the psychophysiology of freedom

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The Psychophysiology of Freedom Author(s): José M. R. Delgado Source: Political Psychology, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Jun., 1983), pp. 355-374 Published by: International Society of Political Psychology Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3790945 . Accessed: 17/07/2013 07:14 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . International Society of Political Psychology is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Political Psychology. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 129.93.16.3 on Wed, 17 Jul 2013 07:14:23 AM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

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Page 1: The Psychophysiology of Freedom

The Psychophysiology of FreedomAuthor(s): José M. R. DelgadoSource: Political Psychology, Vol. 4, No. 2 (Jun., 1983), pp. 355-374Published by: International Society of Political PsychologyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3790945 .

Accessed: 17/07/2013 07:14

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

International Society of Political Psychology is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extendaccess to Political Psychology.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 129.93.16.3 on Wed, 17 Jul 2013 07:14:23 AMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Page 2: The Psychophysiology of Freedom

Political Psychology, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1983

The Forum

The Psychophysiology of Freedom

Jose M. R. Delgado'

Presented at the Fourth Annual Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, University of Mannheim, Mannheim, West Germany, June 24-27, 1981

Personal freedom is not inherited nor is it a gift of Nature. It is a mental function which must be acquired through training and learning. Since the human brain is very immature at birth, lacking the anatomical and physiological elements prerequisite for mental functions, the mind does not yet exist at the moment of birth. Freedom is an aspect of mental activity requiring reception of information, internal processing of data, and output of behavioral manifestations. Thus, freedom may be curtailed by (1) privation or distortion of information, (2) alteration of intracerebral processing, or (3) inhibition of expression due to environmental factors such as coercion and punishment. Freedom involves learning of intellectual skills. The degree of freedom attained will be directly related to the amount of effective training - or behavioral control- provided by those in charge of education. Freedom may be considered a general purpose cerebral mechanism which increases the number and quality of available behavioral options. Human dignity, self-realization, happiness, and personal freedom are products of mental activity which should have priority in present educational systems.

KEY WORDS: freedom; political behavior; peace and war; aggressive behavior; neurological mechanisms.

'Departamento de Investigaci6n, Centro "Ram6n y Cajal," Madrid 34, Spain. 355

0162-895X/83/0600-0355$03.00/1 @ 1983 International Society of Political Psychology

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INTRODUCTION

Freedom has been the emotional flag of many battles and is one of the most cherished privileges of man. Definitions of freedom and paths to its realization are controversial, however, and social consequences and limits are also continuously debated. Economic, ideological, and ethical issues may be interpreted in different ways, and some essential elements are not given adequate attention.

Understanding of the many theoretical and practical aspects of freedom could be clarified by studying their related psychophysiological mechanisms, and this is the purpose of the present paper.

Human behavior may be considered as observable phenomena pro- duced by an "unknown black box," a brain, or preferably we may try to cor- relate behavioral manifestations with specific neurological mechanisms. There are already important trends in this direction and, for example, Davies (1976) has discussed the chemistry of the brain in relation with possi- ble explanations for political behavior. As Tinbergen (1969) predicted, "A scientific understanding of our behavior, leading to its control, may well be the most urgent task that faces mankind today."

The study of neurological mechanisms of aggressive behavior in animals and man has implications for the understanding of war and peace in human societies (N.A.T.O. Conference, 1980). At present only about 5% of the population is involved in solving the problems of our civilization, and they usually talk to each other. Science is responsible for the social production of knowledge. Politician must work with scientists to organize, support, and disseminate information to the general public.

Recent advances in psychophysiology modify the traditional concepts of personal freedom and responsibility. The individual does not control his own genes, liver functions, or the synaptic linkages of his neurons. Most essential aspects of our biology are beyond personal awareness and control. At the same time, procedures are being developed which allow surgical, chemical, electrical, and psychological modifications of the brain. Many benefits, as well as risks, derive from these facts. The implications of scien- tific advances must be discussed openly, and as proposed in this paper, democratization of psychological knowledge will give each individual a bet- ter understanding of his own personality, cerebral mechanisms, basic needs, and attitudes. As stated by Roe (1959), "You cannot be easily manipulated if you know more about yourself than the would-be manipulator does."

We are immersed in a new scientific age of microelectronics, atomic power, outer space exploration, and an information explosion which have revolutionized present civilization. Unfortunately we have acquired huge amounts of power but not the wisdom to use it intelligently, and we are suf- fering crises of values and technology which are threatening the environ- ment and the very existence of the human race.

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A biological understanding of reality should diminish today's con- flicts. Study of the brain, which is the human power center, may provide new solutions in agreement with man's limitations and options for develop- ment. The main psychological issue is not to discover dormant potentials of our neurons but to develop and use existing cerebral qualities. The goal of future civilization should be balance between material progress and per- sonal happiness, proposing new alternatives for the biological meaning and purpose of human life. This orientation does not ignore the importance of economic, political, philosophical, and other aspects of life, but may clarify the neurological mechanisms which are not taken into consideration by other disciplines.

