The Cold War Part 3

Global Crisis & The Thaw

World Crisis and Responses

Nuclear Anxiety

Cold War to Hot

The French Plan

European Economic Integration

New Leadership

The Thaw

Strategy Under Eisenhower

Demise of the EDC Ideal

Issues in European Integration

East-West Relations After Stalin

As the U.S. committed itself to the defence of Western Europe, communist aggression saw the Cold War turn hot in East Asia, and it became evident that mere rhetoric wouldn't protect the West from the Soviet juggernaut. This in turn led to plans for Western rearmament in the face of communist aggression, and the closing of the first stage of the Cold War.

While the American entry into NATO had gone a long way to allaying European fears, serious issues still challenged any sense of Western security.

It was widely believed that the Soviet Union and its client states had a considerable advantage in military manpower. Given the time it would take to deploy a U.S. army across the Atlantic to Europe in the event of war, military officials estimated that the Red Army would already be at the Rhine, if not the English Channel.

The U.S. was almost entirely reliant on its nuclear arsenal (on which it had a monopoly) to keep the Soviet Union at bay.

When the Soviets tested an atomic bomb in August 1949, the U.S. was both shocked (there had been no prior warning) and horrified (the Soviets now possessed nuclear weapons, in addition to their vast armies).

To cope with this, desperate action was needed: National Security Council Memorandum 68 (NSC-68)

Among other ideas, it proposed to counter what it viewed as the dire Soviet threat with the development of advanced hydrogen bombs.

It also recommended a large increase in U.S. land, sea, and air forces.

Finally, the expansion of American defence industries, and a 300% increase in the United States defence budget were advised.

While a few inside the inner circles of power opposed this (including George Kennan, who though it grossly exaggerated Soviet geopolitical ambitions), most supported a harder line with the Soviets.

While President Truman was impressed by their arguments, he was loathe to force such an onerous burden on the American people in a time of peace.

While initially promising not to deploy American forces in Europe during peacetime, the outbreak of the Korean War in late 1950 led President Truman to base 4 U.S. infantry divisions in West Germany.

Likewise, NATO was transformed from a loose-knit coalition to an integrated force under centralized command, with its first Supreme Commander being war hero General Dwight D. Eisenhower.

Meanwhile the U.S. underwent a massive expansion of both nuclear and conventional forces while increasing its defence budget three-fold. In 1952 Greece and Turkey joined NATO, while Spain (an international pariah for its Pro-Axis stance in the Second World War) received American economic aid in exchange for military basing rights.

Essentially, the U.S. strategy for the defence of Europe was twofold: the U.S. forces in Germany would serve as a proverbial tripwire, engaging Soviet forces as soon as they invaded. This reassured the European leaders of NATO that the U.S. would respond with maximum force, as no American President could justify not launching a nuclear assault on the USSR if American GIs were dying in combat with Soviet forces.

As well, the ground forces would serve as a 'Shield' with other NATO troops to block the Soviet attacks into Western Europe, while the 'Sword' of U.S. long-range nuclear bombers prepared to attack the Soviet Union.

While no one doubted the power of America's nuclear 'sword', the ground force 'shield' was simply too weak to hold out for long against the Soviet Army. Severe action would be required to maintain the credibility of NATO's defences.

To offset the shortage of military manpower, the U.S. proposed that West Germany be allowed to rearm itself to contribute to the defence of Western Europe.

Many Europeans were uncomfortable with this idea, only 5 years after the defeat of Nazi Germany, and a French proposal known as the Pleven Plan called for the creation of a Pan-European army, with German divisions existing under multinational European command.

René Pleven

This seemed to offer advantages to all parties: the Europeans didn't have to worry about a new full-blown German army, the Americans got the additional manpower they wanted, and the Germans were able to parlay their contribution of troops into regaining full sovereignty from the occupying powers.

In the end the 6 nations of what came to be called 'Inner Europe' (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg) signed on, and in May 1952 the European Defence Community (EDC) treaty was signed.

Relations in Europe were transforming, and not simply in a military sense. Germany and France, bitter enemies for centuries, had decided to end their long and ultimately pointless rivalry.

