The Progressive Politician as a Diplomat: The Case of John Lind in MexicoAuthor(s): Larry D. HillSource: The Americas, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Apr., 1971), pp. 355-372Published by: Academy of American Franciscan HistoryStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/979854Accessed: 01/09/2010 23:45

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THE PROGRESSIVE POLITICIAN AS A DIPLOMAT: THE CASE OF JOHN LIND IN MEXICO

IN AUGUST, 1913, President Woodrow Wilson made one of his numerous attempts to remold Mexico in the image of the United States by sending a special executive agent, John Lind, to hasten the

political demise of Provisional President Victoriano Huerta. Having refused Huerta diplomatic recognition because he achieved power by military coup d'etat, Wilson instructed Lind to insist that Huerta ar-

range an armistice with the Constitutionalists, the revolutionaries who had risen in rebellion rather than accept the usurper's rule. Free elections, in which Huerta was not to be a candidate for President, were to follow the armistice. Following his Anglo-Saxon instincts, Wilson assumed that, if all parties abided by the results of the elections, a constitutionally legitimate government would be installed and the source of Mexico's

revolutionary strife would thereby be eliminated.'

Wilson was certain that Huerta's government would not have stood as long as it had, had not several European powers accorded Huerta diplomatic recognition in order to protect their business concessions. Wilson and his equally idealistic Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, insisted that concessionaires-foreign capitalists who gave ma- terial and financial support to often unpopular Latin American regimes in return for lucrative business opportunities-stifled the legitimate enterprise of natives and foreigners, thereby encouraging revolutions. Disavowing such a materialistic policy for the United States, they promised that just as Wilson's New Freedom would destroy privilege

SLetter, To Whom It May Concern, August 4, 1913, and Instructions (Mexico), John Lind Papers, Minnesota Historical Society, Box 3; drafts of both in Woodrow Wilson Papers, Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress, Series II, Box 95. Actually there was little new in these instructions, insomuch as two months earlier Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson had been instructed to follow similar guidelines in his relations with the Huerta government. Suspecting with good reason that Ambassador Wilson had been at least indirectly involved in the coup that elevated Huerta to power, President Wilson feared that his official representative had not been vigorously pressing Huerta to accept the proposals. Henry Lane Wilson, therefore, was recalled and President Wilson determined to send a special agent to press the matter more firmly. See State Department to American Embassy, June 15, 1913, General Records of the Department of State, National Archives, RG 59, 812.00/7743; hereinafter documents from the State Department 812.00 (Internal Affairs of Mexico) file will be cited only by slash number; draft in Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 94; State Depart- ment to American Embassy, August 4, 1913, U. S. Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1913 (Washington, 1920), pp. 817-18.

355

356 JOHN LIND IN MEXICO

and unleash the potential of the small capitalist in the United States, so would his foreign policy eschew protection of special interests and

promote the welfare of all the people of Latin America. Thus, free-

ing the Latin American nations from the clutches of concessionaires would promote political stability in the Western Hemisphere.2

In Wilson's and Bryan's eyes, therefore, the move against Huerta called for the services of a diplomat who sympathized wholeheartedly with New Freedom ideals and had absolutely no connection with busi- ness concessionaires. John Lind was such a man. In fact, Lind insisted that he was chosen for the mission for no other reason than the fact that he had never been associated with concessionaires or any other kind of interest in Mexico. Other than this, he had no obvious qualifica- tions as an emissary to the republic south of the border. He did not

speak Spanish, knew nothing of Mexican affairs, and had no previous diplomatic experience; but he offered Wilson and Bryan a most impor- tant qualification: he was a loyal progressive Democrat.3

John Lind shared many of the beliefs and characteristics common to reform-minded politicians of the Progressive Era. Only the fact that he was a Swedish immigrant prevented him from completely fitting the urban middle-class Anglo-Saxon Protestant Progressive stereotype.'

2New York Times, March 12, 1913; Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow Wilson: Life and Letters (8 vols.; Garden City, N.Y., 1931), IV, 64-65.

3Testimony of William F. Buckley, December 6, 1919, and John Lind, April 27, 1920, U.S. Senate, Investigation of Mexican Affairs, 66 Cong., 2 Sess., Doc. 285, 767-814, 2318; hereinafter cited as Investigation of Mexican Affairs; Interview with Lind, November 12, 1919, William F. Buckley Manuscripts, Latin American Collection. University of Texas Library, File No. 233; "John Lind as a Strong Personality," American Review of Reviews, XLVIII (September, 1913), 281. Buckley, a lawyer and speculator in Mexican real estate and oil leases, served as counsel for the Huerta

delegation at the Niagara Falls Conference, arranged by Argentina, Brazil and Chile to settle disputes growing out of the American military intervention at Vera Cruz in April, 1914. He was openly hostile to Wilson's Mexican policy, and he acknowl-

edged that Lind was chosen as the President's agent because of his complete lack of association with any interests in Mexico. He believed that an appointment based on such considerations was naive and ill-considered. Buckley's testimony was largely a re-statement of the information contained in his private papers.

4 George M. Stephenson, John Lind of Minnesota (Minneapolis, 1935), pp. 3-27, 191. Basic studies of the Progressive Era characterize "progressives" as being well-educated urban middle-class businessmen and professionals from the nation's older families of

Anglo-Saxon stock. For basic statements of this stereotype, see George E. Mowry, The California Progressives (Berkeley, 1952), pp. 86-104; Richard Hofstadter, The

Age of Refom: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York, 1955), pp. 133-73; George E.

