the republic of trinidad and tobago in the high court...

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THE REPUBLIC OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE

SUB-REGISTRY, SAN FERNANDO

No. CV 2008-01274

BETWEEN

DILLON HAYNES

Claimant

AND

THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

Defendant

Appearances:

Mr. Haresh Ramnath for the Claimant

Ms. Karlene Seenath instructed by Nairob Smart for the Defendant

Dated the 6th of March 2014

Before The Honourable Mr. Justice Devindra Rampersad

JUDGMENT

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ContentsIntroduction .................................................................................................................................... 3

The Case.......................................................................................................................................... 3

Issues............................................................................................................................................... 5

The Claimant’s evidence ................................................................................................................. 5

Dillon Haynes .............................................................................................................................. 5

Cross Examination................................................................................................................... 7

The Defendant’s evidence .............................................................................................................. 8

Wendell Manohar ....................................................................................................................... 8

Cross examination................................................................................................................... 9

Richard Smith.............................................................................................................................. 9

Cross examination................................................................................................................. 11

Marlon Mendoza....................................................................................................................... 11


Dhanraj Malloo ......................................................................................................................... 12


Anand Bissoon........................................................................................................................... 13

Submissions................................................................................................................................... 13

Claimants submissions .............................................................................................................. 13

Defendant’s submissions .......................................................................................................... 14

The law involved ........................................................................................................................... 16

The Seizure and Retention of the Goods.................................................................................. 16

Standing Orders of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service .................................................... 18

Standing Order 26................................................................................................................. 18

Owner/Ownership .................................................................................................................... 20

The resolution of the case ............................................................................................................ 20

Items unaccounted for.............................................................................................................. 25

The Order: ..................................................................................................................................... 25

Closing comments:........................................................................................................................ 26

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Introduction

1. On 9 August 2007, police descended upon the home of the claimant and removed a

number of personal items and vehicles which the police contended that they had

reasonable grounds to believe were stolen items. Those items were taken and retained by

the police. This action was brought by the claimant for the return of his personal items

and vehicles and for damages in respect of the failure to return several items which the

police have been unable to account for.

2. Some of the personal items were returned on 13 October 2009 and then some others on

14 April 2011. Seven of the items which were detained included motor vehicles, five of

which were returned on the eve of the trial in this matter.

3. The parties consented to the trial being conducted on the issue of liability only in light of

the great number of items which were involved and which would have caused a trial on

both liability and quantum to have been exceedingly long as the claimant would have had

to have called a multitude of witnesses on the issue of quantum.

The Case

4. The claimant brought this action pursuant to the State Liability and Proceedings Act

Chapter 8:02 of the laws of Trinidad and Tobago. The claimant, who was involved at the

time in the business of money lending, claims that on 9 August 2007, several police

officers from the Gran Couva Police Station and the Criminal Investigation Department

of San Fernando entered his business place and home and took possession of several

items. The items were comprehensively detailed in approximately 9 pages of the

statement of case amounting to a total value of $888,917.00. The claimant says that as a

consequence, he has lost the value of the said items and has been unable to carry on his

business and has been deprived of the profits that he ordinarily would have made.

Particulars of loss and damage were pleaded which included the said value of the items,

and loss of earnings of $10,125.00 per week from the 9th of August 2007 and continuing.

In the alternative the claimant says that he was, and is, the owner of the items and is

entitled to possession of the items. The claimant says that by letter dated 13 March 2008,

he requested the return of his items and has received no response. The claimant therefore

claimed for damages for trespass to goods, alternatively damages for detinue and/or

conversion, aggravated and/or exemplary damages, interest and costs.

5. The defendant on the other hand admitted that on 9 August 2007 several police officers

entered the claimant’s premises and took possession of a number of items – the items

which were identified in the claimant’s list in his statement of case were listed in just

under half of a page of the defence suggesting that there was no consensus on the balance

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of the items listed in the statement of case. The defendant averred that the police officers

acted lawfully in the performance of their duties and were justified in seizing the items.

The defendant said that on the date in question, one PC Manohar together with one

Corporal Harrysingh, one PC Mallo and a party of officers proceeded to the home of the

claimant where they executed a search warrant for stolen articles relative to a report of

house breaking and larceny. During the search many items were found, including a

firearm believed to be holding ammunition, and a quantity of electronic items for which

the claimant had no receipt. The defendant says that claimant remained silent when he

was informed that it was the opinion of the officers that the items were stolen or

unlawfully obtained. According to the defendant, the search also revealed several motor

vehicles for which the claimant could not provide proof of ownership. The defendant said

that as a result of enquiries made, PC Manohar had reasonable cause to suspect that the

questioned items did not belong to the claimant but were stolen or unlawfully obtained.

Subsequent to this search, on 15 August 2007 one PC Mendoza went to the garage of one

Egbert Rouse and seized two motor vehicles – PBR 5502 and PBH 3548 - one of which

had a chassis number that was alleged to have been tampered with. The claimant was

subsequently arrested for a number of offences including possession of a firearm,

possession of ammunition and receiving stolen articles.

6. The defendant on this basis denied having unlawfully converted or detained the

claimant’s goods or any goods lawfully owned by the claimant and denied further that the

claimant was entitled to any relief sought.

7. In reply to the defence the claimant says that he informed the police officers that several

persons pawned items with him as he was a moneylender and that the warrant had a list

of items which were pawned during the same week. The claimant says that he handed

over those listed items to the police. He claims that he informed the police that for some

of the items he had promissory notes and for some he had receipts. There were also some

items which the claimant said either belonged to him or which did not have receipts. The

claimant says that because the promissory notes were taken by the police officer he is

unable to recover monies owed on them to him by clients but these were not identified.

The claimant denies that the defendant seized all of the vehicles referred to in paragraph

5(h) of the defence from his premises and instead claims that there were only two

vehicles on the compound on that date in question, being PBT 9743 and TBE 2118. The

other vehicles – PCB 5371, PBJ 1714 AND PBG 4005 - according to the claimant, were

leased and the claimant was made to call them in. The claimant insisted that he had

documents relating to the ownership of these vehicles and that the police officers took

some of the same documents but did not pay attention to their contents. The claimant

went on to explain his manner of obtaining possession and/or his title of and in the seven

vehicles. The claimant says that he was accused of bribing the Couva police and paying

bandits to rob people and he denied these accusations. The claimant admits that he was

arrested but says that on 1 December 2008 the receiving stolen articles cases were

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dismissed by Magistrate Ayers-Caesar and on 22 January 2009 the arms and ammunition

charges were dismissed.

Issues

8. The parties agreed that the trial would be on liability alone.

9. An agreed statement of issues was filed on 30 April 2012. The issues for determination

were listed as follows:

9.1. Whether the State is liable to pay compensation to the claimant for the items

seized?

