the rationalization of neoliberalism in ontario’s public

8/18/2019 The Rationalization of Neoliberalism in Ontario’s Public

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The rationalization of neoliberalism in Ontario’s publiceducation system, 1995–2000

Ranu Basu

Department of Geography, York University, N430 Ross Building, 4700 Keele Street, Toronto, ON, Canada M3J 1P3

Received 17 September 2003; received in revised form 20 February 2004

Abstract

The globalization of neo-liberal policy solutions to education problems has gained increasing dominance in recent years. In

Ontario, Canada the success of this ideological discourse, particularly during the past decade, has been hard to combat due to the

ideal message that it conveys to the general electorate, that is one based on efficiency, accountability and equity of resources across

different school boards in the province. Despite protests from many activist groups (i.e. unions, educators, parent-groups) the

implementation of such policies has been largely successful. By tracking education policies, statements and events, newspaper

articles and other policy reports from 1995 to 2000, this paper seeks to understand the nature of its success during the early years of

restructuring. I argue that part of the success lies in understanding the techniques and strategies of implementation or the process of

rationalization. I argue that policies formulated at one spatial level operate quite differently at another and the spatial disjunctures

that arise as a result of this process lead to the continued success of neo-liberal ideologies and inequalities in education.

2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Education; Neo-liberalism; Planning; Power; Public policy; Ontario

1. Introduction: the rise of neoliberalism in Ontario

According to planning theorist Bent Flyvbjerg, if one

were to take the ideals of the Enlightenment seri-

ously one needs to first understand the Enlightenment in

anti-Enlightenment terms. This distinction between the

principles of reason, morality and progress, how demo-

cracies should ideally function, versus a critical exami-

nation of how democracies function in reality is an

important one, but one that is not always easily empir-

ically discernible. Dominant ideologies of what consti-

tute a ‘good society’ and what leads to ‘good planning’serve to legitimize governing policy paradigms, where

legitimation can be defined as the process whereby those

in power gain acceptance for themselves in the eyes of

those who are governed by them (Scruton, 1996).

However, in order to gain acceptance, or to make people

believe that a decision is indeed justified, a necessary

part of legitimation––‘rationalizations’––or strategies

based on power, are presented as rationality (see Fly-

vbjerg, 1998). This paper examines the rationalization of

neoliberal discourse during a period of structural read-

justment in Ontario’s education system (1995–2000).

These changes are examined during the early years of

the ‘Common Sense Revolution’ (CSR)––a period of

significant economic and political reform introduced by

Mike Harris’ Progressive Conservative government in

the 1990s. More specifically, this paper traces how in the

slow and steady construction of a ‘failing and inefficient

public education system’ reason was fabricated as the

rationale behind the legitimation of neoliberal agendas.The rationalization of restructuring was driven by a

perceived need to improve the efficiency of the public

sector while cutting costs and simultaneously by the

need to increase educational standards, improve out-

comes, and ensure accountability in order to remain

globally competitive in a knowledge based market

economy (Taylor, 2001, p. 4).

Public policy in Canada similar to other western

democracies has been governed by two major paradigms

since the Second World War. Liberalist-Keynesian

economic theory organized federal policy for nearlyE-mail address: [email protected] (R. Basu).

0016-7185/$ - see front matter 2004 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

doi:10.1016/j.geoforum.2004.03.003

Geoforum 35 (2004) 621–634

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three decades after World War II, followed by neolib-

eralism which assumed a similar dominance in the 1980s

and 1990s (see Bradford, 2000; Lemon, 1993). The

Great Depression provided the intellectual–political

context for the Keynesian breakthrough in the second

half of the 1930s and Keynesian theory proved revolu-

tionary in a number of respects but most obviously it

provided a theoretical critique of economic orthodoxy

of the self correcting market (Bradford, 2000, p. 198).

This was a time of activist government, expansion of

public services and the welfare state and of substantial

constraints on corporate power. Yet, as Bradford de-

scribes, the Canadian economy also prospered at this

time and achieved success in four areas: high employ-

ment, price stability, economic growth and international

balance. By the 1970s, however, conditions changed in

most western democracies leading to the crisis of the

Keynesian state. The complex restructuring of the na-

tion state as a consequence of the economic effects of

‘globalization’ and ‘localization’ has received muchattention (see Peck, 2001). For example, the internation-

alization of investment resulted in deindustrialization as

transnational corporations rationalized production

globally (see Bradford, 2000). In Canada, inflation more

than tripled in the first half of the decade primarily due

to the oil price boom, while unemployment doubled in

the second half. Large federal expenditures on tax

incentives and cuts, combined with increased pressure

on automatic stabilizers caused by deteriorating eco-

nomic conditions, created another problem of persistent

growing annual deficits (Bradford, 2000, p. 202). The

capitalist crisis during these decades, with its shrinkingprofit rates, inspired the corporate elite to revive eco-

nomic liberalism (see Martinez and Garcia, 2000). It is

important to note that in such contexts contradictions

do not necessarily arise between the State and the

market and that the State has the option to suppress or

promote the market (Treanor, 2003). When corpora-

tions regained their dominance and control of political

parties in the 1970s they chose the later. Both in the

Conservative and Liberal parties, renewed interests

for deregulation, privatization, and an end to govern-

ment intrusion in the markets led to the re-emergence of

liberalism as the most favoured economic political ide-

ology (Bradford, 2000; Finn, 2001). With rapid global-ization of the capitalist economy, neo-liberal principles

of individualism, privatization and decentralization be-

came increasingly evident in public sector planning and

regulation. At the provincial level reforms of Ontario’s

CSR appeared to follow in the footsteps of previous

governments in New Zealand, Britain and the United

States, as well as closer to home following Alberta’s

‘Klein revolution’ with changes that involved aggressive

deficit and debt reduction, downsizing of the role of

government in economy, and a shift in the way gov-

ernment approached the management of remaining

functions (Taylor, 2001, p. 3). Alberta’s three year

business plan during the early 1990s embraced, accord-

ing to an author from the Fraser Institute, ‘a new phi-

losophy of market-driven delivery of services and an

emphasis on the private sector to ensure economic

growth’ (Taylor, 2001, p. 285). The destruction and

discreditation of Keynesian welfarist and collectivist

institutions––such as health, education, social welfare,

was fuelled by deeply interventionist agendas around

social issues––such as crime, immigration, policing, and

workfare reform (see Peck and Tickell, 2002, p. 42)

These in turn set the tone for the legitimation of neo-

liberal reforms.

