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The Role of Imagery in InformationProcessing: Review and Extensions

DEBORAH J. MACINNISLINDA L. PRICE*

Mental imagery is receiving increased attention in consumer behavior theory andresearch. This article describes imagery, characterizing it as a processing mode inwhich multisensory information is represented in a gestalt form in working memoryand discusses research on the unique effects of imagery at low levels of cognitiveelaboration. It specifies researchable propositions for the relationship between highelaboration imagery processing and consumer choice and consumption behaviorsFinally, it reviews specific methods for studying imagery.

I nformation processing research has traditionally fo-cused on discursive or descriptive information pro-

cessing (Bettman 1979; Greenwald 1968; Olson, Toy,and Dover 1982; Swasy and Munch 1985; Wright 1974,'1980).' As such, researchers have examined how sym-bols (most commonly words and numbers) are com-bined in working memory to represent and solve prob-lems. Discursive (symbolic, language-like) informationprocessing encompasses a broad range of strategies.Compositional choice strategies, counterarguments,attributions, and formulations of choice rules are illus-trations of discursive information processing. Increas-ingly, however, attention has been given to the role ofmental imagery in information processing (Childers andHouston 1982, 1984; Childers, Houston, and Heckler1985; Lutz and Lutz 1977, 1978; Rethans and Hastak1981; Rossiter 1982; Rossiter and Percy 1983; Smith,Houston, and Childers 1984). Imagery is a conceptuallydistinct way of representing information, a way that is"very like picturing and very unlike describing" (Fodor1981, p. 76). To date, this emergent research streamhas focused predominantly on imagery processing atlow levels of cognitive elaboration—for example, men-tally picturing a stimulus object. More recently, therehave been discussions that refer to imagery processingat higher levels of elaboration. These discussions suggestthat elaborated imagery plays a role in influencing (1)affective responses to stimuli, and (2) behavior (Calder

•Deborah J. Maclnnis is Assistant Professor, Department of Mar-keting, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ 85721. Linda L. Price isAssistant Professor, Department of Marketing. University of Pitts-burgh, Pittsburgh, PA 15260. Authors are listed in alphabetical orderto reflect equal contributions. The authors would like to acknowledgethe many helpful comments of C. Whan Park and three anonymousreviewers on earlier versions of this article.

1978; Cohen 1982; Greenwald and Leavitt 1984; Ros-siter and Percy 1978, 1983; Smith et al. 1984).

This article addresses the meaning of imagery pro-cessing, how it differs from discursive processing—par-ticularly under varying degrees of cognitive elaboration,and what unique effects it has on processing outcomes!It also reviews research on the unique effects of imageryunder conditions of low elaboration and explores thepotentially unique effects of imagery at higher levels ofelaboration. The article gives specific attention to therole of imagery in problem framing, assessing proba-bilities, forming intentions, and generating affect. Inaddition, it considers the use of imagery in consumersettings throughout the phases of consumption and de-velops researchable propositions to guide future re-search on elaborated imagery. Finally, it explores issuesrelated to the conduct of research on imagery.

THE MEANING OF IMAGERYImagery is defined here as (1) a process (not a struc-

ture) by which (2) sensory information is representedin working memory. Imagery processing, and infor-mation processing in general, fall on an elaborationcontinuum that ranges from processes limited to thesimple retrieval or evocation of a cognitive concept to

As used here, discursive means passing from premises to conclu-sions; proceeding by reasoning or argument (Oxford dictionary). De-scriptive processing is a somewhat broader term suggesting anymeaningful combination of verbal or other symbolic units. Althoughthe two terms have a slightly different connotation, they will be usedinterchangeably here for ease of presentation.

•This is not to say that the debate of what imagery is and what itis not has been resolved (cf Block 1981). Processing probably oftenoccurs on a continuum between "pictures" and "symbols." For ex-ample, maps and stick figures (as mental images) would have featuresof both (Fodor 1981).

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processes involving multiple concepts and constructions(e;g., problem solving, creative thinking, and day-dreaming). The following section will describe each ofthese issues in greater detail, and will serve to (1) dis-tinguish imagery processing from schemas and scripts,(2) distinguish imagery processing from discursive pro-cessing, and (3) describe the elaboration continuum forimagery processing.

Imagery as a Process, Not a Structure

While the idea of imagery processing is widely ac-cepted, the assumption that knowledge is stored or rep-resented as images has been hotly debated (Pinker andKosslyn 1983). Propositional theorists (e.g., Anderson:1978; Anderson and Bower 1973; Lang 1979; Pylyshyn1973, 1981) argue that knowledge is represented onlyas a set of verbal propositional networks composed ofnodes (representing concepts) and connected by links(representing relationships between concepts; see alsoKieras 1978). Others have argued that knowledge canbe stored as images. In support of their argument theynote that studies on mental rotation of objects, imagesize, and parallel processing are more consistent withan imagery' perspective than a propositional one (Bug-elski 1983'; Kieras 1978; Kolers 1983; Kosslyn 1975;Kosslyn and Pomerantz 1977; Kosslyn et al. 1981).These researchers contend that images have emergentproperties that cannot be explained by propositjonalnetwork theories.

While the debate between propositional theorists andimagery theorists is far from resolved, Yuille andCatchpole (1977) have developed a compromise posi-tion based on the work of Piaget and Inhelder (1973).They propose that the ability to generate images doesnot necessarily imply that knowledge is stored as images.They argue that knowledge is stored in an abstract (butnot necessarily verbal) operational code. The well-sub-stantiated ability to move from words to pictures andpictures to words suggests that there is a representationin memory that encompasses both. Once a knowledgestructure has been activated, imagery can be generatedfrom information contained in that structure. For ex-ample, after activating the knowledge structure forbirds, an individual may imagine a prototypical birdsuch as a sparrow (see Mervis and Rosch 1981 for areview).

Consistent with the views of Yuille and Catchpole(1977), imagery is conceptualized here as a mode ofprocessing information. In other words, imagery pro-cessing is viewed as distinct from information structure(knowledge storage). This distinction serves to differ-entiate imagery from such knowledge structures asschemas and scripts. The latter constructs refer toknowledge structures regarding an object, person, role,event, or action (cf. Abelson 1976; Rosch 1978). It isthe instantiation of a schema or script that generatesimagery, not the schema or script itself. For example.

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an individual may draw upon a script of a "romanticevening" in imagining such an evening. Informationfrom schemas or scripts can also be processed in a dis-cursive mode. Hence, the information structure isviewed as distinct from processing mode.

Since imagery processing relies on stored knowledge,the evocation and vividness of the image is likely todepend on the level of knowledge development. Con-sistent with this notion. Smith et al. (1984) found thatindividuals who possessed a script for a given event re-ported evoking imagery experiences when they instan-tiated that script. Moreover, inclividuals with well-de-veloped scripts reported that their imagery experienceswere significantly more vivid than did individuals with-out well-developed scripts.

Imagery as a Sensory Process

Imagery processing has several qualities that distin-guish it from discursive processing. Most fundamen-tally, imagery processes are evoked as sensory experi-ences in working memory. Imagery processing includesperceptual or sensory representations in working mem-ory that are used in much the same way as perceptionsof external stimuli. Thus, imagery involves concretesensory representations of ideas, feelings, and memo-ries, and it permits a direct recovery of past experiences(Yuille and Catchpole 1977). The evocation of iniagerymay be multi-sensory—involving images that incor-porate, for example, smell, taste, sight, and tactile sen-sations—or may involve a single sensory dimension,such as sight. In contrast, discursive processing (suchas verbal retrieval, cognitive responding, and verbal en-coding) is more detached from internal sensor>- expe-riences. The absence of sensory dimensions of infor-mation in working memory- makes these discursiveprocesses less concrete (more abstract) than imageryprocesses. Moreover, unlike discursive processing, im-agery can be described along several unique sensory-related dimensions. For example, vividness refers to theclarity of images. And controllability reflects the extentto which images can be held in mind and/or altered inspecific ways at will (Marks 1972).

