the priority of reason in descartes

Philosophical Review

The Priority of Reason in DescartesAuthor(s): Louis E. LoebSource: The Philosophical Review, Vol. 99, No. 1 (Jan., 1990), pp. 3-43Published by: Duke University Press on behalf of Philosophical ReviewStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2185202 .

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The Philosophical Review, Vol. XCIX, No. 1 (January 1990)

The Priority of Reason in Descartes

Louis E. Loeb

I. INTRODUCTION

According to Descartes, it is reason which corrects sense- perception in cases of disagreement or conflict between the

two faculties. In his reply to the ninth difficulty raised in the Sixth Objections, Descartes claims that it is reason which corrects the visual judgment that a stick protruding from water is bent. Reason also corrects perceptual judgments about the size of distant objects, such as the sun (cf. HR 1, 161, 193, 106, 0 111; AT VII, 39, 82, VI, 39-40, 144).1 When Descartes writes of one faculty correcting another, he uses "emendare" and "corriger" (AT VII, 80, 89, 144, 439; IX-1, 64, 71, 113, 238). I therefore take it that Descartes's doctrine about correction is normative: whereas the proper use of reason does not require submitting the beliefs it generates to tests for correction by sense-perception, the proper use of sense-perception does require submitting the beliefs it generates to tests for correction by reason. (I document Descartes's commitment to this doctrine

11 use the following abbreviations for editions of Descartes's and Hume's works: AT-Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, editors, Oeuvres de Descartes, vols. I-XI (Paris, France: Libraire Philosophique J. Vrin, 1964); C -John Cottingham, translator, Descartes' Conversation with Burman (Ox- ford, England: Clarendon Press, 1976), references to Cottingham's nu- merical divisions; E-L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed., Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, third edition by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1975); HR-Eliza- beth S. Haldane and G. R. T. Ross, translators, The Philosophical Works of Descartes, vols. I-II (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1970); K-Anthony Kenny, translator and editor, Descartes, Philosophical Letters (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1970); O-Paul J. Olscamp, translator, Reng Descartes, Discourse on Method, Optics, Geometry, and Meteo- rology (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965); T-L. A. Selby-Bigge, ed., A Treatise of Human Nature, second edition by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1978). References to specific paragraphs of the Meditations follow the paragraph divisions of the second Latin edition, 1642, as edited by Adam (AT VII); this is the edition translated by Hal- dane and Ross.

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below.2) I introduce the phrase "priority of reason" stipulatively, as a label for the italicized doctrine. According to this doctrine, reason and sense-perception are hierarchically ordered. Throughout this paper, I use the term "reason" to refer to the faculty of clear and distinct perception.3

Any interpretation of Descartes's epistemology must explain his grounds for the normative claim that, in cases of conflict, it is reason which corrects sense-perception. What is to rule out the possibility that it is sense-perception which corrects reason? What is to rule out the possibility that reason and sense-perception are coordinate faculties, and that in cases of conflict either they trade- off until they reach reflective equilibrium, or they deadlock in ineliminable incoherence? The priority of reason must be grounded in some asymmetry between reason and sense-perception. In this paper, I attempt to identify the asymmetry that ultimately serves this function.

In order to demonstrate that there is an interpretive problem here, I turn to an obvious, but I think futile, strategy for explaining Descartes's commitment to the priority of reason. The strategy is to exploit Descartes's commitment to the "truth rule" in order to ground the priority of reason. According to the truth rule, whatever one clearly and distinctly perceives is true; clear and distinct perception is an infallible source of true belief. Descartes does not subscribe to an analogous "truth rule" for sense-perception; he does not maintain that whatever one believes on the basis of sense-perception is true. This suggests that the priority of reason is grounded in the superiority of reason as a source of true belief, in the greater truth-conduciveness of reason: whereas reason is infallible, sense-perception is fallible.

According to the strategy under consideration, the priority of reason ultimately rests on the truth rule and the greater truth- conduciveness of reason. The difficulty is that Descartes's argument for the truth rule itself relies on the priority of reason. Des-

2See three paragraphs below, and note 5. 3My interpretive claims about this faculty rely on passages where

Descartes uses the terms "ratio" or "raison," "intellectus" or "entendement," "mens" or "espirit," and "lumen naturals" or "lumilre naturelle." When it seems required, I provide textual justification for interpreting these passages as applicable to the faculty of clear and distinct perception.

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THE PRIORITY OF REASON IN DESCARTES

cartes holds that the truth rule is a consequence of the existence of a non-deceiving God. In the version of the argument in the Second Replies, Descartes claims, on the ground that "it is contradic- tory that anything should proceed from [God] that positively tends toward falsity," that "in the case of our clearest and most accurate judgments which, if false, could not be corrected by any that are clearer, or by any other natural faculty, I clearly affirm that we cannot be deceived" (HR II, 40-41; AT VII, 143-144). If clear and distinct perception were susceptible to correction by some higher faculty, the mere fact that clear and distinct perception led to false belief would not render God a deceiver-God would be a deceiver only if the false belief withstood all appropriate tests for correction. The inference from the existence of a non-deceiving God to the truth rule requires the independent assumption that there is no faculty for correcting judgments based upon clear and distinct perception, that the proper use of reason does not require submitting the beliefs it generates to tests for correction by sense-perception, or indeed by any other faculty.4 The italicized portion of this assumption is identical to (the first half of) the priority of reason.5 Since the priority of reason figures in the explanation of the truth

4The application of the infallibility rule to clear and distinct perception at the final paragraph of Meditation IV does not make the presupposition explicit. In this respect, the argument for the truth rule in the Second Re- plies is a more careful statement of Descartes's position. In the Meditations, however, the presupposition has already been introduced at paragraph nine of Meditation III: "I cannot doubt that which the natural light causes me to believe to be true, as, for example, it has shown me that I am from the fact that I doubt.... And I possess no other faculty whereby to distinguish truth from falsehood, which can teach me that what this light shows me to be true is not really true, and no other faculty that is equally trustworthy" (HR I, 160-161; AT VII, 38-39). It is clear from the use of the cogito as an example that the natural light includes clear and distinct perception (cf. HR I, 7, 158, and AT X, 368, VII, 35). The claim at paragraph nine is therefore that reason is not susceptible to correction by any other faculty.

5The second half of the priority of reason emerges in the course of Descartes's application of the infallibility rule to sense-perception, and to belief in the existence of a material world in particular. Descartes writes in Meditation VI that "God is not a deceiver, and ... consequently He has not permitted any falsity to exist in my opinion which He has not likewise given me the faculty of correcting" (HR I, 191; AT VII, 80). Thus, at the preceding paragraph of Meditation VI, the argument that a material world exists depends on three claims: that Descartes has a strong inclination to believe that the material world exists, that God is no deceiver, and

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rule, the priority of reason must have some basis that is independent of the truth rule. (I develop this point in more detail in Sec- tion V.)

This leaves us with the question of what explains Descartes's commitment to the priority of reason. My thesis is that the priority of reason to sense-perception ultimately rests on the greater irresistibility of reason. According to my interpretation, Descartes holds that whereas reason generates beliefs that are psychologically irresistible, sense-perception generates suppressible inclinations to believe; Descartes also holds that permanence is a doxastic objective; thus, in the pursuit of permanence in belief, one need not submit reason to tests for correction by sense-perception, but one ought to submit sense-perception to tests for correction by reason. Some of the elements of this interpretation are doubtless familiar. Descartes's doctrine of the irresistibility of reason is en- trenched in the literature.6 The theme of permanence is an important element in a number of recent discussions of the problem of the Cartesian circle.7 My claim is that a psychological asymmetry

that "He has given me no faculty to recognise" (HR I, 191; AT VII, 79) that ideas of material objects are caused by something other than material objects. The point of the latter claim is that the belief that ideas of material objects are caused by material objects "passes" tests for correction by other faculties, and by reason in particular. This is an essential step in the argument only on the assumption that the proper use of sense-perception requires submitting the beliefs it generates to tests for correction by reason. Since sense- perception is susceptible to correction by a higher faculty, the mere fact that sense-perception led to false belief would not render God a deceiver; God would be a deceiver only if the false belief withstood all appropriate tests for correction.

6Cf., for example, Anthony Kenny, Descartes (New York, N.Y.: Random House, 1968), pp. 179-182; Harry Frankfurt, Demons, Dreamers, and Madmen, The Defense of reason in Descartes's Meditations (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1970), pp. 154 and 163-169; Jeffrey Tlumak, "Certainty and Cartesian Method," in Michael Hooker, Descartes, Critical and Interpre- tive Essays (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins, 1978), p. 54; Bernard Wil- liams, Descartes: The Project of Pure Enquiry (Harmondsworth, England: Penguin, 1978), pp. 180, 183-187, and 306; and Williams, "Descartes's Use of Skepticism," in Myles Burnyeat, ed., The Skeptical Tradition (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California, 1983), pp. 345-346.

7See Kenny (1968), pp. 192-193; Frankfurt (1970), pp. 24, 124, 179-180; Tlumak (1978), pp. 45-49 and 58-63; Williams (1978), pp. 202-204 and (1983), pp. 345, 349; and Genevieve Rodis-Lewis, "On the Complementarity of Meditations III and V," in Amelie Rorty, Essays on Descartes's Meditations (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1986), pp. 277-281.

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between reason and sense-perception, together with the adoption of permanence as a doxastic objective, explain the priority of reason.

In Sections II and IV, I explore interpretations of Descartes's grounds for asserting the priority of reason that are different from my own. I develop my positive interpretation in Section III. In Section V, I explain how Descartes could exploit his doctrine of the greater irresistibility of reason in order to establish the greater truth-conduciveness of reason. In Section VI, I consider the bearing of the problem of the Cartesian circle on my account of the priority of reason. In Section VII, I argue that the epistemological theory that emerges in Section III has interesting affinities with the epistemology of Hume.

II. THE COHERENCE OF REASON

In this section, I explore the possibility that the priority of reason is grounded in the claim that reason is internally coherent, and sense-perception internally incoherent. Descartes's commitment to an asymmetry with respect to coherence emerges in the Objections and Replies. Descartes writes, in the Sixth Replies, of the case in which refraction makes a stick protruding from water ap- pear bent:

But I cannot grant what you here add, viz. that that error is corrected not by the understanding but by the touch. For, although it is owing to touch that we judge that the staff is straight,... this, nevertheless, does not suffice to correct the error. Over and above this we need to have some reason to show us why in this matter we ought to believe the tactual judgment rather than that derived from vision; and this reason ... must be attributed not to sense but to the understanding. Hence in this instance it is the understanding solely which corrects the error of sense; and no case can ever be adduced in which error results from our trusting the operation of the mind more than sense (HR II, 253; AT VII, 439).

