the philosophical quarterly 1951 feibleman 416 22

8/13/2019 The Philosophical Quarterly 1951 Feibleman 416 22

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CULTURE AS APPLIED ONTOLOGY

IThe smallest hu m an isolate is a cultu re, no t an individ ual. Th e tes t

for valid isolation is th e prospect of surv ival : th e indiv idua l ca nno t livealone, a culture can. Philosophy in th e old sense of a subjective stu dyinvolving supernatural or transcendental knowledge was inimical to thephysical sciences ; bu t philosophy in th e new sense in which it is now con

ceived is inimical neith er to th e physical nor to th e social sciences. W e shallsee what these two propositions involve, for they result in the proposal toset forth a certain theory concerning the relations of that part of philosophynamed ontology to those large-scale items of the social field called humancultures, more specifically in the use of ontologies as instruments of culturalanalysis. The term ontology has acquired an unfo rtuna te rep utatio namong scientists because of the theological endorsement by which it hasbeen identified with a pa rtic ula r theology of ontology long conside red official

in certain qua rter s. B ut the field of ontology is wider th an a ny p artic ulartheo ry comprised within it. Since th e association with theology is no t th emeaning of ontology intended here, it may be well to begin with a definitionand description.

Ontology is th e widest system in an y finite set of system s. I t w ouldperforce have to be an abstract body of knowledge and make the claim totru th. This could be either a ten tativ e or an absolute claim. It s ownterm s of description are the categories of trad itiona l metaphysics. Thedefinition of Be nth am , th a t th e field of ontology is th e field of suprem elyab stra ct entities , refers to these categories ; in mo dern logical an d m ath ematical systems we would call these categories the undefined terms employed in the unproved propositions which constitute the postulates of thesystem . There is no official ontology, an d conten ding ontologies m u stsupport their claims on the basis of the same criteria used by other kinds ofsystems : consistency, completeness, and applicability. Riv al ontologiesexist theoretically and practically, and assert both abstractly and concretelytheir respective claims. Th ey exist theore tically in th e w ritten an d spokenwords of the professional philosophers. W e shall see th a t their prac ticalexistence is somewhat more concrete, for they exist practically as actualelements of culture s. B ut before we can be more detailed we shall ha veto explain what we mean by culture.

Culture is the common use and application of complex objective ideasby the members of a social group working with tools, folkways, and institutio ns. Such complex ideas are held subconsciously b y th e individu almembers, and are manifested socially by the myth of the leading institution,of the cu lture. The complex ideas are said to be objective because th ey issue

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from th e exte rna l world an d are referred back to it. Ano ther nam e for themis th e implicit do m ina nt ontology. Th ey are ontological because the y referto ultimate problems of being, and they are dominant because they takeprecedence over all the thoughts, feelings and actions of the social groupwhich holds the m . Thu s every culture has its own implicit dom inant ontology, but the environing conditions for every culture differ, and each findsitself in a definite climate, terrain, with different types of neighbours, etc.Thus a culture, let us say in a revised definition, is the actual selection ofsome part of the whole of possible human behaviour considered in its effectupon materials, such as tools and institutions, made according to the demands of an implicit dominant ontology and modified by the total environment.

Ontologies are empirical affairs, then, since they are elements of analysisof actu al cultures. Th ey are found empirically in two places : in the subconscious of the individual and in the social order of institutions.

elief at least the kind of fundamental belief from which we act, isunconscious an d rarely rises to the level of awa reness. The unconsciousbeliefs held by individu als reve al them selves in critical action s. W henindividuals are forced to decisions without having had time to consider,their actions are the consequences of beliefs which are held so deeply that

they themselves are unaw are of holding them . In other words, the subconsciously maintained propositions are the postulates for the actual deductions which consist in sudden an d decisive moves. W ha t individualsdo may be better (or worse) than what they consciously know they aredoing. Beliefs are common to th e individuals of a given culture . Theyexist within each individual yet they are social, for they exist within allthe individuals of the culture.

The re is no d ou bt t h a t w e are all susceptible to th e power of certain con

ceptions of which we are for the m ost pa rt un aw are . The first principleswe accept are so pervasive that we do not consider them at all but everything else in the light of th em . In s ho rt, we live inside a system of ontologywhich is altogether taken for granted, and this is what we have called theimplicit do m ina nt ontology . I t requ ires a trem end ou s effort of conc entrationafter prolonged preparation in dealing with abstractions of this sort, forthe individual to be able to make himself aware of his unconscious ontological beliefs (for that is what they are).

With the term, implicit dominant ontology, we have recognized, inaddition to H egel s com mu nity of conscious life , th e existence of a comm un ity of unconscious social life. Th e infant is ethically ne utra l : we arenot bo rn with a knowledge of good an d evil or with a conscience. W e aretau gh t by the acq uisition of a set of conditioned reflexes. These m ay bepsychological as well as physiological. H ab it pa tte rn s of think ing and ofemotional attitu de s a re also stimulus-response mechanisms.