That imagery involves internal sensory experienceshas both intuitive and empirical support. Early researchsuggested that people can confuse imaging with per-ceiving (Perky 1910). Even before research on imageryexisted, people talked naturally about the "pictures" intheir heads. Research has since indicated that imageryand perceiving (or sensing) share the same physiologicalmachinery, and that imagery produces physiological ef-fects that'mirror perceptual processes (Deckert 1964;Finke 1980; Lang 1979; Perky 1910; Shaw 1940). Im-agery content also influences a broad range of physio-logical responses (e.g., muscular reactions, heart rate,eye movements, galvanic skin response; Lang 1979).Other research stresses the analogue relationship be-tween imagery and pictures (Kosslyn 1980; Kosslyn et

IMAGERY PROCESSING

al. 1983; Paivio 1975; Shepard 1978; Shepard andMeltzer 1971). Specifically, imagery is presumed to haveproperties that preserve the spatial and size dimensionsin actual stimuli. Thus, just as an ant looks small com-pared to a butterfly, imagery would reproduce their rel-ative relationship. Compared with symbolic or lan-guage-like processing, imagery processing bears a non-arbitrary correspondence to the thing being represented.

While it is recognized that imagery is a sensory andsometimes a multisensory process, the remainder of thisarticle focuses predominantly on visual imagery. Thatis, the examples and discussion tend to emphasize pic-turing and visualizing rather than other sensory prop-erties ofthe informatioti in working memory.

The Elaboration Continuum Of Imagery

Several streams of research have proposed that in-formation can be processed at different levels of cog-nitive elaboration (Cacioppo and Petty 1984; Chaiken1980; Craik and Lockhart 1972; Craik and Tulving1975; Greenwald and Leavitt 1984; Mitchell 1981; Pettyand Cacioppo 1983). Elaboration reflects the extent towhich information in working memor>' is integratedwith prior knowledge structures. Information processedat a low level of elaboration may elicit only a recognitionresponse. Information processed at higher levels ofelaboration, however, establishes connections betweenencoded information and prior knowledge, and thusinvolves the activation and integration of data frommultiple knowledge structures. Thinking, problemsolving, cognitive responding, and daydreaming are allprocesses involving high degrees of cognitive elabora-tion (Arieti 1976; Bugelski 1983; Greenwald and Leavitt1984; Simon 1978).

There has been an implicit confound in some researchbetween processing mode (imagery vs. discursive) andprocessing level (high vs. low elaboration; Craik andLockhart 1972; Craik and Tulving 1975; Petty and Ca-cioppo 1983). Specifically, low elaboration has beenimplicitly linked to imagery and high elaboration todiscursive (symbolic, language-like) processing. How-ever, both imagery- and discursive processes can be de-scribed on an elaboration continuum (see the Figure).At the low end ofthe elaboration continuum are simpleresponses such as the retrieval of a verbal label, and/oran image of a perceptual object. At the high end oftheelaboration continuum are discursive processes such ascounterarguments, attributions, and compositionalchoice strategies (Wright 1980), and imagery processessuch as daydreams, fantasies, and visual problem solv-ing (Hilgard 1981; Richardson 1983). The same factorsthat influence elaborated discursive processing alsostimulate elaborated imagery processing. For example,involvement in an activity (Greenwald and Leavitt1984; Klinger 1977; Mitchell 1981; Sarbin 1972) andprior knowledge (Burnkrant and Sawyer 1983; Ca-cioppo and Petty 1984; Petty and Cacioppo 1983; Smith

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et al. 1984; Yalch and Yalch 1984) can elicit elaboratedimagery processing, elaborated discursive processing,or both.

It is important to remember that imagery and dis-cursive processing are not mutually exclusive processes(Arieti 1976; Bugelski 1983; Holbrook and Moore1981 a). For example, an individual may evoke an imageand give it a verbal label or generate cognitive responsesbased on imagined (visualized) scenarios. When con-sumers in "real" contexts engage in imagery, it is quitelikely that discursive and imagery processing and thecontents of each become elaborately intertwined.' Basedon current research, it is difficult to disentangle imageryand discursive processing and ensure that the uniqueeffects of each processing mode are independent of con-tent effects. Nevertheless, it is important to understandthe situations that influence the dominance of one pro-cessing mode over the other. Understanding the uniqueeffects of each processing mode on processing outcomesis an equally important issue. Research that addressesthese issues is summarized in the Figure, which servesas a framework for the remainder of this article.

Our attention will now turn to the unique effects oflow elaboration imagery (vs. low elaboration symbolic/language-like processing) on learning and memor>s thepotential effects of elaborated imagery on informationprocessing and the phases of consumption, and finally,issues involved in the conduct of research on imagery(imagery-eliciting strategies and measures of imageryprocessing).

REVIEW OF LOW-ELABORATIONIMAGERY PROCESSING

The bulk of research on imagery has examined im-agery experiences that fall at the low end ofthe elabo-ration continuum. Two broad imagery research streamsare: (1) studies ofthe effect of imagery as a mnemonicdevice, and (2) studies of the effect of imagery in en-hancing incidental learning. Excellent reviews of thesestudies exist elsewhere (cf. Ernest 1977; Lutz and Lutz1978; Paivio 1971; Richardson 1983); hence, the reviewprovided here is brief and selective.

Imagery as a Mnemonic Tool

General Findings. One research stream indicatesthat, compared to non-imagerj' processing strategiessuch as verbal rehearsal, imagery can substantially en-hance memory for pairs of stimuli (Bower 1970, 1972;Paivio 1969, 1971; Yates 1966). A factor explaining theeffect of imagery on paired associate learning is thatimagery provides a holistic construction that serves to

'One reviewer noted that a related but separate line of inquio'would not seek to disentangle the experimentally divisible processand content domains, but would instead focus on consumers' use ofimagerj' in naturalistic settings.

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FIGURE

ANTECEDENTS AND CONSEQUENCES OF IMAGERY PROCESSING

Antecedents

Pictures

Alesandrini and Sheikh 1983*Childers and Houston 1984"Lutz and Lute 1978*Paivio 1971*"Rossiter 1982'Shepard 1967"

Concrete words

Alesandrini and Sheikh 1983'Cartwright 1980"Cartwright et al. 1978"Lutz and Lute 1978*Paivio etal. 1968"Paivio and Foth 1970"Rossiter 1982'

Instructions to imagine

Carroll 1978"Rossiter 1982'Sherman et al. 1984"Wright and Rip 1980"

Guided imagery

Wolltnan1981'

Current concerns

Klinger 1977*"'Singer 1978'

Needs for enhanced orreduced stimutation

Doob 1972'Singer 1978*Tushup and Zuckerman

1977"

-*• Processing

Low elaboration

Imagery - -Discursive

High elaboration

Moderators: Individu^ Differences intmagery Processing

Imagery vividness

Marks 1972*Marks 1973"Sheehan 1967"Singer and Antrobus 1972"

Controttabitity of imagery

Gordon 1949"Richardson 1969"

tmagery content

Singer and Antrobus 1963"Singer and Antrobus 1972"

Spatiat abitity

Shepard and Melteer 1971"

Processing styte

Childers et al. 1985"Holbrook et al. 1984"Kunzendorf 1982"Paivio 1971*"'Richardson 1977"

• Review article." Empirical article.' Theoretical article.

unify object pairs in a meaningful association (Bower1970, 1972). Thus, memory for a pair of words like"tub" and "bug" can be etihanced by imagining a bugtaking a bath. These memory effects may be substantialif the unification ofthe object pairs results in a bizarreimage. Miller, Galanter, and Pribram (1960) found thatsubjects could remember as many as 500 responses by

Consequences

Effects on memoryChilders and Houston 1984"Emest 1977*Lute and Lute 1977"Lute and Lute 1978'Miller etal. 1960"Paivio 1969"Paivio (1971)'"Paivio and Csapo 1973"Paivio and Foth 1970"Yates 1966"'

Effects on incidental learning

Bower 1972"Butter 1970"Sheehan 1972"Sheehan and Neisser 1969"Swann and Miller 1982"

Effects on problem framing

Simon and Hayes 1976Holbrook and Moore 1981b

Effects on probability assessment

Carroll 1978"Einhom and Hogarth 1984"Kahneman and Tversky 1982"'Sherman etal. 1984"

Effects on intentions and purchase timing

Anderson 1983"Bandura 1982"Cautela and McCuiiough 1978*Lang 1977"Lang 1979*McMahon 1973*Mischel 1974*Mischel and Moore 1973'Staats and Lohr 1979'Wolpe 1958"

Imagery as a consumption experience

Arieti 1976'Doob 1972*Hilgard 1978*"Hirschman and Holbrook 1982'Holbrook etal. 1984"Undauer 1972*Undauer 1983*Singer 1978*

imagining a stimulus in a bizarre image. The unusualimage created by a bizarre association may create a moredistinctive memory trace that enhances the likelihoodthat subjects will recall the appropriate target word(Nelson, Reed, and McEnvoy 1977). Paivio and Csapo(1973) found that memory for objects increased as theconcreteness of the stimulus words increased. Thus,

IMAGERY PROCESSING

memory was greatest for pictures, less for concretewords, and least for abstract words. In sum, imageryhas greater effects on paired associate learning when thestimuli are concrete (particularly if they can be unifiedin an interactive image).

