The rise of China and those left behind: a

study of the Chinese government’s treatment

of ethnic and religious minorities

Chris Haynes

0029115

03/12/04

Introduction

China’s ascent has proven that a formerly communist country can become capitalist and

significantly increase its prosperity levels. However, the effects of the rise of China have

not benefited all of its 1.4 billion citizens. The multicultural, egalitarian nationalism of

Mao Zedong’s creation have faded away, probably for good, and deliberately or not, it

has left many behind. Cultural violence plagued Mao’s time. Disparities of wealth have

increased dramatically since Mao’s death, and if history is any guide, this problem will

grow worse. But while its peasants and farmers have suffered under Deng Xiaoping’s

liberal reforms, its ethnic and religious minorities have suffered since Mao. Those hardest

hit by the rise of China, the ethnic and religious minorities, are the focus of this essay.

Nationalism has been a key driver of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)’s success in

uniting the People’s Republic of China (PRC). However, certain groups have not been

fully integrated into nationalist sentiment. Any threats to this nationalism, this artificial

feeling of oneness that is applied as a blanket to so many people, the CCP will inevitably

consider “subversive”. And it seems that several ethnic and religious minority groups,

both old and new, have faced great hardship in coping with the changes brought by the

PRC. But first I consider the general economic problems that have caused social unrest.

Economic disparity—who is losing?

The First National People’s Congress on September 20, 1954 stated the following:

The People’s Republic of China is a unitary multinational state.

All the nationalities are equal. Discrimination against or

oppression of any nationality, and acts which undermine the

unity of the nationalities, are prohibited. (Mackerras, 145)

Why, then, has China’s development favoured some groups over others? Li Cheng,

Associate Professor at Hamilton College, writes that China has gone from one of the

world’s most egalitarian countries to one of the least. “The period of ‘reform without

losers’ has been replaced by ‘reform with many losers.’” (Li, a121) Li also indicates a

high unemployment rate and no substantial social safety net, and says that these factors

increase the chance of social unrest. (a123) Another potential threat to state stability is

the mass of internal migration of farmers and other labourers, (b1123) including peasants

displaced and resettled after the Three Gorges Dam project. Many are driven to the cities

and add to China’s mass of urban unemployed. The east coast of China is “blessed with

natural advantages and granted a head start in liberalisation,” (Economist) and the interior

of China has lagged behind. The poorest areas consist of non Han minorities such as

Tibetans, Muslims and Mongolians. “By 1996, Chinese leaders began to perceive a threat

to social (read political) stability.” (Economist) They took measures to curb poverty by

urging foreign business to invest in remote areas and encouraging local governments to

offer tax and other incentives. But local protectionism, provincial, county and city

governments’ blocking of goods from elsewhere, continues. (Economist)

There are 55 official minority nationalities in China. These minorities cover

approximately five eighths of China’s territory, much of which is rich in natural

resources. The Han majority often occupies plains, arable land, towns and cities, while

some four fifths of the country’s minorities take refuge in the more mountainous (and less

suitable for agriculture) land, with the exceptions of such groups as the Manchus and the

Koreans. (Mackerras, 198) Self sufficiency in minority regions, such as Xinjiang, Tibet

and Qinghai, is extremely low and although this dearth of economic vigor is somewhat

offset by state subsidies, it is clear that the people are not allowed access to the benefits

of the natural resources found where they live. (201)

Religion and the government

Since the creation of the PRC in 1949, China has been an officially atheist state. It has

tolerated some other religions and their followers to some extent, but others it has

deemed subversive and unpatriotic, and thus a threat to the CCP’s nationalist policy that

legitimises its monopoly on power. Some religions are traditional: Confucianism,

Buddhism and Taoism. But three groups that fall into the category of subversives are the

Buddhists of Tibet, the Muslim Uighurs of Xinjiang and the Falun Gong. The first two

periodically face brutal repression at the hands of the government. The Falun Gong,

however, a more recent cultural phenomenon, is considered heretical and has suffered

terribly as a result of its illegality.

Tibet

Buddhism was brought from India to Tibet around 779 AD. It spread to Mongolia during

the rule of Altan Khan. The Chinese government claims that Tibet has always been a part

of China; Tibetans say that Tibet was an independent nation for centuries before 1950. It

is likely that both cases are incorrect. (Dillon, 12) Like Xinjiang, Tibet has been part of

China since the Qing dynasty from 1644 to 1912. Tibet’s de facto independence lasted

from 1913 to 1950. One author calls Tibet “[t]he territory which has caused the greatest

problems for the CCP government.” (Mackerras, 148) In late 1950, PLA troops advanced

on Tibet and drove the Dalai Lama out in fear. Under pressure from the central

government, the Dalai Lama appointed representatives who signed the Measures for the

Peaceful Liberation of Tibet. Tibet became an Autonomous Region but the CCP would

handle its external affairs and the PLA could enter at will. (149) Tibet had lost.

Several uprisings since 1959 have been brutally suppressed, and the Cultural Revolution

of 1966-76 raised the level of attacks on Tibetan Buddhism. Demonstrations throughout

Tibet in 1957 became violent as religious Tibetans marched into government offices and

some of the demonstrators were killed by police. The Tibetans’ cause was gaining

international recognition. (Dillon, 13) In July 2000, the Tibetan government, in exile in

India, after a crackdown the previous month, reported that the CCP aimed to totally

eliminate Tibetan culture. (14) Based on CCP policy since 1950, this idea is not

unthinkable. Things are not much better for the Muslim Uighurs.