The first big breakthrough was a proposal known as the Schuman Plan to jointly coordinate the coal and steel industries of France and Germany, the logic being that these industries were complementary between the two (as opposed to competitive), and that a prosperous Europe was inconceivable without a prosperous Germany. Robert Schuman

In this way, France hoped that just as it sought to utilize Germany's manpower in the EDC, it could utilize its economic recovery to allow Europe to prosper.

A conference between the six EDC countries resulted in the signing in April 1951 of a treaty to merge their coal, iron, and steel industries under a supranational entity known as the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).

In fact, both the Pleven and Schumann Plans that led to the EDC and ECSC had been created by a French bureaucrat by the name of Jean Monnet: a political and economic genius who worked tirelessly his entire life for European unity and who many consider today to be the Father of a United Europe.

Jean Monnet

Monnet realized from observing both World Wars first hand that steel was central to war making capability, and that if the German steel industry were highly integrated into the larger European one, it would render war making both harder and less desirable, contributing to a peaceful and prosperous Europe.

While Chancellor Adenauer realized by joining the ECSC he would render reunification with East Germany impossible, he felt it was justified, as a stronger, more economically powerful West Germany allied to the U.S. would be in a better position to eventually agitate for reunification: and in the long term, he was correct.

In early 1953 the first stage of the Cold War came to an end with the departure of the two leaders who had overseen this era. In January President Harry Truman handed over power to the newly elected President Dwight D. Eisenhower, and only 6 weeks later Soviet Dictator Joseph Stalin died of a stroke.

In his later years, Stalin had become increasingly paranoid, with deadly results for many communist party members in the satellite states and at home in the USSR. After his death, the USSR was ruled for the next two years by consensus among top officials as opposed to the diktat of a single leader.

The legacy of Stalin in the postwar period is undeniably impressive (albeit not morally), as despite the USSR's incredibly massive strategic inferiority in both nuclear weapons and naval forces, it managed to create a satellite empire in Eastern Europe, while in East Asia China and North Korea became communist states and the Vietnamese communist party battled the French for independence.

Truman however was also an accomplished leader: the spread of communist power had been contained by the rebuilding of Western Europe, the repulsing of Soviet moves towards Turkey and Iran, and the defence of South Korea and the Nationalist Chinese on Taiwan along with a security agreement with old wartime opponent Japan.

Ultimately, both these nations had survived the Second World War to become the only two nations capable of pursuing not merely regional, but global interests: they had become Superpowers in a Bipolar International System. The question on everyone's mind now was whether the Cold War would go on, or would a peaceful, diplomatic solution be found?

While the attempts to form a Pan-European army began to run into trouble, it may yet have proved unnecessary as relations with the USSR begin to warm slightly. This was a result of complex interactions between the policies of the new Eisenhower administration, the ongoing process of European integration, and the consequences of Stalin's death on the Soviet Union.

The election of the Republican presidential candidate Eisenhower served as an indication of dissatisfaction with the Democrat's policy of containment. Republicans decried it as an immoral abandonment of millions to communist slavery, and called for a 'rolling back' of the iron curtain.

However, American military forces were insufficient to even defend Western Europe, never mind liberating Eastern Europe, and the Republicans were committed to lower government expenditures. A way was needed to limit spending, yet still project great military power, but how?

The answer came in 1954 when the 'new look' in American defence policy was announced: NATO would rely on America's nuclear forces to keep the Soviets in check.

This would both allow costly conventional forces to be kept modestly sized, while ensuring American willingness to utilize military power (as the Soviets despite having tested nuclear weapons, had no functional ones and no means of delivering them, rendering America invulnerable) in the defence of Europe.

In order for the new American defence policy to work, a rearmed West Germany was needed to compensate for the lack of American forces in Europe (despite nuclear superiority, a decently sized army was still needed in Europe).

While the EDC seemed to be the answer to this problem, and was ratified in 5 of the 6 constituent states, it was ultimately defeated in the French National Assembly. To overcome this setback, the British proposed a novel solution: the old Brussels Treaty (made largely superfluous by NATO) would be expanded to include West Germany and Italy, and renamed the Western European Union.

This parallel organization saw Britain commit forces to the continent, and forced West Germany to accept limits on its new military forces (no army operating outside NATO, limits on certain conventional weapons systems, no ABC [atomic, biological, chemical] weapons).

