«the portuguese semi-presidential system in times of ... · a president caught between...
TRANSCRIPT
1
«The Portuguese semi-presidential system in times of crises, 2011-2016:
A president caught between international responsibility and responsiveness to the
electorate»,
paper prepared to be delivered at Panel P429: The Relationship between Heads of State and
Prime Ministers (Section Presidential Politics. Powers and Constraints in Comparative Perspective),
Chair: Thomas Sedelius, ECPR General Conference, Prague, Czech Republic, 7-10/9/2016.
André Freire1
and
José Santana-Pereira2
Introduction
While there are different interpretations in the literature, not all of which agree, it has been
said Portugal has a semi-presidential system of government in which a directly-elected
president exists alongside a prime minister who is politically responsible to parliament. In
terms of the president’s constitutional powers and its exercise (formal and material
constitution), the existing literature suggests Portuguese semi-presidentialism is neither one of
the weaker (e.g. Slovenia, Ireland, Austria) (Elgie 1999; Metcalf 2000; Shugart & Carey 1997;
Siaroff 2003; Novais 2007; 2014; Freire & Pinto 2011) nor one of the stronger regimes (e.g. the
Weimar Republic, Finland before 2000, France, Poland at various times, Cape Verde, São Tomé
e Príncipe), but that rather for most of the time since 1974 – and especially since the 1982
constitutional revision – it has been somewhere in between (Canotilho & Moreira 1991; Sartori
1994; Novais 2014).
The Portuguese constitution states: ‘The president of the republic represents the Portuguese
Republic, ensures national independence, the unity of the state and the normal functioning of
the democratic institutions, and is, in effect, the supreme commander of the armed forces’
(República Portuguesa 2005, Art. 120).3 The first article of the constitution also states:
‘Portugal is a sovereign republic based on human dignity and the will of the people and is
1Associate professor with Aggregation / Habilitation at ISCTE-IUL, Instituto Universitário de Lisboa, and researcher at CIES-IUL. Director of the political science doctoral programme, specialising also in international relations, at ISCTE-IUL, Instituto Universitário de Lisboa. 2Post-doctoral researcher at ICS, University of Lisbon, and invited assistant professor at ISCTE-IUL, Instituto Universitário de Lisboa. 3 Emphasis added.
2
committed to the creation of a free, just and supportive society’.4 The president’s
constitutionals duty, therefore, is to protect the sovereignty of the nation (responsiveness) and
its democratic order (constitutional responsibility). Furthermore, Article 134 states the
president’s duties include ensuring all laws made by parliament and by the executive (decree-
laws) strictly observe the letter and spirit of the constitution. The president also has some
‘legislative powers’, which include a veto (República Portuguesa 2005, Art. 138). While the
presidential veto can only delay parliamentary legislation it can stop decree-laws, although this
can be overcome quite easily when the government enjoys a disciplined and cohesive
parliamentary majority in the parliament.
One of the duties that became significant towards the end of a presidential term, and which is
the focus of this article, is the presidential authority to appoint the prime minister (República
Portuguesa 2005, Art. 113). This power is also limited, however, as the prime minister can only
be appointed after the leaders of all parties represented in parliament are heard, and any
decision must take the results of the election into consideration. It is the prime minister who
chooses the government ministers who are then formally appointed by the president. Since
1982 government has been the political responsibility of parliament (Freire & Pinto 2011;
Novais 2014), with the president’s responsibility being purely institutional (concerning the
normal operation of democratic institutions – which is the only acceptable reason the
president can have for dismissing a government). Neither the dismissal nor formation of a
government depend on enjoying the confidence of the president (Sartori 1994; Canotilho &
Moreira 1991; Freire & Pinto 2011; Novais 2014; Pinto 2016). The 1982 revision of the
constitution and the change of political conditions in relation to government and parliament
between 1987 and 2002 has resulted in a significant increase in the political power of the
prime minister, which has turned the office into something that can be described as being a
kind of ‘prime ministerial presidentialism’ (Freire 2010; Moreira 1989; Freire & Pinto 2011).
Research into the Portuguese case shows there has been a significant change in the role of the
president: a change that depends on political conditions (especially the type of parliamentary
majority and political congruence with the president) and on the timing of the presidential
terms (Duverger 1980; Cruz 1994; Lobo & Neto 2009; Freire & Pinto 2011). Here we will
explore to what extent short-term economic conditions, as well as the Troika’s foreign
4 Emphasis added.
3
intervention (2011-2014) currently known as ‘the bailout’ on Portugal /by the CE, ECB and the
IMF), enhance or mitigate these two political factors.
Between 2011 and 2014 – and in the context of a serious economic crisis – Portugal required a
bailout from the European Commission, European Central Bank and the International
Monetary Fund (the Troika) that resulted in the country being placed under its supervision.
During this period, Portugal was an illustration of the dilemma noted by Mair (2011), which
states that the processes of globalisation and Europeanisation – particularly in the context of
the sovereign debt crisis and external intervention – have made the country’s political parties
responsible to two different types of actor: the electorate and international partners (other EU
member state governments and the Troika institutions). This has brought the dilemma
between responsiveness to the demands of the electorate (the source of sovereignty for
nationally-elected political bodies) and responsibility into sharp relief.
The purpose of this article is to analyse the role of the president role during his second term in
office (2011-16) and to assess on what side of the scale his attitudes and activities fell –
whether on the side of meeting the nation’s international commitments (international
responsibility), or its national commitments to uphold the constitution (domestic responsibility)
and responding to the demands of the electorate (responsiveness) or if he achieved a balance
between both obligations.
The article is divided into three parts. In the following section, we analyse some of the
important theoretical contributions, with a special focus on the important dilemma facing
semi-presidentialism at times of crises (the balance between international responsibility and
responsiveness and national responsibility) and provide a number of contextual details about
how Portuguese democracy operated from 2011 to 2015. We go on to examine the president’s
discourse outlining his understanding of his role during the bailout, about the crises and
austerity, the exercise of his legislative powers during his second term in a longitudinal
perspective (and the factors explaining the differences between Cavaco Silva’s first and second
terms), the occasions he used (and refused to use) his power to veto laws and request rulings
by the Constitutional Court and his role in the formation of the 21st constitutional
government. The paper ends by outlining the main findings.
4
Semi-presidentialism at a time of crisis: International responsibility versus responsiveness
(and domestic responsibility)
The great liberal revolutions of the 18th century brought about important innovations to the
art of government (Freire 2014). Underlying these innovations, beyond the aim of eradicating
tyranny (through the separation of powers) and the arbitrariness of power (through Bills of
rights), there was one guiding principle – government based on consent – and free, fair and
frequent elections were introduced as the basic mechanism for ensuring this (Schedler 1998;
Manin et al. 1999; Freire 2014). In democratic representative regimes, it is those who are
elected who govern by taking into account the basic choices of the electorate. The political
parties present the electorate with a package of policies and are then selected on the basis of
these proposals, which then serve as the goals of government (Schedler 1998). Once their
allotted time in office is over, the electorate will decide if they were governed in accordance
with their previously expressed preferences.
As a result of the Troika bailout programme, from May 2011 to May 2014 Portugal was
effectively controlled by external agents who severely restricted Portuguese sovereignty while
limiting the actions of both the government and the president. The Memorandum of
Understanding (MoU) signed with the Troika in 2011 contained a large privatisation
programme, called for an extensive and profound programme to deregulate the labour market
and reduce the size of the state through the implementation of pay freezes and the phased
reduction in the number of state employees, while also calling for the rationalisation of the
state and reductions to the cost of doing business. The programme also called for the
recapitalisation of the banks as a means of both ensuring compliance with the new capital
ratios demanded by the EU and of providing credit to businesses (Moury & Freire 2013).
The MoU also established a framework within which the political parties could make proposals
and which restricted the choices open to the electorate in the June 2011 general election
(Freire & Santana-Pereira 2011). During the campaign, the Socialist Party (PS – Partido
Socialista) said it would honour the agreement, although it did not share the radicalism of the
Social Democratic Party (PSD – Partido Social Democrático), which saw the agreement as a way
for Portugal to make amends for its recent excesses, confirming it would go much further than
the Troika. It should be noted that, in terms of state reform, the PSD claimed it wanted to trim
the fat (intermediary costs, duplication of functions, cuts to public-private partnership charges)
and not cut the welfare, and it openly assumed a number of commitments to this end. The
5
manifesto of the CDS-PP was more moderate, occupying a position midway between the PS
and the PSD. The Left Bloc (BE – Bloco de Esquerda) and Portuguese Communist Party/Green
Party (PCP/PEV – Partido Comunista Português/Partido Ecologista ‘Os Verdes’) remained
bitterly opposed to the MoU and called instead for debt renegotiation. With no single party
winning a parliamentary majority, the PSD and CDS-PP formed a majority coalition.
