individually because of their strategic interests. Firstly, to protect
these interests, states can provide regimes with the technical means to repress the anti -government
forces. Prior to the 2011 revolution, and since the Camp David Accords in 1978, Egypt had been a
stalwart American military ally in the Middle East against Islamism. Indeed, “between 1948 and 2011,
the United States has given Egypt about $71.6 billion in bilateral military and economic aid”. 112 More
important though, was the aid used specifically for military and security purposes. Indeed, of the $1.5
billion in aid Egypt received from the United States for the 2011 fiscal year, $1.3 billion was designated
for peace and security.113 More recently, Amnesty International has discovered that even during the
2011 protests three deliveries of arms were made to Egypt by American company Combined
Systems.114 Indeed, many of the empty tear gas canisters, found in Tahrir Square, have been found to
have ‘Made in the U.S.’ markings much to the irritation of the protesters in Tahrir Square.115 Thus, the
United States was directly funding and supplying the equipment used by Egyptian security forces to
repress the Egyptian protesters. Obviously, simply having the equipment ready to use raises the costs
of participation for citizens in a civil resistance campaign, making them harder to mobilise since they
111 Castells (2004) 365 112 Plumer, (9 July 2013) http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2013/07/09/the -u-s-gives-egypt-1-5-billion-a-year-in-aid-heres-what-it-does/ 113 Wingfield, (29 January 2011) http://www.forbes.com/sites/brianwingfield/2011/01/29/making-sense-of-u-s-foreign-aid-to-egypt-and-elsewhere/ 114 BBC, (7 December 2011) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-16075152 115 Ibid.,
39
are more likely to be repressed. Moreover, it can be used to provoke the protesters into abandoning
non-violence, thereby justifying the use of further repression, which could lead to violent escalation
and the complete abandonment of non-violence.
The provision of technical support and aid, as detailed above, that direct efforts to prevent
repression, such as statements calling for a regime not to employ repression, are likely to fall on deaf
ears, whilst the threats of sanctions are unlikely to be seen as credible. Consequently, the threat of
repression to protesters remains high making it more difficult for social movements to mobilise
domestic support for their campaigns. The behaviour of the Mubarak regime in Egypt is a good
example of this. President Obama threatened to withdraw military aid unless the regime refrained
from violence against protesters and reversed the Internet blackout,116 which the regime eventually
did on February 2nd. The protesters could again organise and mobilise the protests using social media
and mobile telephony, whilst also demonstrating to the world the brutality of the regime. They
thereby mobilised further domestic and international support, increasing the pressure on Mubarak.
The regime’s actions were, however, not down to the threat of sanctions. The Mubarak regime was
unlikely to believe that the threats from the United States were credible given the shared interest in
tackling the Islamist terror threat, and the US having invested billions of dollars of aid into Egypt.
Indeed, the Obama administration was reluctant to abandon Mubarak and the US adopted a Janus
like approach to the crisis; there was no concrete demand that Mubarak should stand down.117
Without an outright demand to stand down, the Mubarak regime had the perception that it could, to
some extent, continue to repress the protesters violently without genuinely losing the support of the
US. Indeed, with regard to Egypt, Obama’s statement was made on January 28th whilst the violent
repression of the Egyptian people continued. Indeed, the worst of the violence against protesters
116 McGreal, (29 January 2011) http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jan/29/white-house-aid-egypt 117 Ibid.,
40
occurred on February 2nd during the Battle of the Camel some five days later. As a result the chances
of repression were not lowered, thereby maintaining the physical costs of participation for citizens,
making civil resistance less attractive. Moreover, the Internet blackout was not ended because of state
pressure – it ended because the economic costs of maintaining the blackout were extremely high. All
economies are now integrated with the Internet, meaning that when the Internet is removed so is a
sizeable portion of the economy. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
conservatively estimated that the Internet shutdown resulted in a US$90 million loss for Egypt, some
3-4% of GDP with other estimates being as high as US$110 million.118
Finally, because states support repressive regimes to protect their strategic interests, they
can become a toxic brand to the citizens repressed by that regime. This means that anything
associated with that state would become less attractive. This is a particular problem for civil resistance,
since it has American origins. Therefore, in states where the Unites States is not popular, civil
resistance could be unattractive, if its origins were revealed to the local population. Such associations
could make it harder for a movement to mobilise domestic support. Moreover, there are even fears
that it could potentially destabilise fragile protesting movements. This was a problem that civil
resistance activists had to contend with during the Egyptian revolution. The mixed messages that the
US propagated in the Middle East, paradoxically supporting both democracy and the maintenance of
authoritarian regimes meant that, in Egypt, the US was extremely unpopular. Indeed, in 2010 “more
than four out of five Egyptians (82 percent) now rate the U.S. negatively, including nearly half (48
percent) who give the United States a "very unfavourable" rating”.119 Therefore, it is unsurprising then
that when told by a BBC journalist of the origins of the 198 non-violent methods given out to
118 Olsen, (3 February 2011) http://www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2011/02/03/how-much-did-five-days-of-no-Internet-cost-egypt/ 119 Blumenthal, (31 January 2011) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/01/31/egypt-poll-negative-views-us-obama_n_816428.html
41
protesters, Mahmoud, a protestor in Tahrir Square stated: “This is an Egyptian revolution, we are not
being told what to do by the Americans”.120 Could the organisers of the protests convince ordinary
Egyptians to join the protests if it were openly known that they were using an American’s methods?
