the pension problem,cdn.calisphere.org/data/28722/8w/bk0003z8h8w/files/bk... · 2009-02-05 · in...

26
Management Faces the Pension Problem, Prepared by Industrial Relations Division, NAM (~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ (Economic Policy Divis Series ) ion ,(No. 32 4 2 IN,- -I-- _J October 1950 > IMND@Tfpi kstL. (LLATIONS ) 14 WEST 49TH STREk, NEW YORK 20, N. Y.

Upload: others

Post on 11-Aug-2020

1 views

Category:

Documents


0 download

TRANSCRIPT

Page 1: the Pension Problem,cdn.calisphere.org/data/28722/8w/bk0003z8h8w/files/bk... · 2009-02-05 · In the case of Inland, the company negotiated the right to offer to employees a choice

Management Faces

the

Pension Problem,

Prepared by Industrial Relations Division, NAM

(~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~(Economic Policy Divis

Series )

ion ,(No. 324 2 IN,- -I-- _J October 1950 >

IMND@TfpikstL. (LLATIONS )

14 WEST 49TH STREk, NEW YORK 20, N. Y.

Page 2: the Pension Problem,cdn.calisphere.org/data/28722/8w/bk0003z8h8w/files/bk... · 2009-02-05 · In the case of Inland, the company negotiated the right to offer to employees a choice

Foreword

Realizing the tremendous problems posed by the current drive for pensions,especially insofar as smaller companies are concerned, the Industrial RelationsDivision has prepared this study under the guidance of the Subcommittee on Col-lectively Bargained Pension Plans of the NAM Employee Benefits Committee.

It has been designed primarily to assist smaller companies with some of themajor problems and considerations in pension planning. It focuses special atten-tion on the many fundamental questions on which information must be obtainedin order to develop and establish a sound company policy on pensions. Pension plan-ning is an involved and technical problem, and this study should not be construedto be a complete treatise covering the manifold and complex issues relating to thissubject. There is no attempt to tell any employer whether he should or should nothave a pension plan, what kind of a pension plan he should have or to indicate anypossible pattern of pension development for NAM membership.

It cannot be emphasized too strongly that each employer confronted with pen-sion demands should avail himself of the most competent professional advice avail-able to him. Since local considerations and practices may be of major importance,employers will find it advisable to consult with the state, local and trade associa-tions affiliated with the National Industrial Council. The Industrial Relations Divi-sion of NAM also stands ready to supply information of a general nature onpensions.

CLIFFORD F. HAWKER, ChairmanNAM Subcommittee on CollectivelyBargained Pension Plans

Page 3: the Pension Problem,cdn.calisphere.org/data/28722/8w/bk0003z8h8w/files/bk... · 2009-02-05 · In the case of Inland, the company negotiated the right to offer to employees a choice

ContentsWHAT IS APENSION PLAN?..................................................................3

EARLY PRIVATEEMPLOYERPROGRAMS..........................................................3WHAT FORCES ARE BEHIND THE RECENT INTEREST IN PENSIONS?...... 3

AnAging Population..................................................................3An Increasing Tendency Toward Retirement by Age 65....................................3The Social Security Act...................................................................3Emerging Governmental Interest in Private Pensions..........................................3

TheRise of Labor Union Interest in Private Pensions..........................................4Full Scale Federal Intervention in Private Pension Planning..................................4Nature of Recent Settlements..................................................................4

MUSTIHAVEAPENSION PLAN IN MY COMPANY?....................................5NoLegal Requirement ......... ........................................................ .5

Compulsory Collective Bargaining on Pensions......................................................5DO MYEMPLOYEES WANTAPENSION PLAN?..................................................5

Results of Surveys..................................................................5TheIndividual Company..................................................................6

ARE MY EMPLOYEES LIKELY TO NEED A PENSION PLAN?........................6THE GOVERNMENT HAS A PLAN- WHY SHOULD MY COMPANY

HAVEONE? .................................................................6WHATDOPENSIONS COST?..................................................................6

WHAT KINDS OF PLANS AREAVAILABLE?......................................................7WHAT INFORMATION IS NECESSARY FOR TENTATIVE

CONSIDERATION OF APENSION PLAN?................................................8WHAT ARE THE ADVANTAGES OF COMPANY PENSION PLANS?................8SUPPOSE INVESTIGATION DISCLOSES THAT I CAN'T AFFORD

A PENSION PLAN -WHATDO I DO?......................................................9Inform All Employees..................................................................9Investigate Thrift or Profit-Sharing Plans..............................................................9OtherEmployee Benefits..................................................................9

Wage Adjustment ..................................................................9SHOULD I CONTRIBUTE "X" CENTS PER HOUR TO A UNION

PENSION FUND, AVOID FURTHER RESPONSIBILITY ANDLET THE UNION HANDLE THINGS AS IT SEES FIT?............................ 10

SHOULD I FOLLOW WHAT I'M TOLD IS A GENERAL PATTERN-WITHORWITHOUTUNION PRESSURE?.............................................. 10

SUPPOSE THE UNION PRESENTS ME WITH A PACKAGE?............................ 10SHOULD I WAIT UNTIL THE UNION ASKS FOR A PLAN?.............................. 11

WHAT HAVE OTHERCOMPANIES GIVEN?.......................................................... 12WHAT ARE THE PENSION OBJECTIVES OF VARIOUS UNIONS?.................. 12-

WHO SHOULD BECOVERED?................................................................. 13WHAT ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS SHOULD BE CONSIDERED?.............. 13WHAT COMPLICATIONS MAY RESULT FROM MILITARY LEAVES

OFABSENCE? ................................................................. 14WHO SHOULDCONTRIBUTE?................................................................. 14

WHYHAVEMANYPENSION PLANS FAILED?.................................................... 15WHAT ARE AN EMPLOYER'S PAST SERVICE PROBLEMS?.............................. 15

SHOULD RETIREMENT BECOMPULSORY?........................................................ 15SHOULD A PLAN BE FULLY FUNDED, PARTIALLY FUNDED

ORPAY-AS-YOU-GO? ....................... .......................................... 16WHAT PRINCIPAL FINANCING ARRANGEMENTS ARE AVAILABLE?........ 16

TheGroup Annuity Plan................................................................. 16Individual Policy Plan................................................................. 17TheTrust Fund Plan................................................................. 17

WHAT IS THE SOCIAL SECURITY PICTURE AND HOW DOES ITAFFECT ANY PLAN I MAY HAVE OR MAY BE CON-SIDERING? ................................................................. 17

VESTING- WHAT DOES IT MEAN AND WHAT DOES IT COST?.................. 18WHO SHOULDADMINISTER THE PLAN? ............................................................ 18

WHO IS INVOLVED IN PENSION PLANNING BESIDES A COMPANYANDITS EMPLOYEES?. ................................................................. 19

IF I WANT TO EXPLORE THIS WHOLE PROBLEM, HOW DOI GOABOUT IT?................................................................. 19

MUST I SELL THE PLAN TO MYEMPLOYEES?.................................................. 19ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON PENSION REFERENCES

AND SOURCEMATERIAL............................................................. 21

Page 4: the Pension Problem,cdn.calisphere.org/data/28722/8w/bk0003z8h8w/files/bk... · 2009-02-05 · In the case of Inland, the company negotiated the right to offer to employees a choice

Management Faces the

Pension Problem

WHAT IS A PENSION PLAN?

A private pension plan is a formal system under which anemployer commits himself in advance to pay a determinablesum.at regular intervals for the entire remaining life of em-ployees who leave the company at a pre-determined age orwithin a certain age range and who meet certain other defi-nite standards. It involves anticipation of the cost of suchpayments, a formal provision to meet that cost, and soundadjustment of that cost to the economic structure and for-tunes of the company. Profit-sharing plans, thrift and sav-ings plans and informal arrangements under which benefitsare paid at management discretion do not come within themeaning of formal retirement programs.

EARLY PRIVATE EMPLOYER PROGRAMSSome employers had recognized the constructive em-

ployee relations values in pension plans for rank and fileemployees well before 1900. Among the earliest knownprograms were those established by the Grand Trunk Rail-road in 1874, the Adams Express Company in 1875, the Bal-timore and Ohio Railroad in 1880 and the Consolidated Edi-son Company in 1892. Andrew Carnegie appropriated fourmillion dollars from steel corporation reserves in 1901 toestablish a retirement trust fund. The installation of sound,private programs was limited for many years to those com-panies that could afford to establish pension funds from re-serves on the books or that were prepared to adopt the con-servative financing methods required by insurance com-panies and bank trustee services.

WHAT FORCES ARE BEHIND THE RECENTINTEREST IN PENSIONS?

An Aging PopulationIn 1920, we had approximately 5 million people aged 65

or over; today there are about 11 million; it is estimatedthat by 1980 those aged 65 or over may exceed 20 million.Although life expectancy from age 40 has not improvedsignificantly, more people are and will be living to reachretirement age, due to advances in medical science anrd tothe general increase in population. Economic and socialpressures following 1929 brought these developments topublic attention and stimulated consideration of ways andmeans to solve the economic problems of old age.

An Increasing Tendency Toward Retirement by Age 65A larger proportion of the population is now engaged in

urban pursuits and a larger proportion of the gainfully em-ployed works for others rather than being self-employed. Anaccompanying tendency developed for men and women atage 65 and older to receive less income from regular em-ployment. During the depression of the 1930s, it was con-sidered desirable to encourage the withdrawal of those over65 from the labor market in order to make employmentopportunities for the younger unemployed, and retirementpensions at age 65 were considered a suitable mechanism foraccomplishing this desired end.

The Social Security ActConsiderable pressure on Congress from many sources

resulted in the passage of the Social Security Act in 1935.The Old-Age and Survivors Insurance provisions of thismeasure awakened popular interest in formal provisions tobe made during working years for the time when unemploy-ment because of age was probable. Increases in the cost ofliving and the depreciation in the value of the dollar duringand following World War II intensified the pressure to in-crease federal benefits. Because the federal program hadbeen designed in 1935 purposely to afford only a basic mini-mum layer of protection, attention was directed to varioussuggestions for expanding or supplementing Social Securitybenefits.

Emerging Governmental Interest in Private PensionsCongress in 1926 authorized income tax exemption for

certain payments to pension trust funds and premiums paidto life insurance companies under group annuity contracts.Under this stimulus, private pensions began a slow growth,which was intensified after the passage of the Social Se-curity Act. A sharp increase in the number of plans estab-lished immediately prior to World War II coincided withthe growing labor shortage of the defense period when thevalue of a pension plan in reducing employee turnover andin attracting new workers became apparent.

In 1942, the passage by Congress of the Wage Stabiliza-tion Act and the revision of the Internal Revenue Codecreated conditions especially favorable to pension growth.With wage rates frozen and corporate tax rates approach-ing 90%, the newly liberalized treatment of employer taxdeductions for contributions to pension plans plus the abil-

3

Page 5: the Pension Problem,cdn.calisphere.org/data/28722/8w/bk0003z8h8w/files/bk... · 2009-02-05 · In the case of Inland, the company negotiated the right to offer to employees a choice

ity to get advance approval of such arrangements resultedin qualification for tax exemption of 4,208 pension plansfrom August 1942 to December 1944.

The Rise of Labor Union Interest in Private PensionsLabor unions historically had been opposed to private

company benefit programs on the ground that they werepaternalistic and tended to make employees less militanton other issues. However, when Wage Stabilization regula-tions prevented outright wage increases, unions sought andgained a variety of "fringe" adjustments, including pen-sions, in order to justify their dues collections. Also, as indi-cated above, employers in many cases resorted to pensionplans in an effort to attract and retain employees in a tightlabor market. Many existing employer-established pensionplans were forced into union contracts under War LaborBoard policy.The establishment, under federal duress, of the coal

miners' welfare fund with its magic $100 per month pen-sion promise made it inevitable that other union leaderswould attempt to emulate John L. Lewis. Up to this point,union pension demands had been principally strategic ma.neuvers designed to draw employer concessions on otherpoints. Now, however, union negotiating committees wereinstructed to insist on pensions.

Full Scale Federal Intervention inPrivate Pension Planning

In 1948, the protection of law was extended by NLRBto the union drive for negotiated pensions. In a decisionthat had wide implications in the labor relations field atlarge, the Board ruled that Inland Steel Company mustbargain with the union over its pension demands and theage at which employees could be retired. This doctrine wasextended by the Board in a later case to include insuranceand other benefits and both decisions were affirmed by thecourts. These developments found the majority of employersand unions unprepared to cope with the issues created andill-equipped to engage in the complexities of welfare-planbargaining.

1949 saw pension proposals assume the status of majordemands as some unions exerted industry-wide or nation-wide power and sought to impose a standardized benefitplan package on various industries: This development wasprompted by several factors-membership pressure for "se-curity"; a conviction that the economic climate was notfavorable for a fourth round of direct wage increases; anda hope that industries faced with union pressure for privatepension programs would support increased federal benefitsas an alternative.The specific direction of the "fourth round" of nation-

wide union postwar demands was determined on- the basisof expediency rather than sound business economics by apresidentially appointed fact-finding board attempting toavert a steel strike. Although finding against a direct wageincrease, the Board voiced the doctrine that the steel in-dustry was responsible for providing for the "depreciationof its human machine" and that contributions to pensions toprovide for this "depreciation" should be considered a nor-mal item of current operating costs. The non-contributoryprinciple and the cents-per-hour recommendation of theBoard became an integral part of the fourth round union de-mand "pattern," disregarding the further recommendationthat pension and insurance programs should be tailor-madeto fit the circumstances and abilities of individual companies.

Nature of Recent Settlements

Principal settlements in the various basic industries havelargely conformed to the contracts signed by Ford Motorand Bethlehem Steel, which are closely related to the SteelBoard doctrine. Notable exceptions have been the agree-ments signed by Inland Steel and by General Motors.