Throughout the 2011-15 legislature, the concept of government based on consent was
constantly threatened. In fact, many of the right-wing government’s flagship measures –
including public sector pay cuts, reductions in pension and benefit payments and the harsh tax
increases – had been in the manifestoes of neither of the coalition parties and nor were they
contained in the 2011 MoU, which formed the basis of the choices facing the electorate in
June 2011 (Freire 2016a; Freire 2016b; Gouveia & Piçarro 2013). There is an abundance of
empirical evidence supporting the idea that the government had implemented an ideological
programme on which it was not elected and which would have been very difficult for it to
impose (either socially or politically) on the Portuguese political system but for the context of
the bailout (Moury & Freire 2013; Freire et al. 2015). While a failure to deliver on manifesto
promises is not new to Portuguese democracy, the failures during the 2011-15 legislature were
unprecedented in their breadth, depth and severity, undermining the electorate’s trust in
politicians and, ultimately, their faith in democracy itself.
Elections cannot give the winning party free rein to do what they wish (Schedler 1998). In 2012
the Portuguese were asked if they thought the emergency economic and financial situation in
which the country found itself justified the violation of the commitments made by the
governing parties (Freire et al. 2012), with 68.1% of those surveyed saying it did not (including
60.3% of supporters of the right-wing parties). Voters were also asked if the government was
sharing the sacrifices fairly in applying the Troika programme, with the majority again saying
they did not think this was the case (90.6% of all respondents and 77% of supporters of the
right-wing parties). It should be noted that the position of those who voted for parties of the
right contrast quite strongly with the views expressed by PSD and CDS-PP deputies, resulting in
a strong incongruence between the electorate and those they elect – the opposite was true for
those on the left (Moury & Freire 2013).
The coalition government also operated at the very limits of the constitution. No fewer than 22
of their proposals were declared unconstitutional (Gouveia & Piçarro 2013; Novais 2014;
Ribeiro & Coutinho 2014) – but only 12 following the President’s requests: see Table 2 below -,
6
while the sacrifices they demanded of capital and labour were significantly unbalanced – an
‘asymmetrical austerity’ (Freire 2016a; Freire 2016b) – that in and of itself demonstrated the
significant degree of discretion available to national politicians at a time of external
intervention: that is to say, the national government was not just a puppet hanging on strings
being controlled by the Troika (Moury & Freire 2013; Freire 2016a). The result of this
asymmetrical austerity can be seen quite clearly in the Eurostat data showing the declining
relative weight of wages in Gross Domestic Product (GDP). In 2015 Portugal had the sixth-
worst wage to GDP ratio, having reached its lowest level since 1960 (Aníbal 2016). There was a
small reduction in inequalities measured by the Gini index between 2011 and 2013 (resulting
from the compression of middle-class salaries and pensions); however, the gap between the
rich and the poor grew, as did poverty levels and severe material deprivation (Bancaleiro &
Aníbal 2014). Portugal experienced the largest number of cuts to social programmes of any EU
country during this period (Suspiro 2014), while macroeconomic results (in terms of the public
debt to GDP ratio, the public debt, unemployment and economic growth) remained very poor
(Freire 2016a; 2016b).
However, there were some positive results: the reduction in the external trade deficit (2011-
14) and the country’s alleged improved credibility with international partners and investors.
Interest rates on Portuguese debt have fallen sharply since 2012; however, while there are
those who claim this is due more to the increasingly assertive intervention of the European
Central Bank (ECB) in purchasing national debt than to the specific merits of these countries
(Sánchez-Cuenca 2014), it has to be said additionally (on the side of general factors) that
interest rates have been very low across the EU and United States since 2013 (Aníbal 2014).
Furthermore, between 2013 and 2014 there have been signs of a slight recovery in GDP
growth and a fall in unemployment; however, these developments have been too weak to
make any real difference. In any event, the fall in unemployment must be put in the context of
the large wave of emigration (Albuquerque 2013), and the poor quality, instability and low pay
of the newly-created jobs. In fact, much of the fall in unemployment is due to a large number
(of temporary) public sector internships, which have been responsible for the (artificial)
reduction in the rate of unemployment (SIC Notícias 2014). Nevertheless, a second bailout was
avoided, which was an incredibly important result, particularly given Greece is already on its
third rescue plan (Freire & Lisi 2016a).
7
Insert Table 1 about here
This all appears to have led to a decline in the confidence Portuguese have in their political
institutions, which in 2012 was much lower than in other institution (except the banks and
financial system, see Table 1). Apart from the president, the ranking situation was the same in
2008 in relation to all political institutions; however, from 2008-12 the situation got much
worse. In the context of an erosion of social and working rights, it is interesting to note that
only the trade unions were trusted more 2012 than in 2008. It is also interesting to note the
fall in trust in the EU. It is not difficult to understand the reason for this given the EU’s
responsibility for the difficulties many European countries are experiencing – particularly those
countries that have accepted financial assistance programmes.
Data for 2014 shows there has been a slight economic recovery from the depth of the crisis in
2012-13, but that it remains below the levels of 2008 – a clear indication of the effects of the
crisis. The situation in other countries subject to austerity programmes is identical (Sánchez-
Cuenca 2014, pp.59–77; Freire & Lisi 2016a). In Portugal, it is difficult not to see in the
extraordinary betrayal of election promises one of the factors accounting for the decline in
trust in political institutions.
Insert Figure 1 about here
The situation in terms of the public’s satisfaction with how democracy in Portugal functions is
equally problematic (Figure 1). The decline dates back to 1999-2000 when the country joined
the single currency; however, the 2008-14 crisis made this situation much worse, while the
recovery of 2012-14 was limited and weak. Again, this trend is particularly pronounced in
those countries that were worst affected by the crisis, especially those in the southern
periphery, while it is much less evident across the rest of Europe (Sánchez-Cuenca 2014; Freire
& Lisi 2016a), suggesting the crisis is at the root of these developments.
How do we understand the role of the president in this context? An eminent German
sociologist informs us that the indebted Western capitalist states of today operate as if there
are two types of constituents: ‘State’s people’ (Staatsvolk) and ‘financial markets’ people’
(Marktsvolk) (Streeck 2013, pp.129–130). This idea was first developed by Mair (2011) as the
conflict between responsiveness towards the sovereign power at the national level (the
8
electorate, or Staatsvolk) and the international responsibility (of governments and national
parliaments towards other governments, parliaments and international institutions, as well as
towards the Marktsvolk) developed – a situation that is particularly pronounced with
globalisation, multi-level democratic systems and external interventions, such as financial
bailouts. By favouring responsiveness governments and presidents are more responsible and
responsive to their electorate, but this can lead them to fail to meet the state’s international
commitments while favouring international responsibility can undermine the democratic
legitimacy of the nationally-elected political bodies. Clearly, this is not an easy dilemma to
resolve; however, the responsibility noted by Mair points to the external dimension.
Nevertheless, when looking at this dilemma we must also include responsibility to the
constitution that the president, prime minister and the government swear to uphold when
taking office.
Cavaco Silva’s second term
The presidency in times of financial bailout, according to Cavaco Silva.
The bailout was both the president’s biggest worry and the greatest on political activity during
these years. In March 2013 President Cavaco Silva wrote that ‘the commitments to the
international institutions, which were supported by a large party political consensus ... define
the framework that since May 2011 has been a standard for the actions of the public
authorities, including the president, in both domestic and external matters’ (Silva 2013, p.15).
He then outlined what he considered to be his role in foreign policy, which was to: reassure
international partners the national authorities are determined to meet their commitments to
external bodies in full; keep them informed of the progress made; emphasise the political and
social consensus in terms of carrying out the adjustment programme while highlighting the
sacrifices imposed on the Portuguese people; outline the negative effects of the adjustment
programme on the Portuguese economy; and remind Portugal’s European partners that the
success of the bailout is of interest to the countries being bailed out and to the EU as a whole.
On the domestic scene, the president saw it as his duty to use his office to exert influence in a
way that would preserve the political and social consensus. His appeal to the traditional parties
of government (PS, PSD, CDS-PP) to come to an agreement was a common thread in his
discourse (Silva 2012; 2013; 2014), particularly during the crisis of the summer of 2013 and in
the aftermath of the October 2015 general election – which were also the moments in which
9
his popularity ratings reached new lows (De Giorgi & Santana-Pereira 2016; Fernandes & Jalali
2016). Disagreements within the coalition in 2013 created the potential for a political crisis
that Cavaco Silva attempted to resolve by encouraging the coalition government to reach out
to the PS to reach an agreement for national salvation. While no agreement was reached (Silva
2014; Pinto 2016) the government survived, with the PSD and CDS-PP quickly coming to an
understanding. Again, in the wake of the October 2015 election, the president strongly
encouraged the three parties to come to an understanding, again without any success (De
Giorgi & Santana-Pereira 2016).