Marketing Applications. In marketing, the effects ofimagery on paired associate learning have been appliedin several ways. Lutz and Lutz (1977) found that pic-tures (imagery-eliciting stimuli) in advertisements hada positive effect on memory for product-relevant infor-mation when the brand (company) name and productattribute were unified in a picture (interactive image).Memory was reduced when items in the pair did notinteract. Childers and Houston (1984) found that re-dundancy between pictorial and visual information inadvertisements produced a superior effect on recall forthe advertisement, particularly when a sensory pro-cessing strategy, as opposed to a verbal (symbolic) pro-cessing strategy, was used. The authors proposed thatbecause of chunking at encoding, interactive imagescreate a stronger memory trace that facilitates retrieval.

While much of the research on imagery effects uponintentional learning has focused on memory for nounor item pairs, Wright and Rip (1980) examined the roleof imagery in learning a problem-framing rule. Theyhypothesized that imagery instructions might enhancelearning by making the attributes more concrete andsalient, and hence, more memorable. However, the ef-fects of imagery on learning were modest at best. Oneimportant factor influencing these results may be thatthe subjects, as novices, had little schematic informationabout the attributes or the problem situation. For them,attribute-based information was abstract, not concrete.Thus, their ability to generate imagery may have beenlimited.

Imagery Efiects on Incidental Learning

General Findings. Several studies indicate that im-agery-eliciting stimuli (e.g., pictures, concrete words,instructions to imagine) enhance incidental learning,and thus reduce the gap between incidental and inten-tional learning-task conditions (Bower 1972; Butter1970; Sheehan 1972; Sheehan and Neisser 1969). Stim-ulus concreteness is one factor that may help to reducethis gap. Butter (1970) asked subjects to read pairs ofwords that were either abstract or concrete. Subjectsdid not expect a recall test, making the task an incidentallearning situation. Subjects recalled a significantlygreater number of concrete than abstract word pairs.Butter hypothesized that concrete words elicit imagerythat enhances incidental learning. In several studies re-ported in Sheehan 1972, Sheehan manipulated both theconcreteness of the word pairs (concrete vs. abstract)and the learning conditions of subjects (incidental vs.intentional learning). In these studies, subjects in theintentional learning condition remembered both ab-

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Stract and concrete pairs. However, in the incidentallearning situation, subjects recalled significantly moreconcrete than abstract words. Sheehan (1972) proposesthat imagery-eliciting stimuli in general (e.g., pictures,concrete words, imagery instructions), and not merelyconcrete words, enhance incidental learning. Consistentwith Sheehan's hypothesis. Bower (1972) found thatimagery instructions facilitated incidental learning. Halfof the subjects were told to memorize 20 noun pairsand expect a recall test (intentional learning). The otherswere told to rate the vividness of mental images gen-erated by the word pairs. No mention of a recall taskwas made to this group (incidental learning). The resultsindicated that imagery-orienting instructions at encod-ing significantly reduced the gap between intentionaland incidental learning.

Marketing applications. The effects of low-elabo-ration imagery on consumer learning and memory offera rich domain for future research. For example, giventhe often cited notion that much of consumer behavioris ofthe "low involvement" variety (e.g., Batra and Ray1983), studies ofthe role of imagery in enhancing in-cidental learning would be quite informative. Since bothimagery vividness and stimulus concreteness affect theusefulness of imagery in incidental learning tasks(Swann and Miller 1982), marketers need to explorethe factors under their control that can influence im-agery vividness and concreteness and that thus affectconsumers' abilities to remember product-related in-formation.

ELABORATED IMAGERY: REVIEWAND EXTENSIONS

In a consumer context, the role of imagery processingat high levels of the elaboration continuum remainsillusory, although it is also important. Research in otherfields indicates that elaborated imagery experiences(such as daydreams, fantasies, and visual problem-solv-ing) are ubiquitous across cultures (Doob 1972) andage groups (Giambra 1977). Elaborated imagery pro-cessing can help an individual anticipate future situa-tions (Kolers 1983; Singer 1974. 1978; Singer and An-trobus 1972) and work out solutions to current prob-lems (Klinger 1977), and can influence affectiveexperiences. Few consumer researchers have examinedthe types of consumption experiences that may evokeelaborated imagery processing or the types of con-sumption-related experiences that are processed as im-agery.'' Moreover, little is known about whether elab-

'Exceptions are studies by Holbrook el al. (1984) and Rethans andHastak (1981). Holbrook et al. found that individuals enjoyed gamesmore when their preferred cognitive style (imagery vs. verbalization)matched the game format (visual vs. verbal). Rethans and Hastakfound that a significant portion of consumers' fears about producthazards is evoked as imagery' experiences.

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orated imagery produces effects that differ from dis-cursive processing.

The following section reviews studies on elaboratedimagery processing made elsewhere and develops prop-ositions about the potentially unique effects of elabo-rated imagery on selected consumer behaviors. In par-ticular, the influence of elaborated imagery on problemframing, the assessment of probabilities, purchase in-tentions, and affect are explored. Research relevant tothis discussion is listed in the Figure.

Consumer Imagery and Problem Framing

Research in human problem solving indicates thatproblem framing is an important part of subsequentproblem-solving activities. Both discursive and imageryprocesses can be used to frame problems (Simon andHayes 1976). For example, an individual may visuallyimagine a product in use and use that evoked scenarioas a basis for subsequent problem-solving activities (e.g.,attribute evaluations, risk assessment). Alternatively,using discursive processing, an individual might ex-amine a series of brands and attributes in a matrix andinvoke a choice heuristic (e.g., a lexicographic strategy)to make a product selection decision. Research hasdemonstrated that the way in which a problem is rep-resented (visually or otherwise) can have a dramaticimpact on the amount of time it takes to solve a prob-lem. It also affects the solution strategies used (Simonand Hayes 1976). While research in the choice and de-cision making literature has been extensive in marketing(e.g., Bettman and Park 1980; Bettman and Zins 1977;Grether and Wilde 1984; Lussier and Olshavsky 1984;Park and Lessig 1981; Wright 1974), little is knownabout whether imagery is used in these decision makingactivities and whether imagery influences decisionmaking strategies and outcomes.

The Effect of Imagery Processing on Brand Evalua-tion Strategies. Most research has assumed that con-sumers either combine attributes to make an overallbrand evaluation (choice by processing brands) orcompare all brands on one or more attributes, such asprice or quality (denoted as choice by processing attri-butes; Bettman 1979). Discursive processing obviouslyallows for both types of brand-evaluation strategies.Research has demonstrated that the structure of thetask, information presentation format, and the priorexperience and learning goals ofthe consumer ali affectthe use of brand- and attribute-evaluation strategies(Bettman and Kakkar 1977; Biehal and Chakravarti1982; Brucks 1985; Johnson and Russo 1980).

The effect of imagery processing on brand evaluationstrategies has not been explored. However, Park andMittal (1985) indicate that elaborated imagery pro-cessing is likely to differ in important ways from elab-orated discursive processing, in particular, while dis-cursive processing can be characterized as an implicit


or explicit summary of features or attributes using somecombination rules, imagery is holistic. A particularlyinteresting study suggests the impact of mental imagingon the presence of cue configurality (feature interac-tions) in a product evaluation task (Holbrook andMoore 1981b).' While the study focused predominantlyon processing differences for verbal versus pictorialpresentations, the subject's claimed processing strategy(discursive vs. imagery) was found to exert a significantmoderating effect on the presence of cue configuralityfor different input formats. As such, imagery processingdoes not readily lend itself to piecemeal comparisonsacross brands. Hence, as a tool for framing problems,imagery is more appropriately characterized as a brand-based processing strategy.