Uighurs

There are an estimated 20 million Muslims in China, and most of the Muslims who do

not speak Chinese are in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region. Some Hui, the

Chinese speaking Muslims, also live in Xinjiang. However, the Turkic speaking

Muslims, mainly the Uighurs, have been subject to greater control from the government

and are granted far less freedom of religion than the Hui. “At times when Hui mosques

have been open and busy with worshippers, Uighur and Kazakh mosques remained

closed, even in the Xinjiang capital Urumqi, which is generally stable and thoroughly

under Chinese control.” (17) A separatist movement with a long history was suppressed

from 1949 to 1976, but at the end of the Cultural Revolution it gradually developed into

an opposition to the government. There is evidence that at the moment the government is

attempting to overwhelm the existing Uighur population by encouraging Han

immigration. Economic development is an attempt to entice their migration, some say,

and while it relieves some of the worst cases of poverty, Uighurs consider these new

economic incentives are going to the Han and not to the Uighurs. New conflicts have thus

arisen in recent years. Riots in the 1950s against the Chinese authorities have resulted in a

difficulty of ascertaining the religious affiliations of the people. The CCP banned all

religious organisations other than state registered ones, and civil authorities and police

closely monitor all religious activities. (18) But the violence has not abated.

In Baren in southern Xinjiang in 1990, a group of Muslims were protesting the CCP

policies of birth control, nuclear weapons testing and the exporting of Xinjiang’s

resources westward. A mass protest developed, and police and army were sent to quell

the riots. From 15 to over 60 protesters died, depending on the report, and over 100 were

arrested. 50 mosques were closed and the construction of 100 more was halted. (19) A

series of trials of separatists in March 1999 found eight people executed and 45 others

imprisoned for ‘illegal religious terrorist activities.’ (20) Despite the suffering the

Tibetans and Uighurs have endured, there is a general consensus among observers that

the Falun Gong has suffered worse.

Falun Gong

In October 2002, members of the Falun Gong spiritual religious sect filed a class action

lawsuit in a US federal court against Jiang Zemin, alleging that Jiang and the

government’s Falun Gong Control Office committed acts of torture, genocide, violations

of the rights of life, liberty, security of the person, freedom of thought, conscience and

religion, against the Falun Gong. To the Falun Gong’s dismay, the US State Department

rejected this claim because Jiang Zemin had been head of state, and under the US’

customary practice of international law, it will not convict a current or former head of

state. (American Society of International Law, 977) Nonetheless, the members who had

put forth the charges had made a point about their plight in China.

Started by Li Hongzhi in 1992, the Falun Gong draws on Buddhist and Taoist teachings,

meditation and qigong, the art of deep breathing exercises. It is the most popular of the

new religions, with some estimates as to its membership at 70 to 100 million. It has posed

unique challenges to the central government. Being Chinese in origin, it could not be

dismissed as a foreign import. It is not overtly religious “as its main public manifestation

is the practice of qigong exercises, which is commonplace in China.” (Dillon, 21) And its

members are generally urban, educated, middle aged and even include members of the

CCP and the armed forces. (21) In April 1999, 10,000 followers of Falun Gong protested

peacefully outside the Zhongnanhai in Beijing after some government sponsored

magazines attacked Li Hongzhi (who now lives in the US) as a fraud and a profiteer. “Its

growing influence terrified the Chinese government, which a few months later ordered a

decisive and nation wide crackdown on the movement.” (Li, a112) Other sources say it

was also a demand for dialogue with the government in reaction to the harassment and

detention of its members over the previous months. Amnesty International reports that

tens of thousands of Falun Gong practitioners have been detained arbitrarily and

repeatedly. In prisons, labour camps and psychiatric hospitals, they are subject to ill

treatments such as torture. Besides the clear human rights violations in general, it is

concerning that the Chinese government has not provided any evidence that those it has

detained have committed crimes as defined under international law. (Amnesty

International)

The government’s fear of the Falun Gong seems to stem from its ability to mobilise, and

thus influence, so many people in Chinese society, coupled with its rapid expansion. The

government wants to control information and thought as tightly as it can, in order to

maintain the nationalist sentiment that has kept it in power since 1949. Moreover, the

onslaught on the Falun Gong began at a time of some social upheaval. The Information

Centre of Chinese Democracy and Human Rights estimated over 100,000 people

engaging in public demonstrations in 1999. (Li, a123) As a result, they have branded the

Falun Gong as “a threat to social and political stability.” (Amnesty International) The

government controlled press has made various allegations about the Falun Gong, likening

them to terrorists and cults, and has published articles of the recantations of members

under duress (Dillon, 22) and one on the virtues of atheism and anti religion. (21) Having

claimed it eliminated the Falun Gong in 1999, the police arrested hundreds of its

supporters in Tiananmen Square at National Day celebrations on October 1, 2000. (22)

This testament to the government’s lies and incapacity to stop the movement will likely

push them harder to crack down on it in future.

Conclusion

The rise of China has left groups of people and even entire regions scrounging for the

prosperity their compatriots enjoy. Some of these people are Han but many others are

ethnic and religious minorities. Some, like the Tibetans and the Uighurs, have striven for

independence at great cost to their livelihood, their culture and their dignity; others, like

the Falun Gong, who do not come from just one place, have peacefully challenged the

government and found themselves bearing the wrath of China’s leaders. If the way things

have gone in the past for these people is any indication, and China refuses to democratise,

there is little hope that its minorities will become independent any time soon.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

American Society of International Law: Head-of-State Immunity for Former Chinese

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http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/ENGASA170112000

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