Just why did the president seek an agreement? He said that failure to do so meant it was
certain that during a serious political crisis, during the critical phase in the execution of the
financial assistance programme, it would leave the country in an even worse situation and that
it was his ‘duty to prevent this from happening’ (Silva 2013, p.29). In March 2014, he said it
was ‘essential that there be a medium-term agreement between the political forces
committed to the financial assistance programme’ (Silva 2014) that must focus on the goals of
political stability, governability and the implementation of measures consistent with the
country’s commitments to the end of the next legislature (2019), given that they concerned
goals independent of the electoral cycle. Such an understanding ‘would in no way prevent
political alternation, nor would it put an end to political diversity or the plurality of ideas within
the political parties. Focusing on structural and consensual aspects of the parties of
government, seeking to adhere to the rules Portugal signed up to within the framework of its
involvement in the European project, an agreement of this nature ... would serve the interests
of all Portuguese’ (Silva 2014, p.24).
The president believed Portugal had to honour its commitments to the international
community, both because the release of further tranches of the loan depended on it and
because the idea of restructuring the public debt would, in his opinion, have seriously negative
effects (Silva 2013). Nevertheless, he often mentioned his belief that the sacrifices being
demanded as a consequence of the adjustment programme should be shared more fairly, for
the solidarity between generations to be preserved, for the uneven regional development to
be addressed and of the need for austerity to be accompanied with stimulus and growth
programmes.
In October 2011, he spoke about the lack of fairness in some of the measures announced by
the government, including the planned abolition of the holiday and Christmas payments for
10
public sector employees. At the time, some of his detractors believed his statement to be
more one of concern for his own position as a state pensioner rather for any citizens who may
be affected (Pinto 2016). His January 2012 gaffe, when he stated publicly that his pensions
were not enough to meet his expenses (Pinto 2016) only strengthened the criticism of him and
led to a sharp fall in his popularity (Fernandes & Jalali 2016). In his 2013 New Year message,
Cavaco Silva emphasised the need to prevent a recessionary spiral caused by the commitment
to austerity not being accompanied by an economic development plan (Silva 2013). In his
speech to parliament on the 39th anniversary of the Carnation Revolution, he stressed this
point, saying the austerity measures that had been implemented had a much greater
recessionary effect than originally anticipated, and that this was due to failures in the
government’s estimates that had led to austerity fatigue and a lack of concern for the situation
(Silva 2013).
In his understanding of the president’s relationship with the government at times of crisis,
Cavaco Silva preferred to intervene discretely in a manner that respected his influence on the
government’s legislative output. His contacts were designed to help make clear the content of
some of the Bills while persuading the government to introduce formal or substantive changes
to them being an important part of his involvement behind the scenes. He also rejected
adopting «a populist posture» and intervention that would gain him momentary popularity: he
believed adopting such a posture would be damaging to the country:
In times of crisis such as we are experiencing today, it would be easy to take advantage
of a presidency with no direct executive responsibilities and, through inflammatory
public statements, satisfy the instincts of a certain branch of the media, of some
political analysts and of those who wish to challenge the institutions. It would be easy,
for example, to encourage feelings against the political classes or even against the
actions of the government; however, this is not my understanding of responsible
action by a president of the republic, much less during times of grave crisis (Silva 2013,
pp.32–33).
This position has been criticised by analysts and specialists who believe the president should
be an actor and not a spectator, and that his apparent inability to act was the cause of his
popularity ratings falling to their lowest level (Cordeiro 2013).
11
The exercise of legal powers during the crisis: A longitudinal view
The president is an important actor in Portuguese politics, enjoying legal powers with which to
limit the activities of government and the parliamentary majority supporting it, including a
right of veto and to request judicial review (both prior and subsequent) by the Constitutional
Court. Thus, the Portuguese President is a fundamental veto player (Tsebelis 1995). The
question facing us here, though, is has the president exercised his powers effectively, and if so
to what extent? This is particularly important given the gravity of the situation in which
Portuguese democracy finds itself and the restrictions on the national sovereignty as a result
of the external bailout. We know the Constitutional Court has been particularly active and its
many important and – for some – controversial rulings of incompatibility with the constitution
during the legislature were a demonstration of both the separation of powers and horizontal
responsibility. They were also an indication of the seriousness of the crisis and of it being seen
as an opportunity by an executive that has often governed at the extreme limits of Portuguese
constitutional order (for a contrasting view of this, see the condescending face of the
government and its parliamentary majority in Ribeiro & Coutinho 2014; for a more
sympathetic view of the Constitutional Court see Novais 2014 and Gouveia & Piçarro 2013).
Insert Table 2 about here
In order to analyse this situation, we must take into account the president’s constitutional
powers and the differences in political conditions that were responsible for increased or
decreased levels of presidential activism. The existence of a solid and cohesive parliamentary
majority (which can more easily overcome presidential vetoes), the ideological and political
congruity between the president and the parliamentary (and governmental) majority, suggests
there would be fewer differences between the president and the government, and the first
term of any president (as a result of their need for re-election) tends to be a time of limited
presidential activity (Lobo & Neto 2009; Freire & Pinto 2011). Theoretically at least, the first
two elements should have resulted in less presidential activism by Cavaco Silva, while the third
should have resulted the opposite.
It was expected that Cavaco Silva would become more active during his second term, not least
because this was a promise he made to the electorate during his re-election campaign
(Fernandes & Jalali 2016; Silva 2012; 2013). Considering the three indicators of presidential
12
intervention presented in Table 2 as a whole (requests for prior and successive constitutional
review and vetoes), however, we see Cavaco Silva was the only civilian president to use his
legal powers on fewer occasions during his second term than his first (22 and 26,
respectively).5 This is more remarkable because of all civilian presidents, he was the most
active during his first term (in their first terms, Mário Soares and Jorge Sampaio used these
powers 24 and 19 times, respectively). With Soares and Sampaio, their reason for making
greater use of their powers during their second terms was the fact they were cohabiting with
governments led by their political opponents (in Sampaio’s case for just some of his second
term), while in the case of Cavaco Silva, the cohabitation took place during his first term and at
the very beginning of his second term, meaning his initial expectation of another term of
cohabitation was overtaken by events and the result of the 2011 election that produced a
government with of the president’s political hue.
Given the notorious difference between the frequency of his use of the president’s legal
powers during his second term and that of Soares and Sampaio (who used the powers 2.5 and
3.2 times more frequently, respectively, than Cavaco Silva), we would be well advised to
consider other explanatory factors that go beyond the institutional and questions of timing.
The gravity of the economic and financial crisis and limitations to national sovereignty resulting
from the external intervention acted to limit presidential activity during Cavaco Silva’s second
term. Fernandes and Jalali (2016) claim Cavaco Silva’s reduced intervention was due to the
bailout, and that for most of his second term he was caught between a rock and a hard place.
If he was seen to be encouraging popular dissatisfaction with the austerity caused by the
bailout and to use his powers in mitigation, he could have created additional problems in the
already difficult task of implementing the adjustment programme. This, in turn, could have had
undesirable consequences in the Troika’s quarterly assessments. On the other hand, were he
to take ownership of the austerity agenda, he would risk being seen to replace the elected
government (which had taken on the adjustment programme as its own) with the possibility of
it making him unpopular in political circles, thereby limiting his ability to persuade other
political actors. The fact the coalition government was going further than either demanded by
the Troika or proposed in its election manifesto, alongside the asymmetrical austerity (which
the president said it had to seek to avoid) and a government that often acted at the very
boundaries of constitutionality, were factors demanding he act with discretion in order to
retain some margin for manoeuvre for national political actors before the Troika, which,
5 We exclude President General Ramalho Eanes, the first to be elected after the transition to democracy.
13
according to our standpoint, could create conditions for more presidential involvement –
particularly since the president is the guardian of the constitution and of democratic political
order.
The other reasons for Cavaco Silva not using his legal powers are of a party political nature.
During the January 2011 presidential election campaign, Cavaco Silva expected he would need
to deal with the Socialist prime minister, José Sócrates, for another two-and-a-half years – he
expected to spend at least half of his term in cohabitation. Shortly after his second term
began, however, the economic crisis collapsed into a political crisis that resulted in the
resignation of Sócrates, the dissolution of parliament and the calling of an early general
election in June, which in turn led to the formation of a coalition government involving the PSD
(which Cavaco Silva had led for almost a decade) and the CDS-PP. Consequently, for most of his
second term, there was marked by a solid and cohesive ideological congruity between the
president and the parliamentary majority supporting the government.
