the privy council the “halcyon isle”; bankers trust...
TRANSCRIPT
www.ipsofactoJ.com/archive/index.htm [1980] Part 4 Case 7 [PC]
Appeal No 19 of 1979
THE PRIVY COUNCIL
Coram
LORD DIPLOCK
The “Halcyon Isle”;
Bankers Trust
International Ltd
- vs -
Todd Shipyards
Corporation
LORD SALMON
LORD SCARMAN
LORD ELWYN-JONES 24 JUNE 1980
Judgment
Lord Diplock
(delivering the majority judgment of the Board)
1. The appellants (the mortgagees) are an English bank. They held a mortgage
on a British ship the ‘Halcyon Isle’ registered in London. It was dated 27
April 1973 and registered on 8 May 1974. The respondents (the Necessaries
Men) are ship-repairers carrying on business in New York. They executed
repairs to the ‘Halcyon Isle’ at their Brooklyn yard in New York State in
March 1974. Under United States law a ship-repairer is entitled to a
maritime lien for the price of repairs done to a ship. The ‘Halcyon Isle’ was
arrested in Singapore on 5 September 1974 in an action in rem brought in
the High Court of Singapore by the mortgagees. On 6 March 1975 she was
sold by order of the court, for a sum insufficient to satisfy in full the claims
of all the creditors of her owners. The question of law directly involved in
this appeal is whether in the distribution of the proceeds of sale the claim of
the mortgagees should take priority over the claim of the Necessaries Men
or vice versa.
2. Although the admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court of Singapore is
statutory the order of priorities in the distribution of the proceeds of sale of a
ship in an action in rem or in a limitation action is not. It is a matter of
practice and procedure of that court in the exercise of its admiralty
jurisdiction; and in matters of practice and procedure as well as the
substantive law which it administers there is no relevant difference between
the law of Singapore and the law of England. Since nearly all the cases to be
cited will be English cases, their Lordships will for brevity use the
expression ‘English law’ as embracing also the law of Singapore
administered by the High Court of Singapore in the exercise of its admiralty
jurisdiction.
3. At first sight, the answer to the question posed by this appeal seems simple.
The priorities as between claimants to a limited fund which is being
distributed by a court of law are matters of procedure which under English
rules of conflict of laws are governed by the lex fori; so English law is the
only relevant law by which the priorities as between the mortgagees and the
Necessaries Men are to be determined; and in English law mortgagees take
priority over Necessaries Men.
4. In the case of a ship, however, the classification of claims against its former
owners for the purpose of determining priorities to participate in the
proceeds of its sale may raise a further problem of conflict of laws, since
claims may have arisen as a result of events that occurred not only on the
high seas but also within the territorial jurisdictions of a number of different
foreign states. So the lex causae of one claim may differ from the lex
causae of another, even though the events which gave rise to the claim in
each of those foreign states are similar in all respects, except their
geographical location; the leges causarum of various claims, of which under
English conflict rules the ‘proper law’ is that of different states, may assign
different legal consequences to similar events. So the court distributing the
limited fund may be faced, as in the instant case, with the problem of
classifying the foreign claims arising under differing foreign systems of law
in order to assign each of them to the appropriate class in the order of
priorities under the lex fori of the distributing court.
5. The choice would appear to lie between
a. on the one hand classifying by reference to the events on which each
claim was founded and giving to it the priority to which it would be
entitled under the lex fori if those events had occurred within the
territorial jurisdiction of the distributing court; or
b. on the other hand applying a complicated kind of partial renvoi by
i. first ascertaining in respect of each foreign claim the legal
consequences, other than those relating to priorities in the
distribution of a limited fund, would be attributed under its
own lex causae the events on which the claim is founded; and
ii. then giving to the foreign claim the priority accorded under
the lex fori to claims arising from events, however dissimilar,
which would have given rise to the same or analogous legal
consequences if they had occurred within the territorial
jurisdiction of the distributing court.
To omit the dissection of the lex causae of the claim that the second choice
prescribes and to say instead that if under the lex causae the relevant events
would give rise to a maritime lien, the English court must give to those
courts all the legal consequences of a maritime lien under English law
would, in their Lordships’ view, be too simplistic an approach to the
questions of conflicts of law that are involved.
6. Even apart from the merit of simplicity, the choice in favour of the first
alternative, classification by reference to events, appears to their Lordships
to be preferable in principle. In distributing a limited fund that is insufficient
to pay in full all creditors of a debtor whose claims against him have already
been quantified and proved, the court is not any longer concerned with
enforcing against the debtor himself the individual creditors’ original rights
against him. It is primarily concerned in doing evenhanded justice between
competing creditors whose respective claims to be a creditor may have
arisen under a whole variety of different and, it may be, conflicting systems
of national law. It may be plausibly suggested that the moral and rational
justification of the general conflicts of law rule, applied by English courts to
claims arising out of foreign contracts, that the contract should be given the
same legal consequences as would be accorded to it under its ‘proper law’,
is that the legitimate expectations of the parties to the contract as to their
rights against one another, which will result from entering into and carrying
out the contract, ought not to be defeated by any chance of the forum in
which such rights have to be enforced. Rights of priority over other creditors
of the defaulting party to such a contract, in a judicial distribution of a fund
which is insufficient to satisfy all the creditors in full, are not, however,
rights of the parties to the contract against one another. They are rights as
between one party to the contract against strangers to the contract, the other
creditors, who have done nothing to arouse any legitimate expectations in
that party as to the priority to which he will be entitled in the distribution of
such a fund. Every such creditor whose claim is based on contract or quasi-
contract must have known that in so far as the legal consequences of his
claim under its own lex causae included rights to priority over other classes
of creditors in the distribution of a limited fund resulting from an action in
rem against a ship, that particular part of the lex causae would be compelled
to yield to the lex fori of any foreign court in which the action in rem might
be brought.
7. Counsel for the Necessaries Men in the instant case, who are experienced
litigants in courts of admiralty, has not suggested that they were not
perfectly well aware of this when they allowed the ‘Halcyon Isle’ to vacate
the berth that she was occupying in their busy repair yard in Brooklyn and
thereby relinquished their possessory lien for the unpaid work that they had
done upon the ship. They would likewise know that if the ‘Halcyon Isle’
were to enter a port in any of the major trading countries of the world while
their bill remained unpaid could have her arrested in an action in rem and in
this way obtain the security of the ship itself for their claim; subject,
however, to being postponed to any other claimants who might be entitled to
priority under the lex fori of the country in which the action was brought.
They or their lawyers, would know, too, that the priorities as between
various kinds of maritime claims accorded by the lex fori were subject to
considerable variation as between one country and another.
8. In the case of claimants to a limited fund consisting of the proceeds of sale
of a ship in an action in rem brought in a court which, like the High Court of
Singapore, applies English admiralty law and practice, the problem of
classifying foreign maritime claims for the purposes of determining
priorities is complicated by the legal concept of ‘maritime lien’ to which
some classes of maritime claims against a ship owner give rise in English
law while other classes do not. This concept derived as it is from the civil
law and not the common law may fairly be described as sui generis.
