The Politics of Population Change

Eric KaufmannProfessor of Politics, Birkbeck College, University of London

What of Unevenness?

• World is not one cultural and political unit. If it were, no problem

• Power has shifted from empire to nation, from the rulers to the people since 1776/1789

• Spread of democracy (starting 18th c, esp. post-1980s)

• A battle of numbers. Getting a majority now counts, i.e. Iraq, Syria, Bahrain…

Uneven Growth Between:

• World Region/Civilization• Nation• Ethnic group• Religion• Regions within a nation

International Conflict

Countries’ population as % of Britain

•Hedley Bull claims 100 million a threshold for Great Power

•‘Boots on the Ground’ continues to matter as does scale economies for military procurement

•Perceptions matter as much as reality

•Rise of China?1800 1850 1870 1900 1913

0%

50%

100%

150%

200%

250%

300%

350%

400%

RussiaU.S.Ger-manyFrance

Demography and Ethnic Conflict: Northern Ireland

• "The basic fear of Protestants in Northern Ireland is that they will be outbred by the Roman Catholics. It is as simple as that." - Terence O’ Neill, Unionist PM of Northern Ireland after resigning, 1969

Developing World Transition More Rapid

• At the end of the demographic transition Denmark 5 times greater population, Guatemala up to 24 times greater population.

0

1

2

3

4

5

60 20 40 60 80 100

120

140

160

180

200

220

240

260

Years since onset of demographic transition

Surv

ivin

g O

ffspr

ing

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

Popu

latio

n de

nsity

(ind

ivid

uals

per

sq

km

)

Denmark SO

Guatamala SO

Guatamala Pop Density(World Bank)

Denmark PopulationDensity

Guatamala Pop Density(UNPD)

Internal Racial Demographic Change: California, 1970-2030

California's Population by Racial Category, 1970-2030

0%

20%

40%

60%

80%

100%

1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020 2030

Asian

Hispanic

Black

White

UK: A Multiracial Future?

Age Structure (‘Youth Bulge’)

• More young people – dependency ratio - poverty

• More young people – unemployment - poverty• More young poor unemployed people – recruits

for ethnic, class, religious violence• More young poor unemployed people –

elite/middle class fear – autocracy• Aging population brings different effects

Young age structure, rather than Islam or poverty, is most closely related to democracy

Expansion of Islam; Decline of Animists and Seculars

Past and Projected Global Religious Affiliation (World Religious Database)

0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

Christian Muslim Hindu Nonreligious +Atheist

Other

1900

1970

2000

2025

Eurabia?Proportion of Muslims in Austria's under-15 Population, 2000-2100

Current Muslim Fertility

Muslim Fertility Converges to

Average by 2030

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

2001

2006

2011

2016

2021

2026

2031

2036

2041

2046

2051

2056

2061

2066

2071

2076

2081

2086

2091

2096

2101

Perc

ent M

uslim

Direct Effect:

Ultra-Orthodox Salford

vs

mainstream Jewish Leeds

Conclusion

• Not just how much population, but how it is distributed across political, ethnic, religious units

• Uneven growth and transition, coupled with numbers increasingly counting for power

• Shifting within and between states• Both numbers and age structure affect politics