The globalization of neo-liberal policy solutions to

education problems has similarly gained increasing

dominance in recent years. Critics argue, however, that

such policies in education––increasingly concerned with

issues of privatization, marketisation, performativity,

and the ‘enterprising individual’––have created greater

inequalities and disparities in society (Apple, 2001).During the mid to later 1990s public education in On-

tario underwent much structural change and reform in

this direction with the general approval of the public.

The CSR’s broader agenda focused on lowering income

taxes, less government spending, cutting the size of

government and balancing the budget. Reforms in

education were part of the broader agenda for change in

the province.

Despite many criticisms, the success of this ideologi-

cal discourse, particularly during the past decade has

been hard to combat due to the ideal message that it

conveys to the general public, that is one based on effi-ciency, accountability and equity of resources across

different school boards in the province. By tracking

education policies, statements and events, newspaper

articles and other policy reports from 1995 to 2000, this

paper seeks to understand the nature of its success

during the early years of restructuring in three areas of

reform: governance, finance and curriculum. More

importantly, however, the narratives that emerge within

these broader themes focus on the process of rationali-

zation: neoliberal ideologies as applied to education; the

use of rhetoric in discourse; using legislation by stealth

and QUANGOS to undermine an existing structure;

restructuring education to gain money for tax cuts anddebt; and punishing one’s enemies i.e. teachers and their

unions, as well as school boards in cities defined as more

progressive. Thus, I argue that part of the success during

this period of restructuring lies in understanding the

techniques and strategies used for implementation. This

is because neoliberalization is a process that is in con-

stant flux and riddled with contradictory rationaliza-

tions based on power relations at different scales. As

Peck and Tickell (2002) argue, the ideologies of neolib-

eralism are themselves produced and reproduced

through institutional forms and political action. In order

622 R. Basu / Geoforum 35 (2004) 621–634



to understand how neoliberal policies were rapidly ad-

vanced during the early years of restructuring requires

an exploration of techniques and strategies related to

power relations, hidden agendas (or motivations) and

legitimations. An assessment of these variants contrib-

utes to an understanding of the transformative and

adaptive capacity of neoliberalism (see Brenner and

Theodore, 2002).

The paper is structured as follows: After an intro-

duction to the case study, three periods of neoliberal-

ization are presented. First, a period of aggressive

implementation whereby using a variety of techniques

and strategies neoliberal reforms were introduced in

areas of governance, finance and curriculum. Followed

by a period of dissent and chaos to finally a period

of quiet anticipation the neoliberal agenda was slowly

secured in Ontario’s landscape. The discursive con-

struction of neoliberal policies during the early years

of education reform will be examined within this con-

text.

2. The neoliberalization of education reform in Ontario

2.1. Introduction to case study

The public education system in Ontario has under-

gone much structural change in recent years, especially

since 1995 when the Progressive Conservative (PC)

government, under the leadership of Mike Harris, as-

sumed power, elected on a neo-liberal platform called theCommon Sense Revolution (CSR) (see Keil, 2002). As

Gidney notes, CSR was coined as an election strategy to

woo voters disenchanted by rising taxes, spiralling defi-

cits and debt, and the intrusion of big government in

their lives (1999, p. 234). The message of the CSR fo-

cused on job creation, tax reduction, and cost saving

strategies. Changes in all areas (e.g. education, municipal

administration, hospitals, roads) included claw-backs on

entitlements and the downloading and amalgamation of

services deemed necessary to promote efficiency. The

government assured the public that a reduction in

expenditure would not be at the expense of the quality of

public services, including education. In fact, what wasexplicitly proposed was that the public would get more

for less-first, by a reduction in taxes; and second, by

higher quality public services.

Many of the changes that took place in the public

education system between 1995 and 2000 were actually

based on the recommendations of a report entitled ‘For

the Love of Learning ’ prepared by the Royal Commis-

sion on Learning––a task force formed in 1993 by the

previous leftist, New Democratic Party (NDP) govern-

ment. The 550-page report made 167 recommendations

on reforming the education system in Ontario (Royal

Commission on Learning, 1994). The report recom-

mended new directions in four core areas:

• Community alliances: Promote partnerships between

community organizations, businesses, parents and

social agencies.

• Early childhood education: Enhance learning and pro-

vide a head start for children from three years of age.

If required, to be combined with before and after

school childcare programs.

• Teacher professionalization and development: The

establishment of the Ontario College of Teachers as

an independent professional body.

• Information technology: Provide schools with techno-

logical resources.

From 1995 to 2000 many of the structural changes

that were introduced by the new government were based

on these recommendations. As we will see later on in the

paper, some of these policies were selectively pursued,while others, such as early childhood education pro-

grams, were dropped. I briefly trace three major areas of

change during this period: governance, finance and

curriculum. As Gidney (1999) notes these motifs form

the structural basis of Ontario’s school system. How-

ever, an investigation into these themes also uncovers

the extraordinary spatial variations that can arise within

contextually specific institutional landscapes as neolib-

eral initiatives are imposed (Brenner and Theodore,

2002, p. 6). These are particularly evident at the local

school level. Basu (2004) explains the unique local

specificities of public schools in Ontario that are notusually considered during the design and implementa-

tion of ‘universalistic’ neoliberal policies: First, schools

are one of the few publicly funded community resources

present in every neighbourhood across the city and vary

by the socio-demographic composition, history and

culture of the neighbourhood they are located within.

Second, though the primary purpose of these public

institutions is educational, schools can also be thought

to be centres for civic renewal since they provide a

common space for neighbourhood integration. Third,

schools are essentially political in nature and can often

be the battleground for larger social change. Fourth,

schools are intrinsically spatial in nature and the parti-tioning of space into local school districts has direct

effects on the welfare and status of a neighbourhood.

Witten et al. (2001) similarly argue that schools can

serve as catalysts for community participation, social

cohesion and the vitality of neighbourhoods. The neo-

liberal doctrine of ‘one size fits all’ is therefore prob-

lematic in the case of school districts due to the spatial

disjunctures that can arise from these local specificities.

Despite these tensions neoliberal ideals were slowly ad-

vanced, modified and cemented into the education arena

over the next few years.