As a within-brand problem-framing tool, imagerybecomes an effective strategy for making a single out-come or scenario specific and concrete. For example,the individual may first simply imagine (visualize) theproduct. Having made this construction, the image maybe elaborated as the individual develops a scenario ofthe product being used. Of course, alternative scenariosmight be imagined to reflect multiple-usage situations.There is obviously a tradeoff between evaluating a singlebrand thoroughly and evaluating multiple brands usingfewer criteria. Since imagery encourages a focus on asingle brand, resources available for processing infor-mation about other brands are reduced.' It is importantto remember, however, that the use of imagery in choicecontexts does not imply that the individual ignores in-formation about other brands. Specifically, imagerymay be used as part of a phased decision-making strat-egy along with other choice rules (Cohen 1982; Parkand Mittal 1985). For example, the individual may usediscursive processing to reduce the number of alter-natives and then use imagery to evaluate the few thatremain.

Decision Complexity and Imagery Processing. Theextent to which consumers use imagery as an alternativeto complex information-integration rules is not known.The issue is an important one, however, because it hasimplications for consumers' abilities to deal with a largearray of data for a single product. Using a linear conti-pensatory choice model, there is a positive relationshipbetween the number of attributes or brands consideredand the complexity of the problem: the greater thenumber of attributes or brands, the more informationthat must be evaluated, and hence, the more complexthe decision. This guideline has been implicit in re-searchers' understanding of information load. While

'The presence of feature interactions is consistent with holistic andintegrative processing.

'This effect may be heightened if visualizing the brand has arousalvalue (i.e., it's exciting and fun to imagine use of the brand). Thearousal effects of imagery are discussed in subsequent sections of thisarticle.

IMAGERY PROCESSING 479

consumers in general seem to be able to handle a fewmore attributes than alternatives before informationoverload sets in, both attributes and alternatives affectdecision complexity (Malhotra 1982).

Using imagery, it is much easier to consider a largerset of attributes than to evaluate a larger set of brands.'While considering a larger set of brands requires theconstruction of additional images, a larger set of attrib-ute information may be helpful in "filling out" or en-hancing an image. In fact, for imagery processing, theremay be an inverse relationship between the number ofattributes and the complexity of the decision. Whenattributes are not given, the image is likely to be vague,making the evocation ofthe image and the evaluationofthe product more difficult. In contrast, greater num-bers of attributes add clarity and precision to the image,which could facilitate the evaluation ofthe product. Ofcourse, as noted in previous sections, this would dependon the concreteness and hence imagability ofthe attri-butes. Comparable to the novelist's detailed descriptionof characters, detailed information on the features of aproduct may make visualizing the product and its usesmuch easier.

Missing Information and Imagery Processing. Fi-nally, since imager>' processing encourages within-brandproduct-evaluation strategies, it has some importantimplications for how consumers deal with missing in-formation in product selection decisions. Recent re-search suggests that consumers use information aboutcomparable brands to fill in missing information on apartially described alternative (Huber and McCann1982; Meyer 1981, 1982). For example, consumers us-ing an across-brand strategy (or processing by attributes)may assign a discounted mean value to the missing at-tribute (Huber and McCann 1982). Other research sug-gests that consumers use information about other at-tributes ofthe partially described alternative to fill inthe missing values (within-brand strategy: Ford andSmith 1985). Both types of inferences have been dem-onstrated, but the conditions that lead to across-brandversus within-brand inferences have not been deter-mined. Understanding the type of processing used couldimprove predictions of the likelihood of differing in-ferential strategies. While consumers using discursiveprocessing might infer price by substituting a discountedaverage price ofthe product across brands, consumersusing imagery would be more likely to infer price byfirst representing the product based on available infor-

'This would not necessarily generalize lo sequential tasks (i.e.. whereadditional attributes are provided at a second exposure) since thenature ofthe information stored in memory for imaginal versus dis-cursive processing may vary (see Fiske 1982). Little is known aboutthe factors that affect information use in memory-based choice, butthere is some evidence that consumers use prior overall evaluationsand that the extent of brand-attribute feature processing in generalis reduced (Biehal and Chakravarti 1986; Lingle and Ostrom 1979;Loken and Hoverstad 1985).

mation for the brand and then determining value. Thefollowing propositions summarize this discussion oftheinfluence of elaborated imagery on problem framing*:

PI: When imagery processing is used, consumerswill be more likely to rely on within-brandprocessing strategies as opposed to across-brand strategies.

P2: Consumers will evaluate fewer brands whenimagery processing rather than discursiveprocessing is used, controlling for processingmotivation.

P3: There will be an inverse relationship betweenthe number of attributes given and perceiveddecision complexity when imagery process-ing is used. In contrast, there will be a positiverelationship between the number of attri-butes given and perceived decision complex-ity when a discursive processing strategy isused.

P4: When imagerj' processing is used, consumerswill infer missing attributes based on existinginformation about the product rather thanon estimation ofthe mean value ofthe miss-ing attribute from information on otherbrands.

Imagery Effects on Probability Assessmentand Consumer Satisfaction

In framing consumption problems and product al-ternatives, consumers are likely to elaborate on theconsequences of product use (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980:Wright 1980). In using imagery to elaborate on productor purchase outcomes, systematic effects in probabilityassessment and behavioral intentions may arise. Theseeffects are explored in the sections that follow.

Conjunctive Probability Assessment. Recent re-search suggests that individuals overestimate conjunc-tive probabilities (i.e., the likelihood that two eventswill occur together: Fischhoff 1985: Tversky andKahneman 1983: Wallsten and Budescu 1983). Whilethere are many possible sources of biases in predictivejudgments of this sort, one ofthe most important ap-pears to be elaborated imagery. Recent research byKahneman and Tversky (1982) indicates that when in-dividuals imagine a future scenario they attach proba-bilities to the scenario as a whole, not to the individualsequences of events that make up the scenario. AsKahneman and Tversky note, "the cumulative proba-bility of at least one fatal failure in the sequence of

'It is recognized that discursive processing refers to a broad set ofprocessing strategies, including cognitive responses and cognitive al-gebra. For ease of presentation, these (and subsequent) propositionsare simply formulated around the general term, without specifyingthe specific form of discursive processing.

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images could be overwhelmingly high, even though theprobability of each individual cause of failure is negli-gible" (1982, pp. 207-208). Relatedly, Einhorn andHogarth (1984) found that individuals tend to assign ahigh probability to conjunctive events that they canreadily imagine and pay little attention to the numberof contingent outcomes between the two events. More-over, the authors suggest that imagery may be one ofthe most frequently used methods for estimating con-junctive probabilities. Thus, when asked about theprobability of event 1 and event 2 co-occuring, respon-dents may decide about the plausibility ofthe scenarioby imagining (visualizing) a scenario in which the eventsco-exist. The research discussed earlier on the relation-ship between the presence of feature interactions andprocessing strategy (discursive vs. imagery) also providesindirect support for the importance of processing strat-egy in conjunctive probability assessment (Holbrookand Moore 1981b).

Likelihood Assessment. Because of its impact onconjunctive probability assessment, imagery is likely toincrease the perceived likelihood that the visualizedscenario will unfold as imagined. That is, probabilitiesof individual events that make up the scenario are dis-counted in judging the likelihood ofthe imagined sce-nario. However, imagery also affects perceived likeli-hoods more directly. Some research suggests that thevery act of visualizing an event can make the eventseem more likely. Carroll (1978) conducted experimentsin which individuals were asked to imagine a specificoutcome for a future event (e.g., the outcome of a pres-idential election or a football game). The remainingsubjects were given no imagery instructions. For sub-jects who imagined the outcome, a portion was askedto verbally elaborate on the reasons for the imaginedoutcome, while the remainder engaged in imagerywithout verbal elaboration. The dependent variable wasthe perceived likelihood that the event would occur asimagined. Subjects who imagined the future outcomeperceived a higher likelihood ofthe event occurring thandid subjects who did not imagine the future event.Moreover, verbal elaboration (a discursive processingstrategy) had no additional effect on expectations. Thiseffect has been explained in terms of the availabilityheuristic: imagining outcomes increases their perceivedlikelihood by making the outcomes more salient andeasier to recall.