Given that, they refused to talk about Gene Sharp on camera and that his works were distributed in
Arabic because of fears that the work being of American origin could destabilise movements, 121 it
seems unlikely. Destabilised movements are more likely to splinter, potentially allowing radical fringe
movements to adopt violence, as they are no longer marginalised by the majority consensus. It should
be noted however, that this problem only applies to some states in particular circumstances, since
adopting civil resistance was obviously not an issue for the Occupy Movement or for Pora!. However,
as long as the US retains its current role as the global superpower, this problem of association is
unlikely to disappear as a problem for the attractiveness of civil resistance.
In comparison to states, non-state actors such as multinational corporations (MNCs), the
international media and hacktivist organisations and non-governmental organisations do have
significant power to influence making civil resistance more attractive than violence to networked
social movements. Firstly, let us examine the international media. Without doubt, the international
media organisations can be a potent influence on the attractiveness of civil resistance because of the
significant amount of pressure that negative news coverage can exert on a regime. Sophisticated
information communication technologies allow live around the clock broadcasting of events such as
the Orange Revolution and the Arab Spring to a global audience. The stories that journalists report are
often emotionally charged and designed to make the viewer empathise with those portrayed as the
victims. Indeed, most importantly, such coverage altered international and domestic public opinion
and turned it against the regime. Hillary Clinton has remarked of Al Jazeera that “they are changing
120 Arrow, (2011) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12522848 121 Ibid.,
42
people's minds and attitudes. And like it or hate it, it is really effective". 122 During the Egyptian
Revolution, news stations like Al-Jazeera and CNN presented the regime in a bad light, raising the
political costs of repression and thereby, according to Wael Ghonim, kept the protesters safe by
highlighting the barbarity of the regime.123 Consider the example of the Battle of Camel in Tahrir
square, which as we have already seen, thanks to the coverage provided by international media
organisations, caused a huge domestic backlash which not only allowed greater mobilisation of the
population to be achieved, but also massively improved the ability of the networked social movements
operating in Egypt to leverage pressure against the regime as the crowds grew in number.
In some situations, however, controlling the narrative is less possible for networked social
movements, because regime censorship of traditional media and the Internet can mean that social
movements can struggle to highlight the brutality of the regime. It seems in such cases that violence
would be the only option. However, other non-state actors, such as multinational corporations and
hacktivists groups, can intervene with technical support for the networked social movements so that
non-violent movements gain vital media exposure and overcome censorship, ensuring that the global
news and social media networks can actually continue to raise the costs of repression and lower the
physical costs of participation. In effect, this technical support that transcends national borders helps
networked social movements to control the narrative concerning the regimes brutality during the
blackout, thereby generating support both domestically and internationally through both traditional
and new media outlets. This coverage then sways domestic support that in turn puts pressure onto
the regime as more people join the protests. Examples of this support can be found during both
Tunisian and Egyptian Revolutions. When the Tunisian uprising started, the hacktivist group known as
‘Anonymous’ announced in an open letter:
122 Huffington Post, (3 March 2011) http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/03/03/hillary-clinton-calls-al-_n_830890.html 123 Ghonim, (2012) 236
43
"Dear Journalists, It has come to our attention that the ongoing riots in Tunisia have by and
large escaped the notice of the major Western news networks. It is the responsibility of the free and
open press to report what the censored press cannot. The people of Tunisia have asked for our help
and we have responded through launching a new operation, Operation Tunisia. We are asking you,
the journalists, to respond to the Tunisians' appeals for assistance at this most troubling time".124
More than just drawing attention to the non-violent struggle taking place in Tunisia,
Anonymous also actively helped the protesting social movements overcome regime censorship.