Descartes calls attention to the fact that perceptual judgments sometimes conflict.8 He claims that there are no resources internal

8Descartes's claims that error can occur in sensation, and that visual judgments can conflict, are to be understood against the background of

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to sense-perception sufficient to resolve the conflict, and that the conflict can be resolved by reason. Reason would not have the resources to resolve the conflict if it were itself incoherent. Descartes must therefore hold that reason does not exhibit internal conflicts analogous to those found within sense-perception.

This thesis emerges more explicitly in the Second Replies, in the reply to the fourth objection in the Second Objections. In the ninth paragraph of this reply, Descartes introduces the example of jaundice:

In matters perceived by sense alone, however clearly, certainty does not exist, because we have often noted that error can occur in sensation, as ... when one who is jaundiced sees snow as yellow; for he sees it thus with no less clearness and distinctness than we see it as white. If, then, any certitude does exist, it remains that it must be found only in the clear perceptions of the intellect (HR II, 42; AT VII, 145).

Once again, Descartes claims that reliance on sense-perception on its own leads to ineliminable incoherence.9 He concludes that there is no certainty based on sense-perception on its own, and that certainty must either be achieved through the use of reason, or not at all. In the tenth paragraph, Descartes maintains that some perceptions of reason are indeed certain. In the eleventh paragraph, he considers an objection:

No difficulty is caused by the objection that we have often found that others have been deceived in matters in which they believed they had knowledge as plain as daylight. For we have never noticed that this has occurred, nor could anyone find it to occur with these persons who have sought

his distinction between three grades of sensation in the Sixth Replies. Any error in sensation requires judgment, and judgment is involved only in the third grade of sensation (cf. HR II, 251-252; AT VII, 436-438).

9Although Descartes is fond of the example of jaundice (cf. HR I, 44, 105; 0 110; AT XII, 423, VI, 39, 142), the example of the protruding stick has the advantage that the perceptually generated conflict is internal to a single cognizer, who possesses both an inclination to believe that the stick is bent and an inclination to believe that the stick is straight. (An object's feeling warmer to one hand than to the other would constitute an analogue to the case of the stick involving a single sense.) By contrast, the jaundiced person need not have a perceptually generated conflict since he need not, on the basis of perceptual experience, have any inclination to believe that snow is white. He may have b 'en jaundiced from birth.

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to draw the clearness of their vision from the intellect alone, but only with those who have made either the senses or some erroneous pre- conception the source from which they derived that evidence (HR LI, 42; AT VII, 146).

Descartes claims that deception could not occur through the use of reason on its own. In context, the point is that reason is not susceptible to the same kind of uncertainty that infects sense-perception, and hence that reason does not admit of internal incoherence.'l Descartes's strategy in defending this position is to explain conflicts that apparently arise within reason as due to reason's con- tamination either by sense-perception or by a false presupposition.11 Descartes maintains that no conflict could occur from the use of reason on its own, that is, from the use of pure reason.

In the reply to the fourth objection, Descartes discusses the intellect -"intellectus" at AT VII, 145, 146 and "l'entendement" at AT IX- 1, 114. I have taken the discussion to apply to reason in the sense of Section I, the faculty of clear and distinct perception. One of Descartes's examples of a perception of the intellect at paragraph ten of the reply is "that I, while I think, exist" (HR II, 42; AT VII, 145). Knowledge of one's own existence is attributed to clear and distinct perception both in the Meditations and in the Rules (HR I, 7, 158; AT X, 368, VII, 35). In the French version of the Second Replies, the discussion is explicitly directed at what the intellect "clearly and distinctly conceives" (AT IX- 1, 114). The claim that the intellect is internally coherent is intended to entail that clear and distinct perception is internally coherent.

Descartes holds that whereas (pure) reason is internally co-

'0This claim emerges in the early work from the Rules for the Direction of the Mind: "By intuition I understand, not the fluctuating testimony of the senses ..., but the conception which an unclouded and attentive mind gives us so readily and distinctly that we are wholly freed from doubt about that which we understand" (HR I, 7; AT X, 368). The fluctuating testimony of the senses just is the manifestation over time of internal incoherence. Reason, by contrast, does not exhibit such fluctuations.

"The Rules contains a mitigated version of this claim: "it is a matter of experience that the most ingenious sophisms hardly ever impose on anyone who uses his unaided reason" (HR I, 32; AT X, 406). Translating "pura" as "unadulterated" or "pure" would better convey what Descartes intends than "unaided" as supplied by Haldane and Ross. The point is that the sophisms fail to convince reason when it is uncontaminated.

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herent, sense-perception is not.12 This asymmetry with respect to coherence can explain why it is reason which corrects sense- perception in the following case: (i) sense-perception generates conflicting beliefs, one of which conflicts with reason. Since reason is coherent, only one of the beliefs generated by sense-perception will conflict with reason, and thus reason will have resources to resolve the conflict.

These considerations, however, do not establish, in its full generality, the thesis that in cases of conflict it is reason which corrects sense-perception. The difficulty is that Descartes recognized a second case: (ii) sense-perception generates a belief that does not conflict with any other belief based on sense-perception, but which conflicts with reason. Descartes provides examples in Meditation VI: the belief in the existence of vacuums, the belief that bodies possess qualities exactly similar to sensory experiences of secondary qualities, and the belief that pain and pleasure exist in bodies (HR I, 192-194; AT VII, 82-83). It is important that case (ii) does not reduce to case (i). There are extended arguments, at The Principles of Philosophy, Part II, Principles 10-18 and Part I, 66-70, culminating in the correction of the beliefs about vacuums, and about secondary qualities and sensations, respectively. Inspec- tion of the arguments shows that they do not draw on any inclinations generated by sense-perception to disbelieve that vacuums exist, or that bodies possess qualities exactly similar to sensory experiences of secondary qualities, or that sensations exist in bodies. If they did so, the present example would reduce to an instance of case (i). We are, instead, confronted with a conclusion of (pure) reason that conflicts with a belief generated by sense-perception. In case (ii), where the only conflict is between sense-perception and reason,

'2There are passages in the Discourse and the Principles that might seem at odds with my interpretation: "there are men who deceive themselves in their reasoning and fall into paralogisms, even concerning the simplest matters of geometry" (HR I, 101; AT VI, 32); "We shall also doubt ... even of the demonstrations of mathematics. . .. One reason is that those who have fallen into error in reasoning on such matters, have held as perfectly certain and self-evident what we see to be false" (HR I, 220; AT VIII- 1, 6). These passages are consistent with those in the Second Replies and the Rules, provided we suppose that the mathematical errors occur only when reason is adulterated by the senses or by some erroneous pre- conception.

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the internal incoherence of sense-perception does not come into play. 13

This point would apply to any attempt to ground the priority of reason that stresses examples of mistaken perceptual judgments involving the size of distant objects (the sun), perceptual illusions (the stick protruding from water), or defective perceptual appa- ratus (jaundice). These are examples of the relativity of perception due to the (external or internal) conditions of observation; they involve internal conflicts within sense-perception, and hence represent instances of case (i). Thus, a number of potential accounts of why Descartes takes sense-perception to be defective are subsumed under accounts with reference to the asymmetry with respect to coherence, and succumb to the difficulty I have mentioned.

The asymmetry with respect to coherence cannot provide any direct rationale for holding that it is reason which corrects sense- perception in case (ii). It might be replied that it can provide an indirect rationale: if sense-perception sometimes generates conflicting beliefs, and reason never does so, then we should always prefer reason to sense-perception. The strategy here is to provide a boot-strapping rationale that attempts to extend the results for case (i) in the interest of achieving generality in the overall account of the relationship between reason and sense-perception.

There is a line of resistance even to the indirect rationale. This line begins with the earlier observation that the conflicts in case (i) are due to relativity in the conditions of observation. Perceptual relativity plays no obvious role in the generation of the false beliefs in case (ii). The incoherence in case (i) can therefore be isolated, and prevented from infecting case (ii). This is suggestive of some difference in the sorts of cognitive processes that operate in cases (i) and (ii). According to the proposed line of resistance, "sense-

13In "The Senses and the Fleshless Eye: The Meditations as Cognitive Exercises," in Rorty (1986), Gary Hatfield points out that in the case of the stick protruding from water, the visual judgment is corrected not by the sense of touch, but by the understanding. He comments that if this "were all that Descartes' claim of the greater certitude of the intellect over the senses amounted to, it would be a rather unexceptional doctrine . . ." (p. 59). Hatfield does not explain why an "unexceptional" doctrine cannot ground the priority of reason. My position is that it fails to do so because it does not generalize to case (ii).

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perception" might even be conceived as consisting of two faculties: the cognitive processes that account for perceptual relativity and generate the conflicting beliefs in case (i); and the cognitive processes that generate false, but not conflicting, beliefs about vacuums, secondary qualities, and sensations, in case (ii). The motivation behind the indirect rationale is to achieve generality in the account of the relationship between the faculties of reason and sense-perception. This motivation seems less compelling if the beliefs attributed to "sense-perception" in cases (i) and (ii) are conceived as resulting from the operation of two different faculties.

Pending a resolution of the issues raised by this line of resistance, the indirect rationale for the claim that it is reason which corrects sense-perception in case (ii) cannot be rejected out of hand. Even if the indirect rationale proves viable, however, it would be preferable to locate a rationale for the priority of reason that applies directly to both cases (i) and (ii). In the section that follows, I show that the resources for a rationale of this sort are readily available within the Meditations.

III. THE IRRESISTIBILITY OF REASON

In this section, I argue that the priority of reason can be explained by an asymmetry with respect to the psychological properties of the cognitive faculties. Descartes holds that correction is a psychological process that results in a belief's being undermined or subverted. In his discussion in Meditation III of beliefs about the size of the sun, Descartes writes:

I find, for example, two completely diverse ideas of the sun in my mind; the one derives its origin from the senses .. .; according to this idea the sun seems to be extremely small; but the other is derived from astronomical reasonings, i.e. is elicited from certain notions that are innate in me, or else it is formed by me in some other manner; in accordance with it the sun appears to be several times greater than the earth. These two ideas cannot, indeed, both resemble the same sun, and reason makes me believe that the one which seems to have origi- nated directly from the sun itself, is the one which is most dissimilar to it (HR I, 161; AT VII, 39).

Descartes's claim is not that reason shows that the belief based on sense-perception is false; rather, reason makes him believe ("ratio per-

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suadet" at AT VII, 39; "a raison me fait croire" at AT IX- 1, 31) that it is false. Similarly, at paragraph seven of Meditation VI, Descartes writes that nature leads him to many beliefs from which reason "dissuades" ("dissuadere" at AT VII, 77) him or "turns him away" ("detourner" at AT IX- 1, 61). In these examples, a result of the process of correction is that the belief based on sense- perception is subverted by reason. Psychological characterizations of the relationship between the deliverances of reason and sense- perception are also given some prominence at paragraph fifteen of Meditation VI (HR I, 193-194; AT VII, 83, IX- 1, 66).

