the role of a preventive services unit in combating fraud and corruption world bank group -...
TRANSCRIPT
The Role of a Preventive Services Unit in Combating Fraud and Corruption World Bank Group - Integrity Vice Presidency - Preventive Services Unit - September 2008
Strategy of the Preventive Services UnitC
om
p. A
dv. Investigations Forensics NetworkAdvice
Ser
vice
s
Advice
Ap
pro
ach
PartnershipsTrustedAdvisor
Tools
Schemes Red Flags Risk Mgt.Proc. & Acct.
Training Outreach
SolutionsOriented
Practical
Roads Water HealthPower
Our Key Challenges
Excess Demand
Interdisciplinary Nature
Political Sensitivity
Competing Objectives
Interdepartmental Work
PSU Has Advised 70+ Teams In Two Years
Cameroon
Congo, D.R.
Ethiopia
Kenya
Nigeria
Malawi
Mozambique
Rwanda
Zambia
Angola
Djibouti
West-Bank Gaza
Cambodia
Indonesia
Philippines
Thailand
Vietnam
Bangladesh
India
Pakistan
Kazakhstan
Russia
Tajikistan
Argentina
Colombia
Paraguay
Honduras
Examples of Work
Example 1 Distilling Weaknesses in Project Design
Fraud and corruption risks are underplayed… Key risk areas are not mentioned Articulation of risks is vague or presented at too high a level Past fraud and corruption experiences, incidents, etc. are not referenced
Risk assessment processes provide relatively weak assurances… Risk assessment is undertaken too late in the cycle and inadequately resourced No diagnostics undertaken in key risk areas Critical skills have not always been brought to the team
Mitigation measures (controls) lack specificity and robustness… Mitigation measures are not specific in terms of who does what when Government and donor accountabilities in risk mitigation not mentioned / explicit Mitigation measures are not necessarily linked to risks Supervision, prior review thresholds, etc. are not linked to specific threats
Monitoring framework and triggering actions are not clearly spelled out… Indicators are not clearly defined Triggered Bank action (misprocurement and other remedies) has not been adequately
defined and/or agreed with the Borrower
Example 2 Defining Reality
Crumbling Roof in New Health Clinic – Fraud or Shoddy Workmanship?
Above Cost Estimate
Firm A 28%
Firm B 31%
Firm C 32%
Firm D 33%
Firm E 34%
Firm F 35%
Evenly “spaced” cost Total Bid Prices
1,235,848,743.38
1,266,666,000.00
1,276,000,000.00
1,285,858,585.88
1,296,000,477.64
1,302,573,393.31
Δ Firm A
30.8m
40.2m
50.0m
60.2m
66.7m
Disqualified bidders
“Unnatural” numbers
“Rounded” figures
Example 3 Distilling Investigative Lessons
Do few companies dominate the market? Do companies take turn winning projects? Is the industry operated/strongly influenced by organized
crime? Are there high entry barriers?
Are shell companies submitting bids? Are there examples of bidders with cross-ownership? Are there allegations of bidders being coerced to join the cartel?
Prior allegations or cases related to procurement or corruption? Are Officials tied to bidders?
Sector
Bidders
Agency
Bids
Are bid prices significantly above or below earlier prices/the cost estimate/market prices or too close to the cost estimate?
Are bidders prices, unit rates or bills of quantities too identical? Are there odd numbers in the bid prices or bills of quantities? Are there examples of similar formats, spelling mistakes, etc.? Are bid securities sequential? Is most work subcontracted or substantial agent fees involved? Are loosing bids irrational or poorly formulated?
Does the winner back out because major sub-contractor declines workImplementation
Example 4 Communicating Red Flags
Third Party Monitoring
External Checks
Courts
Police
Audit
Attorney General
CompetitionAuthority
Parliament
Anti-CorruptionAgency
InternalControlsProc
FM
Supervision
Mgt.