In the case of Inland, the company negotiated the rightto offer to employees a choice of coverage either under thenon-contributory "Bethlehem Plan," which was advocatedby the union, or under the contributory plan developed byInland. Both plans were presented on a non-competitivebasis in personal interviews with each employee affected.The interest shown in the additional features provided inthe Inland plan, despite the fact that participation would beon a contributory basis, is evidenced by the company's dis-closure that 74% chose the Inland plan. Even among unionmembers, the company's plan proved more attractive-70%chose the Inland plan,The recent five-year agreement signed by General Mo-

tors has been widely discussed, owing to several departuresfrom conventional labor-management practices. With re-spect to pensions, it should be noted that the union did notadhere to its announced objective of $125 per month butsettled for a maximum pension of $100 per month, in-cluding Social Security, which was to be increased to $117.50per month if Congress were to grant Social Security benefitincreases of the magnitude expected by the negotiators.The May 25, 1950 issue of Current News, published by

Industrial Relations Counsellors, Inc., New York, states onPage 83:

"Collective agreements negotiated so far this year, withtheir main stress on pension and welfare provisions,show a trend toward no wage rise at 'all or smallerones than in the previous year. A recent Bureau ofNational Affairs analysis of 815 collective agreementssigned during the first quarter of 1950 and of 3,550settlements signed in 1949 discloses that 26 per centof the contracts in 1950 did not include a pay increase,as against 21 per cent in 1949. Contracts calling forraises of 4 to 6 cents an hour were 34 per cent of thetotal in 1950 and 28 per cent in 1949; those liftingpay from 7 to 12 cents an hour represented 24 percent of the total in 1950, and 32 per cent of the totalin 1949; and 8 per cent of the 1950 contracts granted10 or more cents an hour, as against 15 per cent ofthose in 1949. On the other hand, welfare plans in thetwo years nearly tripled, being covered in 4 per centof the total contracts in 1949 and 11 per cent in 1950,while health and welfare provisions, covered in 14 percent of the 1949 settlements, were in 29 per cent ofthe 1950 contracts.

"It now appears that in 1951 labor will put emphasison wages, not pensions, and will seek (1) a 35-hourweek at forty hours' pay in industries where unem-ployment is prevalent, (2) health insurance and dis-ability pay plans, and (3) in some industries, severancepay provision and union shop clauses. Drives for pen-sions will continue in industries where they are not nowpaid, with the goal $125-a-month benefits. (BusinessWeek, May 20; U. S. News and World Report, May26)."

It will be noted that these figures are for settlements inall industries and may not be applicable to manufacturingindustries or specific localities.

4

Page 6: the Pension Problem,cdn.calisphere.org/data/28722/8w/bk0003z8h8w/files/bk... · 2009-02-05 · In the case of Inland, the company negotiated the right to offer to employees a choice

MUST I HAVE A PENSION PLANIN MY COMPANY?

No Legal RequirementThere is no law which compels an employer to establish

a private pension plan in his company, whether or not hehas a union, and whether or not a union demands a pen-sion. Most employers are already involved in one form ofcompulsory pension plan since they are required to con-tribute a percentage of their payrolls and to deduct em-ployee payroll taxes for the federal Old Age and SurvivorsInsurance program.

Compulsory Coalective Bargaining on PensionsEmployers who are subject to the Taft-Hartley Act are

now required to bargain collectively over pension demandsmade by duly certified or recognized unions. This require-ment has come about through several NLRB and courtdecisions which have held that employer contributions topensions and other "social insurance" programs come withinthe meaning of "wages" or "conditions of employment,"and that the age and terms of retirement come within themeaning of "conditions of employment."Many of the issues and problems raised by this require-

ment have yet to be clarified by judicial recognition and un-doubtedly will be the subject of much contention in legaland labor relations circles. For the present, the Labor-Management Relations Act has been interpreted to meanthat the existence of a contract does not annul the em-ployer's continuing duty to bargain on a subject not men-tioned in the agreement. "It should be emphasized that theNLRB's interpretation of the duty to bargain, as defined inthe Taft-Hartley Act, has not yet been passed on by thecourts. At the same time, it should be recognized that, un-less and until an appellate court reverses the Board's inter-pretation of the proviso, employers will be expected by theNLRB to conduct themselves so as to conform with theWagner Act rule of bargaining 'continuously' with respect tomatters not covered by contract. Thus under the Board'stheory, for example, a union apparently would be free onthe day following signing of a contract to renew demandswhich might have been discussed and abandoned by theunion in earlier negotiations in exchange for some valuableconsideration." 1

Although the requirement to bargain on pensions doesnot mean that the employer must agree upon a plan, he issubject to an unfair labor practice charge if he refuses tobargain at the union's request. It appears at this writing thatan employer must discuss with his union, in advance, theterms of a pension plan which he desires to install uni-laterally. It has also been held that where a union has beencertified or recognized, the employer must consult with theunion before making any changes in existing retirementplans. This apparently applies both to plans established out-side of, or included in, the terms of the union contract.Some companies which were not able to adopt a pension

plan 'at their union's request have negotiated a waiver ofthe union's right to discuss pensions for the term of theagreement. Such a waiver should be clear and specific in itsterms. Other labor relations authorities suggest the negotia-tion of a general waiver clause wherein the union wouldwaive any right to further bargaining for the term of the

'NAM LAW DEPARTMENT MEMO, October, 1949, "The Em-ployer's Duty to Bargain on Matters not Covered by an ExistingContract," page 11.

agreement on any and all matters whether or not includedor mentioned therein. In the recent five-year contract signedby General Motors, the parties agreed to forego bargainingfor the duration of the agreement on any subject, whetheror not covered in the agreement. Others have attemptedwaivers which specifically mention the various non-bargain-able subjects for the term of the agreement, but such acourse might produce a list of exceptions longer than thecontract itself.The preceding questions and problems strongly suggest

the advisability of full exploration of such matters with thecompany's counsel before deciding on a particular courseof action. Although the many legal complexities surround-ing compulsory bargaining on pensions seem to imposestumbling blocks in the way of employer initiation of plans,the several advantages which can accrue as the result of theestablishment of a sound program may outweigh thesedifficulties.

DO MY EMPLOYEES WANTA PENSION PLAN?

Results of SurveysThere are substantial indications that many employees

today look to their employer to provide a major proportionof retirement security.

A December 1949 study made by the Opinion Re-search Corporation reports the following attitudes heldby a nationwide sample of manual workers in manu-facturing industry. A major question was, "Who hasthe duty to provide pensions-Government, Companyor Individual?" When asked about each one sepa-rately, 77% said Government has a duty to help pro-vide for a man's old age, 88% said the company aman works for has a duty, and 96% that the indi-vidual himself has a duty to help. When all three werecombined in the same question, and employees wereasked to select which one has the principal obligation,they voted (in rounded figures): Government 19%,employer 18%, all three 11 %, the man himself 53%.Ninety-one per cent of those interviewed said that theyfelt federal Social Security would not provide enoughretirement income and 65% thought that it wasn'tpossible for the average man to provide for himselfby his own efforts. Sixty-six per cent claimed that theywould sooner have ten cents an hour in pensions thanhave a wage increase. (Quoted by special permissionof the Public Opinion Index for Industry, Opinion Re-search Corporation.)

The February 15, 1950 issue of Modern Industry, in asurvey of worker opinion on the pension issue, says in part,"It's clear that workers assign such a high degree of respon-sibility to their companies only because they are convincedthat they are earning retirement pay as they work. Theylook upon pensions as deferred wages, not as gifts frombenevolent bosses." This article further states, "After 15years of welfare statism, only a small percentage, regard-less of age group, look toward the Government alone forfuture security. The great majority have either accepteda part of the responsibility or feel that they are earningpensions as a part of their day's work. Furthermore, sub-stantially more workers say that they would rather keeptheir freedom to move from company to company and jobto job than sacrifice it for an assured pension."

Statistics quoted in that report indicate that more than

5

Page 7: the Pension Problem,cdn.calisphere.org/data/28722/8w/bk0003z8h8w/files/bk... · 2009-02-05 · In the case of Inland, the company negotiated the right to offer to employees a choice

60% "would favor a pension plan where the company paida fixed percentage of its profits before taxes into the pen-sion fund; half of these approved this method even if itmeans that there might be some years when the companycould not afford to make any pension contributions."

The Individual CompanyBefore proceeding very far in his thinking about pensions,

an employer ought to decide whether or not his own em-ployees really want a pension plan. The presence of effectivetwo-way communications is a decided asset in this con-nection.

Full information on whatever benefit plans presentlyexist in the company should be in the hands of employees,including data on employer contributions to state unemploy-ment insurance, workmen's compensation and federal So-cial Security. Often employees are not aware of the cost tothe company of existing benefits and do not understand theextent of existing protection.The facts of each company's particular situation will

modify employees' desire for a pension plan. There may bea majority of younger employees in the work force, andthis group may prefer that emphasis be placed on wages orother employee benefits. If the work force has a large pro-portion of older workers, the cost of adequate pensions forthis group may be prohibitive, even under the best of plans.Such a group may prefer that attention be directed towardproviding work beyond the age at which retirement mightbe required. Some employees and unions take the view thatcompany pensions are too paternalistic or will restrict theworker's right and ability to change jobs at will. There arestill others that claim that we must place our primary re-liance on federal pensions and that widespread companyprograms are economically and socially unsound. Each em-ployer should be prepared to analyze his employees' viewsand the composition of his employee group in order to de-termine how high an order of priority should be given thepension program.

Consideration by management of a pension plan shouldalso be made in the light of whatever other employee benefitplans may be existing in the company or may be desired byemployees. A sound balance as between the various types ofbenefit plans-group life insurance, sickness benefits, sever-ance benefits, hospitalization, vacation plan-usually hasmore employee relations value and employee acceptancethan any one particular plan which is arbitrarily imposedwithout reference either to employees' benefit needs or de-sires.

ARE MY EMPLOYEES LIKELY TONEED A PENSION PLAN?

Many employers show increasing concern about the eco-nomic status of long-service employees after retirement fromactive service. The determination of the needs of retiredemployees is an important primary step in consideringwhether or not a pension plan should be undertaken. Anintelligent estimate should be made by the employer of theability of his employees to provide for themselves afterthey are retired.

Such evaluation ought to be in terms of local area reali-ties and should not be unduly influenced by popularized"patterns" or by developments in other localities. It involvesconsideration of the extent of private insurance and annui-ties held; savings, coverage under federal Old Age andSurvivors Insurance, home ownership, part-time employ-

ment opportunities which may become available, and otherdignified non-charitable sources of support.A company pension should be designed to fill a definite

need, to accomplish a, specific purpose and should berealistically tied in with individual and governmental pro-visions for retirement income.

THE GOVERNMENT HAS A PLAN-WHY SHOULD MY COMPANY HAVE ONE?The Old Age and Survivors Insurance provisions of the

Social Security Act are designed to produce a basic mini-mum pension. Except in unusual circumstances, recipientsof this pension have had to supplement this basic minimum'with other sources of support.A few students of retirement security problems propose

the elimination of private pension programs and the estab-lishment of an "adequate" federal pension, supported bygeneral taxation. Some employers and some labor unionsare of this persuasion. However, it is questionable whetherour economy could bear such a burden in the years aheadwhen more persons will live to be over 65.Many employers continue to regard federal Social Se-

curity as a base upon which to build sound company planswhere the circumstances of the company permit establish-ment of a private plan. Thus, the private plan is linkedwith the federal program on a supplementary basis, per-mitting the creation of a retirement income which shouldbe adequate to encourage employee retirement and whichshould take into account the living standard which theemployee has experienced during his working years.

WHAT DO PENSIONS COST?Historically, pension growth has been retarded more by

the substantial costs involved than by any other factor.Despite industry's bitter experience in under-estimating pen-sion costs, many quarters today are broadcasting the fallacythat such costs, both present and future, may be estimatedsimply on the basis of so many cents per hour to return abenefit of so many dollars per month. Often these esti-mates seem to be rather reasonable on the surface and leadmany to believe that a "modest pension" can be purchasedwith a relatively small outlay of company funds. This is afalse and misleading conception, especially when cost esti-mates developed under one particular plan as of a givendate are assumed to be applicable to the differing circum-stances of a wide range of companies.

Five cents per hour spent by one company will not alwaysbuy the same pension for that company since the age distri-bution of the employees may change; neither will it auto-matically buy the same pension for other companies. "Centsper hour" is merely a method of estimating current costs-it is not a measure of benefits. General average pensioncosts which are frequently referred to may be entirely mis-leading for a specific company-and especially in the caseof small companies. This is because the factors which influ-ence pension costs-such as age distribution, turnover,withdrawals, length of service, sex, occupation, death rates,etc., vary considerably from company to company.

Pension costs must be viewed in the light of the par-ticular conditions prevailing in the individual company. Apension plan that one company may safely absorb couldbankrupt another.

Even the expanded benefits of the new Federal Government pro-gram are considered as providing no more than a basic minimumlayer of protection, in view of current living costs.

6

Page 8: the Pension Problem,cdn.calisphere.org/data/28722/8w/bk0003z8h8w/files/bk... · 2009-02-05 · In the case of Inland, the company negotiated the right to offer to employees a choice

It is possible to estimate in advance roughly what apension plan will cost in the immediate future.' This isbecause over just a half-dozen years or so, there are notlikely to be great changes in wage or salary levels, size ofthe working force or big changes in the number of em-ployees of different ages, sex or length of service. All ofthese are factors which help determine pension costs.The present age of employees, for instance, determines

how soon they may reach pension age and thus, over whatperiod of time the employer can accumulate a pensionfund for them. Sex is important because women live in re-tirement longer than do men and therefore need a largerpension fund to sustain any particular monthly amount ofpension. The length of service already rendered by presentemployees is important because presumably in determiningthe pensions of these present employees there will be givensome credit for past years at work during which there wasno pension plan in existence.

For another reason, age, sex and present length of serviceare important since they affect any particular employee'schances of remaining at work until pension age. Otherfactors affecting costs are the amount of pension, the ageat which employees will retire, the anticipated interestincome of the fund, whether or not vesting is provided, andthe eligibility provisions desired. Thus, the cost of the planis not automatically determined when the employer agreesto some fixed contribution.The ultimate cost of a pension plan cannot be calculated

precisely in advance. The "true" cost of a plan which isthe amount of pensions plus the expense of administrationless interest earned on the funds, if any, depends on long-term changes in the factors noted above, and can be ap-proximated only by assembling estimates, based on recentexperience of a large number of basic elements.

