The Philosophical Influences That Have Shaped Coaching

Peter Jackson and Elaine Cox

This article first appeared in the International Journal of Coaching in Organizations, 2009 7(1), 81-103. It can only be reprinted and distributed with prior written permission from Professional Coaching

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2009

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the Philosophical Influences that Have shaped coachingPETERJACKSONANDELAINECOX

This paper explores the impact of philosophical thinking on coaching practice. In particular it looks at the epistemology of Socrates (via the writing of Plato), Locke, Hume, Kant, and Dewey. Key concepts from each philosopher are introduced and the ways in which their thinking informs modern coaching practice are explored. In this article, the authors contend that coaching is an application of philosophy in two ways: firstly, as the application of philosophical techniques in order to help the client; secondly, as a manifestation of a long philosophical history. Jackson and Cox offer both an argument for and an experience of philosophy for coaching practitioners.

IntroductIonIf thereasonswhypeoplethinkthewaytheydoweretransparentthere would be no psychology or therapy and coaching wouldcertainly be much less interesting. As academics, coaches, andteachersof coaching,ourprofessionallivesareshotthroughwithaninterestinpeople’sthinkingand,inparticular,thatpartof theirthinkingthatremainsunacknowledgedorhidden.Whenwediscussideaswithdevelopingpractitionersinthecourseof ourteaching,weareoftenstruckbyhowphilosophicaltheorypermeatestheirpractices even though they may not necessarily recognise theseinfluences.Wefeelthatamoreexplicitinvestigationof someof thathistorywouldofferasourceof potentiallearningforpractitionersandstudentsalike.

Inthisarticlewelookspecificallyatsomeof thepossiblerootsof thethinkingbehindmoderncoachingpractices.Atthesametime,givenhowdiverseindividualpracticescanbe,wedonotproposeamappingof the sourceof allmoderncoaching concepts toallpossibleprecedents.Instead,inthisarticlewedrawfromasampleof sixkeyphilosophicalthinkers,andrecognisesomeof theirimpactoncoachingpractices. In sodoing,wehope toopen thedoor tocoachingpractitioners tousethe ideas,methodsandconcernsof philosophy to understand and develop their practice more fully.Whenworkingwithstudentsof coaching,wefindthattheprocessof formalisingtheirownexperience,findinglanguagetodescribeit,theorisingandsynthesisingdifferenttheories,andputtingthembackintopracticecreatesanewlevelof constructiveenquirywhichheightensandacceleratesthedevelopmentof theirpractice.Theycometoknowtheirownpracticebetterbyaskingthemselveswheretheir ideas come from and whether they can be questioned ordevelopedinanewwayusingdifferentperspectives.©

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Letus,then,definethescopeof ourdiscussion.Philosophycouldbedescribedastheinvestigationof knowledge,theexplorationof principlesunderlyingknowledge(suchasrationality,empiricism,logic, ethics, aesthetics) or, as in existentialist philosophy, anexplorationof ‘being’ in theworld.Within thisbroad rangeof the‘content’of philosophicalthoughtwehavechosentofocusontheproblemof knowledgeorepistemology.Wewillhighlightthesubtleinfluencesoncoachingof severaltheoristsfromrationalist,empiricistandpragmatictraditions.Webelievethattheseprovidethepotentialforfruitfulreflectiononpracticeandthattheyformacoherent‘unit’of investigation.

Eventhoughphilosophyisthebusinessof abstractthought,ithasenormouspractical,albeitoftentacit,implications.Itis,initself,amethodof interactingwith,respondingto,andquestioningtheworld.Itcouldevenbeseenasawayof beinginthatworld;forasCreelargues(2001,p.24),“whenwetrytostopdoingphilosophy,wefindit’sliketryingtoholdourbreathindefinitely–wejustcan’tdoit!”Thegoalof philosophyisknowledgeandtruthaboutrealitybutnotfortheirownsake;byconsideringwhatandhowweknowintheabstract,weseektobebetterpreparedtoacteffectivelyandtolivewell.

Likethephilosopher,thecoachseekstopullouttheessentialsfromthemessy immediacyof the situationand toquestionpremisesand motivations in order to create clarity and understanding.Likethephilosopher,thecoachrarelystopswiththefirstquestionasked.Intheserespects,acoachingsessionorrelationshipcouldbeconceptualisedasanopportunityto‘do’philosophy.Coachingcanbeseenasbeingfirstandforemostabouthelpingaclientthinkthroughacurrentproblemefficientlyandeffectively;andtothisendit isanappliedphilosophyof knowledge.Toput itanotherway,whereasthegoalof philosophyisknowledgeandtruthaboutrealityandvalueatamoreuniversallevel,thegoalof coachingisknowledgeandthetruthaboutrealityandvaluesatanindividuallevel(forclientsandcoachesalike).Thecoachandthephilosopherhave,therefore,muchincommon.Wehavearguedalreadythatthe content of philosophical thought can help practitioners toenquire of and develop their practice. We are also saying herethatthinkingphilosophicallycanprovideuswithmodelsof howwemightthinkaboutcoachingpractice.

Let us briefly illustrate these two points. Student coaches learnthat it isgood toaskquestions.They learn thatopenquestionsare more effective than closed questions (this is well covered inthe practitioner literature). They may learn to ask questions toelicittheclient’sunderstandingratherthantheirown.Theymaylearntheseastechniquesandmaybequitegoodatthesetechniques.Imaginenowthatacoachdecideshe/shehasastrongorientationtowards relativism as a result of reflecting on their underlyingphilosophical orientation. Questioning then becomes not just a

Like the philosopher, the coach seeks to pull out the essentials from the messy immediacy of the situation and to question premises and motivations in order to create clarity and understanding. Like the philosopher, the coach rarely stops with the first question asked.

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method,but theexpressionof abelief.Itno longerneedstoberemembered,butrathercanbenoticed,challenged,andrefined.Itisnolongersomethingthecoachsimplydoes,butsomethingthecoachwants.Further,thecoachmaycometoincreasinglydeveloppracticebythinkingphilosophicallyandquestioningthecoherenceof theirideasabouttheirpractice(e.g.,whathappensif Iabandonallpretenceof knowinganythingabout theclient’sworldview?Whatif Iknewnothing?).

As we have said, the influence of traditional philosophical ideastypicallygoesunnoticed.Inthe followingsectionswe introducesixmajor philosophical thinkers from the Western tradition, with aparticularfocusonepistemology,andweconsiderhowelementsof their thinkingare in evidence in coachingpractice.Wehavebeenselective in our choice of influences and have decided that thesesix in particular offer a spread and continuity of ideas. We freelyacknowledgetheabsenceof womenandeasternphilosophersinthislist; similarly, we have not investigated the contribution of criticalapproachessuchasMarxismandfeminismandwehaveavoidedthecomplexitiesof existentialismandpostmodernism.Thereissomuchtobesaidaboutallof theseandwedonotintendtoimplythatthosewehavechosentohighlightthe‘best’of philosophy.Itis,indeed,a‘conventional’choiceanditisintendedonlyasastartingpoint.

Abrief introductiontothemajorthinkingof eachproponentisfollowedbya short exposéof the impactof theirphilosophicalthinkingoncoachingpractice.Intheprocessof settingouttheseideaswehavegeneralised, interpretedandselectedinformation.Wedonot in thisexercise intend tomisrepresentordistortanywider history of ideas or any different perspectives. Quite thereverse. We believe strongly in opening up and challenging thethinking of all coaching practitioners. Too often that challengeremains located in universities and post-graduate courses. Weinvite readers, whether you agree or not, to engage with thefollowingargumentsandtousethemtofindmoreof theirownphilosophicalthinkingabouttheirpractice.

MaJor PHIlosoPHIcal tHInKErsInthissectionwebrieflyintroducesixmajorthinkersaspotentialinfluencesoncoachingpractice:Socrates(viathewritingof Plato);Descartes;Locke;Hume,KantandDewey.