There is no agreement on this explanation, however, and Fernandes and Jalali (2016) list a set
of counter arguments. Cavaco Silva sometimes proposed initiatives that did not please the
government (such as the request for review and veto on the unconstitutionality of austerity
measures in the 2013 Budget; the 2013 New Year speech in which he spoke of the
recessionary spiral; the exertion of pressure for an agreement between the incumbents and
the PS, particularly in 2013 and 2015; and his veto of a law that had been passed unchanged by
parliament. See tables 5 and 6). Despite being from the same ideological family (or, in the case
of the president and prime minister, linked to the same party), the relationship between
Cavaco Silva, Passos Coelho and Paulo Portas had never been particularly close or friendly.
Despite all this, from our standpoint the undeniable congruence between the president and
the government/parliamentary majority, both on the political-ideological direction and the
scale of the conflict between national responsiveness and international responsibility and their
understanding of the crisis, the bailout or austerity discussed above, this seems to us to have
been a factor that has had much more weight than Fernandes and Jalali attribute it.
Insert Table 3 about here
Insert Table 4 about here
14
There are even more factors that can help explain Cavaco Silva’s limited activism during his
second term compared to those of Soares and Sampaio. One of these was the huge loss of
popular support for Cavaco Silva between his first and second terms (Fernandes & Jalali 2016),
which was in sharp contrast to the previous presidencies (Veiga 1998). Clearly this could have
been a result of the crisis and its socio-economic effects (an argument corroborated in the
individual-level data analysis, based on mass surveys, presented in Freire 2016a); however, it is
also associated with the political management of the crisis and the association between the
president and the governing majority, an accusation the left-wing opposition parties (PS, BE
and PCP/PEV) repeatedly threw at Cavaco Silva (Fernandes & Jalali 2016; Freire et al. 2015;
Freire 2016a; 2016b). There was also the question of Cavaco Silva’s weakness, given he was re-
elected with the fewest and the lowest percentage of votes in the history of Portuguese
democracy – even if we only consider presidential elections (Table 3). Cavaco Silva was also the
only president in the history of Portuguese democracy in which the absolute number of votes
cast for the president was lower than the total number of votes cast for the parliamentary
majority (Table 4). While this is partially due to the extraordinarily low levels of electoral
participation in 2011, even if we only count the percentage of votes, Cavaco Silva received the
lowest number in the election for his second term compared to the votes cast for the majority
party in parliament.
Vetoes and non-vetoes, requests and non-requests for rulings on the constitutionality of
economic matters.
Concerns over the distribution of sacrifices seem to have troubled the president during the
analysis of the budgets in the bailout years. Nevertheless, he did not always decide to ask the
Constitutional Court to rule on the constitutionality of the austerity measures being
implemented (particularly in respect of cuts to public sector wages and pensions). He
expressed some concerns about the scale and fairness of some measures contained in the
2012 Budget (Correia 2011), yet he did not ask for a ruling. Instead, it was a group of
opposition deputies who called for a decision, with the Constitutional Court ruling a number of
the measures proposed were unconstitutional (Fernandes & Jalali 2016). Some journalists
asked Cavaco Silva if he regretted not asking for a ruling, to which he responded: ‘it could
undermine the entire budget were a president to seek a prior ruling from the Constitutional
Court on the constitutionality of a simple clause. There would be no budget’ (Jornal de Notícias
2012a). This standpoint is clearly contested by the (left leaning) high profile constitutionalist
15
Jorge Reis Novais from both the standpoint of constitutional theory and political stances (see
Novais 2014).
When it came to the 2013 Budget, which contained similar measures, he decided to act and
ask for a ruling,6 due to concerns he had regarding the extent to which the sacrifices were
being fairly shared (Pinto 2016). Cavaco Silva spoke of the ‘different treatment being meted
out to public sector workers’, ‘class taxes’ and, in respect of measures affecting pensioners,
the violation of their ‘legitimate expectations’ and their ‘real acquired rights’ (Público 2013).
Cavaco Silva took action two weeks after the budget was published, when it became clear the
PS, BE and PCP appeared ready to approach the Constitutional Court for a ruling (Público
2012). This strategy meant the year would start with a budget in place, while the president
was able to beat the opposition to the punch in requesting a ruling. The request to the
Constitutional Court for a ruling on three articles in the 2013 Budget law rather unsurprisingly
resulted, in April 2013, with them being ruled unconstitutional: 7 a decision Fernandes and
Jalali (2016) claim was popular with the public.
The 2014 Budget, which yet again included measures similar to those that had been ruled
unconstitutional, prompted a presidential request for a ruling from the Constitutional Court.
This may have been because he did not want to create instability during the final years of the
adjustment programme (Fernandes & Jalali 2016). In October 2013, he confirmed his decisions
in respect of requests for prior or subsequent rulings on the constitution nature of state
budgets were based on careful assessments of the costs involved, which is what happened
that year (Fonseca 2013; Visão 2013a; the used of subsequent rullings in clearly contested by
Novais 2014, for both constitutional and political reasons). At the beginning of 2014, a
presidential source said that ‘opinions on the 2014 Budget the president had requested,
bearing in mind the jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court, do not suggest there are any
unconstitutional articles in the budget’ (Lusa 2014). However, the advice the opposition
received was somewhat different, leading it to request a ruling on four of the clauses
contained in the budget, three of which (public sector pay cuts, cuts to basic pensions and
6 ‘Cavaco Silva revealed this Wednesday that the articles of the State Budget over which he had concerns regarding their constitutionality ... are those calling for the suspension this year of the holiday subsidy to public employees (29), the suspension of 90% or equivalent of the holiday subsidy to pensioners (77) and the introduction of an extraordinary solidarity tax to be paid by pensioners with pensions above 1,350 euros (78).’ Measures worth almost two billion euros (Aníbal 2013). 7 In particular, the cut to the holiday subsidy for public sector employees, pensioners and teaching and research contracts, and a tax on health and unemployment benefits.
16
taxes on health and unemployment benefits) were ruled in breach of the constitution by the
Constitutional Court (Crisóstomo et al. 2014).
Austerity was not just a product of the budgets. Other measures were designed to cut
spending and/or increase receipts via changes to the legislative framework on workers’ rights,
and particularly on the rights of public sector workers. The president did not appreciate the
call from Jerónimo de Sousa, leader of the PCP, and the leader of the General Confederation of
Portuguese Workers (CGTP – Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses) union
confederation, for him to veto changes to the Labour Code that they claimed would lead to a
serious deterioration in the rights of Portuguese workers (Sol 2012; Lusa 2012). Cavaco Silva
was strongly criticised by those on the left who believed his drive for changes to the Labour
Code was ‘still more proof of [Cavaco Silva’s] commitment to the interests of big capital and a
rejection of his sworn duty to defend, uphold and enforce the constitution’.8
The position he adopted in 2013 was slightly different. Requests were made for a ruling on Bills
on workers’ rights, including the public sector regrading and the convergence of public sector
pensions with those of the private sector (Visão 2013b; Jornal de Negócios 2013). Both Bills
were ruled unconstitutional (Table 6), with a safeguard later incorporated into the regrading
Bill to protect the majority of public sector workers from redundancy. The president passed
the new General Public Sector Labour Law with this clause in place (Público 2014). In 2014, the
only requests for prior rulings on financial matters (Table 6) occurred as the result of a request
by the prime minister, Pedro Passos Coelho – after several measures in the 2014 Budget had
been defeated – as a way of anticipating future defeats in the Constitutional Court during the
critical post-bailout period (Dinis 2014). The Bills were declared unconstitutional.
Insert Table 5 about here
Insert Table 6 about here
The only government Bill vetoed, in March 2014, sought to block measures destined to
increase the percentage of their pay packet public sector workers paid for services such as the
public administration health subsystem (ADSE), among others (Table 5). Pinto (2016) reminds
us that this veto would have cost the government €33 million, but that it was easily
8 See Jornal de Notícias 2012b. During a visit to Madeira three years later, Cavaco Silva was on the receiving end of similar criticisms from a trade unionist (Lusa 2015).
17
circumvented by publishing it again shortly afterwards, after having being approved by the
majority of deputies in parliament.
Cavaco Silva and the appointment of the 21st constitutional government
In 1994, Giovanni Sartori made a distinction between the formal (the letter and spirit of the
basic law) and the material (effective operation of the political system within a particular
constitutional framework) constitution (1994). While Portugal’s 21st constitutional
government, which did not take office until the end of November 2015 and was formed
following the 4 October general election, complied fully with the formal constitution, the
democratic parliamentary political practice and semi-presidentialism, it is a fact that the
solution agreed upon was in contrast with how the material constitution has been applied
since 1975. First, because a minority PS government has parliamentary support from the BE,
PCP and PEV, the first time in 40 years of the democratic constitution that the radical left has
been involved in government. It also represents a move towards greater inclusiveness in the
political system and the increased responsibility of all party political forces represented in
parliament (De Giorgi & Santana-Pereira 2016; Freire 2016a; 2016b; Freire & Lisi 2016b).
