the political consequences of corruption: a reassessment

The Political Consequences of Corruption: A ReassessmentAuthor(s): Michael JohnstonSource: Comparative Politics, Vol. 18, No. 4 (Jul., 1986), pp. 459-477Published by: Ph.D. Program in Political Science of the City University of New YorkStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/421694 .

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The Political Consequences of Corruption

A Reassessment

Michael Johnston

An Inconclusive Debate

Disagreement continues over the political consequences of corruption. Perspectives on the question are almost as numerous as cases of corruption itself. Thus, the literature resists any easy classification into schools of thought. In general, however, "moralists" (a term used more by critics of this outlook than by its adherents) have long argued that corruption is harmful to societies and governments, impeding development and eroding the legitimacy even of honest elites and well-run institutions.' "Revisionists, by contrast, point to possible benefits of corruption, suggesting that it can speed up cumbersome procedures, buy political access for the excluded, and perhaps even produce de facto policies more effective than those emerging from legitimate channels.2 A third outlook suggests that the consequences of corruption depend in part upon the characteristics of political systems, such as the balance of political and economic opportunities,3 levels of economic development, national integration, and governmental capacity,4 or upon the relationships among key factions and elites.5

But while the debate has produced many useful studies of particular cases, its overall findings have been contradictory. In one sense, the debate has been curiously asymmetrical, with moralists arguing that corruption is harmful, while revisionists reply that it can be beneficial.6 Moralistic analyses also suffer, at times, from an a priori assumption that corruption is a bad thing (or that "legitimate" policies are inherently preferable to those produced corruptly) and tend to blame corruption for a disproportionate share of a society's problems. Revisionists, for their part, often rely too much upon anecdotal evidence, hypothetical cases, and speculative linkages between corruption and social outcomes.

This paper is an attempt to refocus the debate by calling attention to two recurring problems. First, I will argue that we have tended to focus upon overly broad (and at times unanswerable) questions. Before we can attribute general systemic trends and problems to corruption, we need to understand its more specific political effects. Second, I will suggest that we can reconcile seemingly contradictory findings if we recognize that corruption can come in many forms with differing consequences. Most forms of corruption, I will argue, can be studied as processes of exchange whose internal logic differs from one form to another. This approach will be used to define four common types of corruption and to point out the political consequences of each. These will be "micro" consequences, specifically the extent to which each tends to solidify or weaken linkages among people and groups at various strata of political systems.

This analysis is not intended to produce global generalizations about the implications of corruption for such systematic processes as economic or political development. Rather, it will propose categories which will allow us to employ the concept of corruption more

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precisely in our study of political systems and which will facilitate comparisons across systems and over time. A full test of these ideas is beyond the scope of this analysis, but I will discuss cases which illustrate some of the major characteristics and consequences of each of the categories and identify important questions for further research.

Definitions Definitions of corruption have been a matter of considerable debate in their own right.7 A definition incorporating all of the perceptual and normative subtleties is probably unattainable; perhaps for this reason, scholars have tended recently to avoid "over- defining" the phenomenon.8 At its most basic level, corruption is the abuse of public roles and resources for private benefit. "Abuse," in this sense, can be initiated by people who hold public positions or by those who seek to influence them. But by what standards can we identify "abuse"? Public norms and opinions represent one possibility; the "public interest" is another. But both are seriously deficient.9 The former rests on standards which are shifting, vague, and often contradictory, while the latter posits a standard which, in most issues and settings, does not exist.

A more stable and precise standard is the law or formal regulations. Laws change, but, unless we seek a single ultimate standard, this is an advantage, not a problem: contrasts or changes in laws allow us to compare the political processes and value conflicts involved in setting rules of behavior. Hence, the definition I will employ is based upon formal-legal norms and was formulated by J. S. Nye. Corruption is "behavior which deviates from the formal duties of a public role (elective or appointive) because of private-regarding (personal, close family, private clique) wealth or status gains: or (which) violates rules against the exercise of certain types of private-regarding influence."'10

Definitions such as Nye's have at times been criticized as being culturally biased, particularly when applied to nations where laws and institutions have been imposed or left behind by outsiders. Indeed,"western condescensions" and biases have been blamed both for outsiders' emphasizing corruption in developing nations" and for their ignoring it.12

In one sense, definitions such as Nye's are culturally biased only if we assume from the outset that corruption is a bad thing. In that case, to identify an action as corrupt is to condemn it as well. If we avoid such prejudgments, the formal-legal definition directs our attention to critical contrasts between official and social norms. At the same time, however, we cannot deny that conflicting conceptions of right and wrong are, in large part, what make corruption politically significant in the first place. How best, then, to include this cultural dimension in the study of corruption?

We cannot bridge this gap by attempting to build both social and legal norms into our basic definition. Corruption and the public perception that an action is corrupt are not necessarily the same thing; we may encounter either without the other.'3 Nor can we rely upon social opinions and perceptions alone: popular conceptions of right and wrong are vague and shifting, as noted above, and involve complex processes of rationalization, equivocation, and attribution of motives.14 Thus, surveys asking people to judge the "corruptness" or wrongness of actions find few sharp divisions between right and wrong, but rather a spectrum of finely graded judgments about which consensus can be quite weak. 15Definitions based upon these judgments will likely impose a false structure upon a set of subtle perceptions or produce categories which are unworkably numerous, unstable, and soft at their boundaries.

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A better approach is to use a definition such as Nye's to identify corruption and to incorporate social norms into a consideration of political responses (or nonresponses) to it. Instead of trying to merge fundamentally different notions of corruption into a single concept, this perspective focuses our attention upon the contrasts between social and official norms as a significant political question in its own right. Responses or nonresponses to corruption, be they on the part of the regime, of counterelites,16 or of ordinary citizens, are at times far more important politically than the corrupt actions themselves. Social norms will have much to do with whether or not actions are perceived as corrupt and with the type and strength of response (if any) to them. As we shall see, the varieties of corruption to be discussed vary in their degree of inclusiveness, and hence may be expected to elicit particular patterns of political response. Thus, while this analysis does not directly address the cultural dimension of corruption, it does point toward ways in which social perceptions can and should be incorporated into a consideration of the political significance of corruption.

Problems of Analysis

Analysts of corruption, whatever their outlook, encounter a number of problems. The most difficult is a pervasive lack of data, for those who know of corrupt transactions often have an interest in maintaining secrecy. There are also problems of comparability, across systems and over time. Moreover, by its very nature as wrongdoing, corruption arouses strong emotions, simultaneously posing normative and positive questions which are difficult to disentangle. The term "corruption" itself compounds the latter problem: Moodie contends that confusion over the nature of corruption persists in part "because writers have been loathe to sacrifice the element of moral disapproval inseparable from the word itself."