Initial benefit disbursements under a new plan are almostinvariably much less than future outlays. This is because themoney needed to pay benefits increases in a geometric pro-portion as the number of people retired under the planincreases from year to year. Only after many years of op-eration does the number being retired each year tend tooffset the pensioners who die during that period, and thusstabilize costs. This aspect of pension costs is a principalreason for the failure of a considerable number of plans,and illustrates the necessity for a conservative approach topension planning so that the plan will survive good timesand bad.

WHAT KINDS OF PLANS ARE AVAILABLE?

There are six major types of pension plans based on thenature of the pension benefits, and a considerable numberof combinations thereof. They are:

1. Definite benefit typeIn this type, the pension is computed by multiplyinga pre-determined percentage (for example, 1 %) ofan employee's earnings by his years of service or byhis years of participation in the plan. The amountof annuity therefrom can be predicted in advancesince the amount credited annually is established byformula. Usually the percentage given to past serviceis slightly less than that for future service. It isadaptable to employee contributions which usually

See Appendix A, "Pensions and Group Insurance" by Edwin C.McDonald, pgs. 611.

are related to earnings and remain fixed for eachearnings bracket. The employer pays the remainder-usually 2/3 to 3/4-of the cost of the annuitycredited each year. This cost customarily varies fromyear to year.

2. Flat percentage typeAfter completion of a specified number of yearsof service, the employee may be retired on a pen-sion equal to a flat percentage (for example, 25%,30%, 40%) of his earnings. It is possible to recog-nize service over the required minimum by establish-ing basic and additional benefits. The pension maybe based on the average salary for a certain numberof years, on the final annual salary2 or a numberof other similar arrangements. This plan is alsoadaptable to employee contributions.

3. Money purchase typeA variable benefit is returned under this type ofplan. A definite percentage of employee salary orpayroll is set aside each year. To this may be addedemployee contributions geared to earnings. Thesemoneys are used to purchase whatever pension theywill buy which will be relatively large for a youngemployee whose contribution will bear interest formany years but relatively small for an employeenear retirement age.

4. Deferred profit-sharing typeA percentage of yearly net profits may be accumu-lated to the employee's credit, being disbursed uponretirement on the basis of a pre-determined formulaand payable either in cash or by investment in apaid-up annuity. To some extent this is not a truepension plan because there is no commitment topay a determinable sum at regular intervals; thereare no employer contributions if there are no profitsfrom which to make them, nor are employees retir-ing when the plan is new likely to receive an ade-quate pension.

5. Combined money purchase-deferred profit-sharingtypeThis arrangement, which adapts the leading featuresof the two previously mentioned types, is particu-larly adaptable to small and medium-sized concernsthat have no large cash reserves to fund past serviceat the beginning of their pension plan. In somecases a pension plan has been established to providea minimum basic pension (perhaps including SocialSecurity) to which a profit-sharing plan has beenadded to provide supplementary benefits. Thus theemployer's commitment is held to a minimum whichcan be handled in good years and bad, the fundsfor supplementary benefits being provided only whenthe company's economic situation makes it feasible.

6. Flat benefit typeA uniform benefit is provided for every pensionerwho fulfills a minimum service requirement-a pro-portionate reduction often is provided for shorterservice. It is not related to past earnings-each per-son who fulfills the basic eligibility requirements gets

2 It should be realized that a pension based on a percentage of thefinal salary may vary appreciably from that based on average salary.

7

Page 9: the Pension Problem,cdn.calisphere.org/data/28722/8w/bk0003z8h8w/files/bk... · 2009-02-05 · In the case of Inland, the company negotiated the right to offer to employees a choice

identical pension payments. Many of the recentlynegotiated plans are of this type.

There are also many other varieties of pension plans,especially of the non-funded, pay-as-you-go and informaltypes. These are not considered here because they generallyare not established on an actuarial basis and may often befinancially unsound.

WHAT INFORMATION IS NECESSARYFOR TENTATIVE CONSIDERATION

OF A PENSION PLAN?

Before an employer can decide whether or not his com-pany should have a pension plan, there are several matterson which he should acquire information. Such a procedureis a necessary prelude to full exploration of ways andmeans. Even if the employer's ultimate decision will be thathe cannot adopt a plan, the following areas should be in-vestigated in order to deal with union demands success-fully and in order that employees may be informed of thereasons behind his decision.Among the most important factors are:

1. The advantages and disadvantages of company pen-sion plans;

2. The needs and desires of employees for pensions;3. The differing benefit problems of hourly, salary and

supervisory employees;4. Community and local area practice;5. Stockholders' interest and attitude;6. General financial position of the company, stability

of the business, employment, competitive and marketpositions-past, present and future;

7. Actual and expected treatment of aging employeesby the company; e.g.-are they sometimes given apension on an informal basis, retained on the pay-roll at a higher rate than they really earn; the costsof "make-work" jobs for those employees for whomthe employer feels responsibility; problems in im-partial and uniform application of such plans; isadvancement blocked by retention of superannuatedsupervisors and executives?

8. Union demands and their costs as applied to theparticular company;

9. The amount of money (total and cents per manhour)now being spent on such non-wage labor costs asvacations, insurance, health and medical costs, in-formal retirement pay, recreation, etc.;

10. The amount of money which is presently availableand which may be expected to become available inthe future for additional employee benefits;

11. The types of plans available, the benefits providedand the probable costs of each, all viewed againstthe composition of the work force- age- sex-amount of past service-mortality rates-turnover,etc.;

12. A tentative retirement age;13. Funding arrangements available; ability of the com-

pany to finance the obligations thus created;14. Attitude of employees, stockholders and manage-

ment toward employee contributions; costs and ad-ministrative aspects;

15. The desirability and costs of vesting provisions;16. Relationship with Social Security and existing com-

pany benefit plans;17. Legal obligations and restrictions under various state

and federal laws and regulations, and especially taxexemption requirements of the Bureau of InternalRevenue.

Owing to the technical and complex nature of pensionproblems, the initial exploration of the preceding questionsshould be made with the assistance, where necessary, ofcompetent professional advice. Retirement plans are long-term programs which must meet the pension requirementsof the company and its employees as they exist today andas they will develop over the next 25 or 30 years. Theyhave to be constructed so as not to place an undue burdenon the company during years of poor earnings but at thesame time provide for employees as they retire in a fashionthat, when added to Social Security, will give adequate re-tirement income.To develop a plan which will meet satisfactorily the

needs of the company and its employees, protect the in-terests of the stockholders, take into account the stabilityof the company's business, its financial condition, its rela-tionship with employees, and which will be flexible enoughto meet changing conditions-is indeed a complicated task.

WHAT ARE THE ADVANTAGES OFCOMPANY PENSION PLANS?

The business and employee relations values of a pensionplan can be determined only with reference to the particu-lar conditions faced by the individual company. The short-term advantage gained by granting a plan to settle a strikeor to relieve heavy employee or community pressure mayquickly evaporate if the plan has not been tailor-made tofit the circumstances and capacity of the business.

However, soundly developed plans geared to present re-alities and future probabilities can have benefits for bothemployer and employee which in the long run may proveof specific value to the enterprise. Many employers claimthese advantages for their plans:

1. Orderly method to separate superannuated employeesThis may be the most substantial attraction from anemployer's point of view. It allows removal of theolder employee without imposing hardship on him.Some employers claim that the cost of pensions islikely to be outweighed by the savings in wageswhich otherwise would have been paid less efficientemployees.

2. Creates "room at the top"An employer with a promotion-from-within policyis aided both at the production employee level andat the supervisory and management level by a re-tirement plan which removes older employees andprovides opportunity for advancement of youngermen. The incentive benefits created as a result ofsuch a plan are apt to promote greater efficiency.

3. Attracting and retaining personnelUnder certain conditions, such as during WorldWar II, pension plans have been considered as aidsin attracting employees and in inducing others to re-main with the company, particularly in the execu-tive and technical classifications. Undoubtedly, pen-sions do discourage turnover in the higher agebrackets. In connection With executives and otherhigh salaried people, pensions offer a means of pay-ing deferred compensation which it is impracticalto pay currently because of high income tax rates.

8

Page 10: the Pension Problem,cdn.calisphere.org/data/28722/8w/bk0003z8h8w/files/bk... · 2009-02-05 · In the case of Inland, the company negotiated the right to offer to employees a choice

4. Better employee relationsIt is claimed that employees who have fewer eco-nomic worries about old age are likely to be betterteam players and more efficient producers. There isundoubtedly considerable employee good will gene-rated by a sound program which recognizes long andfaithful service, especially if the benefits of the planare well understood. Knowledge among employeesthat retirement will be made in a humane and non-discriminatory manner may develop employee appre-ciation of the employer's desire to do more than hisshare in developing good human relations.

5. Better public relations

It is an advantage for a company to have a reputa-tion for being concerned about its employees' futurewelfare and for being progressive in its human re-lations. A good plan avoids the appearance in thecommunity of destitute, aged, long-service formeremployees or the necessity for them to depend oncharity.

6. Better treatment of a business cost

Since some humane and systematic procedure forremoving older employees from the active roll seemsdesirable from the point of view of personnel man-agement, employee relations and public relations, itis often advantageous to adopt and publish a definitepension plan and to take, in accordance with theplan, the necessary steps to make sure that whena man retires, there will be on hand a capital sumwhich with interest, and considered on the average,will pay his pension until he dies. The annual pay-ments to accumulate this capital sum over an em-ployee's active years are analogous in a certain senseto machinery depreciation accruals which arecharged during the active life of the machine andaccumulated to offset the capital write-off when itis retired.

Because a similarity in accounting treatment may existbetween "depreciation" and certain methods of pensionfunding, it does not follow thitt employers are responsiblefor "depreciation of the human machine" they employ.Provisions for depreciating equipment must be made by anycompany which desires to stay in business and thus providejob security and earning power for employees. The "humanmachine," however, if one can properly call it such, is notan asset secured by the employer at some designated pur-chase price, and therefore requires no provision for depre-ciation. Determination of a sound pension program is notfacilitated by forced comparisons between men and ma-chines.

SUPPOSE INVESTIGATION DISCLOSESTHAT I CAN'T AFFORD A PLAN-

WHAT DO I DO?An employer may have to conclude, after thorough analy-

sis of the factors previously mentioned, that a sound andworkable pension plan cannot be effectuated in his com-pany. Many employers have had to make this decisiondespite heavy union, employee and community pressure.In this situation, companies have explored the followingpossibilities:

Inform All EmployeesAn explanation of the reasons and necessities behind the

employer's decision not to provide a pension plan shouldbe made to employees. If such communication is backed upby facts and figures wherever possible and if opportunityis provided for answering legitimate employee questions,much suspicion, dissatisfaction and unrest may be avoided,Many employees have been led to believe that the employercan give or withhold pensions simply on the basis of hisattitude or willingness to do so. This misconception shouldbe dispelled. At the same time, the employer should makesure that his employees fully understand all other employeebenefits to which they may be entitled.

Investigate Thrift or Profit-Sharing PlansIf a pension plan is impractical or impossible, there are

other plans wherein an attempt can be made to provide apartial old age income for employees. Such arrangementsas thrift plans, where an employer matches employee con-tributions into a fund which is invested to provide a lumpsum or an annuity upon retirement, are frequently used inlieu of formal pensions. There is also a variety of profit-sharing programs, applicable to a wide range of businessenterprises.

Other Employee BenefitsAnalysis of contracts signed since collective bargaining

on pensions became mandatory discloses that much atten-tion has been given to other "fringe" benefits where pen-sions have not been granted. Such programs as group lifeinsurance, sickness benefits, lump sum severance pay, andhospitalization meet current worker needs and offer theemployer a worthwhile opportunity to demonstrate his con-cern over the welfare of his employees. Since these plans donot create future financial liabilities and are financed on ashort-term basis (usually annually), they permit avoidanceof commitments which might bankrupt the business. Itshould be noted, however, that in terms of employee rela-tions values, a benefit program once begun is extremely dif-ficult to discontinue. For this reason, benefit plans shouldbe established at such a level as the company expects to beable to continue, through bad times as well as good.

Wage AdjustmentA wage adjustment granted in lieu of a pension plan is

a currently popular method of disposing temporarily of atroublesome issue. Such a step should be weighed againstthe possibility that the pension issue may arise again laterwith equal or greater pressure.Some authorities claim that many recently negotiated

pension plans will not cost as much as either company orunion estimated, and fell below the "cents-per-hour pat-tern." The implication is that the pension concession actu-ally costs less than a wage increase. This argument can beanswered only with reference to the facts of the individualcompany. It also ignores the realities of pension costs-that they pyramid over the years and persist during badyears as well as good, whereas the total wage bill tends torespond to business conditions.

Granting a wage increase in lieu of a pension requiresconsideration by the employer of the inclusion in his con-tract of the union's waiver of its right to negotiate on pen-sions for the life of the agreement. Considerable careshould be taken with such a waiver, as noted on Page 5.

9

Page 11: the Pension Problem,cdn.calisphere.org/data/28722/8w/bk0003z8h8w/files/bk... · 2009-02-05 · In the case of Inland, the company negotiated the right to offer to employees a choice

SHOULD I CONTRIBUTE "X" CENTS PERHOUR TO A UNION PENSION FUND, AVOIDFURTHER RESPONSIBILITY AND LETTHE UNION HANDLE THINGS AS

IT SEES FIT?

One of the unfortunate aspects of labor's drive for "se-curity" benefits is that many unions have implied that theycare more for the welfare of employees than does theiremployer. It is particularly easy for a union to promotethis attitude when the union administers the fund and de-termines how it is to be invested. By abdicating responsi-bility through contributions to welfare and pension fundsover which they have no control, employers lose much ofthe human relations values obtainable and continue tobear the responsibility for plan failures.

If benefits are inadequate, or if expected benefits are notforthcoming because of unsound administration, employeeswill normally blame the employer. If funds received fromthe employer are insufficient to maintain the schedule ofbenefits established by the union, it will customarily demandthat the employer finance the deficit rather than reducebenefits.

