the philippines: lessons from the thai experience (1997
TRANSCRIPT
Cha
rter
-Cha
nge
in th
e Ph
ilipp
ines
:Le
sson
s fr
om th
e Th
ai E
xper
ienc
e (1
997-
pres
ent)
Bjö
rnD
ress
el, P
h.D
. Can
dida
teJo
hns
Hop
kins
Uni
vers
ityK
onra
dAd
enau
er F
ound
atio
nM
akat
iSha
ngri
La H
otel
Man
ila, A
ugus
t 23,
200
4
Out
line
I.W
hy to
look
at T
haila
nd?
II.Th
e Th
ai C
ase
I.Th
e Pr
oces
sII.
The
Con
stitu
tiona
l Con
tent
III.
Polit
ical
-Eco
nom
ic E
ffect
s: s
ome
prel
imin
ary
eval
uatio
ns
III.
Less
ons
and
Cho
ices
for t
he P
hilip
pine
sI.
On
Proc
ess
II.El
ecto
ral S
yste
ms
III.
The
Form
of G
over
nmen
t
IV. C
oncl
usio
n
Rea
sons
to lo
ok a
t Tha
iland
The
broa
d pi
ctur
e
�So
mew
hat c
ompa
rabl
e in
si
ze a
nd p
opul
atio
n�
Cou
ntry
with
sim
ilar
soci
o-ec
onom
ic
cond
ition
s in
the
1960
s an
d ye
t ver
y di
ffere
nt
outc
omes
forty
yea
rs
late
r�
Cas
e of
a p
arlia
men
tary
sy
stem
refo
rm
Rea
sons
to lo
ok a
t Tha
iland
: Th
e G
over
nanc
e C
ompo
nent
In c
ontra
st to
the
cons
titut
iona
l dra
fting
in 1
987,
the
curre
nt C
ha-C
ha d
ebat
e is
abo
ut im
prov
ing
gove
rnan
ce, s
peci
fical
ly a
bout
:
�In
crea
sing
the
effe
ctiv
enes
s of
the
polit
ical
sys
tem
�En
hanc
ing
the
stab
ility
of th
e in
stitu
tiona
l env
ironm
ent
�St
reng
then
ing
good
gov
erna
nce,
ser
vice
del
iver
y an
d co
mpe
titiv
enes
s�
Incr
easi
ng th
e ro
le o
f the
loca
l (an
d po
tent
ially
) fed
eral
leve
l�
Whi
le m
aint
aini
ng th
e pr
otec
tion
of in
divi
dual
and
civ
il rig
hts,
and
thro
ugh
the
Rul
e of
Law
The
Thai
con
stitu
tiona
l ref
orm
s w
ere
prec
isel
y gu
ided
by
thes
e co
ncer
ns �
so w
hat c
an w
e le
arn?
Thai
con
stitu
tiona
l-pol
itica
l his
tory
�Si
nce
1932
a c
onst
itutio
nal m
onar
chy
with
a b
icam
eral
pa
rliam
enta
ry s
truct
ure
of g
over
nmen
t gov
erni
ng a
uni
tary
st
ate
�H
isto
ry o
f wea
k an
d un
stab
le c
ivilia
n go
vern
men
ts, c
reat
ing
a vi
ciou
s cy
cle
of m
ilitar
y in
terv
entio
ns in
pol
itics
. As
a re
sult:
�
Popu
lar d
eman
d fo
r dem
ocra
cy w
as v
iole
ntly
sup
pres
sed
by m
ilitar
y in
197
3, 1
976
and
1992
; �
Con
stitu
tion-
mak
ing
has
ofte
n be
en m
isus
ed a
s a
tool
for
givi
ng le
gitim
acy
to th
e au
thor
itaria
n re
gim
e in
pow
er�
15 c
onst
itutio
ns a
lone
wer
e dr
afte
d be
twee
n 19
32 a
nd
1997
, mos
t of t
hem
lack
ing
any
dem
ocra
tic p
roce
ss,
mak
ing
Thai
land
the
coun
try w
ith th
e m
ost c
onst
itutio
ns in
th
e re
gion
Hen
ce, k
ey q
uest
ions
to b
e ad
dres
sed
by th
e co
nstit
utio
nal d
rafte
rs w
ere�
�H
ow c
an w
e m
ake
the
polit
ical
sys
tem
mor
e st
able
and
mor
e ef
ficie
nt?