Two problems, however, have been particularly significant. First, we have not carefully defined our basic questions about the political consequences of corruption. Indeed, some of the most frequently posed questions cannot be answered at all, while others lead to circular arguments post hoc. Second, we have often tried to generalize about corruption as though it were a single unified phenomenon. Many proposed distinctions among types of corruption (high-level versus low-level, or bureaucratic versus other, often unspecified kinds) refer more to the location of corrupt processes than to their internal dynamics. I will suggest that categories defined by the internal logic of processes of exchange can enable us not only to distinguish among forms of corruption, but also to spell out some of their differing political consequences.

Asking Appropriate Questions To identify the consequences of corruption, we must first decide what kinds of effects we are looking for and where we might expect to find them. Too often, we have posed questions which are overly broad or even unanswerable.

Summary Judgments It makes little sense to ask whether corruption is inherently good or bad. For some, the fact that it is a departure from established rules is sufficient to make it harmful by definition. But this is precisely the reason why we cannot reach an absolute verdict, for judgment requires comparison with the rules or procedures being broken. As

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Leys asks, "What is the alternative?"''18 And in making these comparisons, we must judge official procedures by their actual content and consequences, not by stated goals or by the formal missions of the institutions involved. Unless we are willing to grant automatic approval to all policies and activities of the powers that be, we must acknowledge that corruption could at times create de facto policies less objectionable than their "legitimate" alternatives. "Normative statements about corruption," writes Rose-Ackerman, "require a point of view, a standard of 'goodness,' and a model of how corruption works in particular instances. . . . One does not condemn a Jew for bribing his way out of a concentration camp."'9

Corruption and Development A more focused question frequently posed is that of effects upon a system's development. This concern is a natural outgrowth of the fact that corruption is an overt part of political life in many developing nations (although openness is not in itself proof that corruption is necessarily more common or politically significant).20 Also, to the extent that development involves making the most of scarce resources, corruption again becomes a matter of concern as one influence upon the distribution and use of such resources.

But however tempting it is to explain trends in development in terms of corruption, here too there are problems. We have yet to sort out basic causal relationships: is corruption an influence upon development2' or a product of development?22 And what do we mean by "development"? Nye reminds us that development is not one problem, but many.23 Related to this is the need for "mediated" explanation, in which causal linkages are traced through the behavior of people and groups whose political roles are well-understood.24 Without such linkages, we may be limited to circular arguments25 "explaining" development by fitting evidence of corruption to past trends. This approach will very likely overstate the importance of corruption. Moreover, Ben-Dor argues that studies of developing nations do not add up to a theory, or even to a comprehensive set of observations; corruption and development may interact in very different ways in more advanced settings.26 Relationships between corruption and development are clearly worth careful study, but our understanding of them will depend upon what we learn by looking at many more limited political processes.

The Functionality Issue Finally, there is the frequently posed question of whether or not corruption is functional, aiding in the survival or successful adaptation of a regime, economy, or political system. This approach does at least invite comparisons between corruption and its realistic alternatives, but we may be posing questions which cannot be answered.

First, we must be clear on the meaning of "'functional." The concept is well-defined in theory,27 but its applications at times seem to imply that "functional" really means "beneficial." Such a proposition begs the same questions as assertions that corruption is inherently bad or good: again we must ask, "compared to what?" In any event, whole systems will rarely stand or fall because of corruption alone. We can apply functional concepts to more specific elements, such as a system's regime, aspects of its economy, or a particular accommodation among ethnic factions. But answers to functionality questions will then depend upon the particular aspects we choose for analysis: in Morocco, for example,

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Waterbury suggests that corruption in land reform policy was functional for the survival of the regime, but dysfunctional for economic growth.28 This in turn raises the question of short- versus long-term effects. In the Moroccan case, will enhanced regime stability eventually aid economic growth? Or will the marginal reduction in growth attributable to corruption come to threaten the regime? And-perhaps most difficult--is there an answer beyond "wait and see"?

Even where corruption helps a regime or other structure to persist, it does not leave that structure unchanged. Because corruption is an alternative to other processes of influence and allocation, its significant presence means that the system is different, to some degree, from what would otherwise have been observed. As Waterbury contends,

It is illusory to think that we can actually measure the costs and benefits of corruption. Either one is dealing with a country in which some level of corruption is apparent or with a country in which, at least for the sake of argument, no corruption is apparent. On the one hand, a discussion of the benefits of corruption would oblige the observer to make a purely hypothetical guess as to how the system would function without corruption, and on the other, how a noncorrupt system would function with corruption. One can convincingly and legitimately analyze only what actually is going on and what the costs and benefits seem to be. It is very difficult to suggest what the costs and benefits of some hypothetical process might be.29

Perhaps we can, at times, make intelligent estimates of possible political alternatives. Still, the basic point remains: we cannot really say whether or not corruption helps a system to survive. At best, we can discuss its role as a process operating within that system as altered by corruption.

Multiple Forms of Corruption Most systems will experience several sorts of corruption at any given time. Even if most of that corruption is politically inconsequential--as will often be the case-the important cases will very likely have differing implications for politics.

I have commented elsewhere at some length about a number of factors which affect the types and amounts of corruption to be found within political systems.30 These include social attachments and customs, such as political culture, popular attachment (or lack of it) to government, and social customs (such as kinship) which pose norms and obligations contrary to official rules; attributes of the policy process, including its speed, patterns of access and exclusion, and anticorruption laws and their enforcement; and economic characteristics, such as level of development and relative size of the public sector. These have a bearing upon the kinds of behavior which will be legally and socially defined as corrupt, upon the frequency and pervasiveness of corruption, and upon popular and official responses (or nonresponses) to that corruption which comes to light. The importance of these characteristics means that a full discussion of the implications of corruption in any given system must be constructed in the context of system-specific factors. The existence of ethnic factions among elites, the extent to which kinship norms mean that citizens and/or officials take a different view of patronage practices than does the law, or the exclusion of certain economic interests from decision-making processes, for example, can all be critical parts of the corruption story in specific settings.

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As a consequence, our comparisons of the political consequences of corruption must begin at a general level. But we can still draw significant distinctions among varieties of corruption, and explore their distinctive political consequences, if we define our types of

corruption in terms of their characteristics as processes of exchange.3' In most instances of corruption, things change hands. Money, jobs, contracts, licenses, building materials, favorable decisions: the list is as long and varied as the range of activities of government itself. Exchanges, in turn, imply some sort of relationship between people or groups, and these relationships can vary markedly from one form of exchange to another. Some corrupt exchanges may take place on more or less equal terms, while others amount to extortion. "'Partners in the relationship may be linked continuously or sporadically," as Dowse has

pointed out.32 Other kinds of corrupt exchange may be marked by the kinds of people and

groups they exclude. Thus, if we understand the internal logic of various forms of corrupt exchange, we can begin to compare their political consequences by exploring the kinds of relationships among people and groups which each will tend to create.