9.2. Whether the State is liable to pay compensation to the claimant for items seized

on 9 August 2007 and returned on 13 October 2009 and 14 April 2011?

9.3. Whether the lists provided by the State in the undated letter from Richard Smith

to Ms. Karlene Seenath and a letter dated the 20 August 2009 from Mr. Smart to

Mr. Ramnath disclosed all the items seized and returned?

9.4. Whether the defendant had reasonable and probable cause to seize and detain the

subject articles from the claimant?

9.5. Whether the defendant ever seized and detained the articles still claimed by the

claimant in his exhibited list?

The Claimant’s evidence

Dillon Haynes

10. The claimant filed a witness statement on 3 April 2012. He was the sole witness on

liability for the claimant’s case. He stated that in 2007, he was in the business of

moneylending and that as part of his moneylending business he would hold items as

security for loans. The values of these items were ascertained from jewelers and others.

11. On 9 August 2007, between 4:30 pm and 5:30 pm, he arrived at his business place and he

was met by police officers in plain clothes. He said in particular officers Bacchus and

Harrysingh asked him questions about some men who brought items for him between

Monday and Tuesday of that same week. He says that he proceeded to show them the

items that were delivered. In the meantime, one officer Sahadeo stopped his auto

mechanic who was driving one of his B15 motor vehicles saying that the vehicle was

stolen.

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12. The claimant says that officer Harrysingh searched him and took his three mobile phones

and informed him that anything that was seized would be written down and that he would

be given a copy of the list of items taken. It is his evidence that there were more than

twelve officers in plain clothes at his house at this time and that he was taken to his

bedroom by officer Harrysingh who emptied the draws and took jewelry belonging to the

family. The claimant says that he was then taken to the living room where he showed the

police officers where he had other jewelry, cell phones, cameras and video cameras.

These items were also seized. According to the claimant, at the same time, officers were

taking things from the front rooms and in the garage and he overheard officer Harrysingh

on his phone saying that he made a ‘big buss (sic)’ in Couva and needed to transport

items. He says that when requested of him, he showed officer Harrysingh the receipts that

he had for certain items as well as statements, receipts and promissory notes. He says that

sometime after, officer Manohar came into the living room stating that he found a gun

and he was placed in handcuffs and later taken to San Fernando CID where he was placed

in a cell with about eight other men. The claimant says that he was not charged nor was

he allowed to call his family or lawyer. The claimant says that he was detained until 13

August 2007 and he was allowed to go to court on two charges - one for receiving of a

welding machine and grinder and the other of receiving of stolen goods from Gran

Couva. The gun was not mentioned until the claimant appeared before “the San Fernando

court”.

13. The claimant claims that he appeared twelve times on the matter of the welding machines

and grinder before it was dismissed on 1 December 2008. He says that appeals were also

made for officer Harrysingh to come to court to answer questions about the items seized

but that there was no appearance and that matter was dismissed on 26 June 2008. By

letter dated 13 March 2008 to the Commissioner of Police, a request was made for the

return of the items. They were not returned.

14. On 8 April 2008 the claimant initiated this action and on 13 October 2009 the police

returned to him 55 items – mainly tools and electronics. The electronic items, he said,

were of no use, as they were not working, parts were missing and some were not

repairable. A further 60 items were returned on 14 April 2011 and, of those, none of the

cell phones were working and it was not economical to repair them. The claimant

annexed a list of the items returned. The claimant caused another letter dated 7th June

2011 to be sent to the defendant listing seized items which were not returned to him. He

says by undated letter to Ms. Karlene Seenath, officer Smith attempted to account for the

items and provided a list where he identified certain items coloured in black thereon for

which there was no record.

15. The claimant says that as a result of the seizure, he was deprived of the use of his items to

the value of $888,917.00, he earned $10,125.00 per week in car and equipment rentals

and now only earns $4,000.00 and his business was crippled for about 6 months.

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Cross Examination

16. It was established in cross examination that the claimant was not a licensed money lender

at the time. In fact, no moneylender’s license was ever produced for him and he admitted

that he did not have a valid license at the time.

17. He made reference to a diary in which he kept the information in relation to the items

which were allegedly pledged to him but he did not produce it to this court because he

did not think it was important. He indicated that he was not in a position to say how many

items he was holding as security on the date in question. In any event, he confirmed that

none of the items which were seized were items which he was holding for security.

18. He confirmed that he was never given a list of the items which were taken by the police

despite their promise to do so but that he had sight of an entry in the station diary some

days later. He was shown the original station diary for the 10th of August 2007 which set

out the listing of items allegedly taken by the police. He said that he did not read it before

signing it because he did not have his glasses and he just followed the lead of PC

Manohar. He did not receive a copy of that entry in the station diary.

19. It is clear to this court to that the claimant was not afforded an opportunity to make a list

of the items as they were being taken by the police that day. He said that that the list,

which he set out in the statement of case, was compiled by him over the course of 3

months from memory and from his diary.

20. The copies of the certified copies of ownership for the vehicles which were annexed as

“RS 11” to the witness statement of Richard Smith were shown to the claimant and he

acknowledged that none of the vehicles were registered in his name.

21. When shown the list exhibited at “E” of his witness statement, which was a list set out in

a letter from the claimant’s attorney at law addressed to attorney at law for the defendant

and which was annexed to an undated letter from the defendant’s witness Richard Smith

identifying what had happened with the retained items, his evidence was as follows:

21.1. The items colored in pink were handed over to him;

21.2. The items at 69, 79, 86 and 93 which were allegedly retained for use in court

proceedings were not returned to him despite the fact that those matters were

dismissed;

21.3. He refused to accept item number 82 – the Stihl 500 edge cutter - because it was

run down and in bad condition;

21.4. It was suggested to him that the police had no records of the items which were not

shaded as they were not seized. He did not agree that they were not seized.

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The Defendant’s evidence

Wendell Manohar

22. Constable Manohar gave evidence on behalf of the defendant. He said that on 8 August

2007 he was on duty at the San Fernando police station where he interviewed several

persons who were detained relative to reports of larceny. He received information from

one of the individuals that he sold several items that were stolen or obtained illegally. On

this basis he said that he conducted enquiries and as a result obtained a search warrant for

the premises of the claimant. He said that around 5 pm on 9 August 2007 he went to the

claimant’s house and informed him that he was in possession of a search warrant to

search his home for stolen items. He said that he read and showed the warrant to the

claimant and cautioned him. He said that he and other officers searched the claimant’s

premises, including an annexed video store, and that PC Malloo informed the claimant

that they were of the opinion that the items were stolen. The claimant allegedly said that

he purchased the items from ‘Kevin’. He said that during the search he also found a

‘Smith and Wesson’ firearm and when he enquired about the same, the claimant informed

him that it was his and that he did not have a gun license as it was hard to obtain one. He

said that he arrested the claimant for the offence of possession of arms and ammunition

and cautioned him.