9. The classic description of a maritime lien in English law is to be found
in The Bold Buccleugh (1851) 7 Moo PC 267; 13 ER 884 a case decided by
the Privy Council at a time when the English Court of Admiralty regarded
itself as applying not so much English law as the ‘general law of the sea of
the whole of Europe’. Sir John Jervis described the concept as having its
origin in the civil law. He adopted as correct Lord Tenterden’s definition of
‘maritime lien’ in Abbott on Shipping, as meaning
a claim or privilege upon a thing to be carried into effect by legal
process
10. and Sir John Jervis added:
This claim or privilege travels with the thing into whosesoever
possession it may come. It is inchoate from the moment the claim or
privilege attaches, and when carried into effect by legal process, by
a proceeding in rem, relates back to the period when it first
attached.
11. The expression ‘privilege’ in this description of a maritime lien is a
reference to the concept of ‘privilege’in the Civil Law from which the
French Code Civil is derived. There, privilege is used in the sense of the
right of a creditor of a particular class to be paid out of a particular fund or
the proceeds of sale of a particular thing in priority to other classes of
creditors of the owner or former owner of the fund or thing. In the French
Code Civil it is distinguished from the concept of ‘hypothèque’, which was
the subject of detailed analysis by the English Court of Appeal in The
Colorado [1923] P 102.
12. Sir John Jervis, speaking in 1851 said that a maritime lien existed in every
case in which the Court of Admiralty had jurisdiction to entertain an
action in rem against a ship. Jurisdiction in rem and maritime lien went hand
in hand. This had been true when the jurisdiction of the Court of Admiralty
was at its lowest ebb in the early years of the nineteenth century as a result
of harassment by the courts of common law. It has remained true in the law
of the USA where today all maritime claims enforceable in rem are treated
as giving rise to maritime liens; but it was no longer true in English law,
even by 1851, after the jurisdiction of the Court of Admiralty had been
extended by the Admiralty Court Act 1840 and the Merchant Shipping Act
1844. Subsequent extensions of jurisdiction in rem in respect of maritime
claims were made by the Admiralty Court Act 1861 and by later Merchant
Shipping Acts until its modern jurisdiction was laid down in the
Administration of Justice Act 1956 which is in the same terms as the High
Court (Admiralty) Jurisdiction Act, of Singapore.
13. During the period that the English Court of Admiralty regarded itself as
applying the ‘general law of the sea’ four classes of claims only were treated
as giving rise to maritime liens on ships, viz:
1. Salvage;
2. Collision damage;
3. Seaman’s wages; and
4. Bottomry. Bottomry is now obsolete, but historically it provided a
normal means of providing security for the price of goods and
services supplied to a ship by Necessaries Men outside its home port.
Two additional classes of claims were added to this list by statute in
the 19th century. These were
5. Master’s wages, and
6. Master’s disbursements.
14. The ranking for the purpose of priority in the distribution of a limited fund
that has been accorded by the English Court of Admiralty to claims within
the various classes that were treated as giving rise to maritime liens was
complicated. It still is. It can be found conveniently set out at paras 1574 et
seq in the volume of British Shipping Laws that deals with Admiralty
Practice. For present purposes it is sufficient to observe that the priorities,
whether between class and class or within one class, bear no relation to the
general rule applicable to other charges upon property as security for a
debt: qui prior est tempore potior est jure. This rule is based upon the
principle that when the owner of a thing grants a charge on it as security for
the payment of a sum of money, he transfers to the grantee part of his own
proprietary rights in the thing and so deprives himself of the ability to
transfer to a subsequent grantee anything more than such proprietary rights
as remain to him.
15. This principle, based as it is upon the concept of a transfer of proprietary
rights, cannot explain the priorities accorded to maritime liens. Indeed a
later maritime lien for one class of claim may rank in priority to an earlier
maritime lien for another class of claim, and even within a single class a
later maritime lien may rank in priority to an earlier one.
16. Thus when Gorell Barnes P in The Ripon City [1897] P 226 at p 242 said
of a maritime lien:
It is a right acquired by one over a thing belonging to another – a jus
in re aliena. It is so to speak a subtraction from the absolute property
of the owner in the thing.
17. The second sentence is inaccurate if it is to be regarded as suggesting that
the owner of a ship, once it has become the subject of a maritime lien, can
no longer create a charge on the whole property in the ship which will rank
in priority to the existing lien. This he can do – as for instance by entering
into a salvage contract or by signing on a crew.
18. In English admiralty law and practice claims of all those six classes that
have hitherto been treated as giving rise to a maritime lien take priority over
claims under mortgages in the distribution of a limited fund by the court,
and mortgages themselves rank in priority to all classes of claims that have
not been treated as giving rise to maritime liens.
19. [In view of the reference hereafter to be made to The Colorado it is also
relevant to note that for the purpose of priority of ranking inter se mortgages
fall into two classes:
. British registered mortgages (which can only be upon British ships)
and
a. other mortgages, British or foreign (which can be upon either British
or foreign ships).
20. British registered mortgages rank in priority to all other mortgages and
rank inter se in order of date of registration. All other mortgages regardless
of whether they are British or foreign rank inter se in order of date of
creation.]
21. The pattern of priorities, which has been applied by the English Admiralty
Court in the distribution of the fund representing the proceeds of sale of a
ship in an action in rem, thus affords no logical basis for concluding that, if
a new class of claim additional to the six that have hitherto been recognised
were treated under its own lex causae as having given rise to a maritime
lien, this should have any effect on its ranking for the purpose of priority
under the lex fori in the distribution of the fund by the court and, in
particular, no logical basis for concluding that this should entitle it to
priority over mortgages.
22. There is, however, an additional legal characteristic of a maritime lien in
English law which distinguishes it from maritime claims to which no
maritime lien attaches and which is not confined to rights to a particular
rank of priority in the distribution by a court of justice of a limited fund
among the various classes of creditors of a single debtor. A maritime lien
continues to be enforceable by an action in rem against the ship in
connection with which the claim that gave rise to the lien arose,
notwithstanding any subsequent sale of the ship to a third party and
notwithstanding that the purchaser had no notice of the lien and no personal
liability on the claim from which the lien arose. This characteristic points in
the direction of a maritime lien partaking of the nature of a proprietary right
in the ship.
23. It is true that in the instant case this complication does not in fact arise; there
had been no change of ownership since the claim of the Necessaries Men
arose. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to overlook this special characteristic
of a maritime lien (for which the French expression is droit de suite) in any
consideration of how a claim, which under its own lex causae would be
treated as having the same legal consequences as those of a maritime lien in
English law, is to be classified under English rules of conflict of laws for the
purpose of distribution of a fund under Singapore law as the lex fori; for a
maritime lien does something more than merely affect priorities.
24. As explained in the passage from The Bold Buccleugh has already been
cited, any charge that a maritime lien creates on a ship is initially inchoate
only; unlike a mortgage it creates no immediate right of property, it is, and
will continue to be, devoid of any legal consequences unless and until it is
‘carried into effect by legal process, by a proceeding in rem’. Any
proprietary right to which it may give rise is thus dependent upon the lienee
being recognised as entitled to proceed in rem against the ship in the court in
which he is seeking to enforce his maritime lien. Under the domestic law of
a number of Civil Law countries even the inchoate charge to which some
classes of maritime claims give rise is evanescent. Unless enforced by legal
process within a limited time, for instance, within one year or before the
commencement of the next voyage, it never comes to life. In English law,
while there is no specific time limit to a maritime lien the right to enforce it
may be lost by laches.