One way to compare varieties of corrupt exchange-which will be the focus of much of the rest of this analysis-is to distinguish between integrative and disintegrative corruption. Integrative corruption links people and groups into lasting networks of exchange and shared interest. Disintegrative corruption does not; indeed, it may well produce divisions and conflict, both among those involved in a corrupt enterprise and between those who are included and those left out. A related, but not identical, concern is the internal stability or instability of a form of corrupt exchange. Some varieties of integrative corruption will be less stable and lasting than others, while some types of disintegrative corruption may be

relatively stable internally, even though they may strongly alienate those who are left out of the spoils.

Integration and disintegration, stability and instability are posited here as characteristics of forms of corruption, not of the systems within which they occur. Integrative, stable corruption will not necessarily bring about a stable system if its effects are outweighed by other factors, nor will disintegrative corruption necessarily produce an unstable system. Moreover, "integrative" and "stable" do not necessarily mean "beneficial" or"just"; an integrative form of corruption could solidify the power of an authoritarian regime, while disintegrative corruption could help make way for welcome political changes. Nor, finally, do these categories merely bring back functionality by another name. As we shall see, integrative and disintegrative forms of corruption can be identified by their characteristics as

processes of exchange, not by their results. We need not know, or await, macro outcomes in order to categorize a form of corruption. Instead, these categories direct our attention to characteristic forms of interaction among people and groups within systems. If we do wish to consider wider trends and events, we can incorporate our understanding of these specific consequences of corruption into our more general knowledge of the system.

Varieties of Corrupt Exchange

In attempting to distinguish integrative from disintegrative forms of corrupt exchange, we have many possible bases of comparison. One is price: do the corrupt prices of contracts or jobs, for example, remain fairly constant, or do they fluctuate wildly? Another aspect is

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repetition: black market purchases in the gastronoms of Moscow are a routine and repeated event for both buyer and seller,33 while persons seeking kickbacks from major defense contracts might have to wait for years. Price and repetition interact: those engaging in repeated transactions may settle for moderate prices and profits on each transaction, while persons trading in the extraordinary may push prices as high as possible since similar opportunities may be unlikely to recur any time soon. An exchange may be relatively equal (a bribe in exchange for a permit) or unequal and coercive (the Nixon campaign's threats of regulatory harassment against corporations unless they contributed to the reelection effort).34 Some exchanges might be open to most who wish to participate (black market dealings, again), or closed to all but a privileged few. In the latter connection, corruption can often become a process of exclusion whereby one denies resources, influence, or opportunities to one's rivals. Finally, the stakes of exchange may be tangible or intangible, durable or nondurable. The point is that an exchange perspective allows us to classify forms of corruption (and legitimate dealings, if we wish) by their internal dynamics, rather than by the places they occur or by their popular labels.35

Two factors, however, best set integrative forms of corruption apart from disintegrative forms: the number of suppliers dispensing corrupt benefits (many versus few or one), and the degree to which the stakes of exchange are routine or extraordinary. "Routine" stakes are of modest scale and, while often in short supply, are at least available on a continuing basis, such as the small favors dispensed by political machines (although they are obviously not completely routine, or else no one could use them to extract significant illegitimate returns). "Extraordinary" stakes are unusually valuable and/or scarce: windfall profits on foreign exchange markets, perhaps, or very large construction contracts are examples of extraordinary stakes. I leave undefined for now the precise distinctions between few and many suppliers and between routine and extraordinary stakes; these may vary from system to system and will in any event involve subjective estimates on the part of participants.

These two factors relate to several other dimensions of exchange. Routine stakes imply repeated exchanges and will likely command relatively consistent prices. A large number of suppliers should, in most instances, moderate prices as well and also mark the presence of repeated exchanges. Where suppliers are few, by contrast, transactions can be tightly controlled, and corruption aimed at exclusion will be more common. Exchanges involving routine stakes should encourage frequent contacts and linkages between suppliers and clients; this integrative effect can become pervasive if routine stakes are available from many suppliers. When stakes are extraordinary or suppliers few, on the other hand, such linkages would be less likely to develop. Indeed, these sorts of exchanges may lead to alienation or conflict between suppliers and clients, or between those included in the exchanges and those left out. While numbers of suppliers and types of stakes do not directly address the demand side of corrupt exchanges, I assume a level of demand which substantially exceeds the supply of stakes available through legitimate channels; this after all is a major reason why corruption occurs in the first place.36 The degree to which demand exceeds supplies available through illegitimate channels is reflected, at least crudely, in the distinction between routine and extraordinary stakes.

Together, these two variables-number of suppliers and routine versus extraordinary stakes-point to four common types of corruption which vary significantly in their

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integrative or disintegrative effects. These types, and some representative examples, are shown in Figure 1.

Some comments are in order here as to just what Figure 1 does and does not represent. The cell entries are examples of corruption within systems, not whole systems themselves; thus, the terms "stable," "disintegrative," and the like refer to the patterns of corrupt activity, not to the politics of entire nations. Second, since most systems experience more than one form of corruption at a time, nations may appear in more than one cell, as in the case of Mexico. Third, corruption is not proposed here as necessarily explaining macro outcomes in these systems, such as the fall of the Shah in Iran (cell 3), even though the role of corruption in such events is worth study. Fourth, while the examples included in Figure 1 all involve corruption as defined under the formal rules of the nations in question, I am not labeling all patronage, informal markets, or dealings among cronies as necessarily corrupt. That judgment, as Nye's definition implies, will depend upon the laws in a given setting. Finally, Figure 1 is not proposed as a final answer to the consequences-of-corruption debate. Some forms of corruption, such as those not taking the form of exchanges, may not fit these categories at all. Instead, the idea is to show how a focus on varieties of corrupt exchange can help us to understand the various political consequences of corruption.

Market Corruption Market corruption is perhaps best exemplified by the black markets, na levo transactions, and false reporting practices (pripiska) which are so much a part of life and commerce in much of the USSR.3' These transactions range from a clerk's demanding extra payments or favors in exchange for choice consumer goods, to the widespread illegal bartering and reporting of false data among business enterprises struggling to meet their planned quotas. Katsenelinboigen has described a number of "coloured markets" in the USSR which vary in their legal and political status and in their modes of exchange.38

In other settings, many of these activities would not be corruption as Nye has defined it,

Figure 1 Varieties of Corruption as Defined by Types of Stakes and Number of Suppliers STAKES

Routine Extraordinary

i. Market Corruption 4. Crisis Corruption

(Black markets, pripiska (Bolivia; Mexico during oil in USSR) boom;"rapacious individualism"

in 19th-century New York) Many

Integrative Disintegrative Very stable Very unstable

SUPPLIERS

2. Patronage organizations, 3. Cronyism, Nepotism patron-client networks

Few (urban machines; PRI in Mexico) (Sukarno's Indonesia; Iran mid 70s)

Integrative Internally integrative Stable Externally disintegrative

Somewhat unstable

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for they would not involve public roles or resources. But in the USSR the reach of laws and of the planning apparatus is so extensive that many otherwise private roles and transactions are defined as public.