Having no control over union-managed pension funds,an employer may awake to find that his contributions for"welfare" objectives are being used as a slush fund or evenas a strike fund. Full management or trustee control overpension and welfare funds is a most desirable objective-to insure sound administration, to demonstrate manage-ment's concern and assumption of responsibility and toassure that fund contributions and benefits are not con-sidered as current wages but are being accumulated forspecific future purposes.Where a pension plan involves employer payments to

union representatives (i.e., a union-managed fund) theTaft-Hartley Act requires that employers and employees beequally represented in the administration of the fund, witha provision contained in the agreement for settlement ofdisputes or deadlocks by an impartial third party. It shouldbe noted that where there is no question of payment ofemployer contributions to union representatives for pensionpurposes, there is no legal requirement for joint administra-tion (or the other requirements of Sec. 302 (c) of theTaft-Hartley Act).

SHOULD I FOLLOW WHAT I'M TOLDIS A GENERAL PATTERN-WITH OR

WITHOUT UNION PRESSURE?It has been repeatedly emphasized by pension authorities

that retirement plans should be "tailor-made" to fit therequirements and abilities of each individual company andto meet the desires of employees and company. This is thestrongest and soundest argument against the granting ofany particular "pattern."

Although both employer and employee cannot help beinginfluenced in their pension thinking by nationwide develop-ments in industrial pensions, the pension plan ultimatelyestablished must conform to the facts of the local situationand reflect prevalent points of view. To be successful, anypension plan must be carefully integrated-benefits, eligi-bility requirements, funding arrangements, methods of meet-ing costs and other key provisions must be adjusted to eachother, to the over-all objective of the plan and to the busi-ness which makes it possible. Thus, any so-called "pattern"

-such as $100 per month or 10¢ per hour-must of neces-sity be modified by the other provisions which have to beadopted to make the plan work correctly. In addition, in thesteel industry where much was made of the "pattern" bythe union, the specific provisions vary widely from com-pany to company and the costs to the individual employersdeviate even more widely.

Another disadvantage of following patterns is that inmany cases, a substantially uniform benefit bearing littlerelationship to earnings and service is likely to result. Sucha benefit, of course, does not give extra reward to long andfaithful service and is unfair to the higher skilled individual.Some unions have referred to a "pattern" of 10¢ per

hour as a minimum basis for discussion of employer con-tributions. On the assumption that $100 per month pen-sions will cost less than 10¢ per hour, some unions havedemanded whatever benefits can be purchased at that fig-ure. Employees covered by pension agreements that havebeen translated into these terms may be led to believe thatfor every hour they work, 10¢ is being placed in a kittyfor their future benefit.The concept of financing pensions by paying so many

cents per hour tends to erase the distinction between wagesand benefits, and the employer in such a case may face ademand in the future to discontinue such contributions andallocate the 10¢ to current wages or even to distributepreviously accumulated 10¢ allocations even though theymay be needed to finance the few pensions actually com-menced prior to discontinuance of the plan. The possibilityof such demand exists because union representatives maycontinue to think of the plan as a series of 10¢ depositsearmarked for individual employees rather than thinking ofit as a mutual insurance fund with the contributions goingto the benefit of those who draw pensions.As indicated previously, 10¢ per hour (for example) will

yield widely differing benefits from company to company,owing to differences in employee age, length of service,other eligibility requirements, interest earning rates, etc.Despite this, many unions cite pension gains in terms ofcents per hour both for membership consumption and forpurposes of comparison with gains made by other organi-zations. The prudent employer will be adequately preparedin advance for discussion on this point.

SUPPOSE THE UNION PRESENTSME WITH A PACKAGE?

A substantial number of employers have been presentedwith a "package" of welfare demands-pensions, group in-surance, hospitalization, medical expense, and other em-ployee benefits. Often the union has stated that these de-mands could be defrayed by an employer contribution ofso many cents per hour per employee and has insisted uponemployer acceptance of a complete union-sponsored bene-fit program. The employer should insist on reviewing thedetails supporting such a package and preferably have themreviewed by one or more qualified experts.

Experience has demonstrated that no over-all approachis practical which ignores company financial status and em-ployee needs. Each separate plan should be flexible enoughso that changes which may be necessary in one plan wouldnot involve changes in other elements of the program.It is possible that the need for correction of an unsoundfeature in one plan might open up the whole program torenegotiation. A package plan on a compulsory basis mightbe unacceptable to many employees who may not desire

10

Page 12: the Pension Problem,cdn.calisphere.org/data/28722/8w/bk0003z8h8w/files/bk... · 2009-02-05 · In the case of Inland, the company negotiated the right to offer to employees a choice

the coverage provided or who may have made private pro-visions which are more desirable.

Sound administration of a benefit program requires thateach plan stand on its own feet financially. Since hospitali-zation, group insurance, and the like are benefit plans whichdo not require any long-term financial commitments, theyare usually reviewed with the carrier annually. If an em-ployer has agreed to contribute a specific sum toward thepurchase of a complete package, increases in the costs ofcoverage under the various short-range plans might con-ceivably reduce the amount available for pension contribu-tions. Similarly, the union may insist that employer savingsunder one plan be applied to the liberalization of the others.

If an employer has decided that there is money availablefor a benefit program, the basic question he must face is:how much is available and what can be done with it? Ifmanagement has the answer to this question in advance ofdiscussions with the union, it becomes easier to illustratejust how far the available money will go in buying thepackage that the union requests. In such a case, it may bepossible to demonstrate that it would be preferable to omitany item which provides a wholly inadequate benefit andutilize available funds to provide adequate benefits withrespect to such items as are finally included in the package,rather than to deal inadequately with certain items becauseof lack of funds.

It is the experience of companies which have adminis-tered benefit programs for years that such benefits are nota substitute in the eyes of the employees for maintainingwage levels and working conditions at least on a par withthose of competitive or surrounding employers. Conse-quently, the employer should weigh carefully what portionof funds available for compensation should be used tofinance benefits and what portion should go into more di-rect wage payments.

SHOULD I WAIT UNTIL THE UNIONASKS FOR A PLAN?

Most employers who have had some experience withpensions feel that the time to consider whether or not apension is feasible or practicable for a company is wellbefore the union raises the question. They agree that con-sideration of pension questions should be made in anatmosphere free from pressure, with sufficient time andinformation to avoid jumping to unsound conclusions. Ifthe employer's decision is that he cannot afford a plan, heis thus well prepared to resist union demands with facts andfigures and is better able to inform his employees of thetrue situation.No employer is justified in establishing or agreeing to a

pension plan unless he believes it is a sound business propo-sition. If, however, investigation has disclosed that a pensionwould be possible and practicable, an employer may wellconsider the advantages of voluntarily working out a planin advance of union requests. Of course, such a procedurewould involve consultation with the union (if any) in ad-vance of establishing the plan, after which the employer'saction would be conditioned by the conclusions reachedduring that discussion. The employer would be well advisedto open discussions in such a situation only on a basiswhich he would be prepared to extend to non-bargainingunit employees. The advantages of establishing a company-initiated pension program are held to be:

1. The employer gets the credit for his demonstrated

interest in his employees' welfare. Although the em-ployer bears the lion's share of the cost, he losesmuch of the employee relations value of pensionswhen he is put in the position of being forced bythe union to adopt a plan.

2. In many cases, the longer the employer waits, themore the plan will cost him. This applies becausehis group ages while he waits-there is less time inwhich to accumulate the required funds for a pen-sion of a given number of dollars per month.

3. If the employer has established a reasonable pension,he may be able to keep many of the troublesome"issues" (such as employee contributions, eligibilityrequirements, vesting, joint administration, methodof funding, etc.), from the bargaining table, thuspreserving the flexibility he needs for successfuloperation of the plan.

4. The employer is in a better position to solve themany complex legal, tax and actuarial problemsthan if forced to consider them under the pressureof bargaining.

5. A sound and thoughtful approach by the employermay release much of the union pressure upon em-ployees-the presence of a program adapted to thecapacity of the company and the needs of the em-ployees can be a strong antidote to unreasonableunion demands.

It should not be construed that this document urgesall employers to rush into pension plans merely to antici-pate union demands or to accede to popular pressures. It ismerely suggested that e~ach employer give weight to theseconsiderations in shaping his policy on pensions so that hisposition is taken in full view of the facts and probabilitieswhich may apply, including the advantages flowing fromthe establishment of pensions before they become an issuein collective bargaining.

It is worthy of note that some unions are very well pre-pared for bargaining on welfare issues, often being accom-panied by an expert in the field. Some unions, such asUAW-CIO, have prepared minimum standards to whicheach pension plan negotiated by a local union must con-form. That union also maintains a social security depart-ment and assigns pension specialists to its various regionaloffices. Months have been spent by the union in acquiringpertinent data on the individual company, in preparing costestimates of a variety of proposals and in stimulating mem-bership interest. The employer who is not at least equallyprepared may subject himself to an overwhelming barrageof statistics, contentions and pressures which he may notbe able to refute.

Mr. F. W. Climer, Vice-president in charge of IndustrialRelations for the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company, inaddressing a recent pension forum of the United StatesChamber of Commerce, made the following comments withreference to pension negotiations: "In conclusion I wouldlike to say for those who have not yet been through pen-sion negotiations, but who are faced with that unpleasanttask, three things which I believe to be of utmost impor-tance. One, before you start negotiations, be well preparedwith the best actuarial figures on your own situation thatyou can possibly get. Two, when you have concluded youragreement be sure it is well drafted. It's a very difficult jobto put down in a contract the proper words to cover justwhat you agree to. This is important, of course, in any

11

Page 13: the Pension Problem,cdn.calisphere.org/data/28722/8w/bk0003z8h8w/files/bk... · 2009-02-05 · In the case of Inland, the company negotiated the right to offer to employees a choice

agreement, but these pension agreements may last in theirfundamentals for many years. There are many ramifica-tions, and the wording should be clear, concise, and diffi-cult of any other than the intended interpretation. Third,much has been said about the effect on our overall economyof this pension movement. I don't profess to know toomuch about that part of the problem, but I am sure thatno company should put into effect a pension plan unlessit is well thought out, and unless it has as many financialsafeguards as possible. It should be one that meets thespecific need of the company and its employees rather thanfollowing some pattern set by someone else."

WHAT HAVE OTHER COMPANIES GIVEN?

During his tentative consideration of pensions, the em-ployer should gather information on local area and com-munity practice with respect to retirement benefits. Manylocal employers' associations have made excellent and de-tailed surveys of community practice with reference toexisting pension programs. Not only should he study thepossible demands his union may make, and their cost andproblems as related to his company, but, also, he shouldexamine what that union has gained from others, particu-larly those companies in the employer's industry.

Plans granted by an employer's competitors should bescrutinized carefully so that their effect on labor costs andmarket prices may be judged. Often a study of a com-petitor's pension bargaining history may be of value indetermining whether or not a pension would produce anunhealthy effect on labor costs and his ability to remainin business during slack times. It is repeated, however, thatanother company's pension plan should not be adoptedwithout careful consideration of its application to the cir-cumstances of the specific company.

WHAT ARE THE PENSION OBJECTIVESOF VARIOUS UNIONS?

Organized labor's pension proposals have had a double-barreled purpose. As noted previously, many labor organi-zations have found it necessary to emulate the achievementsof such pacesetters as John L. Lewis. In addition, however,as the more pressing problems of seniority, wages, grievanceprocedures, and the like have been settled, unions haveturned attention to pensions, insurance, guaranteed wagesand other formalized measures for employee security.

Organized labor's second purpose has been to secure sup-port for liberalization of the federal Social Security lawsso that the eventual retirement income of union memberswould devolve from two principal sources-the federal gov-ernment and the employer.With respect to private negotiated pension plans, there

is considerable difference in the attitude of leading labororganizations. Even within one particular internationalunion, demands may vary and settlements made by thevarious locals often differ from the basic program favoredby the international. AFL, in general, stresses the need forhigher public pension benefits and, except in isolated cases,has put little pressure upon employers for negotiated plans.The international unions of the CIO, however, have con-tributed most to the developing pressure for private plans.In general, CIO's objectives are the following:

1. Flat benefits bearing no relationship to earnings orservice

Each employee receives roughly the same benefit(for example, $100 a month, including Social Se-curity) under many of the settlements negotiated inlate 1949 and early 1950. Under these agreements,the employer was able to deduct the employees'primary Social Security benefit. In view of the liber-alization of federal benefits, most companies thatnegotiated such agreements will spend less moneythan originally predicted. Thus, it is expected thatmany unions will demand fixed company contribu-tions (expressed in terms of so many cents per hour)so that the deduction of Social Security benefits wouldhave less effect on the employers' cost. This was anissue in the long Chrysler strike and was granted inthe agreement made by General Motors. Others areexpected to insist that employer savings under SocialSecurity liberalization be applied to the purchase ofadditional benefits. Although $100 per month includ-ing Social Security has been a conventional pensionsettlement, much evidence exists to indicate an up-ward revision in union demands. For example, oneprominent union leader has been quoted as saying,"Brick by brick we are laying the foundations untilour pension plan represents a return of $200 amonth. Give us ten years and we'll reach that goal."'

2. Employer contributionsAlthough many agreements continue to be signedwhich provide for joint contributions of employerand employee, the general objective of most CIOunions is that the employer alone should bear thetotal cost of employee pensions. However, manyplans negotiated with AFL unions and some withCIO unions have incorporated employee contribu-tions.

3. Joint administrationAlthough some settlements provide for joint adminis-tration of eligibility requirements and other ques-tions in connection with day-to-day administration ofthe pension plan, there have been few agreementswhich give the union joint control with the companyover pension funds. However, unions are expectedto press for joint administration of the whole pensionprogram on the ground that the money which theemployer has contributed is part of the wages of theemployee and therefore he should have some voicein its management. Both AFL and CIO unions havepressed for joint or even tripartite administrationand one AFL union, (the IBEW) has stated in itsjournal, ". . . but it seems to us that the best plansas far as organized labor is concerned are those paidjointly and administered by the unions."2 However,administration of pension funds to which firms withIBEW contracts contribute jointly with employeesis on a tripartite basis.Employers should make every effort to assure thatif joint administration is conceded, the union's par-ticipation in the administration of the plan does notdestroy its soundness. In many cases, sharing theadministrative responsibility has developed into ef-fective union control owing to a lack of interest onthe part of the employer.