25. If and when a maritime lien is carried into effect by legal process, however,
the charge dates back to the time that the claim on which it is founded arose.
It is only this retrospective consequence of his having been able to enforce
the legal process in a court of law that enables a claimant, whose entitlement
to a maritime lien is still inchoate and has not yet come into effect, to pursue
his claim to the lien, as it were proleptically, in a proceeding in rem against
the ship; at a time when it no longer belongs to the ship owner who was
personally liable to satisfy the claim in respect of which the lien arose.
26. This characteristic of a maritime lien is one that is unique in English law. It
has the result that the recognition of any new class of claim arising under
foreign law, as giving rise to a maritime lien in English law because it does
so under its own lex causae may affect not only priorities as between classes
of creditors of a particular debtor in the distribution of the proceeds of sale
of a particular ship in an action in rem, but such recognition may also extend
the classes of persons who are entitled to bring such an action against a
particular ship, i.e. by including among them some who, although they have
no claim against the current owner of the ship, have claims against his
predecessor in ownership.
27. But any question as to who is entitled to bring a particular kind of
proceeding in an English court, like questions of priorities in distribution of
a fund, is a question of jurisdiction. It too under English rules of conflict of
laws falls to be decided by English law as the lex fori.
28. Their Lordships therefore conclude that, in principle, the question as to the
right to proceed in rem against a ship as well as priorities in the distribution
between competing claimants of the proceeds of its sale in an action in
rem in the High Court of Singapore falls to be determined by the lex fori, as
if the events that gave rise to the claim had occurred in Singapore.
29. Although in the English cases involving claims to maritime liens, which
extend over a period of a century and a half, there is no apparent recognition
in the judgments that any hidden problems of conflict of laws might be
involved, the English Courts of Admiralty have consistently applied English
rules as to what classes of events give rise to maritime liens wherever those
events may have occurred. Not one single case has been drawn to their
Lordships’ attention in which it has been treated as relevant that a
transaction or event did or did not give rise to a maritime lien under the law
of the country where the transaction or event took place; even though the
judges of the Court of Admiralty were fully aware that under the law of
many European countries claims falling outside the six classes recognised
by English law were treated by those countries’ courts as giving rise to
maritime liens. Claims for the supply of necessaries provided the most
widespread example of foreign recognition of a maritime lien, but, under
French law in particular, a wide variety of other maritime claims were
treated as giving rise to privileges, i.e. maritime liens.
30. To take an early example in The Golubchick (1840) 1 W Rob 242 the
English rule was applied by Dr Lushington to claims for wages by Spanish
seamen engaged on a Russian vessel. In The Pieve Superiore(1874) LR 5
PC 482 the Privy Council in the course of its judgment stated as self-evident
that cargo claims against an Italian vessel did not give rise to a maritime
lien. The Milford (1858) Swa 362, The Tagus[1903] P 44, The
Zigurds [1932] P 113 and The Acrux [1965] P 391 are supporting
authorities, spanning a century, in which the court has applied English rules
as to the existence and extent of maritime liens and not the differing rules
which would have been applicable under the lex causae.
31. The statutory extensions by the Admiralty Court Acts 1840 and 1861 of the
jurisdiction of the English Court of admiralty to entertain actions in
rem ships in respect of claims of most of the kinds now listed in the current
Singapore and English statutes, including claims by Necessaries Men, might
have been regarded as entitling these new claims to maritime liens. Under
admiralty practice as it then existed this would have given to them that
priority over mortgagees to which the Necessaries Men in the instant case
would be entitled under United States law. After some early vacillation by
Dr Lushington, however, it was decided by the Privy Council in The Two
Ellens (1872) LR 4 PC 161 that those English statutes did not create a
maritime lien for any of the additional classes of claims over which the
Court of Admiralty had newly been granted jurisdiction, and that,
accordingly, mortgagees had priorities over Necessaries Men. See also The
Pacific (1864) Br & L 243; 167 ER 356. It required an express provision of
an English statute to create a maritime lien for classes of claims other than
those entitled to such liens under what the Court of Admiralty regarded and
referred to as the ‘general law of the seas’. This was done in the case of
masters’ wages by the Merchant Shipping Act 1854, The Salacia (1862)
Lush 545; 167 ER 246 and in the case of masters’ disbursements by the
Merchant Shipping Act 1889 after the House of Lords in The Sara (1889)
14 App Cas 209 had held that the earlier statutes conferred no such lien.
32. In coming to the conclusion in the instant case that, because it would have
given rise to a maritime lien under its lex causae (United States law) to
which effect would be given by an American Court applying US law as
the lex fori, the Necessaries Men’s claim was therefore entitled to the same
priority over mortgages as maritime liens as a class enjoy over mortgages
under the law of Singapore as the lex fori, the Court of Appeal were greatly
influenced by the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in The Ioannis
Daskalelis [1974] 1 Lloyd’s Rep 174 that under Canadian law, which in
admiralty matters is derived from English law, American Necessaries Men
took priority over mortgagees of a Greek ship. There had been a previous
decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in 1926 The Strandhill [1926] 4
DLR 801 in which it had been held that American Necessaries Men could
proceed to enforce their claim by an action in rem against the ship
notwithstanding a subsequent change in ownership; but this earlier decision
expressly left open the question whether priorities between competing
claims would be determined by Canadian law. A subsequent decision of the
Canadian Court of Exchequer had determined that priorities were to be
determined by Canadian law, The Astoria [1931] Ex CR 195. In
overruling The Astoria the Supreme Court of Canada in The Ioannis
Daskalelis relied strongly on the judgment of the English Court of Appeal
in The Colorado, a case that was not concerned with a claim to a maritime
lien at all.
33. The only question in The Colorado was whether a hypothèque executed and
registered in France over a French ship created a proprietary right in the ship
which the court would recognise as similar enough in legal character to an
English mortgage to justify according it the priority over the claim of
Necessaries Men to which a mortgagee would be entitled in English law.
This is not a problem that would have troubled the Court of Admiralty when
it was manned by civil lawyers; they would have known all about the legal
concept of hypothèque. An examination of the expert evidence of French
law, which can be found in the report of the case in 16 Aspinall’s Maritime
Law Cases, at pp 145–147, discloses that, contrary to what Scrutton LJ said
in The Colorado p 109, a hypothèque does constitute a jus in rem or right of
property in the ship that is created consensually to secure a debt, although,
unlike an English mortgage, it gives no right to take possession of the res.
There is nothing inchoate about it; it requires registration and is enforceable
by judicial sale. It has different characteristics from a privilege in French
law and, what is significant for present purposes, according to the French of
priorities, it ranks behind and not before the claims of Necessaries Men.