The first question arising around this new government solution is: why only now? On several
occasions in the past, when the PS had fallen short of an absolute parliamentary majority while
left-wing parties were in the majority (1975, 1976, 1983, 1995, 1999 and 2009), the party
preferred to either seek formal (coalition) or informal (supply and demand) support from the
right in order to govern (Freire & Lisi 2016b). In our opinion, there are at least eight
explanations for this situation.
Insert Figure 2 about here
The significant ideological shift of the right-wing parties, especially the PSD, further to the right
during the previous parliament, made it much more difficult for the PS and PSD to come to an
agreement (Figure 2) (Freire et al. 2016), is one explanation enabling an agreement between
the parties of the left becoming a reality.9 However, it is important to note the limitations to
the president’s powers in such situations, especially in relation to dissolving parliament. Doing
so will help understand the situation and the solution that was hit upon, and which was far
9 For a discussion of several factors, see Freire & Lisi (2016b).
18
from being the president’s preferred outcome. Because he was in the final six months of his
term and it was the first months of a parliamentary term, Cavaco Silva did not have the
authority to dissolve parliament and call fresh elections, and nor could he refuse to appoint a
government on ground of political trust, because this was not in accordance with either the
letter or the spirit of the constitution – and had not been since 1982. The only alternative open
to him was to appoint a caretaker government that would take office from October 2015 to
June 2016, which would be very costly to the country. He was therefore ‘obliged’ to appoint a
PS minority government supported by political forces he believed to be anti-European and
which were opposed to the country’s military and political alignments (particularly
membership of NATO) – his only other solution was to keep the caretaker government in office
until his successor could call fresh elections (De Giorgi & Santana-Pereira 2016). Also, before
being obliged by circumstances to appoint the 21st constitutional government, the president
tilted towards his international responsibility and view (ideological and other) of what was in
the national interest, to the detriment of his responsibility to the Portuguese voters who had
elected a parliament containing a majority of left-wing deputies.
Conclusions
The aim of this paper was to analyse whether Cavaco Silva’s actions and attitudes during his
second term (2011-16), which coincided with a serious economic and financial crisis and the
intervention of the Troika (EC, ECB and the International Monetary Fund [IMF]) were more
concerned with the country meeting its international commitments (international
responsibility), first, or fulfilling its national commitments (domestic responsibility: complying
with the constitution) and responding to the demands of the electorate (responsiveness),
second – or if there was a balance between these two aspects.
While the assistance programme was in force, Cavaco Silva often spoke of the importance of
complying with international agreements in order to maintain the confidence of investors and
international partners. It is clear that the government’s responsibility was to honour the state’s
international commitments; however, it is significant that the president – the supreme
guardian of the constitution – was able to neglect the equally important need for substantial
levels of trust between representatives and those they represent: that is, to give equal weight
to the government’s commitments to the electorate (Silva 2013, pp.4–5). The president’s
successive declarations and actions in this respect, as well as those of the government and its
19
parliamentary supporters, clearly show their lack of concern for their electorate as they
focused almost entirely on the Marktsvolk.
Despite the dominant trend in this direction, however, we must also recognise Cavaco Silva
continued to express – at least here and there – some concern for the Portuguese and the
need for market and Troika diktats to show some respect for them. Here, however, we can
emphasise the following: at the level of his discourse, and despite his mixed nature, there is a
clear tendency for greater emphasis on international responsibility over responsiveness to the
electorate and national responsibility to the constitution; however, this relative imbalance is
perhaps even more apparent in his limited presidential activity – for example, by comparing his
use of legal powers (vetoes and requests for constitutional rulings) to the use made of them by
past presidents in their second terms. In other words, if the preferences expressed by Cavaco
Silva during his second term in office seem to show him inclining more towards international
responsibility than towards the wishes of the Portuguese electorate (responsiveness) and his
national responsibilities (to the constitution), his use of his legal powers while in office show
him to be clearly in favour of the former over the latter.
References
Albuquerque, R., 2013. Número de emigrantes em 2012 foi superior ao total de nascimentos.
Público. Available at: https://www.publico.pt/sociedade/noticia/numero-de-emigrantes-
em-2012-foi-superior-ao-total-de-nascimentos-1610703#/0.
Aníbal, S., 2014. Agora é muito fácil ter emissões de dívida bem sucedidas. Público. Available
at: https://www.publico.pt/economia/noticia/agora-e-muito-facil-ter-emissoes-de-
divida-bem-sucedidas-1626337.
Aníbal, S., 2013. Medidas enviadas por Cavaco para o Constitucional valem mais de 1500
milhões de euros. Público. Available at:
https://www.publico.pt/economia/noticia/medidas-enviadas-por-cavaco-para-o-
constitucional-valem-quase-2000-milhoes-de-euros-1579208.
Aníbal, S., 2016. Peso dos salários na economia volta a subir após estar ao nível mais baixo
desde 1960. Público. Available at: https://www.publico.pt/economia/noticia/peso-dos-
salarios-na-economia-volta-a-subir-apos-estar-ao-nivel-mais-baixo-desde-1960-1718967.
Bancaleiro, C. & Aníbal, S., 2014. Diferença entre muito ricos e muito pobres continuou a subir
em Portugal. Público. Available at: https://www.publico.pt/sociedade/noticia/diferencas-
entre-os-muito-ricos-e-muito-pobres-continuou-a-subir-em-portugal-1629573.
Barómetro da Qualidade da Democracia, 2011. Inquérito à população portuguesa, Lisbon.
20
Belchior, A., Serra da Silva, S. & Queiroga, V., 2014. Portuguese Population Survey: 2014
Dataset, Lisbon.
Canotilho, J.G. & Moreira, V., 1991. Os Poderes do Presidente da República, Coimbra: Coimbra
Editora.
Cordeiro, A.D., 2013. Analistas dizem que Presidente escreveu prefácio auto-justificativo.
Público. Available at: https://www.publico.pt/politica/noticia/presidente-expos-limites-
da-sua-actuacao-com-prefacio-que-nao-abrandara-contestacao-1587186.
Correia, A., 2011. Cavaco diz que limites aos sacrifícios que se podem pedir foram
ultrapassados. Jornal de Notícias. Available at:
http://www.jn.pt/nacional/interior/cavaco-diz-que-limites-aos-sacrificios-que-se-podem-
pedir-foram-ultrapassados-2067550.html.
Crisóstomo, P., Correia, R.A. & Rodrigues, S., 2014. TC chumba cortes salariais na função
pública. Público. Available at: https://www.publico.pt/economia/noticia/tc-chumba-
cortes-salariais-na-funcao-publica-1638132.
Cruz, M.B. da., 1994. O Presidente da República na génese e evolução do sistema de governo
português. Análise Social, XXIX(125-126), pp.237–266.
Dinis, D., 2014. Passos já pediu a Cavaco fiscalização preventiva das leis mais sensíveis.
Observador. Available at: http://observador.pt/2014/06/17/passos-ja-pediu-cavaco-
fiscalizacao-preventiva-das-leis-mais-sensiveis/.
Duverger, M., 1980. A newpolitical system model: Semi-presidential government. European
Journal of Political Research, 8(2), pp.165–187. Available at:
http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/j.1475-6765.1980.tb00569.x [Accessed July 23, 2016].
Elgie, R., 1999. Semi-Presidentialism in Europe R. Elgie, ed., Oxford University Press. Available
at: http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0198293860.001.0001/acprof-
9780198293866 [Accessed July 23, 2016].
Fernandes, J.M. & Jalali, C., 2016. A Resurgent Presidency? Portuguese Semi-Presidentialism
and the 2016 Elections. South European Society and Politics, pp.1–18. Available at:
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13608746.2016.1198094 [Accessed July
23, 2016].
Fonseca, S., 2013. Bloco critica “calculismo político” de Cavaco Silva. Diário de Notícias.
Available at: http://www.dn.pt/politica/interior/bloco-critica-calculismo-politico-de-
cavaco-silva-3487391.html.
Freire, A., 2010. A new era in democratic Portugal? The 2009 European, legislative and local
elections. South European Society and Politics, 15(4), pp.593–613.
21
Freire, A., & Pinto, A. C., 2005, O Poder dos Presidentes. A República Portuguesa em Debate,
Lisboa: Campo da Comunicação.
Freire, A. et al., 2003. As Eleições Legislativas de 2002: Inquérito Pós-eleitoral. Base de Dados,
Lisbon: Imprensa de Ciências Sociais.
Freire, A., 2014. - : n n d d ,
Freire, A., 2016a. The condition of Portuguese democracy during the Troika’s intervention. In
Reconciling Economic and Social Europe - REScEU The Politics of Bailouts Negotiations,
Università degli Studi di Milano. Milan.
Freire, A., 2016b. The condition of Portuguese democracy during the Troika’s intervention,
2011-2015. Portuguese Journal of Social Science, 15(2).