�H
ow c
an w
e in
crea
se a
ccou
ntab
ility,
pa
rtici
patio
n an
d tra
nspa
renc
y in
pro
cess
of
gove
rnan
ce?
�H
ow c
an w
e cu
rb c
orru
ptio
n am
ong
polit
ical
and
bu
reau
crat
ic a
ctor
s?�
How
can
we
brin
g se
rvic
es c
lose
r to
the
peop
le?
Con
stitu
tiona
l ref
orm
was
see
n as
a �
tool
� fo
r wid
er p
oliti
cal-a
dmin
istr
ativ
e re
form
s
Gui
ding
Ass
umpt
ions
1.�T
he p
roce
ssof
dra
fting
mat
ters
as
muc
h as
the
cons
titut
iona
l ou
tcom
e�2.
�Ins
titut
iona
l arr
ange
men
tsm
atte
r, be
caus
e th
ey g
ive
ince
ntiv
es/
disi
ncen
tives
to a
ctor
s an
d th
eref
ore
shap
e th
eir b
ehav
ior i
n th
e fu
ture
�Th
eref
ore,
we
need
to lo
ok a
t pr
oces
s an
d ou
tcom
e of
the
cons
titut
iona
l ref
orm
exe
rcis
e
The
Proc
ess:
The
bac
kgro
und
�Pu
sh fo
r con
stitu
tiona
l am
endm
ents
sta
rted
with
the
popu
lar
dem
ocra
cy m
ovem
ent i
n 19
92;
�H
owev
er, t
he a
men
dmen
t pro
cess
left
to p
arlia
men
t was
pe
rcei
ved
as u
nsat
isfa
ctor
y by
the
publ
ic;
�As
a re
sult,
civ
il so
ciet
y pu
shed
par
liam
enta
ry a
ctor
s to
ag
ree
on a
n am
endm
ent t
hat w
ould
allo
w fo
r the
co
nstit
uenc
y of
a C
onst
itutio
nal D
rafti
ng A
ssem
bly
(CD
A);
�Th
e C
DA
wou
ld b
e in
depe
nden
t fro
m p
arlia
men
t; m
ost o
f its
m
embe
rs w
ould
be
popu
larly
ele
cted
and
cur
rent
MPs
wou
ld
not b
e al
low
ed to
run
for t
he s
eats
of t
he C
DA;
�O
nce
the
CD
A ha
s pr
oduc
ed a
dra
ft w
ithin
240
day
s,
parli
amen
t can
mak
e no
cha
nges
to it
, but
is le
ft w
ith
acce
ptin
g or
reje
ctin
g th
e en
tire
docu
men
t; �
In c
ase
of a
reje
ctio
n, a
pub
lic re
fere
ndum
will
be h
eld
Que
stio
n: H
ow to
sel
ect t
he d
rafte
rs?