The psychological features of correction in these examples are consequences of a body of psychological theory about the cognitive faculties. One element of the theory is that reason generates beliefs that are irresistible. According to Descartes, clear and distinct perception is psychologically compelling or irresistible in the sense that the belief that p is true is irresistible at any time p is clearly and distinctly perceived. He writes, for example: ". . . I am of such a nature that as long as I understand anything very clearly and distinctly, I am naturally impelled to believe it to be true" (HR I, 183; AT VII, 69; cf. HR I, 160, 236, HR II, 41; AT VII, 38, VIII-1, 21, V119 144).14

A second element of the theory is the claim that sense- perception on its own produces inclinations to believe. Descartes identifies beliefs based solely on sense-perception with beliefs that are taught or learned by "nature," as distinct from the light of nature.15 At paragraph nine of Meditation III, he holds that sense-

14There are other passages that stress the irresistibility of clear and distinct perception without explicitly committing Descartes to the claim that the belief that p is true is irresistible at any time p is clearly and distinctly perceived. Descartes writes, for example: "our mind is of such a nature that it cannot help assenting to what it clearly conceives" (K 73; AT III, 64; cf. K 149; AT IV, 115-116 and C 6; AT V, 148). Here, the explicit claim is that the belief that p, rather than the belief that p is true, is irresistible. I am not suggesting that Descartes distinguishes the belief that p and the belief that p is true. It is important, however, for the argument two paragraphs below that Descartes holds that the belief that p is true is irresistible at any time p is clearly and distinctly perceived.

'5See Meditation VI, paragraphs five through eight (HR I, 187-189; AT VII, 74-78). There is some tendency, as at paragraph eight of Medi- tation VI, to restrict the "teachings of nature" to those beliefs generated by sense-perception that survive tests for correction by reason-these are the

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perception or nature produces an inclination ("impetus" at AT VII, 38, "inclination" at AT IX- 1, 30) to believe.'6 For example, nature produces an inclination ("propensionam" at AT VII, 80, "inclination" at AT IX- 1, 63) to believe that sensory ideas are caused by corporeal objects. In cases in which reason subverts sense-perception, conflicts between reason and sense-perception must result in suppressed inclinations to believe. It follows that at least some of the inclinations generated by sense-perception are suppressible by reason. In sum, Descartes holds that there is a psychological asymmetry between reason and sense-perception: reason generates beliefs that are psychologically irresistible, whereas sense-perception generates suppressible inclinations to believe.

The psychological theory not only explains the ability of reason to subvert sense-perception, but indeed has the consequence that reason will subvert sense-perception in any case of conflict between them. Suppose sense-perception and reason generate conflicting beliefs. Sense-perception on its own produces a suppressible inclination to believe that p. Reason generates a belief that - p is true. Any use of reason has clear and distinct perception as com- ponent steps. Descartes holds that if the premises of a continuous demonstration are themselves irresistible, the conclusion is irresistible, provided one attends to the entire demonstration (cf. HR I, 184, 224; AT VII, 69-70, VIII-1, 9). The belief that -p is true will therefore be irresistible. I assume that if the belief that -p is true is irresistible, the belief that p is false is also irresistible. In the presence of the irresistible belief that p is false, the inclination to believe p based on sense-perception is suppressed, and the belief that p is undermined or subverted. In any case of conflict between reason and sense-perception, reason, in virtue of its irresistibility, subverts sense-perception by suppressing the inclination to believe generated by sense-perception.

beliefs within class (iii) below. Cf. L. J. Beck, The Metaphysics of Descartes, A Study of the Meditations (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1965), pp. 257-258.

16In the Latin edition, this is specifically a "spontaneous" inclination. I think that when Descartes describes the judgments contained in the third grade of sensation (see note 8 above) as ones "we have from our earliest years been accustomed to pass about things external to us" (HR II, 251; AT VII, 437), his point is that these judgments are the result of spontaneous inclinations to believe.

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It should be noted that the psychological features of correction are not "merely psychological" in the sense of involving no epistemic or semantic notions. As we have seen, where a belief that p based on sense-perception on its own is corrected by reason, reason makes one believe that p is false. Thus, the notions of truth and falsity play a role in a complete description of the content of the doxastic states that result from correction, construed psychologically.

I observed at the close of Section II that the asymmetry with respect to coherence cannot provide a direct rationale for the claim that reason corrects sense-perception in case (ii), where there is no conflict internal to sense-perception. The psychological asymmetry is a more promising candidate for grounding, in its full generality, the thesis that reason corrects sense-perception. This is because the psychological asymmetry applies directly to both cases (i) and (ii). Reason is always irresistible, and sense-perception always resistible; hence, the mechanism of the subversion does not depend on the presence of a conflict internal to sense-perception.

But this cannot be the whole story. The priority, of reason is a normative doctrine. The psychological asymmetry explains how reason in fact subverts sense-perception in cases where a conflict has been uncovered. This falls short of explaining why the proper use of sense-perception requires tests for correction by reason. An explanation is not far to seek.

Beliefs based on sense-perception are susceptible to correction by reason, and correction is a psychological process of subversion; thus, beliefs based on sense-perception that are not submitted to tests for correction by reason are liable to subversion. This suggests a strategy for exploiting the psychological asymmetry in support of the priority of reason. The claim that beliefs based on sense- perception ought to be submitted to tests for correction by reason can perhaps be established with reference to permanence in belief as a doxastic objective. There is substantial evidence that Descartes did adopt this objective.

Descartes's emphasis on doxastic permanence emerges in the first paragraph of Meditation I, where he writes of establishing a "firm and permanent structure" in the sciences (HR I, 144; AT VII, 17). The same theme appears in a number of passages where Descartes writes of beliefs that are "firm and immutable" (HR II, 41, 42; AT VII, 145, 146), "immutable" (HR II, 245; AT VII,

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428), and "firm" (HR I, 314; AT X, 513); there are also contrasts with "mutable" (AT VII, 69; HR I, 184) and "fluctuating" beliefs (HR I, 7; AT X, 368). I suggest that for Descartes both individual beliefs and structures of beliefs are "firm" to the extent that they are resistant to change, and that they are "permanent" to the extent that they do not change over time. Susceptibility to subversion diminishes the extent to which a belief is firm.'7 Individual beliefs and structures of beliefs are "permanent" to the extent that they do not change over time. In the case of both structures of beliefs and individual beliefs, firmness and permanence are distinct properties. Firmness, however, is conducive to permanence-the firmer a structure of beliefs, the more likely it is to be permanent.

It is also a doxastic objective for Descartes that a belief system be comprehensive, and indeed "complete" in the sense of including "all things that man can know" (HR I, 203-204; AT IX-2, 2; cf. HR I, 9; AT X, 371-372). We may suppose that Descartes would view completeness as a special case of permanence, rather than as an independent objective. Incomplete belief systems lack permanence in the sense that they are liable to change through augmen- tation.

I can now return to the problem of providing an explanation for the priority of reason. The proper use of sense-perception presumably requires, at the ideal limit, submitting beliefs based on sense-perception to all possible tests for correction by reason.18 Submitting beliefs based on sense-perception to all possible tests for correction by reason yields beliefs that are maximally firm and hence maximally permanent, in comparison to other beliefs that

171 am not saying that resistance to subversion, or irresistibility, is sufficient for firmness. Descartes arguably holds that first-person beliefs about current conscious mental states-for example, my belief at t "visually, it now appears to me as if there is wax in front of me"-are irresistible (cf. paragraph fifteen of Meditation II), but they are not permanent.

18The notion of "all possible tests" for correction is ambiguous. One way to flesh out the notion would be in terms of the "availability" of various cognitive procedures to the cognizer. This requires relativizing the notion of the proper use of sense-perception to specific cognizers at specific times. The notion of "availability" has received attention in the literature on reliabilist theories of knowledge. See Alvin I. Goldman, "What is Justi- fied Belief?" in George S. Pappas, ed., Justification and Knowledge (Dor- drecht, Holland: D. Reidel, 1979), pp. 1-23, esp. pp. 18-20; and Fred- erick S. Schmitt, "Reliability, Objectivity and the Background of Justifica- tion," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 62 (1984), pp. 1- 15, esp. pp. 9-1 1.

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sense-perception might generate. This result can be established on a case by case basis.

In case (i), sense-perception generates conflicting beliefs, one of which would fail some test for correction by reason. Suppose one has not submitted sense-perception to a test of reason that would correct one of the conflicting beliefs. One would be left with the inclinations to hold conflicting beliefs generated by sense- perception. On the assumption that these inclinations are of equal strength, one's doxastic system would be inherently unstable. Sta- bility can be achieved only if one of the conflicting inclinations is suppressed as the result of failing some test of reason. It is important to take note of the role of the asymmetry with respect to coherence in this case. The significance of incoherence is that it renders sense-perception inherently unstable. (Thus, the testimony of the senses is characterized as "fluctuating" (HR I, 7; AT X, 368) in the Rules.) The significance of coherence is that it enables reason (given its irresistibility) to stabilize the doxastic system. Were reason itself incoherent, so that it conflicted with both beliefs generated by sense-perception, stability could not be achieved.

In case (ii), sense-perception generates a belief that does not conflict with any other belief based on sense-perception, but which would fail some test for correction by reason. Examples are provided in Section II. These beliefs constitute teachings of nature that conflict with reason. Suppose one has not submitted the belief based on sense-perception to a test of reason that would correct it. Such a belief is liable to subversion by reason, and is therefore less firm than the corrected belief. This is a direct consequence of the fact that, in a case of conflict, reason, in virtue of its irresistibility, subverts sense-perception by suppressing the inclination to believe generated by sense-perception. Once again, the rationale for holding the corrected belief is provided directly by the psychological asymmetry relative to the objective of doxastic permanence; the uncorrected belief is liable to subversion. The significance of coherence is that it enables reason (given its irresistibility) to enhance the firmness of the doxastic system. Were reason itself incoherent, it would not be able to perform this function.

It might be objected that reason is liable to subversion by sense- perception, on the following grounds.19 Clear and distinct percep-

9I owe this objection to Stephen Darwall.

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tion occurs only under favorable conditions, when the mind is "unclouded and attentive" (HR I, 7; AT X, 368). Suppose one is clearly and distinctly perceiving that p, and that sensory inputs (for example, a loud noise) then cause inattention such that one is no longer clearly and distinctly perceiving that p. In that event, it seems that sense-perception has subverted reason, and hence that beliefs generated by reason have no special claim to stability.