R. Basu / Geoforum 35 (2004) 621–634 623



2.2. Gaining a foothold: constructing a neoliberal agenda

2.2.1. Educational governance: the actors

‘‘My problem is to see how men govern (themselves

and others) by the production of truth.’’ Foucault

Various state and non-state actors are involved in the

public education system in Ontario both at the provin-

cial and local level (see Fig. 1). At the provincial level,

the Ministry of Education and Training (MET) is for-

mally responsible for developing curriculum guidelines,

certifying teachers, and requiring that school boards

have policies in specific areas. The driving force and

governmental reason behind the cabinet’s message

conveyed in the CSR was fiscal efficiency and tax saving

strategies. The government’s electoral promise of a 30%

reduction in personal provincial income tax while

simultaneously endeavouring to eliminate an $8 billion

budget deficit was the main motivational factor behind

many of the policies designed in subsequent years––in

other words, policy initiatives were rooted in ‘economic

rationalism’ (Wilson, 2001). As the following section

reveals, the overall strategy in the area of neoliberal

governance was to slowly increase control at the centre

through the appointment of regulatory bodies while

Education

(72)

Boards of

REGIONAL/

MUNICIPAL

AGENTS

Ministry

of

Education

Cabinet

Common

Sense

Revolution

Teachers’

Unions

Agencies,

Commissions

PROVINCIAL

SCALE

• Education

Improvement

Commission (EIC)

• Education

Quality and

Accountability

Office (EQAO)

• Ontario Parent

Council

• Languages of

InstructionCommision of

Ontario

• Minister’s

Advisory Council

on Special

Education

• Provincial

Schools Authority

• Ontario

Teacher’s

Federation

• Elementary

Teacher’s

Federation of

Ontario

• Ontario

Secondary

School

Teachers’Federation

• Ontario

English

Catholic

Teachers’

Association

• Association

des

enseignantes

et des

enseignants

franco-

ontariens

• English

Language Public

District School

Boards (31)

• English Language

Catholic District

School Boards (29)

• French Language

Public District

School Boards (4)• French Language

Catholic District

School Boards (8)

LOCAL

AGENTS

Private

School

Parents

Non-

ParentsPublic

School

Parents

Principals

and Vice-

PrincipalsCaretakers/

Support

Staff

Teachers

Activist Groups:

Parents for Education,

Metro Parents Network

Board Watch

Community

Organizations,

Businesses

Ontario

College of

Teachers

Business

Groups/

Sponsors

Fig. 1. Actors in Ontario’s public education system.

624 R. Basu / Geoforum 35 (2004) 621–634



reducing power at the board and local level. By imple-

menting various legislations and appealing to the emo-

tions, logics and ethics of the electorate, neoliberal

discourse was rationalized at various scales. Some of the

strategies and techniques used in governance were

through the use of quangos, rhetoric and discourse;

fragmenting collective bargaining; and the recruitment

of neoliberal volunteers.

2.2.1.1. Quangos, rhetoric and discourse. One way that

the implementation of policies was attained and legiti-

mized by the ministry was with the appointment of

independent agencies as regulatory bodies––such as the

Ontario College of Teachers, Education Quality and

Accountability Office (EQAO), Education Improvement

Commission (EIC) and the Ontario Parent Council. The

function of these agencies also known as Quangos

(Quasi Autonomous Non Governmental Organisations)

was to provide advice to the MET and ensure

accountability and efficiency in specialized areas. Theagencies appointed by the MET also provided the

opportunity for monitoring, shaping and controlling

institutional behaviour according to neoliberal interests.

For example, in November 1995, the government sig-

nalled its intention to ensure that the ‘teaching profes-

sion would be made fully accountable to the public it

serves’ with the establishment of the Ontario College of

Teachers (OCT)––a 31 member governing council that

would independently regulate the province’s teaching

profession. The function of the OCT as defined by the

Royal Commission stated

‘‘teachers would collectively, through a College of

Teachers, set the standards for entry into teaching,

maintain a register of those licensed to teach in On-

tario, and determine the criteria for accrediting (or

recognizing) teacher education programs, whether

that means pre-service preparation or the on-going

professional development of practising teachers.’’

(p. 17)

Similarly, the function of the EQAO was to monitor and

report to the public on the performance of the education

system (by the use of test results) across the province.

Likewise, the function of the EIC was to oversee theimplementation of education reforms.

Many of the policies implemented during this time

period soon became controversial. However, the pres-

ence of centrally controlled advisory-agencies, operating

as neoliberal instruments of control, provided a way of

assuring the public that decisions were fair, just and

non-partisan. Publicly, what appeared to be a non-par-

tisan process may well have been a strategy to deflect

some of the heat the ministry had been receiving in

previous months. For example, Gerald Caplan, the co-

chair of the Royal Commission had publicly attacked

the ministry for misinterpreting the Royal Commission’s

research (see Wilson, 2001). The centralization of edu-

cation control (distinct from responsibility) through

these agencies was tied to the altered ideologies and

practices of the neoliberal state (see Witten et al., 2003).

At the Municipal level, School Boards operate

schools according to provincial legislation, provide

educational programs, and hire staff. Run by locally

elected trustees, they represent the interest of all voters

in their ward, regardless of citizenship status. This is

in contrast to federal and provincially elected politi-

cians, who are elected by Canadian citizens only. What

this implies, particularly in large urban areas where

there are many non-Canadian citizens including recent

immigrant and refugee children with special needs

such as English as a Second Language (ESL) and

settlement programs, is that accountability of political

leaders varies depending on the electorate. With the

centralization of resources and power this often leads

to the compromise of some services at the expense of others.

In 1998, the power of the boards was reduced in a

number of ways. Peck and Tickell (2002, p. 40) have

argued that in the asymmetrical scale politics of neo-

liberalism, local institutions and actors are increasingly

being given responsibility without power. This was re-

flected in a number of new reforms: First, the number of

boards operating in the province was reduced by amal-

gamation. Second, trustees were stripped of their control

over levying taxes which was now provincially deter-

mined. Third, the annual salary of trustees was capped

at a few thousand dollars another stealth measure toensure that the experienced and oppositional trustees

would no longer be in place to oppose the government.

The ‘rationalization’ of this process began in January

1997, when the Minister of Education announced the

need to reduce administrative costs by reducing the

number of school boards. Though trustees across On-

tario receive nominal remuneration, the message con-

veyed in the following statement implicates trustees as

part of the major financial problem:

‘‘As part of our commitment to move students to

the head of the class, we will refocus our resources

where they belong––on the individual student andteacher in the classroom. . . To do this, we will

streamline administration by cutting the number

of school boards by half, and eliminating politicians

by cutting the number of trustees by two-thirds.’’

(MET, January 1997)

Thus by 1998, as a cost-cutting strategy made on the

recommendations of the Ontario School Board Reduc-

tion Task Force, 129 major school boards in Ontario

were reduced to 72 ‘district boards’––classified under

English and French Public and Separate School Boards.

R. Basu / Geoforum 35 (2004) 621–634 625



The number of trustees was similarly cut from almost

1900 to approximately 700. 1 By 1998, the six cities and

boroughs that made up the Municipality of Metropoli-

tan Toronto were amalgamated into a single city of

Toronto. The six boards of education were similarly

merged into the new Toronto District School Board

(TDSB) as part of a fundamental realignment of taxa-

tion and spending between the province of Ontario and

its municipal governments (Basu, 2002). Currently the

largest board in Canada and among the 10 largest in

North America, it has a full-time student enrolment of

over 300,000 (1998–1999 TDSB School Brochure).