Several other studies have demonstrated that imag-ining or explaining a hypothetical future event increasessubjects' subjective probability estimates that the eventwill actually occur (Anderson 1983; Gregory, Cialdini.and Carpenter 1982; Hoch 1984; Sherman et al. 1981,1983, 1984). Sherman et al. (1984) told college studentsabout a new disease that was increasingly prevalent oncampus. The disease was described to one group of sub-jects in terms of several concrete, easy-to-imaginesymptoms. To the other group, the disease was described

with nebulous, difficult-to-imagine conditions. Whenthese two groups were asked to imagine themselvescontracting the disease, only those given the easy-to-imagine symptoms increased their estimated likelihoodof getting it. (Those given the difficult-to-imaginesymptoms actually reduced their perceived chance ofcontracting the disease.) These results suggest that im-agery can upwardly bias perceived likelihoods, partic-ularly when subjects are provided with concrete infor-mation that enhances the vividness of images.

While several studies suggest that the presence (vs.absence) of imagery can influence likelihood assess-ments, the results do not clearly establish whether elab-orated discursive processing (such as the constructionof explanations or reasons) and elaborated imagery haveequivalent or differing effects on perceived likelihoods.For example, Carroll's 1978 study suggests only thatthe effects of imagery are not enhanced by the additionof verbal arguments. Moreover, the extent to which theeffect is the consequence ofthe nature of imagery pro-cessing itself or the indirect effect of imagery on contentis also unclear. Certainly, providing a construction ofexplanations or reasons for a particular outcome differsfrom visualizing the outcome—not only in processingstyle, but also in content.

There are several reasons to suspect that elaboratedimagery may affect perceived likelihoods more thanwould elaborated discursive processing. For example,imagery is likely to be more concrete and bear a closerresemblance to perceptual phenomena (perhaps in-creasing the salience of imagined outcomes over verbalarguments). Nevertheless, it is clear that both types ofprocessing can affect likelihood estimation, and thereis, at present, no unambiguous test of which type ofprocessing has the greater impact.

Extremity of Decision Outcomes Considered andConsumer Satisfaction. In addition to its potentiallybiasing effect on likelihood assessment and estimatesof conjunctive probabilities, elaborated imagery- maylead to a positivity bias with regard to future decisionoutcomes (O'Neal 1974). The fact that imagery providesa sensory analogue makes it natural for consumers tofocus on outcomes that feel good. Note that the posi-tivity bias is an indirect effect of imagery processing.The sensory analogue properties of imagery processingcause consumers to focus on positive consequences.

If imagery does promote a positivity bias, it has se-rious implications for consumer satisfaction, especiallywhen examined in conjunction with the biases discussedabove. For example, as a brand-based evaluation strat-egy, imagery may reduce the number of brands thatconsumers consider in their evoked set. Instead of thor-oughly evaluating a number of alternatives, consumersmay focus on a single brand, imagining one or severalscenarios that are both positively biased and seen ashighly likely (e.g., conjunctive biases and perceivedlikelihoods). The likelihood that the imagined scenario


will unfold as planned is quite low. Even if the actualoutcome is favorable, it is likely to differ from the imag-ined outcome. Deviations ofthe actual outcome fromthe imagined outcome give rise to surprise. Deviationsof this sort have been noted in the satisfaction literatureas an imponant cause of consumer dissatisfaction (An-derson 1973). The effect of imagery on the extremityof the decision outcomes considered before purchaseand post-purchase satisfaction has not been investi-gated.

Individual difTerences in product- or purchase-relatedknowledge are likely to influence the magnitude of a"halo effect" and the number of alternative scenariosgenerated. A better developed knowledge base allowsfor the construction of greater numbers of alternativescenarios. Consequently, if consumers are willing andsufficiently knowledgeable to imagine multiple scena-rios, they are less likely to expect any one of these tounfold as planned (Carroll 1978). Moreover, in a prob-abilistic sense, there is an enhanced likelihood that atleast one of the scenarios will unfold as planned. Inaddition, an experienced consumer might not only drawfavorable outcomes but may develop unfavorable out-come scenarios as well. These imagined negative sce-narios not only affect the direction of expectations; theyalso make it possible for the individual to engage in pre-purchase behaviors that reduce the likelihood that thenegative imagined event will occur (risk-reductionstrategies).'

Based on this discussion, several propositions for theeffects of imagery on probability assessment and con-sumer satisfaction can be developed:

P5: Consumers will estimate higher conjunctiveprobabilities for decision outcomes when animagery processing mode as opposed to adiscursive processing mode is used.

P6: Consumers will estimate higher likelihoodsfor the decision outcomes when an imageryprocessing mode as opposed to a discursiveprocessing mode is used.

P7: When imagery processing is used, the levelof prior knowledge moderates the relation-ship between imagery and satisfaction. Spe-cifically, the lower the level of prior knowl-edge, tiie higher the level of purchase dissat-isfaction (for a given level of decisioninvolvement).

Imagery Effects on Purchase Intentionsand Purchase Timing

Imagery Effects on Purchase Intentions. Since an-tiquity, philosophers have suggested that elaborated

'Other individual differences (e.g., optimism vs. pessimism), pastexperiences, and particular circumstances may also affect the extentof a posiliviiy bias.

imagery (such as daydreams) affects intentions to act(see McMahon 1973). Research in some areas has sub-stantiated this effect (Cautela and McCuiiough 1978;Staats and Lohr 1979; Wolpe 1958). In clinical psy-chology, research indicates that elaborated imagery ofa feared outcome is a major factor perpetuating phobias(intentions to avoid an object). Moreover, imagery-based treatment strategies can successfully reverse theseintentions (Bandura 1982; Cautela and McCuiiough1978; Wolpe 1958). At least in clinical contexts, imageryprocessing has been found to be more effective thandiscursive processing in influencing behavioral inten-tions (Cautela and McCuiiough 1978). The latter ex-plain imagery's effect on intentions as a form of "covertconditioning," suggesting that people approach (avoid)objects that they associate with positive (negative) re-wards via imager>'. Similarly, Staats and Lohr (1979)view imagery as a stimulus that can elicit approach(avoidance) responses.

On the basis of several experiments, Lang (1977,1979) concludes that intentions are affected only if thereis an emotional reaction evoked by the imagined sce-nario. On the basis of experimental results he arguesthat emotional reactions to imagined scenarios that in-clude feared objects are highest when elaborated im-agery processing is used. In particular, the strongest ef-fects were observed when subjects imagined themselvesinteracting with the feared object (rather than simplyimagining the feared object or reading about the fearedobject).

Outside ofthe clinical context, there is little researchon the connection between imager> processing and be-havioral intentions. In one study, however, Gregor\ etal. (1982) found that subjects who imagined themselvesenjoying the benefits of cable TV were more likely tosubscribe to cable TV service than were subjects whoonly heard of these benefits. Anderson (1983) had sub-jects imagine either themselves, a liked friend, or a dis-liked acquaintance performing (or not performing) aset of behaviors (e.g., donating blood, taking a trip).The effect on intentions was most dramatic for sell"-related imagery. Subjects who imagined themselvesperforming the set of behaviors significantly changedtheir behavioral intentions. Furthermore, greaterchanges in intentions were found the longer subjectsimagined themselves performing the behavior. The ef-fect of self-oriented imagery on intentions was also quiteenduring (at least 3 days).

The effect of self-related imagery- on intentions mightbe explained in two ways: by the concreteness of theimagined scenarios and/or by the greater emotionalityofthe imagery. It might be that individuals can imaginetheir reactions to constructed scenarios better than theycan imagine the reactions of others. Thus, the imaginedscenario (including responses) is more concrete (An-derson 1983). Alternatively, the effect might occur be-cause imagery is more emotionally provocative whenit is self- versus other-oriented. Recall that Lang's (1977.

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1979) results suggested that the extent to which imageryaffects intentions is related to the emotionality of theimage. Self-oriented imagery may also make more in-formation available. Mowen (1980) examined the re-lationship between imagery and purchase intentions,hypothesizing that imagery would make informationmore available and, hence, impact intentions. He foundno effects. According to Mowen, however, several as-pects ofthe study and the manipulations used may haveled to the null effects. Thus this hypothesis deservesfurther testing.