The
Proc
ess:
Sel
ectin
g th
e D
rafte
rs
99 D
rafte
rs
in th
e C
DA
Parli
amen
t sel
ects
can
dida
tes
out o
f sug
gest
ed s
hortl
ists
Uni
vers
ities
pre
sent
sho
rtlis
t of
�Exp
erts
� in
Law
, Pol
itica
l Sc
ienc
e an
d R
elat
ed D
isci
plin
es
Prov
inci
al E
lect
ions
of
cand
idat
es, c
reat
ing
a sh
ortli
st o
f th
e 10
top
cand
idat
es
2376
(one
per
pro
vinc
e)
The
Proc
ess:
Org
aniz
ing
the
Dra
fting
�Ti
ght t
ime
fram
e: 2
40 d
ays
for d
rafti
ng; n
o po
ssib
ility
for e
xten
sion
(fix
ed a
gend
a)�
Com
mitt
ee S
truct
ure
to fa
cilit
ate
the
draf
ting
�D
rafti
ng S
ub-C
omm
ittee
(lat
er s
crut
iny
com
mitt
ee)
�Pu
blic
Rel
atio
ns S
ub-C
omm
ittee
�Pr
ovin
cial
Pub
lic H
earin
g Su
b-C
omm
ittee
�Ac
adem
ic S
ub-C
omm
ittee
�Th
e ar
chiv
e an
d ho
use
affa
ires
com
mitt
ee�
Thre
e re
adin
gs a
nd v
ote
by th
e si
mpl
e m
ajor
ity�
In p
aral
lel m
anne
r: pu
blic
con
sulta
tions
in th
e pr
ovin
ces,
que
stio
nnai
re re
sear
ch, l
ette
rs e
tc.,
fe
edin
g in
to th
e co
mm
ittee
wor
k
The
Proc
ess:
The
App
rova
l Pro
cedu
re�
The
final
dra
ft is
han
ded
over
to p
arlia
men
t whi
ch
coul
d no
t mod
ify th
e dr
aft b
ut o
nly
appr
ove
or
reje
ct th
e en
tire
docu
men
t;�
In c
ase
of re
ject
ion
thro
ugh
parli
amen
t, a
publ
ic
refe
rend
um w
ould
hav
e to
be
orga
nize
d;�
In c
ase
that
the
cons
titut
iona
l dra
ft is
app
rove
d by
pa
rliam
ent o
r ref
eren
dum
, con
stitu
tiona
l am
endm
ents
are
exc
lude
d fo
r 5 y
ears
�Con
stitu
tion
is o
verw
helm
ingl
y ap
prov
ed b
y pa
rliam
ent
and
prom
ulga
ted
in D
ecem
ber 1
997
�Yet
, in
prac
tice
supp
ort i
n pa
rliam
ent f
or th
e dr
aft
mus
t be
seen
as
the
resu
lt of
str
ong
civi
l soc
iety
pr
essu
re fo
r app
rovi
ng t
he c
onst
itutio
nal
docu
men
t (�g
reen
flag
mov
emen
t�)
The
Con
stitu
tiona
l Con
tent
:En
hanc
ing
Stab
ility
I: E
xec.
-Leg
isla
tive
Rel
atio
ns
�St
reng
then
ed ro
le o
f the
PM
�
MPs
can
not b
e ca
bine
t mem
ber a
nd v
ice
vers
a�
PM c
an d
isso
lve
parli
amen
t (an
d fre
sh e
lect
ions
mus
t be
held
with
in 6
0da
ys)
�D
isin
cent
ives
for p
arty
sw
itchi
ng�
Can
dida
tes
mus
t hav
e be
en m
embe
rs o
f the
pol
itica
l par
ty
unde
r whi
ch b
anne
r the
y in
tend
to ru
n fo
r at l
east
90
days
be
fore
regi
ster
ing
thei
r can
dida
cy�
In a
dditi
on M
Ps m
ust v
acat
e th
eir s
eats
whe
n le
avin
g th
e pa
rty u
nder
whi
ch th