This objection can be met by invoking a distinction between two senses in which one faculty f might subvert another faculty g: (A) beliefs generated byf undermine inclinations to believe generated by g with which they conflict, even at a time when g operates under favorable conditions; (B) the exercise of f disrupts g's oper- ating under favorable conditions. It is (A) which has been the focus of my discussion to this point. The objection points out that reason is susceptible to subversion by sense-perception in sense (B). Des- cartes would, I believe, maintain that such subversion is in principle eliminable, by sufficient practice in a proper method. The construction of a proper method is a part of Descartes's project in the Rules for the Direction of the Mind and the Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Understanding. Descartes therefore empha- sizes the importance of intellectual attention and concentration (see, for example, Rules IX, X and XII).20 What is significant about subversion in sense (A) is that it can occur even when the relevant beliefs and inclinations to believe are generated by the operation of faculty g under favorable conditions. Thus, sense-perception's susceptibility to subversion by reason in sense (A) is not eliminable even in principle, unless it is possible in principle not to exercise either sense-perception or reason at all. This, however, would vio- late the objective-mentioned earlier in this section-that a belief system be comprehensive. It follows that, in cases (i) and (ii), holding a belief generated by sense-perception, but that conflicts with reason, is a doxastic strategy that inevitably leads to a sacrifice in terms of either permanence or comprehensiveness.

I have considered cases in which a belief generated by sense- perception conflicts with reason. There is an additional case in

20Cf. L. J. Beck, The Method of Descartes, A Study of the Reglae (Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1952), pp. 56-59; Frankfurt (1970), pp. 150-151; and Williams (1983), pp. 346-347.

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which the proper use of sense-perception requires submitting the beliefs it generates to all possible tests for correction by reason. In case (iii), sense-perception generates a belief that does not conflict with any other belief based on sense-perception, and which would survive all possible tests for correction by reason. I will say that a belief that has survived all possible tests for correction by reason has been sustained by reason. Beliefs are partially sustained by reason to the extent that they pass individual tests for correction. Ex- amples of beliefs sustainable by reason include: "the ideas of sensible things ... are conveyed to me by corporeal objects" (HR I, 191; AT VII, 79); "I have a body which is adversely affected when I feel pain"; "I am not only lodged in my body as a pilot in a vessel, but ... I am very closely united to it"; and "many other bodies exist around mine" (HR I, 192; AT VII, 80-81). These beliefs constitute teachings of nature that do not conflict with reason.

Suppose one holds a belief based on sense-perception that is sustainable by reason, but which has not been submitted to all possible tests for correction. Such a belief is presumably less irresistible than the same belief would be after it had survived all possible tests for correction, and thereby been sustained by reason. This is a natural extension of the explicit psychological theory. Descartes maintains that, in cases of conflict, reason, in virtue of its irresistibility, subverts sense-perception by suppressing the inclinations to believe generated by sense-perception. Here I assume that, in cases where reason partially sustains sense-perception, reason re- inforces sense-perception by strengthening the inclinations to believe generated by sense-perception.

Care is needed in envisioning the mechanism of reinforcement. Let p be a belief based on sense-perception that survives all possible tests for correction. The mechanism of reinforcement does not require that p is itself clearly and distinctly perceived. In that event, the belief that p would be an irresistible deliverance of pure reason. Descartes does not take the position that instances of (iii) -for example, the proposition that there exists a material world -are themselves clearly and distinctly perceived.2' Let T be a vari-

2IDescartes's statement at The Principles of Philosophy, Part II, Principle I, that "we seem (videmur) to see clearly" (AT VIII-1, 41) that our idea of matter is caused by material objects falls short of saying that we do clearly and distinctly perceive the existence of material objects.

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able ranging over possible tests for correction by reason. I pre- sume that Descartes would hold that instances of the schema "p survives T" are clearly and distinctly perceived; it is this recognition that strengthens the inclinations to believe generated by sense- perception.22 Thus, beliefs that have been sustained by reason are more firm than their unsustained counterparts.

The results in cases (i-iii) yield the normative claim that the proper use of sense-perception requires submitting the beliefs it generates to all possible tests for correction by reason. In each case, submitting a belief based on sense-perception to all possible tests for correction by reason maximizes the firmness, and hence the permanence, of beliefs based on sense-perception. Since beliefs based on reason are irresistible, the objective of permanence does not require that they be submitted to tests for correction by sense-perception. What has been constructed is a mandate or sanction for holding beliefs that result from reason, even in the absence of tests for correction by sense-perception, and for holding beliefs that result from sense-perception, when they have been submitted to all possible tests for correction by reason.23 I conclude that it is the psychological asymmetry and the associated psychological doctrines, together with the objective of doxastic permanence, which ground the normative doctrine of the priority of reason to sense- perception.

IV. REASON AND THE RECOGNITION OF NECESSARY TRUTH

My claim is that a psychological asymmetry between reason and sense-perception is fundamental to the explanation of the priority

22Presumably, for the reinforcement to reach the maximum, it has to be the case not only that (a) for every T, reason recognizes that p survives T, but also that (b) reason recognizes (clearly and distinctly perceives) that p survives every T. Even this does not involve clearly and distinctly perceiving p itself. Of course, since T ranges over every possible test for correction, the recognition involved in (b), that p survives every T, may require a kind of knowledge that is not humanly possible. For a relevant discussion, see Frankfurt (1970), pp. 141-143.

23This mandate does not address the question of whether the resulting beliefs are true. In particular, I am not attributing to Descartes any version of a coherence theory of truth, for example, a theory on which truth consists in membership in a maximally permanent belief system. I discuss Descartes's arguments to show that beliefs based on the proper use of the cognitive faculties are true in Sections V and VI.

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of reason. I have canvassed a number of alternative explanations. In Section I, I have rejected attempts to derive the priority of reason from the truth rule. At the close of Section II, I have argued that the priority of reason, in its full generality, is not grounded in Descartes's claim that only reason is internally coherent. In this section, I explore an additional avenue for at- tempting to explain the priority of reason.

In his "Descartes on the Consistency of Reason," Harry Frank- furt points out that "since there is no appeal from reason to any superior natural source of knowledge, we can possess no natural basis for correcting a belief in what we have clearly and distinctly perceived."24 I am uncertain what explanation of the priority of reason to attribute to Frankfurt.25 As far as I can see, if he offers an interpretation of why reason is superior to sense-perception, he does not explicitly identify it as such.26 My interest is in an explanation of the priority of reason that can be extracted from his re- marks, whether or not he would endorse it, and which is distinct from the explanations I have considered to this point.

Frankfurt attributes to Descartes the doctrine that clear and distinct perceptions "constitute the best testimony of our highest

24Frankfurt, "Descartes on the Consistency of Reason," in Hooker (1978), p. 28; cf. p. 35.

25There is one explanation that can be ruled out. Frankfurt cannot appeal to the asymmetry with respect to coherence to ground the priority of clear and distinct perception. Frankfurt does hold that sense-perception is internally inconsistent (Frankfurt, 1978, pp. 33-34; 1970, pp. 44, 170). He takes the point of the appeal to Divine veracity to be an attempt to establish that clear and distinct perception is internally consistent, and hence to establish the coherence asymmetry (Frankfurt, 1978, pp. 34-36; 1970, pp. 49, 176). This question is held to be pressing precisely because "we have no other faculty superior to reason, which we might invoke in an effort to resolve a conflict generated by reason itself" (1978, p. 35). Frankfurt's interpretation commits him to the view that the priority of reason is established in advance of the argument for the consistency of clear and distinct perception. Frankfurt cannot hold that the coherence asymmetry is the ground of the priority of reason.

26He does write that "Descartes' question [leading to the proof of a benevolent creator] is this: what basis is there for accepting what we clearly and distinctly perceive besides the irresistible conviction which having a clear and distinct perception arouses?" (1978, p. 32). This might be taken to imply that, prior to the proof of a non-deceiving God, the psychological asymmetry provides a basis, and indeed the sole basis, for the priority of reason. If so, we are in agreement.

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faculty," that they convey "the most impeccable credentials reason can provide," that they provide "the best reasons" for believing a proposition.27 Frankfurt's account of the testimony, credentials, or reasons provided by clear and distinct perception is as follows:

What is it, exactly, for a person to perceive something clearly and distinctly? It consists in his recognizing that the evidence he has for some proposition, or his basis in experience for accepting the proposition, is logically definitive and complete. He perceives clearly and distinctly that p when he sees that his evidence or basis for accepting p is conclusive, in the sense that it is consistent and that no body of evidence which would warrant rejecting or doubting p is logically compatible with the evidence or basis he already has.28

What is involved in a person's recognizing that his evidence for a proposition is "logically definitive" or "conclusive"? Frankfurt writes in the paragraph following: "A person who attentively grasps the rigorous connection of the premises and the conclusion of a valid argument, for example, perceives clearly and distinctly that the conclusion must be true if the premises are true."29 He also states that clear and distinct perception extends to "necessary truths like those of logic and mathematics."30 It appears that Frankfurt takes clear and distinct perception to include recognition of necessary truths generally, and not merely logical truths. Frankfurt's discussion is suggestive of the thesis that the priority of reason derives from the fact that reason is the faculty deployed in the recognition of necessary truths.3'

27Frankfurt (1978), pp. 28, 36. 28Ibid., p. 28. 29Ibid. 30Ibid., p. 29; cf. Frankfurt (1970), pp. 102- 103. 31I am aware that Frankfurt wants to extend clear and distinct percep-

tion beyond necessary truths, and that one of my quotations is embedded in a context where he makes this point: "It is not only necessary truths like those of logic and mathematics, then, which can be perceived clearly and distinctly. Logically contingent propositions may also be objects of clear and distinct perception" (1978, p. 29; cf. Frankfurt, 1970, pp. 123-124). Frankfurt's example is the proposition "I am in pain" (1978, p. 28; cf. Frankfurt, 1970, p. 134). There is an obvious strategy for subsuming first- person beliefs about current, conscious mental states under a general account of clear and distinct perception as the recognition of necessary truths. Let us say that the belief that p is incorrigible just in case it is a necessary truth that if S believes p, p is true. Although "I am in pain" is

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In order to evaluate this suggestion, let us take an instance of case (ii) -where there is no conflict internal to sense-perception- as an example. Let "v" be the proposition that vacuums exist. Sense-perception generates an inclination to believe that v is true; reason generates the belief that v is necessarily false. If reason is correct that v is necessarily false, sense-perception is in error. But it is equally the case that if sense-perception is correct that v is true, reason is in error. The fact that reason, unlike sense-perception, generates beliefs in what it takes to be necessary truths does not ground a presumption that reason is less fallible than sense- perception. In other words, the fact that reason is directed at the recognition of necessary truths provides no grounds for thinking that reason is better at successfully recognizing necessary truths than sense-perception at successfully recognizing truths. The recognition of necessary truth is not the necessary recognition of truth.32