Audit
World Bank
BilateralDonors
NGOs
CBOs
AssetsBusinessOrganizations
Beneficiaries
Others
Project Officials
Bidders
Influencers
Example 5 Interpreting Audit Findings
Example 6 Providing Tips for Better Supervision
1. Ensure your Team has the Skills needed to detect fraud and corruption during supervision
2. Undertake a Risk Assessment based on reliable information concisely assessing corruption risks
3. Develop a Supervision Plan detailing who is responsible for doing what, when and how
4. Explore ways to involve other donors in fraud and corruption-related supervision of the project
5. Be strategic and selective in your supervision but do include key control weaknesses
6. Sequence supervision such that it takes place during critical decision points
7. Ensure that the supervision tools, approaches and control functions are sufficiently robust
8. Seek independent verification, e.g., through walk-throughs and site inspections
9. Follow-up to ensure that contractual remedies are being exercised where relevant
10. Ensure that complaint handling is working Effectively
11. Report suspicions of fraud and corruption as part of your risk management strategy
Fraud and Corruption Threats Diversion of road construction and
maintenance funds to benefit certain constituencies
Pressure on BEC members to award contracts to favored bidders
Bribery to steer contracts to favored bidders
Collusion in the bidding of public works contracts
Scaled-back reports from consultants to fund kickbacks
Fraudulent misrepresentation of work by the contractors
Control Weaknesses Procurement process lacks integrity Assets are not properly registered and
protected Internal audits fail to identify
misstatements Technical audits provide “clean bill of
health” when they shouldn’t Independent Validation and
Verification Agents are bribed and/or extorted to sign-off on work
Performance bonds are not invoked when they clearly should
Complaint handling system is not in place / producing results
Debarment system is not in place, partially implemented and/or not complied with
Poor performers keep doing business with the government
Example 7 Identifying Risks
Risk Key Controls
Elevated bid prices
collusion due to
by local and int’l bidders in three highway contracts
Package contracts to attract int’l bidders Make bidding documents available for on
Internet Use post-bid qualifications
Deploy collusion detection software Hire International Procurement Assessor who
is independent (AusAID financed) and shares reports directly with the Bank
Improve quality of ECE
Enhance complaint line use Engage industry association Publish bid awards and trends Move procurement to national level
Example 8 Mitigating Risks
Risk Indicators
Elevated bid prices due to collusion by local and international bidders in three highway packages
Lowest bid price is significantly higher than the ECE Allegations of threat against bidders / cannot purchase bidding doc’s Similar names of key staff and owners; same address; executed
contracts jointly in the past; etc. Shell companies (outsourcing major work to local contractor)
Controls Indicators
Strengthened competition through ICB and removal of conflicting rules restricting sourcing to domestic contractors
Number of qualified bidders purchasing bid packages / submitting bids Number of notable companies not submitting bids National rules to restrict domestic sourcing removed
Deploy collusion detection software Installation, input of data and regular of software Number of red flags detected by software Follow-up on red flags
International Procurement Advisor monitors compliance with Bank Procurement Guidelines
International Advisor to the satisfaction of the Bank is hired Compliance issues identified Timely response to issues by the Borrower
World Bank’s Fraud and Corruption Hotline is included in bidding documents
Bidding documents include Bank hotline
Enhance complaint line use Number of stakeholders showing that they would complain Increase in complaints Redress of key impediments to complaints
Example 9 Linking Mitigation and Supervision
Example 10 Assessing NGO Related Risks
Diagnostics
SectorGovernance
NGOCapacity
GovernmentOversight
ComplaintHandling
Schemes Opportunity
Laws NGO Commission Audits / oversight Enforcement action
Code of Conduct HR Policy Accountants Project Mgt.
Accounting Due diligence Spot audits Inspection
Target NGO sector Generally effective
Fraud Corruption Political ties Poor performance
Weak checks Difficult to measure
Incentivize Audience
Communicate
Incentives
Disincentives
Awareness
Decision
Action
Process Complaint
Complain Register
Inquire
Address Complaint
Report
Review
Prioritize
Govern Complaint System
Administrative
Criminal
Example 11 Assessing Complaint Handling
1. Not aware that the act was an offense2. Did not have enough information3. Did not recognize the “red flag”4. Did not understand why it was important to file complaint5. Did not know how to file complaint6. Complaining runs counter to culture7. Complaint does not contain enough specifics about the event for follow-up
action to take8. Complainant did not provide means to get in contact with him/her9. Was not mandated to file complaint10. Anonymous complaints are not possible and/or are not addressed11. Could not overcome time or monetary hurdles to filing complaint12. Whistleblowers are not (adequately/effectively) protected13. Was never contacted to get additional information14. Did not trust the Government15. Past complaint never resulted in anything16. Feared retaliation from the government and/or subject of the complaint
Identifying Barriers to Filing ComplaintsC
om
mu
ni c
at i
on
sP
oli
cy
Go
v.
Assessing Effectiveness of Complaint Handling
Overlapping jurisdictions among mechanismsCases are sent back and forth between mechanismsReferrals among agencies are slow or do not take placeMechanisms sub-optimize their prioritization / don’t coordinateNo mechanism has critical mass of skills / resources
Complaints fail to get recordedThe prioritization process is weak or non-existent
Follow-up action take too long / is not professional / lacks integrityFollow-up action focuses on process rather than outcomes
Corruption hot spots / systemic issues are not identified
Prioritization and follow-up action is subject to undue influenceResources are wholly inadequate to address case loadMechanism have insufficient powers
Fra
gm
en
t ati
on
Int a
ke
Inq
ui r
yK
MP
oli
tic
al
Assessing Integrity Issues In Complaint Handling
Head of mechanism Has strong party / political affiliations Lacks complaint handling experience Can be terminated immediately by Government (with no other checks) May have term of office extended May take up other Government position upon leaving position Is forbidden to enter office building
Decision making Political level is involved in operational decisions about what to investigate / audit / review Only opposition figures appear to be investigated / audited / reviewed
Procedures Due process consideration are not enshrined in law and procedures No recourse for the subject of a complaint Complaints about the actions taken by the mechanism
Support Prosecutor does not / seldom initiates prosecution on the basis of cases presented Inadequate budget set aside for the functioning of the mechanism When police is engaged to conduct searches they turn up nothing Mechanism is criticized by the opposition