The very broad scope of criminal regulation reflects the primacy of state property in Soviet law and the "total" character of political management over organisational life.

Anybody with authority in any recognized organization in the Soviet Union is a "servant of the state," even if the organisation (say a trade union) is not officially regarded as a state organisation. Any holder of office is responsible to the political authority and his or her obligations to the state are defined by criminal law as well as administrative rules. The list of possible abuses is, then, a long one.39

Thus, the black market dealings of a functionary in a Moscow gastronom and the pripiska maneuverings of a factory clerk are just as surely corruption as the misappropriation of construction supplies by a government official. In fact, all three would likely be prosecuted under the same section of Soviet law ("crimes against socialist property"). Market corruption, of course, is not limited to Soviet-style systems; agencies elsewhere in which a number of functionaries demand small payments in exchange for routine services, such as the issuance of business permits or ration documents, fit the market corruption model as well.

Market corruption draws buyers and sellers into networks of mutual self-interest which can become quite large and pervasive. Simis contends, for example, that because of the rigidity of planned quotas pripiska practices are "necessary and useful not only to the party doing the cheating but also to the party that is being cheated.'"4' The more routine the stakes and repetitive the transactions--purchases of basic raw materials by a factory, for example-the stronger this integrative effect is likely to be. Market corruption is relatively stable internally as well: competition among suppliers and the probability that transactions will be repeated should produce relatively constant prices and terms of exchange. There will be little incentive to "gouge" regular clients on any one exchange.

Given its stability and integrative nature, it is not surprising that in the Soviet case, for example, authorities often "wink" at market corruption.4' It can help planners and producers alike to finesse-or at least conceal--production bottlenecks and is far less disruptive than facing up to actual economic problems and mounting serious reforms. Official toleration of market corruption in turn allows its integrative effects to extend well beyond the ranks of immediate participants themselves.

These integrative effects do have their limits: market corruption, like any other market, can be disrupted by external developments, especially to the extent that they make routine stakes scarce (and thus extraordinary, at least temporarily) or significantly reduce the number of suppliers. Moreover, the problems of imperfect information which occur in any market can be all the more serious here, for the illegitimate nature of market corruption means that participants often must communicate by word of mouth rather than more overtly. Even where discreet market corruption is tolerated, authorities may be forced to intervene once it crosses some threshold of visibility. Finally, there are questions of consumers' perceptions. I do not assume that consumers like market corruption (they very likely will not), but rather that they perceive it as the most workable way of obtaining things they want

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or need. This perception may be gradually undermined by rising prices, for example, or dashed more abruptly if consumers come to believe that underlying scarcities are artificially contrived or that more desirable alternative processes are really possible. When either of these things happens, market corruption networks can be severely disrupted.

Still, market corruption is a stable and integrative pattern of corrupt exchange, so much that regimes attempting to eradicate it often encounter great difficulty. Even when corrupt markets have been disrupted, there typically remain significant imbalances of supply and demand which must be addressed by one mechanism or another. These may range from the creation of legitimate alternative markets to stepped-up coercion, but the result may well be the reemergence of market corruption.

Patronage Networks and Machines When routine stakes of corrupt exchange are held in fewer hands, they can be used to build and maintain extended patron-client networks. These centralized networks of benefit and obligation can be found in many forms. In traditional patron-client systems relationships tend to be "multiplex"42 and diffuse, involving several overlapping and reinforcing kinds of ties (such as kinship, region, and political party). In other instances, such as urban political machines, relationships may be more specific and

obligations more limited: loyal voting may be enough payment for political "help" in a

scrape with the police. Corrupt transactions, as defined by Nye, make up only a part of the overall pattern of patron-client exchange, particularly in cases of traditional, "multiplex" systems.

Patronage organizations can be integrative and stable, as the very term "machine" implies.43 Centralized control over things people need and the organization of action and supervision along clear-cut hierarchical lines can draw large numbers of people into extended networks of personal and political obligation. These in turn can be employed for disciplined political action, such as winning elections, or for more generalized forms of

cooptation. An example of the latter sort was Morocco's "planned corruption," as analyzed by Waterbury: there, the corrupt distribution of small plots of land by land reform agencies became a form of patronage "manipulated, guided, planned and desired by the regime itself. 44

But these networks are somewhat less stable than systems of market corruption, particularly to the extent that the stakes of exchange are specific rather than multiplex and diffuse. Analysis of the internal economies of political machines, for example, reveals contradictions and sources of instability.45 One may distribute short-lived rewards (such as food or small gifts of cash) pretty much as one likes, but once "durable" rewards such as

jobs have been distributed it can be very difficult to change allocations without a fight. As a result, key subleaders and factions may command a disproportionate share of the spoils long after their political performance has entered a decline. Networks of obligation and exchange can thus become rigid and overly complex, as multiple standards of reciprocity emerge between leaders and various factions; the organization may adapt poorly to changing circumstances or fall victim to factional disputes. In a sense, a patronage organization can "age" in ways which more internally fluid systems of market corruption do not.

Patronage organizations will also be less integrative than market corruption. While patronage networks can become quite large, they still link fewer people together than do entrenched cases of market corruption: even the largest pool of rewards will stretch only so

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far. Moreover, while market corruption typically revolves around frequently repeated transactions serving the short-term interests of both buyer and seller, some kinds of patronage (jobs, for example, or important contracts) change hands less often. Opportunities to call in the debts may be infrequent as well, with return "payments" proving difficult to extract over time.46 Perhaps for this reason, a political proverb has it that a patron who has one available job and ten followers will end up with "nine enemies and one ingrate."

Finally, to be most effective at integration, those who control the stakes must enjoy as close to a monopoly as possible. If one's clients have somewhere else to turn, one must offer them more and expect less in return; the resulting organization will be the smaller and more unreliable as a result. Shefter has described a phase in the emergence of machine politics in New York City during which an oligopoly of patronage groupings, each with its pool of public spoils, competed for power.47 Compared to the "rapacious individualism" of the era immediately preceding, these organizations were relatively integrative and stable. But for most of the 1870s and 1880s, none was able to dominate the city; thus, patrons could not monopolize rewards, or impose effective discipline. It was not until Tammany Hall defeated its rivals that New York experienced machine politics at its most disciplined and integrative. The most advantageous monopoly, almost by definition, is control of a government. But even then integration has its limits, for beyond a certain point further inclusiveness dilutes the already limited pool of spoils while yielding few new advantages; moreover, the very presence and power of a monopoly machine can give the excluded an issue around which to organize.

