the president, the polls, and vietnam

7/30/2019 The President, The Polls, And Vietnam

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The Preudent, he Po//4 and 89Ambivalent attitudes on the war allow Johnson to lead public opinionS E Y M O U R M A R T I N L I P S E T

Never before in the annals of American political historyhas a President exhibited such an obvious and intense con-cern over his public image as indicated by the publicopinion polls . President Johnson's welt-reported attentionto the rise and fall of percentage points raises the question:what are the uses and abuses of polls in affecting the ac-tions o f p olitical leaders.

There is a very great difference in the reliability ofresponses with respect to domestic and foreign affairs.Domestically, the polls indicate that we are dealing withrelatively stable attitudes, on issues such as the welf are state,race relations, etc. In addition, when new issues arise such

as how to deal with inflation, unemployment, or Medicare,people can react to them in terms of direct personal ex-perience or liberal-conservative predispositions.

Conversely, in the area of foreign policy most Americansknow very li t t le, and are only indirectly involved. Theyhave no way of checking on often conflicting reports fromcountries and regions under contention, nor on publicsentiments elsewhere in the world. Consequently, the pressand political leaders can have much more influence indetermining public opinion on foreign issues than ondomestic issues. Whether Tshombe is a villain or a hero,whether the downfal l of Nkrumah is good or bad, i s

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defined for the average American rather than by the averageAmerican. If we trace the poll popularity of a single leader,say Tito of Yugoslavia or de Gaulle of France, it becomesclear that the poll variations in the United States followpolicy decisions made about him on the basis of whetherhis actions further or hamper American concerns. In otherwords, polls do no t make policy so much as follo w policy inmost areas of internatio nal affairs.

When it comes to Vietnam, basically the opinion dataindicate that national policy-makers, particularly the Presi-dent, have an almost free hand to pursue any policy theythink correct and get pu blic suppo rt fo r it. They can escalateunder the justification that this is the only way to preventa "C omm unis t take-over" in Southeast As ia; they can nego-tiate with the Viet Cong for a coalition government if thispolicy is presented as one which will gain peace whileavoiding such a presumed take-over. These conclusions donot mean that most people are fickle, but rather that theyagree on certain larger objectives, peace without the ex-pansion (or contraction) of communism, and find it neces-sary to trust the judgment of national leaders as to what ispossible given these purposes.The highly publicized efforts by the President and otherforeign policy advocates to interpret the various poll resultsdealing with the Vietnam conflict--with both hawks anddoves claiming that the American people agree with them--p oi nt up the need to clarify the meaning of the polls. Somemon ths ago, a faculty group at various San Francisco BayArea colleges actually dug dow n in th eir ow n pockets to p aythe National Opinion Research Center (N OR C) of theUniversity of Chicago to conduct a survey which mig ht clearup some of the confusion. Unfortunately, this survey wasno more conclusive than others which have been conductedover the years by other pollsters such as George Gallup,Louis Harris, National Analysts, and the Opinion ResearchCorporation. The results of most surveys can still be inter-preted by both extremes in the foreign policy debate to fittheir own preconceptions.N o P i g e o n h o le s f o r H a w k s a n d D o v e s

The truth is that the American people as a whole, andmany, if not most, individuals cannot be placed in thecategory of dove or hawk. Two sets of attitudes stand outamong the various responses. The great majority of theAmerican people desire peace in Vietnam, do not want warwith China, are prepared to accept some sort of compro-mise truce with the enemy, and, in fact, anticipate a negoti-ated peace rather than a victory which will see the defeat ofthe Viet Cong. On the other hand, a substantial majority isstrongly hostile to communism and all the Communistcountries, inclu ding Soviet Russia, Cuba, and China. Alm ostnobod y interviewed by NO RC (5 percent or less) believedthat our foreign policy toward any one of these countriesis "too tough"; a large majority agree with statements thatthe US is "too soft" in dealing with China and Cuba; al-most half think we are "too soft" in our relations with the

Russians. Most of those who do not think the policy is"too so ft" say it is right.