'Monthly Letter on Economic Conditions, Government Finance, Na-tional City Bank of New York, May 1950, page 56.

2 Business Week, November 5, 1949, quoting November 1949 issue ofThe Electrical Workers' Journal.

12

Page 14: the Pension Problem,cdn.calisphere.org/data/28722/8w/bk0003z8h8w/files/bk... · 2009-02-05 · In the case of Inland, the company negotiated the right to offer to employees a choice

4. Full vestingUnions have sought vesting arrangements wherebythe employee receives all of the pension credits builtup in his behalf in the event he decides to leave thecompany after reaching some minimum length ofservice or age. This has not been granted in any im-portant negotiated settlements although it is quitecommon in many plans established before the eraof mandatory bargaining. The pressure for full vest-ing is also behind union proposals for industry-wideor area-wide pension programs (such as the ToledoPlan) since the employee could carry his accumu-lated pension rights with him from company to com-pany. For example, an area-wide pension programrecently agreed to by UAW-CIO and the AutomotiveTool and Die Association in the Detroit area coversabout 4000 employees in 70 tool and die shops. Thisplan establishes a common trust fund thus permit-ting employees to move from plant to plant but toretain pension rights. It is reported that employercontributions to the fund will amount to 8¢ perhour which is expected to yield benefits of $100 permonth, including Social Security.'

' 5. No mandatory retirement ageOne of the advantages of a pension plan from theemployer's point of view is that it provides for sys-tematic, non-discriminatory retirement at a fixed age(usually 65). In general, unions oppose this featureand desire optional retirement with additional pen-sion credits accumulating after age 65.2

1 6. CoverageExcept in the coal-mining industry, there has beenno serious pressure for coverage of union membersonly, up to this point. However, current demands forthe union shop are a possible prelude to demands torestrict benefits to union members only. Under theTaft-Hartley Law, limitation of pension benefits tounion members only would probably be consideredan unfair labor practice although in the absence ofcourt or NLRB decisions no positive conclusion ispossible.

Until recently, the central critical issue in bargaining hasbeen the size and terms of benefit payments. However, re-cent negotiations indicate that the emphasis has shifted frombargaining benefits to bargaining costs-the employer hasbeen faced with the demand to allocate a specific number ofcents per hour to whatever benefit that contribution wouldbuy. This is consistent with the theory that once a pensionplan has been negotiated, the union will seek broadeningand liberalization of its provisions. It has been pointed outby some employers that bargaining on the basis of costs isan approach which appears to accept the deferred wagetheory of pensions and tends to smother the real problemwhich both the employer and the union should face-theretirement needs of the employees involved, the best way tomeet these needs, and an equitable basis for meeting thecost.

Certain authorities feel that current union pension de-mands are a phenomenon which will fade in time to lessersignificance. This theory is based on anticipated strongermembership pressure for current benefits, the unsoundnessof many recently negotiated plans, the bitter disappoint-1 For further discussion of vesting, see page 18.- For further discussion of retirement age, see pages 15-16.

ments to employees when their pension promises are not ful-filled and the expectation that expanded federal benefits willprovide subsistence pensions while not tying employees toone company for life.

WHO SHOULD BE COVERED?

One of the major decisions to be made in pension plan-ning is the extent of coverage which the plan should have.Recently negotiated plans have applied, almost without ex-ception, to those in the bargaining unit only. In some ofthese cases, employers have developed similar coverage forsupervisory, white collar and executive personnel. Manyprograms provide for additional supplementary coverageavailable to those earning above a certain salary minimum.

It may be observed that from a management point ofview, the objective of a pension plan is not solely to grantbenefits. As previously noted the pension plan is basicallya device to maintain and increase productivity. Therefore, adegree of coverage should be sought which promises thegreatest return in terms of reduced cost, turnover reduction,enhancement of employee morale and increased opportuni-ties for advancement.Some employers feel that separate plans should be de-

veloped for each major employee group so that changes inthose plans subject to collective bargaining would not alterthe application of the program to the other employees. Thisapproach is advocated by many who point out that benefitneeds vary from group to group and the employer may havedifferent objectives in each case. On the other hand, it ispointed out that employees often move from one group toanother, e.g., wage earner to supervisor, and vice versa,and therefore it is better to frame the general plan so that itcovers employees without regard to the particular group inwhich they may be included at any specific time. In com-panies where differing plans are contemplated for variousemployee groups, the employer should review Treasury De-partment regulations so that discriminatory practices are notadopted which would result in denying tax exemption tocompany contributions. There are many employers, how-ever, who feel that the desirability of a single company planis indicated by considerations of sound financing, of de-termiming Treasury Department approval and of equitableand uniform treatment of all employees.Where an employer deals with more than one bargaining

unit, it may be extremely difficult to obtain a uniform pen-sion program covering all employees.

WHAT ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTSSHOULD BE CONSIDERED?

In addition to making a decision on which groups of em-ployees should be covered, an employer must consider whatrequirements are to be imposed for entrance into the plan,what conditions will be necessary for continued participa-tion and under what conditions benefits will be paid.

Entrance eligibility has been circumscribed by exclusionsincorporated in many plans to reduce costs, to promote ad-ministrative simplicity and so that a more stable plan couldbe developed. In general, the most successful plans havebeen those which have included permanent personnel only.This is usually accomplished by establishing a minimumservice requirement-such as two years. Some plans haveestablished minimum and maximum age restrictions on en-trance age to reduce the record-keeping and other costs due

13

Page 15: the Pension Problem,cdn.calisphere.org/data/28722/8w/bk0003z8h8w/files/bk... · 2009-02-05 · In the case of Inland, the company negotiated the right to offer to employees a choice

to turnover among younger employees, and in the case ofthose who enter the company at an advanced age, to ex-clude from the operation of the pension plan those who canbest be taken care of on some individual basis. It should benoted that to exclude older employees with long service ac-tually would defeat several objectives of the pension planunless other provision for them is made.

Other exclusions based on type of work performed, sexand minimum salary have been incorporated for cost re-duction purposes. However, such limitations must be viewedin the light of Treasury Department regulations which donot permit tax relief where certain discriminatory practicesexist. Furthermore, the broader the participation, the bettera pension plan is likely to fulfill its basic purpose.Some long-established, non-contributory trusteed plans

have no entrance eligibility requirements so as to reduceadministrative problems and costs. In such cases, a require-ment of minimum service to qualify for a pension is cus-tomarily imposed.

Continuance of participation in the plan is modified byrequirements imposed with respect to layoffs, strikes, per-manent disability, leaves of absence and discharge. Each ofthese situations should be explored and clarified by the em-ployer so that the possibility of misunderstandings and dis-putes is minimized. He will also find it advisable to arriveat a clear definition of how service accumulates for pen-sion purposes and to maintain the necessary service recordsso that there will be no difficulty when an employee be-comes eligible to retire.

Eligibility for benefits upon retirement is usually a majorpoint in union demands. Most recent agreements providingsubstantially flat pension benefits specify that a base pensionwill accrue to an employee at age 65 with 25 years of serv-ice, with a lesser amount payable to those with fewer years'service. Since the most desirable results are obtained froma plan which relates benefits to years of service and earn-ings, the employer may wish to adopt a benefit formulawhich provides additional benefits for additional years ofservice or for higher earnings.

WHAT COMPLICATIONS MAY RESULT FROMMILITARY LEAVES OF ABSENCE?

In view of recent international developments, the effecton pension planning of partial or total mobilization requiresparticular consideration. Employers should anticipate thefollowing problems in connection with individuals whovolunteer for military service or who are called to activeduty through the Selective Service system or activation ofreserve and National Guard units:

1. Is the period in service to be counted toward fulfill-ing eligibility requirements-both for membership inthe plan and for computation of the period neces-sary to qualify for benefits?

2. Is the employer required to continue contributionsduring the period of military service?

3. In a contributory plan, will the employee be requiredto continue his contributions during the period ofservice?

4. If the plan includes expedited maturity (early retire-ment) for disability benefits, does it apply in theevent of (a) disability incurred off the job; (b) inthe event of service-connected disability?

Employers with negotiated pension plans should make

certain that the intent of the parties is carefully spelled outin advance of possible large-scale mobilization. Employerswith unilaterally established plans may desire to provide forthese contingencies, both to avoid administrative and finan-cial complications and to be able to advise the veteran ofhis status prior to entry into military service.

Similar consideration is necessary when leaves of absenceare granted for other reasons, for example: leaves grantedunder contract provisions to union officers; leaves for per-sonal reasons; sick and maternity leaves; leaves granted toveterans to study under provisions of the GI Bill of Rights.The provisions of the Selective Service Act should be

reviewed in making provision for employee obligations andbenefits in case of military leave.

WHO SHOULD CONTRIBUTE?

The question whether employees should contribute to em-ployee pensions has been the most controversial issue in re-cent pension negotiations. In general, the arguments infavor of employee contributions are:

1. Employee contributions provide greater benefits be-cause of the limit to the fixed commitments thatmanagement can make. If the employer has absorbedall past service costs, employee contributions aresometimes necessary to assure adequate financing ofcurrent and future service.

2. To the extent that pensions result from employeecontributions, they are clearly not a gift. To theextent that participation in a contributory program isvoluntary, as it frequently is, charges of companypaternalism lose their force.

3. The employee has a greater interest in the programwhen he helps to support it and has a better under-standing of the nature and source of benefits. He isdeemed less likely to press for unrealistic increasesin benefits if he has to help support those increases.

4. The relationship of higher earnings to greater bene-fits acts as an incentive to increased effort. In a con-tributory plan where pensions bear some direct rela-tionship to size of earnings, a pay increase meansthat the employee will also be eligible for a higherpension.

5. In many cases, the employer can hardly be expectedto meet the higher costs of a pension plan with vest-ing provisions unless the employees help to meet thecost.

Unions have been successful in negotiating many non-contributory plans because of the assistance- given theirposition by the recommendations of the Steel IndustryBoard. It was also contended by the unions that since pen-sions were a form of wages, the employees should not beexpected to contribute additionally. Further argumentsagainst employee contributions have been:

1. Under contributory plans, employees must pay outof income which has been taxed, whereas the em-ployer's contribution is usually tax exempt. The em-ployer's dollar contributed to a pension fund willbuy a dollar's worth of benefits. The same dollarpaid in wages to the employee and then contributedby him to the pension plan is subject to income taxand will therefore purchase less in benefits.

2. A non-contributory plan usually involves automatic

14

Page 16: the Pension Problem,cdn.calisphere.org/data/28722/8w/bk0003z8h8w/files/bk... · 2009-02-05 · In the case of Inland, the company negotiated the right to offer to employees a choice

participation by all employees which results in groupeconomies and lower administrative costs. Coverageof all employees results in making pensions availableto those who are considered to need them most.

3. Necessary changes in the plan are easier to makebecause employee money is not involved. (This doesnot, however, affect the obligation to bargain.)

4. Contributory plans may involve problems in con-nection with the return of employee contributions inthe event of layoffs or other temporary absencesfrom work, and in case of termination of employ-ment.

In studying this question, employers should develop al-ternative cost estimates based on each approach-contribu-tory or non-contributory. In many medium and small sizeconcerns, it may be that employee contributions will makethe difference between the company's ability to have a real-istic pension or none at all. In other cases, however, em-ployers who may wish to retain as complete a degree ofcontrol over the plan as possible may find it desirable todevelop a non-contributory program.

WHY HAVE MANY PENSION PLANS FAILED?

Financial collapse is a type of pension plan failure whichcauses the greatest degree of worry among company execu-tives. However, there are other ways in which a plan mayfail to fulfill the purpose for which it was originally in-tended.

Emoloyees will judge the success or failure of a plan bythe adequacy and certainty of benefits actually paid afterretirement. The adjustment of plan provisions to the fluc-tuations in living costs is a problem which today is beingfaced by many companies that established plans prior towartime inflation and the subsequent depreciation in valueof the dollar. Some employers have found it necessary tosupplement benefits under their existing retirement programsin order to maintain employee interest in their current pen-sion plan.Many plans established on an inadequately funded basis

have failed when the company has been faced with badbusiness conditions over a period of years. Pension costs canbe covered satisfactorily only by regular payments, actu-arially determined over the years and applying to both goodtimes and bad. Many unfunded or pay-as-you-go arrange-ments thus failed during the depression because no advanceprovision was made to accumulate the necessary funds todischarge the pension liability as it developed.

WHAT ARE AN EMPLOYER'S PASTSERVICE PROBLEMS?

There are two types of pension liability which must beconsidered in pension financing. One involves an employee'syears of service before the plan was established (past serv-ice liability) -the other involves current and future servicewhich will accrue. Therefore, in approaching the financingof a plan, a decision will have to be made on whether or nota past service commitment will be made and, if so, whatprovisions will be made to defray that cost. It will alsobe necessary to select the most suitable and systematicmethod of accumulating employer contributions (and em-ployees', if contributory) for current and future service sothat money will be available for benefit payments.

Because the assumption of past service liability is apt tobe the most expensive immediate aspect of pension costs,some companies have ignored past service altogether in set-ting up their program and pay only on current and futureservice. Some pension agreements provide for amortizingthe cost of past service over a considerable number of years-for example, ten or more. Ford Motor Company will meetactuarial requirements for future service liability but hasadopted a level method of funding past service over a periodof not more than 30 years. U. S. Steel has indicated that itwill pay only the interest on its past service liability, esti-mated by the company to have been one billion on the daythe plan was established. Still others limit the amount ofpast service liability by paying only for years of service be-yond a specified date or age. Almost without exception, em-ployers bear the entire cost of whatever pension is based onpast service credits.

If it is desired to recognize past service, and amortize itscost over a number of years, the employer should give con-sideration to possible bad years in which he may not beable to meet these payments.The determination of the period over which funding for

past service takes place should be determined in the light ofapplicable Bureau of Internal Revenue provisions, in orderto make sure that the funds then set aside are consideredtax exempt.