23. This witness stated that he asked the claimant whether or not he had any receipts for the

large quantities of electronic items and he stated that he did not. He said that the items

were seized along with jewelry, heavy duty equipment and five motor vehicles. He said

that he examined the chassis number of the vehicles found and they appeared to have

been tampered with and he informed the claimant of the same and cautioned him. All the

items were taken to the San Fernando police station. Officer Manohar further stated that

on 10 August 2007 he made notes in the station diary relating to the arrest of the claimant

and the seizure of the goods in the presence of Cpl Harrysingh and he allowed the

claimant to read the entire entry. According to the witness he together with Cpl

Harrysingh, PC Malloo and the claimant signed several places on that entry relative to the

utterances made by the claimant. The items were then handed over to Cpl Harrysingh

who was the property keeper. The witness said that he caused notice to be sent out

through the media to invite victims of larceny to attend the police station to assist with

inquiries. He stated that several persons came to the San Fernando police station in

connection with the same and identified some of the seized items as their own.

24. On 13 October 2009 this witness informed Sgt Smith that his investigations in respect to

some of the items were exhausted and those items were returned to the claimant. On 7

July 2011 he says that he was instructed by Sgt Smith to submit TBE 2118 to the

Forensic Science Center for examination of its chassis and engine number and he did so.

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On 14 April 2011 he said that he further informed Sgt Smith that enquiries with the

property were totally exhausted and further items were returned to the claimant.

Cross examination

25. Mr. Manohar was referred to items mentioned at paragraph 4 of the defence and it was

suggested to him that what was said there at paragraph 4 was not correct. The basis of

this suggestion was the list annexed at exhibit “C” to the claimant’s witness statement,

which was a list allegedly prepared on 13 October 2009 for and on behalf of the police of

items delivered to the claimant on that date. Despite the contention in the defence that the

items listed at paragraph 4 thereof would be the only items identifiable from the

claimant’s list set out at paragraph 3 of his statement of case, it was quite evident that

there were several other items referred to in the list at exhibit “C” which corresponded

with items listed in the claimant’s statement of case e.g. the items at 1, 2, 6, 21, 26, 46,

48, etc. He therefore conceded that the list at paragraph 4 of the defence was not correct.

26. According to Mr. Manohar, he was the one who had seized most of the items and he

prepared the list in manuscript. He said as he moved from room to room and items were

seized, the rooms were labeled and a list was prepared of the items seized from that

particular room. That list cannot be found and no mention of making this list was set out

in his witness statement. The list was in a desk diary and it was signed by the claimant

but he does not know where the diary is. According to him, the station diary list was

prepared from the manuscript list.

27. It became quite obvious in his cross examination that there were discrepancies in the list

set out in the station diary when compared to the lists at “WM2”, “WM3” and “WM4”,

which were typewritten notes of items allegedly prepared from the manuscript in the lost

desk diary.

28. It was suggested to him that the items were not advertised until 1 July 2008 which Mr.

Manohar said he was not aware of. What he was aware of was that there was an

advertisement by radio i.e. it was radioed to the various police stations. No evidence of

this was provided and it is difficult for this court to appreciate the efficacy of this type of

advertisement, if it is an advertisement at all, in relation to the public.

Richard Smith

29. This witness stated that in August 2009 he was detailed to be the custodian of certain

property seized from Dillon Haynes. This duty was handed over to him from Cpl

Harrysingh and his function as custodian would have been to secure the said property and

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account for it whilst in the police custody. Further, he stated that he had to make the

necessary arrangement with the forensic science to have any exhibits submitted. The

witness stated that the property was secured at the San Fernando Police Station in a

‘strong room’ and the vehicles were stored on the compound of the San Fernando police

station.

30. The witness said that several media releases were sent inviting person who had property

stolen from them to visit the San Fernando Police Station and from time to time he had to

arrange for the items to be viewed by victims who would visit the station. Mr. Smith says

that on 13 October 2009 he had a conversation with PC Manohar and was informed that

the investigation with respect to the items were exhausted and as a result he

communicated with the claimant and returned some of the seized items to him. He says

that the claimant signed a receipt and the same was exhibited. The witness says that at

that time the vehicles were not returned as they had to be analyzed by the Forensic

Science officer. He then detailed the dates that these same vehicles were examined.

30.1. On the 29th of August 2007, he caused the examination of PBH 3548 by the

scientific officer in respect of which he received a Certificate of Analysis report

dated 9 December 2007 which stated that the chassis number of the vehicle had

been found to be tampered with. He alleges that the vehicle was traced by

Constable Bissoon to be PBA 7337 allegedly stolen from Kirk Anthony Rogers

and the vehicle was handed back over to Mr. Rogers around 1 July 2008;

30.2. Around 13 September 2007, he caused the analysis of PBT 9743 which is the

subject of a Certificate of Analysis dated 4 October 2007;

30.3. Around 5 August 2009, he caused the analysis of PBR 5502 which indicated that

the chassis number was tampered with;

30.4. On 18 August 2009, he caused the Scientific Officer to examine PCB 5371 and

she gave him a Certificate of Analysis dated 8 September 2009 which stated that

the engine and chassis number will found to have been tampered with;

30.5. On 7 July 2011, TBE 2118 was examined and found to have the chassis number

tampered with;

30.6. On or about 13 December 2011, PBG 1714 was inspected and examined and a

Certificate of Analysis dated 29 December 2011 was produced showing that even

though the engine number was not tampered with, the visible number stamped on

the firewall was not the original chassis number and there was evidence to show

that a portion of the firewall was cut out and replaced with another portion

bearing the visible number;

30.7. On 13 December 2011, PBG 4005 was examined and the Certificate of Analysis

revealed that the chassis number was tampered with.

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31. Evidently, there were title issues with all of the vehicles which were seized in August

2007. Notwithstanding that, however, 5 of the 7 vehicles were returned to the claimant on

14 May 2013 – just before this trial began.

32. Mr. Smith says that on 14 April 2011 PC Manohar told him that enquiries with the

property were completely exhausted and as a result he communicated with the claimant

and he returned more of the claimant’s items and the claimant again signed a receipt

which was exhibited. The witness said that to date all of the property that was handed

over to him in August 2008 was returned to the claimant save for the seven vehicles

because they were at the time of the witness statement still in the process of concluding

enquiries on the same.

Cross examination

33. Mr. Smith was not aware that all of the matters against the claimant had been dismissed.

34. Further, he gave evidence that he only took over custody of the property seized from the

claimant in August 2009. He was not able to say if there was any record of these items in

the property register and he did not make any entry in the property movement register.