Most Americans are, in fact, both doves and hawks; themore thorough and detailed the querying of opinions, themore clearly this appears. Early in March of this year, theGallup Poll asked, "Would you favor or oppose bombingbig cities in No rth Vie tnam ?" Sixty percent voiced opposi-tion, while only 28 percent favored it. (The N OR C studyused a similar question and reported 55 percent against bomb-ing cities in North Vietnam and 39 percent in support.)These results would seem to clearly indicate a dove maj orityagainst bombing North Vietnam. Yet in the same survey,Gallup also inquired, " Wo uld you favor or oppose bombingindustrial plants and factories in North Vietnam?" Theresponse distribution was almost precisely opposite to the"bomb North Vietnamese cities" question. Sixty-one per-cent said they were for the bombing of factories and 26percent were against. In other words, three-fifths of theAmerican public were for bombing the North Vietnamesefactories, but three-fifths (not all the same people) werealso against bombing their cities, in March and April. Thismeans that the policy of "strategic" bombing and avoiding"civilian" targets is generally approved. Thus, when LouisHarris asked about US resumption of bombing in January("Do you think President Johnson was right or wrong toresume bombing in North Vietnam after the recentpause?") 73 percent said he was right; only 10 percentwere opposed. And two months later a National Analystssurvey conducted for NBC which inquired, "Should theUS continue bombing North Vietnam?" reported almostidentical results, 78 percent for continuing; 14 percentfor stop ping the attacks.

The American public shows a similar general propensityto discriminate among the methods wh ich should be used infightin g the war. Almo st the same size majority (68 per-cent) told National Analysts interviewers that they opposedthe US using "any nuclear weapons in Vietnam," asapproved US use of "gas that does no t kill people."

Are these illogical o r inco nsiste nt responses ? No, as inthe case of the answers to th e bom bing questions, they re-flect a national mood to do as little as possible to stopcommu nist expansion. T he do min ant attitude seems to benot to let Vietnam "go Communist" coupled with a desireto end the war as soon as possible, on the most minimalconditions which include a willingness to negotiate directlywith the National Liberation Front (NLF).Peace--yes; C o m m u n i s m - - n o

The various surveys point up this mixed pattern of re-sponses. Peace sentim ents are strong. A lmo st everyone (8 8percent) polled by NO RC would favor "Am erican negotia-tions with the Viet Cong if they were willing to n egotiate,"and a majority (52 percent for, 36 percent against) wouldbe willing to approve "forming a new government inwhich the Viet Cong took some part" in order to "end thefighting."

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But the s am e s am p l e of respondents wh o gave these doveanswers turned into veritable militant hawks when asked,"If President Johnson were to announce tomorrow that wewere going to withdraw from Vietnam and let the Com-munists take over, would you approve or disapprove?"Four-fifths of the NOR C sample, 81 percent, disapproved,

" T h o u g h m o s t A m e r i ca n s a re w i l l i n g t o k e e pf i g h t i n g i n V i e t n a m , t h e y c l ea r ly w o u l d p r e f e rn o t t o b e t h e r e a n d a r e a n x i o u s a n d w i l l i n g t ot u r n o v e r t h e r e s p o n s i b i l i t y t o s o m e o n e e l s e . "

as compared with but 15 percent favoring getting out. Agoodly majority (5 6 percent for, 39 percent against) wouldp~ot agree to " gradually withdrawing our troops and lettingthe South Vietnamese work out their own problems" eventhou gh the possibility of a Com mun ist victory was not m en-tioned in the question.

The willingness of the Americans to fight the war wasexpressed in the response to a NORC question which firstasked respondents to choose among three alternativecourses of action: contin uing the present situation in-definitely; fighting a major war with hundreds of thousandsof casualties; or supportin g a withd rawal of A mericantroops which leads to an eventual Communist take-over.Almost half (49 percent) would continue the present situa-tion; 23 percent favored escalation to a major war; and 19percent would support getting out. However, when thechoice was narrowed to either support of escalation to amajor war or withdrawal, twice as many (60 percent)chose major war as favored withdrawal. The same aggres-sive posture is reflected in the answers to an NBC-NationalAnalysts poll, in March, which asked respondents to choosewhether we should "pursue a more offensive ground warin Vietnam than we are presently doing, or should weestablish defensive positions around the cities we nowcontrol?" Over half (55 percent) chose to escalate ascompared to 28 percent who favored holding our presentlines.Wh en pollsters' questions remind respondents of thecost of the war in lives and do not mention communism,Americans often support the more pacific alternative; whenthey are faced with fighting or agreeing to a Communistvictory, they opt for continuing the war, and even withescalating if necessary.