Mowry, The Era of Theodore Roosevelt (New York, 1958), pp. 85-105. More recently historians have suggested that the base of the progressive stereotype needed broaden-

ing. Two recent articles indicate that the WASP background of progressive reformers

LARRY D. HILL 357

Reared on a Minnesota farm, Lind, like so many other midwestern

progressives, spent much of his adult life in the city, practicing law and engaging in politics. He began his political career as a Republican and held moderately conservative views. Serving three successive terms in Congress between 1887 and 1893, he became increasingly dissatisfied with his party's failure to check the domineering and corruptive tenden- cies of big business. And before he retired from Congress, he had

gained the reputation of a reformer of unimpeachable honesty. Sup- porting such measures as pure food laws, forfeiture of unused lands by the railroads, a more effective Interstate Commerce Act, and the Sher- man Antitrust Act, he won repeated endorsements from the Minnesota Farmers' Alliance and was wooed by the Peoples' Party. Although he was alienated by Populist calamity oratory and reliance on panaceas, he, nonetheless, endorsed William Jennings Byran for President in 1896 and became an undying supporter of the Great Commoner for the remainder of his political career.5

Having bolted the Republican Party, Lind accepted the support of reform Democrats and Populists and was elected governor of Minne- sota in 1898. At the beginning of his term, he called for a thorough- going reform program, including tax reform; expansion of the activi- ties of the state correctional and charitable institutions; stricter antitrust laws; reservation for the state of mineral rights on lands to be disposed of in the future; and the direct democracy devices, such as direct primary, initiative, and referendum. Like Wilson's later New Freedom, Lind dedicated his program to freeing politics and business from the grip of special interests; but he faced an obstructionist legislature throughout his term and secured few reforms. His administration, nonetheless, served as a harbinger of Progressivism in Minnesota."

may be overdrawn and that the role of the immigrant in the Progressive Movement has been largely overlooked. See J. Joseph Huthmacher, "Urban Liberalism and the Age of Reform," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XLIX (September, 1962), 231-41; John D. Buenker, "Edward F. Dunne: The Urban New Stock Democrat as Progressive," Mid-America, L (January, 1968), 3-21. Another recent article suggests that earlier studies failed to note the importance of the rural background of progressive reformers, especially those of the Midwest. It argues that a majority of progressives came from the farms and small towns of rural America and moved to the city after reaching adulthood. See Wayne E. Fuller, "The Rural Roots of the Progressive Leaders," Agricultural History, XLII (January, 1968), 1-13.

5 Stephenson, Lind, pp. 15-117; John D. Hicks, " The People's Party in Minnesota," Minnesota History, V (November, 1924), 555-59; Carl H. Chrislock, "A Cycle of the History of Minnesota Republican'sm." Minnesota History, XXXIX (Fall, 1964), 102-103.

I Stephenson, Lind, pp. 133-78; Russell B. Nye, Midwestern Progressive Politics (East Lansing, Mich., 1959), pp. 214-15.

358 JOHN LIND IN MEXICO

Between his gubernatorial administration and his mission to Mexico, Lind remained a powerful force in Minnesota politics. He was again elected to Congress in 1902, but retired voluntarily after one term.

Serving actively in Minneapolis civic affairs and on the Board of Regents of the University of Minnesota, he also campaigned vigorously for Bryan in all of his presidential bids. He was wooed by the Bull Moose Party in 1912, but remained a loyal Democrat and was instru- mental in securing a Minnesota delegation that supported Woodrow Wilson at the Democratic National Convention. Following the election, he was called to Washington to discuss policy and patronage with his old friend, Secretary of State designate Bryan, and Wilson's personal advisor Colonel Edward House.' Lind, himself, was an obvious candi- date for appointment. Indeed, he declined the ambassadorship to Sweden, because he did not think it ethical for a Swedish immigrant to serve in that post." Thus, politics and personal scruples combined to make the Minnesota progressive available for the mission to Mexico.

John Lind's trip to Mexico City in the face of threats from Huerta that he would be expelled; his confrontation with the Mexican Minister of Foreign Relations, Federico Gamboa; and Gamboa's emphatically nationalistic denial of the right of the United States to interfere in Mexico's internal affairs, are well known aspects of the Lind Mission. More obscure is the fact that after being rebuked by Gamboa, Lind retreated to Vera Cruz and remained there at Wilson's insistence until

April, 1914.9 During this period, he served as the President's eyes and

7Stephenson, Lind, pp. 180-206, 348-50. 8Wilson to Lind, June 11, 1913, and Lind to Wilson, June 12, 1913, Wilson Papers,

Series IV, Box 285.

9Baker, Wilson, IV, pp. 264-313; Stephenson, Lind, pp. 208-62; J. Fred Rippy, The United States and Mexico (New York, 1926), p. 334; James Morton Callahan, American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations (New York, 1932), pp. 539-45; Stuart Alexander MacCorkle, American Policy of Recognition Towards Mexico [Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, Series LI, No. 3] (Baltimore, 1933), pp. 88-89; Alberto Carrefio, La Diplomacia Extraordinaria entre Mexico y Estados Unidos, 1789-1947 (2 vols.; Mexico, 1951), II, 275-77; Howard F. Cline, The United States and Mexico (Cambridge, Mass., 1953), pp. 145-48; Arthur S. Link, Woodrow Wilson and the Progressive Era (New York, 1954), pp. 113-16; Au- thor S. Link, Wilson: The New Freedom (Princeton, 1956), pp. 356-92; Isidro Fabela, Historia Diplomdtica de la Revolucidn Mexicana (2 vols.; Mexico, 1958-1959), I, 207-17; Louis M. Teitelbaum, Woodrow Wilson and the Mexican Revolution, 1913- 1916: A History of United States-Mexican Relations (New York, 1967), pp. 103- 106, 143-47; Peter Calvert, The Mexican Revolution, 1910-1914: The Diplomacy of Anglo-American Conflict [Cambridge Latin American Studies, No. 3](Cambridge, 1968), pp. 201-84. The above is an incomplete list of words dealing, at least in

part, with the Lind Mission. Most textbooks dealing with United States-Latin American relations mention the mission. The works cited above deal more specifically with the United States and Mexico or Wilson and Mexico.

LARRY D. HILL 359

ears on the Mexican scene. To a remarkable degree, Lind and Wilson responded to changing situations in Mexico in the same way, except that Lind's responses were usually more vehement. In almost every case during Lind's extended stay, a change in the Administration's Mexican policy was preceded by a similar or stronger policy recommendation from Lind.