ey w
ere
elec
ted
�
Lim
its to
the
vote
of n
o co
nfid
ence
/cen
sure
de
bate
�R
equi
rem
ent o
f con
stru
ctiv
e vo
te o
f no
conf
iden
ce�
Cen
sure
pro
cedu
re re
quire
s pa
ralle
l filin
g w
ith N
CC
C
The
Con
stitu
tiona
l Con
tent
:En
hanc
ing
Stab
ility
II: E
lect
oral
Sys
tem
�20
0 Se
nato
rs a
re d
irect
ly e
lect
ed b
y pr
ovin
cial
co
nstit
uenc
ies
on a
non
-par
tisan
bas
is�
Out
of 5
00 M
Ps in
the
Low
er H
ouse
, 400
are
el
ecte
d by
plu
ralit
y el
ectio
n an
d 10
0 (2
5%) a
re
elec
ted
thro
ugh
a pa
rty
list s
yste
m�
The
syst
em o
f plu
ralit
y el
ectio
ns w
as c
hang
ed fr
om
mul
ti-m
embe
r to
sing
le m
embe
r con
stitu
enci
es, i
n or
der
to d
ecre
ase
fact
iona
lism
�Th
e ne
w P
R c
ompo
nent
opt
ed fo
r a c
lose
d pa
rty
list
syst
em�
5% m
inim
um th
resh
old
for p
oliti
cal p
artie
s�M
ajor
itaria
nco
mpo
nent
gen
erat
es s
trong
par
ties
�PR
com
pone
nt s
treng
then
s in
fluen
ce o
f par
ty
lead
ersh
ip o
ver c
andi
date
s an
d en
cour
ages
a
natio
nal,
prog
ram
mat
ic o
rient
atio
n of
par
ties
Rea
son
The
Con
stitu
tiona
l Con
tent
: Im
prov
ing
Effic
ienc
y�
Exec
utiv
e B
ranc
h �
incr
ease
exe
cutiv
e po
wer
by:
�St
reng
then
ed ro
le o
f PM
vis
-à-v
is p
arlia
men
t (i.e
. dis
solu
tion
pow
er;
emer
genc
y de
cree
s) a
nd c
abin
et (i
.e. l
ose
MP
stat
us)
�C
abin
et li
mit
to a
max
imum
of 3
6 ca
bine
t pos
ition
s, fr
om fo
rmer
ly 4
8 (c
urre
ntly
20)
�Le
gisl
ativ
e br
anch
�in
crea
se la
w-m
akin
g fu
nctio
n by
:�
incr
easi
ng ti
me
for l
egis
lativ
e se
ssio
n to
240
day
s, o
f whi
ch 1
20 a
re
rese
rved
for d
elib
erat
ing
bills
dur
ing
the
legi
slat
ive
gene
ral d
ebat
e�
Stre
amlin
ed c
omm
ittee
stru
ctur
e�
Inst
itutio
naliz
ed R
esea
rch
Supp
ort (
i.e. K
PI)
�Ed
ucat
iona
l req
uire
men
ts fo
r MPs
(i.e
. Bac
helo
r Deg
ree)
�B
icam
eral
ism
�m
aint
aini
ng a
n as
ymm
etric
st
ruct
ure
�Th
e Lo
wer
Hou
se is
the
�man
ager
ial b
ody�
�
Sena
te is
the
nonp
artis
an �c
ontro
l bod
y� w
ith o
nly
limite
d ro
le in
the
la
w m
akin
g pr
oces
s
The
Con
stitu
tiona
l Con
tent
: En
hanc
ing
Acco
unta
bilit
y I
�Se
para
tion
of p
ower
s�
Stre
ngth
enin
g th
e ju
dici
al b
ranc
h�
Sepa
ratio
n of
MP
and
Cab
inet
pos
ition
s�
Non
inte
rfere
nce
clau
se o
f MPs
in c
ivil
serv
ice
appo
intm
ents
�C
heck
s an
d ba
lanc
es�
Pow
er o
f Hou
se to
laun
ch v
ote
of n
o co
nfid
ence
vs.