There is an additional difficulty for attempts to locate in the connection between reason and necessary truth an account of the priority of reason that is a genuine alternative to the explanation I have offered in Section III. Such accounts of the priority of reason are at risk of collapsing into an explanation grounded in the psychological asymmetry. The pressure in this direction issues from an idiosyncratic feature of Descartes's metaphysics, his doctrine that the "eternal truths" are dependent on God's will. Frank-

contingent, a necessary truth is lurking here. Assuming that the belief that I am in pain is incorrigible, it is a necessary truth that if I believe that I am in pain, I am in pain. Thus, Frankfurt could amend his account of clear and distinct perception (in its application to contingent, first-person beliefs about current, conscious mental states) to hold that what is clearly and distinctly perceived is not p, but rather that p is incorrigible. This would preserve the idea that clear and distinct perception is perception of necessary truth. Frankfurt adopts a similar strategy in the context of his earlier discussion of one's certainty in the special case of one's own existence: "[Descartes's] conclusion can appropriately be formulated as an ascription of logically necessary truth to a certain proposition, but that proposition is not sum. It is the proposition that sum is true whenever he utters or conceives it" (1970, p. 101; cf. pp. 102-103). For an interpretation that links clear and distinct perception and incorrigibility, see Williams (1978), pp. 49-50, 73, 76-81, and 86.

321 am indebted to Frederick Schmitt for (whatever is good in) this for- mulation of the present objection.

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furt's own interpretation of this doctrine exposes the pressures in question.

Frankfurt holds that for Descartes "the eternal truths are inherently as contingent as any other propositions."33 He proceeds to address a puzzling question: how are we to understand the claim that God could have made logical impossibilities, contradictions, true?34 Frankfurt offers a broad sketch of what he takes to be Descartes's reply. The basic idea is this. We do regard some propositions as necessary, and we are unable to conceive the truth of their negations. These ascriptions of necessity and impossibility derive from the occurrences of specific subjective experiences:

[W]hat we identify as necessary or as impossible, depends in the end upon the occurrence of certain experiences -our experiences of an inability to refuse assent.

When we now attentively consider the proposition that one and two make three, having first discriminated and analysed its terms, we cannot help assenting to it; and that is ultimately why we regard the proposition as necessary.35

That we have the experience of the inability to refuse assent when we consider some propositions is a contingent fact about our minds. Frankfurt identifies the inability to refuse assent with a compulsion to assent.36 God might have given us minds so constituted that they failed to experience a compulsion to assent when we attentively considered propositions that we now regard as necessary. We cannot conceive of the truth of the negation of a proposition we now regard as necessary, but perhaps we can conceive of our minds having been constituted in such a way that we would have regarded different propositions as necessary.

How are we to understand Frankfurt's claim that our regarding a proposition as necessary "depends in the end" on our experience of a compulsion to assent? Frankfurt writes: "The necessities human reason discovers by analysis and demonstration are just

33Harry Frankfurt, "Descartes on the Creation of the Eternal Truths," The Philosophical Review 86 (1977), p. 42.

34Ibid., p. 43. 35Ibid., p. 46. 36Ibid., pp. 46, 48.

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necessities of its own contingent nature."37 The burden of Frank- furt's discussion, I believe, is that clearly and distinctly perceiving a proposition to be a necessary truth reduces to coming to have, as the result of an appropriate intellectual process (of attention, concentration, discrimination, analysis, etc.), a compulsion to assent, an irresistible belief that the proposition is true.

What, then, are we to make of the suggestion that the priority of clear and distinct perception consists in its providing the best reasons for believing a proposition? It would seem that ultimately, or in the end, clear and distinct perception is "logically definitive" or "conclusive" only in the sense that the relevant intellectual process generates psychologically irresistible beliefs. The view that the priority of reason derives from its role in the recognition of necessary truths, when combined with Descartes's doctrine of the eternal truths, provides a natural route to the result that the priority of reason derives from its irresistibility.38

V. THE INFALLIBILITY OF REASON

I have argued for the following interpretive claims about Descartes's epistemology: (A) reason, unlike sense-perception, is psychologically irresistible; (B) correction is a psychological process, in the sense that whenever reason corrects sense-perception, the corrected belief is subverted; (C) permanence is a doxastic ob-

37Ibid., p. 45. 381n generating this result, I have drawn on Frankfurt's own interpreta-

tion of the doctrine of the eternal truths. My argument, however, is not strictly ad hominem- I am inclined to agree with the points of interpretation I utilize. This is not to say that they are uncontroversial. For criticism of Frankfurt's position, see E. M. Curley, "Descartes on the Creation of the Eternal Truths," The Philosophical Review 93 (1984), pp. 569-597, esp. pp. 571-574 and 576-583; and Richard R. LaCroix, "Descartes on God's Ability to Do the Logically Impossible," Canadian Journal of Philosophy 14 (1984), pp. 455-475. I do not have space to defend the relevant aspects of Frankfurt's interpretation. Frankfurt does not explicitly bring his own views on Descartes's doctrine of the eternal truths to bear on his discussion of Descartes's doctrine of the priority of reason. The discussion of the priority of reason at Frankfurt (1978) contains no reference to Descartes's doctrine of the eternal truths, nor to the extended discussion of that doctrine at Frankfurt (1977). I doubt that it was with the present result in view that Frankfurt wrote the passage cited at note 26 above.

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jective; (D) thus, whereas one need not submit reason to tests for correction by sense-perception, one ought to submit sense- perception to tests for correction by reason. In sum, the priority of reason is ultimately grounded in an asymmetry with respect to irresistibility, together with Descartes's adoption of permanence as a doxastic objective. The notion of "correction" invoked at (D) is inherited from (B). What has been explained is why Descartes subscribes to a doctrine of what I will call the psychological priority of reason: whereas the proper use of reason does not require submitting the beliefs it generates to tests for subversion by sense-perception, the proper use of sense-perception does require submitting the beliefs it generates to tests for subversion by reason. (The "psychological priority of reason," unlike the "psychological asymmetry," is a normative doctrine.)

Dissatisfaction with my interpretation will derive, I believe, from the conviction that there is a more attractive, alternative, interpretation of Descartes: (a) reason, unlike sense-perception, is an infallible source of truth; (b) correction is an epistemic process, in the sense that whenever reason corrects sense-perception, the corrected belief is false; (c) truth is a doxastic objective; (d) thus, whereas one need not submit reason to tests for correction by sense-perception, one ought to submit sense-perception to tests for correction by reason. In sum, the priority of reason is grounded in an asymmetry with respect to infallibility, together with Descartes's adoption of truth as a doxastic objective. The notion of "correction" invoked at (d) is inherited from (b). What is explained here is why Descartes subscribes to a doctrine of what I will call the epistemic priority of reason: whereas the proper use of reason does not require submitting the beliefs it generates to tests for truth by sense-perception, the proper use of sense-perception does require submitting the beliefs it generates to tests for truth by reason.

There is, however, no incompatibility between the claims in any of the lettered pairs. The claim that (A) there is an asymmetry with respect to irresistibility is compatible with the claim that (a) there is an asymmetry with respect to infallibility. Only the stronger claim that (A') the asymmetry with respect to irresistibility is the only asymmetry between reason and sense-perception would be incompatible with (a). The claim that (B) whenever correction takes place, the corrected belief is subverted, is compatible with the claim (b) that whenever correction takes place, the corrected belief

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is false.39 Only the stronger claim that (B') correction is merely or nothing but a psychological process would be incompatible with (b). The claim that (C) permanence is a doxastic objective is compatible with the claim that (c) truth is a doxastic objective. Only the stronger claim that (C') permanence is the only doxastic objective adopted by Descartes would be incompatible with (c). Finally, the claim that (D) the psychological priority of reason is explained by (A-C) is compatible with the claim that (d) the epistemic priority of reason is explained by (a-c).

Let us look in more detail at the proposed explanation of the epistemic priority of reason. The step at (d) is the conclusion of the argument. I take (c) to be uncontroversial. The claim at (b) is itself a consequence of (a). Thus, (a) is the crucial claim in the proposed explanation. How is an asymmetry with respect to infallibility to be established?

An obvious resource is Descartes's claim that God is not a deceiver. At paragraph three of Meditation IV, Descartes provides a substantive account of what it is for an all-perfect being to be a non-deceiver: "as [God] could not desire to deceive me, it is clear that He has not given me a faculty that will lead me to err if I use it aright" (HR I, 172; AT VII, 54). Let us call this "the infallibility rule"; it states that any faculty is infallible in the sense that it never leads to false belief, on the condition that it is used properly. Un- fortunately, the infallibility rule applies to every faculty; it follows from the infallibility rule both that reason, if used properly, never leads to false belief, and that sense-perception, if used properly, never leads to false belief.40 An asymmetry with respect to infallibility has not yet been located.4'

39The notion, invoked in Section II, of reason's "resolving" conflicts that arise within sense-perception also admits of psychological and/or epistemic interpretations.

40In "Semel in vita: The Scientific Background to Descartes' Meditations," Rorty (1986), Daniel Garber states that reason is "the faculty which, by the argument of Meditation IV, is always trustworthy if used properly" (p. 107). It is true that, in Meditation IV, the infallibility rule is applied to reason, and not to any other faculty. But since the infallibility rule is perfectly general, it could equally have been applied to yield the conclusion that sense-perception is always trustworthy if used properly.

411t might be suggested that the priority of reason is grounded in an asymmetry implicit in the character of the argument to establish that reason and sense-perception are both infallible, when properly used. The

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In order to do so, it is necessary to distinguish between the proper use of a faculty, and a use of a faculty that falls short of proper use in a respect to be specified. The priority of reason is, for Descartes, embedded within a larger body of doctrine about the "proper use" of individual faculties. Consider reason in particular. The proper use of reason does not require tests for correction by sense-perception. The proper use of reason does require assenting only to those propositions that are clearly and distinctly perceived (HR II, 41; AT VII, 144-cf. Meditation IV). The earlier methodological works, the Rules for the Direction of the Mind, and Part II of the Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Understanding, contain assorted precepts governing the proper use of reason-precepts about order, attention, continuous and un- interrupted movements of thought, enumerations, aids to the understanding, and so forth. (These precepts fix what it is for reason to operate "under favorable conditions," as discussed in Section III.) The priority of reason fixes one aspect of what is required by the proper use of reason. Similarly, the priority of reason fixes one aspect of what is required by the proper use of sense-perception: submitting sense-perception to tests for correction by reason. Let us say that (the use of) a faculty is "uncorrected" just in case it has not been submitted for any tests for correction by other faculties, but has been properly used insofar as that is compatible with its not having been submitted for any tests for correction.