His dispatches from Mexico exuded an air of Anglo-Saxon superi- ority, a definite sense of noblesse oblige. His first inclination, neverthe- less, was to assent to conditions as they were. " I have learned enough of conditions here and learned enough of the Latin character," he wrote to Bryan, shortly after settling in Vera Cruz, " to realize that we cannot expect to make them [Mexicans] conform in any great degree to our standards in the matter of government." Referring to the up- coming Mexican elections of October 26, in which, supposedly, Huerta's successor would be chosen, Lind counseled that:

... we simply cannot expect elections to be held in the sense that they are conducted in the United States . . . The sense of cooperation in government and in business which is a strong characteristic of the Teutonic race, is utterly lacking in them.

Closing with a note of disapprobation, but recommending no remedial action on the part of the United States, Lind added that anyone who "has had the misfortune to deal with the Irish of our cities .. . has his mind prepared in a slight degree to appreciate conditions in Mexico." 10

Lind's tacit acquiescence did not last. Less than three months later, he was an avowed interventionist. "A worse pack of wolves never infested any community," he wrote of Huerta and his supporters in November. "Nothing can be done in the way of reconstruction until they are all eliminated . . ."" The transition in Lind's attitude resulted, in part, from his growing awareness of what he considered to be the true causes of the Mexican Revolution. In mid-September he wrote to Bryan that a purely political settlement, a mere transition in govern- ment, would solve no problems permanently. " There can be no lasting peace," he insisted, "without judicious and substantial social and eco- nomic reforms." 12

10 Lind to Bryan, August 28, 1913, Wilson Papers, Series IV, Box 120. 11 Lind to State Department, November 13, 1913/9704. 12 Lind to Bryan, September 19, 1913, Correspondence of Secretary of State Bryan with President Wilson, General Records of the Department of State, National Archives,

RG 19; hereinafter cited as Bryan-Wilson Correspondence; copy in William Jennings Bryan Papers, Division of Manuscripts, Library of Congress, Box 43; John P. Harrison, "Un Anailisis Norteamericano de la Revoluci6n Mexicana," Historia Mexicana, V

360 JOHN LIND IN MEXICO

These convictions were based largely on information he received from others. Living in Vera Cruz, Mexico's most important port, Lind was in an advantageous location to gather information. He solicited in- formation from a wide variety of people-Mexicans, as well as Euro-

peans and Americans; landowners and businessmen, as well as property- less laborers and peasants; conservatives, as well as radicals. On occasion others sought him out. He received dozens of letters, petitions, and memorandums from anonymous or insignificant persons from all over Mexico. He had numerous visitors at his residence in the American Consulate.` Lind also harbored numerous fugitives from Huerta's

persecution and helped several of them escape the country aboard U. S.

Navy warships.'4 By mid-December he had established confidential communications with Constitutionalist sympathizers in the Vera Cruz

region and, in March, 1914, he began communicating with agents of Emiliano Zapata.1" Because of these clandestine activities, one Mexican historian has suggested that Huerta would have been justified in treating Lind as a spy."6

(April-June, 1956), 598-618. The latter citation is a Spanish translation of the first, with an introduction and notes. Harrison contends that, despite being an amateur diplomatist, Lind understood Mexico's needs better than did the professionals in the State Department.

-a Lind's contacts and interviews too numerous to cite individually, but the Lind Papers, Boxes 14, 15, and 16 and the State Department's 812.00 (Internal Affairs of Mexico) file reveal that Lind did solicit information from numerous sources. Some of his many conferences with well-known visitors drew considerable publicity. For example, in November, 1913, the Ministers of Germany, Norway, and Russia, disturbed by degenerating economic conditions in the Mexican capital, came to Lind and hinted at the advisability of American intervention. Although they were ostensibly on a hunting trip, the Mexico City press reported the true purpose of the trip to Vera Cruz. See Mexican Herald (Mexico City), November 1-3, 1913; El Imparcial (Mexico City), November 1-3, 1913; Lind to State Department, November 3, 1913/ 9513. The Mexico City press was particularly intrigued by Lind's conversations with Jesuis Flores Mag6n, whose revolutionary reputation predated the Madero upheaval of 1910-1911. Actually, Flores Mag6n came to Vera Cruz to plead for the recognition of the Huerta regime as a means of ending Mexico's fraticidal strife. See Mexican Herald, January 20, 1914; El Pais (Mexico City), January 20, 1914; Lind to State

Department, January 19, 1914/10600. 14 Lind to State Department, November 20, 1913 (two), January 23, 27, 1914/9841,

9850, 10652, 10703; Admiral F. F. Fletcher to Navy Department, November 21, 1913, January 31, 1914/9889, 10907. The New York Times, November 1, 1913, reported that Mrs. Lind, who was returning to the United States after being with her husband in Vera Cruz since August, hid two refugees in her stateroon aboard the steamer Morro Castle until it reached Havana.

15Lind to State Department, December 12, 13, 1913/10152, 10170; Testimony of Lind, Investigation of Mexican Affairs, pp. 2350-55; Teitelbaum, Wilson and the Mexican Revolution (New York, 1969), p. 184.

xIsCarrefio, La Diplomacia Extraordinaria entre Mexico y Estados Unidos, II, 276.

LARRY D. HILL 361

But it was his own personal observations of the hacienda system and peasant life that made the greatest impact on Lind's thinking. He was particularly appalled by the attitude of a fellow Minnesotan who managed an hacienda near Vera Cruz and who defended the system. "When Americans and 'Democrats' at that," he wrote to Bryan, " be- come so entranced with this method of appropriating the toil and blood of human beings that they wantonly repudiate the noblest accomplish- ments of our [the American] people," is it any wonder that revolution is wracking this nation? 17