Freire, A. & Lisi, M., 2016a. Introduction: Political parties, institutions and civil society: The
economic crisis and the evolution of Southern Europe political systems. Portuguese
Journal of Social Science, 15(2).
Freire, A. & Lisi, M., 2016b. The fall of the Berlin Wall 26 years later: The state of the left in
Portugal, 2015-2016. In State of Affairs in Europe, Berlim, Rosa Luxemburg Foundation ,
7-10 July. Berlin.
Freire, A., Lisi, M. & Viegas, J.M.L., 2015. A gestão política das crises, os mandatos dos
governos e a representação política. In A. Freire, M. Lisii, & J. M. L. Viegas, eds. Crise
Económica, Políticas de Austeridade e Representação Política. Lisbon: Assembleia da
República, pp. 19–48.
Freire, A., Lobo, M.C. & Magalhães, P.C., 2005. Inquérito à população portuguesa, Lisbon.
Freire, A. & Pinto, A.C., 2011. O Poder Presidencial em Portugal: Os Dilemas do Poder dos
Presidentes na República Portuguesa, Lisbon: Dom Quixote.
Freire, A. & Santana-Pereira, J., 2011. Portugal 2011 : une victoire de la droite néolibérale et
une défaite de la gauche. Pôle Sud, 35(2), pp.157–166. Available at:
http://www.cairn.info/article.php?ID_ARTICLE=PSUD_035_0157&DocId=256230&hits=48
62+4859+4857+4856+4855+4852+4850+4849+14+11+9+8+7+4+2+1+ [Accessed July 23,
2016].
Freire, A., Tsatsanis, E. & Lima, I., 2016. Portugal in times of crisis: value change and policy
representation. In M. Voicu, I. C. Mochmann, & H. Dülmer, eds. Values, Economic Crisis
and Democracy. London: Routledge, pp. 240–276.
Freire, A. & Viegas, J.M.L., 2008. Inquérito à população portuguesa 2012, Lisbon.
Freire, A., Viegas, J.M.L. & Lisi, M., 2012. Inquérito à população portuguesa 2012, Lisbon.
Available at: er.cies.iscte-iul.pt/.
De Giorgi, E. & Santana-Pereira, J., 2016. The 2015 Portuguese Legislative Election: Widening
22
the Coalitional Space and Bringing the Extreme Left in. South European Society and
Politics, pp.1–18. Available at:
http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/13608746.2016.1181862 [Accessed July
23, 2016].
Gouveia, J.B. & Piçarro, N., 2013. A Crise e o Direito, Coimbra: Almedina.
Hartung, H., 2008. Eurobarometer 54.1: Building Europe and the European Union, The
European Parliament, Public Safety, and Defense Policy, November- December 2000.
Available at: http://www.icpsr.umich.edu/icpsrweb/ICPSR/studies/3209.
Jornal de Negócios, 2013. Presidente da República envia convergência das pensões para o
Tribunal Constitucional. Jornal de Negócios. Available at:
http://www.jornaldenegocios.pt/economia/financas_publicas/detalhe/presidente_da_re
publica_envia_convergencia_das_pensoes_para_o_tribunal_constitucional.html.
Jornal de Notícias, 2012a. Cavaco Silva não pediu fiscalização do orçamento para evitar
inviabilização. Jornal de Notícias. Available at: http://www.jn.pt/politica/interior/cavaco-
silva-nao-pediu-fiscalizacao-do-orcamento-para-evitar-inviabilizacao-2652739.html.
Jornal de Notícias, 2012b. Jerónimo de Sousa junta Cavaco e PS às críticas e defende “poderosa
luta de massas.” Jornal de Notícias. Available at:
http://www.jn.pt/politica/interior/jeronimo-de-sousa-junta-cavaco-e-ps-as-criticas-e-
defende-poderosa-luta-de-massas-2643485.html.
Lobo, M.C. & Neto, O.A., 2009. O semipresidencialismo português revisitado: Uma avaliação
do papel do Presidente na política nacional, 1976-2006. In M. C. Lobo & O. A. Neto, eds.
O Semipresidencialismo nos Países de Língua Portuguesa. Lisbon: Imprensa de Ciências
Sociais, pp. 25–48.
Lusa, 2015. Cavaco Silva foi recebido com manifestação à porta do parlamento da Madeira.
Observador. Available at: http://observador.pt/2015/11/17/cavaco-silva-foi-recebido-
com-manifestacao-a-porta-do-parlamento-da-madeira/.
Lusa, 2014. Pareceres pedidos por Cavaco Silva não apontam inconstitucionalidades no OE.
Expresso. Available at: http://expresso.sapo.pt/politica/pareceres-pedidos-por-cavaco-
silva-nao-apontam-inconstitucionalidades-no-oe=f848538.
Lusa, 2012. PCP apela a Cavaco para vetar leis laborais. Público. Available at:
https://www.publico.pt/politica/noticia/pcp-apela-a-cavaco-para-vetar-leis-laborais--
1550010.
Mair, P., 2011. Bini Smaghi vs. the parties: representative government and institutional
constraints, Florence.
Manin, B., Przeworski, A. & Stokes, S.C., 1999. Elections and Representation. In A. Przeworski,
23
S. C. Stokes, & B. Manin, eds. Democracy, Accountability and Representation. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, pp. 29–54.
Metcalf, L.K., 2000. Measuring Presidential Power. Comparative Political Studies, 33(5),
pp.660–685. Available at:
http://cps.sagepub.com/cgi/doi/10.1177/0010414000033005004 [Accessed July 23,
2016].
Moreira, A., 1989. O regime: Presidencialismo do primeiro-ministro. In M. B.- Coelho, ed.
Portugal: O Sistema Político e Constitucional, 1974-1987. Lisbon: Imprensa de Ciências
Sociais, pp. 31–38.
Moury, C. & Freire, A., 2013. Austerity Policies and Politics: the case of Portugal. Pôle Sud:
Revue de Science Politique, 39(2), pp.35–56.
Novais, J.R., 2007. Semipresidencialismo. Volume I - Teoria do Sistema de Governo
Semipresidencial, Lisbon: Almedina.
Novais, J.R., 2014. Semipresidencialismo. Volume II - O Sistema Semipresidencial Português,
Lisbon: Almedina.
Pinto, J.F., 2016. Presidentes da República no Portugal Democrático: Eleições, Dinheiros e
Vetos, Coimbra: Almedina.
Público, 2014. Cavaco Silva promulga lei geral do trabalho na função pública. Público. Available
at: https://www.publico.pt/economia/noticia/cavaco-silva-promulga-lei-geral-do-
trabalho-na-funcao-publica-1639298.
Público, 2012. Cavaco Silva promulgou Orçamento do Estado na sexta-feira. Público. Available
at: https://www.publico.pt/politica/noticia/cavaco-silva-promulgou-orcamento-do-
estado-1579064.
Público, 2013. Cavaco Silva queixou-se de “impostos de classe” ao Tribunal Constitucional.
Público. Available at: https://www.publico.pt/economia/noticia/cavaco-silva-alerta-
constitucional-para-impostos-de-classe-sobre-funcionarios-publicos-e-pensionistas-
1580311.
República Portuguesa, 2005. Constituição da República Portuguesa VII Revisão Constitucional.
Assembleia da República. Available at:
http://www.parlamento.pt/Legislacao/Documents/constpt2005.pdf [Accessed July 23,
2016].
Ribeiro, G. de A. & Coutinho, L.P., 2014. O Tribunal Constitucional e a Crise - Ensaios Críticos,
Coimbra: Almedina.
Sánchez-Cuenca, I., 2014. La Impotencia Democratica. Sobre La Crisis Política de España,
Madrid: Catara.
24
Sartori, G., 1994. Ingeniería Constitucional Comparada: Una Investigación de Estructuras,
Incentivos y Resultados, Mexico City: Fondo de Cultura Económica.
Schedler, A., 1998. The normative force of electoral promises. Journal of Theoretical Politics,
10(2), pp.191–214.
Shugart, M. & Carey, J., 1997. Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and ElectoraI
Dynamics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Siaroff, A., 2003. Comparative presidencies: The inadequacy of the presidential, semi-
presidential and parliamentary distinction. European Journal of Political Research, 42(3),
pp.287–312. Available at: http://doi.wiley.com/10.1111/1475-6765.00084 [Accessed July
23, 2016].
SIC Notícias, 2014. Estado subsidia cerca de 60% dos novos empregos. Available at:
http://sicnoticias.sapo.pt/economia/2014-08-30-Estado-subsidia-cerca-de-60-dos-novos-
empregos.
Silva, A.C., 2012. Roteiros VI: Intervenções do Presidente da República no Ano de 2011/2012,
Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional Casa da Moeda.