Ontologies exis t also in exp licit social form. An implicit do m ina ntontology is found in th e my th of th e leading institu tion of th e culture. Theinstitutions within a culture are arranged in some order of importance, and





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this arran gem ent differs from c ulture to cultu re. Th us th e order is revealing.The first division of cultures is institutional, it is not the class struggle butthe institution al struggle th a t is th e mo st significant. Th e cultur e is dom inated by the institution it places first in order. For exam ple, th e Church wasthe leading institution in the Europe of the Middle Ages, while economicsan d politics are th e leading institu tion s of Soviet Ru ssia. I n th e MiddleAges the implicit dominant ontology fostered by the Church included thesuperiority of certain absolute values over the human values, original sin,and the par tially evil na tu re of m an du e to th e fall : th e idealistic philosophy based upon a realm of essence superior to ac tua l existence. I nSoviet Russia, the implicit dominant ontology fostered by the state includesthe superior reality of the means of production, of the class struggle, thesuperior values of th e pro letar iat : th e nom inalistic philosophy based upo na realm of existence supe rior to essence. I t ma y be difficult if no t impossibleto analyse the content of one s own my th witho ut getting outside th e circleof belief of which th a t m yth forms th e centre. Fo r everything in a c ultureis affected, from the merest details of economic life to the most grandioseconceptions of th e professional philosopher. Th e te rm m y th as we useit is intended to convey no opprobrium, it means a symbolic account contain ing a the ory (or eidos) of rea lity. I t is revea led in th e folkways as well

as in the order of institutions, and it is pervasive through the quality whichis termed the ethos.

I IThe foregoing discussion of culture and ontology and their interrelations

suggests certain methodological considerations. Th e classic concep tions ofphilosophy are swept away, for philosophy can no longer be limited to theab stra ct speculations of th e professional philosoph ers. Such m en are th e

theorists bu t th e theories the y develop can be applied. Their proce dure isuntouch ed, it is merely reinterp reted. W ha t is new is th e research an ddevelopm ent at th e empirical level. W e ha ve no t been think ing along lineswhich would make of the subject-matter of the cultural anthropologists andthe historian a fertile field of data for the hypotheses of the empirical ontol-ogist. Therefore we shall need to say a few words ab ou t th e em piricalproblem and its approaches, and then try to show what this adds to thework of the speculative ontologist.

The organization of things and events qua organization is also evidenceof th e force of ontology in existence. Those organiza tions whose po stula tesinclude false ontological propositions (and this must be true of every actualorganization to some extent) a re those which must suffer d iminution, degrad ation, and perhap s exterm ination. An organization exists and acts accordingto the forces of its ontological po stul ates . To act inconsiste ntly is to ac ti llogically; to act astructurally is to act unm athe m atica lly; and to actagainst the postulates is to act anti-ontologically.

The empirical ontological problem, then, can be formulated as follows.Given the institutions, tools, and folkways of actual cultures, to find the





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42 JAMES K. EEIBLEMAN

I I IThus far we have been viewing the relations between ontology and cul

tu re from the perspe ctive afforded b y cultu re. In oth er wo rds, we hav e

been considering th e cultura l functions of ontology. B ut we can tu rn t hepicture around and look at it from ano ther angle. W e can view th e relationsbetween ontology and culture from the perspective afforded by ontology,an d consider th e ontological functions of cultu re. W here cu lture ha s beenour chief concern, ontology will be substituted.

The fundamental theory of ontology involves inquiries which in a certainsense can never be answered with any finality or absolutene ss. Ye t ac tua lcultures are them selves th e frozen answers to ontological prob lem s. Unlesssuch answers are ma de tenta tively , the y ten d to block further inqu iry. Thisis the sense in which philosophy can act as a liberating force, as Russellpointed out. I t sets us free of fixed ab straction s which we ha ve been accepting as implicit beliefs. B ut th e forces of tra dit ion , which are th e conditionedhab its of cultures, are against change of an y kind . I n short, cultures inhibitfurther inquiry by giving final answers to ultimate questions.

W e see this at work in th e process of edu cation . I t has often been observed th at young children are na tur al me taphysician s. W ithin th e narrowlimits of their vocabulary, they do ask penetrating questions, such as howfar does space exte nd or who m ade God. Th e end prod uc t of th e processof education, however, transforms such basic inquiry and smothers thehunger it represents with the petty behaviour patterns of our complexsociety : th e rat rac e which consists in pay ing tax es , going to chu rch,earning a living, runn ing for street cars. Th e autho rities who adm inisterthis system have the temerity to consider the ultimate problems adequatelysolved. Th us far th e only institutions de voted to the necessity of keepingan open mind on tentative answers to such problems are the mathematical

an d empirical sciences an d the fine art s. The scientists and the a rtists arethe only ones who are able to save or else reca pture wh at Einstein h as somewhere described as the holy curiosity of inquiry , an atti tu de paradoxicallyso foreign to the established religions.