Lind's compassion for the Mexican middle and lower classes was genuine, but his analysis of their problems was often naive and faulty. As an example, he blamed Spanish colonial policy entirely for Mexico's contemporary agrarian problems, including the inequitable distribution of land. He seemed completely ignorant of the fact that many of the aggregations of agricultural property had been secured within the past fifty years, during the Juirez and Diaz regimes of the late nineteenth century. A man of definite anti-Catholic bias, Lind insisted that the Catholic clergy, from the bishops to the curates, were little more than agents of repression." Ignoring all local influences, he divided the Mexican people into two geographical groupings: Northerners and Southerners. Although he had never been in the northern part of the republic, Lind, nevertheless, developed the notion that, with the possible exception of the wealthy propertied and professional classes of the South, the Northern Mexicans were decidedly superior to their South- ern counterparts in intellectual and economic development. He rea- soned, therefore, that the Northerner would never accept Southern leadership in government. Having concluded that a revolutionary set- tlement was necessary in Mexico, Lind placed his faith in the rebels of the North and dismissed the Southern followers of Emiliano Zapata as little more than brigands.'9

17Lind to Bryan, September 19, 1913, Bryan-Wilson Correspondence. 18 Ibid.; John Lind, "The Mexican People," The Bellman, XVII (December 5, 12,

1914), 715-18, 749-54. This article was originally delivered as an address to the Chicago Traffic Club in the fall of 1914. With some misgivings, Lind allowed the speech to be published in the Bellman without significant revision. It was immediately branded as being anti-Catholic by Father C. Kelley, an outspoken critic of the Wil- son Administration's Mexican policy. Claiming that Lind encouraged the revolution- aries in Mexico, hence the persecution of the Catholic Church, Father Kelley used the article to drum up hostility to the Administration's policy. Father Kelly also charged that Lind plagiarized most of his historical data from the Encyclopedia Britannica, which may explain Lind's superficial knowledge of Mexican history. See Testimony of Buckley and Lind, Investigation of Mexican Affairs, pp. 774-79; Stephenson, Lind, pp. 279-80.

1•9Lind to Bryan, September 19, 1913, Bryan-Wilson Correspondence; Lind to State

362 JOHN LIND IN MEXICO

Why were the Northern Mexicans more advanced and more respon- sible? Lind believed the answer lay in the proximity of Northern Mexico to the border of the United States. Northern Mexicans were afforded a greater opportunity to come into contact with Anglo- American ideas and institutions. The most fortunate among them, he

suggested, had even lived in the United States and they or their children had been educated there. The total result was that the Northerner had

appropriated " progressive ideas " from the United States.20 Lind natur-

ally assumed, therefore, that the Northerners drew their revolutionary fervor from their association with American ideas and institutions. Their revolution, he concluded, was an attempt "to keep step with the march of our people." 21 By the end of September, Lind felt that the United States had a definite responsibility to give moral support to the Constitutionalists of the North.22

Of even greater importance in developing Lind's interventionist attitude was his response to a series of incidents that occurred in October. On October 8, the rebels overran Torre6n, the key to the Federals' northern defenses, and threw the Huertistas into a temporary panic. Taking advantage of the situation, Constitutionalist sympathi- zers-mostly holdovers from the Madero regime-grew bolder in their defiance of Huerta. Always a thorn in his side, they now threatened to

completely disrupt the government by disbanding and reconvening else-

where, presumably in rebel held territory. On October 10, Huerta

responded by arresting 110 of the Deputies. The next day, he assumed dictatorial powers pending the election of a new Congress.23 By un- fortunate coincidence, that same day Sir Lionel Carden, the new British Ambassador, arrived in Mexico City and presented his credentials to General Huerta.2*

As far as Lind was concerned, none of this was coincidence. The American agent saw the makings of a monstrous conspiracy. The arrival

Department, October 11, 1913/14966; Lind, "The Mexican People," The Bellman, XVII, 718-19, 749, 752; Testimony of Lind, Investigation of Mexican Affairs, pp. 2327- 30, 2355.

20 Ibid. 21 Lind to Wilson, January 10, 1914, Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 101.

:22Lind to Bryan, September 19, 1913, Bryan-Wilson Correspondence. 23 Juan Barragain Rodriguez, Historia del Ejercito y de la Revolucidn Constitucional-

ista (2 vols.; Mexico, 1946), I, 263-67; Manuel Gonzilez Ramirez, La Revolucidn de Mexico, Vol. I: Las Ideas-La Violencia (Mexico, 1960), pp. 396-98; William L. Sherman and Richard E. Greenleaf, Victoriano Huerta: A Reappraisal (Mexico, 1960),

pp. 105-107. 24 Mexican Herald, October 12, 1913; Calvert, The Diplomacy of Anglo-American

Conflict, p. 233.

LARRY D. HILL 363

of Carden at the same time Huerta assumed dictatorial power, Lind insisted, " was no accident. I believe the whole was carefully planned." "5 Conversing with the new ambassador upon his arrival at Vera Cruz, Lind found him outspokenly critical of Wilson's nonrecognition policy, claiming that it encouraged revolution and was largely responsible for the heavy losses suffered by British investors in Mexico. But even more

incriminating than these hostile comments, at least in Lind's eyes, was the fact that Carden was greeted at Vera Cruz, not by an embassy staff member, but by the representative of Viscount Cowdray, England's largest developer of the Mexican oil industry.26 Incriminating, because weeks before the Ambassador's arrival, Lind had reported his conviction that British oil interests were angling for favorable treatment from Huerta.21

Basing his assumptions on rumors and reports from American oil men, Lind concluded with undue haste that Lord Cowdray's money kept Huerta in power. In return for his support, Cowdray was demand-

ing new concessions, which would enable him to deliver oil to the Royal Navy under fifty to one hundred year contracts. The Royal Navy being dependent on Mexican oil, the British Cabinet, Lind be- lieved, had readily acceded to Cowdray's demand that their Minister in Mexico City be replaced by the British oil man's hand-picked tool, Sir Lionel Carden. Fearing the disruptive potential of the rebel sympa- thizers in the Mexican legislature, Cowdray and Carden had insisted upon the establishment of a dictatorship. The ultimate end of the con- spiracy, the American agent insisted, was the complete control and monopoly of the Mexican oil fields and oil business by the British. To insure the success of this scheme, Carden would find some means of maintaining Huerta in power despite the upcoming elections.28

25 Lind to State Department, October 15, 1913/9218. 26Lind to State Department, October 8, 1913/9127; Calvert, Diplomacy Anglo-

American Conflict, pp. 225-26. Actually the British Charg6 d'Affaires had gone to Vera Cruz to meet the new Ambassador, but Carden disembarked aboard the pilot boat. Before the Charge could locate him, Carden had been greeted by Cowdray's agent, Fred Adams, and had had a conference with Lind.