Indeed, Anonymous “created a care packet, translated into Arabic and French, offering cyber-
dissidents advice on how to conceal their identities on the web, in order to avoid detection by the
former regime's cyberpolice”.125 Moreover, they used Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks to bring down
Tunisian government websites.126 In Egypt, “Anonymous worked in collaboration with Telecomix, a
cluster that uses legal means to promote free speech, to restore mirrors and proxies to help maintain
Egyptians' access to sites being censored by the government”. 127 Similarly, during the Internet
blackout in Egypt some MNCs had a similar impact. Indeed, “working with Twitter, Google acquired
SayNow, a start-up specialising in social online voice platforms, to make it possible for anyone to
‘tweet’ by leaving a message at any of three telephone numbers”.128 Clearly the online international
community rallied to the aid of the networked social movements, ensuring that they could continue
to inhabit both online and physical space and mobilising support even in an environment where that
should not have been possible.
124 Anonymous, (3 January 2011) www.anonnews.org/index.php?p=press&a=items&i=133on. 125 Ryan, (19 May 2011) http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/05/201151917634659824.html 126 Ibid., 127 Ibid., 128 Al-Jazeera, (2 February 2011) http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2011/02/201122113055781707.html
44
Finally, non-state actors can also be extremely influential in that they can provide funding for
the training of professional vanguards and their campaigns. Non-state actors are able to provide
significant capital to fund other non-state actors who provide training in civil resistance and fund the
training of individuals in specialised training workshops. The Centre for Applied Non-Violent Actions
and Strategies (CANVAS) is a good example of the former. They run workshops with a network of
international trainers,129 around the world. Indeed, from 2002-2012, CANVAS has held 300 workshops
for 3000 participants from 46 different countries.130 Moreover, non-state actors can fund the training
of activists directly. For Pora! training of activists was supported by small grants provided by the
German Marshall Fund of the United States, Freedom House and the Canadian International
Development Agency (in the overall amount of approx. 130, 000 USD).131 Similarly, the April 6 Youth
Movement in Egypt, the Bahrain Center for Human Rights and grass-roots activists like Entsar Qadhi,
a youth leader in Yemen, received training and financing from groups like the International Republican
Institute, the National Democratic Institute and Freedom House.132
However, there is a crucial caveat to mention. In some cases it is sovereign states that are
surreptitiously providing the funding for these non-state actors. Direct state intervention in the
internal affairs of another state can actually damage the attractiveness of civil resistance. The question
is, how do states overcome this difficulty? How can states increase the attractiveness of civil resistance
if they are seen as a toxic brand or do not wish to be seen to be directly influencing events in another
state? The answer lies with applying their influence through non-state actors, for example non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and international organisations that have transnational
connections and can operate where the state cannot venture openly. Non-state actors have always
129 CANVAS, http://www.canvasopedia.org/index.php/who-we-are 130 CANVAS, http://www.canvasopedia.org/index.php/what-we-do 131 Kaskiv et al, (2005) under, ‘Campaign’s funding and resource supply’ 132 Nixon, (14 April 2011) http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/15/world/15aid.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1&
45
been able to influence public opinion. However, with the increasingly prominent role played by the
Internet and social media the flexibility and reach of such non-state actors has increased to the point
that they can now network with a huge range of other organisations and individuals as well as having
the ability to access and distribute huge tracts of information instantaneously. Thus their ability to
influence public opinion is greatly enhanced with modern information communication technologies.
Now obviously, there are non-state actors and international organisations that operate independently
of state government. However, many now rely heavily on private sources of funding meaning that
their impartiality is open to question. Indeed, whilst funding can come from many sources, one vital
source of income is governmental in origin. For example, the National Endowment for Democracy
receives about $100 million annually from Congress.133 Similarly, Freedom House also gets the bulk of
its money from the American government, mainly from the State Department. 134 CANVAS most likely
receives substantial sums from the American government in this fashion too. Their key text, Non-
violent Struggle was funded with a grant from the United States Institute for Peace, 135 therefore
indicating at least some level of funding and support. These non-state actors can therefore very much
be the tools of the states that fund them because, if they do not spend that funding in the manner
that particular government wanted, then that organisation will most likely not receive future funding.
When states fund these organisations, they are able to direct their operations so that they benefit the
interests of that state without direct involvement. When those interests can best be fulfilled by civil
resistance campaigns then states can use non-state actors to fund and support them.