Yet, though most Americans ruefully are willing to keepfighting in Vi etnam i f this is necessary to prevent a completetake-over, or expansion to neighboring countries, theyclearly would m uch prefer not to be there, and are anxiousand w illing to turn over responsibility to someon e else. Backin June 1954, w hen it first appeared as if the US migh t sendtroops to Indo-China, only 20 percent told Gallup inter-viewers that they would approve sen ding US soldiers "tohelp the French fight the Communists in Indo-China."

And much more recently, on various occasions, clearmajorities have reported to Gallup, Harris, and NORCalike that they would like to see the United Nations takeover from the United States, either to fight or settle thewar. Thus in the first few months of this year, 70 percenttold NOR C they would approve the UN or some neutralcountries negotiating a peace "with each side holding theterritory it now holds"; 74 percent indicated to GalIupinterviewers they would approve the UN working out "itsown formula for peace in Vietnam"; more people (49 per-cent) said that the US should submit the Vietnam questionto the UN and abide by the UN 's decision, no m a t t e r w ha tit is, than opposed the idea (37 percent) ; and a UN armyfor Vietnam an d Southeast Asia was approved by a three toone majority (almost identical to the results obtained byG allup to a simiIar question a year earlier).Peace Hope s and the U N

The strength of the sentiment to turn ~he war over tothe United Nations may be seen in the fact that this is theonly issue on which poll results indicated that negativejudgments of President Johnson far outweighed hissupport. In September 1965, the Harris Survey reportedthat 42 percent agreed with the statement, the Presidentwas "more wrong than right" in not asking the UN totake over in Vietnam, while only 25 percent thought hewas "more right than w rong," and the rest were not sure. Amore recent Harris Survey released in early April of thisyear reports that Americans favor by nearly two to one(50 percent to 27 percent) "turn ing over the entire Viet-nam war to a special three-man United Nations committeefor arbitration and a decision binding on aI1 parties."

These attitudes not only reflect ambivalent sentimentsabout US participation in Vietnam, they also indicate thevery strong positive feeling of the overwhelming majorityof the American people toward the United Nations. Al l thesurveys have consistently indicated widespread popular sup-port fo r the UN. (Th e vociferous rightist critics of Am eri-can membership in the international body can hardly findmore than a small minority to support their views amongthe general public. M ost Americans seem to ident ify the U Nwith prospects for world peace, and are willing to do any-thin g to endorse it, includ ing criticizing American foreignpolicy if a question is worded in such a way as to make thepro-U N response inv olve such criticism.)

In evaluating the polt responses, it is important to keepin mind that the proportion of Americans who can beconsidered soft on communism is insignificantly small.Those who approve forming a new government in whichthe NLF takes part are almost as hard in their attitudestoward Castro, Communist China, and Russia as those whooppose NL F participation. In other words "h ard line" anti-Communists are almost as prone to favor dealing with theViet Cong directly, as those who are generally more favor-able to the expan sion of relations with C omm unist countries.For example, 60 p ercent of those favorable to a coalition

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with the Viet Cong think our policy toward Castro is "toosoft," as compared with 70 percent among those who wouldnot admit the Viet Cong to the government. The responsepattern with respect to attitudes toward Communist Chinaand Russia is similar.

What the polls show is that the anti-communism ofAmericans has little to do with their opinions about howthe war in Vietnam should be handled at the tactical level.But, the belief in the need to defeat the Communist enemy,serves to support any actions which the President can argueneed to be taken to defeat this enemy. Such attitudes pro-vide a strong reservoir of support for the hawks, and anequally significant imped iment fo r the doves.

These mixed "hawk-dove" sentiments in large measureunderlie the general state of opinion concerning PresidentJohnson's handling of the Vietnamese situation. Polls ta-ken before the spring 1966 Buddhist crisis, by Galtup andHarris over the previous year, had indicated approval forthe President in the ratio of two to one. The last such pre-crisis survey, Gallup's of late March, indicated that 56percent approved, w hile 26 percent disapproved. (Th eNORC survey taken a little earlier found a comparabledivision, 61 percent approving and 29 percent disapproving,almost identical to the results reported by the NBC NationalAnalysts poll, also taken in March. )W h o A r e t h e P r e s id e n t 's C r it ic s ?