Imagery Effects on Purchase Timing. Research ondelay of gratification (Mischel 1974; Mischel and Moore1973) indicates that the degree of elaboration invokedin imagery can influence subjects' abilities to delaygratification. It finds that imagery of having and usinga desired object produces a positive sensory and emo-tional experience, which in turn enhances desires forthe object. The emotions induced by elaborated imager%reduce subjects' abilities to delay gratification. The im-plicit reasoning is that while the imagery itself offers apositive sensory and emotional experience, actual con-sumption ofthe product would offer more tangible sen-sory and, thus, emotional benefits. Research by Mischelalso suggests that when subjects simply generate staticimages of the desired object, but do not engage in anelaboration of these images, imagery enhances theirabilities to delay gratification. While it is easy to seehow using imagery to produce a positive sensory andemotional experience would decrease the ability to delaygratification, it is not intuitive why imagining a staticimage ofthe desired object (versus imagining nothingat all) would increase the ability to delay gratification.Mischel (1974) proposes that generating an image ofthe object serves to remind individuals that the objectis still there to be acquired at some future time. Becausethe image is not elaborated, emotional responses (andresulting frustrations) are kept to a minimum.

The relationship between elaborated imagery andenhanced purchase desire is directly relevant to pro-motional strategy. To be effective in reducing the delaybetween purchase consideration and actual purchase,persuasive communication strategies need to focus onhelping audiences imagine the positive sensory andemotional experiences they would derive from havingthe object. Just reminding consumers ofthe product'sexistence is not sufficient to stimulate desires. In fact,it may even help them to delay purchase. Despite theintuitive importance of the relationship between elab-orated imagery and reduced purchase acquisition time,this relationship has not been investigated in consumerresearch.

Summarizing the preceding discussion of imagerj ef-fects on purchase intentions and timing in the form ofpropositions:

P8: There will be a greater change in behavioralintentions when elaborated imagerj' as op-posed to discursive processing is used.'

P9: Self-related imagery will affect intentionsmore than will imagery that does not includethe self.

PIO: The more concrete and emotional the im-agery, the greater the change in behavioralintentions.

P l l : Controlling for ability to buy, elaboratedimagery will reduce the delay between pur-chase consideration and actual purchase.

PI 2: The degree of elaboration moderates the re-lationship between imagery and purchasemotivation. Specifically:

a: Controlling for ability to buy, elaboratedimagery will reduce the delay betweenpurchase consideration and actual pur-chase.

b: Controlling for ability to buy, visualizingthe desired object (low-elaboration im-agery) will increase the delay betweenpurchase consideration and actual pur-chase.

Imagery as a Consumption ExperienceOne of the most important and unique qualities of

high-elaboration imager>' is that it is a sensory analoguethat provides the imager with a surrogate experience(Arieti 1976). Doob (1972) proposes that high-elabo-ration imagery- enables people to secure "substitute sat-isfaction." Hilgard (1978), Lindauer (1972, 1983), andSinger (1978) provide evidence that high-elaborationimagery offers a form of self-entertainment, gratifica-tion, and stimulation. The ability to secure substitutesatisfaction through imager>' applies not only to pre-consumption activites. but to activities throughout thephases of consumption: preconsumption. consumption,and post-consumption.

Preconsitmpiion Imagery. At the preconsumptionstage, imager>' processing allows vicarious consumptionthrough browsing or shopping. While researchers havenoted that experiential pleasures can result frombrowsing and shopping (Bloch, Sherrell, and Ridgway1986; Hirschman 1980), the extent to which imageryaffects satisfaction with these browsing and shoppingactivities has received little attention.

In facilitating vicarious consumption, elaboratedimager)' is likely to be most valued and prevalent whenconsumers perceive actual consumption to be blockedby situational contingencies. For example, inability tobuy, risk associated with product use, or other personalcircumstances make imager>' an important tool for at-taining some of the entertainment, gratification, andstimulation that would derive from actual consumption.The implication is that elaborated imagery is most use-ful as a substitute experience when actual consumptionis not a viable alternative and when some ofthe benefits


of consumption can be attained from imagined con-sumption. Obviously, there are limits to the benefitsthat can be attained with imagined consumption. Inparticular, since imagery offers a sensory substitute, itis most useful when the benefits of product use involvesensor>' stimulation (as opposed to, for example, func-tional benefits). Thus, elaborated imagery is most usefulas a substitute experience when the benefits of con-sumption are sensory and high, and the costs and/orrisks of product acquisition are also high. In this caseconsumers can attain some of the benefits of productconsumption without incurring the costs. Interestingly,whereas elaborated imagery with ability to buy can in-crease frustration and reduce the delay between pur-chase consideration and actual purchase, elaboratedimager>- without the ability to buy may provide satis-faction through a substitute sensory and emotional ex-perience. Thus, whether elaborated imagery processingleads to reduced or enhanced purchase desire dependson whether actual consumption is viewed as possibleor not (given the costs and risks of consumption).

Consumption Imagery. Imagery can also play animportant role during the actual consumption experi-ence. Many products are purchased explicitly for thefantasy imagery they generate (Hirschman and Hol-brook 1982; Holbrook and Hirschman 1982). Productsare often viewed as important for their role in stimu-lating imagery (e.g., records, books, movies). Playfulconsumption, which includes leisure activities, sports,games, etc, is a domain where imagery appears to playa panicularly important value-enhancing role (Hol-brook et al. 1984). As such, the value of many productsis a function of both intrinsic qualities and qualitiesimbued by imagery during the consumption experience.Thus, imagery in the consumption phase has the po-tential for increasing product satisfaction. Lindauer(1983) provides an extensive review of the use of im-agery experiences in the pursuit of hedonic consump-tion activities (e.g., listening to music, through litera-ture, etc.). Research has suggested that some individualsreport substantial levels of imagery when engaged inhedonic consumption activities (Hilgard 1978). Nev-ertheless, the connection between imagery processingduring consumption and levels of consumption satis-faction has not been established. Some indirect evidencein consumer behavior of this connection is the findingthat enjoyment of games (positive feelings and pleasure)is a function of the congruency between the type ofgame and the preferred cognitive style (imagery or dis-cursive). Hence, at least for people who like to engagein imagery, products that facilitate imagery providemore pleasure and fun (Holbrook et al. 1984).

The relationship between imagery and hedonic andsymbolic consumption experiences offers a rich terrainfor future consumer research. Unfortunately, as Lin-dauer (1983) notes, much ofthe research thus far hasbeen poorly conceptualized and methodologicallyflawed. Important and interesting questions for mar-

keters include the role of imagery in the stimulation ofhedonic and symbolic consumption, and satisfactionwith hedonic and symbolic consumption activities.Understanding the fantasies consumers associate withthe consumption of hedonic and symbolic products canfacilitate the promotion of these products. Further, un-derstanding consumption imagery can provide mar-keters with an important way of increasing satisfactionwith the consumption experience.'" If imagery enhancesthe value of the consumption experience, products(especially hedonic and symbolic ones) can be designedto stimulate imagery. Even consumption of certainfunctional products may be enhanced by associatingthe product with positive imagery. For example, thecommunications research manager at Coke summarizesone advertising strategy as imbuing the object with im-agery to give it added value (Wall Street Journal 1984).He goes on to note that concrete cues can be associatedwith positive imagery such that the presence of thesecues in other circumstances elicits positive imagery re-garding the product.

Post-Consumption Imagery. Remembered con-sumption has long been viewed as an important inputinto decisions about future consumption activities (En-gel and Blackwell 1982). Nevertheless, little attentionhas focused on the nature of remembered consumption.Tendencies to save mementos, ticket stubs, and photosindicates consumers' desires to relive consumption ex-periences. Imagery can play an important role in reliv-ing these experiences. Recent work indicates that valuedpossessions are often treasured for the imagery expe-riences and memories they generate (Csikszentmihalyiand Rochberg-Halton 1981: Wallendorf 1984). Consis-tent with earlier discussions, research has indicated thatimagery of past experiences is most often associatedwith experiences and events that were particularly sa-lient and/or emotional at the time (Marks 1972). Hil-gard's (1978) work refers to "reintegrating stimuli"—stimuli that reinvoke a state-dependent retrieval ex-perience. She observes that stimuli are most successfulin retrieving a memory image if they include some ofthe direct perceptual properties (e.g., sights, sounds,smells) associated with the remembered experience.These stimuli serve as concrete cues that elicit imagery.