2.2.1.2. Fragmenting collective bargaining . By 1998, the

power of principals and vice-principals was considerably

reduced: First, as a measure of cost cutting, schools with

fewer than 350 students were required to share a prin-

cipal or ‘double up’. Second, after a province wide strike

in October 1997, principals and vice-principals wereremoved from teachers’ unions. Following the logic of

the market big business has encouraged government and

the public to see big unions as foot-dragging impedi-

ments to economic restructuring and prosperity (see

Barlow and Robertson, 1994).

The relations between teachers and the province had

become increasingly strained with the implementation of

new rules and regulations but did not go uncontested

despite the removal of principals and vice principals from

unions. A province wide strike in October 1997 over Bill

160 (dealing with class size, preparation time and cur-

ricula) was determined unlawful. It was deemed the

largest such strike in Canadian educational history–– with 126,000 teachers walking the picket line and 2.1

million students out of their classroom (Wilson, 2001).

The power of teachers was changed considerably

through legislation and discourse. As a result of the

protest an evaluation of Bill 100 (dealing with collective

bargaining rights) was considered to strip teachers’ un-

ions of the right to strike. Second, student instructional

time was increased by decreasing teacher preparation

time and professional advancement (PA) days. Third,

after-school curricular activities––activities that were

traditionally provided on a volunteer basis––were to be

mandated. Fourth, teachers were to be tested every fiveyears for re-certification purposes. These measures, the

ministry argued, were not only cost-saving strategies but

would also result in more time spent ‘within the class-

room’. In August 1996, the government had released

two reports to the public indicating why education costs

were higher in Ontario. Along with trustees, teachers

were now portrayed as being part of the financial prob-

lem and the reason behind high property taxes.

‘‘Teacher salaries had driven up education costs dis-

proportionately to other provinces since 1984’’ and

as a result ‘‘100 Ontario school boards had raisedproperty taxes.’’ (MET, August 1996)

Using this rationalization, the province rhetorically ar-

gued that it was necessary to examine ‘outdated school

board/teacher bargaining rules’ by conducting a review

of Bill 100. The timing of this proposition was impor-

tant. Due to the expiry of the Social Contract 2 set by

the previous government, collective bargaining negoti-

ations related to the salaries of teachers were antici-

pated. By November 1996, Bill 100 was invalidated and

the collective bargaining process for teachers was

incorporated into the Labour Relations Act. Strategies

now included using rhetoric on the plight of childrenwhere the Ministry now argued

‘‘Bill 100 is outdated, inadequate and worst of all,

does nothing to clarify who is ultimately responsi-

ble and accountable for educating our children.

And it is the children who suffer as a result.’’

(Emphasis added to illustrate the use of rhetoric.)

Other rationalizations included

‘‘Over the past 20 years, strikes have resulted in

more than 17 million student days lost. That is adisgrace and should not be tolerated .’’ (emphasis

added) (MET, November 1996)

Validity is established by mode of communication––

in this case by an attempt to shift the blame to labour

unrest and striking teachers. The neoliberal ideals were

slowly advanced and cemented by appealing to the

logics (financial savings, efficiency within the class-

room), ethics (waste of time due to strikes), and emotion

(state of children) of the public.

2.2.1.3. Recruiting neoliberal volunteers. At the locallevel there are many actor agents outside the state sys-

tem. In Ontario, school councils became mandatory in

1998. These local volunteer bodies also faced increased

responsibilities and less power in the form of ‘commu-

nity responsibilisation’ (see Witten et al., 2003). Their

role defined by the Royal Commission on Learning was

to provide advice to principals and school boards on1 The Ministry of Education argued that other provinces in Canada

were following such restructuring measures by reducing the number of

boards (British Columbia––reduced from 75 to 57; Alberta 181 to 57;

Saskatchewan, Manitoba, Quebec and New Brunswick––18 school

boards eliminated altogether (MET, Background Report, 1997).

2 Negotiated in 1993, the social contract froze salary increases and

pay increases based on teaching experience for three years (News

Release, August 1996).

626 R. Basu / Geoforum 35 (2004) 621–634



various local issues such as school budgets, curriculum

and program priorities, school code behaviour, com-

munity use of school facilities and the selection of

principals. Elected at the neighbourhood level, council

members are local volunteers representing the welfare of

their immediate school. According to market logics such

voluntary, self interested groups are primarily driven by

the interests of their local children and the activities of

the council are geared towards improving the conditions

and facilities of the neighbourhood school. However,

paradoxically, though school councils appear to func-

tion as ‘state volunteers’ providing the services of a

shrinking welfare state (see Deem et al., 1995), networks

between public schools have also resulted in advocacy

groups that are more widespread in nature. In contrary

to neoliberal ideologies that foster competition and

individual self interest, local neighbourhood schools

have also expanded into networks and alliances whose

concerns extend beyond the ‘particular local interests’.

Some examples of informal political groups that beganto take an active role and challenge policies include

Parents for Education (P4E); Metro Parents Network;

and Board Watch among many others. Finally, other

stakeholders in the education system include caregivers

with children (i.e. parents, grandparents) in the private

education system, businesses and other community

groups.

2.2.2. Finance: centralization of control and equitable

funding

In the ‘hollowing out’ of the post-welfare state,

schooling remains compulsory and the state still ownsand funds the majority of schools (Witten et al., 2003).

Funding however, is guided by the models of the Neo-

liberal State with their concerns for fiscal efficiency,

accountability and choice. In October 1995, soon after

the elections, the government announced a reduction

target of $79.8 million to the education system. A gov-

ernment press release in December 1995 stated that

‘Ontario spent approximately $600 more per student

than the average of all the other provinces, for a total of

$1.3 billion more’. The goal of the ministry was to bring

the costs down to an average rather than maintain its

position as the ‘highest spender’ in public education.