This alternative to the EDC saw West Germany formally join NATO on May 9 1955, ten years to the day after the surrender of Nazi Germany, and finally regain full sovereignty.

In response to the rearmament of West Germany, the Soviet Union and its various satellite powers formed a counterpart alliance known as the Warsaw Pact.

The expansion of NATO in no way however lessened the alliance's dependence on nuclear weapons, which took on an increasingly important role in alliance planning, with the idea being that nuclear weapons would indeed be considered a weapon of first resort.

This strategy of a full nuclear attack in response to a conventional Soviet attack was referred to by American Secretary of state John Foster Dulles as 'Massive Retaliation'.

John Foster Dulles

It required the U.S. to let the Soviets know that they would strike, without actually striking, a convoluted game of political and diplomatic manoeuvring known as 'Brinkmanship'. The Soviets likewise began to focus on building up their nuclear forces, and by the beginning of the 1960's war seemed a remote possibility (due to the fact it would almost immediately become an all out nuclear exchange).

The path to European cooperation did not die with the EDC, far from it. The ECSC was seen as a success, and negotiations began to expand the integration of the ECSC economies. While Jean Monnet preferred what he called the 'functional' approach of gradual integration of certain sectors, the 'comprehensive' school of thought won out, and in March 1957 the European Economic Community (EEC) was established.

In addition to its stated goals of seeking to integrate the European economies, allow a free flow of labour, and standardize social legislation, it also introduced various political bodies to help manage this new community including an executive commission, a council of ministers, a parliamentary assembly, and a court of justice. The second great goal of the EEC after the harmonization of the European economies was to establish a standardized trading policy with the rest of the world.

The British, who had stayed out of the EEC so as to benefit from their special relationship with the U.S. as well as to maintain trading benefits with their vestigial empire, were concerned that their extensive links to the European states of the EEC would be threatened if they remained outside it. To remedy this the U.K. along with Norway, Denmark, Austria, Sweden, Switzerland, and Portugal founded the European Free Trade Association (EFTA).

The EFTA was much more loosely organized and widespread than the EEC, lacking the political bodies of the later, and was the answer of the so called 'Outer Seven' to the EEC's 'Inner Six'. With this, non-communist Europe was split into two separate economic blocs, which served to complicate and perhaps even threaten the future of European economic cooperation.

With Stalin's death power had passed into the hands of a collection of high Soviet officials working in consensus, and a new period of improved relations began with the West, nicknamed the 'Thaw'. Under this new leadership, political prisoners were released, the secret police reigned in, economic reforms implemented, and communist organizations and allies abroad were encouraged to parlay with their Western opponents.

In 1955 a new de facto leader emerged in the form of the until then obscure first secretary of the communist party Nikita Khrushchev.

Among other ventures in the spirit of reducing global tensions was the solution to the long simmering 'Austrian Question', as that nation had like Germany been occupied since the end of the war.

In the end, Austria was reunited as a sovereign, neutral nation, and was a signal that East-West cooperation need not end in bitter stalemate and division.

On the Western side of the continent, an unlikely leader called for face to face meetings between the two sides. Winston Churchill, back in power after his 1945 electoral defeat and as ardent an anticommunist as any man, greatly feared that a nuclear war would annihilate civilization, and was desperate to avoid that possibility.

He proposed that the big stumbling block of East-West relations, Germany, be reunited as a neutral state. However, this plan was ultimately rejected by members of both sides, as both feared a united Germany would slip into the other's sphere of influence. Regardless, in July 1955 the leaders of the Soviet Union, France, the U.K., and the U.S. met in Geneva, Switzerland.

While nothing substantive resulted from these talks, the press images of the leaders of East and West chatting happily led to international media referring to the 'Spirit of Geneva', as both sides seemed to be on much better terms.

In February 1956 the degree of change in the Soviet Union became clear, when Khrushchev delivered a speech behind closed doors angrily denouncing Stalin and his many crimes, and renouncing the dead leader's belief in the inevitability of war between communism and capitalism, putting forth a new policy of peaceful coexistence.

With this in mind he subsequently dissolved the Cominform and vowed to relax the Soviet grip on the satellite states. It seemed that a new age of moderation and cooperation might be at hand.