All he received was a list.

35. It was very interesting that Mr. Smith, for the first time, in cross examination, indicated

that there was allegedly a mandate from the senior superintendent not to place the items

with the property manager. That mandate was never produced nor was it ever verified by

Mr. Smith. Further, when he took over custody of the items there is no mention that he

verified them with the list that he was given.

36. Mr. Smith also accepted that there were errors on the lists meaning that there were items

which were mentioned in the list exhibited as “C” to the claimant’s witness statement

which were not mentioned in the station diary listing.

Marlon Mendoza

37. This witness stated that on 13 August 2007 he had a conversation with PC Manohar in

respect of Dillon Haynes. He says that he was aware of the search that was made at the

home of the claimant at that time. He said he had a further conversation with Cpl

Harrysingh regarding information as to where the claimant may have other stolen

vehicles. On 14 August 2007 the witness said that he obtained a search warrant to search

the premises of Egbert Rouse for stolen motor vehicle parts. On 15 August 2007 at 3:05

pm the witness said that he, Cpl Harrysingh and a party of officers went to the home of

Egbert Rouse where he inspected the vehicles and found that the chassis numbers on the

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B15 Sentra PBR 5502 and Honda Civic PBH 3548 were tampered with. Both vehicles

were seized.

38. The witness says that he interviewed Egbert Rouse at the San Fernando Police station and

was informed that both cars belonged to Dillon Haynes, the claimant. The witness says

that he made further enquiries and found that the Honda Civic vehicle bore a false

registration number. He further states that on 29 August 2007 he was present when

scientific officer Paula Waheed examined the vehicle at the San Fernando police station

and confirmed that the chassis number was tampered with but the engine was original and

intact. The claimant said that public announcements were made in the local media

inviting persons who lost vehicles of a similar make and model to visit the police station

to view the vehicles and eventually one Kirk Anthony Rogers came to the police station

and after he was interviewed and identified the Honda Civic as a car stolen from him he

was handed over the vehicle. The witness says that one Indarjit Rampersad was

interviewed concerning the B15 motor vehicle. Mr. Rampersad bore a key that easily

opened the doors and trunk of the same vehicle but was unable to give a written statement

at the time he identified the vehicle and was not able to return to give the same until

November 2011. The B15 vehicle is still in the possession of the police and is secured at

the St. Madeline police station.

Cross examination

39. Mr. Mendoza admitted that he returned PBH 3548 to Mr. Kirk Anthony Rogers despite

the fact that the forensic report indicated that the engine number had not been tampered

with and that it was not the same engine number for the vehicle PBA 7337 which was

allegedly the correct number and registration for this vehicle.

40. With respect to the other vehicle which he had knowledge of – PBR 5502 – it was

apparently identified by one Mr. Indarjit Rampersad who never came back to give a

statement. Mr. Mendoza said that he is uncertain as to whether charges were laid against

the claimant and to whom the vehicle should be returned.

Dhanraj Malloo

41. Mr. Malloo is a police corporal who investigated a report of a housebreaking and larceny

at the home of one Errol Ramsaroop and allegedly found in the claimant’s house a high-

speed blender, sewing machine, a Sharp 20 inch color television, and a green colored bed

sheet set which allegedly belonged to Mr. Ramsaroop. Those items were seized and were

identified by Mr. Ramsaroop as his. The items were subsequently returned to Mr.

Ramsaroop. Charges were laid against the claimant and were dismissed eventually as Mr.

Ramsaroop never showed up for the hearing.

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Cross examination

42. This witness admitted that he never assessed the value of the items and therefore could

not say if he could have proven that the claimant had received these goods knowing them

to be stolen since he could not have ascertained whether they were sold to the claimant at

fair market value. He also accepted that he never issued a warrant for the attendance of

Mr. Ramsaroop at the hearing and that, in fact, Mr. Ramsaroop would not have had any

incentive to attend that hearing since he had already received the goods.

Anand Bissoon

43. This witness also gave evidence on behalf of the defendant. It was his evidence that on 24

February 2007, while he was attached to the Couva Police Station, he interviewed one

Kurt Anthony Rogers who reported that he was robbed of his motor vehicle registration

number PBA 7337. He said that sometime in 2008 he was contacted by Constable

Mendoza and he was informed that a search warrant was executed at the garage of Egbert

Rouse and the subject vehicle was recovered bearing the license plate PBH 3548. He said

he went to the San Fernando police station where he saw the vehicle. He said that he

contacted the victim and confirmed that the victim had positively identified the vehicle.

He said that he continued enquiries and interviewed and cautioned the claimant. He later

preferred a charge against the claimant at the Couva Magistrate court for receiving a

stolen vehicle. The matter was subsequently dismissed.

Submissions

Claimant’s submissions

44. The claimant submitted that there were two issues to be resolved being whether the items

that have been returned was done so within a reasonable time and whether the items

identified in the letter dated the 7th day of June, 2011 were actually seized by the Police.

45. On the first issue it was submitted that items were returned on the 13 October, 2009 and

these items consisted of about 96 electronic items. It was submitted that a reasonable time

for the Police to have completed their investigation would have been 3 months. To have

detained these items beyond 3 months would amount to a wrongful “detention”. The case

of Jaroo –v The Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago (2002) 1AC 871 P.C. was

relied upon. In that case the Court of Appeal determined that “in the absence of

appropriate criminal proceedings there would of necessity arise a time beyond which it

would be unreasonable to continue to detain the vehicle” although it was also determined

that it is not possible to state what such a period would be in any given case as certain

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other circumstances ought to be considered. It was submitted that the reason for the delay

in returning items in this matter, according to the evidence of the State, was not that there

were criminal proceedings pending but because the Police were conducting further

investigation. The claimant says that the onus was on the Police to demonstrate that the

continued detention was necessary and they have failed to do so.

46. The claimant submitted that since, according to the defendant, the public was made aware

in 2007 of the possibility of the recovery of stolen/loss items, then there is no justification

or investigation that can explain why these items were returned more than two years

after.

47. The claimant submitted that with regard to the vehicles seized, in the case of Adesh

Ramsubhag –v- The Attorney General it was determined that one week is more than

sufficient for a forensic test to be done on a vehicle. The vehicles were seized from the

Claimant in 2007 and all but 2 returned in 2013. The claimant averred that this delay was

unacceptable. It was submitted further that there was a clear breach of the Standing

Orders made by the Commissioner of Police pursuant to power granted under section

57.1 (a) of the Police Service Regulations Chapter 15:01 as the Police failed to keep

accurate records, failed to record items and, up to today’s date, have failed to return

certain items which they admitted that they had seized.