It is also worth noting that the funding of activist training by states is a grey area. It is very
difficult to establish concrete evidence of funding links from a state directly to a civil resistance
133 Nixon, (14 April 2011) http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/15/world/15aid.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1& 134 Nixon, (14 April 2011) http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/15/world/15aid.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1& 135 Popovic et al, (2007) 2
46
movement or individual activists. This is due to states seeking to emphasise their distance from such
direct involvement in the internal affairs of another state and non-state actors wishing to maintain a
façade of independence. Vladyslav Kaskiv of Pora! is keen to downplay the role of international
involvement in the funding and support given to the movement. Kaskiv acknowledges that the
international community provided “small grants for the training of activists”, 136 and also that the
“financial support by international donors geared at developing a network of civil society centers in
Ukraine… made it possible for the campaign to draw on considerable material and technical resources
of regional NGOs.137 However, Kaskiv also states that “Pora!, unlike its counterparts in Serbia and
Georgia, received only minimal financial support from the international community”.138 Indeed, he
puts the figure at about $130,000 USD.139 Considering the huge costs of the Pora! information
campaign and costs of preparing for long-term protests which made use of laser lights, plasma screens,
sophisticated sound systems, rock concerts, tents to camp in and huge quantities of orange clothing, 140
this figure seems impossibly low. Indeed, documents released by WikiLeaks from U.S intelligence firm
Stratfor appear to confirm the extensive relationship between the US government and CANVAS.141
However, the veracity of these documents is questionable and therefore they cannot be relied upon
to categorically prove relationships such as this exist. Therefore, the enigma of funding connections
between states, non-state actors, their subsidiaries, social movements and activists is most likely
impossible to substantiate and therefore the influence that states wield through non-state actors will
remain at best an open secret.
136 Kaskiv et al, (2005) under, ‘Campaign’s funding and resource supply’ 137 Ibid., under, ‘Who Created PORA?’ 138 Ibid., under, ‘Campaign’s funding and resource supply’ 139 Kaskiv et al, (2005) under, ‘Campaign’s funding and resource supply’ 140 Laughland, (27 November 2004) http://www.theguardian.com/media/2004/nov/27/pressandpublishing.comment 141 WikiLeaks, (18 June 2012) https://wikileaks.org/gifiles/releasedate/2012-06-18-08-canvas-how-a-us-funded-group-trains-opposition.html
47
The above evidence, allows us to draw several conclusions, concerning the effect of
international factors on the attractiveness of civil resistance to networked social movements. Firstly,
states can provide repressive regimes with the very tools that are then used to repress anti-
government forces, therefore escalating the chances of violent clashes whilst also making it more
difficult for social movements to mobilise support. Secondly, where states have given support to
repressive regimes in line with protecting their vital strategic interests in the region, they are unable
to directly intervene to prevent the violent repression of anti -government forces. This is because such
support provides these regimes with the evidence that they are valuable allies to those states and
therefore that they are unlikely to jeopardise their own long-term strategic interests in support of
anti-government forces who, if they took power, may not be as accommodating. This allows these
regimes to ignore both requests not to violently repress protesters and to dismiss the threat of
sanctions if protesters are violently repressed as not credible. Finally, where states have practised
such behaviours as above, that state can becomes a toxic brand to the citizens, making anything
associated with it tainted by association. This is a particular problem for civil resistance since its roots
lay in the work of American, Gene Sharp. Therefore, the origins of civil resistance had to be obscured
so as to prevent potential destabilisation of the movement, whereby the destabilised aspects could
potentially adopt violence. In contrast, non-state actors such as the international media can highlight
a regime’s brutality that can increase international and domestic support. Moreover, other non-state
actors such as hacktivists groups will readily lend technical support to anti-government forces so that
they can overcome regime censorship which improves the ability of the networked social movement
to control the narrative and thus receive the benefits which stem from such control. However, these
influences are minor compared to the role that some non-state actors play in providing both funding
for civil resistance campaigns and the training of revolutionary vanguards. As we observed in chapter
two their influence is considerable, when present, in affecting the choice of civil resistance. However,
48
it must be understood, that many non-state actors are not completely independent, receiving
significant funding from states that utilise them to operate in environment where states dare not.
49
Conclusion.
This paper has examined three factors that may influence why networked social movements
are choosing to adopt civil resistance instead of violence as a strategic option. On the basis of the
evidence presented in this paper, several conclusions can be drawn as to why networked social
movements are choosing to adopt civil resistance instead of violent tactics. Also discussed will be the
limitations of this paper and some areas for further research.
Vanguardism plays a hugely significant role in influencing the choice of civil resistance to
networked social movements. Through information campaigns, initial protest organisation and
coordination, preparations for long-term occupation of protest locations and finally through teaching
and example setting, vanguards guide networked social movements into almost unknowingly
adopting civil resistance. Tentatively, we can side with Lenin and suggest that Ross’s concept that the
movements involved in the recent political turmoil have adopted non-violent tactics spontaneously
without vanguards is debateable. However, it must be noted that societal divisions such as
sectarianism can limit the appeal of a vanguard’s information campaigns . Moreover, teaching and
example setting by vanguards has limitations in emotionally charged environments, where it is difficult
to control large diverse crowds.