Imager>' used to relive consumption experiencesshould be of interest to marketers for several reasons.First, using imagery to relive a valued consumption ex-perience suggests that a consumption experience caniive well beyond its typically conceived duration. Flow-ers, champagne corks, photographs, and other itemsmay be saved for a lifetime and used to relive importantevents. Huge expenditures for events like weddings,proms, and special vacations are often justified notsolely by their present value, but by their future value.

'"This would probably come as no surprise to the novelist or moviedirector concerned with helping audiences "live the story." Nev-ertheless, the importance of imager>- in other consumption activitieshas been overlooked.

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If marketers want to encourage investment in appar-ently transient consumption experiences, they may findit useful to emphasize the lasting power of these expe-riences through imagery. Moreover, elaborated imageryafter consumption can increase the remembered satis-faction of consumption. The same kind of "halo" effectthat appears to operate with imagery processing in gen-eral is likely to operate with imagery of rememberedevents. In this way, consumption experiences that in-cluded a mixture of good and bad events may be re-membered in a positive light. Finally, elaborated im-agery after consumption can encourage repurchase be-havior. Recall that elaborated imagery, by providing apositive sensory and emotional experience, is likely toreduce ability to delay gratification when controllingfor ability to buy." The relationship between elaboratedimagery and consumption experiences can be sum-marized in several propositions:

PI3: Vicarious consumption facilitated by imag-er>' will be most satisfying when the perceivedbenefits from actual consumption are sen-sory in nature and the cost/risks of actualconsumption are perceived as prohibitive.

P14: Consumption satisfaction for hedonic andsymbolic products will be higher when elab-orated imagery as opposed to discursive pro-cessing is used.

P15: Consumers will report higher levels of sat-isfaction with the recall of a past consump-tion experience when elaborated imagery asopposed to discursive processing is used.

PI6: Elaborated imagery of a past consumptionexperience will increase intention to repur-chase (controlling for ability to buy).

CONDUCTING RESEARCHON IMAGERY

The final section addresses issues involved in theconduct of research on imagery. Intended as a briefoverview of research on the manipulation and mea-surement of imagery processing, the section's primary'purpose is to acquaint the unfamiliar reader with thebasic tools for conducting imagery research. Two do-mains, summarized in the Figure, are reviewed: (1)strategies for manipulating imagery, and (2) strategiesfor measuring the extent of imagery processing.

Imagery-Eliciting StrategiesAs the Figure indicates, a number of external sources

can induce imagery (see Alesandrini and Sheikh 1983

"In this conlcxl it is useful to note that certain consumption ex-periences may be viewed as unrepeatable and hence positive imagerywould not imply repurchase. Howeyer. as one reviewer noted, a pos-itive imagery experience may generate word-of-mouth communica-tions that affect others" purchase ofthe consumption experience.

and Lutz and Lutz 1978 for reviews). The sources de-scribed briefly here are: pictures, concrete words, in-structions to imagine, and guided imagery. Throughoutthis discussion it is useful to keep in mind that imagerycan also occur in the absence of external stimuli simplyvia information voluntarily retrieved from memory."Current concerns" or "unfinished business" oftentrigger daydreams of potential, anticipated, or futureoutcomes (Klinger 1977). Needs for stimulation causedby sensory deprivation also increase spontaneous im-agery (Singer 1978; Tushup and Zuckerman 1977). Fi-nally, needs to escape an excessively stimulating envi-ronment can also give rise to an internal focus on im-agery (Singer 1978). 1

Pictures. Pictures are well-established predictors ofimagery (Bugelski 1983; Finke 1980; Paivio 1971; Ros-siter 19'82; Shepard 1967; Singer 1978). The fact thatvisual information tends to be remembered better thanverbal information (the picture superiority effect) hasalso been explained through imagery (Alesandrini andSheikh 1983; Childers and Houston 1984; Lutz andLutz 1977; Paivio 1971). However, pictures need notinduce only imagery processing (Kieras 1978; Rossiterand Percy 1983); hence, it is dangerous to equate themode of information presentation with its representa-tion in working memory (Rossiter and Percy 1983).With the increased focus on the impact of pictures inconsumer information processing (e.g.. Childers andHouston 1984; Edell and Staelin 1983; Kisielius andSternthal 1984; Rossiter 1982; Rossiter and Percy 1983).understanding the conditions under which picturesproduce imagery becomes important.

Concrete Hord.s. Concrete words can stimulate thegeneration of imagery as well (Paivio and Csapo 1973:Paivio and Foth 1970; Paivio. Yuille. and Madigan1968: Richardson 1980). Ratings ofthe concreteness ofwords are highly related to their rated imagery value(Paivio et al. 1968). Recent work by Cartwright (1980:Canwright. Marks, and Durrett 1978) indicates thatabstract words can be made imaginal by instructingsubjects to think of an imager>'-based exemplar. Forexample, abstract words like "peace" and "quarrel" canbe made concrete by evoking an image of a dove (anexemplar of peace) or an image of people actually en-gaged in a quarrel. Thus, the relationship between con-crete and abstract words and imagery' may be morecomplex than initially thought.

Instructions to Imagine. Instructions to imaginerepresent another external source to the generation ofimagery. Some marketing researchers (Mowen 1980;Wright and Rip 1980) have relied on instructions toimagine in stimulating imagery. These studies reportednegligible effects on learning and attitudes from the im-agery manipulation. However, other studies using thismanipulation have reported important and significanteffects (cf. Carroll 1978: Gregory et al. 1982; Shermanet al. 1984). Rossiter (1982) suggests that in an adver-


tising context, instructions to imagine are less effectiveas imagery-eliciting strategies than are "high imageryvisuals." However, this interpretation should be qual-ified. Instructions to imagine may be ineffective in sit-uations where little schematic knowledge exists (Wrightand Rip 1980) or where external stimulation interfereswith the generation of imagery (Mowen 1980). How-ever, imagery instructions may be an important ma-nipulation strategy when consumers are allowed thetime to generate vivid imagery, when cues are concrete(Paivio and Csapo 1973; Richardson 1983), when in-structions focus on subjects' reactions to the image(Lang 1979), and when consumers have sufficientknowledge to generate imagery about reactions (Re-thans and Hastak 1981; Smith, Houston, and Childers1983).

Guided Imagery. "Guided imagery" (Wollman1981) is an imager>'-eliciting strategy that resemblesimager>-based methods used in clinical settings. Par-ticipants are first asked to relax and then practice de-veloping vivid imagery scenarios. To facilitate imageryevocation and vividness, participants are given cues thathelp to guide their imagery. The procedure is repeatedfor several trials, and finally, subjects are asked toimagine the object that is the focus ofthe study. Woll-man (1981) warns that the usefulness of this proceduremay be confined to those who have vivid, controllableimagery\ Demand characteristics may also operate withthis procedure.

Measuring Imagery Processing

Measuring the presence and content of imagery rep-resents a significant challenge to researchers. Severaldifferent methods have been used to measure imageryprocessing, each with its own unique limitations. Cur-rently, few guidelines for imager>' measurement havebeen established, but a considerable amount of researchhas focused on developing scales to measure individualdifferences in imageryprocessing. The next sectionprovides a brief overview of this research.

Overview of Imagery-Measurement Approaches.Many researchers rely on criterion-based responses, notmanipulation checks, in assessing imagery processing.Thus. imager>' processing is manipulated by one ofthestrategies already discussed and inferred from the results(cf. Anderson 1983; Carroll 1978; Lutz and Lutz 1978;Paivio 1971; Sheehan 1972). An important exceptionis the research by Lutz and Lutz (1977). They manip-ulated mental imagery with the use of pictures, but alsoprovided simple manipulation checks to ensure thatgroups provided only with verbal stimuli generated lessmental imager\ than the experimental groups.

Other researchers have given explicit considerationto measuring the content of imagery processing usingboth simple and complex verbal responses. Klinger(1978) recommends a procedure called "thought sam-

pling," where the experimenter interrupts individualsinvolved in imagery processing and asks them to de-scribe the content of their imaginal experiences. In arelated procedure called "event sampling," imager>'content is assessed by asking subjects to indicate when-ever a certain type of image is aroused. Smith et al.(1984) asked subjects to write out their script for visitingthe school placement office and indicate whether im-agery was present or absent and high or low in vividness.Rethans and Hastak (1981) relied on a free-elicitationprocedure described by Olson and Muderrisoglu (1979)to tap imagery associated with product hazards. It ispossible to criticize these measurements on severalcounts. First, most require that respondents translateimager}' processing into a discursive mode (e.g., verbalresponses), confusing even more the distinction betweenthe processing modes. Moreover, individual differencesin verbosity or vocabulary can influence the nature ofthis translation. In addition, studies that ask individualsto detail imager\' scenarios may not be assessing theextent of detail contained in the image, but rather sub-jects' abilities to control their image so that details canbe specified.