SHOULD RETIREMENT BE COMPULSORY?If option of delaying retirement is provided under a pen-

sion plan, the employer is apt to lose one of a plan's prin-cipal benefits-that of providing an orderly and non-dis-criminatory method of retiring aged and presumably lessefficient personnel. However, in cases where deferred re-tirement is provided under negotiated plans, the employermay attempt to secure the right to retire those employeeswho have reached a specified age but who fail to live up toproduction standards.

In some cases, deferred retirement may lower pensioncosts to the employer since he may have a longer period inwhich to pay for the benefits. It may be advisable to permitemployees to continue to work so that additional creditscan be built up, especially if the plan does not recognizepast service in determining eligibility for benefits. However,this advantage should be carefully weighed against increasedcosts of keeping employees of declining efficiency on thejob and also against the possible effect on the morale of thewhole organization of not opening up promotion channelsfor well-trained younger employees.

Early retirement at lower benefits is provided in manyplans. However, as in the case of deferred retirement, theemployer should prepare adequate cost estimates in advanceso that the effect of such arrangements on plan cost can bepredicted. It is necessary, also, to seek for uniform adminis-tration and to provide in advance for contingencies whichmay increase cost.As noted elsewhere, unions seek non-compulsory retire-

ment. Many employers suggest that the company retain fullcontrol over both deferred and early retirement so that effi-ciency and administration are not adversely affected.

It has been suggested that both from the viewpoint of theemployee himself and from the viewpoint of society, indus-try may have to change its views concerning the wisdom ofretiring employees at age 65. The social gain which may beachieved by continuation in productive work of those phy-sically and mentally capable of adding to the gross national

15

Page 17: the Pension Problem,cdn.calisphere.org/data/28722/8w/bk0003z8h8w/files/bk... · 2009-02-05 · In the case of Inland, the company negotiated the right to offer to employees a choice

product may hold increasing significance in the future whenthe costs of programs established today begin to reach theirpeak.

Another factor which must be considered from the view-point of the employee himself is the factor that a com-pulsory retirement age established well in advance permitsdefinite planning for retirement by the employee, permitsthe employee to retire without apologies and without mak-ing excuses or explanations and avoiding any implicationsof physical and mental deterioration, and also provides aperiod during which the employee may enjoy his leisure ordevelop pursuits requiring a slower pace than the demand-ing requirements of an industrial job.

SHOULD A PLAN BE FULLY FUNDED,PARTIALLY FUNDED, OR

PAY-AS-YOU-GO?

Once a pension plan has been established, it becomesnecessary to plan for the eventual payment of benefits tobeneficiaries. Although the type of plan established usuallydetermines how the benefits will be financed, there is con-siderable question over the soundest and most appropriateway to accumulate funds for benefit payments.A pay-as-you-go plan is one in which benefits are paid

as they become due out of current company earnings-noadvance funding of either past or future service credits isundertaken. A partially funded plan is one in which a fundis accumulated to cover future service liability only, noprovision being made for past service in advance. A fullyfunded plan is one in which all liabilities are calculated inadvance, the funds to discharge these liabilities are accu-mulated as they are incurred, and are invested securely forpurposes of guaranteeing payment of benefits.

In an attempt to get their foot in the pension door, manyunions have negotiated pension arrangements which haveallowed the employer wide latitude in the method of financ-ing. For example, under the Bethlehem type of plan-some-times called "terminal funding" or "emerging cost"-thecompany is not required to fully fund each employee's pen-sion until the date pension payments begin, at which timethe company purchases an annuity which guarantees thatparticular individual a pension for the balance of his life.U. S. Steel's approach was to fund future service credits asthey become due but to pay only the interest on its pastservice liability. The interest alone is estimated to be ap-proximately 25 million dollars per year. Some companieswill find the cost of such arrangements just as unbearableas full funding at the beginning of the plan or systematicamortization over the years. For these reasons, the ad-vantages and disadvantages of each are briefly summarizedbelow.Many employers are attracted to pay-as-you-go plans be-

cause they are cheaper in the beginning. While earnings aregood, pension liabilities can be met as they arise. However,if business becomes slack, the question of ability to continueto meet pension promises must be faced. In addition, underany pension plan, costs are bound to increase over theyears, roughly until the number of pensioners dying bal-ances new additions to the rolls, and the employer may findthat concurrent earnings will not support the benefit pay-ments he must make in the future. Funding a plan is re-garded as more secure both from the employer's viewpointas well as the employee's, and has the additional advantageof spreading company contributions over a longer period

of time. The employee has the assurance that the pensionpromise will be kept and the employer is more likely toavoid catastrophic costs when a large number of pensionsbecome payable-and business may be bad.Another advantage cited by employers for funded plans is

that they afford security for employee contributions. A fur-ther advantage is found in the fact that interest earning onthe accumulated funds serves to reduce costs over a periodof years. It is worthy of note that Treasury Departmentregulations extend the greatest tax relief benefits to fundedplans. Under pay-as-you-go plans, only the employer's ac-tual pension payments on an annual basis are allowed tobe deducted from taxes. Thus, interest earnings and tax ad-vantages serve to make a funded plan cheaper than an un-funded plan on a long term basis.The proponents of fully funded plans cite the failure of

many pay-as-you-go plans during the depression when com-pany earnings were not sufficient to meet the pension prom-ises which these plans had made. A more recent example-the depletion of the UMW Health and Welfare Fund-indi-cates that benefit levels must be related realistically to in-come even where a substantial income is available for pay-ment of benefits.Whether or not the employer should fully fund, partially

fund, or adopt a pay-as-you-go practice will depend partlyon the type of plan he selects, the probable stability of thecompany, and the nature of the commitment he is able tomake. Such decisions should be made in most cases onlyafter full exploration with competent professional pensionexperts.

WHAT PRINCIPAL FINANCINGARRANGEMENTS ARE AVAILABLE?

The type of plan usually determines the financing vehicleand is also influenced by regulations of the state insurancedepartment, the Internal Revenue Code, arrangements of-fered by the carriers available, etc. The various types listedbelow are flexible enough so that various combinations ofdesirable factors of each may be made. The majority ofpension plans is financed under one of the following ar-rangements.

The Group Annuity Plan

This arrangement is offered by insurance companies usu-ally under the terms of a master contract negotiated be-tween the carrier and the employer. One form of this planprovides for the purchase of a unit of single-premium, de-ferred annuity for each year each employee is covered bythe plan. This produces a deferred annuity beginning at aprescribed retirement age, the payment of which is guar-anteed by the insurance company. The individual pensionis purchased by the sum total of annual purchases. Thisplan is readily adaptable to the "money purchase" formula.It should be noted that insured plans usually require fullfunding of the pension before payments begin.

1. This plan is flexible in that contributions can beautomatically adjusted for changes in employee in-come. Further advantages are a high degree ofsafety, employer relief from responsibility for thefunds, guarantee of benefits and employee confi-dence that the pensions promised will be paid.

2. Disadvantages are that rates and terms with respectto future annuity purchases must be periodicallyrenegotiated with the carrier. The employee cannot

16

Page 18: the Pension Problem,cdn.calisphere.org/data/28722/8w/bk0003z8h8w/files/bk... · 2009-02-05 · In the case of Inland, the company negotiated the right to offer to employees a choice

take over the policy and continue it if he leaves thecompany, although if the plan has vesting provisions,he can under the conditions set up by the plan, takewith him the pension credits accumulated to dateand add them to pension credits earned with lateremployers.

Some insured plans employ the "deposit administration"procedure. Contributions based on actuarial estimates ofprobable pension payments are paid into a fund adminis-tered by an insurance company, interest earnings at a guar-anteed rate for a stipulated period are added to the fund,and an annuity is purchased by assignment of a part of thefund on each employee's retirement date. In this plan, theinsurance company does not undertake to guarantee theultimate payment of specific benefits.

Individual Policy Plan(Sometimes called the insured pension trust plan)

This involves individual contracts issued on each em-ployee's life. A trust is created and the trustee retains pos-session of the policies and holds them until the employeedies, retires or terminates employment. The unit of annu-ity purchased is based on the total benefit to be providedso that the company contracts to buy a pension for the em-ployee by paying an annual level premium for a certainstated period of years. On this basis, the pension is fullyfunded on the date benefit payments begin. The initial costis based on the employee's salary when he enters the plan,and as salaries are changed, it is necessary to adjust thepurchase of contracts to the rates then prevailing. This typeis readily adaptable to small and medium-sized companies.

1. Advantages are guarantee of rates and terms for thelife of each contract, and employee assumption ofthe contract under certain circumstances. Premiumrates are higher for the same benefits than under thegroup annuity plan.

2. Disadvantages are relative inflexibility in adjustingcontributions to changes in income. Premium pay-ments must be continued whether or not employeesare at work. There are heavy cash surrender chargesduring the early years of the policy.

The Trust Fund Plan(Sometimes called self-administered or un-insured)

Funds are deposited in a trust under a trust agreementand are limited usually to certain relatively secure invest-ments, though the company may broaden the type of eli-gible security somewhat if it wishes. Usually the employerhires an actuary to select the appropriate mortality tables,develop the various assumptions and specify the rate of in-terest which should accrue from investment of trust funds.Although a trustee is selected who is charged with invest-ment and administrative duties, the employer is responsiblefor providing the pension promised to employees. In someagreements, however, the employer is specifically excusedfrom making up any pension deficits due to loss of fundsby the trustees. Ford Motor is a case in point. Under thistype of plan, it is possible to avoid full funding of the pen-sion on the day payment of it begins.

1. Advantages are flexible contributions which can begeared to business conditions.

2. Disadvantages are that benefits cannot be guaranteedand the employer assumes his own risk. Legal re-

strictions on the fields in which funds may be in-vested may cause the fund to earn inadequate in-terest income.

3. Unions generally favor trusteed plans because rep-resentation on the board of trustees can be de-manded. Insured plans are regarded as less adaptableto joint administration since most administrativeduties are processed by the carrier as part of its pen-sion service.

WHAT IS THE SOCIAL SECURITY PICTUREAND HOW DOES IT AFFECT ANYPLAN I MAY HAVE OR MAY

BE CONSIDERING?

Many private pension plans have been established on thebasis of the primary benefit available under the federal OldAge and Survivor's Insurance system. Many of the fixedbenefit plans recently developed as the result of collectivebargaining also provide for the deduction from employercost of the entire primary benefit or some fraction of it.Many employers have also established supplementary

plans for those earning in excess of the $3000 wage andtax base upon which Social Security benefits and taxes werebased prior to 1950 amendments to the law. In other cases,private plans have excluded from coverage those earningless than $3000 on the theory that the federal pension pro-vided for that category of employees.The 1950 amendments to the Social Security Act contain

several provisions which may require adjustments in privatepension plans. The most important are:

1. Increase in the wage and tax base from $3000to $3600Private plans correlated with the $3000 wage basemay have to be reexamined, especially those planswhich provide varying scales of benefits and con-tributions on the different subdivisions of an individ-ual's earnings. It should also be noted that employertax payments on behalf of employees who earn inexcess of $3000 per year will have to be increased.thus affecting the amount of money available forother employee benefits. In addition, the employer isfaced with a conflict between the higher federal taxand wage base and the $3000 figure upon whichstate unemployment compensation taxes are based.

2. Increase in the benefit formulaThe new benefit formula is 50% of the first $100of average monthly wages, plus 15% of the next$200. Thus, higher benefits will result, both fromthe higher formula and from the fact that the grossamount of average wages to which the formula canapply is $50 per month greater. Benefits to thosenow retired will be increased about 77½2% on theaverage and benefits payable to those retiring in thefuture will be approximately doubled. There is noincrement for years of service. The minimum pri-mary benefit has been increased to $20, the maxi-mum to $80 and maximum family benefits to $150-per month.

3. Higher tax scheduleUnder the amended law, the tax rate for both em-ployer and employee will remain at 1½ %D each

17

Page 19: the Pension Problem,cdn.calisphere.org/data/28722/8w/bk0003z8h8w/files/bk... · 2009-02-05 · In the case of Inland, the company negotiated the right to offer to employees a choice

until January 1, 1954. Then the rate will rise to 2%each, to 2½% in 1960, to 3% in 1965 and to3¼ % each in 1970. This is an item of cost whichthe employer must consider in deciding how muchmoney is available for private pensions; it also mustbe examined from the viewpoint of the employeeparticipating in a contributory plan. Cost consider-ations also take a new light in view of the increasein the wage and tax base to $3600.

VESTING-WHAT DOES IT MEAN ANDWHAT DOES IT COST?

Vesting means the granting to an employee of a perma-nent, irrevocable right prior to retirement to some part orall of the money contributed by the company toward hiseventual pension. Practically every contributory retirementplan provides for return of the employee's contributionsusually with some interest and sometimes subject to a sur.render charge, under stated conditions.

In the past, vesting arrangements have been included inpension plans both as an added inducement to youngeremployees, especially- in contributory plans and to demon-strate the sincerity of the company's motives. Lately, vest-ing has been sought on the ground that employees shouldnot lose accumulated retirement credits if they desire tochange employment.

Vesting is usually in some form of guaranteed benefit andmay apply in three circumstances: at termination of em-ployment; on withdrawal from a voluntary plan; or death,in which case settlement is made with the designated bene-ficiary. Some pension specialists point out that cash vestingof the company's contributions should be avoided becauseof substantial increases in costs, because it might induceadditional turnover and because it would tend to defeat oldage security objectives. Cash vesting also may introduceadditional complications in terms of the overtime provisionsof the Wage-Hour Law.'

Occasionally, vesting is permitted after completion of acertain minimum number of years' participation in the plan.However, practically all present vesting arrangements arecharacteristics of plans established outside of collective bar-gaining; no principal negotiated pension agreement containsvesting provisions except those established on a contribu-tory basis.

Since vesting provisions are cost-increasing measures ofconsiderable magnitude where turnover is high, employersshould investigate such proposals carefully. To some extent,vesting runs counter to one objective often sought by em-ployers in pensions-to reduce turnover and help stabilizethe work force. Additional caution should be exercised onthe circumstances under which withdrawal from and re-entry into the plan will be allowed.

WHO SHOULD ADMINISTER THE PLAN?