dis
solu
tion
pow
er o
f PM
�Bi
cam
eral
ism
with
the
Sena
te a
s a
non-
parti
san
�con
trol�
orga
n� a
nd �g
atek
eepe
r��
Diff
eren
t ele
ctio
n cy
cle
and
term
s fo
r Low
er
Hou
se a
nd S
enat
e
The
Con
stitu
tiona
l Con
tent
: En
hanc
ed A
ccou
ntab
ility
II�
Intr
oduc
tion
of n
ew o
r str
engt
hene
d ov
ersi
ght a
nd w
atch
dog
inst
itutio
ns:
HR
-C
omm
issi
onN
CC
C
Stat
e Au
dit
Com
mis
sion
Con
stitu
tiona
l Ad
min
istr
ativ
e C
ourt
Om
buds
man
Nat
iona
l El
ectio
n C
omm
issi
onG
over
nmen
t
The
Con
stitu
tiona
l Con
tent
: Fi
ghtin
g C
orru
ptio
n &
Vot
e B
uyin
g�
Con
stitu
tion
equi
ps th
e ov
ersi
ght a
genc
ies
with
pow
erfu
l m
eans
to in
vest
igat
e, c
onst
rain
t and
pun
ish
offic
ehol
ders
�
The
Nat
iona
l Cou
nter
Cor
rupt
ion
Com
mis
sion
(NC
CC
) has
pow
er to
: �
Eval
uate
the
man
dato
ry a
sset
and
liab
ility
decl
arat
ions
that
cab
inet
mem
bers
m
ust f
ile u
pon
assu
min
g of
fice,
upo
n le
avin
g of
fice,
and
one
yea
r afte
rwar
ds
�C
onst
rain
t MPs
and
sen
ior b
urea
ucra
ts fr
om re
ceiv
ing
stat
e co
nces
sion
s an
d m
akes
min
iste
rs h
old
thei
r cor
pora
te s
tock
in b
lind
trust
s�
Inve
stig
ate
any
alle
gatio
ns o
f offi
cial
s� fi
nanc
ial i
mpr
oprie
ties
and
sin
case
that
a
cabi
net m
embe
r has
con
ceal
ed o
r fal
sifie
d in
form
atio
n, it
can
see
k to
bar
hi
m fr
om p
oliti
cal o
ffice
for a
per
iod
of fi
ve y
ears
�
The
Elec
tion
Com
mis
sion
(EC
) has
pow
er to
: �
Reg
ulat
epr
ivat
e an
d st
ate
supp
ort i
n th
e fo
rm o
f mon
ey a
nd o
ther
ass
ista
nce
to p
oliti
cal p
artie
san
d ha
s po
wer
�
To is
sue
�yel
low
� and
�red
� car
ds to
ele
ctor
al c
andi
date
s �
Con
stitu
tion
mak
es v
ote
buyi
ng e
xpan
sive
by
intr
oduc
ing:
�co
mpu
lsor
y vo
ting,
abs
ente
e vo
ting,
and
the
exte
nsio
n of
fran
chis
e to
Th
ai c
itize
ns re
sidi
ng in
fore
ign
coun
tries
The
Con
stitu
tiona
l Con
tent
: En
hanc
ing
Peop
le�s
Par
ticip
atio
n�
The
Thai
peo
ple
are
give
n th
e rig
ht to
hav
e pu
blic
he
arin
gs a
nd to
vot
e in
a re
fere
ndum
�50
,000
peo
ple
who
are
elig
ible
to v
ote
can
mov
e to
ha
ve a
bill
�re
gard
ing
Cha
pter
3 (R
ight
s an
d Li
berti
es) a
nd 5
(Sta
te
Polic
ies)
of t
he c
harte
r to
be s
ubm
itted
to th
e Pa
rliam
ent
�an
d to
see
k fo
r an
impe
achm
ent o
f pub
lic o
ffice
hol
ders
(i.e.