48. With respect to motor Vehicle registration number PBR 5502, it was submitted that

unless the defendant can show that Mr. Rampersad has a better claim then this vehicle

must be returned to the Claimant. The cases of Jones – v- Williams (1837) 2M &W 326,

Armory –v-Delamirie (1722) 93 ER 664, Webb –v- Chief Constable of Merseyside

Police, Porter –v- Chief Constable of Merseyide Police (2000) 1 All ER 209 at page

225, Costello –v- Chief Constable of Derbyshire Constabulary (2001) 3 All ER 150 and

South Staffordshire Water Co-v- Sharman (1896) 2QB 44 at 45-46 were submitted in

support of this proposition.

49. On the second issue the claimant said that the Police cannot be believed and that the

Court should find in favour of the Claimant on all the items he listed. It was submitted

that on a balance of probability the Claimant’s evidence is more credible as the record

taken by the Police of the items seized cannot be relied on because based on their own

evidence they did not keep a proper record or alternatively did not record all the items

that were seized.

Defendant’s submissions

50. The defendant first submitted on the law. In relation to trespass to goods, it was

submitted that this amounted to an unlawful disturbance of the possession of goods by

seizure or removal or by a direct act causing damage to the goods. The subject matter of

trespass to goods must be a personal chattel which is the subject of lawful possession.

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The law in relation to detinue and conversion was also discussed. It was further submitted

that at common law the police are vested with the power to seize goods which they

reasonably believe to be stolen and which are the fruit of crime or form material evidence

to prove the commission of a crime and to reasonably detain such goods until either the

completion of their investigations or the completion of the trial of those charged with the

larceny of those goods. The cases of Thakur Persad Jaroo v. The Attorney General of

Trinidad and Tobago P.C. Appeal No.54 of 2000, Chic Fashions (West Wales) Limited

v. Jones (1968) 2 Q.B. 299, Ghani v. Jones (1970) 1. Q.B., Chief Constable of Kent v. V

and another (1982) 3 AER 462 were submitted in support of this contention. Particular

consideration was given to Lord Denning's dicta in Ghani v Jones wherein the

requirements for seizure of good by police were set out.

51. It was submitted that the police officers, including PC Manohar, had sufficient or

reasonable grounds for believing that the items found were stolen or unlawfully obtained

Based on the information received by PC Manohar and having interviewed several

persons detained in relation to reports of larceny, one of whom provided certain

information in respect of where he sold several items that he stole or otherwise illegally

obtained. It was further submitted that PC Manohar and the party of officers had

reasonable grounds for believing that the items were the fruit of a crime and that it was

reasonable for P.C. Manohar and the party of officers to believe that the person in

possession of the items had committed or was implicated in the commission of the crime.

The defendant also said that the items were kept longer than was necessary for the police

to complete their investigations and that PC Manohar’s actions and those of the other

officers were lawful at the time. It was submitted further that the evidence of the claimant

under cross examination was unreliable and inconsistent. In relation to the seven vehicles

that were seized, it was submitted that the claimant provided no evidence that he was the

owner of the same vehicles and that in any event the said vehicles referred to therein were

returned to the Claimant.

52. With respect to the unshaded items in the document provided by the claimant, it was

submitted that the Claimant has not been able to produce for the Court any evidence

relative to such items, whether by way of any inventories, lists, receipts, diary entries,

witness statements by any parties as to possible ownership of same, or any evidence apart

from his verbal evidence. The defendant says that there is no evidence that such items

were seized and taken by the police, kept in storage- in police custody and removed by

any other party.

53. It was submitted that in the circumstances, the police officers acted in lawful execution of

their duty at all material times, and lawfully detained the items for a period of time that

was reasonable in the circumstance and that the Claimant is not entitled to any of the

reliefs sought herein.

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The law involved

54. The Police Service of Trinidad and Tobago, like other Police Services globally, is vested

with the power to seize property in connection with an unlawful act. This power is given

to the police under both the Police Service Act Chapter 15:01 of the laws of Trinidad and

Tobago and the Standing Orders of the Police Service.

The Seizure and Retention of the Goods

55. It is not disputed that under the common law, police officers are equipped with the

authority to seize goods in connection with an unlawful act. The same was discussed in

Ghani v Jones [1970] 1 QB 693. In that case Lord Denning outlined certain criteria that

ought to be followed in order for goods to be lawfully seized by the police. Lord Denning

stated:

“…What is the principle underlying these instances? We have to consider, on the onehand, the freedom of the individual. His privacy and his possessions are not to beinvaded except for the most compelling reasons. On the other hand, we have to considerthe interest of society at large in finding out wrongdoers and repressing crime. Honestcitizens should help the police and not hinder them in their efforts to track downcriminals. Balancing these interests, I should have thought that, in order to justify thetaking of an article, when no man has been arrested or charged, these requisites must besatisfied:

First the police officers must have reasonable grounds for believing that a seriousoffence has been committed—so serious that it is of the first importance that the offendersshould be caught and brought to justice.

Secondly. The police officers must have reasonable grounds for believing that the articlein question is either the fruit of the crime (as in the case of stolen goods) or is theinstrument by which the crime was committed (as in the case of the axe used by themurderer) or is material evidence to prove the commission of the crime (as in the case ofthe car used by a bank raider or the saucer used by a train robber).

Thirdly. The police officers must have reasonable grounds to believe that the person inpossession of it has himself committed the crime, or is implicated in it, or is accessory toit, or at any rate his refusal must be quite unreasonable.

Fourthly. The police must not keep the article, nor prevent its removal, for any longerthan is reasonably necessary to complete their investigations or preserve it for evidence.If a copy will suffice, it should be made and the original returned. As soon as the case isover, or it is decided not to go on with it, the article should be returned.

Finally. The lawfulness of the conduct of the police must be judged at the time, and not bywhat happens afterwards.”

56. In the local Privy Council decision in Thakur Persad Jaroo v. The Attorney General of

Trinidad and Tobago P.C. Appeal No.54 of 2000, Lord Hope, who followed Denning’s

determination in Jaroo, stated that police officers, when detaining goods, “must have had

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reasonable grounds when they insisted on detaining it ….. Second, they had to be in a

position to show that its continued detention was reasonably necessary to complete their

investigations or to preserve it for evidence.” He further noted the case of Malone v

Metropolitan Police Comr [1979] 1 All ER 256 at 270–271 and concluded that “there is

no general power in the police, when they have lawfully seized property which is

thereafter not the subject of any charge and is clearly shown not to have been stolen, to

retain that property as against the person entitled to possession of it against some

uncertain future contingency… the police who wish to continue to detain the property

must be able to justify their retention of it upon some ground which is clearly

ascertainable.”