Socrates (469 – 399) and Plato (423 – 347)Theimportanceof Socrates’andPlato’scontributiontoWesternphilosophy cannot be overemphasised: all the Western thinkingthatfollowsrestsontheirwork.Inthissectionwewanttofocuson the Socratic Method. The method was used by Socrates toelicit philosophical understanding from his pupils and althoughheleftnowritinghimself,themethodisillustratedinanumberof dialogueswrittenbyPlato,hismostfamousstudent.

The Socratic Method is a structured discussion that helps a learner clarify and evaluate beliefs about a philosophical topic. The initial questioning is aimed at helping learners state clearly and, most importantly, to their own satisfaction, what they believe about something (such as the nature of knowledge or justice).

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TheSocraticMethodisastructureddiscussionthatbeginswithaseriesof relatedquestionsthatbuildoneachotherinordertohelpalearnerclarifyandevaluatebeliefsaboutaphilosophicaltopic.The initialquestioning isaimedathelping learnersstateclearlyand,mostimportantly,to their own satisfaction,whattheybelieveaboutsomething(suchasthenatureof knowledgeorjustice).If learners’wordswereinadequateortheirideasnotclearlyformed,Socrateswouldthenhelpthemtoformulatetheirunderstandingfurtherbypromptingthem,sometimesprovocatively,withsuggestions.Onlywhen ideaswereclarifiedand the learnercould say: ‘Yes, that’sexactlywhatitis’,wouldhemovetothenextphase.

A second phase of questioning was then used to evaluate thelearner’sbeliefs.OftenSocrates’ learnersgotangryatthispoint(e.g.,inTheateus),butthisirritationorchallengewasnecessaryinorderforhispupilstocompletetheirlearning.Socratesreferredtohimself as ‘TheGadflyof Athens’ (Apology).Thepurposeof thisevaluationphaseistocheckandchallengeandtomakesurethe articulated assertion is veritable. The Socratic Method didnotdrawonaspecifictheoryorbodyof knowledge;rather,likecoachingitself,itwasamodus operandithatquestionedeverythinginordertotestthecoherenceof ideasandbeliefsandconsequentlyarriveatandbeabletoarticulatetheirfoundations.

Descartes (1596 – 1650)Sometwothousandyearslater,ReneDescartesalsodevelopedamethodfordiscerningknowledge.Hisaimwastobeginphilosophy“all anew from the foundations” (1980),basedonamethodformulatedwithmathematicalprecision.Themethod,heclaimed,wouldofferthesamecertaintyandeleganceof mathematics.Itisprimarily this method upon which Descartes’ reputation as thefounderof modernwesternphilosophystands.

IntheDiscourse on Method,heenumeratedhismethodandthefour rules which he considered essential for the success for anyphilosophicalproject:

1. Totakenothingforgranted.Everythingwouldbeginwithandproceedbymeansof doubt,inordertoavoidbiasandprejudgement;

2. Tosplitanargumentintosimpleparts;3. Toproceedbydegrees,fromsimpleindubitabletruths

tomorecomplexideas;4. To evaluate often in order to ensure that nothing is

missed and that the whole argument is kept underreview.

Descartessuggestedthatthelastof theserulesismostimportant:enumerationsneedtobesocompleteandreviewssogeneralthatnothing is omitted. It is necessary to show that any preferredalternativeisonlyonepossibilityamongmanyothers,allof whichdeservefullconsideration.

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Descartes'initialapplicationof themethodwastoseekaffirmationof hisownexistencethroughalogical,rationalprocess.Fromthishededucedhisfamouscogito ergo sumargument:

Iresolvedtopretendthateverythingthathadeverenteredmy mind was no more true than the illusions of mydreams. But immediately afterward I noted that, duringthetimeIwantedthustothinkthateverythingwasfalse,it was necessary that I who thought thus, be something.Andnoticingthatthistrust–I think, therefore I am–wassofirmandsocertainthatthemostextravagantsuppositionsof the sceptics were unable to shake it, I judged that Iwouldacceptitwithoutscrupleasthefirstprincipleof thephilosophyIwasseeking.(Descartes,1980,p.17)

Classicrationalists,likeDescartes,believedthatwe aremorethanthesumof ourempiricalinteractionswithourenvironmentandthatweareendowedwitha“rationalsoul”.Apartfromhismethod,oneof Descartes’otherimportantcontributionstophilosophicalthoughtisthenotionof subjectivism.Hisargumentwasthatif Icanonlyknowmyownmindanditscontentswithanycertainty,I cannot possibly have knowledge of other minds or materialobjects.Asaresult,everythingoutsideof myownmindbecomesproblematic.Everythingcanonlybeprovedtoexistbyinferencefrommyownconsciousness.

Locke (1632 – 1704)JohnLockewasasignificantfigureintheEnglishEnlightenmentand was greatly influenced by Descartes. He was stimulated byDescartes’ rethinking of the foundations of knowledge. Despitecomingtobeassociatedwithempiricismbecauseof hisemphasison‘senseexperience’asthesourceof knowledge,Lockemaintainedastrongrespectforrationality.Hisapproachisembeddedinthemethodologicalfoundationsof SocratesandDescartes—thoughhisconclusionsdepartfromtheirs.

InhisAn Essay Concerning Human Understanding,Locke(1979)establishestwoimportantpremises.Firstlyhearguesthatextremescepticismisimpractical, “If wewill disbelieve everything,becausewe cannotcertainlyknowallthings,weshalldomuchwhat1aswiselyashewhowouldnotusehislegs,butsitstillandperish,becausehehadnowingstofly”(ibid., Introduction,p.5).Secondly,hearguesatlengththattheconceptof innatehumanknowledgeorwisdomisuntenable.Inmakingthesearguments,heeffectivelyrejectsDescartes’attempttocreateaperfectlyrationalunderstandingof theworld.Instead,hearguesfamouslyfortheconceptof thehumanmindasatabula rasa,an“emptycabinet”furnishedbytheideasenteringintoitthroughthesenses(ibid., Book1,Chapter1,p.15).

1InHume’soriginalusage,‘muchwhat’means‘almost’

If I can only know my own mind and its contents with any certainty, I cannot possibly have knowledge of other minds or material objects. As a result, everything outside of my own mind becomes problematic. Everything can only be proved to exist by inference from my own consciousness.

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Lockewasnotanatheist,butinarguingthatreligiousdiversityshowsthattheconceptof Godisnotinnate(ibid.,Book1,Chapter3),heopensthedoortoakindof relativism.Hearguesspecificallythatthedogmaof receivedopinionsiscountertothesearchfortruthandfurtherthatdoctrineisusedtosubjugatetheindividualandtheirfreedomtothink.Basedonthesepremises,Lockearguesthat“allideascomefromsensationorreflection” (ibid.,Book2,Chapter1,p.2).Thenceitfollowsthatdifferentpeoplehavedifferentideasbasedondifferentexperiences(ibid.,Book2,Chapter1,p.7),andthatthinkingisdevelopedthroughtheexperienceof thequantityandqualityof ideas(ibid.,Book2,Chapter1,p.24).Ourthinking,therefore,isthesumof ourexperience.

Lockefurtherargues(ibid.,Book2,Chapter8,p.7)thatperceptionsare mental phenomena distinct from the external objects theyrepresent,andthatcomplexideascanbebuiltuponlyinsmallstepsconsistingof ideasof whichwecanbecertain.Inthisrespect,muchof thenatural sciences remains speculative, asourknowledgeof theconstituentmaterialsand“powers”of complexobjectsissimplybeyondobservation.Expressingextremescepticismaboutobjectivity,hearguesthattheeffectof relationsbetweencomplexbodiescanbeobserved,butourconfidencethatwederiveknowledgefromthisisnecessarilyvery tentative. It follows that there isno such thingasprivilegedinsight:allinsightsarevalidandknowledgeisgainedthroughpersonalsynthesisof theconflictingviewsof others.Thus,asHowardpointsout:“agreatdealof humilitywillbeneededindeterminingwho ismorenearly rightaboutanything” (Howard,2000,p.151).