34. In The Colorado the court looked at the French law as the ‘proper law’ of
the hypothèque simply to see what its legal nature was. In describing the
right created by hypothèques in French law as being equivalent to a
maritime lien in English law (a passage much relied upon by the Canadian
court) Scrutton LJ can only have been speaking loosely. They have some
characteristics in common; but Scrutton LJ could hardly be taken to have
been suggesting that a hypothèque would take priority over a prior English
mortgage – as it would if it were to be treated by an English court as being a
maritime lien. On the contrary the French law as to the priority of maritime
liens over hypothèques was said by all three Lords Justices to be irrelevant;
nor did any of the members of the court regard their decision as inconsistent
with The Milfordor and The Tagus. Both these cases were cited by
Scrutton and Atkin LJJ in support of their respective judgments.
35. Moreover the same three Lords Justices had in the previous year
decided The Tervaete [1922] P 259 Atkin LJ there says in terms
[The maritime lien] is confined to a right to take proceedings in a
court of law
36. and
The right of maritime lien appears … to be essentially different
from a right of property, hypothec or pledge created by [a]
voluntary act.
37. Scrutton LJ refers to a maritime lien as [emphasis is added]
a privilege or lien .... in this sense, that if the vessel comes within
English territorial waters it may be arrested and the claim or
privilege on it will date back to the time of the lien.
38. Bankes LJ considered that a maritime lien might properly be regarded in one
or other of three ways:
as a step in the process of enforcing a claim against the owners of a
ship, or as a remedy or partial remedy in itself, or as a means of
securing priority of claim.
39. The reasoning of all three judgments is consistent only with the
characterisation of a maritime lien in English law as involving rights that are
procedural or remedial only, and accordingly the question whether a
particular class of claim gives rise to a maritime lien or not as being one to
be determined by English law as the lex fori. Their Lordships, with great
respect, consider that in The Ioannis Daskalelis the judgments in The
Colorado were misunderstood by the Supreme Court.
40. In the instant case the Court of Appeal in Singapore also relied upon
statements on the legal nature of a maritime lien in English law which are to
be found in the judgment of Scott LJ in The Tolten [1946] P 135. That was
an action brought to enforce a maritime lien for damage caused by a ship in
collision with a port installation in Nigeria. Collision damage gives rise to a
maritime lien in English law and in the maritime law of the great majority of
other Western countries, i.e. under what Scott LJ repeatedly referred to in
his judgment as ‘the general law of the sea amongst Western nations’ out of
which, he said, our own maritime law largely grew. Scott LJ in The
Tolten was not concerned with the ‘proper law’ by which the existence or
non-existence of a maritime lien was to be determined, but with a question,
that was purely one of English law as the lex fori – a choice between two
competing rules of English law as to the jurisdiction of English
courts viz the existence of jurisdiction to enforce against a ship which had
come within English territorial waters what was unquestionably recognised
by English law as a maritime lien and the absence of any jurisdiction to
entertain actions concerning foreign land. Scott LJ had participated in the
conferences which resulted in the International Convention on Maritime
Liens and Mortgages of 1926 which the United Kingdom never ratified
because it required member states to create and recognise maritime liens in
favour of Necessaries Men. No-one was better aware than Scott LJ of the
wide departure from what he called the general law of the sea that had
occurred in many western countries as regards the creation of maritime liens
under their domestic law for a whole variety of, claims against ship owners.
France and the United States were conspicuous examples of this. Their
domestic laws provided for the enforcement of maritime liens in respect of
nearly every kind of maritime claim listed in s 3 of the High Court
(Admiralty Jurisdiction) Act, of Singapore. Throughout his judgment in The
Tolten their Lordships think it clear that Scott LJ was treating English law
as the only proper law to determine what kind of transaction or event gave
rise to a maritime lien that an English court had jurisdiction to enforce as
such.
41. In their Lordships’ view the English authorities upon close examination
support the principle that, in the application of English rules of conflict of
laws, maritime claims are classified as giving rise to maritime liens which
are enforceable in actions in rem in English courts where and only where the
events on which the claim is founded would have given rise to a maritime
lien in English law, if those events had occurred within the territorial
jurisdiction of the English court.
42. From principle and authority their Lordships turn finally to the language of
what is now the statutory source of admiralty jurisdiction of the High Court
of Singapore, the High Court (Admiralty Jurisdiction) Act. It is in the same
terms as the corresponding provisions of the English Administration of
Justice Act, 1956 which confer upon the High Court of England its current
admiralty – jurisdiction in rem and in personam. The English statute was
passed to enable this country to ratify the International Convention of 1952
on the Arrest (saisi conservatoire) of Sea-going Ships (The 1952
Convention). The Singapore Act was probably passed for the same purpose
although, in the event, it appears that Singapore has not yet ratified the
Convention. Nevertheless the identical words of the Singapore statute ought
also to be construed in the light of the Convention to which the English
statute was intended to give effect.
43. The list of claims over which the High Court has admiralty jurisdiction
under the statute (maritime claims) reproduces, with one addition relating to
forfeiture and condemnation, the list of maritime claims to be found in the
Convention. The list is both exhaustive of the claims in respect of which the
courts of one contracting party to the Convention may arrest a ship flying
the flag of any other contracting party, and is compulsory upon the court if
invoked by an applicant claiming to be entitled to any of the maritime
claims in the list.
44. The Convention deals with what in civil law countries are treated as two
separate kinds of ‘jurisdiction’ viz:
. jurisdiction to arrest a ship upon the application of a person claiming
to be a creditor of the present or former owner of the ship in respect
of a maritime claim and to release the ship upon the provision of bail
or security sufficient to satisfy a judgment for the claim rendered by a
court of competent jurisdiction (i.e. saisi conservatoire) and
a. jurisdiction to determine the claim on the merits (i.e. sur le fond) and
to order a judicial sale of the ship to satisfy the claim and any other
maritime claims affecting the ship.
45. The concept of ‘saisi conservatoire’ is unknown to English law. In civil law
countries it is not peculiar to maritime law; it applies to other kinds of
movable property. It is a procedure whereby a court, which has no
jurisdiction over a claim ratione causae but within whose geographical area
of jurisdiction property of the defendant to the claim is to be found, may
arrest that property on the application of the claimant and retain it, or any
security provided to obtain its release, in judicial custody to abide the result
of the judgment of another court which does have jurisdiction over the
claim ratione causae. Although generally exercised by one court having
local jurisdiction in aid of another court with local jurisdiction in the same
country, it also extends to ‘saisi conservatoire’ in aid of foreign courts.
46. In English and Singapore law where ‘saisi conservatoire’ is unknown,
jurisdiction in rem to arrest a ship on the application of a claimant and
jurisdiction to adjudicate on the merits of his maritime claim are co-
extensive. The Convention recognises the supremacy of the lex fori in
matters of jurisdiction to adjudicate on the merits by providing in art 7.
The courts of the country in which the arrest was made shall have
jurisdiction to determine the case upon its merits’ (i.e. sur le fond) ‘if
the domestic law of the country in which the arrest is made gives
jurisdiction to such Courts.