Cronyism and Nepotism The essence of cronyism and nepotism is the control of extraordinary stakes of exchange by one or a few persons. "Extraordinary" refers to the scale or scarcity of the stakes of exchange; it does not imply that cronyism or nepotism themselves are necessarily extraordinary occurrences. Extraordinary stakes might include lucrative business concessions, appointments to key positions, unusually generous buy-outs of private businesses by a nationalizing authority, or access to large supplies of hard currency, to name but a few examples. Control over such valuable stakes creates both opportunities and incentives to distribute them in a corrupt manner. But one would hardly distribute them directly to a mass following, for not only are they too few in number, they are also much too valuable. Better to distribute them among a small group of elites or family members, who could be expected to do more in return, and who in any case would not be satisfied with petty favors.

Cronyism and nepotism are thus small group affairs, at least as compared to market corruption and patronage organizations, and the complex and ambivalent consequences noted in Figure 1 derive from this fact. Cronyism and nepotism are to a limited degree internally integrative, drawing participants into relationships of obligation and reward and fostering collective interests in maintaining secrecy and in excluding outsiders. Internal integration is weakened, however, by the fact that cronyism and nepotism are somewhat unstable. Extraordinary stakes do not lend themselves to repeated exchange; thus, the constant intersections of self-interest and reminders of obligation characterizing market corruption and patronage are not so strongly present. In cases of nepotism, these internal weaknesses can be minimized somewhat by the binding force of kinship; but even then there may be relatively infrequent exchanges which will differ markedly from one instance to the

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next or may even be unique. Thus, terms of exchange may have to be worked out from the beginning in each case, instead of being fixed by routine expectations. Partners in market corruption transactions and clients receiving a patron's routine favors know fairly well what is expected of them and know that terms will not differ markedly from one time to the next. By contrast, an elite who has an import concession, a key appointment, and a construction contract to hand out among cronies or relatives has few obvious rules of reciprocity to go by. The various potential recipients will likely possess different kinds of political currency (money, expertise, or a mass following), and a transaction which cannot soon be repeated contains built-in incentives to maximize returns, without much regard for evenhandedness.48 At the very least, such a situation encourages rivalries among potential recipients; indeed, it may well lead to factional conflict, to limited and grudging commitments from the winners and resentments among the losers.

Springborg's analysis of shillas in Egypt offers one example of the functions and limitations of cronyism and nepotism. Shillas-systems of cronyism,49 often reinforced by kinship-were particularly important during the Nasser era. Less lasting and "multiplex" than traditional patronage, they were networks of "lopsided friendships"50 among figures in the government and bureaucracy seeking to share in the sizable spoils available at the top of the regime.5' Shillas at times took on the form of bureaucratic empires, but their strength and stability were limited.

Not only did few of those under Nasser . . . enjoy permanent incumbency in their respective empires-hence the power to keep clientage networks intact-but those below these chief patrons . . . generally viewed clientage obligations as open-ended and not requiring suicidal devotion to a patron in permanent or even temporary disgrace.52

Thus, when in 1960-61 Sayed Bei Marei, head of the agricultural bureaucracy and leader of a prominent shilla, incurred the enmity of his rivals in the top elite, he was unable to avoid his downfall despite his sizable following. All was not lost, however; when Marei was reinstated some years later he was able to bring much of his old following back into politics. A combination of personal loyalty and kinship, as well as political self-interest, had kept the shilla ties alive.53 Cronyism may thus require other kinds of support, such as a network of kinship ties or the formal interrelationships among the offices under a group's control, in order to overcome its own internal instabilities.

Cronyism in particular depends for its internal stability upon the relevant group's political security, as Scott points out in his discussion of Sukarno's Indonesia. Cronyism was rife under Guided Democracy, with a group of businessmen emerging as "palace millionaires" on the strength of special concessions.54 But their political status was far from secure; indeed, "the ruling group under Guided Democracy was a coalition of civilian-military cliques which had their hands full merely maintaining themselves in power.

... ."55 This

political insecurity led to a "chaotic hand-over-fist pattern of corruption"56 in which all concerned, knowing their opportunities might not last, gouged out the largest returns in the shortest possible time.

In Egypt, too, an increasingly fluid political situation changed the nature of cronyism, as Springborg wrote in the late 1970s.

The erosion of patronage solidarities in Sadat's relatively free-wheeling system has been

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accompanied by a scramble by one and all to cash in on available opportunities. ... Marei, for example, like many other well-placed Egyptians, has fallen back on the family to pull off smash-and-grab jobs. ... Sadat's decentralization of the polity and economy has caused clientage networks in the center to be eroded, and family solidarities to be greatly strengthened by the adhesive of cash.57

The political persistence of family ties in such a fluid situation suggests that it is a particularly durable and important variant of cronyism.

Cronyism and nepotism may be somewhat integrative for those directly involved, but for the wider political system they will likely be disintegrative. Unless the political stratum is exceedingly small, many more politically active people will be excluded from the benefits than are included. Exclusion can in turn hand opposing groups significant issues and grievances, made all the more powerful by the important nature of the stakes. Hurstfield describes such a case in mid-sixteenth-century England. Long-standing cronyism and nepotism in filling bureaucratic positions had produced a close-knit elite stratum. But this process of integration was undermined by a rapid increase in the number of persons seeking the positions at stake.

From [the] growth in the bureaucracy, it might have been deduced that a larger part of each generation would have been absorbed into the government service and therefore become defenders of the existing order. In fact, the reverse happened. The expansion of the bureaucracy occurred at a time when the educational system was itself expanding in a manner unparalleled until the twentieth century. . . . From the universities each year were streaming many more educated young men than could possibly be absorbed into the available offices . . . . For the many who failed to gain a place the explanation was simple enough. Appointments were in the hands of a small governing clique and their dependents who maintained a tight grip on the distribution of office and the rewards which went with it. Public careers were not open to men of talent but to the hangers-on of privilege. In many cases, this was true; and this was corruption.58

Thus, so long as the political stratum is very small, cronyism and nepotism can be a significant integrative force. But when that stratum becomes large enough that the excluded sizably outnumber the included, the disintegrative effects become much more important. Hurstfield concludes that the years following this development were marked by "increasing complaints about extravagance and corruption."59

Opposition by the excluded will not necessarily lead to upheaval. But even a relatively secure group of cronies may have to resort to secrecy, cooptation, or coercion in order to protect itself, and these responses can become significant issues in their own right. The last decade of the Shah's Iran might be worth study in this connection: corruption among friends and relatives of the Shah, fueled in part by extraordinary growth in oil revenues, was a major grievance among the opposition.60 The practitioners of corruption were probably protected for a time by the regime's crackdown against dissidents, but over the longer run cronyism and nepotism may have helped to weaken the Shah's hold on power.