Blood chemistry is similar in individuals from different countries. An- tibiotics are used effectively by most people. The brain has comparable potentials in healthy human babies from white, black, and yellow races, poor and rich families, and every corner of the world regardless of climate or political ideology. Darwin's survival of the fittest, Marx' class struggle, and Freud's prevalence of the unconscious are not unavoidable determinations of human behavior, because they can be decisively modified by appropriate mental structuring. Confrontations between East and West, Marxism and Liberalism, Arabs and Jews have historical reasons but no biological bases. These antagonisms have been created by the human brain and could be solv- ed by the wiser brains of future man.

Establishment of individual and social purposes depends on learning sets of values. These values must be created by the collective mind of the species. They must be flexible enough to encompass cultural diversity and multiplicity of personal options with a minimum of individual and social conflicts. The gradual humanization of future psychocivilized man must be directed by intelligent choices with plans and purposes than can be shared by all mankind, because all share similar basic neurological mechanisms.

Human beings may be considered as temporal centers of transaction and reorganization of matter, energy, and information provided by the en- vironment. The reciprocal relations of individuals, the human race, and the cosmos comprise a unidirectional process in continual, dynamic evolution. Each person is physiological dependent on a constant influx of sensory stimuli: we cannot function in sensory isolation.

Personal objectives must, therefore, be integrated with the objectives of society. Possible antagonisms between individual and social goals require solutions integrating both components as complementary aspects of mental activity. Individual existence may be evaluated in terms of the dynamic characteristics of the mind which are not isolated but form an evolutive con- tinuum with many other minds.

Thus, one of the purposes of life may be the integration of individual and social evolution. The products of mental activities transcend personal life, contributing to a lesser or greater degree to the transfer of information

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from the past to the future. Mortality takes on new significance if in- dividuals consider themselves as torchbearers of culture to be transmitted to other generations. Personal material carriers of flesh, bones, and brains have a limited duration of usually less than 100 years, while symbols, ideas, and creations may be individual contributions to future mankind.

THE MEANING OF FREEDOM

Webster's dictionary (1960) defines freedom as "the status of the will as an uncaused cause of human actions," equated with self-determination and spiritual self-fulfillment; "liberation from slavery, imprisonment or restraint." This definition is unsatisfactory as it is doubtful that any human action could exist "uncaused,", and the will is considered a mysterious and independent entity.

A more satisfactory definition is that of Schroder et al. (1971), who regard freedom as "the ability of a person to produce his own conceptions, to generate alternative and conflicting conceptions, to think and value in terms of multiple perspectives, and to define one's identity and his relation to others on the basis of these self-generating conceptions of the world." Definitions by other authors also stress freedom of thought, the importance of the "Self," and "determinism from within.. . by the combined effects of his own thoughts, his own reasoning, his own feel- ings, his own beliefs, ideals and hopes" (Sperry, 1965).

In general the existence of an independent Self is accepted without questioning its origin, elements, or mechanisms. We may suppose that the adult mind has a personal identity capable of thought, decision making, and self-determination. This identity, however, does not emerge by spontaneous generation nor is it preestablished in the fecundated ovum. The Self is a continuously evolving dynamic entity, the product of many genetic possibilities most of them unfulfilled and only a small number developed under the influence of environmental circumstances. The adult may enjoy "freedom of speech," but his range of verbal expression will depend on ex- perience - on what language he has been taught and what vocabulary he has assimilated. A man's concepts and reactivity are also shaped in part by language, and by studying his accent and choice of words, experts can iden- tify the precise geographical location where the speaker grew up, just as others can identify the vineyards where different wines originated. This in- itial imprinting may be modified later with proper training, and one may overcome one's original accent and learn other languages.

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INTRINSIC OR ACQUIRED FREEDOM

The different concepts of man, his potential, dignity, and individual worth are reflected in the two basic kinds of governments which control him in the modern world.

As stated by the United States Presidential Committee on Civil Rights (1947), the central theme of the American heritage is the importance of the individual. Every human being has an essential dignity and integrity which must be respected and safeguarded. The welfare of the individual is the final goal of group life. The basic moral principle is that "all men are created equal as well as free." Freedom means "the right of a man to manage his own affairs as he sees fit. . ." without interfering with similar rights of others.

In contrast to democratic philosophy, totalitarian theory grants not "rights" but "privileges" to the individual in the interest of the welfare of society as "state" (fascism), "race" (national socialism), or "proletarian class" (Russian communism). Liberals value freedom in the interest of the individual, while totalitarians allow freedom in the interest of society.

The recognition of human rights has an increasing political- and practical -importance, being accepted in theory by all civilized nations, although with widely varying differences in interpretation and realization. Generally accepted principles include legal equality, elimination of religious, racial, sexual and other types of discrimination, equal oppor- tunities, and the individual right to freedom of thought and behavior. These commendable principles require, however, an understanding of their biological bases and limitations in order to establish a realistic approach for their accomplishment.