It is difficult to tell from the available reports of thevarious surveys whether the critics of President Johnsonare disproportionately hawks or doves. It is clear that alarge majority both of the extreme hawks, those who favor"carrying the war more into North Vietnam," and of themore pacific doves, those who would "pull our troops outno w," tell pollsters they" oppose the President's V ietnamesepolicies. The President, on a number of occasions, hasstated that m ost of those who disapprove of his V ietnamesepolicies are hawks, rather than doves. And he has in-terpreted increases in the pro portion s voicing criticism, suchas occurred in May and Ju ne of 1966, as reflecting a gro wthin sentiment to escalate. This may be so, but the Presidenthas not presented figures comparing the attitudes of hissupporters a nd oppon ents o n a variety of s pecific policyissues. This w ould b e the on ly way to reach a conclusion onthis point.

The NORC survey tried to do so but the findings areindecisive and incomplete. Those who "disapprove the waythe Johnson administration is handling the situation inVietnam" are slightly more likely to give dove rather thanhaw k responses on a fe w policy questions. H owever, thesedata derive from those questions which produced largedove responses among the sample generally, such as negoti-ate with Viet Cong, form a new government with them.

Most recently, a Gallup survey taken in early June re-ports that among those who disapprove of Johnson's han-dling o f the situation in V ietnam, 10 percent gave answerswhich could be categorized under the heading "we should

be more aggressive," while 13 percent said that " we shouldget out." My own interpretation of the data presented byvarious pollsters is that the proportions of hawks and dovesamong the President's critics, reported recently by Gallup,has tended to be a relatively stable pattern. That is, thecritics have usually contained slightly more doves than

" T h e P r e s i d e n t m a k e s o p i n i o n , h e d o e s n o t f o l l o wi t. T h e p o l l s t el l h i m h o w g o o d a p o l i t i c i a n h e i s .T h e y a r e a w e a p o n a g a i n s t h i s c r i ti c s ."

hawks. It should be stressed, however, that there is alwaysa third group present among the President's critics whoseresponses cann ot be classified in eit her category.

Clearly, the American people are worried about theVietnam war. Indeed, they are, according to recent reports,at least twice as concerned over the war as they are overthe next leading "issue"--the Negro civil rights issue.When Gallup asked a national sample in December whatheadline they would most like to see in "tomorrow's paper,"almost nine out of ten respondents spontaneously mentionedpeace. Almost half (46 percent) specifically said "peace inVietnam," while another 41 percent stated peace in general.These findings were reiterated in the NORC study whichfound that more voters (62 percent) said they "worried agreat deal" about the war in Vietnam than about any otherissue. Only 7 percent said the issue of the war did notworry them at all.

The anxiety and serious though t which Am ericans devoteto the Vietnamese war does not mean that they see anyquick or simple way to g ain the peace they- so arde ntlydesire. They know that we have not been doing well. ACBS-Opinion Research Corporation survey reported inDecember that when asked which side controlled "most ofthe land area of South Vietnam," more people said theViet Cong. O~zly 24 percent thought the US was "makingprogress toward victory." The bulk of those interviewedalso had a reasonably accurate estimate of the numbers ofAmerican troops in Vietnam and the casualties suffered bythem. Last December, when asked by Gallup, how longthey think the war will last, less than 20 percent thought itwould end in a year or less; 26 percent guessed at two orthree more years; while 36 percent said at least four moreyears. And when asked by Gallup in January of this year:"Do you think the war will end in a clear-cut victory inVietnam, or will it end in some sort of compromise settle-ment?" only 7 percent foresaw a clear-cut victor),; 69 per-cent predicted a compromise ending. This anticipation of acompromise settlement is reflected in the large majoritiesfavoring a negotiated settlement as reported by both Gallupand H arris.

The fact that the government of South Vietnam becameinvolved in serious troubles with its own people in the late

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spring should not have been too surprising to many Ameri-cans. The CBS-National Analysts survey reported in Decem-ber 1965, that only 22 percent of Americans thought mostSouth Vietnamese are loyal to their present leaders, i.e., theK y regime. In spite of this lack of belief in pop ular supp ortfor the South Vietnamese government, when this samesample was asked: "Do you think we should have pulledout before American fighting units became involved, or doyou think that staying there was the right thing to do?"only 20 percent said we should have pulled out, 65 percentthought staying in Vietnam was right. The ability of peopleto hold these contradictory beliefs is based on an ov erridingbelief that supporting the war is not specific to Vietnam,but a necessity to stop Communist expansion.Confus ing , bu t Cons i s ten t