Physiological reactions are also used as indicators ofimagery processing. Brain wave patterns (see Ley 1983)are presumed to indicate the presence of imagery, butare extremely difficult to interpret and highly intrusive.Some psychologists have suggested that muscular ac-tivation mirrors imagery content and have thereforeused electromyogram readings to assess imagery- content(see Ley 1983). Again, however, these measures are in-ferential and highly obtrusive. Moreover, assessmentsrequire a considerable level of technical sophistication.

.Measuring Individual Differences in Imagery Pro-cessing. A number of scales have been developed tostudy the role that individual differences play in imager\processing (see Ernest 1977 and Sheehan et al. 1983 forreviews of several of these scales). The scales can beclassified into four basic categories: (1) scales of imager>-ability (vividness and controllability). (2) scales of im-agery content, (3) scales of spatial ability, and (4) scalesof imagery vs. verbal processing styles.

Scales of imagery ability assess individual differencesin imagery vividness and controllability. Imagery viv-idness is a known moderator of imagery effects in in-cidental learning (Ernest 1977: Sheehan and Neisser1969: Swann and Miller 1982). It also moderates therelationship between imagery and emotional and phys-iological arousal (Drummond. White, and Ashton 1978:Grossberg and Wilson 1968). Two commonly usedscales to assess individual differences in imagery viv-idness are The Betts Questionnaire Upon Mental Im-agery (QMI: see Durndell and Wetherick 1976: Rich-ardson 1977; Sheehan 1967; Westcoff and Rosenstock1976) and Marks' Vividness of Visual Imagery Ques-tionnaire (see Childers et al. 1985; Marks 1973: Rossi1977). The controllability of imagery has also beendemonstrated to influence a number of cognitive pro-

486

cesses, including mental rotations (Ernest 1977). Acommonly used measure of imagery control was de-veloped by Gordon (1949) and modified by Richardson(1969; see Childers et al. 1985; Westcott and Rosenstock

Scales of imagery content have been developed bySinger and Antrobus (1963, 1972) and Huba et al.(1982). The shorter version ofthe Imaginal Process In-ventory (IPl; Huba et al. 1982) taps imagery vividness,the use of imagery to relieve boredom, general feelingsabout the usefulness of imagery, the use of imagery inanticipating the future and solving problems, fantasyimagery, distractibility, and emotional arousal fromimagery. The scale is infrequently used in research ap-plications, but has adequate internal consistency andtest-retest reliabilities.

Spatial ability tests are designed to assess individuals'abilities to hold pictures of visual objects in memoryand perform mental operations (e.g., mental rotations).While clearly related to the controllability of imagery,tests of spatial ability are generally independent of testsof imagery vividness (Richardson 1983). Several testsof spatial ability are available and commonly used (seeBennett, Seashore, and Wesman 1947; Likert andQuasha 1970; Shepard and Meltzer 1971; Thurstone1938).

Finally, scales to measure processing style are de-signed to assess preferences for using imagery versusverbal processing in thinking, studying, and problemsolving. The Visualizer-Verbalizer Questionnaire (WQ)is a commonly used measure developed by Richardson(1977). The VVQ has been shown to influence imageryeffects on cognitive processing (Ernest 1977) and to me-diate the relationship between visually presented ads andmeasures of attitudes (Rossiter and Percy 1978). Twomeasures have been developed in consumer behavior thatappear to overcome some of the criticisms of the VVQ.Childers et al. (1985) developed a new measure called theStyle of Processing Questionnaire (SOP), which moreclearly differentiates ability dimensions from processingpreferences. The SOP scale has been related to measuresof advertising recognition and recall (Childers et al. 1985).Another scale, the V/V Index, takes as its starting pointthe Prevalence of Visual Imagery Test (PVIT) developedby Kunzendorf (1981, 1982) to resolve some ofthe dif-ficulties with the VVQ. Developed by Holbrook et al.(1984), the V/V Index differs from the PVIT by usingboth pictorial and verbal anchors for each scale, thusovercoming some of the earlier criticisms of measuringimagery preferences on verbal scales.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Even though there is considerable debate about themeaning of imagery processing and the causal role ofimagery in problem-solving and sensory experiences,there is little doubt that imagery seems to play an im-portant role in information processing (Block 1981).


Empirical evidence is mounting that imagery processingaffects a multitude of cognitive, physiological, and be-havioral phenomena. In a marketing context, imageryprocessing is likely to be important in understandingincidental learning, numerous facets ofthe choice pro-cess, the likelihood and timing of purchases, and thenature of many hedonic and symbolic consumption ex-periences and re-experiences (remembered consump-tion). The purpose of this article has been to reviewresearch on imagery processing, contrast it with dis-cursive (symbolic, language-like) processing, and sug-gest important ways in which imagery impacts con-sumers' learning, choices, and satisfaction. The articlehas also considered the role that imagery is likely toplay throughout the phases of consumption. Althoughother research suggests that imagery is pervasive, littleis known about its relative impact in consumption con-texts.

A review ofthe research on imagery processing sug-gests several important possibilities to consumer be-havior researchers. First, imagery is likely to have apositive impact on incidental learning. Since much ofconsumer learning is incidental, imagery may be evenmore important in consumer contexts than in otherproblem-solving contexts. Second, imagery processingmay encourage within-brand product evaluation strat-egies. Within-brand strategies, in turn, have implica-tions for how missing information is dealt with. Third,the conditions for decision complexity are likely to differbetween imagery processing and cognitive algebramodels. In particular, imagery processing seems bestsuited for the evaluation of very few brands on manyattributes. Fourth, imagery niay bias estimates of con-junctive probabilities and estimates of the likelihoodand positivity of outcomes. These biased estimates maylead to disappointment with post-purchase outcomes.Fifth. imager>' (especially self-related imagery') affectspurchase intentions and the timing of purchases (byinhibiting the ability to delay gratification). Finally,imagery can offer a positive sensory and emotional ex-perience that can substitute for consumption (e.g., vi-carious consumption), enhance or supplement con-sumption (i.e., make hamburger taste more like steak),and play an important role in remembered consump-tion and intention to repurchase.

While this article has outlined some promising do-mains for imagery research and provided a basic over-view of some of the tools of imagery research, muchremains to be done. Even such basic issues as what fac-tors stimulate imagery processing and how imageryprocessing is to be measured are far from resolved. Re-search is needed to explore the types of consumptionproblems consumers represent with imagery and theways that imagery interacts with consumption experi-ences. Similarly, while this article focused on concep-tually distinguishing imagery processing from discursiveprocessing, there are likely to be important interplaysbetween these two processing modes. Research inves-tigating the stages in the decision process where imagery


is most commonly used would be important in describ-ing part ofthe interplay between imagery and discursiveprocessing.

Significant challenges lie ahead in imager>' research.Methodological practices need improvement, andtheoretical grounding is necessary. Because the scienceis in its infancy, imagery research—and elaborated im-agery processing, in particular—offers an opportunityto construct theory. Consumption-related choices andexperiences provide a rich domain for theory construc-tion. The nature of learning, problem-solving, and ex-periences in the consumer domain are well suited toexploration of elaborated imagery processing. Con-sumers often make decisions with less than full infor-mation, considering only one or two alternatives.Moreover, in many cases evaluation ofthe decision re-quires information about sensor>' and emotional reac-tions to the experience. For example, in the choice ofmany services and symbolic or hedonic products, themost important part of the choice involves assessinghow it will feel (the sensations surrounding the antici-pated consumption). Imagery processing provides auniquely appropriate mode for evaluating the sensoryqualities of products. Finally, a considerable proponionof people's hopes and dreams focuses on consumptionrelated experiences—spending a million dollars, owninga fast car, building their own home. As such, consumerresearchers are provided with a natural environment inwhich to explore some of consumers' most importantimager>' experiences.

[Received February 1985. Revised August 1986.]

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