[emphasis is added]
47. Leaving aside questions as to the ownership or possession of ships, the
maritime claims appearing in the list contained in the Convention and the
English and Singapore statutes fall into three classes:
. Claims in respect of mortgages or charges on a ship:
a. Maritime claims which in English law give rise to a ‘maritime lien’
on a ship for the amount claimed: and
b. Maritime claims which give rise to a right of arrest of a ship but in
English law do not give rise to a maritime lien.
48. As has been pointed out, apart from questions of priorities, with which the
Convention does not deal at all, an essential difference between claims in
classes 2 and 3, is that claims which give rise to a maritime lien on a ship
may be enforced in rem against that ship notwithstanding that it has
subsequently been sold to a bona fide purchaser for value without notice of
the claim. This is expressly provided for in Article 8 of the International
Convention of 1962 on Maritime Liens and Mortgages which says:
Claims secured by a lien follow the vessel into whatever hands it
may pass.
49. It is this that makes the recognition of types of claims as giving rise to
maritime liens of considerable commercial importance to the market for the
purchase and sale of ships and in the provision of finance for their
construction and acquisition. Article 9 of the Convention of 1952 is
important. Among the maritime nations of the world at the time of the 1952
Convention, there was still no uniformity of recognition of what categories
of maritime claims gave rise to maritime liens. The United Kingdom policy,
reflected in its refusal to ratify the 1926 Convention on Maritime Liens and
Mortgages, had been to keep down to a minimum the number of maritime
liens that should be recognised, so as to prevent what can be described as
‘secret charges’ arising and gaining priority over mortgagees and over
subsequent purchasers for value of the ship. The United Kingdom stood at
one extreme; under its domestic law only six categories of claims, one of
which is obsolete, give rise to maritime liens. The United States stood at the
other; under its domestic law maritime liens are granted for practically all
classes of maritime claims, including even claims for damage to cargo and
for damages for breach of charterparty.
50. Article 2 of the 1952 Convention which confers the right of arrest for claims
other than those arising under mortgages, hypothecations and other similar
charges says nothing about change of ownership of the particular ship
between the time the claim arose and the time of the arrest. This is dealt
with by Article 9 which provides, in the English language version:
Nothing in this Convention shall be construed as creating a right of
action which, apart from the provisions of this Convention, would
not arise under the law applied by the court which had seisin of the
case nor as creating any maritime liens which do not exist under
such law or under the Convention on Maritime Liens and
Mortgages, if the latter is applicable.
[emphasis is added]
51. In the French language version, ‘any maritime liens’ appears as ‘aucun droit
de suite’ – which may be thought to be a clearer expression in the context of
arts 2 and 9.
52. Article 9 of the Convention in their Lordships’ view points strongly to wide
international recognition of the characterisation of ‘maritime liens’ where
this expression is used in the 1926 and 1952 Conventions, as procedural or
remedial only and governed by the lex fori of the country whose courts have
seisin of the case.
53. The English and Singapore statutes of which the subject-matter, be it noted,
is the ‘jurisdiction’ of the court, comply with the requirements of articles 2
and 9 of the 1952 Convention by the provisions appearing in ss 4(2), 3 and
(4) of the Singapore Statute. In general sub-s (2) and (4) confine the
jurisdiction of the court to entertain actions in rem, and consequently the
right of arrest, to ships belonging to the person who was owner of the ship in
respect of which the claim arises at the date when that claim arose; but sub-s
(3) extends the jurisdiction of the court to entertain actions in rem against
the particular ship in respect of which there is a ‘maritime lien or other
charge’ on it for the amount claimed, regardless of who is currently that
ship’s owner. ‘Maritime lien’ as used in s 4(3) should thus be understood in
the same sense as the same expression in art 9 of the 1952 Convention. If so
understood this, in their Lordships’ view, lends support to the proper
characterisation of its legal nature under Singapore law as procedural or
remedial, and thus governed solely by the lex fori.
54. Their Lordships are accordingly of opinion that in principle, in accordance
with long-established English authorities and consistently with international
comity as evidenced by the wide acceptance of the International Convention
of 1952 on the Arrest of Sea-going Ships, the question whether or not in the
instant case the Necessaries Men are entitled to priority over the mortgagees
in the proceeds of sale of the ‘Halcyon Isle’ depends upon whether or not if
the repairs to the ship had been done in Singapore the repairer would have
been entitled under the law of Singapore to a maritime lien on the ‘Halcyon
Isle’ for the price of them. The answer to that question is that they are not.
The mortgagees are entitled to priority.
55. In the instant case as in the two Canadian cases of The Strandhill and The
Ioannis Daskalelis, the claim of the Necessaries Men is for the price of
repairs to the ship. Such a claim, wherever the repairs were done, whether in
Singapore or abroad, may well invite sympathy since the repairs may be
added to the value of the ship and thus to the value of the security to which
the mortgagees can have resort. As a matter of policy such a claim might not
unreasonably be given priority over claims by holders of prior mortgages the
value of whose security had thereby been enhanced. If this is to be done,
however, it will, in their Lordships’ view have to be done by the legislature.
It is far too late to add, by judicial decision, an additional class of claim to
those which have hitherto been recognised as giving rise to maritime liens
under the law of Singapore; nor is this what the judgment of the Court of
Appeal in the instant case purports to do. The argument for the Necessaries
Men that was accepted by the Court of Appeal was not confined to claims
for necessaries. It was that wherever a maritime claim of any of the kinds
listed in paras (d) to (q) of s 3(1) of the High Court (Admiralty Jurisdiction)
Act gives rise to a maritime lien under its own lex causae, as could be the
case with claims of every kind referred to in the list, even including
damages for breach of charter-party if the lex causae was United States law,
the High Court of Singapore is required by Singapore law to give the claim
priority over earlier and subsequent mortgagees and over all claims for the
price of necessaries supplied to the ship in Singapore itself or in any other
country under whose domestic law claims for necessaries do not attract a
maritime lien.
56. For the reasons already given their Lordships consider that this argument is
unsound, and the appeal must be allowed, the judgment of the Court of
Appeal set aside and the judgment of Kulasekaram J restored. The
respondents must pay the costs of the appeal to the Court of Appeal and of
this appeal.
Lord Salmon & Lord Scarman
(dissenting)
57. In this appeal many questions have to be considered, but only one issue
arises for decision. The issue is: when a ship is sold by order of the court in
a creditor’s action in rem against the ship and the proceeds of sale are
insufficient to pay all creditors in full does a ship-repairer, who has provided
his services and materials abroad and has by the ‘lex loci’ the benefit of a
maritime lien, enjoy priority over a mortgagee? Or is his foreign lien to be
disregarded in determining his priority? The issue has arisen in Singapore
but, so far as this appeal is concerned, the law of Singapore is substantially
the same as the law of England. The trial judge ruled in favour of the
mortgagee.
58. The Court of Appeal reversed him, ruling in favour of the ship-repairer. The
mortgagee now appeals to this Board. No question arises as to the
jurisdiction of the court: High Court (Admiralty Jurisdiction) Act s 3(1)(l)
and (m). The one question is the effect within the jurisdiction of a maritime
lien conferred by the lex loci contractus.
59. In The Tolten at p 144 Scott LJ described the maritime lien as ‘one of the
first principles of the law of the sea, and very far-reaching in its effects.’