What was implied once again was that the educationsystem was riddled with bureaucratic inefficiencies and

was squandering taxpayers’ money. Schools could

achieve better fiscal efficiency, it was argued, if they were

to be placed in a competitive market and managed like

businesses (see Barlow and Robertson, 1994). Among the

immediate cuts announced in the budget was a reduction

in the transfer payment to school boards ($32 million);

cancellation of early childhood education pilot projects

and reduction in administrative services. By December

1995, announcements were even made on cuts that would

make Junior Kindergarten optional for boards and that

would no longer qualify adult students for full-time

status funding. The importance of early childhood edu-

cation, as recommended by the Royal Commission, did

not appear to be ‘cost effective’. By March 1996, the

introduction of The Education Amendment Act 3 allowed

these cuts to be legislated. During this process of

aggressive restraints the electorate was reassured that

though cuts were necessary, essential areas would be

safeguarded, i.e. classroom funding would be protected

and local taxes would not increase. The ideological

stance associated with social justice, equity, progress and

citizenship rights in Ontario’s public education system

(such as expanding into programs related to early

childhood education and adult education) were touted as

costly to maintain and the focus instead, slowly changed

to one of protecting self interest and increasing choice

(classroom funding and saving taxes).

One of the most radical changes, typical of neo-lib-

eral practices, was the centralization of financial control.

Since the creation of Ontario’s school system in the1840s, local autonomy rested on the ability of school

boards to raise their own revenues (Gidney, 1999).

School boards till the early nineties relied on a combi-

nation of local property taxes (residential, industrial and

commercial) and grants from the provincial government

to manage their schools. 4 By 1998 however, the provin-

cial government assumed the power to set the amount to

be raised by school boards from local property taxes. In

order to ensure equitable funding in schools across the

province, the responsibility of financing local schools

was to be centralized and transferred from the municipal

board to the provincial level. School board expenditureswere to be identified and categorized according to––di-

rect classroom expenditures, operational support and

administrative support. 5 The board expenditure on the

3 Amendments to The Education Act included making the delivery

of junior kindergarten optional; directing adult students to continuing

education courses; promoting equitable impacts throughout the system

by enabling negative grant boards to contribute their share of savings;

require that school boards report annually on co-operative initiatives

(MET, March 1996).4 Provincial grants can be classified under ‘foundation grant’,

‘categorical grant’ and ‘equalization adjustment’. The foundationgrant provides a basic amount per pupil; categorical grant provides

funding for special costs and needs; while the equalization adjustment

amount is provided to compensate poorer areas.5 Classroom funding defined as spending on––classroom teachers;

supply teachers; teacher assistants; textbooks and classroom supplies;

computers; library and guidance services; professional and parapro-

fessional services; funding for staff development (65% of all spending

to be directed to direct classroom spending).

Non-classroom funding defined as all other funding-trustees;

school board administration; debt charges; directors of education and

supervisory officers; teacher preparation time; department heads;

transportation; teacher consultants; school operations; continuing

education; principals and vice-principals; school secretaries (Ministry

of Education and Training Background Report, March 1998).

R. Basu / Geoforum 35 (2004) 621–634 627



last two categories were to be limited to less than 40% of

total budgets in order to promote ‘equitable amount of

direct classroom expenditure per pupil’ (Ontario School

Board Reduction Task Force, Final Report, 1996). This

was argued to be a more ‘fair’ way of allocating varia-

tions that existed across boards due to differential

property values––the disproportionate distribution of

education funds leaning towards more heavily popu-

lated urban areas with significant industrial bases (Wil-

son, 2001). However, instead of raising the standard,

recommendations were based on bringing down expen-

ditures to an average level 6 or equalizing down to the

lowest common denominator. A press release in March

1997, announced the support of the Fewer School Boards

Act by the ‘Ontario Parent Council’.

Parallel to this, in September 1996, the need for a new

funding model was announced. The minister stressed

that a new funding model would promote fairness and

equity across the education system in Ontario:

‘‘Parents can be sure that, no matter where they live

in Ontario, their kids will have the same opportu-

nity to excel. There is no such thing as a second-class

student in Ontario. The new model will recognize

that different communities face different challenges

to providing high quality education.’’ (emphasis

added)

while at the same time be fiscally responsible:

‘‘With the new, streamlined model it will be easier

to see where the money is going, to understandwhy it is going there, and to compare how well tax-

payers’ dollars are being managed.’’ (MET, Sep-

tember 1996)

Through the use of rhetorical arguments appeals to

the logic, emotion and ethics were once again used in

public communication to promote and legitimize neo-

liberal discourse. Part of the technique was to allow

some leniency in order to rationalize decisions further.

Thus, though the core message was to build a policy of

fiscal restraint, the Ministry acknowledged the need for

capital investment due to rising enrolments. Soon after,however, a report released in January 1997 entitled

‘Analysis of Capital Funding for School Facilities’ stated

that a new funding model was necessary in order to

‘identify new strategies to utilize schools more effectively

thereby reducing the need for new pupil spaces’. The

rationalization proposed was that school space was not

being used effectively. This verdict set the stage for the

implementation of Bill 160 which proposed the wide-

spread closure of schools across the province. The

implication of this will be discussed later on.

2.2.3. Curriculum: regulating knowledge and classroom

spaceSpaces of learning are politicized and the neoliberal-

ization of the classroom was promoted in different ways.

The rationalization of restructuring was legitimized by a

perceived need to remain globally competitive in a

‘knowledge based economy’ while at the same time

maintain fiscal efficiency and accountability. In order to

remain competitive in a global market the education

system would need to increase educational standards

and improve outcomes. The techniques and strategies

included an ‘audit culture’ framed in terms of quality,

accountability and empowerment that would assure that

these goals were indeed maintained (see Shore and

Wright, 1999). In the message of the ‘CSR’ this wasattained by conveying to voters the necessity to increase

accountability and regulation within the classroom.

Classroom funding was to be protected and enhanced by

redirecting money saved in administrative costs. This

was accomplished in various ways: First, in November

1995, announcements were made to reduce the second-

ary system from five years to four years by the year

2001. This, it was argued would amount to ‘savings for

taxpayers of $350 million annually’ (MET, November

1995). Second, in order to enhance optimal learning

conditions, classroom sizes were to be maintained at a

reasonable level––defined as 25 students in elementaryclassrooms and 22 students in high school classrooms.

Another example of increased regulation within the

classroom came about with the introduction of stan-

dardized report cards and standardized testing across

the province. In 1998, the Ontario Provincial Govern-

ment, through the Education Quality and Accountabil-

ity Office (EQAO), introduced mandatory standardized

testing for grades three and six in Public Elementary

Schools as the beginning of a process of ‘public

accountability and excellence in education for Ontario

students and taxpayers’ (MET, November 1995). Pro-

ponents for this method of evaluation (this included the

‘Ontario Parent Council’ once again) argued that suchprocedures were valuable to teachers, schools and the

community at large since they would inform teaching

and learning. With the release of test results to the

media, this ‘technique of power’ allowed individual

schools to police themselves within the public realm. In

Foucaultian terms this disciplinary mechanism marked

a new form of coercive neo-liberal governmentality

(Shore and Wright, 1999).