Silva, A.C., 2013. Roteiros VII: Intervenções do Presidente da República no Ano de 2011/2012,
Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional Casa da Moeda.
Silva, A.C., 2014. Roteiros VIII: Intervenções do Presidente da República no Ano de 2011/2012,
Lisbon: Imprensa Nacional Casa da Moeda.
Sol, 2012. CGTP indica inconstitucionalidades da nova legislação laboral a Cavaco Silva. Sol.
Available at: http://sol.sapo.pt/noticia/51728/CGTP-indica-inconstitucionalidades-da-
nova-legislacao-laboral-a-Cavaco-Silva.
Streeck, W., 2013. Tempo Comprado: A Crise Adiada do Capitalismo Democrático, Lisbon:
Actual.
Suspiro, A., 2014. Portugal lidera cortes na despesa social na Europa. i, pp.16–20. Available at:
http://eapnimprensa.blogspot.co.uk/2014/03/portugal-lidera-cortes-na-despesa.html.
Tsebelis, G., 1995. Decision Making in Political Systems: Veto Players in Presidentialism,
Parliamentarism, Multicameralism and Multipartyism. British Journal of Political Science,
25(3), pp.289–325. Available at:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/194257?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.
Veiga, L.R.F.G., 1998. Popularity Functions for the Portuguese Prime Minister, Government,
Parliament and President. European Journal of Political Research, 33(3), pp.347–361.
Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=775404 [Accessed July
23, 2016].
Viegas, J.M.L., 2006. Inquérito à população portuguesa, Lisbon.
25
Visão, 2013a. Portas elogia “sinais de estabilidade” do Presidente da República. Visão.
Available at: http://visao.sapo.pt/actualidade/portugal/portas-elogia-sinais-de-
estabilidade-do-presidente-da-republica=f753945.
Visão, 2013b. PR envia requalificação da função pública para o Constitucional. Visão. Available
at: http://visao.sapo.pt/actualidade/portugal/pr-envia-requalificacao-da-funcao-publica-
para-o-constitucional=f745358.
26
TABLES & FIGURES
27
Table 1: Trust in institutions in Portugal: 2008, 2012 and 2014 (proportion of surveyed and that said they had ‘some’ or ‘much’ trust; percentage of each sample)
Institutions (2008). (2012). Difference 2012-2008.
(2014).
Difference 2014-2008.
Church 67.3 66.1 -1.2 n.d. -
Armed forces 74.4 72.9 -1.5 n.d. -
Media 62.1 55.2 -6.9 53.4 -8.7
Employers’ associations n.d. 38.6 - 51.8 13.2*
Large companies 48.6 35.1 -13.5 47.5 -1.1
Banks/financial system n.d. 22.8 - 29 6.2*
Unions 53.2 57.9 4.7 49.6 -3.6
President of the Republic 73.4 35.2 -38.2 36.3 -37.1
Political parties 30.5 19.2 -11.3 n.d. -
Parliament 48.5 22.3 -26.2 33.9 -14.6
Government 44.5 13.6 -30.9 31.6 -12.9
Courts 50.2 36.3 -13.9 39.9 -10.3
Public administration 48.9 41.3 -7.6 n.d. -
European Union 64.7 42.6 -22.1 52.4 -12.3
N 1350 1209 - 1205 -
Sources: Surveys and representative samples of the adult Portuguese population of mainland Portugal as part of the
CIES-IUL research projects: Freire & Viegas (2008); Freire, Viegas & Lisi (2012); Belchior, Silva e Queiroga (2014).
Notes: n.d. = no data; * = no data for 2008, comparison made with 2012.
28
Figure 1: Satisfaction with how democracy functions in Portugal, 1985-2014
(proportion of surveyed who are “satisfied” or “very satisfied”)
Sources: Data elaborated by authors from the Manheim Eurobarometer Trend File 1970-1999 (Schmitt and Scholtz, 2001), in Eurobarometer 54.1 from ICPSR (Hartnung, 2008), in Estudos Eleitorais Portugueses de 2002 (Freire et al 2003) and 2005 (Freire, Lobo and Magalhães 2005), in the CIES-IUL Participação e Deliberação Democrática survey (Viegas 2006) and the 2011 Barómetro da Qualidade (BDQ 2011) survey. For 2008, 2012 and 2014 data, see the surveys cited in Table 1.
51
64,3 65,2
46 47,7 41
33
10,2 16,3
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1985-1986 1987-1989 1990-1994 1995-1999 2000-2005 2006-2008 2011 2012 2014
29
Table 2: Requests for ruling on constitutionality and political vetoes used during the
presidencies of Mário Soares (1986-96), Jorge Sampaio (1996-2006) and Cavaco Silva (2006-
16)
Terms Requests for prior
rulings on
constitutionality
Requests for
subsequent rulings on
constitutionality
Political vetoes
L DL T1 L DL T2 L DL T3 Total:
T1+T2+T3
Soares I:
1986-91
12
(8)
5
(5)
17
(13)
0 0 0 5 2 7 24
Soares II:
1991-96
14
(11)
9
(3)
23
(14)
2
(2)
1 * 3 7 23 30 56
Sampaio I:
1996-2001
3
(2)
4
(1)
7
(3)
0 0 0 4 8 12 19
Sampaio II:
2001-06
7
(7)
0 7
(7)
1
(1)
0 1
(1)
8 55 63 71
Cavaco I:
2006-11
10
(6)
0
10
(6)
1
(0)
0
1
14
1 15 26
Cavaco II:
2011-16
10
(10)
0 10
(10)
2
(2)
0 2
(2)
7 3 10 22
Sources: Freire e Pinto (2010); Fernandes e Jalali (2016); Serviços da Presidência da República. Notes: L - Parliamentary laws; DL – Decree-Laws; T – Total; * ‘The Constitutional Court did not take note of the request’. Between parenthesis, (...) are all the laws considered unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court.
30
Table 3: Participation and abstention in presidential and legislative elections in Portugal, 1975-2016
Presidential Elections 1976 1980 1986 (1st)
1986 (2nd)
1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 2016
Participation (%) 75.4 84.2 75.6 78.2 62.0 66.4 50.9 61.5 46.5 48.7 Abstention (%) 24.6 15.8 24.4 21.8 38.0 33.6 49.1 38.5 53.5 51.3 Total (%) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Votes (millions) 4.885 5.831 5.739 5.935 5.097 5.779 4.324 5.590 4.214 4.638 Registered voters (millions)
6.477 6.921 7.593 7.593 8.222 8.707 8.746 9.085 9.657 9.741
Legislative Elections 1975 1976 1979 1980 1983 1985 1987 1991 1995 1999 2002 2005 2009 2011 2015
Participation (%) 91.7 83.3 87.5 85.4 78.6 75.4 72.6 68.2 67.1 61.8 62.3 65.0 60.5 58.9 57 Abstention (%) 8.3 16.7 12.5 14.6 21.4 24.6 27.4 31.8 32.9 38.2 37.7 35.0 39.5 41.1 43 Total (%) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Votes (millions) 5.666 5.393 5.915 5.917 5.629 5.744 5.623 5.674 5.854 5.363 5.433 5.713 5.485 5.332 5.181 Registered voters (millions)
6.177 6.477 6.757 6.925 7.159 7.621 7.741 8.322 8.719 8.673 8.716 8.785 9.347 9.429 9.440
Sources: Official statistics cited in Freire and Pinto 2005 (1976-2001: PR; 197-2005: AR); for the more recent elections (AR 2009 and PR 2006): National Election Commission (www.cne.pt) and the Interior Ministry (www.eleicoes.mai.gov.pt). Notes: the results of elections to parliament only cover votes cast for national constituencies; Voters = valid votes; RE = Electoral Rol l (STAPE); the presidential elections from 2001-2016 also include residents outside national territory and able to vote.