Most hum an cultures, then , me an inhibited inquiry . Although culturesare themselves the results of inquiry, their practice is to stand in the way offurther inqu iry. If curiosity is almo st as basic as food and sex, fru stratedinquiry may be almost as disastrous to society as frustrated sexual desires

are to the individ ual. The difficulties of ac tua l societies m ay to some exte nt bechara cterized as neuroses resulting from blocked inqu iry. B u t th e fact is th a tindividuals and human cultures do not live on the unsolved problems ofphilosophy bu t on incorporated and institutionalized solutions. Indiv idua llife is simply impossible otherwise, or so it ap pea rs. I t is th e purpo se ofwhat Emerson labelled perpetual inquiry to insure that such acceptance isnever irrevocable. Fo r an individual or an entire culture can progress onlyto the extent to which change is allowable, and improvement is permitted

only when th e final tr u th is held to be unkn ow n. M ilitant faith in badsolutions m ay be ha sty philosophy b ut it is also trad ition al pra ctice . To be





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CTXLTfjRE AS APPLIED ONTOLOGY 421

a realist, it is m istaken ly thou gh t, one m ust be a Pla ton ist. To be religiousmeans to most people to embrace the dogm a of some existing church. W homdo you follow That is the universal question.

But it may be that our failures and frustrations are due to an ambitionfor which hith erto we hav e not found the proper methodology. W e oughtto start by taking tiny steps toward ultimate goals, implementing finalcauses by mo re efficient m etho ds. W e oug ht to inves tigate the n atu ra lsociety. The cultural domain comprises th e laws and the structu re of thena tura l society. Some work toward the discovery of these has alreadybegun, bu t it is in a ten tat iv e stage only. Grim m s Law which describedthe shift in pronunciation of cognate words, imported into Europe fromAsia, the mutes moving forward two places, is an example of a cultural law.Ano ther has been suggested by Bryson . Th e rate of change in any cultureis a function of the complexity of the culture, so that the greater the complexity th e faster th e chan ge. Mu rdock an d othe rs in th e cross-culturesurvey at Yale have discovered more than seventy institutions and folkwayswhich appear, on historical evidence only, to be invariants for all cultures,prim itive as well as ad van ced . Th e lowest subdivision, th e ethnological, isindistinguishable from the highest, which is the subdivision of social psychology. At th e highest empirical subdivision we reach th e lowest level of

theo retical system s : ethics is th e highest subdivision of th e cultural dom ain.Above ethics lies ontology.

Speculative ontology seeks to discover the perfect ontology, which isthe implicit dom inant ontology of the na tur al society. The result of thisis the discovery of be tte r ontologies. Th e theo retic ideal is th e aim of everypra ctice . Th e social is th e highest of th e integrativ e levels, an d so it m ake sno sense to speak at once of the physical or the chemical as empirical andof th e psychological or social as no rm ativ e. The re is such a thing as a

natural society possible, and indeed it is only to the extent to which anyactual society deviates from the natural society that it becomes the productof inhibite d inqu iry. Th e tas k of discovering the perfect ontology is aspeculative one, its app lication the corresponding tas k of finding na tu rein th e social field. In o ther wo rds, th e natu ra l society would be an expressionof the perfect ontology.

Every institution in a culture, and many folkways, represent specificanswers m ade to ontological questions. Since we hav e no t reached absoluteand entirely satisfactory an swe rs, we are intere sted in th e questions. Therefore the first empirical assignment of the ontologist is to work back from theinstitutions and folkways of various culturesfrom the specific answers, inother words to the abs trac t formulations of the questions. Then the movement is to be reversed and go forward again to the hypotheses of betteranswers. Th is is th e empirical side of scientific cultur e the ory consideredin its synoptic aspect, and such aspect proves to be nothing less than appliedontology.

The aim of the theory set forth here, which has been to establish theclaims of th e search for tr u th , is ou t of th e ordina ry. To declare such claims





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officially estab lished would be to defeat th e sea rch . The seal of officialdomor of authority would be as fatal to the realism of the position advancedhere as it has been alread y to other philosophies. W e ha ve been occupiedmainly with a methodology, in an attempt to save speculative ontologyfrom vagueness and to point out the ready-made existence of empiricalontologies to be stud ied in the field. To bring tog eth er t h e spec ulative andempirical branches of ontology, after the manner of mathematical empiricism,would be to discover for ontology a way in which it could be used for theprediction and control of actual human cultures.

Tulane University of LouisianaJAM ES K. FEIBLEMAN




the philosophical quarterly 1951 feibleman 416 22

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