In a consideration of personalfreedom we may ask if it is an intrinsic property of human nature which in normal circumstances will appear and develop spontaneously, or to the contrary, if it is an option which is not in- born, a possibility which to be attained requires suitable training. The two positions may be summarized as follows:

Individuals Are Born Free and Equal

This statement assumes the existence at birth of an individual entity able to choose, capable of making decisions, with freedom of behavioral ex- pression. Form the beginning there is a personal identity which must be respected. The free mind must not be violated or interfered with by external pressures. In practical terms, nonintervention by parents or by society means refraining from influencing or distorting spontaneous self-

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expression. In the extreme, this position leads to totally permissive educa- tion: let the child express his "true" feelings, desires, and personality, avoiding the impositions of adults, protecting the individual from massification and allowing him to be spontaneous, natural and free. Accord- ing to Marcuse (1964), inner freedom designates the private space in which man may become and remain "himself." This private space is invaded and whittled down by technological reality. As discussed elsewhere (Delgado, 1969), many philosophers including Teilhard de Chardin (1959) and Ortega y Gasset (1961) accept the idea of a quasimythical, inviolable Self, an entity somehow identified with the individual mind, ego, or personality which is related to the environment but has a rather independent existence, a quality which is given at birth, like a soul.

To Be Free Requires Training and Learning

This position recognizes the "right to be free" as a desirable cultural agreement but, based on recent neurophysiological and psychological studies, denies that human beings are born free or equal and rejects the idea that freedom will appear spontaneously in the normal process of cerebral development. The importance of this position is that wishful thinking or er- roneous biological assumptions may be detrimental for the acquisition and development of freedom, while acceptance of the need for training and learning will lead to effective educational methods to facilitate the appearance and elaboration of an option-free behavior-which is desirable for the adult but nonexistent at birth.

Freedom has traditionally been considered a spontaneous need, an essential part of human beings. However, modern process psychology (An- drews and Karlins, 1971) does not treat freedom as a "given" ability "but as a skill which may or may not develop depending on the social conditions in which the individual is raised." Freedom is a variable and under the same conditions "one person can be more or less free than another."

Genetic determination and fetal development endow the brain with the capacity to receive sensory inputs and to acquire experience, but in the absence of inputs the individual will not learn. Behavior will be limited to automatisms and the person will not develop the mental functions to think and act freely. At birth there is no capacity to think, to understand, or to select environmental sensory inputs. Parents and educators must make all the initial choices which, in turn, will condition the establishment of per- sonal frames of reference and adult individual reactivity. The brain and mind are shaped by early imprinting which will structure the anatomy and physiology of the neurons. Symbols, emotions, knowledge, skills, and

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many other aspects of mental functions are acquired or decisively influenc- ed by sensory inputs.

This position leads logically to an authoritarian education: the child does not know what is good or bad for him; he lacks the capacity and in- telligence to structure his own neurological mechanisms and therefore must be directed from the outside. This direction, however, may have different aims and may emphasize obedience, shaping the child to conform to a preconceived role, or may stimulate and nurture his own potential for self- expression and personal freedom. Imposition of a set of rules to produce an obedient child who will perform set tasks involves basic reward and punish- ment techniques, while teaching of freedom involves "in depth" guidance in the utilization of complex thought and projection of alternatives and evaluation of consequences. This type of training is much more difficult, in- tricate, and time consuming, and represents a deeper intervention in in- dividual structuring. Thus freedom involves learning of intellectual skills and the degree of freedom attained will be directly related to the amount of effective training-or behavioral control-provided by those in charge of education.

An alternative to the authoritarian position is to evade responsibility. Parents may doubt their ability to make the best choices and may prefer to let chance impose intellectual and behavioral systems on the child. In this situation, he will learn mainly from friends and from the social milieu. In modern society, a large percentage of the educational experience is not pro- vided by the family but by state- or group-controlled education and mass media information and entertainment.

THE STRUCTURING OF MENTAL FUNCTIONS

During fetal life, there is an anticipatory morphological maturation and important functions are developed in order to start as soon as needed. When the baby is born, its heart is already beating and vital functions such as respiration, gastrointestinal activities, kidney filtration, mouth suction, vasomotility, and temperature regulation are triggered immediately. In every normal baby these functions are performed automatically without previous learning. The necessary mechanisms are prewired in the brain and in the organism.

No comparable ready-to-trigger functions exist in the mental sphere. The newborn is incapable of understanding symbols, directing purposeful motor performance, or producing speech. It has no ideas, words, or con- cepts, no significant sensory experience, no culture. The 1-day-old baby is unable to comprehend the loving phrases of his parents.