But, if the appellants are right, a maritime lien is in the modern law no more
than a procedural remedy. So far from being far-reaching, its validity and
effect will be subject to the domestic law of the forum in which it is sought
to be enforced.
60. If this be the law, we have travelled a great distance from the concept of a
universal law of the sea. We have returned to the legal climate which in
England prior to 1840 nourished the common law courts by excluding the
Admiralty jurisdiction from ‘the body of the County’, i.e. the internal
waters, ports and dockyards of the country. In the climate of a dominating
domestic law the concepts and principles of the law of the sea wilt and die.
61. The Court of Appeal in Singapore, allying itself with the Supreme Court of
Canada and accepting the classic description of a maritime lien to be found
in the English cases (notably The Bold Buccleugh) refused to treat a
maritime lien as a mere procedural remedy. Delivering the judgment of the
court, the Chief Justice said:
Apart from authority, we are of the opinion that in principle the
courts of this country ought to recognise the substantive right
acquired under foreign law as a valid right and to give effect to that
recognition when determining the question of priorities between
the ship repairers and the mortgagees of the res.
62. We agree that the issue in this appeal should be approached on the basis of
principle, and we attach great weight to the view of the Republic’s Court of
Appeal as to what the law of Singapore ought in principle to be.
63. The relevant facts are few and can be shortly stated. The ‘Halcyon Isle’ is a
British ship. The appellants, an English company, were first mortgagees and
registered as such on 8 May 1974. The respondents are American ship-
repairers who in March 1974 did repairs and supplied materials to the ship
while it was in the port of New York. The ship reached Singapore waters in
the summer of that year. While there, it was arrested. The ship-repairers had
issued a writ in rem against the ship: so also had the mortgagees. After
arrest, the ship was sold by order of the court. In due course the ship-
repairers obtained a judgment for $237,011 and the mortgagees a judgment
for $14,413,000. The proceeds of the sale amounted only to $1,380,000. If,
therefore, the mortgagees win their appeal, they take all (subject to certain
admitted preferential claims by other creditors). If the ship-repairers are
victorious, they will be paid in full, the mortgagees taking what remains
after the ship-repairers have been paid.
64. First, certain matters which are not in dispute. Under US law a ship-repairer
has a maritime lien against the ship. According to the uncontradicted
evidence of a New York ‘attorney at law and Proctor in Admiralty’ the
rendition by the ship-repairer of services and repairs to the ship ‘gives rise to
a valid maritime lien … which confers upon [him] rights of the same nature
and quality as are conferred upon the holder of a maritime lien under
English law’. It is equally not in dispute that under the law of Singapore, as
of England:
. ‘whatever relates to the remedy to be enforced, must be determined
by the lex fori’: Lord Brougham, Don v Lippmann (1837) 5 Cl &
Fin 1, 13; 7 ER 303;
a. the priority of creditors claiming against a fund in court (including the
proceeds of the judicial sale of a ship) is governed by the lex fori;
b. the claim of a mortgagee has priority over the claim of a ship-repairer
for repairs executed in Singapore;
c. ship-repairers do not have a maritime lien on a ship for repairs
executed in Singapore;
d. a claimant who has a maritime lien recognised by the law has priority
over a mortgagee.
65. These propositions are to be found stated in the Court of Appeal’s judgment
as being not in dispute. They narrow the issue to the question: does the law
of Singapore recognise a foreign maritime lien as a substantive right of
property vested in a claimant who can show that he enjoys it under the law
of the place where he performed his services? The law, admittedly, gives
effect to a validly established foreign mortgage, recognising that the
mortgage is an essential element of the claim. Is a validly established
foreign maritime lien to be treated in the same way, as part of the claim? Or
is it a remedy made available by the lex fori?
66. The law of Singapore follows English law in restricting maritime liens
arising under its domestic law to only a few cases; in modern conditions,
they are for all practical purposes limited to salvage, wages (or salaries) of
the crew, master’s disbursements and liabilities incurred on behalf of the
ship, and damage done by the ship: The Ripon City. Whether it be put in
terms of the law of the sea or of the rules of private international law, the
question has to be asked and answered in this appeal: does English and
Singapore law recognise a foreign maritime lien, where none would exist,
had the claim arisen in England or Singapore? Whatever the answer, the
result is unsatisfactory. If in the affirmative, maritime states may be tempted
to pass ‘chauvinistic’ laws conferring liens on a plurality of claims so that
the claimants may obtain abroad a preference denied to domestic claimants;
if in the negative, claimants who have given the ship credit in reliance upon
their lien may find themselves sorely deceived. If the law of the sea were a
truly universal code, those dangers would disappear. Unfortunately the
maritime nations, thought they have tried, have failed to secure uniformity
in their rules regarding maritime liens: see the fate of the two Conventions
of 1962 and 1967 [Singh, British Shipping Laws (2nd Ed), vol 8 pp 1392,
1397] each entitled (optimistically) an International Convention for the
Unification of Certain Rules of Law relating to Maritime Liens and
Mortgages. Though it signed each of them, the United Kingdom has not
ratified either of them; Singapore (fully independent since 1965) has signed
neither of them. In such confusion policy is an uncertain guide to the law.
Principle offers a better prospect for the future.
67. Against this background the submissions of the parties have to be
considered. The basic submission of the appellants is that in determining
priorities the lex fori looks to the nature of the claim, and has no regard to
the existence, or absence, of a maritime lien. The nature of the claim
determines the priority of the judgment debt founded upon it. The claim of
the ship-repairer is that of a necessaries man and, by the lex fori ranks after
the claim of a mortgagee. The reference in the books to the ranking of
maritime liens before mortgage debts means no more than that the claims
which under the domestic law have the benefit of a maritime lien – notably
salvage, wages and for damage done by the ship – enjoy their priority not
because they have the ‘privilege’ of a maritime lien but because of the
nature of the claims themselves.
68. The respondents submit that a maritime lien is a substantive property right
given by the law as a security for the claim and attaching to the claim as
soon as the cause of action arises, though it does not take effect until legal
proceedings are brought against the ship. They submit that it is as absurd, in
characterising a claim to which the law attaches the security of a maritime
lien, to ignore the existence of the lien as it would be to characterise a
mortgagee’s claim as merely one for the repayment of money lent. In each
the security is part of the nature of the claim. They further submit that both
principle and the weight of authority (which it is conceded is not all one
way) support the view, for which they contend: – that English law has
regard to the maritime lien in determining the nature of the claim. If,
therefore, the court finds that the claim has under itslex loci a valid maritime
lien, the lex fori will give the claim the priority over a mortgagee which it
accords to a claim having the benefit of an English lien.