27Navy Department (transmitting radiogram from Lind, September 13, 1913) to State Department, September 15, 1913/10502. In this dispatch, Lind refers to the "largest interest in Mexico not American." which was British.

28 Lind to State Department, October 15, 25, 1913/9218, 9401; New York World, Octo- ber 21, 1913. The World offered an analysis of British policy very similar to Lind's, charging that Cowdray, as a large financial contributor to the British Liberal Party, wielded enough influence over the Cabinet to dictate the appointment of Carden as the man best qualified to protect and expand British oil interests.

364 JOHN LIND IN MEXICO

The results of those elections, conducted on October 26, served to confirm Lind's suspicions. The voter turnout was too small to meet lawful minimums. It was generally conceded, therefore, that, if Huerta saw fit, he would be justified in nullifying the election results.29 Again, Lind was convinced that it was all carefully planned. Despte his earlier counsels to Wilson and Bryan that they should not expect Mexican elections to conform to Anglo-American standards, when the Minnesotan believed he saw evidence in Vera Cruz that the voters were being dis-

couraged from going to the polls, he refused to see the election results in any other light than part of a conspiracy in which the British were

deeply implicated. Grasping at every shred of evidence, Lind relied

heavily on the advice of Felix Diaz to prove his case. Diaz, one of the

generals who initiated the coup that elevated Huerta to power and now

sought the Presideny for himself, naturally insisted that the elections were managed.30

Lind's analysis of the situation in Mexico had little basis in fact, To be sure, Huerta had managed the elections and was determined to remain in power, but the supposed British determination to sustain him there, in defiance of Wilson's wishes, and to monopolize the Mexican oil

industry, was a fiction derived from rumors and false information pro- vided by American competitors.3' However faulty Lind's notions

29Mexican Herald, October 27, 1913; New York Times, October 27, 1913. On December 9, 1913, the Congress elected in the October 26 elections did declare the results null and void and extended Huerta's Provisional Presidency until new elections could be held in July, 1914. See New York Times, December 10, 1913.

soLind to State Department, October 20, 25, 26, and 27 (two), 1913/9285, 9392, 9401, 9406, 9415. When President Madero was ousted in February, 1913, Felix Diaz and Huerta made an agreement known as the Pact of the Embassy. Arranged under the sponsorship of U.S. Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson, the pact called for Huerta to become Provisional President and Diaz to be a candidate for the elective Presidency at the time of the next elections. After solidifying his power, Huerta intimidated Diaz into leaving the country, ostensibly on a good-will tour to Japan. Diaz returned to Vera Cruz just before the October elections in order to establish his legality as a

presidential candidate. Immediately after the elections he sought asylum in the American Consulate at Vera Cruz, where Lind was staying, then fled the country aboard a U.S. Navy warship. See New York Times, October 28-31, November 1, 1913; Charles Curtis Cumberland, The Mexican Revolution: Genesis Under Madero (Austin, 1952), pp. 233-38; Alfonso Taracena, La Verdadera Revolucion Mexicana (12 vols.; M6xico, 1960-1963), II, 63, 92, 108-110.

31 Link, New Freedom, pp. 369-77; Calvert, Diplomacy of Anglo-American Con- flict, pp. 216-84. Using recently available British Foreign records, Calvert argues convincingly that Lind and American newspapers, especially the New York World,

greatly overestimated British determination to dominate the Mexican oil industry. Although Cowdray did have influence in the British Liberal Party, he did not exert

pressure on the Cabinet in behalf of Carden's appointment, nor did he take advantage

LARRY D. HILL 365

might have been, the important point is that Wilson and Bryan believed him and based the Administration's policies largely on his advice. As a result, Wilson launched campaigns of diplomatic pressure designed to force the British Cabinet to give up its alleged Mexican policy and to unseat Huerta immediately.32

In renewing his pressure on Huerta, inexplicably Wilson temporarily by-passed his special agent and, on November 1, sent an ultimatum to Huerta through the U. S. Embassy in Mexico City, demanding that the dictator retire immediately or face possible intervention.33 The Ameri- can Charg6 d'Affaires, Nelson O'Shaughnessy, having recently been in- formed by members of Huerta's cabinet that the dictator's retirement would serve the best interests of Mexico, sincerely believed that Huerta might be persuaded to step down if he could do so with honor. The

charge, therefore, withheld the full impact of Wilson's demands and began secret parleys with the Minister of Foreign Relations.34

When Lind was informed of these proceedings in Mexico City, he immediately wired for permission to engage in a head-to-head confron- tation with Huerta. When Secretary of State Bryan acceded, the special agent informed the press that he was going to the capital to participate in important regotiations. Secret parleys no longer possible, the Mexican Foreign Minister notified O'Shaughnessy that, since it would now appear to be a surrender to Yankee pressure, thus a blow to Mexican sovereignty, no agreement could be made with the Wilson Administra- tion at that time. The dejected American charg6 naturally blamed Lind for the failure to secure Huerta's resignation.35

Lind, still hopeful of a confrontation with Huerta, went to Mexico

of Huerta's diplomatic difficulties with the United States to press for increased con- cessions. The opposite seems to have been the case. The British historian suggests that Huerta was exerting pressure on Cowdray by "using his interests in Mexico as a hostage to secure active support" in the form of a loan. Calvert also indicates that Cowdray was disturbed when Huerta dissolved the Congress and assumed dictatorial power, because this move insured continued revolution. Calvert, nevertheless, leaves no doubt that Cowdray, Carden, and the British Cabinet disapproved of Wilson's non- recognition policy and looked upon Huerta as the man most likely to restore order in Mexico.

32 Link, New Freedom, pp. 373-81; Cline, The United States and Mexico, pp. 148-51. 3 State Department to American Embassy, November 1, 1913/11443a.