Crisis Corruption Finally, we are left with crisis corruption: many suppliers trading in extraordinary stakes. On its face, this would seem an impossibility: if the stakes are truly

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extraordinary, how can there be many suppliers? The answer is linked to the very unstable nature of this form of corruption. In a system undergoing a crisis of institutionalization,61 for example, private parties may have so thoroughly penetrated the public realm that most public goods and decisions are up for sale. In such a case, extraordinary stakes of many sorts might be constantly coming into the market. Alternatively, a system might experience an extraordinary influx of illicit resources from without, under the control of many entrepreneurs (say, money from numerous drug dealers). The term "crisis" is perhaps overly vivid, but it does convey an important double meaning. First, it reflects the scale and significance of this form of corruption; and second, it suggests that, because of its instability and disintegrative effects, crisis corruption will be a temporary phase. It could revert to another of our forms of corruption, or the unusual conditions which permit its emergence might pass from the scene. Or, though by no means inevitably, crisis corruption could contribute to sweeping political change. Whatever the scenario, crisis corruption is unlikely to become a permanent condition.

Crisis corruption can emerge in the form of new networks of influence and exchange or may transform the old, at least temporarily. An example of the first sort was the case of cocaine-related corruption in Bolivia. There, Alexander reports, "[w]ith the seizure of power in 1980 by General Luis Garcia Meza, the country's drug smugglers took over the government."62 The stakes of the cocaine trade-over $2 billion in 1981--were truly extraordinary for a poor nation. Within a year of the Meza coup, at least three major drug-smuggling rings had emerged.

Drug smuggling mushroomed into an activity that overshadowed all other aspects of the economy . . . . The predominance of the drug smugglers has also greatly aggravated a problem that Bolivia has always had-that of corruption. Since the drug trade was practiced by the highest officials of the Bolivian government, the effect was to make corruption in the government service all but universal.63

Disintegrative consequences were visible, in the short term, in the form of disrupted government functions and the general scramble of the elite for drug-related wealth. Long-term effects may still be unfolding: Alexander speculated in 1981 that the regime might become vulnerable to the reactions of those appalled by the "international disgrace" of Bolivia's corruption.64 This is just what occurred; in 1982, Meza's regime was ousted in favor of a civilian government. The new government, however, has been weak and internally divided and has had little success in dealing with the chaos left behind from the Meza years. The disintegrative effects of drug-related crisis corruption in Bolivia were quite persuasive.

Mexico presents a case in which, by contrast, an influx of extraordinary resources-in this case, rapidly growing oil revenues -transformed existing alignments. Key figures in PEMEX (the state oil corporation), the Oil Workers' Union, and the dominant political party (PRI) had long enjoyed a number of politically significant and mutually profitable corrupt arrangements. But when oil revenues began to grow rapidly in 1977, this corruption became particularly flagrant and disruptive.65 Old "arrangements" in the oil industry gave way to intense competition over shares of the new wealth. The new abuses became matters of considerable controversy, and PEMEX, PRI, and union figures came under political attack

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from several quarters.66 For a number of reasons -not the least of which was the strength of PRI's "extended political family"--this episode did not upset the entire system. But by 1982, when the oil boom had run its course, "it was evident that the nation had been 'sacked' by more than one set of actors. . .. According to the government's own admission the oil boom had whetted unsavory appetities in the nation and had spawned a substantial increase in the level of corruption throughout the nation."''67 Growth of oil revenues had thus placed extraordinary resources in many hands, transforming formerly integrative forms of corruption into disintegrative crisis corruption. When President Miguel de la Madrid took office in 1982, "a system that had never worked smoothly without corruption was no longer working smoothly because of excessive corruption."68

Crisis corruption is internally unstable: the proliferation of suppliers will not produce stable prices through competition if suppliers deal in different commodities, and in any event the extraordinary nature of the stakes encourages the extraction of maximum immediate returns. Crisis corruption is politically disintegrative as well, and not merely because of the macro trends which can make it possible. Corrupt exchanges will not draw people and groups together into networks of mutual interest and obligation. Instead, at the elite level the pattern may be one of disconnected cases of extortion, in which transactions are made because access to extraordinary stakes on exploitative terms is better than no access at all. Nonelites will likely be excluded altogether for lack of sufficient resources; for them, crisis corruption may well be experienced in terms of disrupted markets and political disorder.

But crisis corruption is not inevitably a final stage of political disintegration. A leveling off in the influx of resources might make the stakes of corruption more predictable, and thus less extraordinary, with improved chances of repeated profits over longer periods of time serving to moderate prices and to regulate terms of exchange. Mexico's oil industry had gone through earlier phases of rapid growth and flagrant corruption, reverting to more accustomed forms of corruption during periods of more stable revenues.69

Alternatively, a few suppliers of corrupt stakes might become sufficiently powerful to impose a degree of order upon corrupt processes, perhaps producing one or more systems of cronyism or patronage. This occurred in nineteenth-century New York. An era of rapid urbanization and growth in the duties and resources of local government had given rise to the period of "rapacious individualism" noted earlier. During this phase, which culminated in the collapse of the Tweed Ring in 1872, "politics in New York was Namierian in its complexity . . . major politicians were essentially independent political operators"7? using their shares of the spoils to attempt to hold together political followings. Dozens of loose and shifting factions contended for power. "The political system of mid-nineteenth-century New York was easily penetrated by external authorities," and "corruption appears to have done as much to subvert as to strengthen party ties.''71 But "rapacious individualism" gave way to a relatively stable and integrative oligopoly of patronage organization, as noted earlier. "During the 1870s and 1880s, by contrast, a set of party organizations emerged that were few in number, fairly stable in duration, substantially more coherent in their structure, and did provide a linkage between the city's electoral and governmental arenas."72 Corruption was still central to the existence of these organizations, but years of political conflict had meant that a relatively few survivors now controlled larger pools of spoils.

Such an integrative outcome, however, is no more inevitable than is complete political disintegration. Crisis corruption is more disruptive than any of the other three forms of

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corruption in Figure 1 both because of the conditions that can help to bring it about and because of its internal logic as a process of exchange.

Conclusion

The debate over the consequences of corruption thus has not one answer, but many. I have discussed four types of corruption, as defined by their internal logic as processes of exchange, and have characterized them in terms of their politically integrative and disintegrative effects. Some kinds of corruption will be difficult to categorize, and other dimensions of the exchange process, such as the consumption of the stakes of exchange,73 may merit examination as well. But this analysis does offer a way to identify important similarities and contrasts among the diverse settings, practices, and vocabularies encountered in the study of corruption.