Regime type also influences the attractiveness of civil resistance over violence. The evidence
suggests that Sharp was misguided in his contention that civil resistance can be equally attractive in
one context as in another. Liberal democratic regimes tend to limit the scope for any of Sharp’s
mechanisms to actually bring about change. These regimes have built in systems of guaranteed
political change (elections), which civil resistance cannot offer. This makes it more difficult to generate
support as citizens support the established system. Civil resistance is actually a more attractive
prospect in repressive regimes than in liberal ones. The digital sphere provides a free space in which
50
to organise and mobilise. Most importantly, this is a space which repressive regimes neither
understand, nor can effectively control. Before this change, there was little way in which social
movements could openly challenge such regimes aside from using violence. As with liberal regimes,
using violence will delegitimise a movement’s cause. However, movements operating against
repressive regimes have additional incentives to employ non-violence in that, repressive regimes will
use any example of violence as a pretext for violent crackdowns. Unlike in liberal regimes, the use of
violent repression allows networked social movements to highlight the barbarity to the world, thereby
generating domestic and international support, although this is contingent on international support
helping the movement to overcome regime censorship.
When considering international factors, the direct interventions of individual states damages
the attractiveness of civil resistance to networked social movements. This is primarily because they
have strategic interests. These interests can lead to states providing regimes with technical support
and aid that can be used to repress anti-government forces. They also inhibit an individual state’s
ability to intervene to prevent the repression of protesters. We can cautiously argue that Ritter’s
conception of an iron cage of liberalism is questionable, since regimes appear to understand that a
state’s strategic interests override all other concerns. Finally, because states support repressive
regimes, those states can become tainted in the eyes of the population of those states. This evidence
supports the work of Chenoweth and Stephan, in that when individual states do intervene, it can be
seen as politicised and therefore less welcome. Contrastingly, non-state actors play a subtle yet
marked role in increasing the attractiveness of civil resistance. International media organisations help
to highlight the brutality of regimes, which leads to greater international support and domestic
participation in civil resistance campaigns. Hacktivist groups and multi -national corporations, can
provide technical support to anti-government movements allowing them to overcome regime
censorship and reap the mobilisation benefits that controlling the narrative brings. Most importantly,
51
non-state actors such as non-governmental organisations can provide the funding for the training of
revolutionary vanguard members and also the funding for their campaigns. There is however, a
significant caveat in that states often indirectly fund these non-state actors activities. This would
appear to confirm Castells’ argument that states still retain significant influence in the current global
environment if they work though the networks of power. However such links are extremely difficult
to demonstrate due to the indirect and covert nature of such relationships.
This paper, has limitations which must be acknowledged. Most importantly, given the novelty
of this subject, there exists a distinct lack of primary sources concerning the networked social
movements that have adopted civil resistance. This paper has attempted to circumvent this issue
wherever possible. Nevertheless, such scarcity means that it has had to rely mostly upon the
secondary literature which has issues with validity and reliability. Secondly, this paper is limited by the
enormity of the three key themes discussed. These themes could easily be divided into distinct stand-
alone discussions where a greater level of analysis could be applied. Entire discussions could be had
just about the role of hacktivist groups and their relationships to networked social movements’ choice
of civil resistance. On this point of potential research, the conclusions drawn above have made but a
dent into the civil resistance literature. Future research should focus on differentiating between
repressive regime types and how each impacts the choice of civil resistance by networked social
movements. The study found that civil resistance has to be disguised in order for it to be adopted in
certain environments. This links back to the work of Nepstad and Vinthagen and highlights the
importance of local context plays in the acceptance of civil resistance. This is an issue for civil
resistance in particular because it has American origins, hence, wherever the United States has a
negative reputation, civil resistance will be less attractive to social movements unless it is disguised.
Concealing the origins prevents potential destabilisation, which is a situation where more radical
groups could be free to potentially adopt violence. As long as the United States retains its current level
52
of global influence this will remain a problem for the attractiveness of civil resistance. Perhaps future
research should endeavour to discover how best to combat this image problem. The links that exist
between states, non-state actors and vanguards require further examination. As noted, establishing
these links would be extremely difficult, nevertheless, if achieved it would prove that states are
extremely influential actors as to why networked social movements adopt civil resistance. Civil
resistance appears to be one of the most powerful levers for effecting change utilised by networked
social movements and its relative scholarly neglect cannot continue, all things considered much work
remains to be done.
53
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