57. It is therefore a requirement that goods which are seized by police be done so lawfully

and that the retention of the same be only for a period which is reasonable. As Lord Hope

concluded, police officers who wish to retain goods past a relevant period must justify the

same. The question to be asked then is what is a reasonable time period?

58. Section 58 (1) of the Police Service Act, supra, is apposite. That section provides as

follows:

“58. (1) Where any property has come into the possession of the Police Service inconnection with any criminal charge or under section 29 of the Pawnbrokers Act, aSummary Court may, on application either by a police officer or by a claimant of theproperty, make an order for the delivery of the property to the person appearing to theCourt to be the owner of it or, if the owner cannot be ascertained, make such order withrespect to the property as the Court thinks fit.

(2) An order under this section shall not affect the right of any person to take withinsix months from the date of the order legal proceedings against any person in possessionof property delivered by virtue of the order for the recovery of the property, but on theexpiration of those six months the right shall cease.

(3) Where property has come into the possession of the Police Service:

(a) Under subsection (1); or

(b) In respect of which the owner cannot be ascertained and no order hasbeen made with respect to it by a Court, it shall be dealt with as follows:

(i) If the property is a perishable article, or its custody involvesunreasonable expense or inconvenience, it may be sold as soon asconvenient after it has come into the possession of the Police Service;

(ii) If the property consists of money, it shall be dealt with asprovided in this section with regard to the proceeds of a sale after it hasremained in the possession of the Police Service for three months; or

(iii) In the case of any other property the same may be publicly soldat auction as soon as possible after it has remained in the possession ofthe Police Service for three months and has been advertised in two localdaily newspapers for three consecutive days.

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Standing Orders of the Trinidad and Tobago Police Service

59. The police service in Trinidad and Tobago is also governed by certain Standing Orders.

According to the very introduction to these Standing Orders, they serve as “blueprints for

police operations and functions” and these Standing Orders seek to “provide a manual of

general directions geared for the training and re-training of police officers in keeping

with the changes attending society as a whole.” Section 1 of ‘Standing Order 2’ of the

Police Service Standing Orders states that the Standing Orders are “general instructions

issued by the Commissioner of Police from time to time and published for the efficient and

effective administration of the service.” It is important to note that these Standing Orders are

distinct from the Police Service Regulations which is annexed to the Police Service Act

as subsidiary legislation. It seems to this court that while the Standing Orders are not in

and of themselves legislation, the Police Service is bound to operate within the confines

of these orders for the reasons given in the introduction and set out above.

60. The court would move on to discuss the Standing Orders which operate in relation to

property.

Standing Order 26

61. Section 1 of ‘Standing Orders 26’ refers to property as “any animal, article or thing

which has come into the possession of the police, either through finding, seizure or other

lawful means’.

62. There is a requirement under section 6 of the same ‘Standing Order 26’ that certain

registers are to be kept for the recording and lodging of property at Divisional

Headquarters including Criminal Investigations Department or Police Stations. These

registers include:

62.1. Found Property Register

62.2. Dangerous Drugs Register

62.3. Dangerous Drugs Movement Register

62.4. General Property

62.5. General Property Movement Register

63. Section 7 of the same states:

“(1) The officers in charge of Divisions and Criminal Investigations Departmentsshall designate a place in each station/section for safe storage and preservation ofproperty

(2) Where in extraordinary circumstances, the storage space for property in anyDivision becomes inadequate; it shall be the duty of the Officer-in-charge of the division

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to consult with the assistant commissioner of police in charge of his area to identify anew location for the storage of property.”

64. The Standing Orders further places requirements for the security of goods seized and

procedure for dealing with various types of property. For the purposes of this case the

court must also look at the procedure for dealing with general property. Among the

procedure is section 26:

“26.(1) The officer in charge of a division and criminal investigations department shallappoint a police officer not below the rank of Corporal to be Property Manager in eachstation/section under his command.

(2) In the case of “C” grade stations, the second division officer in charge shall, inaddition to his other duties, perform duties of property manager.”

65. Section 27 defines the duties of the Property Manager. Among his duties are to lodge the

property handed over to him in the General Property Register and to secure the property

book and the exhibits recorded therein against loss.

66. Section 28 governs how property should be disposed of. Certain types of General

Property should be disposed of by public auction which shall be held at least once per

year. This included unclaimed property under section 58 (3) of the Police Service Act

supra.

67. S.28(b)(1) and (2) goes on to state:

“(1) Where the ownership of property lodged is not in dispute, it shall be returned tothe owner.

(2) General property lodged as exhibits may be returned to their owners wherepossible before the determination of the cases. It is no longer necessary for owners togive a written undertaking to produce such property if required. However they are to beadvised that they should retain such exhibits for the production in court as this willconstitute the best evidence.”

68. Finally, section 38 states that:

“General property which falls into the following categories shall be disposed of by publicauction which shall be held at least once per year:

- Vehicles which have come into the custody of the police in pursuance ofsection 108 of the Motor Vehicle and Road Traffic Act 58:501, shall after theexpiration of thirty days be dealt with as laid down in section 109(ii) of thisAct.

- Unclaimed item of property referred to in section 52 of the Police ServiceAct2 chap 15:01

- Forfeitures by the courts

- Judicial decisions.”

1Which deals with vehicles parked in contravention to the provisions of the Act

2This should really be s. 58 of the Police Service Act

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69. A full consideration of the Standing Orders reveals a strong requirement that police

officers charged with seizing goods and keeping the same in safe custody must do so

diligently. The fact that such detail was placed in the drafting of these orders with respect

to property shows the importance which should be placed on property or evidence in the

Police Service.

Owner/Ownership

70. The principles relating to owners/ownership were dealt with in the setting of a

constitutional action by the Privy Council in Jaroo with special reference being made to

two common law English Court of Appeal authorities which were cited with approval.

Those were Webb –v- Chief Constable of Merseyside Police, Porter –v- Chief Constable

of Merseyide Police (2000) 1 All ER 209; and Costello –v- Chief Constable of

Derbyshire Constabulary (2001) 3 All ER 150 which established the accepted

proposition discussed in Jaroo that:

“…. save so far as legislation otherwise provided, possession, whether obtained lawfullyor not, vested in the possessor a possessory title which was good against the world saveanyone setting up or claiming under a better title and that, although he at all times knewthat the car was stolen, the claimant was entitled to an order for its delivery and todamages. Lightman J, with whom Keene and Robert Walker LJJ agreed, said, at p1450D, that possession is entitled to the same legal protection whether or not it has beenobtained lawfully or by theft or by other unlawful means. The decision in Webb v ChiefConstable of Merseyside Police [2000] QB 427 was followed and applied.”3

71. To my mind, therefore, it is incumbent upon the police to return items taken from a

person in possession of the items to that person in possession unless there was someone

claiming under a better title. In such a case, where there is a question of title arising, the

resolution of that question is not a function which falls upon the police but on the court

under section 58 (1) of the Police Service Act. It seems beyond the remit of the cited

legislation for a police officer to determine ownership where there is a conflict between

the person from whom items are taken and a person claiming or setting up a better title.