The effects of corruption, however, do not necessarily extend throughout a political system. Indeed, in an earlier section I warned against using the concept to explain too much. The impact of corruption upon systemic trends and events is mediated by long chains of linkages and contingencies and must in any event be balanced off against other causal factors. Quick generalizations will thus prove both difficult and risky to make.

Political reactions to corruption will also figure into the story. Often, reactions to corruption are more important than the actual wrongdoing itself, and these reactions are a complex matter in their own right. If we presume that those with a stake in corrupt exchanges are less likely to react against them than are the excluded, then analysis of the integrative or disintegrative consequences of particular forms of corruption can help us to understand political responses. Exclusion from corruption by no means guarantees a negative response, however, or indeed any response at all. The excluded may be unaware of corruption or may not believe the allegations they hear; if they do perceive the existence of corruption, their reactions may include apathy, tolerance, amusement, surprise, and/or anger, or attempts to get into the game themselves. These reactions will hinge upon the type and extent of corruption involved, people's perceptions of their own gains or losses from it, and their beliefs about the nature of right and wrong, to name but a few factors. Clearly, the presence and activities of counterelites in publicizing, explaining, and interpreting news and allegations of corruption will be most important in influencing political responses.

In a sense, though, each form of corruption creates a particular pattern of shared interests and cleavages in the society around it. Thus, we might begin to link corruption to more general trends and events by considering factors which might make these effects more or less pervasive. Clearly, the more corruption a society experiences, the more important its political effects are likely to be. But I am concerned here with a somewhat different issue: given a certain level of corruption, how pervasive will its integrative or disintegrative effects become?

Two propositions relating to this question have to do with the general setting of corruption. First, the larger the stakes involved in a given form of corrupt exchange relative to the overall size of the economy, and second, the fewer (or less attractive) the alternative opportunities to win political or economic advantage, the more pervasive the integrative or disintegrative consequences of corruption will be. For integrative forms of corruption, high

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stakes or the existence of few alternatives will increase the incentive for outsiders to attempt to join in the spoils. In cases of disintegrative corruption, these circumstances affect included and excluded parties in different ways. For the included, high stakes and few alternatives are likely to increase the costs and risks of corrupt transactions, while reducing their predictability and the degree of bargaining power one is likely to possess. For the excluded, these circumstances increase the political and economic costs of exclusion, which in turn is likely to increase the intensity of their reactions to corruption.

For integrative forms of corruption, inclusiveness or ease of joining is important. A Soviet consumer can enter into some kinds of market corruption simply by cultivating trust and friendships at a neighborhood market. A political machine, by contrast, is more difficult to join. Not only is its pool of resources more limited, but because the stakes are tightly controlled one may have to endure a lengthy probation period before being cut into the spoils. Thus, I would suggest that the easier it is for outsiders to enter into an integrative form of corruption, the more pervasive its effects will be.

Exclusion, rather than inclusion, is more likely to be an important factor in cases of disintegrative corruption. Most people are likely to be closed out of cronyism or nepotism and will not possess the table stakes needed to buy into the crisis corruption game. Therefore, it is important to compare the lines of exclusion to existing divisions in society. The more the boundaries of a disintegrative form of corruption correspond with existing class, racial, ethnic, and factional cleavages in society, the more pervasive its political effects will be. Where this correspondence is close, corruption is likely to become yet another issue in intergroup conflict, perhaps serving as the "justification" for reprisals or coups.

Although these comments are of necessity general, they may at least serve to illustrate the complexities inherent in linking corruption to systemic political trends and events. Applying these ideas to particular cases will require a knowledge of the systems involved and of the extent to which the linkages and divisions fostered by corruption correspond with the more basic fault lines of society. But this is no more than to observe that the more general consequences of particular forms of corruption, like those of any other kind of political behavior, will depend in part upon the setting in which it occurs.

NOTES

An earlier version of this analysis was presented to the International Political Science Association Research Roundtable on Political Finance and Political Corruption, Pembroke College, Oxford, England, March 1984. 1 am greatly indebted to Douglas Ashford, R. C. Crook, Arnold J. Heidenheimer, Christopher Hood, Joseph LaPalombara, Graeme Moodie, Daniel Regan, Bert Rockman, Dorothy Solinger, Stephen White, and two anonymous reviewers for their most helpful comments and suggestions.

1. See, for example, Stanislav Andreski, "Kleptocracy: or, Corruption as a System of Government," in Stanislav Andreski, ed., The African Predicament: A Study in the Pathology of Modernization (London: Michael Joseph, 1968), pp. 92-109; George C. S. Benson, Steven A. Maaranen, and Alan Heslop, Political Corruption in America (Lexington: D.C. Heath, 1978); Gunnar Myrdal, "Corruption: Its Causes and Effects," in Gunnar Myrdal, Asian Drama: An Enquiry into the Poverty of Nations, vol. 2 (New York: Twentieth Century, 1968), pp. 937-958; Ronald Wraith and Edgar Simpkins,Corruption in Developing Nations (London: Allen and Unwin, 1963).

2. See, for example, Jose V. Abueva, "The Contribution of Nepotism, Spoils and Graft to Political Development," East-West Center Review, 3 (1966), 45-54; David H. Bayley, "The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation,' Western Political Quarterly, 19 (December 1966), 719-32; Nathaniel H. Leff, "Economic Development through

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Bureaucratic Corruption.' American Behavioral Scientist, 8 (November 1964), 8-14; Colin Leys, "What Is the Problem about Corruption?," Journal of Modern African Studies, 3 (August 1965), 215-230.

3. Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968). 4. Joseph S. Nye, "Corruption and Political Development: A Cost-Benefit Analysis," American Political Science

Review, 61 (June 1967), 417-427. 5. James C. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1972). 6. Nye, p. 419. 7. Arnold J. Heidenheimer, "The Context of Analysis," in Arnold J. Heidenheimer, ed., Political Corruption:

Readings in Comparative Analysis (New Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1978), pp. 3-28. 8. Anne Deysine, "Political Corruption: A Review of the Literature," European Journal of Political Research, 8

(December 1980), 447-462. 9. Michael Johnston, Political Corruption and Public Policy in America (Monterey: Brooks-Cole, 1982), chap. 1;

Scott, pp. 3-9. 10. Nye, p. 416; the final clause of the definition is from Edward C. Banfield, Political Influence (New York: Free

Press, 1961), p. 315. 11. Abueva, pp. 45-48. 12. Myrdal, p. 939; Andreski, p. 93. 13. Graeme C. Moodie, "On Political Scandals and Corruption,' Government and Opposition, 15 (Spring 1980),

208-210. 14. Stuart Henry, The Hidden Economy: The Context and Control of Borderline Crime (London: Martin Robinson,

1978); S. Chibnall and P. Saunders, "Worlds Apart: Notes on the Social Reality of Corruption," British Journal of Sociology, 28 (June 1977), 138-154; Erwin O. Smigel, "Public Attitudes towards Stealing as Related to the Size of the Victim Organization," in Erwin O. Smigel and H. Laurence Ross, eds., Crimes against Bureaucracy (New York: Van Nostrand, 1970).