In order to facilitate the process of standardized

testing––based on the recommendations of the Educa-

tion Improvement Commission’s (EIC) report entitled

6 Mackenzie (1998) argues that these spending levels were brought

down to a median level (where Boards across Ontario were ranked

according to spending) rather than an average level.

628 R. Basu / Geoforum 35 (2004) 621–634



The Road Ahead (1997)––the Ministry argued that it was

also necessary for teachers to spend more time in the

classroom. This argument was further fuelled by the first

set of test results released in October 1997, which indi-

cated a ‘need for improvement to meet the standards set

in Ontario’. By 1998, province-wide standards for the

amount of time teachers were to spend in the classroom

were set. By rationalizing the need for measuring and

tracking teacher performance, hours in the classroom,

standardized curriculum, student testing and classroom

sizes the process of neoliberalizing the classroom assured

the public that institutional effectiveness would be

maintained.

2.3. Period of dissent: contesting the rationalization of

school closures––Bill 160

So far the slow and steady construction and consol-

idation of neoliberal policies and principles into the

education system in Ontario was largely accepted andremained unchallenged (up to this point) by the majority

of the population due to two reasons: First, they were

persuaded by the rationales offered by the newly elected

government, and second, because policy change by

‘stealth approach’ was used to legitimize practices. The

core elements of this style are that changes to policy are

made without a genuine process of public consultation

or debate and are done through technical measures an-

nounced in budgets (Prince, 1999, p. 158). The main

goals of a stealth approach are eliminating government

deficits and reducing national debt. Changes are usually

expressed in arcane and technical language involvingamendments to obscure legislation or regulations

(Prince, 1999) and with considerable speed (Murphy and

Kearns, 1994).

The first two years of aggressive changes (1995–1997)

though largely uncontested soon began to falter. As

mentioned earlier by September 1997, the stage was set

for the introduction of one of the most radical bills in

the history of education in Ontario–– The Education

Quality Improvement Act (Bill 160). The Bill was pro-

posed as the next logical step to The Fewer School

Boards Act (Bill 104) discussed above. The goal of the

new bill (nearly 300 pages in length) was to continue

with the ideology of the ‘CSR’ to ‘ensure the highestquality of education in the most cost effective manner’.

Changes and amendments to the Education Act were

made in several major areas: governance, finance, labour

relations and matters related to instruction in Ontario’s

schools (Bill 160 Compendium, September 1997). The

changes, many of them discussed in the previous section,

were to be set by regulation, not requiring approval by

the legislature. According to Gidney (1999) this strategy

of stealth allowed sections in Bill 160 (such as the

complexity of the funding formula) to escape public

scrutiny.

The release and formalization of the various policies

in Bill 160 soon led to a state of disarray and chaos

across the province (see Gidney, 1999). The conse-

quences of the impact were at first contested by those

affected directly––mainly teachers, school trustees and

parent activists involved with education reform. Large-

scale teacher protests over Bill 160 were widely publi-

cized in the media. As mentioned earlier, this strike was

the largest in Canadian educational history and did have

an impact. In October 1997, the Minister of Education,

John Snobelen (infamously known for his comment on

‘creating a crisis in education’ in 1995) was transferred

to the Ministry of Natural Resources. However, in

October 1997, after a two-week long period, the tea-

cher’s strike was declared illegal. The conflicts between

the province and teachers’ unions were widely publi-

cized by both sides to gain public support. For exam-

ple, the Ministry ordered Boards to repay families up to

$40/day for payments in childcare incurred due to the

strike.Soon after in March 1998, the release of the Student-

focused funding model was announced. As part of Bill

160, it was geared towards the allocation of one basic

universal per pupil Foundation Grant. This amount––

$3367 for each elementary student and $3953 for each

secondary student––was to be allocated for students

living anywhere in Ontario. This at first seemed to be a

fair approach. The Minister pledged

‘‘By allocating funds specifically to classroom and

non-classroom areas, we will ensure that students

and teachers in the classroom are clear priorities. . .

We will not fund waste; we are investing in our chil-

dren and in quality.’’ (MET, March 1998) (emphasis

added)

In addition to the Foundation Grant (which includes

10 separate grants) there were nine Special Purpose

grants and a Pupil Accommodation Grant. Special Pur-

pose Grants included funds towards Early Learning,

Special Education, Language, Geography, Transporta-

tion, Adult and Continuing Education, School Board

Administration and Governance and Learning Oppor-

tunities.However, the issue of school closures was a conse-

quence of the Pupil Accommodation Grant. This in-

cluded costs of operating, maintaining and constructing

school buildings. According to this component of the

model, boards qualified for funding of new pupil places

‘when they demonstrate that they had used all their

existing school buildings effectively and could not

accommodate increased enrolment without additional

space’ (MET, 1998). The Boards across the province

were given six months (by September 1998) to develop a

policy on ‘accommodating students effectively’. If

R. Basu / Geoforum 35 (2004) 621–634 629



Boards failed to comply with these regulations and were

to incur financial difficulties or run at a deficit, the

province would assume control over financial decisions.

In addition to this, trustees would be held accountable

by the law if they failed to comply with the minister’s

regulations. 7 The funding formula was to be imple-

mented––regardless of opposition.

So far, parties directly affected contested the impli-

cations from Bill 160. In July 1998, two groups (Ontario

English Catholic Teachers’ Association and the Ontario

Public School Boards’ Association) challenged 14 as-

pects of the 396 sections of Bill 160. By September 1998,

7400 teachers across the Greater Toronto Area were on

strike (Toronto Star, September 1998) once again.

Soon however, the announcement of the Pupil

Accommodation grant was followed by the threat of

potential school closures across the province. The

political definitions regarding what constituted educa-

tional space and what spaces were ‘frill’ areas (often

music rooms, child care spaces) link back to the logics of neoliberal ideologies as to the core areas for education.

According to reports released by the Toronto District

School Board, the provincial funding formula translated

into an excess capacity of 11 million square feet. This

figure was calculated by multiplying the total number of

students by 100 square feet per elementary student and

130 square feet per high school student. The Board then

argued that the only way it could eliminate 8 million

square feet was by closing 138 schools. The media

widely publicized the loss of other school based pro-

grams such as the state of childcare within schools, ESL

programs, Adult Education and other community basedprograms. 8 When the Toronto City Council was pres-

sured to provide some answers, it responded by arguing

that in order to cover the costs of keeping all of the city’s

138 threatened schools open, local property taxes would

need to be increased (Toronto Star, November 1998).

The message soon became clear. A large number of

school closures, it was argued, were necessary in order to

adhere to policies. The strategy that the school board

planners used in 1998 can be considered as both a

technical and political response (see Flyvbjerg, 1998).