69. In The Bold Buccleugh Sir John Jervis looked at the maritime law to help
him towards a decision that English law recognised damage done by a ship
in a collision as creating a maritime lien: and this at a time when Parliament
had already intervened to put Admiralty jurisdiction on a statutory basis;
Admiralty Court Act 1840 (3 & 4 Vict c 65). After contrasting a maritime
lien with the possessory lien of the common law, he said that in maritime
law the word [i.e. lien] is used ‘to express, as if by analogy, the nature of
claims which neither presuppose nor originate in possession’. He continued
at p 284:
This was well understood in the Civil Law, by which there might be
a pledge with possession, and a hypothecation without possession,
and by which in either case the right travelled with the thing into
whosesoever possession it came. Having its origin in this rule of the
Civil Law, a maritime lien is well defined by Lord Tenterden, to
mean a claim or privilege upon a thing to be carried into effect by
legal process; and Mr. Story J (1 Sumner, 78) explains that process
to be a proceeding in rem, and adds, that wherever a lien or claim is
given upon the thing then the Admiralty enforces it by a
proceeding in rem, and indeed is the only court competent to
enforce it.
70. In this passage he clearly identifies the origin of the concept in the maritime
law (itself derived from the Roman and the Civil Law), compares it with a
Civil Law ‘hypothèque’, and treats it as going to the nature of the claim. A
little later, he describes it as a claim or privilege which ‘travels with the
thing, into whosesoever possession it may come’ and adds ‘when carried
into effect by … a proceeding in rem, relates back to the period when it first
attached’: pp 284, 285.
71. The subsequent case law has, save in one respect, adopted and developed Sir
John Jervis’s description of the nature and incidents of the maritime lien. Sir
John Jervis (p 284) declared:
that in all cases where a proceeding in rem is the proper course,
there a maritime lien exists: the Admiralty jurisdiction of the
English court has developed otherwise; for an action in rem is
available in respect of claims to which no maritime lien attaches.
72. The history of this development is referred to by Scott LJ in The Tolten, at
pp 144, 145: but he cites with approval the conclusion of Gorell Barnes J
in The Ripon City at p 242:
It [i.e. a maritime lien] is a right acquired by one over a thing
belonging to another – a jus in re aliena. It is, so to speak, a
subtraction from the absolute property of the owner in the thing.
73. The classic cases, from which these quotations have been taken, do not
touch the question that arises in this appeal. The repairs were carried out by
the respondents in the USA under a contract with the then owners of the
ship; this contract was governed by the lex loci contractus, as both parties to
the contract must have known. This law indubitably conferred a maritime
lien on the respondents in respect of their repairs to this ship: otherwise the
respondents would never have allowed the ship to leave their yard without
payment. It is obvious also that these repairs must have added to the value of
the ship and therefore to the value of the security of the appellant
mortgagees.
74. The law relating to the repair of ships in England under contracts governed
by English law differs, however, from that in the USA. The repairers of a
ship in England do not acquire any maritime lien over a ship which they
have repaired; and accordingly they rarely allow the ship to leave their yard
until they are paid, or have arranged other security for the repairs.
75. In England, the lex fori decides the priority of the rights which exist against
a ship, e.g. the rights conferred by a maritime lien taking precedence over
the rights of a mortgagee. The question is – does English law, in
circumstances such as these, recognise the maritime lien created by the law
of the USA, i.e. the lex loci contractus where no such lien exists by its own
internal law? In our view the balance of authorities, the comity of nations,
private international law and natural justice all answer this question in the
affirmative. If this be correct then English law (the lex fori) gives the
maritime lien created by the lex loci contractus precedence over the
appellants’ mortgage.
76. If it were otherwise, injustice would prevail. The respondents would be
deprived of their maritime lien, valid as it appeared to be throughout the
world, and without which they would obviously never have allowed the ship
to sail away without paying a dollar for the important repairs upon which the
respondents had spent a great deal of time and money and from which the
appellants obtained substantial advantages.
77. It is suggested in the majority judgment that the respondents were well
aware that the lex loci contractus, conferring upon them their maritime lien,
was likely to be disregarded by overseas lex fori in its determination of
priorities. We entirely disagree. The importance which the respondents
attached to their maritime lien is clearly shown by the ship repair contract
which included the term:
Nothing herein shall be deemed to constitute a waiver of our
maritime lien.
78. Moreover, in many countries the lex loci gives priority to maritime liens
over mortgages.
79. In our opinion, the respondents clearly relied upon the fact that overseas
the lex loci and the maritime lien which it created would both be respected,
and the lien would be given the priority which it rightly received from the
Court of Appeal in Singapore according to the law of Singapore and of
England.
80. Finally, on this aspect of the matter, it must be remembered that the nations
have failed to introduce a uniform code governing maritime liens. The two
international conventions relating to maritime liens, upon which the
majority places great weight, cannot affect, in our view, the result of this
appeal. Neither of them has been signed by Singapore; and neither of them
ratified by the United Kingdom.
81. It is submitted, however, by the appellants that the weight of authority
supports their case. We do not agree: we think that the contrary is true.
82. In The Milford the question was whether the statute gave a foreign master a
remedy against the freight for his wages. Dr Lushington doubted whether he
was called upon to give any opinion on the foreign law (p 365) and, in the
result, gave none, holding that the 191st section of the Merchant Shipping
Act 1854 gave the master the same right and remedies as seamen have (p
367). The statute gave a remedy; and he applied it. It was not, therefore,
necessary to go into the lex loci contractus. The decision is no authority for
the proposition that an English court will never have regard to the lex loci
contractus in order to determine the nature of the claim for the purpose of
determining its priority, or that, in determining its nature, it will disregard
the existence of a validly created foreign maritime lien.
83. The Tagus also turned on the language of the same statutory provision, by
now s 167 Merchant Shipping Act 1894. The law of Argentina, the lex loci
contractus, gave a privilege on the ship and freight only for wages due for
the last voyage. The British statute was not so limited. It was ‘perfectly
general’ in its terms (p 53). The question is simply one of remedy, and was
recognised as such by Scrutton LJ in The Coloradoat p 108. The
Tagus does not touch on the question any more than does The Milford.
Both turn on the question of remedy. Nobody doubted in either case that the
master had a claim. But in neither case did the court have to consider
whether or not he had under the lex loci a maritime lien (in The
Tagushe plainly had none other than for his last voyage): for he had a
remedy under the statute.
84. Whatever be the true analysis of these two cases, the English law must be
seen as having been settled in favour of paying regard, in appropriate cases,
to the lex loci contractus, if The Colorado was correctly decided. It was a
decision of the Court of Appeal (Bankes, Scrutton and Atkin LJJ). The court
had before it a motion to determine priorities. The competing claimants
were Cardiff ship-repairers and the holder of a French ‘hypothèque’. It was
established that the French courts would give a necessaries man priority
over a hypothècaire. English courts would, of course, do the reverse; for
English law postpones a necessaries man to persons who have what is
equivalent to a maritime lien. The Court of Appeal applied the priorities of
its lex fori, but looked to the French law to determine the nature of the claim
based on a hypothèque. Scrutton LJ at p 109, described the approach of the
courts to the problem in these words:
Now the English Court has claim from an English necessaries man
who has no possessory lien or maritime lien, but merely in England
a right to arrest the ship in rem to satisfy his claim against the owner
of the ship. It has also a claim by a person who has a hypothèque,
and it may legitimately consult the foreign law as to what
a hypothèque is. It is proved to be, not a right of property in the ship,
but a right to arrest the ship in the hands of subsequent owners to
satisfy a claim against a previous owner. But such a right is the
same as a maritime lien as described by Mellish LJ in The Two
Ellens (1872) LR 4 PC 161, by Gorell Barnes J in The Ripon
City [1897] P 226, 242 and by this court in The Tervaete [1922] P
259. And the English Courts administering their own law would
give a claim secured by a maritime lien priority over the claim of a
necessaries man, who cannot arrest the ship against a subsequent
owner. The fallacy of the appellants’ argument appears to be that
because the French Courts would give a French necessaries man, or
a necessaries man suing in the Courts of France, priority over the
claimant under a hypothèque, therefore an English Court should give
an English necessaries man similar priority. The answer is that the
appellants are not asking for French remedies, but English
remedies; and the English law postpones them to persons who have
what is equivalent to a maritime lien.