Hume (1711 – 1776)Lockemadeagreatleapinphilosophywithhiselevationof senseexperience. Hume’s An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding isanexplicitattempttofindamiddlepathbetweenanobscureandarcaneabstractmetaphysicsandtheeveryday,unstructured,naturalphilosophyof “tasteand sentiment”.Hume (2006) stated thathewouldbe“happy, if wecanunite theboundariesof thedifferentspeciesof philosophy,byreconcilingprofoundenquirywithclearness,andtruthwithnovelty”(ibid.,p.10)!Insodoingheexplorestheimplicationsof empiricism,highlightingissueswhichlaythegroundfortheworkof Kantandtwentiethcenturypragmatists.

Hume retains much of Locke’s empiricism. Yet he moves thefocusof thediscussionfromLocke’semphasisonthatof whichwecanberationallycertain,totheissuesof causeandeffectinthe real world and, perhaps, what we might do about it. WhatHumedescribesas‘truemetaphysics’–basedonexperienceandobservation–is,inessencetherefore,empiricalenquiry.Herejectswithconvictionthecertaintyof divinetruthsandof thepossibilityof extendingknowledgethroughreasonalone.Hearguesthatif rationalityweresufficient,ourconceptswouldbeperfectlyformedfromtheoutset,whereas in fact theyaredevelopedandrefined

Different people have different ideas based on different experiences, and that thinking is developed through the experience of the quantity and quality of ideas. Our thinking, therefore, is the sum of our experience.

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by experience and observation (ibid., p. 31). Not only does heconsiderthisapproachmorepracticalandmoreaccurate,butalsomoreconsistent:hearguesthatDescartes’scepticalrationalismisinherently inconsistent in that itmustdoubt itsown foundationandmethod(ibid., p.116).

Probability is the cornerstoneof modern scientificmethod,butisonly referred tobyLockeasaquestionof plausibility.Humerelatesthestrengthof ourbelief thataparticularcausewillleadtoaparticulareffecttothefrequencywithwhichwehaveseenittobeso(ibid., p.47),eventhoughhearguesquitespecificallythatthistendencytogeneraliseisapartof humannatureandnotrational(ibid.,p.38)andadmitshimself atalosstoexplainitortofindaconcurrence with other philosophical concepts. The nub of hisscepticismonthispointisthatwecannotknowforcertainwhatwilloccursimplyonthebasisthatithasnotoccurredbefore.ThisislaterreferredtobyKarlPopper(1979)as“Hume’sproblem”;Popper’ssolutiontoHume’sproblem(theconceptof falsifiability)hadfar-reachingeffectsonscientificmethods.

Finally, Hume follows the logic of empiricism to a profoundlydifferentconclusion, inrelationtoknowledgeof ourselves, fromtheCartesiandualist conception. InhisTreatise of Human Nature(Cahn,2002,p.803)Humenotesthat“Whenmyperceptionsareremovedforanytime,asbysoundsleep;solongamIinsensibleof ‘myself ’,andmaytrulybesaidnottoexist”.Fromthisobservationhe goes on to argue that those who actually experience a ‘self ’are suffering an illusion. In this sense, his scepticism extendsfurther than Descartes’, doubting even the continuity of theself.Asamaterialist,Humeproposedthat there isno ‘self ’ thatisindependentof ourperception.Insteadtheimpressionof self is given through successionsof differentperceptions that are inperpetual flux. To modern sensitivities, in part because of thesubsequentinfluenceof Kant,itisdifficulttoacceptthisextremeconceptualisationof theself.

Kant (1724 – 1804)Kant’s work can be seen as a revolutionary bringing togetherof rationalism and empiricism. Whereas for Descartes all ourknowledge was given by God and available to us only throughourratiocinations,andforHumeallwecouldknowwasthroughoursenses, forKant the truthwasnot ‘out there’ in some formwaitingtobediscoveredbutinsteadproposedtheonlyknowledgethatwecouldhaveiscreatedbyusviathefunctionsof ourminds.For Kant ‘reality’ is organised and made intelligible throughforms of perception - understanding and imagination that arehardwiredintotheexperiencingmind.So,whilstDescarteshadover-emphasised the role of reason in knowledge creation andHumeover-emphasisedsense-perception,Kantarguedthatthereshould be no dichotomy: perception without conception (i..e.,reason)wasblind,andconceptionwithoutperceptionwasempty.

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ThusKant’s composite theory introduces knowledgeas amorecomplexprocessthanhithertopresented.Thesensoryelementisimportant,butmindismorethanapassiverecipient.Kantfurthersubmitsthatourmindsactuallyimposeformsorcategories,suchasspaceandtime,uponoursensations,thusrenderingallpossibleexperiencecoherent.Hecallsthecategories‘pureconceptsof theunderstanding’(Cahn,2002,pp.960-965)andsuggeststheyareessentialforknowledgegeneration.Thenotionof theseconceptsof understanding has a significant impact on all philosophicalthoughtthatfollows.ForKant,then,themindisacomplexsetof a prioriconceptsandisnottheblanksheetof theempiricists.

Whereas Hume had argued that the basis of our actions wasfoundedinhabitandthatwebuildupknowledgeoveraperiodof time from our experience, Kant was not satisfied with thisexplanation and, almost echoing Locke’s concern, questionedhowandwhyweexperiencethingsinthefirstplace.Heclaimedthat theconditions forourunderstandingwere in fact synthetic(i.e., produced when the mind determines the conditions of itsownexperience)anda priori,enablingustocategoriseandordertheworld.Itfollowsfromthisthatourdescriptionsof theworldnecessarilyhavetoconformtotheperceptualtoolsof themindprovidedtous.Kantgivesspaceandtimeandcauseandeffect,asexamplesof concepts(categories)thataresyntheticanda priori and not empirically derived. We use these to categorise, orderandshapetheworldaroundus.Accordingly,Kant’s‘categoricalimperative’givesananswer,of sorts,toHume’squestionof whyweseekandfindrelationshipsbetweenevents.

This paradigm shift from emphasis on the ‘real’ world to theperceivedworldwasradicalinKant’sdayandhashadanimpacteversinceonourcontemporarythinkingaboutperceptionand,consequently, on how we think about self-perception. Infact, Howard (2000, p. 204) has argued that Kant’s interests in‘deconstructing’ the process of, and conditions for, perception“catapultshimintoapostmodernmind-settwocenturiesbeforepostmodernist scepticismandpluralism”.ForDescartes the self wasaseparatethinkingthing,quitedifferentinnaturefromthematerial body. For Hume, there was no self, only a bundle of perceptions that gave the impression of a self. Kant, however,arguesthattheself isaconstructof theactivityof themindasittriestobringallitssensationsandcognitionstogether.Thepowerof themindtoinfluenceperceptioniswidelyacceptedtoday,buthasitsoriginswithKant.

Dewey (1859 – 1952)JohnDewey,consideredoneof thegreatestAmericanphilosophersandeducationalthinkers,alsorejectedthestarkdivisionbetweenrationalismandempiricism.However,unlikeKant,Deweycameto believe that a workable theory of knowledge must beginby recognising the development of knowledge as an adaptive

The constant interaction between our environment and our meaning making is, according to Dewey, a vital part of knowledge creation.

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response toenvironmentalconditionsaimedultimatelyatactiverestructuringof theseconditions.Deweyarguedthatreasonisnotprivilegedinitsaccesstoknowledgebybeingoutsideitself butisanembeddedprocess,atool,withthecapacitytounderstandandformperspectivesontheworld.