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Thus human beings are born with very immature brains (Conel, 1947; Flechsig, 1896; Jakob, 1943). The hippocampus and cerebellar cortex have only 10 to 20% of their potential neurons and the rest will appear, under normal conditions, after birth (Altman, 1967). Experience provided by sen- sory inputs from the environment will influence the number as well as the structural connections of these postnatal cells. The microneurons of the cerebellum also develop after birth under the influence of the infant's behavioral activities (Ramon y Cajal, 1909-1911). Sensory stimulation is essential for neurochemical and neuroanatomical development of the brain. The corresponding neurons of animals deprived of sight or hearing will be like empty bags, impoverished in both RNA and proteins (Hyden, 1961). Newborn rats kept in information-deprived environments have diminished cerebral cortex weight, less enzymatic cholinesterase activity, and decreased thickness and vascularization of the cerebral cortex (Anderson et al., 1958).

To be born with a very immature brain is a great initial handicap re- quiring external help for survival and growth. At the same time, the lack of maturity significantly increases the number of possible options for learning and development because growth will be shaped by the culture received. In a few years in an enriched environment, a child may acquire concepts and skills which mankind formerly needed centuries to develop. This potential for learning represents a potential for freedom.

During infancy, there is a slow structuring of mental functions depending on the following elements:

1. The collection of hereditary characteristics given to the individual by chance, without his knowledge or consent and therefore without his free choice. Parental desires cannot intervene in selecting the genetic characteristics of ovum and spermatozoa, because fertilization is an event which escapes control. Even in artificial insemination, we are providing many thousands of germinal cells, ignoring the genetic characteristics of the one which will be successful in fecundating the waiting ovum.

2. Nutrients must be provided by parents or guardians, and a baby's only possible reactions are to reject a very hot or cold liquid or to stop swallowing when satisfied. With the passage of time-weeks or months- signs of mental activity will slowly emerge and then food preferences may be shown, which to a great extent will be determined by the postnatal experience which influenced individual taste before any act of "free" will could be expressed. During this period, preferences and caprices may be shaped by associating positive or negative reinforcement with specific foods.

3. Sensory experiences-optic, acoustic, tactile, and others-will be received, evoking responses in the retina, ear, muscle spindles, and other receptors. Lying in his crib, the baby may react by closing his eyes against a

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strong light or crying in discomfort, but he cannot escape or alter his cir- cumstances-he is helpless. Later on, he will gradually learn to move around and to produce articulate speech, and this process of humanization will excite his parents who can watch the development of their child as he gains a normal repertoire of behavior. The amount and qualities of a baby's reactivity will depend largely on early experiences given him by parental care and environmental chance.

The potential to develop abilities should not be confused with their ac- tual existence. Computers have tremendous possibilities and may receive a large variety of information and instructions in order to perform complex operations, but in the absence of suitable programming, the powerful machine will remain dormant.

The infant may learn to process information and to select behavioral responses but these skills, like other mental activities, will not appear spon- taneously and must be taught as part of the general process of education. Behavioral freedom requires normality of mental functions able to receive sensory inputs from the environment, to process and understand the infor- mation, to evaluate it in comparison with previously stored experiences, and to choose a behavioral response among different recognized options. Without awareness, without the possibility to decide between different alter- natives, there is no freedom.

We know very little about the supporting neurophysiological mechanisms, but somehow freedom is related to the normality of con- sciousness and therefore to normal hypothalamic and reticular functions. It also depends on memory storage in limbic structures and preservation of foresight and responsibility in the frontal lobes. On the other hand, lesions of the pyramidal and extrapyramidal system may disturb motility with little or no accompanying inhibition of thought processes, and destructive le- sions in the occipital cortex may induce blindness while incurring minimal alterations of many aspects of free behavior. Freedom cannot be localized in any specific brain structure because the cerebral activities involved are multiple and interrelated, but neuronal groups may be classified are in- volved or unrelated to behavioral freedom.

Neuronal activities, which are essential elements in all behavioral phenomena, have known limitations depending on their physiological characteristics. Mental functions are supported by nonspecific phenomena of oxygen consumption, electrical discharges, energy liberation, release and uptake of neurotransmitters, and many other complex activities. The thinking process follows inescapable biological laws. The sequential spatiotemporal characteristics of thought and behavior are important limitations. Neuronal traffic of signals occupies specific pathways struc- tured to carry only a few lines of communication, making instant com-

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munication impossible. A conversation must proceed with grammatical combination of nouns, verbs, adjectives, and other elements to express chains of ideas. Excessive speed or disorder in the flow of words or thoughts will produce confusion. For the performance of a task, many muscles will be activated with determined strength, suitable coordination, and ap- propriate feedbacks. Motor acts consume time and effort. Disorganized contractions may be observed, for example, in aimless epileptic fits.

It should be emphasized that in a conversation we seldom choose words and grammatical construction. Ideas flow through a series of phrases linked together automatically under the command of the subconscious ac- cording to previous experience. We may use the same stock phrases to cover a multitude of situations, depending on the limitations of our vocabulary.