The resolution of the case

72. In the case before the court, the court is satisfied of the following facts after reviewing

the evidence:

3See Jaroo at paragraph 22

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72.1. Officers Harrysingh, who, remarkably, was not called to give evidence, and

Manohar were the officers who were involved in the drawing up of the list of

items taken from the claimant;

72.2. The list was drawn up in officer Manohar’s desk diary and was headed up

according to the rooms from which items were taken. That list was not verified by

the claimant on site. Unconvincingly, officer Manohar said that the claimant

signed that desk diary but it was not produced to this court because, according to

him, the desk diary could not be found.

72.3. Officer Harrysingh was then given the duty to oversee the seized goods.

According to officer Richard Smith, officer Harrysingh was given a special

mandate to do so by the senior superintendent but that evidence only came out,

belatedly, in his cross examination and was not mentioned by anyone else in their

witness statements. No written evidence of this was produced.

72.4. The items were not entered into the Property Register at the police station as

provided for under the Standing Orders mentioned above so that there is

absolutely no official record of the items as provided for in the Standing Orders

save as mentioned in the next paragraph.

72.5. A list was allegedly drawn up in the Station Diary the next day and was signed by

the claimant. That list did not tally with the several other lists presented as

evidence in this matter and, in any event, that list was not reconciled physically

with the items seized. It has to be said that it is unreasonable to expect that a list

of items seized by the police, which was as extensive as that claimed by the

claimant, could be verified by a mere signature in a station diary without it being

actually physically checked by the claimant and then acknowledged by signature.

To my mind, in the circumstances of this case, the signature appended to the

station diary was an empty gesture in a poor attempt to legitimize what was quite

obviously a haphazard and careless listing procedure.

72.6. In any event, the uncontroverted evidence of the claimant was that he required

reading glasses, which he did not have at the time, and was merely instructed to

sign which he did without reading, in light of him not having his glasses. In the

circumstances of a civilian detained in the manner and circumstances set out in

this case, it is difficult to conceive of the claimant refusing to sign the diary as

directed.

72.7. When officer Richard Smith took over custody of the items, he never reconciled

any list with what was actually being stored at the station. Quite obviously, since

there was not any official compliance with the provisions of the Standing Order in

relation to the entry of the items in the Property Register, one can only wonder

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how the integrity of the listing of the items could have been ascertained at all by

him.

72.8. Despite the items being taken on 9 August 2007, no attempt was made to

advertise the items in the newspapers until 1 July 2008 – which is more than 3

months after the date of the demand for the return of the items made by the

claimant’s attorney at law in his letter of 13 March 20084.

72.9. Certain personal items were returned to the claimant in 2 tranches, namely on 13

October 2009 and 14 April 2011. By letter dated 7 June 2011, the claimant’s

attorney at law identified 164 items which were not returned including the seven

motor vehicles referred to above.

72.10. Also, five of the seven motor vehicles were returned to the claimant on 14 May

2013 – just before this trial began.

72.11. There is no evidence that any one came forward with respect to the personal

property and therefore the release of the personal property in 2009 and 2011

amounted in this court’s mind to an unnecessary and unreasonable retention of the

goods.

72.12. With respect to the motor vehicles, the evidence before this court is that two

persons came forward alleging that two of the motor vehicles belonged to them

i.e. PBH 3548 and PBR 5502. The court accepts the claimant’s unchallenged

evidence that these two vehicles, which were seized from a garage, were there at

the claimant’s request. He said that the vehicles were at the straightener’s garage

as they were damaged5. Therefore, he was still entitled to possession of the same.

72.13. With respect to the items delivered to Mr. Errol Ramsaroop and the motor vehicle

delivered to Kirk Anthony Rogers, it is evident that the particular officers took it

upon themselves to deliver those items to persons other than the claimant despite

the claimant being in possession of the items, contrary to the provisions referred

to above. As was suggested by attorney at law for the claimant, a person in

possession of items can only be dispossessed by a person with a better title to the

items. No mention was made by any of the officers involved that Mr. Ramsaroop

or Mr. Rogers provided any documentary evidence that they were the owners of

the items given to them by police. This is contrary to the position taken by the

police in relation to the claimant, likewise, who they allege did not have sufficient

documents to establish ownership. In those circumstances, delivery of the items to

Mr. Ramsaroop and Mr. Rogers seems to have been ill-advised. In the case of Mr.

Rogers, there was no production of evidence before this court to establish

unequivocally that Mr. Rogers was entitled to the motor vehicle. The same applies

4See exhibit "A" to the claimant's witness statement.

5Paragraph 10 of his witness statement

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to the items delivered to Mr. Ramsaroop. Consequently, to my mind, the officers

were not entitled to so do without recourse to an order from the Magistrate’s

Court under s. 58 (1) of the Police Service Act supra and the defendant would

therefore be liable for detinue and conversion of these items.

73. All in all, it has to be said that the processes adopted by the police in this matter were

fraught with opportunities for issues, as have arisen in this matter, to arise. The collation

and recording of the items seized were done in a most unprofessional, slipshod and

haphazard manner. This court has, on a number of occasions previously, commented that

police officers in the exercise of their duties must act in the best interest of the public

including in relation to any alleged perpetrator. The detention and seizure of items must

be seen as an act for which they have a responsibility to produce a proper account.

Without compliance with the Standing Orders mentioned above, it is possible for items to

go unaccounted for and eventually missing. That opportunity ought not to occur and must

never occur. Based on the evidence produced by the police in this matter, it is impossible

for the court to accept that they discharged their duties properly and professionally. One

can reasonably expect, having regard to the guidelines mentioned above, that items

should be properly identified and registered methodically on site (even taking

photographs in situ) to discourage the type of inaccuracies which have arisen in this

matter. It seems a matter of sheer common sense to record items by descriptions and

serial numbers and, as in this case where there are several pieces of jewelry identified as

“gold chain” or “gold ring”, there seems to be no plausible reason why the items could

not have been photographed and properly catalogued. Such an approach, to my mind

makes it simple for later identification by the alleged perpetrator and also other persons

who may wish to lay claim to the items. But simplicity in such a manner may not always

be adopted in a society where sometimes deliberate confusion may better allow matters to

slip through cracks. With “big busts” comes big responsibility to ensure that, in the event

that the “reasonable grounds” are found to be lacking (as happens often enough), an

innocent person’s possessions are returned to them intact. The adage ‘innocent until

proven guilty’ is still a vibrant feature of our criminal justice system.