Like Descartes, Dewey constructed a theory of knowledge thatclaimedthatwhatweknowis initiatedthrougharationalprocess.However,whereasDescartesconsideredthathismethodledtoaclearknowledgeof truth,a priori,Deweyrejectsa prioriformsof thoughtthatpresupposethatrationalitystructuresourexperience.Heexposesthecontradictionsandconflictsof dualisticthinking,arguingthatacertainunityof experienceprecedesourrationaldivisionof stimulusandresponseandthatthesetwoemergeonlyasaproductof ouractual experience. For Dewey a stimulus was some “transactiondemanded by nature” while a response is a “historically basedadjustment”(Armitage,2003,pp.55-58).Togethertheyformedareflexivearc–whatDeweycalleda“continualreconstitution”(1896,p.99).ThusDeweydecentredreasonbyshowingthatsubjectivity,consciousnessandself areemergentprocessesrootedintransactionsbetween organisms and organisations. The constant interactionbetweenourenvironmentandourmeaningmakingis,accordingtoDewey,avitalpartof knowledgecreation.

He furtherbelieved that any justification for abelief is groundedin individual experience: it is an empiricism made individual. Anexperiencemaybeathoughtprocess, theresolutiontoaproblemoraneverydayactionthathastobecompleted.Deweyviewssuchintentionalexperienceasnecessarilygoal-orientedanddistinguishesitfromtheflowof justexperiencingthings,wherethereisnogoaland no process to achieve a goal. Dewey argues that experiencehasorderanda startandendpointand this iswhy itappears tohaveanaestheticdimension;meaning ismade throughakindof narrative construction that provides not only satisfaction but alsoa justification for our beliefs. It appears that the entire process isunified,hascontinuityandispartof awhole,whicharousesfeelingsof satisfactionaswebecomeawareof thepossibilityof completion.

Dewey's philosophy is, therefore, built on thedifference thatheseesbetweenroutineactionandreflectiveaction.Unliketheflowof routineaction,whichisnotpre-meditated,reflectiveactionisbased on "active, persistent and careful" consideration (Dewey1910,p.6),andtheneedtosolveaproblem.Thisisarationalismof action. For Dewey it is in problem solving that we find "thesteadyingandguidingfactorintheentireprocessof reflection.”Although Dewey appears to borrow the notion of the mind asanactivepowerfromKant,heexternalisesandcontextualisestheotherfeaturesof Kant’scriticalidealism.Kant’shiddensyntheticoperationsbecomeovertactions:Deweyclaimsthatinordertohaveanexperienceweneed todo something: there is alwaysaphysicalormentalactivity,orboth,beingdoneinanexperience.

Coaching is a dynamic interaction between two people who are cooperating in searching for greater clarity about the truth relative to the topic of concern to the client so that a suitable resolution may be found. It is, we would argue, a powerful dialectic.

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SummaryThis brief overview of a small subset of Western thinkers isalreadyabstractandpartial.Attheriskof oversimplifyingwefeelthat it ishelpfulat thispoint to takestockonceagain.WehavehighlightedtheSocraticMethod,theavidquestioningforclarityfromSocrates, fromwhich extends the elevationof reason.WemovedontoDescarteswhosoughttousereasonasthepurebasisof knowledge and in so doing created the dualism of self andbody.Whilecarefulnottoshakereligiousdogma,Lockearguedfortheprimacyof sense-experienceasthesourceof knowledge.Humetookthistoitslogicalconclusion:atheismandthebundleof sensestheoryof self,andittookKanttoreconcilereasonandperception,self andsense,inasystematicmanner.Inthissense,Deweymightbe seenas the implementerof Kant, turning thetheory of knowledge into a practical way of knowing. We nowturntoaconsiderationof howeachof theseideascanbeseentoemergeincoachingpractice.

IMPact on coacHInG PractIcEWe argued in the Introduction that the goal of coaching isknowledgeandthetruthaboutrealityandvaluesatanindividuallevel(forcoachesandclients).Inthisrespect,coachingisadynamicinteractionbetweentwopeoplewhoarecooperatinginsearchingforgreaterclarityaboutthetruthrelativetothetopicof concerntotheclientsothatasuitableresolutionmaybefound.Itis,wewouldargue,apowerfuldialectic.

However,asCreelexplains,highmotivationandarightattitudeare“notenoughtoensureprogresstowardthegoalof philosophy”(p.43).Effectivemethodsarealsonecessary.Thesamestatementcould have been made about coaching. In the next section wehighlighttheimportanceof thephilosophicalthinkingdiscussedaboveinrelationtocoaching,whatassumptionsandmethodsitleadsustoinourpractice,andhowitcanbetterinformourownthinkingandreflectionaboutthatpractice.

Impact of Socrates and PlatoThebiggestimpactof SocratesandPlatooncoachingcomes,wewouldsuggest, throughtheirexpositionof Socraticquestioning.Thereare six typesof questions,eachwithadifferentpurpose:conceptualclarification;probingassumptions;provingrationale,reasons and evidence; questioning viewpoints and perspectives;provingimplicationsandconsequences;andultimatelyquestioningthequestionsthemselves.

Hereagainwehavetheopportunitytoillustratehowphilosophicalpracticeandcoachingapproachesoverlap.IntheSocraticMethodthelearnermakesanassertionandtheteacherinitiatesanevaluationprocess.WhiletheissuesdiscussedintheSocraticDialoguesarethestuffof traditionalphilosophicinquiry(love,poetry,truth,etc.),coachingfrequentlyconcernsitself withmoretangibleproblems,

The Socratic Method relies on suspension of search for solutions and instead focuses on exploring underlying assumptions and personal values related to the issue at stake. It demands that we release our attachments to solving the problem and let go of our own judgments and ideas enabling us to listen to the client.

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for example, career development or organisational survival. Allthe same, the method is directly relevant to coaching, even if thesixtypesof questionsarenotnecessarilyusedinthemselves.Indeed,facilitatorsof adultlearninganddevelopment,includingcoaches,drawonthemannerandintentof Socraticquestioningthroughsimilarproblem-solvingmodels(forexample,Neenan&Palmer,2001a).Atapractical level,Rogers (2004,p.57)warnsagainst “advice-in-disguise questions” and Whitworth, Kimsey-Hall,andSandahl(1998,p.64)cautionagainstclosedquestionsand“informationgathering”.Butthesewarningsmayonlyleavethedevelopingcoachstrugglingtoremembertherules.Socraticquestioningprovidesamoreusefulframeworkthathelpsguidethepractitioner towardseffectivequestioning,asPadesky (1993)hasarguedinrelationtocognitive-behaviouraltherapists.

Itisnotonlyprocedure,butalsotheunderlyingprinciple,of SocraticMethod that applies to coaching. Note that the Socratic Methodinherently relieson the suspensionof any search for solutionsandinstead focuses on exploring underlying assumptions and personalvalues related to the issue at stake. It therefore demands that wereleaseourattachmentstosolvingtheproblemandletgoof ourownjudgmentsandideas inordertoenableusto listentotheclient.Itrequiresacommitmentandaprocesstobuildasharedawarenessof thefundamentalquestionsof interesttotheclient.If thisoutlookisusedintheprocess,effectivequestioning—meetingRogers’descriptionof “deeper”(p.63),“super-useful”(p.64)questionsorWhitworthet al’s‘curiosity’(1998,pp.63ff)—becomesmuchmorelikely.

