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Following the open verdict delivered at the inquest into the fire at the Penhallow Hotelin Newquay Alan Cox – a fire safety consultant who has taken a special interest in hotelsafety – sets out his views on the lessons that can be learned.

on the evening of the fire and duringthe investigation process has beenclosely scrutinised by some of thecountry’s most eminent fire and rescueexperts, who concluded that it had metthe required standard in all aspects.”

You could easily be forgiven forthinking that he was referring to adifferent incident. It would take a lotmore than these words to reassure me– and a lot of other people who werethere at the time – that the requiredstandards had been met in all aspects.If they were met there was, in my view,something radically wrong with therequired standards.

“The question has to be asked: how did the fire spread soquickly in such a short space of time?”

PENHALLOW HOTEL –ACCIDENT OR ARSON?i have been in the fire and safetyprofession for nearly 45 years andnever did I think that I would read anewspaper headline like this about afire in the UK: Fire Brigade not capable ofsaving blaze victims. The news item in theLancashire Post reported on thetestimony given by one of the survivorsat the inquest into the deaths of threepeople in the fire at the PenhallowHotel, Newquay in 2007. She told theinquest how she saw one of the victims,80-year old Joan Harper, trapped inher blazing room. She said thatfirefighters with just one engine and nofirefighting ladder were to ill-equipped

to come to the rescue. Describing themoment firemen did arrive at thescene, she is quoted as saying:

“Everybody was shouting at the firebrigade to save the lady, but they didnot take any actions to saveher…When I saw their single fireengine with one hosepipe, this justreinforced my despair. They did nothave the capability to deal with thefire.”

Following the open verdict at theend of the three week inquest, the newchief fire officer of Cornwall isreported as saying: “The performanceof Cornwall’s fire and rescue service

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finding for the cause of the fire. Theydid add that they could change theirfinding if any new evidence came tolight. When asked if an accelerant wasused they confirmed that no evidenceto this effect was found, but CornwallFire Service Investigator Mark Boecktold the jury the fire was “almostcertainly” arson. He said there was“extremely strong support” for thetheory that an unknown arsonist set abin behind the hotel’s bar alight,possibly dousing the flames with anaccelerant. If the experts can’t agree onthis point, that casts some doubt, inmy view, on their other findings.

One of the other possibleexplanations ruled out by the expertswas the fire being caused by afluorescent light which was fixedunderneath a plastic roof. They statedthat this was a very safe form oflighting and, in their opinion, couldnot have started the fire. But I know ofa number of very serious fires thathave been caused by fluorescent lightsboth in the UK and abroad. One reportinto electrical fires in Finland statesthat “the light fitting that caused themost fires was fluorescent lights.Approximately two thirds of all firescaused by light fittings involvedfluorescent lights.”

The NHS has also issued thefollowing warning: “NHS Estates havereceived numerous reports in the lastfew months of unwanted fire signalsinitiated by faulty/overheated ballastsin fluorescent light fittings. Minor fireshave broken out and patientevacuation has been reported. This hasthe potential to become a seriousincident.” Another warning was issuedby Norfolk County Council following afire in a fluorescent light that ignitedthe roof structure in a school.

One of the other forensic expertsreferred to smoke detectors beingbetter than the human nose atdetecting smoke. Whilst I don’t professto be an expert in this field, I knowthat some scientists say that there is noequivalent to the perception capacityof the scent-sensitive cells in the nose.Furthermore, some researchers openlystate the impossibility of developing anelectronic device that can fullyduplicate the human nose. Edward J.Staples, an expert in electronic sensortechnology, is one who openly admitsthis. Another scientist, ProfessorW James Harper, says: “An electronicnose is not a replacement for people –it is a supplement,” emphasising thatthe electronic nose can only be anadjunct.