The distinction between the proper use of a faculty and the un-

argument in question is an argument of reason, in the sense that all its premises are supplied by clear and distinct perception. (The argument requires the premise "I have an idea of an all-perfect God." This is presumably established by introspection. I believe that for Descartes this would count as clear and distinct perception. The important point is that reason can validate sense-perception without the aid of sense-perception.) This observation suggests an asymmetry: whereas reason (on its own) can supply premises that entail the infallibility of sense-perception, when properly used, sense-perception (on its own) cannot supply premises that entail the infallibility of reason, when properly used. This asymmetry with respect to the method of validating the cognitive faculties cannot generate the claim that reason is prior to sense-perception in the required sense. The fact that reason can validate sense-perception, but not vice versa, does not show that it is reason which corrects sense-perception in cases of conflict.

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corrected use of a faculty suggests the possibility of establishing an asymmetry with respect to infallibility between uncorrected reason and uncorrected sense-perception. Suppose Descartes can establish that uncorrected reason is infallible. He can then establish an asymmetry with respect to infallibility as follows: uncorrected reason is infallible, that is, reason is infallible even in the absence of tests for correction; uncorrected sense-perception sometimes conflicts with uncorrected reason;42 therefore, uncorrected sense- perception is fallible. Establishing the infallibility of uncorrected reason enables Descartes to derive (a), construed as formulating an asymmetry with respect to infallibility between uncorrected faculties: uncorrected reason, unlike uncorrected sense-perception, is infallible.

How is the infallibility of uncorrected reason itself to be established? The claim that uncorrected reason is infallible is equivalent to the truth rule-whatever one clearly and distinctly perceives is true. The truth rule does not state that beliefs based on clear and distinct perception are true provided they have withstood tests for correction by other faculties. The content of the truth rule is that beliefs based on uncorrected clear and distinct perception are true. I observed in Section I that Descartes's derivation of the truth rule from the claim that God is no deceiver relies on (the first half of) the priority of reason.

The contribution of the priority of reason to the derivation of the truth rule can be clarified against the background of the distinction between the proper use of a faculty and the uncorrected use of a faculty. Descartes takes God's being a non-deceiver to entail the infallibility rule. Since the infallibility rule applies to the proper use of a faculty, it is the infallibility of the proper use of reason that follows directly from the infallibility rule. Descartes can in turn derive the infallibility of uncorrected reason if uncorrected reason coincides with the proper use of reason. The use of reason is uncorrected just in case it has not been submitted for any tests for correction by other faculties, but has been properly used insofar as that is compatible with its not having been submitted for

42Uncorrected sense-perception sometimes conflicts with the proper use of reason. I show two paragraphs below that uncorrected reason coincides with the proper use of reason. It follows that uncorrected sense- perception sometimes conflicts with uncorrected reason.

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any tests for correction. The assumption that the proper use of reason does not require submitting the beliefs it generates to tests for correction by sense-perception, or by any other faculty, has the consequence that the uncorrected use of reason coincides with the proper use of reason. It is this consequence that allows Descartes to derive the infallibility of uncorrected reason from the infallibility rule. The italicized portion of the assumption that leads to this consequence is (the first half of) the priority of reason.

In Section I, I concluded that the priority of reason must have some basis that is independent of the truth rule. I am now in a position to refine this conclusion, in light of the distinction between the psychological priority of reason and the epistemic priority of reason. Consider the overall argument for the epistemic priority of reason. This argument proceeds, via the infallibility rule, to establish the infallibility of uncorrected reason and hence (a) the asymmetry with respect to infallibility between the uncorrected faculties; it then continues, via (a-c), to establish (d) the epistemic priority of reason. How is the italicized claim in the preceding paragraph to be construed, in the context of its contribution to the argument for the infallibility of uncorrected reason, and hence to the argument for the epistemic priority of reason? If it is understood in terms of epistemic priority, there is a circularity internal to the argument for the epistemic priority of reason-the epistemic priority of reason is required to establish the infallibility of uncorrected reason, and the asymmetry with respect to infallibility, in the first place. If, on the other hand, the italicized claim is understood in terms of psychological priority, the circularity internal to the argument for the epistemic priority of reason van- ishes. In other words, we can take the italicized claim to mean that the proper use of reason does not require tests for subversion by sense-perception. This is (the first half of) the psychological priority of reason, a doctrine which is established with reference to the asymmetry with respect to irresistibility and the objective of doxastic permanence, and without relying on the epistemic priority of reason.

The issue addressed in this paper is not whether we should accept (A-D) rather than (a-d). The paper does attempt, as I indi- cated in Section I, to locate Descartes's ultimate grounds for the priority of reason. As we have seen, the priority of reason divides into two components, psychological and epistemic. The argument

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for these components proceeds in three stages. In the first stage, the psychological priority of reason is derived from the asymmetry with respect to irresistibility, together with the objective of doxastic permanence-this is the argument at (A-D). In the second stage, the asymmetry with respect to infallibility between the uncorrected faculties is derived from the psychological priority of reason, via the infallibility rule-this is the argument for (a). In the third stage, the epistemic priority of reason is derived from the asymmetry with respect to infallibility, together with the objective of true belief-this is the argument at (a-d). The psychological asymmetry is therefore fundamental to the priority of reason, whether psychological or epistemic.

VI. THE PRIORITY OF REASON AND THE CARTESIAN CIRCLE

An important obstacle to the success of the Cartesian argument for the epistemic priority of reason remains. The argument for the asymmetry with respect to infallibility between the uncorrected faculties of reason and sense-perception, and hence for the epistemic priority of reason, is threatened by the problem of the Car- tesian circle. The argument for the asymmetry with respect to infallibility relies on the infallibility rule. Descartes takes this rule to be a consequence of the existence of a non-deceiving God. The argument for the existence of a non-deceiving God is introduced in a context where the reliability of clear and distinct perception has been called into question, and yet the premises of the argument are themselves generated by clear and distinct perception. The argument for the existence of the non-deceiving God appears question-begging, for the usual reasons, and this circularity in turn infects the argument for the infallibility rule, for (a) the asymmetry with respect to infallibility, for (b) the epistemic account of correction, and hence for (d) the epistemic priority of reason. The threatened circularity is not the circularity internal to the argument for the epistemic priority of reason that arises if the argument for the asymmetry with respect to infallibility itself relies on the epistemic priority of reason. This internal circularity has been removed by supposing that the argument for the asymmetry with respect to infallibility relies on the psychological priority of reason. The circularity in question now is external to the argument for the epistemic priority of reason; the difficulty is that the infallibility

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rule required to establish the asymmetry with respect to infallibility itself depends on the proof of the existence of a non-deceiving God, a proof that appears to beg the question against the skeptical hypothesis of paragraph four of Meditation III.

I believe there is a potential solution to the problem of the Car- tesian circle that also coheres with my account of the priority of reason. The solution I have in mind has been proposed, apparently independently, by a number of commentators.43 The fundamental idea behind the proposal is this. For Descartes, a deduction or demonstrative argument consists of a connected chain or se- quence of individual clear and distinct perceptions (cf. RDM III, VII, XI). Descartes holds that individual clear and distinct perceptions are psychologically irresistible. He also holds that the conclusion of a continuous demonstration is itself irresistible at the time one reaches the conclusion, provided one has attended to the entire chain of clear and distinct perceptions that comprise the demonstration (cf. Section III). Suppose one has attended to the continuous demonstration (via the metaphysical principles about causation introduced in Meditation III, the claim that deception is an imperfection, etc.) of the existence of a non-deceiving God, and of the truth rule. It is a consequence of what Descartes takes to be the psychological characteristics of clear and distinct perception that one will irresistibly believe that a non-deceiving God exists, and that the truth rule is true, at the time one reaches those conclusions. On the present proposal, Descartes's claim for the central line of argument in Meditations III and IV is not that it constitutes a non-question-begging proof of the existence of a non-deceiving God or of the truth rule. His claim, rather, is that attention to the continuous demonstration induces the psychological state of irresistibly believing that a non-deceiving God exists, and that the truth rule is true. The outcome of the argument is that one is in the psychological state of irresistibly believing a proposition that is incompatible with the existence of a deceiver who causes or allows one to have false beliefs based on clear and distinct perception. Let

43See especially Ronald Rubin, "Descartes's Validation of Clear and Dis- tinct Apprehension," The Philosophical Review 86 (1977), pp. 197-208; and Charles Larmore, "Descartes' Psychologistic Theory of Assent," History of Philosophy Quarterly 1 (1984), pp. 61-74.

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us call this sort of proposal a "psychological" response to the problem of the circle.

Why is it important to Descartes to show that the relevant psychological states can be induced? The answer, I suggest, is that permanence is a doxastic objective; the hypothesis of the powerful deceiver introduced at paragraph four of Meditation III is destabilizing, and hence subversive of permanence in belief.44 Care is needed in explaining the sense in which the hypothesis of the powerful deceiver is "destabilizing." Suppose that at time t one either has an individual clear and distinct perception that some proposition p is true, or one believes that some proposition p is true on the basis of a demonstration to which one has continuously attended. Let us say that in either case the belief, at t, that p is true is a "current clear and distinct perception." Since Descartes holds that current clear and distinct perceptions are irresistible, the strength of an inclination to believe p on the basis of a current clear and distinct perception cannot be undermined in the presence of the deceiver hypothesis (cf. HR I, 158-159; AT VII, 35-36). By contrast, suppose that at time t one is not having a current clear and distinct perception that p, but that one recollects that p once was a current clear and distinct perception. Let us say that in this case the belief, at t, that p is true is a "recollected clear and distinct perception." Recollected clear and distinct perceptions are not irresistible. The strength of an inclination to believe a recollected clear and distinct perception will be undermined in the presence of the deceiver hypothesis (cf. HR I, 183-185, 224, II, 42-43; AT VII, 69-71, 146, VIII-1, 9-10).45 The deceiver hypothesis is, in this sense, destabilizing with respect to recollected clear and distinct perceptions. This result applies to any belief generated by reason at those times when the beliefs are recollected rather than current.46 From the perspective of the psychological

44This suggestion is similar in spirit to the material cited in note 7, but clearly supplements the versions of the psychological interpretation pre- sented in Rubin (1977) and Larmore (1984).

451 think Descartes's point is not simply that, in the presence of the deceiver hypothesis, our degree of confidence in a recollected conclusion of reason is diminished; I think his point is that we are left without any de- terminate degree of confidence in the recollected conclusion.