Conscious freedom is a trigger, like an enzyme starting and speeding up automatic reactions and combinations. In the absence of elements to be combined, without suitable established mechanisms, in the vacuum of the newborn - or the unlearned - brain, freedom cannot be detected.

Available physiological data reject the principle of inviolability. In the first days after birth, mental functions have not yet appeared and therefore we cannot invade or violate a nonexistent entity. The principle of inviolabili- ty should be rephrased, stating that the inner space of the brain is con- tinuously being invaded through the natural portals of entry of sensory receptors. This incoming stream of information is essential for the initial structuring of the brain and also for its normal functioning throughout life.

In reality, whatever happens or doesn't happen will influence cerebral development: undernourishment, overfeeding, neglect, or smothering with affection. The elements necessary for cerebral organization must be provid- ed by some source: (1) parental orientation; (2) social norms; or (3) pure chance, which has no human purpose and is indifferent to individual suc- cess or failure. Sheltering the individual from external influences would re- quire sensory isolation which would be disastrous for neuronal and mental development.

THE PHYSIOLOGICAL SUPPORT OF FREEDOM

As previously indicated, freedom is an aspect of mental activities re- quiring (1) reception of information, (2) processing of the received informa- tion, and (3) output of manifestations, including perceptive, visceral, emo- tional and behavioral responses. Freedom is therefore inescapably related to the cerebral reception and processing of information and to behavioral ex- pression. The organ of freedom is not the heart or liver but the brain, and normality of its functions is an essential requirement for the existence of a

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free mind. The anencephalic baby, comatose patient, and anesthetized per- son have limited brain functions precluding consciousness and choice.

This normality requires physiological support of neuroanatomy, elec- trophysiology, and chemistry. Minor or drastic disturbances of free behavior may be related to anatomical and functional alterations of cerebral structures. Neurological determinants, with their ethiological, diagnostic, and therapeutic problems, deserve much greater attention than they presently receive.

In addition to a normal brain, freedom requires adequate sensory in- puts. In the absence of information there are no possible behavioral alter- natives. For example, a person deprived of news about the history and pre- sent political situation of Poland cannot form an opinion or take part in any action related to that country. Mass media suppression and distortion of in- formation are well-known procedures used to restrict freedom of thought and behavior.

Intracerebral processing of received data is an essential element of the mind: this is where the intrinsic neuronal mechanisms of freedom are established. The spatiotemporal association of inputs gives interrelated meaning to the environmental reality. This meaning is not genetically deter- mined and does not exist "per se." It must be acquired within each brain by personal experience. For example, repeated associations of the word "Mama" with the optical image of a woman will create a link in the infantile mind between these acoustic and optic inputs, reinforced by other inputs of food, warmth, care, and affection. The related sensations of pleasure add emotional tones to the association. In this way, fast and automatic process- ing of information is built up inside the brain, and the sight of the mother is processed as rewarding, triggering behavioral outputs of a smile and approaching movements.

It is important to emphasize that these phenomena did not exist before birth, could not exist without direct individual experience, and will be linked to each other by learning and conditioning, shaping automatic and mostly unconscious responses. This original imprinting may be slightly or drastically modified later on by associated positive or negative inputs; sometimes conflicts are created between established meaning and newly ac- quired experiences such as punishment resulting from disagreements with the mother. Thousands of daily inputs will progressively be imprinted in the mind, forming the frames of reference which allow each individual to understand, evaluate, and react to his environment.

Through experience, neuronal mechanisms are shaped in preferential ways and from the many behavioral options, only a few will be established. In this way the brain may be structured for automatic obedience or, alter- natively, for inquisitive analysis of data. Some clarifications are in order:

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(1) As the individual deciding "Self" is formed by external cultural elements, free choice is personal while its mental structuring is social. (2) The exercise of free choice occupies brain pathways and involves cerebral chemistry, time, and mental effort. To facilitate human efficiency and productivity, we gradually learn to perform most activities automatically. In this way, decision making is liberated for use only in resolving important issues.

After the intracerebral mechanism of freedom have been established, their expression may be modified or inhibited by environmental cir- cumstances including technology, economy, and social structure. For exam- ple, we may have dissident opinions which may be repressed for fear of punishment, or we may want to travel abroad but be prevented by lack of money, transport, permission to emigrate, or other problems.

The intracerebral mechanisms underlying thinking, feeling, and motivation must be distinguished from the expression of free will manifested in speech and action. The structure, mechanisms, and conse- quences are different in the two cases: one refers to the internal world of the mind while the other refers to interactions of the individual with his environment.

FREEDOM AND AUTOMATISMS (THE BIOLOGICAL LIMITS OF FREEDOM)

Automatic mechanisms respond to preestablished roles. A thermostat will switch on or off when the set temperature is reached. An airplane may land without visibility, processing received information about altitude, velocity, and location, sending a variety of messages to regulate the thrust of the motors and position of the wings. A computer may receive, store, and process a huge amount of information, and provide a multitude of responses from mechanical actions to mathematical, ideological, and ar- tistic creations.