Asanapproachtodoingphilosophy,whichisperhapsanextensionof theSocraticMethodandmaybeequallyusefulforcoaches,wealsorecommendCreel’s (2001)modelof what is termed rational dialogue. Creel (2001) maps out a four-phase model of rationaldialogue: assertion, justification, comprehensionandevaluation.In this model, the first two phases belong to the speaker andthe second two to the listener. The listener’s comprehension isconsidered important inorder tounderstandcorrectlywhat thespeaker has said. This is critical for coaches as it illustrates theimportanceof reflecting,paraphraseandsummarising.InCreel’soriginalmodel,evaluationisalsoundertakenbythelistenerandtherefore might run counter to many (though not all) people’scoaching practice. The difference, though, is merely one of emphasis,astheclient-centredcoachwouldsimplyencouragethespeaker(client)toevaluateforthemselveswhattheyaresaying.

Afinalnoteof cautiononquestioningtechniques:knowingtherightquestionstoaskto‘sting’aclientintorealisationorawarenessisanimportantskill for thecoach.Also important, though, isknowingwhentostopaskingquestions.Ontheonehand,theintentionistostimulateratherthanirritate;ontheother,if thecoachwaitsuntilaclientisabsolutelyclearabouttheassumptionsunderlyingtheirvaluesandbeliefs,forexample,theremaybenoaction.AsHoward

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argues(2000p.26)“thereisatimeforquestioningandatimefordoing.Each,atbest,forms,informsandisinformedbytheother”.

TheSocraticdialogue–thewholeideaof aconstructivedialectic– is a foundation stone for both the method of philosophicalinquiryandthecollaborativereflectiveprocesswhichtakeplacein coaching. Neither can be meaningful without a degree of challenge,of testingthetruth.Thephilosophiesthatfollow,eachwiththeirownepistemology,embodydifferentwaysof challengingourunderstandingsof whatwethinkweknowandwhatwethinkishappeningaroundus—butallof themanswertotheechoof Socrates’questions.

Impact of DescartesDescartes’ influence on coaching is less obvious than eitherSocrates or the empiricists that follow. In the very concept of dualism,however,Descartessowstheseedsof whatinmanywaystheaxisaroundwhichmuchcoachingpracticespins:theconceptof theself.

By perceiving himself (or his self) as disembodied, Descartesinitiatedtheideaof thethinker/observerwhoisdetachedfromtheworldandwhoisself-consciousandindependent.Guignon(2005,p.43)describesDescartes’formulationof theconceptof theself asa“knowingsubject,aself-encapsulatedmentalsubstanceorafieldof consciousness,thatrepresentsreality,butisnotintegrallypartof it”.Guignondescribeshowtheself forDescartesisexperiencedasa“nuclear self,somethingself-definingandself-contained,ratherthanastheextendedself of earliertimes”(p.43,authors’italics).Thustheself hasnorelationshiptoanythingoutsideitself.Thepotentialimpactisalossof satisfaction–of notknowingourplaceorourpurposeintheworld.

Descartes’dualism supportsa coherence theoryof truth: if mythinkingisthetestof myexistence(cogito ergo sum)thenbeliefsareonly true because they cohere with other beliefs formulated bythemindduringitsinsularratiocinations.Howard(2000,p.129)identifiesthisasthephilosophicalfoundationof ourcontemporaryindividualisticuniverse:

Everythingelse,apparently,isopentodoubt,buthereamI, doubting this, doubting that.Whatever else gets tornaway, I remain, questioning, tearing, thinking, thinking,thinking.Hesuggeststhatanycontemporaryreferencebyclients to ‘findingmyself ’orbecomingauthentic, seemsto presuppose a Cartesian model of personal identity.(Howard,2000,p.129)

Following Cartesian dualism we may tend to take our clients’agendasandtheirrationalesastheonlymeasureof truth:clientstell their stories andas longas theyare internally consistentor

Following Cartesian dualism we may tend to take our clients’ agendas and their rationales as the only measure of truth: clients tell their stories and as long as they are internally consistent or coherent, we tend to believe and value what they say.

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coherent,wetendtobelieveandvaluewhattheysay.Dualismalsoopensthepossibilityof theself asseparate,abletoobserveandevaluateitsownbehaviourandperhapsvaluesandbeliefs.However,wecanseehowinfiniteregressbecomesadangerwiththecoherencetheoryof truthinherentinDescartesthinking,andinpracticethereistheever-presentpossibilityof collusion.Atapracticalleveltheobjectionis immediate:surelywehaveadutytoassistclients inrecognisingthe limits of their constructed narratives, dreams and plans. Theclient’sworldviewmustbetestedagainstsomethingoutsideof itself.Similarly,asthereflectiveobserverof ourownbehaviour,wemustfindstrategiestoguardagainstourselvesbecomingdeludedandself-justifyingintheirownrelianceoncoherence.

Descarteshashadasubstantialinfluenceonsubsequentthinkingaboutthenatureof knowledgeandaboutidentity.Anyviewof theself asanon-physicalmindinhabitingamaterialbodyhasitsrootsin Cartesian dualism and this has impacted current counselling(andcoaching)practice.AsHowardargues,wecurrentlyorganiseourlivestosatisfythistangibleself andmakeourselves‘real’.Wealso need others who will “help us ‘explore’ ourselves, ‘develop’ourselves,‘express’ourselves…”(Howard,p.131).ApureCartesianworldisonethathasinformedsomekeyconceptsincoaching,butalsocreatessomeof itspitfalls.Ourdiscussionof someof thelaterphilosopherswillshedsomelightonmanagingthesepitfalls.

Impact of LockeWe have mentioned the objection of reasonableness to a purecoherenceviewpoint:thisobjectionistheechoof empiricism.The empiricist theory of truth suggests that there should besome correspondence with the external environment; translatedinto practice this means strategies to test hypotheses. Theempiricist influence on humanism builds on, but is differentfrom,thatof Descartes.

As coaches, what strikes us first and foremost about Locke’sepistemologyishispragmaticseparationof thingsinthemselvesand the human sense experience of those things. We cannotentirelyknowthemechanismof howtheexternalworldtriggersour sense experience, but we can know that sense experience.LockethusacceptsDescartes’separationof theself,butseesitas moving in a necessarily real world. From this point on, thisidea runs like a thread through centuries of western thought,disputedanddevelopedbyKantandlaterHusserlwhocouchedphenomenology as a specific branch of philosophy. But ouruseof itincoachingisprobablymostobviouslyderivedviathehumanisticpsychologyof MaslowandRogers.Wewouldarguethatthreekeycoachingconceptsarisefromthiswithwhichmanypractitionerswillbefamiliar:

There is still a shadow side in that too little faith in the client’s ability can be self-fulfilling. In doing so, coaches may set themselves up as arbiters of what is right or true and thereby risk fostering compliant servants instead of accountable adults and clients who come to feel swamped in data and unable to progress.

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Firstlythattheclient’sviewof theworldisnotthesameastheworlditself;Secondly, that it is theclient’sviewof theworldthatwilldeterminehis/herbehaviours;Thirdly,thatourownopinionson,andresponsesto,theclient’ssituationarenecessarilyprovisional.

Fromthesethreeflowanumberof significantcoachingpractices:adherencetotheclient’sagenda(inthesensethatitisallthatcanbeknownratherthanthatitiscorrect);reflectingback;proposingopiniononlyashypothesis.Whileempiricismbalancesrationalismtosomeextent,thereisstillashadowsideinthattoolittlefaithintheclient’sabilitycanbeself-fulfilling.Indoingso,coachesmaysetthemselvesupasarbitersof whatisrightortrueandtherebyriskfosteringcompliantservantsinsteadof accountableadultsandclientswhocometofeelswampedindataandunabletoprogress.

We may deal with the separation of objective and subjectiveworldssimplybyacceptingit,buttherearealsoapproacheswhichmay seek rather to challenge or deal with that separation. Themuchquoted,“amapisnottheterritory”originatesfromAlfredKorzybski’s(1933)explicitexplorationof preciselythisprobleminrelationtohowthelanguageweuseaffectsthelimitsof ourthought.Thegoalof Korzybski’sGeneral Semantics is toalign language topurpose.Hereweareremindedof theuseof metaphorand inparticular howwe can encourage the client to adapt their ownmetaphorsbetter todealwith the issueathand.Dunbar (2005)givesaniceexample;weimagineaclientfeelingstuckinatunnel:“Maybethegroundiswetandthefeetcanloosen.Maybetheyarestuckwithglueandtheglueissocoldthatishasbecomebrittle”.Similarly we may challenge the subjective view and suggest areframeof theproblem;e.g.,fromanegativetoanappreciativeviewof theirobjectives,performanceorability.