85. Bankes LJ (p 107) and Atkin LJ (pp 111–112) also looked to the French law
to establish the nature of the claim. Bankes LJ described it as having
attributes which entitled it to rank on a question of priorities in the
same class as a maritime lien;
86. Atkin LJ said it was
a right closely resembling a maritime lien.
87. The case is a neat illustration of the application of two principles of the law.
The Court looks to the lex loci to determine the nature of the claim. Having
established its nature, the court applies the priorities of its own law, the lex
fori.
88. The effect of the decision is succinctly summarised in the 9th Ed
of Cheshire’s Private International Law (p 697):
French law determined the substance of A’s right, English law
determined whether a right of that ranked before or after an
opposing claim.
89. Two more recent cases, however, contain obiter dicta which in our opinion
are inconsistent with the decision in The Colorado. In The
Zigurds Langton J had to consider a submission based on The Colorado. It
was submitted that a German necessaries man had under German law rights
equivalent to those of a maritime lien and should, accordingly, enjoy the
priority given by English law to a maritime lienor’s claim. The judge
negatived the submission as to the effect of German law: but,
discussing The Colorado, he indicated his opinion that English law would
not allow its priorities to be determined by the existence of a foreign
maritime lien where none would be given by English law. However, he
concluded (p 125) that it was ‘idle’ to consider debatable questions as to
maritime liens in other cases since he had accepted expert evidence that
German law gave no analogous rights in the case he had to decide.
90. Hewson J adopted a similar approach in The Acrux. Again the point did not
arise for decision, the question in the case being whether social insurance
contributions required by Italian law to be paid by ship owners in respect of
the crews of Italian ships were to be treated as part of the crews’ wages for
the purpose of determining whether English courts had jurisdiction to
entertain a claim for their recovery under s 1(1)(o) of the Administration of
Justice Act, 1956. The question was as to the meaning of ‘wages’ in the
subsection. Nevertheless the judge went on to consider whether Italian law
conferred a maritime lien on the claim. He found that it did, but expressed
the opinion that it was not one which would be recognised by the English
courts: p 402G. He added, at p 403E:
the categories of maritime lien as recognised by this court cannot, in
my view, be extended except by the legislature.
91. If this expression of opinion be correct, it constitutes a denial of the
approach adopted by the Court of Appeal in The Colorado. It would deny
the courts the opportunity, which was taken in The Colorado, to have resort
to the rules of private international law. And if it be urged that a better result
would be achieved by a new international convention to be accepted by the
maritime nations of the world, we would reply that experience suggests that
such a convention may be a long time coming. Meanwhile the aid of private
international law, slender and inadequate though it is, should not, in our
opinion, be rejected.
92. The difference of approach visible in the English case law is reflected
elsewhere. Since The Colorado was decided, there have been two notable
decisions overseas, which have taken the line, indicated by Langton J in The
Zigurdsand by Hewson J in The Acrux, that the existence of a foreign
maritime lien is not to be considered in determining the nature of the claim,
for which priority is sought. They are Coal Export Corp v Notias [1962]
EA 220 (East African Court of Appeal in Aden) and The Christine
Isle [1974] AMC 331 (Bermuda). But a series of Canadian cases had
adopted The Colorado approach: see particularlyStrandhill v Hodder The
Strandhill) and a decision of the Supreme Court, The Ioannis Daskalelis.
We agree with the Court of Appeal in thinking that the Supreme Court’s
reasoning is very persuasive: and would draw attention, as the learned Chief
Justice did, to a comment of Ritchie J at p 178, where he treated The
Colorado as authority for the contention
that where a right in the nature of a maritime lien exists under a
foreign law which is the proper law of the contract, the English
Courts will recognise it and will accord it the priority which a
right of that nature would be given under English procedure.
93. In our opinion the English Court of Appeal in The Coloradoadopted the
approach which is correct in principle. A maritime lien is a right of property
given by way of security for a maritime claim. If the Admiralty court has, as
in the present case, jurisdiction to entertain the claim, it will not disregard
the lien. A maritime lien validly conferred by the lex loci is as much part of
the claim as is a mortgage similarly valid by the lex loci. Each is a limited
right of property securing the claim. The lien travels with the claim, as does
the mortgage: and the claim travels with the ship. It would be a denial of
history and principle, in the present chaos of the law of the sea governing
the recognition and priority of maritime liens and mortgages, to refuse the
aid of private international law.
94. For these reasons, we think that the Court of Appeal reached the correct
conclusion and would dismiss the appeal.
Cases
Acrux, The (1965) P 391; Astoria, The [1931] Ex CR 195; Bold Buccleugh, The
[1851] 7 Moo PC 267; 13 ER 884; Christine Isle, The [1974] AMC 331; Coal
Export Corp v Notias [1962] EA 220; Colorado, The (1923) P 102; Don v
Lippman [1837] 5 Cl & Fin 1 13; 7 ER 303; Golubchick, The [1840] 1 W Rob
143; Ioannis Daskalelis, The [1974] 1 Lloyd Rep 174; Milford, The [1858] Swa
362; Pacific, The [1864] Br & L 243; 167 ER 356; Pieve Superiore, The (1874) 5
LR PC 482; Ripon City, The (1897) P 226; Salacia, The [1862] Lush 545; 167 ER
246; Sara, The (1889) 14 App Cas 209; Strandhill, The [1926] 4 DLR 801; Tagus,
The (1903) P 44; Tervaete, The (1922) P 259; Tolten, The (1946) P 135; Two
Ellens, The (1872) 4 LR PC 161; Zigurds, The (1932) P 113
Legislations
High Court (Admiralty Jurisdiction) Act: s. 3
Administration of Justice Act 1956 [UK]: s. 1
Admiralty Court Act 1840 (3 & 4 Vict c 65) [UK]
Merchant Shipping Act 1854 [UK]
Merchant Shipping Act 1889 [UK]
Merchant Shipping Act 1894 [UK]: s. 167
Authors and other references
Singh, British Shipping Laws (2nd Ed), vol 8
Cheshire’s Private International Law, 9th ed
Representations
Michael Thomas QC & Simon Gaunt (Linklaters & Paines) for the appellants.
RF Stone QC & Jervis Kay (Thomas Cooper & Stibbard) for the respondents.
Notes:-
This decision is also reported at [1980] 2 MLJ 217 & [1980] 3 All ER 197.