The data presented by the various pollsters make it pos-sible for one to argue that the American people are tough,soft, informed, confused, decisive, and indecisive, depend-ing on the case one wants to make. To interpret them inany of these ways, however, would be wrong. These at-titudes reflect certain consistent underlying beliefs aboutpeace and Communism which most of the American public,like those wh o h old office, find difficult to reconcile. Ve ryfew are willing to approve actions which they perceivewould increase the chances for a larger war, reduce thepossibilities for early peace, or encourage Com mun ist ex-pansion into non-Communist areas, inside or outside ofVietnam. And the survey data suggest that most Americansshare with their leaders the sense that they are in a morassfrom which they do not yet see a way out.

The findings of the surveys clearly indicate that thePresident, while having a relatively free hand in the actualdecision-making to escalate or to de-escalate the war, ismore restricted when considering the generic issues of actionor inaction. He must give the appearance of a man engagd,of being certain of what he is doing, i.e., that the antici-pated consequences do in fact come about.

The President seems to present his program along twoparameters:9 as part o f a plan to secure the peace, particularly if theaction involved is actually escalation;9 pacific actions are presented as ways to contain com-munism, or even to weaken it.

The President knows that in order to get the support ofthe American people for a war they wish they never werein, he must continually put his "best peace foot" forward--he continually talks and offers peace, so that he may havepublic endorsement for war.

And conversely, any effort to make peace, to reach agree-ment with any Co mmunist state, would best be presented asa way to *'contain" Communism, to weaken it by facilitatingsplits among the various Communist states, or to helpchange it internally so that it will be less totalitarian, morehumane, and less expansionist.

There are, of course, important limits, real limits, on the

ability of the President to determine public response. During1966, his personal popularity and endorsement for theVietnamese pol icy dropped sharply-- to a point where thepercentage indicating support fell to less than 50 percent.A Gallup survey in May indicated only 41 percent of thegeneral public approved "the way Johnson is handling thesituation in Vietnam," as against 37 percent who dis-approved. This general decline in support was a result ofthe internal turmoil among the South Vietnamese, and afeeling that the President had become indecisive in hishandling of the war. Clearly, there was no way that thePresident could have prevented the American people fromlearning of the opposition in the streets to General Ky'sgovernmen t. These events, according to G allup, led to asizable increase in the proportion who felt that continuedfighting is useless, who viewed the war as lost. Gallup re*ported as of early June, before the facili t ies at Haiphongand H anoi were bombed, that fo r the first t ime since the USbecame heavily engaged in Vietnam, less than half thepopulation, 48 percent supported continuing the war, ascompared with 35 percent who were in favor of taking ourtroops out.Yet according to the Harris Survey, another effect of thedespair over the South Vietnamese turmoil was to increasesharply the numbers of Americans who favored sharpescalation in tactics as a means of ending the war. Thus,before the decision was made to bomb installations at H anoiand Haiphong in June, Harris reported that those in favorof bombing the two cities had increased from 20 percent asof Septem ber 1965, to 3 4 percc~at in May 1966, whileopposition to such bombings had dropped from 47 to 34percent. Support for blockading North Vietnamese ports,a step not yet taken, jumped from 38 percent in Septemberto 53 percent in May. Those willing to "carry the groundwar into North Vietnam at the risk of bringing Red Chinainto the f ight ing" went up from 28 percent in December1965 to 38 percent in May.

Once the religious strife was terminated, the Presidentcould regain his hold on public opinion by the twin tacticsof escalating the bombing raids and emphasizing the mili-tary defeats suffered by the Viet Cong, and the presumeddemoral izat ion of the Ho government in Hanoi . Gal lupreports as of July 1966 show that between early June andmid-July general support for the President jumped from46 percent to 56 percent and specific endorsement of hisrole in the Vietnam conflict rose from 41 percent to 49percent. As of August Harris found that "more than 80percent favor the bombings of military targets at Hanoiand Haipho ng . . . . " Those in favor of intensi fying thewar effort rose from 47 percent in May to 60 percent inAugust. These changes underscore the need for Presidentialaction as a basis of continuing support.Democra t i c 'Wa r Losses'

These results do not mean, however, that any course ofdecisive action is without great political risks. The deeply

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felt general anxiety over the continuation and escalation ofthe war ,nay result in considerable loss of support to theDemocrats in the 1966 Congressional elections. A minority,but on e large enou gh to affect the outcome in many districts,is increasingly unhappy. The fact that some of the criticsare hawks and others doves, does not change the fact thatthey may vote for the opposition, or not vote at all as ameans of protest. A Harris Survey early in the year reportsthat "those who disagree with the Administration conductin V ietnam today say they are likely to vote 52-48 percentRepublican next fa ll."