The options of response in automatic mechanisms depend on (1) characteristics, number and quality of sensors; (2) speed and complexity of information processing; and (3) number, location, and function of effec- tors. In the case of the thermostat, the mechanism is very simple: there is only one sensor able to detect changes in temperature and only one response: the closing of a contact. No processing of information is required and there are no options. Instrumental landing of an airplane requires pro- cessing of a tremendous quantity of information and the sending of a varie- ty of orders with fast feedbacks, adjusting the response to the changing situation at every second. The final aim has, however, considerable rigidity: the plane is supposed to land at a precise location on the airstrip at a deter- mined speed, at known horizontal and vertical coordinates, and with a specified angular position with respect to the ground.

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Most visceral functions are regulated by automatic mechanisms which escape consciousness and voluntary control. Blood pressure, heart rate, gastrointestinal secretions, metabolic activities, and many other functions are under the influence of the so-called autonomic, vegetative, or involun- tary nervous system. We are not aware of how our kidneys and liver work, and cannot modify voluntarily our consumption of oxygen or secretion of sex hormones. All these processes have complicated regulatory mechanisms which proceed with total automatism.

In contrast, behavioral manifestations are considered voluntary; sen- sations are consciously perceived and we may demonstrate our free will by starting or stopping a movement or conversation. These actions, however, should be analyzed in order to understand their free and automatic com- ponents. So-called willful, free, or spontaneous behavior depends to a great extent on preestablished mechanisms, some of them inborn and others ac- quired through learning. When a child takes his first steps or when an adult learns a new skill like tennis, the initial motor behavior is clumsy and re- quires considerable attention and effort in every detail. Coordination pro- gressively improves, unnecessary muscular tension diminishes, and movements proceed with speed, economy, and elegance, without awareness.

Acquisition of a skill involves the automation of patterns of response and the establishment of spatial and temporal sequences of behavior. The voluntary aspects of willful activity are the selection and purpose of a specific act. Most details of complex movements and adaptation to chang- ing circumstances are performed automatically. We may say that the role of the will is mainly to trigger previously established mechanisms. Obviously the will is not responsible for the chemistry of muscular contraction, the electrical processes of neural transmission, or the intimate organization of responses. These phenomena depend on spindle discharges, cerebellar ac- tivation, synaptic junctions, reciprocal inhibitions, and many other mechanisms, which are not only beyond consciousness but also beyond our present comprehension. The uniqueness of voluntary behavior lies in its in- itial dependence on the integration of a vast number of personal past ex- periences and present receptions.

Volition is related to specific neuronal activity. It may be asked whether appropriate sensory perceptions or artificial electrical stimulation could induce the neuronal pools involved in decision making and behavioral responses to discharge in a like manner. On the basis of experimental findings, it appears that voluntary and electrical triggering can activate cerebral mechanisms in a similar way. If spontaneous and electrically evoked behavior involve participation of the same set of cerebral areas, then both types of behavior should be able to interact by modifying each others' inhibitory and excitatory influences. This possibility has been proved ex- perimentally.

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A clear example of algebraic summation of voluntary and evoked motility was observed in one of our cats with electrodes implanted in the left hidden motor cortex (Delgado, 1952). Electrical stimulation induced raising of the right forepaw with proper postural adaptation. Offering of fish to the animal resulted in a similar extension and raising of the limb in order to seize the food. Simultaneous presentation of the fish and stimulation of the cortex produced an augmented motor response: the cat miscalculated and overshot its target. It was unable to catch the food until it made a series of corrective adjustments, and then the fish was successfully caught and eaten. In addition to demonstrating the interrelation between evoked and spon- taneous responses, this experiment also proved that the animal was aware of an artificial disturbance, and after a brief period of trial and error was able to modify its performance accordingly.

Reflexes are predictable responses, rigidly patterned, and blindly per- formed. Similarly, electrical excitation of a peripheral motor nerve in- duces a stereotyped movement with little adaptation to external cir- cumstances. In contrast, willful activity generally has a purpose, and its per- formance is adapted to attain a determined aim, requiring continuous pro- cessing of proprioceptive and exteroceptive sensory information, the use of feedback mechanisms, instantaneous readjustment of the central command to adapt to changes in the environment, and prediction of the future which involves spatiotemporal calculation of speed, direction, and strategies of moving targets. Depending on the location of cerebral stimulation, responses obtained by brain stimulation may be similar to a blind reflex or may have all the above-mentioned characteristics of voluntary activity.