31
Table 4: Presidential and parliamentary majorities in Portugal, 1975-2016
Presidential Elections 1976 1980 1986 (1st)
1986 (2nd)
1991 1996 2001 2006 2011 2016
Winning candidate (%) 61.5 56.5 46.3 51.3 70.4 53.8 55.8 50.7 53.0 52.0 Winning candidate (millions of votes) 2.967 3.258 2.628 3.015 3.460 3.038 2.411 2.773 2.232 2.412 Second-placed candidate (%) 16.5 40.2 25.4 48.7 14.1 46.2 34.5 20.7 19.8 22.9 Second-placed candidate (millions of votes) 0.796 2.319 1.443 2.864 0.692 2.606 1.493 1.138 0.833 1.061
Legislative Elections 1976 1980 1985 vs
1st 86
1985 vs
2nd 82
1987 1991 1995 1999 2002 2005 2009 2011 2015
Parliamentary majority (% votes)
35.0 (50.9)
47.1 29.8 29.8 50.2 50.4 43.8 44.0 48.9 45.0 36.6 50.4 32.3 (50.8)
Parliamentary majority (% votes)
1.886 (2.744)
2.841 1.711 1.711 2.851 2.861 2.567 2.359 2.657 2.588 2.077 2.814 1.748 (2.750)
Votes for the party that supported the winning presidential candidate (%)
76.2 44.9 39.5 54.4 39.4 79.7 52.4 44.0 37.8 36.0 39.5 50.4 38.6
Votes for the party that supported the winning presidential candidate (millions)
4.108 2.659 2.270 3.125 2.230 4.521 3.071 2.359 2.056 2.588 2.246 2.814 2.086
Votes for the party that supported the second-placed presidential candidate (%)
3.1 47.1 20.8 39.5 54.4 4.4 34.0 32.3 40.2 45.0 47.3 34.3 1.84
Votes for the party that supported the second-placed presidential candidate (millions)
0.164 2.788 1.195 2.270 3.103 0.248 1.990 1.733 2.182 1.653 2.707 1.918 0.099
Sources: Data elaborated from STAPE (www.stape.pt), National Election Commission (www.cne.pt) and the Interior Ministry (www.eleicoes.mai.gov.pt). Notes:
1. Parliamentary majorities supporting the government: 1976-1978, PS; 1978-1979, PS and CDS; 1979-1980 and 1980-1983, AD (PSD, CDS, PPM); 1983-1985, PS and PSD; 1985-1987, 1987-1991 and 1991-1995, PSD; 1995-1999, PS; 1999-2001, PS; 2002-2005, PSD and CDS-PP; 2005-2011, PS; 2011-2015, PSD and CDS-PP; 2015-, PS.
2. The political parties that supported the winning candidate (Ramalho Eanes) were: PS, PPD/PSD, CDS, MRPP, AOC and PCP-ML; the political parties that supported the second-most voter candidate (Otelo Saraiva de Carvalho) were: UDP, MES and FSP;
32
3. In 1980, the political parties that supported the winning candidate (Ramalho Eanes) were: PS (FRS) and PCP (APU); the political parties supporting the second-placed candidate, Soares Carneiro, were: PSD, CDS and PPM (AD).
4. In 1986, the political parties that supported the winning candidate (Freitas do Amaral) were: PSD and CDS; the political party that supported the second-most voted candidate (Mário Soares) wasi: PS. In 1986, the political parties that supported the winning candidate (Mário Soares) were: PS, PCP (APU) and PRD; the political parties that supported the second-placed candidate (Freitas do Amaral) were: PSD and CDS.
5. In 1991, the political parties that supported the winning candidate (Mário Soares) were: PS and PSD; the political party that supported the second-most voted candidate (Basílio Horta) was: CDS.
6. In 1996, the political parties that supported the winning candidate (Jorge Sampaio) were: PS and PCP (CDU); the political party that supported the second-most voted candidate (Cavaco Silva) was: PSD.
7. In 2001, the political party that supported the winning candidate (Jorge Sampaio) was the PS; the political party that supported the second-placed candidate (Freitas do Amaral) was the PSD.
8. In 2006, the second-most voted candidate (Manuel Alegre), while a member of the PS, was not supported by any party and ran against the PS’s offic ial candidate (Mário Soares); Cavaco Silva, the winning candidate, was strongly supported by the PSD and the CDS-PP; the BE, with Francisco Louçã, the PCP with Jerónimo de Sousa, and the PCPT-MRPP with Garcia Pereira, were the other candidates clearly supported by political parties.
9. In 2011, the winning candidate (Cavaco Silva) was supported by the PSD, the CDS-PP and the MEP. The runner-up (Manuel Alegre) was supported by the PS, the BE and the PCTP-MRPP
10. In 2016, the winning candidate (Cavaco Silva) was supported by the PSD and the CDS-PP. The runner-up (Sampaio da Nóvoa) was an independent who was seeking the support of the PS but who only received the endorsement of Livre/Tempo de Avançar and the PCTP-MRPP.
33
Table 5: Cavaco Silva’s 10 vetoes (2011-2016)
Date Subject Origin Motivation
May 2011 Committee on Access to
Administrative
Documents
Parliament Definition of a special unsubstantiated
remuneration regime and doubts about
the Bill receiving sufficient scrutiny
June 2011 EPAL Government Transition veto during the dissolution of
parliament.
June 2011 Zero rate tax for
innovation
Government Transition veto during the dissolution of
parliament.
June 2011 State support for private
education
Parliament A ministerial order on this already exists
July 2012 Administrative reform of
Lisbon
Parliament Errors identified in the definition of parish
and municipal boundaries
August 2012 Rules for the use of LPG
and natural gas as fuel
Parliament The president had his doubts about the
juridical and constitutional nature of the
Bill.
March 2014 Changes to the value of
discounts for health sub-
systems (ADSE, ADM,
SAD)
Government The president was unconvinced of the
need for and the impact of increasing
contributions. Parliament passed a Bill that
contained this same measure.
March 2015 Private copies Parliament The president called on parliament to
reconsider this Bill to provide more
suitable protection for author and
consumer rights.
January 2016 Adoption by same-sex
couples
Parliament The president thought the change was
very radical and profound.
January 2016 Changes to abortion
laws
Parliament The president did not thing parliament had
spent enough time discussion the topic.
Sources: Serviços da Presidência da República; Pinto (2016). Note: AR - Parliament.
34
Table 6: Cavaco Silva’s 12 requests for ruling on constitutionality (2011-16)
Type of
ruling
Date of
request
Subject Origin Court ruling
Prior April 2011 Suspension of the performance
evaluation model for primary and
secondary school teachers
Parliament Ruling 214/2011
(29 Abril):
Unconstitutional
Prior March
2012
Criminal enrichment Parliament Ruling 179/2012
(5 Abril):
Unconstitutional
Prior April 2013 Establishment of the Court of
Sport Arbitration
Parliament Ruling 230/2013
(24 Abril):
Unconstitutional
Prior May 2013 Intermunicipal bodies Parliament Ruling 296/2013
(28 May):
Unconstitutional
Prior August
2013
Regrading of public sector workers Parliament Ruling 474/2013
(29 August):
Unconstitutional
Prior November
2013
Convergence of public sector
social protection with the general
social security regime (pension
cuts)
Parliament Ruling 862/2013
(19 December):
Unconstitutional
Prior July 2014 Pay cuts and the conditions for
their restoration
Parliament Ruling 574/2014
(14 August):
Unconstitutional
Prior July 2014 Sustainability contribution Parliament Ruling 575/2014
(14 August):
Unconstitutional
Prior July 2015 Crime of unjustified enrichment of
political office holders
Parliament Ruling 377/2015
(27 July):
Unconstitutional
Prior August
2015
Access of officials to information
systems and metadata
Parliament Ruling 403/2015
(27 August):
Unconstitutional
Subsequent January
2013
Items in the 2013 Budget Parliament Ruling 187/2013
(5 April):
Unconstitutional
Subsequent September
2013
Creation of the Court of Sport
Arbitration
Parliament Ruling 781/2013
(20 November):
Unconstitutional
Sources: Constitutional Court; Serviços da Presidência da República; Pinto (2016). Note: AR - Parliament.
35
Figure 2: Position of Portuguese political parties on the left-right scale (1 = left, 10 = right)
according to citizens, 1978-2015
PCP: 2.3PCP: 2.1
CDU: 1.7PCP: 2.0
PCP: 2.7PCP: 2.9
PCP: 29
CDU: 2.8
PCP: 2.5
PCP/CDU: 2.8
PCP/CDU: 2.2
BE: 2.6 BE: 2.6
BE: 3.0
BE: 2.6
BE: 2.6
BE: 2.7
BE: 2.3
PS: 4,6
PS: 5.0PS: 4.8 PS: 4.7
PS: 5.2 PS: 5.3PS: 5.0
PS: 4.7PS: 5.0
PS: 4.8PS: 4.5
PSD: 6.9 PSD: 6.8
PSD: 7.2PSD: 6.9
PSD: 7.6PSD: 7.3
PSD: 7.5 PSD: 7.6
PSD: 8.0
PSD: 7.9PSD: 8.2
CDS: 7.9 CDS: 8.0
CDS: 8.7
CDS: 8.2CDS: 8.0
CDS: 7.4
CDS: 8.0CDS: 8.2
CDS: 7.6
CDS: 7.9CDS: 8.2
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
1978 1985 1989 1999 2002 2005 2008 2011 2012 2014 2015
Sources: 1978-2008, data elaborated by Freire and Lisi (2016a) from several sources; 2011 and 2015, Estudos Eleitorais Portugueses (Lobo and Magalhães 2011; Lobo and Magalhães 2015); 2012, Freire, Viegas and Lisi (2012); 2009 and 2014, European Election Studies (Egmond et al. 2013; Schmitt, Popa and Devinger 2015).