There are other indications of th e diverse ways which thecontinuation of the war m ay aid the Republicans and evenstimulate right-wing sentiment in the country. On one hand ,in July of this year for the first time in many years, a largergroup (30 percent) told Gallup interviewers that the Re-publicans are more likely than the Democrats (22 percent)to keep the US out of World War III. Contrast this resultwith the finding in October 1964 that 45 percent saw theDemocrats as the more pacific party with 22 percent forthe Republicans. But the survey data also suggest that thesocial base for a new wave of McCarthyism may be emerg-ing. In March of this year when asked by national analysts:" Do you agree with the right of an American citizen todemonstrate against the war in V ietnam ?" only" 34.5 per-cent agreed, 62 percent opposed. Tw o earlier surveys, by theOpinion Research Corporation and Galtup in Novemberand December, also yielded results which suggest that thelarge majority of the public do not view opposition to thewar as legitimate, seeing the bulk of the protesters as"communists" or "d raf t dodgers."

To sum up the implications of the polls, it seems clearthat the President holds the trump cards in dealing withthe public on foreign policy matters. The public knowsthey" do n ot know, and feel they must trust the President,for there is no one else on w hom they can rely in the inter-national field. There is no equivalent to D wigh t Eisenhoweraround today--an opposition leader with sufficient per-sonal status and international experience to become acounter-center of foreign policy confidence.

If this is so, why does L yndon Johnson pay so much at-tention to survey results. Not, I would suspect, to convincehimself that he is doing right, or that he is following thewishes of the people. The President makes opinion, he doesnot follow it . His interest in the opinion polls, therefore,reflects his desire to be sure that his approach is reachingthe American public in the way he wants them affected.The polls tell him how good a politician he is. They arealso a weapon against his critics. He feels he is under noobligation to make public politically unpalatable informa-tion. And, as we have seen, there is enough in the surveysfor the President to find justification for whatever policyhe wants to pursue in Vietnam, and to tell his politicalcritics that the people are behind him.

The poll data can also enable the President, and otherpoliticians as well, to ignore opposition demonstrations,

which are organized by relatively small minorities. Thus,opinion surveys of university student populations, who haveprovided the main source of organized disagreement, indi-cate that the overwhelming majority of American studentsare behind the war. There have been four national surveysof campus opinion, two in 1965 by Louis Harris and Ptay-bo); and tw o in 1966 by" Samuel Lubetl and G atlup, thelatter in June. All of these indicate that a large majority- ofAmerican students (between two-thirds and three-quarters)support the w ar in Vietnam. Faculty opinion, according to aPlayboy poll, is also behind the war, although by a smallermajority than the students.

As a final point, it may be noted that the opposition tothe Vietnamese war is far less than that voiced to theKorean war. As of January 1951, Gallup reported that 66percent said: "Pull our troops out of Korea as fast aspossible" as contrasted with 25 percent who said stay andfight. If the evidence of the polls is to be believed, theAmerican public are far m ore willing to fight in Asia todaythan 15 years ago.

The findings presented in this effort to sum up the re-sults of opinion surveys on the Vietnam war may depressmany who hope to m odify American foreign policy throughmobilizing segments of the public in support of variouspeace movements. It is obvious that such efforts face con-siderable obstades, particularly during an on-going war.But ignorance of difficulties is not a virtue, even if knowl-edge m ay not sug gest a path to influence or victor},.

Seymour Martin Lipset isprofessor of governm ent andsocial relations and researchassociate at the Center forInternational Affairs atHarvard Univ ersity. Forth-coming books by Lipsetinclude Elites and Develop-ment in Latin America editedwith Atdo Solari and SocialStructure, Social Mobility, andDevelopment edited with NeifSmelser. Lipset edited forComparative EducationReview a special issue on"Students and Politics."

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the president, the polls, and vietnam

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