Pension plans established prior to the requirement to bar-gain collectively very seldom provide for other than com-plete company control of eligibility provisions, financing,and other elements of the plan. However, many unions havesought joint or tripartite administration and are expected tocontinue to press for this objective.2 However, some of the

See page 19.2 See discussion of Joint Administration, page 12.

earliest of the negotiated pension plans, such as those incoal mining and the needle trades, leave the entire adminis-tration to the union.

In general, administrative problems are made much moredifficult when management does not exercise full controlbecause the needed degree of flexibility to meet changingconditions does not exist when decisions are shared withemployees. Many employers point out that when the com-pany loses the power to appoint the trustee of the fund orotherwise shares management of the funds, there is littleprotection against use of those funds for other than benefitpurposes.

Sharing the determination of eligibility under the plan isanother way in which over-generous administration mayresult, thus ultimately increasing the cost of the plan.Where joint administration of eligibility requirementsmust be granted, employers suggest that the powers of theadministration committee be defined by the pension agree-ment so that unforeseen liberalization does not occur.Where trustees are established to handle pension funds itmay be advisable to deny them authorization to modifybenefits agreed to during negotiations or to alter eligibilityprerequisites. The authority to do so would be the author-ity to determine over the protests of the employer (as forinstance where increase of benefits is approved by union and'public" representatives in a tripartite board of trustees)for all practical purposes what the employer's future costsfor benefits will be.

Another consideration is the extent to which pensioncomplaints will be subject to the regular grievance procedureof the collective agreement. It would seem prudent to ex-clude pension questions from the regular grievance pro-cedure both because of the complex nature of pensionquestions and because the regular grievance committee-men and company representatives are not equipped todeal with such problems. Some authorities recommendcreation of a special complaint procedure for pensionquestions which would be handled outside the regulargrievance procedure. However, there are some employerswho have agreed to process through the regular grievanceprocedure basic contract disputes over non-medical factualquestions, such as an employee's age, period of employ-ment, rate of earnings for pension calculations, etc., leavingthe strictly medical questions to a specific settlement pro-cedure.Some authorities suggest that the pension plan be estab-

lished as a document separate and distinct from the basiccollective agreement, where one exists, in order to assurethe continuity of the plan beyond the lifetime of the agree-ment and to help provide the stable conditions necessaryfor proper operation and financing of the plan. Other prob-lems in connection with pension negotiation which requireconsideration are: the possible effect on the plan of layoffs,strikes or other cessation of production; bargaining overbroad principles, policy and cost versus bargaining over alldetails. Some employers suggest the limitation of the pen-sion agreement to such basic factors as benefits, eligibilityrequirements, retirement age, rights of beneficiaries, effectof prior service, effective date of the plan and the term ofthe agreement, leaving details for a special pension commit-tee.

Companies with arbitration clauses which apply to wagesmay wish to scrutinize these provisions carefully in orderto guard against the possibility of having to submit pen-sion grievances to arbitration. In the event that it is im-possible to eliminate arbitration, many authorities suggest

18

Page 20: the Pension Problem,cdn.calisphere.org/data/28722/8w/bk0003z8h8w/files/bk... · 2009-02-05 · In the case of Inland, the company negotiated the right to offer to employees a choice

strict limitation in the nature of complaints which may becarried to the arbitrator.

WHO IS INVOLVED IN PENSION PLANNINGBESIDES A COMPANY AND

ITS EMPLOYEES?

Any pension plan is a very complex undertaking. It in-volves numerous legal, tax, labor relations, actuarial, finan-cial, accounting and insurance problems. In addition to thenegotiations which may be necessary with a labor union,an employer is also faced with the possibility of concurrentnegotiations with the Treasury Department officials, stateinsurance department representatives, and insurance and/orbank trustees. The employer involved in negotiations withrespect to bargaining unit employees must also considerwhat steps, if any, he is prepared to take with respect tonon-bargaining unit employees.

Although the corporate by-laws of many companies donot provide for submission of such issues to stockholders, itis a general practice to submit pension proposals to thestockholders for approval in advance of establishing theplan. Since any plan will unavoidably affect the earningsrate of the company and its very future as a continuingenterprise, most employers feel that their stockholders shouldnot only be kept fully informed in these matters, but shouldhave a voice in the final decision.There are several federal and state laws which apply to

pension and profit-sharing funds a-ad the prudent employerwill investigate the implication of these statutes thoroughlyin advance of making any pension commitments. As pre-viously noted,' the Taft-Hartley Act makes collective bar-gaining on pensions mandatory, and it also regulates thetype and control of a pension plan which involves companypayments to employee representatives. Pension plans arealso regulated by a variety of state and federal laws. Thelaws of some states restrict the field for permissible invest-ments of trusteed funds and regulate the duties of directorsand stockholders. The insurance departments of severalstates also exert regulatory authority in the pension field.Employers should not overlook the benefits to be derivedfrom consultation with the administrators of the severalstate and federal agencies involved, before finalizing a pen-sion plan.

Applicable federal laws include not only the Taft-HartleyAct but the Investment Company Act of 1940, varioussections of the Internal Revenue Code, the Fair LaborStandards Act of 1938 as amended, and the regulations ofthe Securities and Exchange Commission and the TreasuryDepartment. Complications in terms of computing the em-ployee's regular rate of pay for overtime purposes underthe Wage-Hour Act may be introduced if the plan providescash vesting, if the employee may receive any of the em-ployer's contribution in lieu of benefits, or if he has the op-tion to assign the benefits which he may receive under theplan. Reference to Wage-Hour Administrator's InterpretiveBulletin, issued January 1950, Part 778, may be advisable.

In 1942, the Internal Revenue Code was amended tomake sure that employers would not be permitted to deductas tax exemptions, contributions to pension trust funds ifthe pension plan contained a variety of discriminatory pro-visions, was adopted as a temporary expedient, was notactuarially sound, or did not provide true retirement bene-fits. However, a plan that the employer contemplates in-

'See page 5.

stalling may be submitted to the Treasury Department forqualification in advance. Employers will find it useful toconsult with local Collectors of Internal Revenue beforesetting up their pension plan.The advice of counsel is strongly urged under these cir-

cumstances.

IF I WANT TO EXPLORE THIS WHOLEPROBLEM, HOW DO I GO ABOUT IT?

Owing to the complexity of most of the issues, problemsand questions in pension planning, an employer should se-cure competent professional advice. Initial exploratory dis-cussions are often possible at no charge through the serv-ices offered by banks, insurance companies and consultantactuaries. In addition, some state, local and trade associa-tions are equipped to discuss the pattern of area, industryand community pension settlements, and, in many cases, areable to suggest qualified consultant actuaries, insurancecompanies, or bank trustee services.

Banks and insurance companies usually render a rathercomplete service in the expectation of securing the pensionbusiness the company has to offer. Consultant actuaries,however, operate on a fee basis which is usually related tothe amount of work involved. In addition, there are manypension consultants, some of whom can be extremely help-ful. In view of the large sums of money involved in pen-sions, the employer should take great care in selecting soundconsultants to assist him in solving so vast and complex aproblem.

MUST I SELL THE PLAN TOMY EMPLOYEES?

The alert management will have communicated fully withits employees prior to the establishment of a pension plan,whether negotiated or not. The necessity for an adequatepre-selling job is indicated by the great amount of misin-formation and lack of facts among employees. This is oftenheightened by lack of knowledge of the company's circum-stances and abilities as applied to a pension plan and is in-fluenced by the great publicity given to pension programswon by strong unions in the various key industries.

Merely because a plan is established by a company doesnot guarantee that employees will understand its benefits orwill regard it as a desirable element of the company's em-ployee relations program. Complete details of an announcedprogram should be explained in plain and simple languageso that each employee is fully informed as to the objectives,advantages and capacities of the program. Where a plan iscontributory, the company will have to spend considerableenergy in merchandising this program, especially where thework force contains a large number of younger individuals.Many companies employ individual interviews with em-

ployees when a plan is established. Such meetings are aidedby movies, film strips, charts, graphs, and other aids to com-municating the facts of the plan, the benefit examples, therelationship of Social Security, eligibility requirements andthe like. Considerable publicity is accorded through thehouse organ, letters to employees, and pension bookletswritten in simple language with plenty of examples in orderto get the pension story across.Even though the plan may have been negotiated with a

union, the company will find it advantageous to accept fullresponsibility for informing its employees. In view of the

19

Page 21: the Pension Problem,cdn.calisphere.org/data/28722/8w/bk0003z8h8w/files/bk... · 2009-02-05 · In the case of Inland, the company negotiated the right to offer to employees a choice

fact that the company pays the major share of the cost ofpensions, it should expect to get the employee relationscredit that will flow therefrom.

In smaller companies an elaborate communication pro-gram may not be necessary but some kind of continuinginformation program is essential for best results.

During the years of employees' participation in the plan,there is considerable necessity for re-selling it because thedetails become vague as employees are unaware of the con-

tinuing cost to the company and because such benefits some-times are taken for granted. Many companies have begunmore intensive communications as the year of retirementapproaches. If the plan contains options which the employeemay exercise, this affords a good opportunity to relate thebenefits of the plan with social security, to answer employeequestions regarding details of the plan and to prepare em-ployees for retirement.

20

Page 22: the Pension Problem,cdn.calisphere.org/data/28722/8w/bk0003z8h8w/files/bk... · 2009-02-05 · In the case of Inland, the company negotiated the right to offer to employees a choice

APPENDIX AANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY ON PENSIONREFERENCES AND SOURCE MATERIAL

COLLECTIVELY BARGAINED PENSION PLANS INNEW YORK STATE, State of New York, Department ofLabor, Publication No. B-40, June 1950. This studyanalyzes 102 collectively bargained pension plans andpresents a discussion of major provisions of collectivelybargained plans in New York State.

GOVERNMENTAL AND VOLUNTARY PROGRAMSFOR SECURITY, J. W. Myers, in Harvard Business Re-view, March 1950. This article is an authoritative studyof the relationship of the federal pension program toprivate pension plans. It includes a recommendation asto a suggested pattern for voluntary plans and severaldetailed examples of suggested method and cost of ac-cumulating the pension in various amounts.

HANDBOOK FOR PENSION PLANNING, published bythe Bureau of National Affairs, Inc., Washington, D. C.,1949. Several outstanding pension consultants and at-torneys have contributed to this work. It discusses tech-nical features in pension planning, tax problems, financ-ing, costs, bargaining and communications. It alsoincludes the texts of several pension plans and a discus-sion of collective bargaining provisions relating to pen-sions.

HANDBOOK ON PENSIONS, Studies in Personnel PolicyNo. 103, National Industrial Conference Board, NewYork, 1950. This document summarizes and brings up todate a great many recent Conference Board reports onpension issues and problems. It discusses types of plans,cost, financing, bargaining, and administration and pre-sents articles by leading pension experts who discuss vari-ous critical issues.

HOW TO PLAN PENSIONS, by Carroll W. Boyce. Pub-lished by McGraw-Hill Book Company, New York, 1950.

This is an excellent reference text for employers who wishto discuss most of the key questions and problems in pen-sion planning. Capable use is made of case examples,tables and other statistical material. It discusses eligibilityrequirements, problems in retirement age, methods offinancing and administration, correlation of social secur-ity with private plans, pension communications, andcollective bargaining problems. It also compares leadingnegotiated settlements and contains the texts of some ofthe outstanding collectively bargained plans of recentmonths.

PENSIONS AND GROUP INSURANCE, by Edwin C.McDonald, One Madison Ave., New York 10, March1950. This pamphlet presents handy estimates of the costsof various pension plans and also discusses several of thebasic issues and problems in pension planning.

STUDYING YOUR POLICY ON PENSIONS, publishedby the Research Institute of America, New York, 1950.This 48-page analysis of pension planning is a condensedversion of the subject matter presented in the ResearchInstitute's 3-volume Labor Coordinator. It discussesproblems in bargaining, social security, employee con-tributions, financing, costs and taxes.

SUCCESSFUL PENSION PLANNING, published byPrentice-Hall, Inc., New York, 1949. This 77-page pam-phlet is available gratis from Central Hanover Bank andTrust Co., New York. It discusses ten basic questionswhich companies have to face in considering whether ornot a retirement program is feasible.

WELFARE PLANS AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING,issued by the Chamber of Commerce of the United States,Washington, D. C., 1950. This document discusses theover-all aspects of collective bargaining on pensions andother union welfare demands.

Recent Publications of the NAM Industrial Relations Division

Human Relations and Efficient Production

Employee Communications for Better Understanding

Case Book: Employee Communications in Action

Compulsory Arbitration

Management Memo # 1-Seniority

Management Memo #2-Preparing to Negotiate

Who's Too Small for a Health Program?

Selected Information Bulletins dealing with the fol-lowing subjects: profit sharing, suggestion plans,the closed shop, employee benefit programs, im-proved supervision, employee handbooks and em-ployment of the physically handicapped and olderworker.

21

Page 23: the Pension Problem,cdn.calisphere.org/data/28722/8w/bk0003z8h8w/files/bk... · 2009-02-05 · In the case of Inland, the company negotiated the right to offer to employees a choice

NAM COMMITTEE ON EMPLOYEE BENEFITSCHAIRMAN

IRA MOSHER, DirectorRussell Harrington Cutlery CompanySouthbridge, Massachusetts

VICE CHAIRMEN

*CLIFFORD F. HAWKER,Vice Pres.-Manufacture

Armstrong Cork CompanyLancaster, Pennsylvania

JOS. A. MOORE, JR., PresidentMoore Dry Dock CompanySan Francisco, California

J. W. MYERS, Mgr., Insurance andSocial Security Department

Standard Oil Company, Inc. (N. J.)New York, N. Y.

THOMAS E. ADAMS, JR., PresidentTote System, Inc.Beatrice, Nebraska

C. S. ANDERSON, PresidentBelle City Malleable Iron CompanyRacine, Wisconsin

A. S. ARMSTRONG,Exec. Vice Pres.

The Cleveland Twist Drill Co.Cleveland, Ohio

A. S. ARONSON, TreasurerNational Dairy Products CorporationNew York, N. Y.

RULON BARON, OwnerBaron Woolen MillsBrigham City, Utah

EMERY S. BEARDSLEY, PresidentDon Baxter, Inc.Glendale, California

ELLIS W. BREWSTER,Pres. & Treas.