Stimulation of some points in the motor cortex and motor pathways in the cat, monkey, and other animals may produce simple movements, such as flexion of a limb, which are completely stereotyped and lack adaptation. These effects may be interpreted as the activation of efferent structures where the pattern of response has already been decided. At this level, the neuronal functions are of conduction rather than of integration and organization, and only minor variations are possible in the circulating impulses, regardless of whether their origin was spontaneous or artificial. There is ample evidence, however, that many other effects evoked by brain stimulation are oriented toward the accomplishment of a specific aim with adaptation of the motor performance to unexpected changes in the environment.

This adaptability has been clearly demonstrated by evoked aggression in monkeys, who directed their attacks selectively against their natural enemies in the group with tactics of chasing and fighting which continuous- ly changed according to the targets' unpredictable strategies. Brain stimula- tion evidently evoked not a predetermined motor effect but an emotional

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state of increased aggressiveness that was expressed by preestablished motor behavior directed according to the history of previous social relations (Delgado, 1964).

Experimental evidence indicates that brain stimulation can activate and influence cerebral mechanisms involved in willful behavior, and future studies should clarify the neuronal bases of controversial subjects such as freedom, individuality, and spontaneity in factual terms rather than in elusive semantic discussions.

OWNERSHIP OF THE MIND

Personal ownership of our body is usually taken for granted. We feel our skin, use our senses, and command our muscles. In a similar way, we assume proprietorship of our ideas, emotions, and experiences. Personal identity is based on the possession throughout life of a determined set of physical and mental characteristics. These ideas should, however, be discussed in light of recent biological findings.

The concept of possession of the air in our lungs may be valid for a brief period of time because the gas within our chest is not shared with anyone else and is separated momentarily from the environment. Most of the air we breathe flows in and out of our lungs. A percentage of oxygen penetrates the blood to be combined with the hemoglobin and transported to the capillaries of muscles, liver, and various organs where oxidative pro- cesses occur. Some of this oxygen is transformed into carbon dioxide and transported through the veins back to the lungs from where it is expelled to the environment. The possession of air, therefore, is of rather limited dura- tion.

The water we drink passes to the stomach and intestines, is absorbed, transported by circulation, retained in small amounts, and mostly eliminated by the lungs, kidneys, and perspiration. We "own" much of our body water for only a short period.

Property rights are also debatable for the content of the intestines, for clipped nails and hair, or for our own blood which is in a continuous pro- cess of renovation. Modern biology shows that most of the material substratum of the body is constantly being transformed. The bones of a child change in structure, strength, shape, and chemical composition according to the amount and direction of mechanical forces. Musculature is modified in relation to its use and disuse. The human central nervous system consumes 10 times more oxygen than most other tissues, due to its very active metabolism which includes a rapid rate of protein synthesis. Neurons do not regenerate like other less differentiated cells, but their sub-

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microscopic content and structure are in a process of continuous change and renovation involving the release and uptake of different chemicals. The traditional concept of neuronal stability should consequently be reevaluated.

Learning in rats is known to be related to an increase of protein S 100 in the nerve cells of the hippocampus (Hyden and Lange, 1970). Apparent- ly, short-term information is stored near the synapses at which signals arrive and are read out, while lasting memory traces involve RNA-dependent mechanisms of the nucleus. Neuronal membranes involved in these pro- cesses are morphologically, biochemically, and functionally different mosaics. Structural changes in the synaptic membranes occur under the in- fluence of different types of transmitters. Synaptic regions are modified through the influence of pre- and postsynaptic areas; altered uptake, availability, and release of several transmitters; variations in the number, size, and sensitivity of the receptor sites; structural changes in the synaptic cleft; and modifications in the diffusion rate and extent of the neural transmitters (von Baumgarten, 1970). The presence and characteristics of glycolipids and glycoproteins of neuronal surfaces may play an essential role in specific interneuronal recognition.

The dynamic complexity of neuronal activities is under the continuous influence of genetic determinants, inducer gradients, reactive tendencies, metabolic and humoral factors, electrophysiological phenomena, received inputs, and many other elements which shape the composition, structure, and functions of the neuronal units and responses of neuronal pools. Most of these processes depend on genetically established mechanisms, on automatic reactivity, and on the flow of information reaching the brain from the environment. Pacemaking of the respiratory center, electrical coding of sensory inputs, and complex neuronal activity do not depend on personal preferences; moreover, many of their mechanisms are similar in cats and in humans. We do not personally "own" these mechanisms which are given to all mammals. We do not "own" the material and functional elements of the brain or the information flowing in and out of the brain.

Ownership of these materials, mechanisms, and information is of course a matter of interpretation. Air and water, like sensory inputs, are elements which originate outside the organism and penetrate it for a limited time. Each organism could be considered either the center of these transac- tions and the proprietor of elements circulating within it or a miniscule, short-lived unit involved in these transactions.

More important than ownership is the study of the origin, properties, timing, and evolution of the different elements which form each human be- ing. What is preserved and what is altered from birth to death? Fingerprints are a permanent individual characteristic; personal experiences stored in

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memory are unique although usually modified by time; skills may be learn- ed, modified, and forgotten; taste may be educated and changed; ethics may be influenced by social factors; beauty may fade. Is a person the same at 50 years of age as at 15 or when he or she was born?