840'Shaughnessy to State Department, October 30, November 3, 1913/9469, 9510; Edith O'Shaughnessy, A Diplomat's Wife in Mexico (New York, 1916), p. 32.

S85Lind to State Department, November 2, 1913/9507; State Department to Lind, November 5, 1913/9568; O'Shaughnessy to State Department, November 6, 1913/9598; Mexican Herald, November 4-6, 1913; New York Times, November 6, 1913; O'Shaughnessy, A Diplomat's Wife in Mexico, pp. 33-34, 39.

366 JOHN LIND IN MEXICO

City anyway, and his conduct in November was decidedly different from what it had been at the outset of his mission in August. Then he had conducted himself as a man of peace and goodwill. He had been gracious in his praise of Mexican hospitality, and his relations with the diplomatic corps and members of the foreign colony had been cordial.36 He had even exhibited a temporary reluctance to interfere in Mexican internal affairs.3 Lind, himself, acknowledged in a letter to Bryan that it was generally conceded in the Mexican capital "that I am a safe and prudent man." 38 In November, however, he was brusque with every- one and no longer cared if his actions were considered an unwarranted breach of Mexican sovereignty. He now delighted in taunting members of the diplomatic corps and foreign colony with threats of a possible lifting of the twenty-month-old embargo on American arms sales to Mexico. With access to weapons, Lind threatened, the Constitutional- ists would make short work of Huerta and all his supporters, natives and foreigners alike.39

Of course Lind's hostility for the British was boundless. After speak- ing with Ambassador Carden and finding him still critical of Wilson's policy, Lind was certain that Huerta's refusal to even discuss the pos- sibility of retirement was British inspired. He now insisted that Carden's scheme was to have Huerta install the Congress chosen in the inconclu- sive October elections and allow it to validate British and other European concessions. These validations, supposedly, would insure Huerta in- creased revenue and European support.'0

Lind's longed-for head to head confrontation with Huerta never took

place. The elusive dictator remained inaccessible, hiding among the

many cafes and bars of Mexico City, and, after waiting five days, on November 12, Lind delivered his own ultimatum. Huerta, he de- manded, was to guarantee that the recently elected Congress would not

36Mexican Herald, August 10-13, 1913; New York Times, August 7-13, 16, 1913. Besides the meetings at official receptions, the documents in the Lind Papers, Boxes 3 and 14, reveal that the special agent solicited and received advice from several members of the foreign colony and diplomatic corps.

37 Lind to State Department, August 13, 1913/8334. 38Lind to Bryan, September 19, 1913, Bryan-Wilson Correspondence. 39New York Times, November 9-11, 1913; Testimony of Nelson O'Shaughnessy,

May 3, 1920, Investigation of Mexican Affairs, p. 2710; O'Shaughnessy, A Diplomat's Wife in Mexico, pp. 40-46.

40 Lind to State Department, November 7, 8, 9, 1913/9619, 11440, 9523; New York Times, November 9, 10, 13, 1913; Mexican Herald, November 9, 1913; Testimony of O'Shaughnessy, Investigation of Mexican Affairs, p. 2709; O'Shaughnessy, A Diplomat's Wife in Mexico, p. 41.

LARRY D. HILL 367

convene, then he was to resign. Exceeding his instructions, Lind further demanded that the dictator agree to these terms by 6:00 p.m. that same day and carry them out completely by 12:00 midnight or face a complete rupture in diplomatic relations with the United States. When no reply was forthcoming, Lind packed his bags and returned to Vera Cruz.41

Lind doubtless did not expect an affirmative reply, nor did he care for one. By this time, he was convinced that Huerta and all the foreign and domestic elements supporting him could be eliminated only by violence, preferably by a Constitutionalist military victory. Shortly after returning to Vera Cruz, Lind wrote to Bryan that the dictator and his supporters had to be humbled. Then he added:

We [the United States] could defeat but we could neither humble nor humiliate them. This can only be done by their own people, their own blood, the people of the North. They can do it to perfection if given a fair chance. To make a dog feel that he really is a cur he must be whipped by another dog preferably by a cur. Consequently let this house cleaning be done by home talent. It will be a little rough and we must see to it that the walls are left intact but I should not worry if some of the verandas and French windows are demolished .. . We should be near enough to prevent a neighborhood scandal, and as a good neighbor we shall be glad also when the house is ready for permanent repairs to lend (sic) a helping hand and see to it that the work is done fairly and that the required material is not wasted.42

Lind's last comments reveal his true feelings concerning the Mexican Revolution. He had a progressive's middle-class fear of undirected social upheaval. In this note and every one that followed, in which he discussed the advisability of a rebel victory, Lind insisted that the Wilson Administration be prepared to mitigate the extreme inclinations of the revolutionaries. Not until he returned to the United States in April, 1914, met personally Carranza's agents in Washington and New York, and found that they were as thoroughly middle-class as he, did his reservations concerning the Constitutionalists evaporate. Thereafter he gave unreserved support to the Carrancista element. His distrust for the more radical revolutionaries, such as Emiliano Zapata and Francisco Villa, who, from time to time, sought to take over leadership of the revolution, never disappeared.43

41 Lind to State Department, November 11, 12, 1913/9675, 9677; New York Times, November 13, 1913; El Pais, November 15, 1913; O'Shaughnessy, A Diplomat's Wife in Mexico, pp. 47-48.