Plymouth Cordage CompanyNorth Plymouth, Massachusetts

LESTER I. BROOKS, PresidentBetty Brooks CompanyHuntington Park, California

J. E. BROWN, TreasurerThe Cooper-Bessemer CorporationMount Vernon, Ohio

*ROBERT W. BURGESS,Chief Economist

Western Electric Company,Incorporated

New York, N. Y.

EUGENE CALDWELL, Vice Pres.& Gen. Mgr.

Hyster CompanyPortland, Oregon

*W. G. CAPLES, PresidentInland Steel CompanyChicago, Illinois

SHERWOOD C. CHATFIELD,Asst. Vice Pres. & Personnel Dir.

Bristol-Myers CompanyNew York, N. Y.

JOHNNY G. CHERRY,Vice Pres.-Production

Cherry-Burrell CorporationChicago, Illinois

LYMAN B. COOK, PresidentAcme Staple CompanyCamden, New Jersey

J. W. COREY, PresidentThe Reliance Electric & EngineeringCompany

Cleveland, Ohio

ALFRED D. COURY, ComptrollerBoston Envelope CompanyDedham, Massachusetts

PAUL H. DAVEY, Pres-Treas.Davey Compressor CompanyKent, Ohio

C. T. DEAN, PresidentAmerican Beauty Cover Co.Dallas, Texas

R. E. DERBY, First Vice PresidentConverted Rice, Inc.Houston, Texas

GEORGE L. DRAFFAN, PresidentThe Ohio Brass CompanyMansfield, Ohio

*F. STEELE EARNSHAW,Exec. Vice Pres.

United States Stamping Co.Moundsville, West Virginia

*C. MANTON EDDY, Vice Pres.& Secty.

Connecticut General Life InsuranceCompany

Hartford, Connecticut

NORMAN E. ELSAS, Chairmanof Board

Fulton Bag & Cotton MillsAtlanta, Georgia

J. B. FENNER, TreasurerThe Electric Auto-Lite CompanyToledo, Ohio

JOSEPH C. FILONOWICZ,Vice President

Stamping Service, Inc.Detroit, Michigan

AARON H. FINK, PresidentEssex Paper Box ManufacturingCompany, Inc.

Newark, New Jersey

L. J. FITZPATRICKJ. F. McElwain CompanyNashua, New Hampshire

MARION B. FOLSOM, TreasurerEastman Kodak CompanyRochester, New York

*GEORGE T. FONDA,Asst. to President

Weirton Steel CompanyWeirton, West Virginia

JOSEPH M. FRIEDLANDER,Financial Vice Pres.

Jewel Tea Co., Inc.Barrington, Illinois

ROBERT C. GEFFS, Vice PresidentDomestic Thermostat CompanyLos Angeles, California

JOHN H. GOODWIN, JR.,Secty.-Treas.

Columbus McKinnon ChainCorporation

Tonawanda, New York

*ARTHUR L. GREDE, Vice Pres.Grede Foundries, Inc.Milwaukee, Wisconsin

DAVID C. GRIGGS,Chairman of Board

The Waterbury Farrel Foundry &Machine Co.

Waterbury, Connecticut

EZRA A. HALE, PresidentThe Lawyers Co-operative Publishing

Co.Rochester, New York

*Indicates those Employee Benefit Committee members who are on the Subcommittee on Bargaining on Employee Benefit Programs.

22

Page 24: the Pension Problem,cdn.calisphere.org/data/28722/8w/bk0003z8h8w/files/bk... · 2009-02-05 · In the case of Inland, the company negotiated the right to offer to employees a choice

RODERICK L. HARPER, Exec. VicePres. & Treas.

Harper Electric Furnace CorporationNiagara Falls, New York

A. C. HARRAGIN, ComptrollerLone Star Cement CorporationNew York, N. Y.

W. F. HARRAH, Chairman of BoardNational-Standard CompanyNiles, Michigan

J. A. HARTLEY, PresidentThe Braun CorporationLos Angeles, California

*HUGH R. HAWTHORNE, Pres.Pocahontas Fuel Company, Inc.New York, N. Y.

WARREN J. HELDMAN, PresidentThe Fechheimer Bros. CompanyCincinnati, Ohio

HUGO HEMMERICH, Vice Pres.Berkshire Knitting MillsReading, Pennsylvania

DANIEL H. HICKOK, PresidentThe W. 0. Hickok Mfg. Co.Harrisburg, Pennsylvania

MRS. HARRIET SARGENTHILDRETH, Treas. & GeneralManager

C. G. Sargent's Sons CorporationGraniteville, Massachusetts

W. B. HOLTON, JR., PresidentWalworth CompanyNew York, N. Y.

DAVID CRAWFORD HOUSTON,Director of Industrial Relations

Utah Copper Division KennecottCopper Corporation

Salt Lake City, Utah

HOWARD E. ISHAM, Asst. VicePres. & Asst. Treasurer

United States Steel Corporationof Delaware

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania

G. E. KARLEN, PresidentKarlen Davis CompanyTacoma, Washington

JOHN F. KIDDE, PresidentWalter Kidde & CompanyBelleville, New Jersey

MORRIS KIRSCH, PresidentKirsch's Beverages, Inc.Brooklyn, New York

0. J. LACY, PresidentCalifornia-Western States Life

Insurance CompanySacramento, California

J. H. LAMMERT, Vice PresidentOliver Iron and Steel CorporationPittsburgh, Pennsylvania

H. S. LEWIS, PresidentParish Pressed Steel CompanyReading, Pennsylvania

A. E. LIEBERT, PresidentLogemann Brothers Co.Milwaukee, Wisconsin

E. NOBLES LOWE, SecretaryWest Virginia Pulp & Paper Co.New York, N. Y.

E. JOHN LOWNES, JR., PresidentAmerican Silk Spinning Co.Providence, Rhode Island

L. L. LYON, Vice Pres.-Ind. Rel.Clark Equipment CompanyBuchanan, Michigan

ROBERT E. MacNEAL, PresidentThe Curtis Publishing CompanyPhiladelphia, Pennsylvania

WILLIAM J. MAGEE, TreasurerNorton CompanyWorcester, Massachusetts

*A. D. MARSHALL, Asst. SecretaryGeneral Electric CompanySchenectady, New York

S. A. McCASKEY, JR., SecretaryAllegheny Ludlum Steel CorporationPittsburgh, Pennsylvania

E. S. McCLARY, Secty.-Treas.E. W. Bliss CompanyNew York, N. Y.

CHARLES J. McENERY, SecretaryAirtherm Manufacturing Co.St. Louis, Missouri

JOHN H. McNERNEY, Secty.-Treas.Owens-Illinois Glass CompanyToledo, Ohio

JOHN MEADE, Dir. of Ind. Rel.Eagle Pencil Company, Inc.New York, N. Y.

JAMES F. NIELDS, JR., PresidentWare Knitters, IncorporatedWare, Massachusetts

PHILIP B. NILES, Vice PresidentThe Yale & Towne ManufacturingCompany

New York, N. Y.

J. A. OATES, Asst. TreasurerAmerican Cyanamid CompanyNew York, N. Y.

THOMAS OXNARD, PresidentSavannah Sugar Refining CorporationSavannah, Georgia

AUGUST K. PAESCHKE, PresidentGeuder, Paeschke & FreyMilwaukee, Wisconsin

R. N. PECK, Treas.-ComptrollerTobin Packing Co., Inc.Rochester, New York

DONALD F. PRATT, Vice President& Counsel

Durkee-Atwood CompanyMinneapolis, Minnesota

JAMES W. REID, Secty.-Treas.Eureka Specialty Printing Co.Scranton, Pennsylvania

FRED L. RIGGIN, JR., Vice Pres.Mueller Brass Co.Port Huron, Michigan

*JAMES H. ROBINS, PresidentThe American Pulley CompanyPhiladelphia, Pennsylvania

C. S. ROGERS, PresidentNorfolk Shipbuilding and Dry Dock

CorporationNorfolk, Virginia

WM. A. ROYCE, PresidentTraverse City Iron WorksTraverse City, Michigan

GEORGE A. SCOTT,Vice Pres.-Gen. Mgr.

Walker-Scott CorporationSan Diego, California

W. L. SORENSEN, TreasurerThe Warren Woolen CompanyStafford Springs, Connecticut

HARVEY L. SPAUNBURG,Vice President

Veeder-Root, IncorporatedHartford, Connecticut

TALBOT T. SPEER,Pres. & Gen. Mgr.

The Baltimore Salesbook CompanyBaltimore, Maryland

*Indicates those Employee Benefit Committee members who are on the Subcommittee on Bargaining on Employee Benefit Programs.

23

Page 25: the Pension Problem,cdn.calisphere.org/data/28722/8w/bk0003z8h8w/files/bk... · 2009-02-05 · In the case of Inland, the company negotiated the right to offer to employees a choice

FRANK S. STAHL, Chairman-Annuities & Benefits Committee

The East Ohio Gas CompanyCleveland, Ohio

B. W. STONEBRAKER, PresidentRoanoke Iron Works, Inc.Roanoke, Virginia

JOHN P. SULLIVAN, Financial StaflGeneral Motors CorporationNew York, N. Y.

W. A. SULLIVAN, ControllerSunshine Biscuits, Inc.Long Island City, New York

*ROBERT C. TESH,Ind. Rel. Division

E. I. duPont de Nemours & Company,Incorporated

Wilmington, Delaware

R. P. TIBOLT, Vice PresidentEastern Gas and Fuel AssociatesBoston, Massachusetts

NOBLE D. TRAVIS, Vice PresidentDetroit Trust Co.Detroit, Michigan

WM. C. TREUHAFT, PresidentThe Tremco Manufacturing CompanyCleveland, Ohio

LOUIS C. UPTON, Chairman of Bd.Whirlpool CorporationSt. Joseph, Michigan

L. F. VAN STONE, Vice PresidentUncle Johnny MillsHouston, Texas

R. C. WAGNER, Vice Pres.-Operations

Clinton Foods, Inc.Clinton, Iowa

GEO. C. WALTER, PresidentSouthern Cement CompanyBirmingham, Alabama

*CLOUD WAMPLER, PresidentCarrier CorporationSyracuse, New York

ALBERT G. WEBBER, JR., PresidentMueller Co.Decatur, Illinois

J. T. WEILER, General AuditorNational Carloading CorporationNew York, N. Y.

JACK P. WHITAKER, PresidentWhitaker Cable CorporationNorth Kansas City, Missouri

H. H. WHITTINGHAM, ManagerDetroit Gear DivisionBorg-Warner CorporationDetroit, Michigan

YATES S. WILLIAMS, Asst. Compt.Standard Oil Company (Indiana)Chicago, Illinois

A. ROYCE WOLFE, Asst. TreasurerAmerican Smelting and RefiningCompany

New York, N. Y.

R. D. WOOD, ChairmanMississippi Valley Structural Steel Co.Chicago, Illinois

NIC LIAISON ADVISORSRepresenting Industrial Relations

Group

*EARL S. SPARKS, SecretaryThe Metal Manufacturers Association

of PhiladelphiaPhiladelphia, Pennsylvania

*RICHARD A. STITH, ExecutiveSecty. & Counsel

Lorain County Industrial CouncilElyria, Ohio

Representing Manufacturing TradeAssociation Group

E. G. AMOS, Asst. Exec. Secty.American Paper and Pulp AssociationNew York, N. Y.

A. E. MURPHY, Exec. DirectorFolding Paper Box Association of

AmericaChicago, Illinois

Representing State AssociationGroup

A. C. CONDE, Exec. Vice Pres.Indiana Manufacturers AssociationIndianapolis, Indiana

REUBEN PETERSON, JR.,Gen. Mgr.

Associated Industries of RhodeIsland, Inc.

Providence, Rhode Island

Liaison Representatives from Indus-trial Relations Committee on Sub-committee on Bargaining on Employee

Benefits Programs

VINCENT P. AHEARN,Exec. Secty.

National Sand & Gravel Assn.Washington, D. C.

W. H. WINANS, Vice PresidentUnion Carbide & Carbon Corp.New York, N. Y.

*Indicates those Employee Benefit Committee members who are on the Subcommittee on Bargaining on Employee Benefit Programs.

24

Page 26: the Pension Problem,cdn.calisphere.org/data/28722/8w/bk0003z8h8w/files/bk... · 2009-02-05 · In the case of Inland, the company negotiated the right to offer to employees a choice

1950 ECONOMIC POLICY DIVISION SERIES

Number 22 Nationalization -Costs and Consequencescc 23 Proceedings 1949 Patents and Research Seminars

24 The Federal Program of Old Age and SurvivorsInsurance and HR 6000

25 Unemployment Estimates (Revised April 1950)"t 26 Bring Government Back Home

27 The Economic Impact of an Industry-wide Strike28 Federal Tax Revision

"t 29 The Meaning of Unemployment Statistics"t 3 0 Financing Business Expansion"t 331 Profits and Prices"t 32 Management Faces the Pension Problem"t 333 An Excise Profits Tax Is Against the

Public Interest"t 34 A Federal Tax Program for the Period of

Defense and Partial Mobolization

1949 ECONOMIC POLICY DIVISION SERIES

Number 1 Recent Trends in Savings (out of print)"t 2 Who Pays for Corporate Expansion?

3 The Public's Stake in Patents (out of print)4 New Frontiers

"t 5 Proceedings of Syracuse Patents Seminar"t 6 Public Spending and the Private Economy"t 7 Capital Export Potentialities After 1952"t 8 The Great Illusion"t 9 The Havana Charter for an International Trade

Organization10 Profit Margins and Prices (out of print)

"t 11 The Bold New Plan"t 12 The Private Business Economy

Distribution of Gross Output and Proceeds"t 13 Capital Formation Under Free Enterprise

14 The Foreign Trade Gap"t 15 American Housing

16 Unemployment Estimates (out of print)"t 17 An Analysis of the Brannan Plan"t 1 8 Business Size and the Public Interest"t 19 Why Deficit Spending?"t 20 A Program for Management of the Federal Debt"t 21 Western Europe- Problems and Prospects

Copies of these publications may be obtained by request to theNational Association of Manufacturers,14 West 49th Street, New York 20, N. Y.