The nature of what we know is, as we have said, at the heart of coaching;Locke’sempiricismenablesevaluationtobecriticalwithoutdescendingintoscepticism.Hesteersacoursebetweenwhatcanbereliably inferred from existing knowledge and the uncertainty of experience.Wemightlookuponthisastootentative:thegapbetweenthetwoseemswideinLocke’sthought.Yetincoachingpracticeweareoftenfacedwithclientsholdingfirmtounfoundedorsimplyunhelpfulbeliefs.Inaddition,partof Locke’shistoricalsignificancewastostartthe separation of knowledge from dogma; this more democraticattitudetothenatureof knowledgeperhapspresagessomethingthatwould later be picked up by twentieth century humanism. TheseideasbecamemoreexplicitinHume’sthought.

Impact of HumeHume has been described as taking the process of scepticalquestioning further even than Socrates (Howard, 2000 p. 181).In setting out to reconcile “profound enquiry with clearness,

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and truthwithnovelty” (Hume,2006,p.10),Hume leadsus toapragmaticviewof theextentandnatureof ourknowledge.Heuseslogictoquestionboththecertaintiesof others(notably,intheareaof religiouscertainties),andourconfidenceinobservationsof causalrelations;yethisprogrammeisnotoneof destruction.Ratheritisabouttryingtoseetheworldforwhatitis,toidentifythelimitsorourperceptionandourreason,nottodestroybeliefs,buttoappreciatethemforwhattheyare.

This questioning of what is ‘given’ has a direct parallel in thequestion of where coaching practitioners might draw for theknowledge to support evidence-based practice (see Grant &Cavanagh, 2004; Drake, 2009). In a direct parallel to Hume’sopposition, we have argued elsewhere that the immediacy of unstructuredpersonalexperienceistobeoffsetagainstthereliabilityof moresystematicinvestigation(Jackson,2008).Hume’sideasdonotentirelysolvethisproblem,buttheydohighlightit.Hepointsoutthenaturaltendencytogeneraliseand,althoughhecitesquitearrestingexamples(howdoweknowthesunwillrisejustbecauseitalwayshasdone?), itmayalsobe true that thispowerfulurgeleads toovergeneralisation. In the absenceof anymore certaininformation,weareallpronetoevaluateourstrategiesonwhatis available to us, even to the extent of believing a particulartechniqueiseffectivebasedonasinglegoodexperience.

Thissamehumanurgecanbeseenattheheartof thepresentationinpracticeof phenomenasuchasovergeneralizing (Beck,1967),‘awfulising’ beliefs (Ellis, 1962), and the cycle of self-reinforcingexperience(Bandura,1994).Theidentificationof thesephenomenaandthetechniquestomanagethemhavebecomemoreimmediatelyavailabletocoachingpractitionersthroughcognitive-behaviouralandrational-emotivebehaviouralapproachestotherapy(e.g.,Ellis,1962;Beck,1976)andlater,similarapproachestocoaching(e.g.,Neenan&Dryden,2002;Neenan&Palmer,2001b).

ForHume,alla prioribeliefsabouttheworldwereopentoquestion.Against the spirit of the age (even to the extent that much of his work was published either anonymously or posthumously)Humerejectsanyrationalbasisforbelief inaChristianGod.Hedemonstrates thatmostpeoplemustbewrong in their religiousbeliefs,asforanyparticularbelief therearealwaysmorepeoplewithopposingbeliefs;andif atanyonetime,mostreligiousbeliefsarewrong,what,heasks,leadsustobelievethatitisonlyourownthatarecorrect?ThequestionHumeoffersusis,cananya priorior‘taken-for-granted’beliefsactuallybetakenforgranted?Whileitmaybeconsideredoutsidethescopeof thecoachingrelationshiptoquestiontheclient’sreligiousbeliefs,itiscommontoencounterdeeply held cultural, familial and ethnic beliefs that need to beaddressedinorderfortheclienttomakeprogress.

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Coachingclientsmayexpressthesebeliefsintermsof obligations,necessity,or simple factwhich theymayequally relateeither totheirownbehaviourortoothers:“Idon’thaveanychoice”,“he’sgot toapologise”,“it’sjustthewayitis”.However,itfollowsfromtheabovethatthesebeliefsareopentoquestion.Twocommonstrategiestorespondtothisaretochallengethelegitimacyof thebelief or tochallenge itsutility.Aresponse that ispopularwithourstudentsistoaskwhosevoicewearehearing:“whoisitwhoissaying‘it’sjustthewayitis’?”Byaskingthisquestionthebelief isnotcontradicted,buttheissueof whetheritiscorrectisputintosuspension;thatis,itisseenasabelief ratherthanasafactandtheclientisenabledtoexamineitfromamoreobjectivestance.Asecondpopularresponseissimplytoaskwhetherthebelief helpsorhinderstheclient’sprogresstowardstheirgoals.Again,thetruthof thebelief isputinsuspension,butthistimesotheclientcanexaminewhetherornottheywillbebetteroffwithoutit.

Humeencouragesustoconsiderthepossibilitythatourreasoningcanbetestedagainstrealworldexperienceandthatourperceptionscan be made more reliable through further observation (or thepseudo-observationof thought experiments).Humedoesnotoffera true synthesisof reasonandexperience,butaswehavenotedinrelationtoeachof thephilosophieswehaveconsidered,histhinkingmakesthisnextstepmorepossible.

Impact of KantThe faculties or categories of mind that are a central part of Kant’s epistemology underlie most of psychological thinkingtoday.Belowwehighlightfourimportantareas.

1. Cognitive theory. Cognitive theory attempts to explainbehaviour by understanding thought processes. Kant’s notionof categories,asa priori conceptsof themindcouldbeseenasinfluential in the subsequent development of ideas around theconstructs thatunderpin cognitive theories—the categories, likeschema, that are involved in cognitive processing. In addition,Kant was the first to make a systematic distinction betweenopinion,belief andknowledgeand,insodoing,pavedthewayforlatercognitivetheoriesandinterventionssuchastheABCmodelof cognitivebehaviouraltherapy.

2. Pragmatism. PragmatismbecomespossibleonceKanthasmade the distinction between knowledge, opinions and beliefs.Knowledge,forKant,hasbothobjectivecertaintyandsubjectivevalidity. Opinion, on the other hand, is both subjectively andobjectively insufficient, since itcanbeneithercertainnorvalid.Belief,althoughsubjectivelysufficient,inthatitcarriesconvictionandpersonalvalidity,lackstheobjectivitythatmakesitvalidforeveryone.Kantthereforesawbelief asapragmaticrecourse,whatweresorttowhenthereisnoknowledge.Hegivestheexampleof adoctorbeingrequiredtomakeadiagnosisbasedonaneducated

Pragmatism opens the door to experimental or instrumental adoption of a view of reality. Hence, we might ask a client who has become stuck, “If you were not stuck, what would you do next?”, or “What would be possible if you did like your boss?”

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guessorbelief (Rockmore,2006,p.77).Pragmatismissometimessummarisedbythephrase'whateverworks,islikelytobetrue’andbecause our experiences change, 'whatever works' also changes.The pragmatic stance suggests that truth is changeable and noonecanclaimtopossessanyfinalorultimatetruth.Incoaching,helping the client to appreciate this possibility can often bedevelopmental.Pragmatismalsoopensthedoortoexperimentalorinstrumentaladoptionof aviewof reality.Hence,wemightaskaclientwhohasbecomestuck,“If youwerenotstuck,whatwouldyoudonext?”,or“Whatwouldbepossible if youdid likeyourboss?”Studentsareoftenscepticalatfirstabouttheeffectivenessof questionslikethis,yetdiscoverthatchangingthereality,albeittemporarilyandaspartof thethoughtexperiment,oftenopensupnewpossibilities.