The search for answers in this casewas not helped by a number ofwitnesses using Rule 22 when askedquestions (under Rule 22 of theCoroners Rules, witnesses have the

plastic/perspex roof; this was sitedunder the external wooden fire escapeand this provided no fire protection tothe staircase. The guidance onprotecting external fire escapes hasbeen in existence for nearly 40 yearsand to my knowledge, has not changedsignificantly in all that time. So whywas this problem not identified beforethe fire? I cannot answer this becausethe information is not publiclyavailable (I have not even been able todetermine if a fire certificate wasdefinitely issued) but what is certain isthat had the required level of fireprotection been in place at the time ofthe fire, this would not have happened.

Unfortunately, there was a secondroute that the fire took. The expertsput forward the theory that the firecould have spread into the first floorboiler room which was above thebeer/alcohol store, either through thefloor which may then have caused thelights to go out, or externally. Whenthe fire reached the boiler room it thenactivated the smoke detector beforetravelling into other areas. At the sametime, the fire door between the barstore and the lounge appears to havefailed fairly quickly, which thenallowed fire to quickly spread via themain internal staircase (which was notprotected at the bottom with a firedoor) up to the upper floors and intoan unprotected light/ventilation wellwhich went up to roof level. So thesecond question that must be asked iswhy the internal staircase andlight/ventilation well had not been fireprotected? Again I cannot answer thisquestion as the information is notavailable and the details of the firecertificate have not been ascertained,but if this protection had been in placethe internal escape routes would nothave failed as quickly as they did andguests might well have been able toescape safely.

Accident or arson?The inquest returned an open verdicton the three people who died in thefire and the coroner, Dr EmmaCarylon, told the jury that a verdict ofunlawful killing was not an option, asinvestigators were not able to confirmthe fire was started deliberately. Ofcourse, there have been many theoriesabout how the fire started and it isclear that both the Devon andCornwall Police and Cornwall FireService believe it was starteddeliberately. In reaching this decision,a great deal of reliance was placed onthe evidence of forensic scientists whowere called in to investigate the fire.They indicated that they had ruled outall of the obvious and accidentalcauses of fire and were left with onlythe deliberate act, which was their

The scenarioThe generally accepted scenario putforward during the inquest appears tobe as follows:

22.15 A burglary was reported in oneof the guest rooms and thepolice were called.

23.32 The police arrived.23.40 The shutters were closed in the

bar.23.59 The police left.00.10 The lights failed in the lounge

and the barman went to investigate.

00.15 The fire alarm actuated and indicated a fire in zone 6 whichwas the boiler room (1st floor)

00.17 The barman calls the fireservice.

00.26 The fire service in attendance -Newquay 511R (it was confirmed that this time was not logged as the FireControl Operators were taking multiple repeat fire calls)

00.36 Second appliance in attendance– ‘St Columb’

Note that some of the above timings areapproximate. Also, while this is thegenerally accepted timing of events,there is some confusion surroundingsome of the events. For example, two ofthe staff who were on duty were unableto agree who closed the bar shutters.When the barman rang the fire servicehe said he could see smoke behind adoor, but this was not confirmed byother people in the bar at the time. Inrespect of the arrival of the firstappliance, the fire service haveindicated that whilst no arrival timewas logged, it was taken as being thetime that they received a “make pumps4” message at 00.26 This I feel may notbe totally accurate, because it iscommon practice if you are on the wayto a fire and can see that it is a verylarge fire, to send an assistance messagebefore you arrive and I am fairly surethat they would have been able to seethis incident well before they arrived.

The fireThere can be little doubt that theramifications of this fire are seriousand whether the fire was accidental ordeliberate, the question has to beasked: how did the fire spread soquickly in such a short space of time?

The forensic scientists were of theopinion that the fire started less than20 minutes before the smoke detectorin the first floor boiler room operated,and so the fire could have started ataround midnight. In just over 20minutes the fire had spread from thebeer/alcohol store behind the bar andhad engulfed the external rear fireescape. The reason for the rapid firespread was because the beer store had a

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PENHALLOW HOTEL FIRE

never know the full facts. I, for one,tried to help the investigation byoffering my services free of charge,because I believed that the experience Igained in the USA on the ‘mapping’process of fire investigation might helpestablish exactly where people wereand what they did, to a realistictimeline, but this offer was turneddown. I also tried to get a copy of thefire certificate under the Freedom ofInformation Act and this was alsoturned down, so I had to prepare myown plans based on people’s memory.Many of the people whom I spoke tofelt totally traumatised by theirexperience and their lives will never bethe same again.