74. In any event, the evidence was that the police had gone to the claimant’s home in relation

to a warrant involving certain specific items – see the warrant exhibited at “WM1” to the

witness statement of officer Manohar.

75. In Chic Fashions (West Wales) Ltd. v. Jones - [1968] 2 Q.B. 299, Lord Denning M.R.

said at page 313:

“In my opinion, when a constable enters a house by virtue of a search warrant for stolengoods, he may seize not only the goods which he reasonably believes to be covered by thewarrant, but also any other goods which he believes on reasonable grounds to have beenstolen and to be material evidence on a charge of stealing or receiving against the personin possession of them or anyone associated with him. Test it this way: Suppose theconstable does not find the goods mentioned in the warrant but finds other goods which

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he reasonably believes to be stolen. Is he to quit the premises and go back to themagistrate and ask for another search warrant to cover these other goods? If he wentaway, I should imagine that in nine cases out of ten, by the time he came back with awarrant, these other goods would have disappeared. The true owner would not recoverthem. The evidence of the crime would have been lost. That would be to favour thievesand to discourage honest men. Even if it should turn out that the constable was mistakenand that the other goods were not stolen goods at all, nevertheless so long as he actedreasonably and did not retain them longer than necessary, he is protected. Thelawfulness of his conduct must be judged at the time and not by what happensafterwards.”

76. Officer Manohar stated that the basis for the detention of the items was:

76.1. The fact that there were a large number of electronic items which were on the

premises for which the claimant did not have receipts/bills; and

76.2. The fact that the chassis numbers of the vehicles appeared to have been tampered

with.

77. There was no evidence led by the defendant that any of the items of jewelry seemed to be

suspicious for any reason so no basis for the detention of the jewelry on reasonable

grounds was established. That lapse, to my mind, was compounded by the fact that

absolutely nothing was done in relation to all of the several items falling outside the remit

of the search warrant and the firearm until the advertisement almost one year after the

detention of the items. There was no diligence shown whatsoever by the police to resolve

this matter within a reasonable time.

78. To my mind, the provisions of the Police Service Act and the Standing Orders

demonstrate the diligence which ought to be exercised and this court is of the view that 3

months is a sufficient amount of time to have advertised the items to the public. That

would include any forensic report which would have had to have been commissioned in

relation to the motor vehicles6. In those circumstances, any detention beyond 3 months

would be unreasonable save in relation to the items involved in the magisterial court

proceedings which was subsequently dismissed. Upon the dismissal of those proceedings,

those items ought to have been returned to the claimant forthwith. Failure to do so would

again have been an unreasonable detention.

79. With respect to the items and motor vehicle returned to the two parties named above, this

court is of the view that, as mentioned, the same was ill-advised and the State would be

liable in conversion for those items and the vehicle.

6See the one week prescribed to have been reasonable for forensic testing in Adesh Ramsubhag –v- The Attorney

General supra

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Items unaccounted for

80. The claimant in his claim listed several items that were not on the defendant’s list of

items and which were unaccounted for. The court then must determine whether it agrees

with the defendants that all of the items claimed to have been taken from the claimant

were returned and that the items shown in black on the 7 June 2011 listing were not taken

by them.

81. In this court’s mind the claimant’s evidence was generally unwavering and stood the test

of cross examination while the defendant’s evidence was largely inconsistent and was

evidence of a most unconvincing and unreasonable and unacceptable application of

established police protocol and procedures. In particular, the court takes issue with the

fact that perhaps the main person for the defendant was not called to appear as a witness

in these proceedings. Officer Harrysingh was involved not only in the seizure of the

goods but he was the custodian of the seized goods before they were handed over to

officer Smith. Therefore he would have played an integral part in determining whether all

the items on the list were accounted for. The defendant failed to produce any evidence

from officer Harrysingh and the court is thus forced to determine the event without his

evidence.

82. This court is also of the view that the claimant’s evidence of the listing that he produced

was not seriously challenged in cross-examination and therefore holds, on a balance of

probabilities, that the items identified in the letter dated 7 June 2011 were items which

were seized and not returned – save for those identified and coloured in pink which he

acknowledged as having received and the five vehicles which were subsequently

returned. I find that the claimant’s version of events more credible.

The Order:

83. In summary, this court holds that the defendant is liable to the claimant in damages for

trespass and the detention of the claimant’s items beyond the period of 3 months from 9

August 2007 i.e. from 10 November 2007, to the dates when the particular items were

returned:

83.1. On 13 October 2009 and 14 April 2011 in respect of the personal items which

were returned;

83.2. On 14 May 2013 in relation to the five motor vehicles returned.

84. This court also holds that the defendant is liable for damages for trespass and for detinue

in respect of the 2 motor vehicles which were not returned i.e. PBH 3548 and PBR 5502

along with the items not marked in pink on the letter dated 7th of June 2011.

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85. This court also orders the defendant to return PBR 5502 to the claimant by 18 March

2014 and to pay damages for trespass and to detinue until the date of delivery.

86. The defendant is also ordered to pay damages for trespass to goods, detinue and

conversion in respect of PBH 3548 which was delivered to a 3rd party assessed as at the

date of delivery to the 3rd party.

87. The defendant would also pay to the claimant the claimant’s costs of this action on the

prescribed scale of costs after the assessment of damages and interest on the damages at

the rate of 6% per annum from the 10th of November 2007; with such damages to be

assessed on a date to be fixed before a Master in Chambers on a date to be fixed by the

Assistant Registrar.

Closing comments:

88. Courts continue to call upon the powers that be to take cognizance of the fact that the

failures of persons entrusted with the duty to protect and serve continue to fall upon the

taxpayers to foot the bill. It is not clear what training programs are in place, for example,

for the identification, collation, registering and preservation of seized items. The court

has no understanding of whether or not the designated officers were so trained or had the

requisite experience. Quite obviously, they did not follow the established procedure and

no explanation was given for that. This court believes that the taxpaying public is entitled

to such an explanation and for a true account of where their hard earned money is being

spent and how and why. It may be a good idea to formally review these types of matters

and to review the training which goes into the preparation of an officer to fulfill such an

important role and function. Or, for that matter, in relation to the simple matter of

collecting evidence on a suspected crime scene.

89. For clarity, the court wishes to express no opinion on the police officers’ decision to take

the items on the date in light of the learning cited in Chic Fashions above. The real issue

was the improper record and the failure to deal with the items expeditiously. Those are

the issues on which the police particularly faltered and which founds the basis of this

court’s decision.

.......................................................Justice Devindra Rampersad

Assisted by Krystal RichardsonAttorney at Law

Judicial Research Assistant

the republic of trinidad and tobago in the high court...

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