46There is an additional case in which the presence of the deceiver hypothesis is destabilizing. Consider beliefs based on sense-perception that

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interpretation, the point of attending to the argument of Medita- tions III and IV is to eliminate the destabilizing effects of the deceiver hypothesis. This is achieved by inducing the psychological state of irresistibly believing that a powerful deceiver does not exist and that the truth rule is true.

The psychological interpretation of the procedure in Medita- tions III and IV extends quite naturally to such conclusions as those at (a-d). The infallibility rule is a consequence of the existence of a non-deceiving God. The infallibility rule is, in turn, used to establish (a) the asymmetry with respect to infallibility, (b) the epistemic nature of correction, and (d) the epistemic priority of reason. Suppose that one has attended to the continuous demonstration (via the existence of a non-deceiving God) of the infallibility rule, and of (a), (b), and (d). It is a consequence of what Descartes takes to be the psychological characteristics of clear and distinct perception that one will irresistibly believe the infallibility rule, and (a), (b), and (d), at the time one reaches those conclusions. Thus, one will irresistibly believe that the infallibility rule is true, that there is an asymmetry with respect to infallibility between uncorrected reason and uncorrected sense-perception, that correction is an epistemic process, and so forth. On this account, Descartes's claim for the arguments for these conclusions is not that they constitute a non-question-begging proof of the infallibility rule, (a) the asymmetry with respect to infallibility, (b) the epistemic nature of correction, and (d) the epistemic priority of reason. His claim, rather, is that continuous attention to the demonstrations induces the psychological state of irresistibly believing the propositions in question. If the psychological response can

are sustained by reason-case (iii) in Section III. Suppose that at time t one believes, on the basis of a demonstration to which one has continuously attended, that some proposition p generated by sense-perception survives all possible tests for correction. Let us say that the belief, at t, that p is true is a "current sustained belief." The belief that p, the current sustained belief, is not itself clearly and distinctly perceived, and is therefore not itself irresistible. (It is the belief that p survives all possible tests for correction that is a current conclusion of reason.) The strength of this less than irresistible inclination to believe that p is true will presumably be subverted in the presence of the deceiver hypothesis. Thus, whereas the deceiver hypothesis is destabilizing with respect to only those clear and distinct perceptions that are recollected, it is destabilizing even to current sustained beliefs.

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meet the threat of circularity in Descartes's argument for the existence of a non-deceiving God and for the truth rule, it can equally meet the threat of circularity in his argument for the infallibility rule (itself a premise for the derivation of the truth rule), the asymmetry with respect to infallibility, and the epistemic priority of reason. If the psychological response can be sustained, the problem of circularity is removed as an obstacle to the success of the argument for these results.47

I am not, however, endorsing the psychological response to the problem of the Cartesian circle, either as the best interpretation of what Descartes takes himself to be doing in Meditations III and IV, or as a philosophically satisfactory solution to the problem of the circle. One could accept my psychological account of the priority of reason without accepting the psychological response to the problem of the circle. My exposition of the psychological response, together with its extension to (a), (b), and (d), does not include any general assessment of the strengths 'and weaknesses of this proposal.48

I do offer one observation that is germane to assessing both the psychological interpretation of Descartes's argument in Medita- tions III and IV, and my psychological interpretation of the priority of reason. These interpretations reply on what are funda-

47Other obstacles remain. The argument for (a) relies on the infallibility rule, and the infallibility rule is inferred from the existence of a non-deceiving God. Thusjust as the argument for (a) inherits the problem of the Cartesian circle, it also inherits the substantive defects in the arguments for the existence of God in Meditation III.

48j do believe that the psychological response is by far the most promising constructive attempt to meet the threat of circularity in Meditations III and IV. I suspect that if this interpretation cannot be sustained, dissimulation hypotheses-as discussed in my "Is There Radical Dissimula- tion in Descartes' Meditations?" in Rorty (1986), and my "Was Descartes Sincere in His Appeal to the Natural Light?"Journal of the History of Philos- ophy 26 (1988)-will merit yet increased consideration. What would remain of Cartesian epistemology in the event that Descartes was not sincere in offering his proofs of the existence of a non-deceiving God, and his arguments for the infallibility rule and truth rule, in Meditations III and IV? The present paper contains an answer: the mandate or sanction, constructed in Section III, for holding beliefs generated by the proper use of the cognitive faculties remains intact. Descartes's argument for (D) the psychological priority of reason, unlike this argument for (d) the epistemic priority of reason, does not appeal to the existence of a non-deceiving God.

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mentally the same interpretive resources. In Section III, I have argued that the priority of reason is grounded in an asymmetry with respect to irresistibility, together with the objective of doxastic permanence. In Section V, I have shown that Descartes can exploit the psychological priority of reason in order to construct an argument for the epistemic priority of reason. This argument is threatened by the problem of the Cartesian circle. In Section VI, I have noted that on the psychological response, Descartes's claim for this argument is that, in the interest of doxastic permanence, it induces the psychological state of irresistibly believing such conclusions as the infallibility rule, (a), (b), and (d). The psychological interpreta- tionA of the priority of reason, and of Descartes's argument in Meditations III and IV, both rely on Descartes's doctrines about the psychological features of the cognitive faculties, and both rely on Descartes's doctrine that permanence in belief is a doxastic objective. Jointly, these psychological interpretations offer an inte- grated account of fundamental features of Descartes's epistemological position. Those who find the psychological response to the problem of the circle attractive ought to welcome my psychological account of the priority of reason.

VII. PERMANENCE AND IRRESISTIBILITY IN DESCARTES AND HUME

Fundamental to the epistemology of Hume is a distinction between two kinds of principles:

But here it may be objected, that the imagination, according to my own confession, being the ultimate judge of all systems of philosophy, I am unjust in blaming the antient philosophers for makeing use of that faculty, and allowing themselves to be entirely guided by it in their reasonings. In order to justify myself, I must distinguish in the imagination betwixt the principles which are permanent, irresistable, and universal; such as the customary transition from causes to effects, and from effects to causes: And the principles, which are changeable, weak, and irregular; such as those I have just now taken notice of. The former are the foundation of all our thoughts and actions.... The latter are neither unavoidable to mankind, nor necessary, or so much as useful in the conduct of life; but on the contrary are observed only to take place in weak minds, and being opposite to the other principles of custom and reasoning, may easily be subverted by a due contrast and opposition. For this reason the former are received by philosophy, and the latter rejected (T 225).

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Hume is here classifying principles of the imagination, that is, psychological belief-forming mechanisms. I will refer to the principles that are permanent and irresistible as "PI-principles," and to the principles that are changeable and weak as "non-PI-principles." (The contrast between universal and non-universal, or "irregular," principles does not require discussion for the purposes of this paper.) I will say derivatively that a belief is permanent and irresistible if it is produced by a PI-principle, and that a belief is changeable and weak if it is produced by a non-PI-principle. We can thus distinguish between "PI-beliefs" and "non-PI-beliefs." When Hume writes of the non-PI-principles as "being opposite" to the PI-principles, I take him to mean that the two sets of principles generate conflicting beliefs. When he writes that the non-PI- principles "may easily be subverted," I take him to mean that non- PI-beliefs are subverted by the PI-beliefs with which they conflict. When he writes that "philosophy receives" the PI-principles, I take him to mean that philosophy receives both PI-principles and the PI-beliefs they generate.

We can think of the two sets of psychological principles as con- stituting two respective faculties, the PI-faculty and the non-PI- faculty.49 One point in the passage cited is that because the PI- principles are irresistible, whereas the non-PI-principles are weak, beliefs generated by the non-PI-faculty "may easily be subverted" or undermined by beliefs generated by the PI-faculty, but not vice versa. In other words, whereas beliefs based on the non-PI-faculty are susceptible to correction by the PI-faculty, beliefs based on the PI-faculty are not susceptible to correction by the non-PI-faculty

the PI-faculty and the non-PI-faculty are hierarchically ordered. "Correction" in this context is of course construed psychologically (see Sections III and V).

In addition to observing that non-PI-beliefs are subverted by the

49I believe that Hume sometimes identifies the set of non-PI-principles with the imagination (T 117-118, note 1, and 371, note 1), though he also uses this term more broadly to refer to the set of PI-principles and the set of non-PI-principles, taken together (T 225, 267). I introduce the terms "PI-faculty" and "non-PI-faculty" in order to avoid, insofar as possible, interpretation of Hume's terminology. My substantive argument below, however, does require the claim that Hume identifies the set of PI- principles with the understanding.

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PI-beliefs with which they conflict, Hume claims that it is "for this reason" that the PI-principles "are received by philosophy." The objection to allowing oneself to be "entirely guided" by the principles of the imagination, to include the non-PI-principles, is that this is a suboptimal strategy for achieving permanence in one's beliefs. This is confirmed by independent discussions of Hume's sole example of a PI-principle at page 225, the customary transition from causes to effects. Hume states earlier in the Treatise that it is "by their . .. settled order" that ideas "arising from ... the relation of cause and effect ... distinguish themselves from the other ideas, which are merely the offspring of the imagination" (T 108). Hume writes two pages later that one of the "advantages" of beliefs based on the relation of cause and effect is that they are "solid ... and invariable" (T 110). Hume's assertion that PI-beliefs are "received by philosophy" is his way of assigning such beliefs normative pride of place. Permanent and irresistible belief-forming mechanisms lead to a more permanent structure of beliefs than any available cognitive alternative.50 It is noteworthy that the objective of achieving permanence and avoiding fluctuation or contradiction also plays a crucial role in Hume's account of moral judgment at pages 581-582 of the Treatise and sections 185-186 of the Enquiries.5'

50Previous interpretations of Hume's rationale for approving the PI- principles place insufficient emphasis on the underlying importance of permanence in belief. In his "Hume's Defense of Causal Inference," The Journal of the History of Ideas 19 (1958), John Lenz maintains that Hume justifies causal inference on the ground that it is universal (p. 179) and irresistible (p. 183). Lenz does notice that only beliefs based on PI- principles will be permanent. However, he treats this not as the basis of their being received by philosophy, but as an incidental byproduct of their irresistibility (pp. 185-186). Page references are to Lenz's article as re- printed in V. C. Chappell, ed., Hume, A Collection of Critical Essays (Garden City, N.Y.: Anchor Books, 1966). In his Hume's Intentions (London, En- gland: Gerald Duckworth, 1968), John Passmore holds that Hume takes the PI-principles to be "natural" because they promote "consistent and orderly thinking" or "regularity" (p. 55). Passmore's interpretation is similar to mine in spirit, but he neglects, or at least does not make explicit, the temporal aspects of consistency and orderliness.