Following the Crimewatchreconstruction I wrote to the chiefconstable of Devon and Cornwallquerying the timings which wereshown. It took me six months to getany admission that there might havebeen a mistake, and this only cameafter a county councillor took up myrequest and wrote again to the chiefconstable. I also wrote to Sadiq Khan,the minister responsible at the Fire andResilience Directorate (Communitiesand Local Government) expressing myconcern about the fire and theinspection process. He replied: “Howeach fire and rescue service determinesits inspection programme is a matter oflocal discretion, and again it would beinappropriate for ministers tocomment.”

Lastly, I think that we must have abetter fire investigation process forserious fires like this, because nomatter how well qualified individualsmay be and what experience they mayhave, I don’t think that the process thatwas carried out during this fire does usany credit at all. To my mind simplyruling out accidental causes and sayingthat it was a deliberate act, because thisis the only one left, is not the way thatwe should be investigating fires likethis. Perhaps a public enquiry is nowneeded to get to the truth and I ampleased that the coroner is going toraise some of these fire safety concernswith the government.

Alan Cox is a fire and safety consultant. Hehas held senior fire safety posts in the publicand private sector.

included the need to fit additionaldetectors in bedrooms, carry out a firerisk assessment, make sure themaintenance of fire safety equipmentwas up to date, change the RedlamBolts to panic bolts and replace someglazing to be fire resisting. They alsoissued a notice to have the external fireescape repaired. It is difficult at thispoint to say for certain if a new firealarm system would have made anymaterial difference to the outcome,because there were so many failings inthe structural fire safety and the firetravelled so quickly, that it would haveneeded a very early alarm and goodstructural fire safety to have changedthe outcome to any great extent.

My conclusionsI have followed this fire from the verybeginning because it typified many ofthe failings that I and many othershave worked to prevent over the years.I think that everyone in the fireprotection profession shouldacknowledge what a serious failure thiswas. Whether it was a deliberate act oran accident, we may never know which,it was certainly a disastrous failure ofthe system that was there to preventsuch things from happening.Unfortunately, three people died as aresult of these failings and we mustnever forget that.

I acknowledge that this was a verycomplex case and I’m not convinced,on the information that I have seen,that it was a deliberate act. We may

right not to answer questions, oftenafter legal advice) Many of the hotelstaff and the owners used this whenasked questions such as: Did youcheck to see if it was a false alarmbefore calling the fire service? Wereregular fire checks carried out? Andwas the fire alarm installed by a fullyqualified engineer? This inevitablycontributed to the uncertainty in thisvery complex case and given theevidence, I feel that the coroner wasright to record an open verdict,because it was not proved beyondreasonable doubt that this fire wascaused by a deliberate act.

Automatic fire detectionThere was considerable debate aboutautomatic fire detection and whetherthis would have changed the outcomeof the fire. In a statement at the end ofthe inquest, the relatives said: “Fromthe evidence, we were somewhatsurprised to hear that the hotel was notcompliant with the fire safety order of2005, particularly regarding itsrequirements for smoke detectors in allbedrooms. We feel that the absence ofthese smoke detectors could havesaved the lives of our loved ones.” Itshould be stated at this point that thehotel did have some automatic firedetection but it was not up to the L2standard and only a small number ofbedrooms had smoke detection. It wasclaimed that Cornwall Fire Servicevisited in July 2006 and gave verbaladvice to the hotel manager, which

“There was ‘extremely strong support’ for the theory that anunknown arsonist set a bin behind the hotel’s bar alight,possibly dousing the flames with an accelerant”

John Hughes, sonof Monica Hughesand brother of PeterHughes, who bothdied in the fire,making a statementoutside TruroCrown Court afterthe inquestJAMIE GRIERSON/PA

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