On the technical side, they were able to respond by

implementing the provincial policy to its fullest extent

thus exposing the inadequacies of the funding formula.The issue of school closures soon generated a large scale

urban social movement in Toronto––whereby many

residents were outraged at the prospect of losing so

many publicly funded schools and collectively organized

protests and rallies across the city (see Basu, 2004).

Participants in these protests included teachers, stu-

dents, parents and politicians. For example, protests

such as the ‘Green Ribbon Campaign’ were organized

by the Parents for Education activist group across the

city. Protests took place in front of the neighbourhood

schools and were not restricted to demonstrations in

front of school boards or the ministry headquarters. The

widespread visibility of dissent led to the message being

heard across various communities. Phipps (2000) simi-

larly notes the successful movements against school

closures in Essex County, Ontario based on the com-

munity’s knowledge of neighbourhood rules and re-

sources.

The threat of school closures evokes a passionate

response in communities (see Witten et al., 2003; Bondi,

1987). When institutional restructuring unfolds at the

local level negotiations begin to take place (see Brenner

and Theodore, 2002). What is conveyed in the following

statements are the sentiments attached to neighbour-hood schools when faced with closure.

For example, Gidney notes (1999, p. 274)

‘‘When both rural and urban boards began to re-

lease lists of specific schools to be axed––schools

which children actually attended and which were

rooted in real communities––protests mounted in

villages, towns and cities alike.’’

Newspaper articles at this time period report

‘‘What has become clear is that Toronto is tied toits neighbourhood schools in a big way.’’ (Toronto

Sun, December 1998)

‘‘They’re not just schools, they’re meeting places.

They’re the heart and souls of our communities. . ..

Our final position is that no school, under this

funding formula, should close.’’ (Toronto Star,

November 1998)

By November 1998, the power of some neighbour-

hood-based collective action on the planning decision

translated into the re-negotiation of the funding for-

mula. A newspaper report alludes to this strategy:

‘‘Objectively, there may indeed have been enough

money for Toronto under the provincial funding

formula to keep all or most of the 138 school open,

provided that the school board was willing to make

cuts elsewhere, which it wasn’t.’’ (Toronto Star,

November 1998)

Though trustees, it seemed, had lost their power to

levy taxes and most of their salaries, they still held the

responsibility of accountability to their constituents and

7 In March 2000, The Greater Essex County Board passed a motion

that indicated the majority of trustees were prepared to approve a

deficit budget, contrary to the Education Act (News Release, March

2000).8 A news release stated that 71 day cares would close and would

affect 3500 children (Toronto Star, October 1998).

630 R. Basu / Geoforum 35 (2004) 621–634



were able to take advantage of this position. The polit-

icizing of planning by the announcement of mass clo-

sures of schools had managed to spark considerable

dissent across the city. The Premier immediately an-

nounced a package of initiatives designed to ‘make the

province’s education funding formula more flexible’

(MET, November 1998) and announced the injection of

more than $200 million into the funding formula (Tor-

onto Star, November 1998). To assist the board in

finding savings the government announced four initia-

tives, mainly:

• To maintain the current levels of funding for a one

year period to assist school boards that were phas-

ing-in reductions.

• To provide additional flexibility in the form of a 20%

operating fund top-up (schools operating at an 80%

enrolment level would be funded at a full level).

• To adjust the formula to reflect the unique design fea-

tures of many schools (larger hallways).• To provide the assistance of an expert management

company to analyze boards budgets and operations

and provide recommendations (MET, November

1998).

In this case during open confrontation rationality yields

to power (Flyvbjerg, 1998)––whereby the cabinet chan-

ged its funding formula due to resulting public reaction.

What is interesting to note in relation to power

dynamics is that neighbourhood residents (constituents)

operating from an informal semi-institutionalized posi-

tion had greater authority than agents operating withinthe formal structure ––i.e. teachers, trustees. Centralized

government felt compelled to show some sort of flexi-

bility in the design of the policy when compromising

with the ‘realities’ on the ground. Following this event

the interim strategy, influenced by this initial collective

action for the 481 public elementary schools in Toronto,

was a long range planning exercise, divided into three

phases that envisaged the proposed closure of 30 schools

over three years (1999, 2000, 2001). The change from a

formula that necessitated the closure of 138 schools (at

once) to 30 schools (over a period of three years) is an

exemplary case of the malleability of neoliberalism to

maintain its legitimacy (see Student-Focused FundingModel, 1997; Pupil Accommodation Review, 1999;

School Closures––September 2001, 2000). The one-time-

only mitigation fund illustrates how antagonistic con-

frontation is avoided and how stable power relations are

promoted by power.

2.4. Period of quiet anticipation

Before concluding, the events that followed (till the

end of 2000) are briefly summarized. After the wide-

spread dissent of Bill 160 what followed was a relatively

quiet year in preparation for the forthcoming provincial

elections that was to take place in June 1999. The mes-

sage in the election campaign was the same as before: to

improve the quality of education; to improve funding in

the classroom; and to improve accountability to stu-

dents, parents and taxpayers. In the 1999 provincial

elections, the Provincial Conservative Government was

re-elected to power. The Minister of Education, David

Johnson, however, was defeated at the polls. Janet

Ecker, previously the Minister of Social and Community

Services, was brought in as the new Minister of Edu-

cation. By March 2000, as a form of protest against new

regulations related to instructional time, teachers from

Janet Ecker’s riding––The Durham Board of Educa-

tion––withdrew after-school extra-curricular activities.

Due to the withdrawal of these volunteer services, the

Minister announced the need for new legislation–– The

Education Accountability Act, 2000 (Bill 74). 9 Activities

outside the classroom (that were traditionally provided

on a volunteer basis) were now to be classified as ‘‘co-instructional’’ (not extra) and to be reported to the

Ministry by the boards. Parallel to the implementation

of Bill 74, the focus for the rest of 2000 was mainly on

issues related to regulating safety, discipline, code of

conduct and student behaviour, such as the passing of

The Safe Schools Act and partnership with police. Issues

popular with voters and the theme of the CSR were

reinforced to promote, build and legalize ideals of safety

and security in Ontario’s schools.

3. Conclusion

In this paper, the rationalization of neoliberal dis-

course during a period of structural readjustment in

Ontario’s education system was examined. From a

period of aggressive construction and consolidation of

market based principles; followed by a period of dissent

and chaos; and to a period of quiet anticipation before

the elections––the neoliberal agenda of the CSR used a

variety of techniques and strategies to gain a foothold

and entrench itself more firmly in the education system.