15. For American data, see Michael Johnston, "Right and Wrong in American Politics: Popular Conceptions of Corruption," Polity, 18 (Spring 1986); for survey data gathered in Great Britain, see Michael Johnston and Douglas Wood, "Right and Wrong in Public and Private Life," in Roger Jowell and Sharon Witherspoon, eds., British Social Attitudes: The 1985 Report (London: Gower, 1985), pp. 121-147.

16. I am indebted to Joseph LaPalombara for his comments on this point. 17. Moodie, p. 214. 18. Leys, p. 220. 19. Susan Rose-Ackerman, Corruption: A Study in Political Economy (New York: Academic Press, 1978), p. 9. 20. John Waterbury, "Endemic and Planned Corruption in a Monarchical Regime," World Politics, 25 (July 1973),

534. 21. Abueva, pp. 45-54; Leff, pp. 8-14; Myrdal, pp. 937-958; Nye, pp. 417-427; Gabriel Ben-Dor, "Corruption,

Institutionalization, and Political Development: The Revisionist Theses Revisited," Comparative Political Studies, 7 (April 1974), 63-83; John Waterbury, "Corruption, Political Stability and Development: Comparative Evidence from Egypt and Morocco," Government and Opposition, 11 (Autumn 1976), 426-445.

22. Huntington, pp. 59-71. 23. Nye, pp. 418-419. 24. David R. Cameron, "Toward a Theory of Political Mobilization," Journal of Politics, 36 (February 1974),

139-140. 25. Nye, p. 419. 26. Ben-Dor, p. 68. 27. Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1957). 28. Waterbury, "Endemic and Planned Corruption." 29. Ibid., p. 542. 30. Johnston, Political Corruption, chap. 2. 31. Robert Dowse, "Conceptualizing Corruption," review of Robert M. Price, Society and Bureaucracy in

Contemporary Ghana (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1975), in Government and Opposition, 12 (Summer 1977), 244-54; Johnston, Political Corruption, chap. 1. 32. Dowse, p. 244. 33. Konstantin Simis, USSR: The Corrupt Society (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1982), chaps. 6, 8; John M.

Kramer, "Political Corruption in the USSR," Western Political Quarterly, 30 (June 1977), 213-224; Hedrick Smith, The Russians (New York: Random House, 1976), chap. 3. 34. J. Anthony Lukas, Nightmare: The Underside of the Nixon Years (New York: Bantam, 1977), pp. 187-9. 35. Gerald Mars has used an analogous approach to define categories of workplace crime. See Gerald Mars, Cheats

at Work: An Anthropology of Workplace Crime (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982). 36. Johnston, Political Corruption, chap. 2: Robert O. Tilman, "Emergence of Black-Market Bureaucracy:

Administration, Development, and Corruption in the New States," Public Administration Review, 28 (September- October 1968), 439-441.

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37. Simis, chap. 6; Kramer, pp. 215-220; Smith, chap. 3. 38. A. Katsenelinboigen, "Coloured Markets in the Soviet Union," Soviet Studies, 29 (January 1977); see also

Istvan Kemeny, "The Unregistered Economy in Hungary," Soviet Studies, 34 (July 1982). 39. Nick Lampert, "Law, Order and Power in the USSR," paper presented to the Annual Conference of the National

Association for Soviet and East European Studies, Fitzwilliam College, Cambridge, England, March 1984, p. 3 (quoted by permission). 40. Simis, p. 128. 41. Kramer, p. 220. 42. Robert Springborg, "Sayed Bei Marei and Political Clientelism in Egypt," Comparative Political Studies, 12

(October 1979), 260-61. 43. See, for American machines, James Q. Wilson, "The Economy of Patronage," Journal of Political Economy,

69 (August 1961), 369-380; Milton L. Rakove, Don't Make No Waves-Don't Back No losers: An Insider's Analysis of the Daley Machine (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1975). For machines in other settings, see Scott, Comparative Political Corruption, chaps. 7-9; Paul Martin Sacks, The Donegal Mafia: An Irish Political Machine (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1976); Judith Chubb, "The Social Bases of an Urban Political Machine: The Case of Palermo," Political Science Quarterly, 96 (April 1981), 107-125. 44. Waterbury, "Corruption, Political Stability, and Development," p. 534. 45. Michael Johnston, "Patrons and Clients, Jobs and Machines: A Case Study of the Uses of Patronage," American

Political Science Review, 73 (June 1979), 385-398. 46. For an example, see Wolfinger's account of the problems the boss of the New Haven Democratic machine had

in getting his political clients to perform routine political duties. Raymond E. Wolfinger, The Politics of Progress (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1974), p. 81. 47. Martin Shefter, "The Emergence of the Political Machine: An Alternative View," in Willis D. Hawley et al.,

Theoretical Perspectives on Urban Politics (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1976), pp. 25-33. 48. Scott, p. 84. 49. Springborg, p. 261. 50. Ibid. 51. Ibid., p. 276. 52. Ibid., p. 268. 53. Ibid., p. 273. 54. Scott, p. 82. 55. Ibid., p. 81. 56. Ibid., p. 83. 57. Springborg, p. 279. 58. Joel Hurstfield, Freedom, Corruption and Government in Elizabethan England (London: Jonathan Cape, 1973),

pp. 155-6. 59. Ibid., p. 156. 60. Fereydoun Hoveyda, The Fall of the Shah (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1980), pp. 63-66. 61. Huntington. 62. Robert J. Alexander, Bolivia: Past, Present, and Future of its Politics (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 24. 63. Ibid., pp. 139-40. 64. Ibid., p. 140. 65. George W. Grayson, The Politics of Mexican Oil (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1980), pp. 93, 97. 66. Judith Gentleman, Mexican Oil and Dependent Development (New York: Peter Lang, 1984), p. 224; Alan

Riding, Distant Neighbors: A Portrait of the Mexicans (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985), pp. 168-179. 67. Gentleman, p. 223. 68. Riding, p. 133. 69. Grayson, p. 101. 70. Shefter, "The Emergence of the Political Machine," p. 15. 71. Ibid., pp. 23, 24. 72. Ibid., p. 25, emphasis in original. 73. I am indebted to Christopher Hood for his comments on this point.

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