51For discussion of the role that Hume assigns to permanence in moral judgments, see: R. F. Atkinson, "Hume on the Standard of Morals," in Kenneth R. Merrill and Robert W. Shahan, eds., David Hume, Many-sided Genius (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1976), pp. 25-44, esp. part IV; Annette Baier, "Hume's Account of Our Absurd Passions,"

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Furthermore, the non-PI-faculty itself generates conflicting beliefs. This point emerges in the paragraph following the initial characterization of the distinction between the PI-principles and non-PI-principles:

The opinions of the antient philosophers are deriv'd from principles, which, however common, are neither universal nor unavoidable in human nature. The modern philosophy pretends to be entirely free from this defect, and to arise only from the solid, permanent, and consistent principles of the imagination (T 226).

The non-PI-principles are evidently inconsistent, in the sense that they generate conflicting beliefs (that is, inclinations to hold incompatible beliefs). This is confirmed in the conclusion of Book I. In discussing the option of assenting "to every trivial suggestion of the fancy," Hume writes that "these suggestions are often contrary to each other" (T 267). In the following paragraph, Hume contrasts "the trivial suggestions of the fancy" with "the understanding, that is, . . . the general and more established properties of the imagination" (T 267). These "general and more established properties" are the PI-principles of pages 225-226; the trivial suggestions of the fancy are identical to the non-PI-beliefs.52 If the trivial suggestions of the fancy are inconsistent, the non-PI- principles are inconsistent.53 Hume holds not only that the non-PI-

The Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982), pp. 643-65 1; Thomas K. Hearn, "General Rules and the Moral Sentiments in Hume's Treatise," The Review of Metaphysics 30 (1976), pp. 57-72, esp. Part I; Peter Jones, "Cause, Reason, and Objectivity in Hume's Aesthetics," in Donald W. Livingston and James T. King, eds., Hume: A Re-evaluation (New York, N.Y.: Fordham University Press, 1976), esp. pp. 328-330; J. L. Mackie, Hume's Moral Theory (London, England: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), esp. Chapter VII; and D. G. C. MacNabb, David Hume, His Theory of Knowledge and Morality (Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell, 1966), pp. 191-197.

52There is additional evidence for this claim. The initial distinction between the PI-principles and non-PI-principles is introduced in the first two paragraphs of I.iv.4., "Of the modern philosophy." At page 225, when Hume mentions as examples of non-PI-principles "those I have just now taken notice of," he is referring to the psychological mechanisms discussed in the preceding section, "Of the antient philosophy." In the final paragraph of that section, Hume writes that the ancient philosophers "were guided by every trivial propensity of the imagination" (T 224).

53The role Hume assigns to the trivial propensities of the imagination receives insufficient attention. John Immerwahr is a notable exception. See his "The Failure of Hume's Treatise," Hume Studies 3 (1977), pp. 57-71; and "A Skeptic's Progress: Hume's Preference for the First En-

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faculty generates beliefs that conflict with beliefs generated by the understanding, but also that the non-PI-faculty itself generates conflicting beliefs.

There is an impressive structural similarity between Hume's position and that of Descartes. For Descartes, reliance on sense- perception on its own leads to ineliminable incoherence; reason, in virtue of its irresistibility, corrects sense-perception by suppressing some of the inclinations to believe that sense-perception generates. For Hume, reliance on the non-PI-faculty on its own leads to ineliminable incoherence; the PI-faculty, in virtue of its irresistibility, corrects the non-PI-faculty by suppressing some of the inclinations to believe that the non-PI-faculty generates.54 (The language of "inclination" and "suppression" is Hume's-see T 224.) In sum, the PI-faculty stands in the same relationship to the non-PI-faculty for Hume as reason stands to sense-perception for Descartes.

Descartes and Hume also provide substantially the same rationale for submitting beliefs generated by one faculty to tests for subversion by another faculty. Cognitive faculties are evaluated with reference to their contribution to doxastic permanence.55

quiry," in David Fate Norton, Nicholas Capaldi, and Wade Robison, eds., McGill Hume Studies (San Diego, Calif.: Austin Hill Press, 1979), pp. 227-238.

54Descartes and Hume would disagree about how to characterize the notion of an "incoherence" (or "conflict") that arises within a faculty, or between faculties. Descartes would characterize this notion in terms of logical incompatibility. Hume, I believe, would characterize it in terms of psychological instability-a faculty or set of faculties is incoherent to the extent that it generates psychologically unstable sets of doxastic states (that is, unstable sets of beliefs and dispositions to hold beliefs). On this model, dispositions to hold logically incompatibile beliefs would be a special case of incoherence. The notion of doxastic instability, implicit in Descartes, is a major preoccupation for Hume, who devotes many pages to the psychological dynamics of the imagination's attempts to resolve such conflicts (cf. T 186-187, 198-210, 210-216, 219-224, 253-255). Space does not permit development of this point.

551n this regard, both figures have an affinity with Charles S. Pierce, who takes "the settlement of opinion" or "firm belief" as "the sole end of inquiry." See "The Fixation of Belief," in Vincent Tomas, ed., Charles S. Pierce, Essays in the Philosophy of Science (Indianapolis, Ind.: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957), p. 13. In "How To Make Our Ideas Clear," Pierce writes of Leibniz that "He . .. missed the most essential point of the Cartesian philosophy, which is, that to accept propositions which seem perfectly evident to us is a thing which, whether it be logical or illogical, we cannot help doing" (ibid., p. 33).

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One important determinant of that contribution is the relative strength of the inclinations to hold beliefs generated by the available faculties or belief-forming mechanisms; greater degrees of irresistibility contribute to greater degrees of permanence. Given the psychological properties of the relevant faculties, submitting the psychologically weaker faculty to tests for correction by the stronger faculty generates a more permanent belief system than any available cognitive alternative. Descartes and Hume share a common project, to show how permanence can be achieved. It may not be surprising that we find in Plato passages that have affinities with Descartes's view that there are conflicts within sense- perception that must be resolved by reason.56 What is striking is the presence of the similarities in structure and underlying rationale that I have identified in the Rationalist epistemology of Descartes and the Empiricist epistemology of Hume. Both hold that the cognitive faculties are hierarchically ordered in virtue of their psychological properties.

It is not my intent to obscure the differences between the epistemological theories of Descartes and Hume. The most obvious difference in the theories, as developed to this point, is in the locus of irresistible beliefs. For Descartes, it is only clear and distinct perception that is psychologically compelling; for Hume, the psychologically compelling beliefs include those that result from "the customary transition from causes to effects," from associative mechanisms triggered by a background of observed conjunc- tions.57 This difference is an important symptom, if not the es- sence, of the difference between the epistemological orientations of Descartes and Hume.

There is one additional development in Hume's theory that must be mentioned. Hume brings himself to conclude that there is internal incoherence within the PI-faculty itself:

56Cf. Republic 523a-524d and Theaetetus 184b- 187a. The interpretation of these passages is of course controversial. For some discussion, see John M. Cooper, "Plato on Sense-Perception and Knowledge (Theaetetus 184-186)," Phronesis 15 (1970), pp. 123-146; and A. J. Holland, "An Ar- gument in Plato's Theaetetus: 184-186," The Philosophical Quarterly 91 (1973), pp. 97-116.

57This is Hume's example at T 225; however, for Hume there must be other psychological propensities that generate irresistible beliefs. This is a consequence of his discussion at T 231 and T 266, quoted below in this section.

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Thus there is a direct and total opposition betwixt our reason and our senses; or more properly speaking, betwixt those conclusions we form from cause and effect, and those that persuade us of the continu'd and independent existence of body (T 231).

'Tis this principle [the imagination], which makes us reason from causes and effects; and 'tis the same principle, which convinces us of the continu'd existence of external objects, when absent from the senses. But tho' these two operations be equally natural and necessary in the human mind, yet in some circumstances they are directly contrary ... (T 266).

Two "equally natural and necessary" principles of the imagination, in other words, the PI-principles themselves, generate conflicting beliefs.58 (It should be noted that Hume is not basing his conclusion on such conflicts as arise from perceptual relativity. He thinks the latter conflicts are resolved within the PI-faculty through the use of "general rules"-cf. T 632.) Since PI-principles generate beliefs that are irresistible, this conflict, unlike those generated within the non-PI-faculty, cannot be resolved.59 The continuation of the passage at page 266 of the Treatise explicitly draws out the consequence that permanence cannot be achieved:

[N]or is it possible for us to reason justly and regularly from causes and effects, and at the same time believe the continu'd existence of matter. How then shall we adjust those principles together? Which of them shall we prefer? Or in case we prefer neither of them, but suc- cessively assent to both, as is usual among philosophers, with what confidence can we afterwards usurp that glorious title, when we thus knowingly embrace a manifest contradiction?

58For discussions of Hume's claim, see John Bricke, Hume's Philosophy of Mind (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980), Chapter One, Section 4, pp. 9-12; Ronald J. Butler, "Natural Belief and the Enigma of Hume," Archiv fur Geschichte der Philosophie, band 42, heft 1 (1960), pp. 80-81 and 85; Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume (London, En- gland: Macmillan, 1941), pp. 127-129 (cf. pp. 490-494); and Wade L. Robison, "David Hume: Naturalist and Meta-sceptic," in Livingston and King (1976), pp. 46-48. The argument at T 226-231 that leads Hume to the claim in question is not relevant to the present paper. For a careful exposition of the argument, see Bricke (1980), Chapter One, Section 7, pp. 16-19.

59For a different interpretation of the outcome, see Bricke (1980), Chapter One, Section 8, pp. 19-24. A full discussion of the issues is not possible here.

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The conclusion, if correct, that the PI-faculty generates ineliminable incoherence undermines the entire project of justifying beliefs with reference to the objective of doxastic permanence. Descartes is confident that the source of irresistible beliefs is coherent (cf. Section II). This confidence stands in sharp contrast to Hume's despairing conclusion that the source of irresistible beliefs is incoherent.60

The University of Michigan

60j am indebted to Nicholas White for urging me to write a paper on the present topic, and to Jaegwon Kim for questions concerning my "Is There Radical Dissimulation in Descartes' Meditations?" that led me to develop the interpretive material at Sections II-III. I am also grateful to Richard Brandt, Tyler Burge, Stephen Darwall, Frederick Schmitt, Kim, Brian McLaughlin, Adrian Piper, Lawrence Sklar, and White, for helpful comments. I have benefitted from reading versions of this paper at Bowling Green State University and Southern Methodist University. The paper has been improved in response to the comments of anonymous referees and editors at The Philosophical Review. I am especially grateful to David Velleman for providing detailed substantive, organizational, and stylistic comments on previous versions of this paper.

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the priority of reason in descartes

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