Policies driving the agenda of education reform illus-

trate many features of neoliberal discourse such asincreasing concerns with issues of privatization, mar-

ketisation and performativity in the school system (see

Apple, 2001). The rationalization of restructuring was

legitimized by first establishing an immediate need for

schools to raise their standards and adjust their curric-

ulum in order to remain competitive in a global eco-

nomy. However, as the underlying motivation of the

9 Instructional time was to continue to be regulated at 4 h and 20

min for elementary students and 4 h and 10 min (equivalent of 6.67

credits/yr) for secondary students each day.

R. Basu / Geoforum 35 (2004) 621–634 631



CSR was deficit elimination and tax reduction, the dis-

course of fiscal efficiency and accountability were en-

trenched in all areas of reform. Changes included

funding cutbacks, centralization of financial control,

amalgamation of school boards, closure of schools,

standardized testing, teacher-testing, limiting the power

of teachers unions, mandatory school councils and

preparing students to meet the demands of the market.

In this paper I have argued that part of the success of

this ideological discourse was largely due to the strate-

gies and tactics used by the CSR to promote policies that

appeared legitimate and effective in improving the edu-

cation system.

Three types of techniques were used to aggressively

implement neoliberal policies in education during the

early years of the CSR. First, through the appointment

of various Quangos––such as the Education Improve-

ment Commission (EIC), Education Quality and

Accountability Office (EQAO), Ontario Parent Coun-

cil––where ‘objective’ advice was in reality geared to-wards legitimizing neoliberal economic rationalism.

Such systems operate under an ‘audit culture’ of gov-

ernance that allows the system to be placed under

surveillance and control through the ‘monitoring’,

‘standardizing’ and ‘accounting’ of performance in var-

ious sectors (see Foucault, 1991; Shore and Wright,

1999). What were proposed as being arm-length agen-

cies were not separate institutions in reality but tech-

niques of power used to create knowledge (see Flyvbjerg,

1998).

Another political technique leading up to the rapid

and harried legislation of neoliberal agendas wasimplementing policies through a ‘stealth approach’. As

discussed earlier this process is characterized by hidden

and closed process of budgeting, minimum public con-

sultation, and where arcane and technical language is

used to rationalize predetermined decisions (Prince,

1999). This was particularly evident in the implementa-

tion of Bill 160––a 300 page document, filled with

technical ambiguities and amendments in areas of fi-

nance, governance, labour relations and curriculum.

Other bills implemented this way included Bill 100

(reducing the bargaining power of teacher unions); Bill

104 (reducing the number of boards, centralizing

financial control, and reducing the power of localtrustees); Bill 74 (reducing the power of teachers and

imposing extra curriculum activities). Overall, the re-

form by stealth process was driven by economic and

ideological imperatives beyond education policy; intro-

duced with considerable haste; and instituted without

(or with minimum) public consultation (see Murphy and

Kearns, 1994).

Finally, numerous examples cited in the paper illus-

trate that in order to legitimize neoliberal ‘truths’ gov-

ernments use rhetoric, as an art of persuasion to appeal

to the logics, emotion and ethics of the public. Flyvbjerg

(1998) argues that communication is established via the

mode of communication that is eloquence, hidden con-

trol, rationalization, charisma and by using dependency

relations. As shown in the examples of this paper, pol-

iticians used persuasion techniques (both oral and

written techniques) that created doubt and allowed the

public to lose confidence in the system. Rhetorical lan-

guage such as ‘putting children first’, ‘local school

boards are inefficient and inept’, ‘unions are a problem’,

‘teachers do not spend enough time in the classroom’,

and ‘funding should be shifted back within the class-

room’ freely flowed from speeches and media releases.

Such rationalization techniques not only further pro-

mote, strengthen and consolidate the foundation of

neoliberal principles but also work towards appealing to

the general approval of the public.

However, neoliberalization is a process that is in

constant flux and riddled with contradictory rational-

izations based on power relations at different scales and

different time periods. The ideologies of neoliberalismproduced by the CSR did not go uncontested especially

during the early years. The period of aggressive imple-

mentation was challenged by various actors especially

when the implications were felt at the local level. Thus

for example, when the issue of school closures was

brought forward, the local boards retaliated by imple-

menting the formula to its fullest extent. This resulted in

large scale school closures and consequently led to grass-

root protests across the city. The scalar dynamics implied

that there was a spatial disjuncture in the rationalization

of neoliberal policies. What appeared to work at one

level (macro-provincial level) disintegrated at another(micro-neighbourhood level). As argued earlier on in the

paper, universal policies are problematic when the

specificities of local contexts are taken into account.

Local residents do not usually organize in response to

macro-societal changes and general conflicts, but typi-

cally around specific issues perceived as critical at the

local level (see Cox and Mair, 1988; Davis, 1991; Hasson

and Ley, 1994). What this implies, then, is that

some localities are better able to organize and protect

themselves against impending cutbacks (‘active’ neigh-

bourhoods) compared to others (more ‘dormant’ neigh-

bourhoods) (see Basu, 2002). This leads to further

inequalities in the provision of public services includingeducation particularly impacting different marginal

groups. I have written about the implications of these

local dynamics elsewhere (see Basu, 2002, 2004). As

noted, neoliberal policies were more responsive to

informal action (from ratepayers, neighbourhood

groups, school councils) than formal collective action

(such as teachers’ unions, caretakers’ unions). In order to

maintain legitimacy and support of the wider electorate,

policies were rapidly (though only temporarily) trans-

formed. This period of retreat or roll back was followed

by a phase of slow, non-confrontational, voter friendly

632 R. Basu / Geoforum 35 (2004) 621–634



policy building. Hence, in order to remain successful and

legitimate, neoliberal discourse is malleable and adjusts

according to power dynamics which differ by the context,

history and spatial dynamics of a place.

Thus by and large, though structural changes did not

go uncontested they were positively accepted by the

majority of the voters during the early years of the CSR.

With very clever and timely strategies the province was

rapidly able to restore its previous image––as a cham-

pion of the neo-liberal agenda.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Professors John Miron, Larry

Bourne and Kim England for their advice during the

research phase of this project. Special thanks to Editor

Jenny Robinson and three anonymous reviewers for

their invaluable feedback and critical comments.

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of schools win reprieve as Premier restores $200 million’’.

TorontoStar (November 4, 1998) ‘‘600 turnout to fightschoolclosing’’.

Toronto Star (November 7, 1998) Ian Urquhart’s Editorial ‘‘Premiercoughs up cash but school battle still rages’’.

Toronto Sun (December 9, 1998) ‘‘City can’t dodge school space bullet

Toronto’s budget problems have only just begun––and we’re

talking millions and millions of dollars’’.

634 R. Basu / Geoforum 35 (2004) 621–634

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