3. Metacognition. Kant’s epistemology suggests that we canknowaboutthemind’sconsciousness.ForKanttherearetwokindsof informative knowing: knowledge from experience (syntheticjudgmentsa posteriori)andknowledgeof theconditionsof possibilityof experience (synthetic judgments a priori). The focus on thecognitiveaspectsof knowledgecreationhasgivenustheconceptof metacognitionandalsoself-reflection.Metacognitionistheabilitytobecomeconsciousof ourownmentalfacultiesandoperationsandboththisandtheinherentself-reflectionitinvolvesdrawonthecapacitytoabstractfromwhatweexperience.Thisabilitytoreflectonourmentalactivityhasimpactedonourdevelopmentof reflectivepracticeandmetacognitiveandsubsequenttheoriesof learningandadultdevelopment.Thepossibilityof thesubjectiveand the objective also informed eventual theories of cognitive-development and theories of adult development. Kegan andLahey(2003)havedescribedindetailhowinarangeof workplacecontextswecanbuildpsychologicalspacebetweenourselvesandourassumptions,thusmovingthemfromsubjecttoobject.Fromapracticalperspective,developingsuchmetacognitiveabilityoffersusanescapefromautomatismandprejudice.

4. Interpretivism. Theimplicationsof Kant’sphilosophyforcoaching and for coaching research are far reaching. It is fromKant that we get the possibility of an interpretivist paradigm.Withinthepreviouspositivistparadigm,objectivityistheguidingprincipleandresearchersarerequiredtoremainneutralinrelationtowhatisbeingresearched.ThisparadigmwasbasedonHume’sproposition that there is a world is ‘out there’ from which wediscovercausalrelationshipsandsubsequentlygeneralisefromtheparticularresultsof ourresearchtoalargerpopulation.Withintheinterpretivistparadigmtheseparationof ‘outthere’factsfromthe‘inhere’ subjectivityof theresearcher is impossible.Knowledgeis seen as something that is inherently constructed, rather thanbeingthediscoveryof anindependent,pre-existingreality.Thusthe idea of causality is defined differently: in the interpretivistmodel, a causal relationship is simply one possible constructed

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explanationforparticularaspectsof theworld.AndsofromKantthepossibilityof constructedknowledgeisborn,togetherwithaninevitable dichotomy between objectivity and subjectivity. Theeffectof thisconceptonpracticeisseenmorefullythroughtheideasof Dewey.

Impact of DeweyUnlike earlier philosophers, who viewed thought as a somethingpurelysubjectivewithinanindividual,Deweyseesitastheproductof interaction between us and our environments and posits thatknowledge has a practical role to play in the guidance of thatinteraction.Heusestheterminstrumentalismtodescribehisapproach.

Twokeyconceptsembedded in theapproacharecontinuityandinteraction. ‘Continuity’ refers to the idea that each experienceis stored and carried into the future, whether we like it or not;‘interaction’buildson thenotionof continuityandexplainshowpast experience interacts with the present situation to create ourcurrentexperience.Currentexperienceisunderstoodasafunctionof ourpast(stored)experienceswhichinteractwiththepresenttocreateunique,individualexperience.Dewey(1938)assertsthatthereiscontinuityinanyinquiry(informalorformal)astheconclusionsreachedinoneinquirybecomethemeansandmaterialforcarryingonfurtherinquiries.Extrapolatingfromthistheorywecanseehowadisciplined reflectiononourexperience can result in increasedintuition,acoretoolof theexperiencedcoach.

ThemethodDeweydescribeswillseemfamiliartocoaches,sinceitinvolvesseveralstagesthatresembleanytransformativelearningprocess.Thesecanbesummarisedasfollows:

1. Adifficultyispresented(itmaybecognitive,practicalorexistential).

2. Tentative ideas for meanings and actions that couldshed lighton the difficulty are gleaned from pastexperiences(ourownandothers).

3. Ideas are experimented with in order to resolve thedifficulty.

4. Results are reflected on and evaluated, meaning isclarified, and the process continues until a workingsolutionisfound.

InmanywaysDeweyisarticulatinga learningcyclewithinthesestages—similartothatpresentedmuchlaterbyKolb(1984).Wecanalsorecognisetheimportantroleof reflectivepracticeinthismethodandthecentralityof learningincoachingfordevelopment.Dewey(1934)describeshowattendedexperiencecanbedecipheredthroughreflectionandutilisedforproblemsolving:

Each resting place in experience is an undergoing inwhich is absorbed and taken home the consequences of priordoing,andunless thedoing is thatof uttercaprice

For an end to have true significance for someone it needs to lose its position as an “end” and become a point of transition — it needs to become a means. For coaches this is an important point to note as they reflect on the use of goals in their work and in their clients’ success.

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orsheerroutine,eachdoingcarriesinitself meaningthathasbeenextractedandconserved.Aswiththeadvanceof anyarmy,allgainsfromwhathasbeenalreadyeffectedareperiodicallyconsolidated,andalwayswithaviewtowhatis to be done next. If we move too rapidly we get awayfromthebaseof supplies–of accruedmeanings–andtheexperienceisflustered,thinandconfused.If wedawdletoolongafterhavingextractedanetvalue,experienceperishesof inanition.(p.56)

Ascoachingpractitionerswerecognisethesethemesof continuityand interaction in guiding practice. Many approaches, but inparticular developmental coaching, are influenced by Dewey’sideaseitherdirectlyorvia intermediaryconceptssuchasactionlearning (Revans, 1980), experiential learning (Kolb, 1984) orreflectivelearning(e.g.,Moon,2004).Ineachcase,theprocessof discoveryiscyclicalandemergent.Wehavenotedelsewhere(Cox&Jackson,inpress)thatthereisabalancetobestruckbetweenconceptualisingapresenting issueasproblem(tobesolved)andopportunity(todevelop).

Deweyalsosawnodistinctionbetweenendsandmeans;hefoundthemtobeof thesamenature(1950).If someend(goal)issought,certainmeansareemployedtoreachthatend.Deweywasconcernedwiththereasonsforreachingtheend.If weimagine,forexample,thatacoachingclientwantstoincreasehernetworkof influentialpeople,theendisanetworkof influentialpeople.However,Deweywouldarguethatthisendwouldbelessthansatisfyingunlesstheclient’sbroaderintentwastoreachtheendinordertobuildonitandgofurther.Soforanendtohavetruesignificanceforsomeoneit needs to lose its position as an “end” and become a point of transition—itneedstobecomeameans. Forcoachesthis isanimportantpointtonoteastheyreflectontheuseof goalsintheirworkandintheirclients’success.AsDewey(1916)writes,

Everymeansisatemporaryenduntilwehaveattainedit.Everyendbecomesameansof carryingactivityfurtherassoonasitisachieved.Wecallitendwhenitmarksoffthefuturedirectionof theactivityinwhichweareengaged;meanswhenitmarksoffthepresentdirection.Everydivorceof endfrommeansdiminishesbythatmuchthesignificanceof the activity and tends to reduce it to a drudgeryfromwhichonewouldescapeif hecould.(pp.105-106)

The impact of Dewey’s pragmatic approach to knowledgedevelopmenthashadanimportantimpactonsubsequenttheoryandpracticedevelopmentinarangeof disciplines.Heavoidedtheemphasisonknowledgeandbelief astheonlyendsof inquiryandwasthefirsttocombinebothreflectionandactioninthequestforknowledge.Assuch,heprovidesastrongfoundationformoderncoachingpractices.