Pol
itici
ans
and
Seni
or S
tate
Offi
cial
s)�
Sim
ilar p
rovi
sion
s ap
ply
for t
he lo
cal g
over
nmen
ts�
New
Rig
ht to
Info
rmat
ion
Act
�M
anda
tory
par
ticip
atio
n in
nat
ural
reso
urce
m
anag
emen
t�
Dec
entra
lizat
ion
prov
isio
n
Eval
uatin
g th
e O
utco
me:
Succ
ess
in Im
prov
ing
Gov
erna
nce
IW
B G
over
nanc
e In
dica
tors
0,00
0,10
0,20
0,30
0,40
0,50
0,60
1996
1998
2000
2002
Gov
ernm
ent
Effe
ctivi
ness
Polit
ical
Sta
bilit
y
Voic
e an
dAc
coun
tabi
lity
Eval
uatin
g th
e O
utco
me:
Succ
ess
in Im
prov
ing
Gov
erna
nce
II�
Econ
omic
and
pub
lic k
ey in
dica
tors
hav
e si
gnifi
cant
ly
impr
oved
�Su
stai
ned
GD
P gr
owth
of 5
-7%
�In
flatio
n ra
te k
ept a
t man
agea
ble
leve
l of 2
,4 %
�D
ownw
ard
trend
of u
nem
ploy
men
t rat
e (2
,2%
)�
Publ
ic F
inan
ces
have
equ
ally
impr
oved
�Ba
lanc
ed b
udge
t pro
pose
d fo
r 200
5, tw
o ye
ars
ahea
d of
tim
e�
Impr
ovem
ents
in ta
x co
llect
ion
by n
early
20%
(dire
ct ta
xes)
�D
ebt s
ervi
ce ra
tio k
ept a
t 14%
�N
ew p
olic
y an
d re
form
focu
s of
the
gove
rnm
ent
�U
npre
cede
nted
gov
ernm
ent e
fforts
in la
unch
ing
pro-
poor
pol
icie
s as
par
t of
PM
Tha
ksin
�sde
clar
ed �w
ar o
n po
verty
��
Maj
or e
fforts
in la
unch
ing
civi
l ser
vice
refo
rms,
aim
ed a
t im
prov
ing
good
go
vern
ance
of t
he c
ivil
serv
ice
1997
con
stitu
tion
clea
rly a
driv
er fo
r re
form
and
an
�ena
blin
g� e
nviro
nmen
t
Eval
uatin
g th
e O
utco
me
Prob
lem
Are
as�
The
stre
ngth
ened
role
of t
he P
M�
Has
put
s lim
itatio
ns o
n tra
nspa
renc
y an
d ac
coun
tabi
lity
(esp
ecia
lly w
hen
com
bine
d w
ith la
rge
maj
ority
for P
M in
pa
rliam
ent)
�Th
e ro
le o
f the
Sen
ate
rem
ains
unc
lear
�O
verly
idea
listic
(i.e
. dire
ctly
ele
cted
but
non
-par
tisan
; non
-po
litic
al n
omin
atio
n pr
oces
s)�
The
frag
ility
of t
he c
onst
itutio
nal o
vers
ight
ag
enci
es�
Inde
pend
ence
vs.
pol
itica
l int
erfe
renc
e an
d pr
essu
re�
The
pers
iste
ncy
of c
orru
ptio
n�
Shift
from
dire
ct fo
rms
to m
ore
subt
le fo
rms
(i.e.
�pol
icy
corru
ptio
n�)
�N
ew te
nden
cy to
war
ds p
opul
ist p
olic
ies?
�Su
stai
nabi
lity
of th
e pr
o-po
or p
rogr
ams/
hous
ehol
d de
bt
The
need
for r
efor
m?
Phili
ppin
e G
over
nanc
e Tr
ends
WB
Gov
erna
nce
Indi
cato
rs
-0,6
0
-0,4
0
-0,2
0
0,00
0,20
0,40
0,60
1996
1998
2000
2002
Gov
ernm
ent
Effe
ctivi
ness
Pol
itica
l Sta
bilit
y
Voi
ce a
ndA
ccou
ntab
ility
Con
trol o
fC
orru
ptio
n
Less
on 1
: Th
e Im
port
ance
of P
roce
ss: T
rade
-Offs
Con
Ass
Con
Con
�Is
chea
per
�Allo
ws
to li
mit
disc
ussi
ons
to
amen
dmen
ts
�Mig
ht la
ck le
gitim
acy
�Is
expa
nsiv
e
�Mig
ht o
pen
up
deba
tes
�Pot
entia
lly h
igh
legi
timac
y
How
muc
h pu
blic
pa
rtici
patio
n?
1) Y
ou c
an th
ink
outs
ide
the
box!
2) B
e aw
are
of th
e co
nseq
uenc
es o
f you
r cho
ice !