42Lind to State Department, November 15, 1913/9760. 43 Memorandum (by Lind), April 30, 1914, and Lind to Bryan, no date, Wilson

Papers, Series II, Box 108; Lind to Bryan, April 21, 1915, ibid., Box 129; Lind to Wil-

368 JOHN LIND IN MEXICO

Anglo-American guidance of the Mexican Revolution was no more a realistic solution to Mexico's problems than Wilson's asking Huerta to resign. Lind failed to take into account the strident nationalism of the Constitutionalists' First Chief, Venustiano Carranza. Indeed, when Wilson approached Carranza in November and offered to lift the arms

embargo in return for acceptance of American cooperation in forming a constitutional government in Mexico City, he met with an outright refusal. All Carranza wanted from Wilson was the right to purchase arms in the United States. Having been rebuffed by both Huerta and Carranza, uncertain that either would ever establish a constitutional

government he could recognize, and fearful that military intervention would provoke war with both, Wilson ignored his agent's desire for a

complete break in diplomatic relations with the provisional government and merely reverted to a policy of " watchful waiting." "4

By early December, also, the British Foreign Office made it abun-

dantly clear to Wilson that Lord Cowdray had little influence in formu-

lating British foreign policy or in choosing Britain's diplomatic repre- sentatives, that British policy with regard to Mexico had never been

designed to thwart his purposes, and that Great Britain would never

support Huerta against the United States.45 Lind, nonetheless, persisted in seeing a British plot to maintain Huerta in power. When Bryan asked him for concrete evidence of British wrongdoing, the special agent was forced to admit that his evidence against the British was " not of a character cognizable in a court of justice." 46 Since the special agent could not prove his assertions, his anti-British tirades thereafter had little effect on the Administration's policy.

son, August 2, 1915, ibid., Series IV, Box 125; Lind to Bryan, May 29, 1914, Bryan Paper, Box 30; Lind to Bryan, April 16, 1915, ibid., Box 43; Stephenson, Lind, pp. 263-310; Fabela, Historia Diplomdtica de la Revolucidn Mexicana, I, 367-71. The Constitutionalist agents, Juan F. Urquidi and Rafael Zubarin Capmany, like Carranza himself, were lawyers and only moderate revolutionaries. Lind believed their propa- ganda which branded Villa and Zapata as dangerous self-seekers. As Wilson and

Bryan began to flirt with Villa and Zapata in the summer and fall of 1914, hoping to back a revolutionary faction that would accept guidance from the United States, Lind's advice was temporarily ignored. He remained a steadfast supporter of Carranza, so much so that ultimately charges were leveled that he was a paid agent of the Carrancista faction. See New York Sun, July 18, 1914, November 5, 1915, in Buckley Papers, File No. 233; Testimony of Buckley and Lind, Investigation of Mexican Affairs, pp. 812, 2364.

44 Link, New Freedom, pp. 382-86; Cline, The United States and Mexico, pp. 151-52.

45 Link, New Freedom, pp. 369-77; Calvert, Diplomacy of Anglo-American Con- flict, pp. 354-84; Walter V. Scholes and Marie V. Scholes, "Wilson, Grey and Huerta," Pacific Historical Review, XXXVII (May, 1968), 151-58.

46State Department to Lind, December 16, 1913/10185; Lind to State Department, December 17, 1913/10239.

LARRY D. HILL 369

The siege-like operation implicit in the Administration's Mexican

policy soon tried Lind's patience. Throughout the month of December, as he grew increasingly sympathetic to the Constitutionalists, he re- peatedly urged the Administration to give more active support to the rebels, at least, by lifting the arms embargo. Bryan could only reply that Carranza's headstrong attitude prevented such support. By the end of the month, Lind was thoroughly frustrated, and he asked for a personal conference with the President. Pressured by Bryan and the Chief Counselor of the State Department, John Bassett Moore, Wilson agreed to meet Lind while on vacation in Pass Christian, Mississippi."'

Chagrined from the outset because Lind allowed his departure from Vera Cruz and his destination to be known by the press, the President was visibly disturbed when reporters descended on his holiday retreat and gave the conference the fullest publicity. Lind's views being well known, rumors spread that Constitutionalist officials, including Pancho Villa, were aboard the agent's ship and that more active support of the revolutionaries would follow the meeting. Another widely circu- lated rumor had it that Lind was accompanied by officers of Huerta's government, who were prepared to lead an American backed coup to oust the dictator. Wilson, now fearful of his agent's discretion in meet- ing the press, did not even allow him ashore. Instead, the President steamed several miles into the Gulf of Mexico aboard a revenue cutter to meet Lind aboard ship. This determination for privacy only served to multiply and amplify the rumors. Ultimately all but one were dis- counted; that one being that a major policy change was in the offing.48

Lind doubtless applied every argument in his repertoire in trying to persuade the President of the necessity of giving open and active sup- port to the Constitutionalists.49 Although after the conference, Wilson steadfastly denied that a change of policy would be forthcoming, Lind returned to Vera Cruz with a definite understanding that Wilson agreed with him and that support for the rebels would soon follow.5o Recog-

a4Lind to State Department, December 5, 12, 13, 15, 17, 19, 22, 27, 1913/10077, 10152, 10170, 10185, 10196, 10239, 10269, 10342; Wilson to Moore, December 29, 1913/ 10454; Bryan to Wilson, December 25, 1913, Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 100; Moore to Wilson, December 29, 1913, ibid., Series IV, Box 285.

48Mexican Herald, December 31, 1913, January 1-3, 1914; New York Times, Decem- ber 31, 1913, January 1-4, 1914; Daily Picayune (New Orleans), January 5, 1914.

49A transcript of Wilson's shorthand notes taken at the Pass Christian conference only gives hints of the topics of discussion, but suggests that Lind urged vigorous action. See Notes from conversation with Lind (transcription made under direction of Ray Stannard Baker), no date, Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 101.

50 Lind to Wilson, January 10, 1914, Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 101; Lind to Mrs. Lind, January 22, 1914, Lind Papers, Box 15; Lind to Bryan, January 12, 15, 27,

3-70 JOHN LIND IN MEXICO

nition of the belligerency of the Constitutionalists and the lifting of the arms embargo, indeed, did follow within a month after the meeting at Pass Christian."'