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soME BIndInG tHEMEsWehavenowlookedatsixphilosophersandtheirpotentialimpacton coaching practice. To summarize, from Socrates we take theconceptof dialecticalenquiry;fromDescartes,self awarenessandthestartof anindividualistworldview;fromLockeandHumethechallengeof senseexperienceandtherejectionof thea priori;fromKantthesynthesisof theobjectiveandsubjectiveworlds;andfromDeweythepracticalapplicationof knowledgeasongoingdiscovery.Somethemeshaveemergedfromthesediscussionsthatmightbeseentobearexplorationbypractitionersintheirownright:

• The dialectic as a founding principle: coachinginvolvesanexchangeof viewpoints.Isthistosaythatwecannotcoachourselves?Indeedwecan;yetdoingso requires that we somehow stand outside of ourcurrentperceptual,mentaloremotionalworld.Thisisessentiallywhatweofferascoaches.

•Therelativeweightof internalandexternalworlds:thereispowerinanempatheticacknowledgmentof anindividual’sworldviewinordertofosterconfidenceand in providing a critical foil to these very sameworldviewsinordertostimulategrowth.

• Thevariabilityof ourprocessesinseekingtounderstandtheexternalworld:bothascoachesandasclientswemust acknowledge that our perceptions are tentativeandrelative.

• Theneedtoactonsomething:coachingcanbeseenasareflexiveprocessof puttingphilosophyinto action.

Wewouldaddafifththemethatisonlyimplicitinourinvestigationof epistemologybutisconstantlytriggeredbyitinourpractice:

•Coachingisarelationshipbetweentwopeople.

WeclaimedintheIntroductionthatthegoalof philosophywasto pursue effective action and the ‘good’ life through abstractthought and that coachingparallels this objective in relation toanotherperson,theclient.However,coachingmustbemorethanacollectionof toolsforknowingandacoachismorethan‘gadfly’.Coaching draws on the dialectic nature of philosophy with itsfocusontherelationshipanddialoguebetweentwopeople—twofallible, different, inconsistent selves with their own perceptionsandexperience.Coacheshavetomanagebothof theaspectsof thisdialecticinordertobeeffectiveinworkingwiththeirclients.Asanexampleof howthesetwosidesof theprocesscometogether,takethisextractfromRogers(2004)whichwasfirstpublishedin1967,basedonalecturegivenin1954:

It is only as Iunderstand the feelings and thoughts whichseemsohorribletoyou,orsoweak,orsosentimental,orbizarre–itisonlyasIseethemasyouseethem,andacceptthemandyou, thatyou feel really free toexploreall the

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hiddennooksandfrighteningcranniesof yourinnerandoftenburiedexperience.(p.34)

dIrEctIons For FurtHEr studYWe are very aware that this discussion is selective. We have focusedon a limited number of Western philosophers and in particular theirphilosophyof knowledge.Wehopethatbydoingsowehavestartedtouncover some of the hidden dimensions of coaching practice – whatmight be thought of as the submerged part of the iceberg (Malderez& Badoczky, 1999) – and at the same time provided an exemplar foruncoveringmoreof thathiddendimension.Asimilarexercisemightbeundertakenwithadifferentareaof philosophicalenquiry(forexample,ethics), with different philosophers, or from a completely differentphilosophical tradition (such as Indian or Chinese philosophies). Forindividualpractitionerswefeelthatonefinalethicalissueemergesfromthisdiscussion.Thatisthatourpersonalphilosophiesmatter;thatwearedriven by traditions and beliefs which bear examination. The currentdiscussion may not fulfil that role for all readers. Yet, given the corefunctionof relatedness inthecoachingundertaking,wefeelthatsomedegreeof examinationisadutytoourclients.

rEFErEncEsArmitage, K. (2003). The continuity of nature and experience:

JohnDewey’spragmaticenvironmentalism. Capitalism, Nature, Socialism, 14 (3),49-72.

Bandura, A. (1994). Self-efficacy. In V. Ramachandran (Ed.),Encyclopaedia of human behavior (Vol.4).NewYork:AcademicPress.

Beck,A.T.(1967).Depression: Clinical, experimental, and theoretical aspects.NewYork:Harper&Row.

Beck, A. T. (1976). Cognitive therapy and the emotional disorders. NewYork:InternationalUniversitiesPress.

Cahn,S. (Ed.). (2002).Classics of Western philosophy (6thed.). Indianapolis,IN:HackettPublishingCo.

Carruthers,P.(1995).Human knowledge and human nature. NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.

Cornford,F.M. (1957).Plato's theory of knowledge: The theateus and sophist.NewYork:PrenticeHall.

Cox,E.,&Jackson,P. (inpress).Developmentalcoaching.InE.Cox,T.Bachkirova&D.Clutterbuck(Eds.),Sage handbook of coaching.London:Sage.

Creel,R.(2001).Thinking philosophically, Oxford:Blackwell.

Descartes,R.(1980).Discourse of method and meditation on first philosophy (D.A.Cress,Trans.). Indianapolis,IN:HackettPublishing.

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Dewey,J.(1896).Thereflexarcconceptinpsychology.Psychology Review,3,357-370.

Dewey,J.(1910).How we think.Boston:Heath.(Republished1991byPrometheusBooks,Amherst,NY)

Dewey,J.(1916,1944).Democracy and education.NewYork:TheFreePress.

Dewey,J.(1934).Art as experience.NewYork:Dover.

Dewey,J.(1938).Logic: The theory of inquiry.NewYork:HenryHolt&Co.

Dewey,J.(1950).Human nature and conduct.NewYork:ModernLibrary.

Dunbar,A.(2005).Usingmetaphorswithcoaching.Association for Coaching Bulletin, 6.

Drake, D. B. (2009). Evidence in action: A relational view of knowledge and mastery in coaching. International Journal of Evidence Based Coaching and Mentoring, 7(1),1-12.

Ellis,A.(1962).Reason and emotion in psychotherapy.NewYork:LyleStuart.

Grant,A.&Cavanagh,M.(2004).Towardaprofessionof coaching:Sixty-five years of progress and challenges for the future. InternationalJournal of Evidence Based Coaching and Mentoring, 2(1).

Guignon,C.(2005).On being authentic, London:Routledge

Howard,A.(2000).Philosophy for counselling and psychotherapy. Basingstoke,UK:Palgrave.

Hume, D. (2006). An enquiry concerning human understanding. NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress.

Jackson,P.(2008).Doesitmatterwhatthecoachthinks?Anewfoundation for professional development. In D. Drake,D. Brennan, & K. Gørtz (Eds.), The philosophy and practice of coaching: Insights and issues for a new era. London: Wiley.

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aBout tHE autHors

Peter Jackson MSc MA

Phone: +44 (0)1453 731689Email: peter.jackson@brookes.ac.ukWebsite: www.jackson-pdc.co.uk

Peterteachespart-timeontheOxfordBrookes post-graduate in Coaching& Mentoring Practice as well asrunning a professional coachingpractice. Peter’s practice focus is onprofessional specialists moving intogeneralmanagement.Hehasresearchinterests in coaching approaches,coachingphilosophy,professionalandacademic development of coachingpractitioners and the physical andenvironmental influences on thecoachingprocess.

Elaine Cox, BA, MA, PhD

Phone: +44 (0)1865 488350Email: ecox@brookes.ac.ukWebsite: http://www.business.brookes.ac.uk/futures/cam/

Elaineis a Principal Lecturer andHead of Research Group in theInternationalCentre forCoachingandLeadershipDevelopmentattheBusiness School, Oxford BrookesUniversity.She leads the Doctor of CoachingandMentoringProgramme,isEditorof theInternational Journal of Evidence-Based Coaching and Mentoringandisalsocurrentlyco-editingThe Sage Handbook of Coaching.

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