Many of these factors can be investigated with the aid of neurobiological technology. If personal identity is determined by elements which can be known and selected, should we let natural chance be the decisive power in structuring each individual brain, or should we use our freedom and intelligence in order to encourage the development of neuronal and behavioral qualities chosen with a human purpose? What should this purpose be? From now on, we must assume responsibility for our evolu- tion; we must be the directors of our future.

THE PURPOSE OF FREEDOM

Three different aspects of freedom may be considered: (1) the establish- ment of its intracerebral mechanisms; (2) the exercise of behavioral options; and (3) the purpose of the selected responses.

Freedom is a general purpose, cerebral mechanism which may be ap- plied in many different ways. It is a technology to deal with brain inputs, throughputs, and outputs, increasing the number and flexibility of options to accept, reject, combine, and modify the flow of information and responses. It may be compared to a language which must be learned and established in the brain, with richer or poorer elements, to be used later for many different purposes.

When a person learns not to accept information blindly but to con- sider its causality, significance, and consequences, this internal process will influence all personal thinking, and, once established, it will be difficult to block or erase in spite of external pressures. Intelligent processing of data is a skill which should have a reason, a purpose. Given a free mind we may ask "What for? How should freedom be used? Why possess a brilliant mind if its capacities are dormant or misused?"

The exercise of freedom must be at the service of suitable aims and a free mind should start by careful selection of the purpose of its own freedom. Here we are facing the basic contradiction in the psychophysiology of freedom: the individual mind is structured without its own choice by elements originating in its material and cultural environment which subsequently will determine individuality and personal choices. Where then is the freedom of the mind? The partial answer is that, although shaped by outside forces, each mind is unique and its particular experiences and feedback capacity will influence its own functioning decisively, follow-

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ing personal choices. This is a possibility which may be cultivated and in- creased to reinforce personal identity and originality. One of the purposes of freedom may be to increase personal freedom.

A variety of purposes may be suggested to increase available options in the exercise of freedom. Prominent among them is the education of all social and intellectual strata of future generations to increase awareness of their own mental structure and behavioral reactivity through a program of Psychogenesis (Delgado, 1969).

Democratization of available psychological knowledge, especially the fundamentals and technology of mass manipulation, will provide the in- dividual with intellectual awareness to diminish the outside manipulation of his own self. At present, political opinions, personal needs, ethical issues, social structures, and many other aspects of human activities are skillfully directed by advertisements, propaganda, and persuaders which flood our sensory inputs, shaping our neurons and establishing patterns of response. The mass media power should be counteracted by an educational program. Science must be placed at the service of the masses in order to increase per- sonal freedom through better knowledge of its cerebral mechanisms. To protect the individual from intellectual and emotional manipulation, he must be instructed about mechanisms, technologies, and options.

Human dignity, self realization, personal happiness, and freedom are products of mental activities which should have a high priority in the pre- sent systems of education.

SUMMARY AND WORKING HYPOTHESES

1. Personal freedom is not inherited nor is it a gift of Nature. It will not unfold automatically through brain maturation. It is a mental function which must be acquired through training and learning.

2. The human brain is very immature at birth, lacking the anatomical and physiological elements prerequisite for mental functions. Therefore the mind does not yet exist at the moment of birth. Man is not born free but subservient to genes and education. Sensory inputs, carrying information from the environment, are totally necessary for the normal development of the brain, for the appearance of mental activities, and for the structuring of the Self.

3. Freedom is an aspect of mental activity requiring reception of infor- mation, internal processing of data, and output of behavioral manifesta- tions. Freedom therefore may be curtailed by (1) privation or distortion of information, (2) alteration of intracerebral processing, or (3) inhibition of expression due to environmental factors such as coercion and punishment.

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4. Free choice is individual but its mental determinants are social. 5. As decision making occupies brain pathways, time, and requires ef-

fort, most behavioral responses must be relegated to automatic mechanisms, liberating free choice for consideration of complex issues.

6. The main role of free will is to trigger previously established automatic mechanisms.

7. Freedom involves learning of intellectual skills, and the degree of freedom attained will be directly related to the amount of effective train- ing - or behavioral control-provided by those in charge of education.

8. We "own" the air in our lungs and the water in our body for only short periods of time; similarly, we "own" only transitorily the information provided by culture.

9. Freedom may be considered a general purpose cerebral mechanism which increases the number and quality of available behavioral options.

10. A democratization of psychological knowledge will diminish the power of mass media and the manipulation of individuals.

11. Human dignity, self-realization, happiness, and personal freedom are products of mental activity which should have priority in present educa- tional systems.

12. Human beings may be considered temporal centers of transactions of matter, energy, and information which are provided by the environment, transcending individual existence. In this way, mortality assumes a more biological, realistic, and optimistic significance.

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