Encouraged by his conference with the President, but impatient for an immediate Constitutionalist victory, Lind began devising more specific means for aiding the rebels, even before the arms embargo was lifted. At first he urged only that the United States somehow take over the commissary operations of the revolutionary armies. He insisted that the rebels "should not be permitted to fritter away their time "

foraging for food. Later he suggested that the United States provide military advisors to organize the Constitutionalists' transportation, com- munications, and intelligence systems. Perhaps his most ambitious scheme called for the capture of Huerta's gunboats, which defended the Gulf Coast against rebel attack. Trained by the U. S. Navy and commanded by a U. S. Marine Officer-who would temporarily assume civilian status-a small band of Mexican guerrillas, Lind insisted, could

easily capture the gunboats and use them to invade Tampico and Vera Cruz. With the gunboats in rebel hands, Lind believed the revolution would be over in thirty days. Wilson, although obviously wanting a

rapid Constitutionalist victory, vetoed Lind's schemes.52

The pace of the revolutionaries' southward advance was never fast

enough for Lind, and the month of February was a time of great anguish for him. After smashing victories in December and January, even after the lifting of the arms embargo, the rebel offensive seemed to

languish, while Huerta showed signs of gaining strength, as the Church, propertied classes, and bankers closed ranks behind him as their best

hope for survival.'3 In the face of such conditions, Lind wrote to Bryan,

1914/10517, 10652-1/2, 10688. Lind left no record of the conference at Pass Christian, but from his correspondence to Wilson, Bryan and his wife, it is apparent that he expected a lifting of the embargo and closer relations with the Constitutionalists to follow shortly after.

51 State Department to All Diplomatic Missions of the United States, January 31, 1914, and Proclamation revoking the proclamation of March 14, 1912, prohibiting the

exportation of arms or munitions of war to Mexico, February 3, 1914, U.S. Depart- ment of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1914

(Washington, 1922), pp. 446-48. 52Lind to State Department, January 12, 14, 15, 30, 1914, February 5, 6 (two),

1914/10517, 10537, 10652-1/2, 10737, 10792, 10818, 10819; State Department to Lind, February 8, 1914/10818; Lind to Wilson, January 10, 1914, Wilson Papers, Series II, Box 101.

53Robert E. Quirk, The Mexican Revolution, 1914-1915 (Bloomington, Ind., 1960), pp. 17-19; Edwin Walter Kemmerer, Inflation and Revolution: Mexico's Experience of 1912-1917 (Princeton, 1940), pp. 11-26; Jorge Vera Estafiol, La Revolucion Mexicana (Mexico, 1957), pp. 350-51.

LARRY D. HILL 3.71

insisting that if " the revolutionists fail to take active and efficient action

by the middle of March it will be incumbent on the United States to put an end to Huerta's saturnalia of crime and oppression." "5 There- after, he never relented in his demands for military intervention. Ignor- ing Bryan's denials of the possibility of intervention, Lind proceeded, on his own initiative, to send a Marine officer to Mexico City to make a reconnaissance of Huerta's military installations. With this information to guide him, he then planned a campaign for the capture of the Mexican capital. He arranged with the American manager of the Mexi- can National Railway to secretly transport several hundred Marines to Mexico City by night. At dawn, the Marines would seize strategic locations, arrest Huerta, and establish a military government, which would serve until the Constitutionalists could take over the city. Huerta was to be given political asylum in the United States. Lind acknowl- edged that Carranza should be informed of the operation in advance, but did not think the Constitutionalist leader would have any reason to raise objections. " The taking of Mexico City," he euphorically assured the Secretary of State, "if limited to the purpose of putting a stop to Huerta's anarchical career and to afford the Mexican people an oppor- tunity to resume orderly government, should not be regarded as inter- vention in the offensive sense it seems to me." 1

Significantly, Bryan replied that the President had taken the proposal under consideration.56 All that remained was the right pretext to force the landing of American troops.

By the end of March, however, Lind was certain that the civil war in Mexico had reached a stalemate. His despatches were openly critical, almost condemnatory of the Administration's failure to accept more responsibility in ending the strife. But neither Wilson nor Bryan gave any indication of adopting a more vigorous policy. Lind, therefore, asked for and received permission to return to the United States."5

54Lind to State Department, February 24, 1914/10965. 5 Ibid.; State Department to Lind, March 3, 1914/11000; Lind to State Department,

March 8, 12, 23, 1914/11098, 11227, 27482; Captain W. A. Burnside to Lind (conveying summary of military strength and action, February 26-March 4, 1914), no date/16251; Stephenson, Lind, pp. 259-60. Stephenson, using only the Lind Papers, and not having access to complete State Department records, suggested that the "most char- itable" conclusion to be drawn from this scheme is that it was pressed upon Lind by Marine and Navy officers who were "itching for a scrap with the greasers." State Department records indicate that Lind was the instigator of the plan.

56State Department to Lind, March 25, 1914/11265. 57 Lind to State Department, March 29, 1914, and State Department to Lind March

31, 1914/11327.

372 JOHN LIND IN MEXICO

Thus ended Lind's mission to Mexico, but he still had an important role to play when he returned to Washington. Three days after he left Vera Cruz, one of Huerta's officers in Tampico arrested and detained several American sailors, thus providing the pretext that Wilson was

looking for. On April 14, before the President met with his cabinet to discuss possible punitive emasures, he held a conference with Lind. If Wilson needed any assurance of the necessity of forceful action, he

surely received it from his special agent. Even more important, Lind

may have suggested, as he had in his despatches, that the citizens of Vera Cruz so despised Huerta's exorbitant taxes and military impress- ment that they would not offer much resistance and might even wel- come the invasion.-" Lind's arrival in Washington, then, came precisely at the time when Wilson needed moral support.

In John Lind's mind, Mexico contained all the same evils he had

sought to eradicate in the United States during his political career: a

corrupt political regime (in this case, Huerta's provisional government) sustained by a privileged group of business interests (in this case, Brtish concessionaires) who did not have the public interest at heart. He had a progressive's faith that such malignant political and economic conditions could be eliminated by an enlightened elite-in this case, the Constitutionalists of the North-working through democratic institu- tions. Since free elections, the traditional Anglo-Amercan techinque "of eliminating such evils, seemed temporarily unworkable in Mexico, Lind accepted as axiomatic the assumption that intervention by the United States would advance Mexico toward the establishment of a liberal capitalist democracy. While Lind's motive was altruistic, he failed to realize, as did his President, that the price of such advance- ment-control of the Mexican Revolution by the United States-was greater than the Mexican people were willing to pay.

LARRY D. HILL Texas A & M University, College Station, Texas

8s Lind to State Department, February 4, 1914, March 12, 1914/10965, 11227.