Thai
cas
e sh
ows
Less
on 2
:Fo
rm o
f Gov
ernm
ent:
Trad
e-of
fs
Pres
iden
tialis
mPa
rliam
enta
rism
�Fus
ion
of P
ower
�Im
porta
nce
of s
trong
par
ties
�Cre
ates
flex
ibilit
y an
d co
nsen
sus
orie
ntat
ion
�Sep
arat
ion
of P
ower
�Les
s de
pend
ence
on
stro
ng p
artie
s
�Mor
e rig
id a
nd m
ore
adve
rsar
ial
Thai
cas
e sh
ows
1) F
usio
n of
Pow
er n
eeds
to b
e co
unte
rbal
ance
d by
ho
rizon
tal a
genc
ies
of a
ccou
ntab
ility!
2) A
par
liam
enta
ry s
yste
m re
quire
s st
rong
par
ties
!
Less
on 3
:El
ecto
ral S
yste
m: T
rade
-offs
Prop
ortio
nal
Rep
rese
ntat
ion
(PR
)Pl
ural
ity E
lect
ions
(SB
)
�Ten
ds to
cre
ate
few
er b
ut
stro
nger
par
ties
and
mos
t lik
ely
sing
le-p
arty
gov
ernm
ents
�Em
phas
izes
par
ticul
aris
tic
conc
erns
�Ten
ds to
cre
ate
a m
ulti-
party
sy
stem
s an
d m
ost l
ikel
y co
aliti
onal
gov
ernm
ents
�Em
phas
izes
bro
ad
cons
titue
ncy
conc
erns
Thai
cas
e sh
ows
1) P
ower
ful i
mpa
ct o
f ele
ctor
al e
ngin
eerin
g in
te
rms
of p
arty
sys
tem
, can
dida
te s
elec
tion
and
polic
y ou
tcom
es!
Con
clus
ion
Whe
re d
o yo
u w
ant t
o be
?
SB PR
Pres
iden
tial
Parli
amen
tary
1. D
imen
sion
: For
m o
f Gov
ernm
ent
USA
UK
LAW
este
rn
Euro
pe
2. D
imen
sion
:Uni
tary
vs.
Fed
eral
ism
Addi
tiona
l saf
egua
rd, y
et c
onst
itutio
nally
cha
lleng
ing
Philip
pine
sTh
aila
nd (1
997-
)
Thai
land
Con
clus
ion
Thre
e �G
olde
n R
ules
� fr
om a
Tha
i Dra
fter
1.�T
hose
who
are
to b
e re
form
ed c
anno
t ref
orm
them
selv
es.
Vest
ed in
tere
sts
and
an u
nwilli
ngne
ss to
dim
inis
h th
eir o
wn
basi
s of
pow
er p
reve
nt p
arlia
men
taria
ns fr
om m
akin
g si
gnifi
cant
cha
nges
to th
e po
litic
al s
yste
ms
that
gav
e ris
e to
th
em. T
hose
who
des
ign
polit
ical
refo
rms
mus
t com
e fro
m
outs
ide
the
halls
of p
oliti
cal p
ower
�2.
�The
succ
ess
of re
form
depe
nds
on te
chni
cals
uppo
rtfo
rth
edr
afte
rsan
d le
ader
ship
. Acc
urat
ein
form
atio
nis
need
edso
that
the
corre
ctpr
oble
ms
can
bead
dres
sed
and
so
prob
lem
s ca
nbe
addr
esse
dus
eful
ly; t
o th
isen
d, s
trong
stud
ies
of th
eex
istin
gpo
litic
alsy
stem
and
of a
ltern
ate
polit
ical
mod
els
are
indi
spen
sabl
e�3.
�Fin
ally
, the
suc
cess
of r
efor
m d
epen
ds o
n ci
rcum
stan
ce.
Con
ditio
ns in
the
polit
y m
ust b
e rig
ht if
pol
itica
l ref
orm
is
goin
g to
pro
ceed
. Eve
n if
it is
too
muc
h to
hop
e th
at a
ll of
th
e ac
tors
will
be re
ady
to re
form
, a s
uffic
ient
num
ber o
f ac
tors
mus
t be
anxi
ous
enou
gh fo
r ref
orm
that
they
will
pres
s th
ose
that
are
relu
ctan
t to
purs
ue it
