The Role of the Military Attaché in Diplomacy

Gerald Mathis

11/15/2012

CAR IR 535 Diplomacy & Statecraft Fall 2012

Professor Erik Goldstein

Military Attachés have been instrumental in the successes of foreign policies across the globe yet little is known about what they have accomplished or what they actually do. This paper will try to explain the historical role of the military attaché beginning in Europe and transitioning to the United States. We will look at how the roles have evolved and how the attaché is trained to support the current diplomatic environment and foreign policies.

Introduction

Although military officers have served as “soldier diplomats” for centuries, very few

publications exist that discuss the roles they have played in shaping or promoting foreign policy

or the impacts they have had in the development of diplomatic relations. In 1956 Andrew Vagts

and William Fox wrote Defense and Diplomacy: The Soldier and the Conduct of Foreign

Relations which helped to shed some light on the impacts military attachés (MAs) have had in

international relations up to 1956. Later, in 1969 Vagts penned The Military Attaché, a work

which gave us a deeper look into the lives and experiences of soldier diplomats. But the only

full-length study was published in 1959 in a Swiss doctoral thesis entitled Der Militarattaché;

seine Volker- und landesrechtliche Stellung mit besonderer Beruchsichtigung de Schweizer

Verhaltnisse (DiNicola 2010). This research is a brief synopsis of the MA throughout history by

first examining the European examples documented primarily by Vagts to provide some

historical background. Next we intend to inform the reader on the evolution of the role of the

MA up to the present with an emphasis on the United States (US) Defense Attaché System. In

concluding this research, we will describe the future of the MA and the roles they are expected to

play in the application of Defense Diplomacy.

A Historic Perspective of Military Attachés

Military attachés can best be described as military officers assigned to embassies around the

world as representatives of their national Defense Ministries, in some cases serving as the senior

military representative in the host country. U.S. military attachés are part of the Foreign Area

Officer1 (FAO) Program and include: Defense Attachés (DAs), Service Attachés (SAs), and

Security Assistance Officers (SAOs) who heads the Office of Security Cooperation (OSC).2 In

1 Foreign Area Officers are Soldiers who are regionally-focused experts in political-military operations with advanced foreign language skills and cultural competence who advise senior decision-makers throughout all phases of military operations.

2 The term Military Attaché includes military officers such as the Defense Attachés (SDO/DATTs: Senior Defense Official/Defense Attachés); service attachés from the various armed services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine). Defense Attachés are the senior military representative responsible for all military activities and service attachés within a host country. They are also serve as advisor to the US Ambassador on all issues related to US and host nation militaries. In most cases, the Security Assistance Officer is a FAO but does not have the diplomatic credentials of the DA.

19643, frustrated with poor coordination efforts of information and intelligence gathering from

the various agencies, Defense Secretary Robert S. McNamara established a new agency to be the

nation’s premiere producer of foreign military intelligence and the central intelligence manager

for the Department of Defense (DoD) under the title of Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA)

(DiNicola 2010). But military officers have been used as representatives and spokesmen for their

respective countries since the 1600’s on the European continent.

Beginning in the seventeenth century, during the time of the Thirty Years’ War, military officers

were “dispatched by the Duke of Richelieu to liaise with allied powers, monitor military

developments, and gather intelligence” [information] (Defense Attachés 2007). By the eighteenth

century, defense attachés (DAs) were being assigned as permanent positions in some embassies

around the world (Defense Attachés 2007).

The nineteenth century ushered in a practice where “most countries were using DAs, a trend

encouraged by the emergence of national defense establishments and the building of colonial

empires” (Defense Attachés 2007). Technology had evolved warfare and weapon systems to new

heights and the importance of situational awareness in the form of information gathering became

essential in solidifying alliances and quenching the thirst of nervous European leaders. Even the

great German statesman, Otto Von Bismarck to some degree relied on MAs to provide him with

information to assist him in holding together the fragile alliances and instituting his defense

diplomacy that he so adeptly weaved together from 1871 to 1890. Each of his treaties and

alliances: the Treaty of Frankfurt 1871; the League of the Three Emperors 1873; the Dual

Alliance 1879; the Triple Alliance 1882; the Mediterranean Agreement 1887; and the

Reinsurance Treaty 1887 were all in no small part integrated in what would be called today

defense diplomacy and military attachés played a part in maintaining these relationships. While

he entrusted the task of ensuring these alliance and treaties (to varying degrees) to his MAs he

consistently took issue with most attachés assigned to Germany from abroad (Vagts 1967).

Brilliant, yet paranoid, Bismarck habitually questioned the competency of the attachés and

regularly suggested that their activities of collection was liken to a form of espionage, an act

3 Some sources have the date as 1961.

which he despised. In fact, he referred to them as being “socially lower ranking persons” (Vagts

1967).

However despised the MAs were by Bismarck, they were well received abroad, so much so “that

a number of them contracted foreign marriages” (Vagts 1967) much to the chagrin of foreign

leaders such as Bismarck. So much international marriage had taken place between military

attachés and host country and foreign women, that one would assume the sentiment of

international unity would have been at an all time high, but such “expectations, in an age of

nationalism…did nothing to further what is euphemistically called a better understand between

the counties concerned” (Vagts 1967). Some statesmen feared that attaches would be more

susceptible to political ambitions by such intermarriage, which would, in most cases, “lead the

observer-officer to neglect his true office duties” (Vagts 1967). These speculations were true in

the case of the German military attaché in St. Petersburg in the late 1870’s, Major von Lignitz.

So lofty were the political ambitions of Ligntz he often defied the wishes of the German

Ambassador and would refuse to adjust reports back to Germany that were in contradiction to

those of the ambassador (Vagts 1967) causing what was essentially chaos, confusion and at times

complete misunderstanding of what was really happening in Russia at the time. Ligntz went so

far as to “on one occasion [lose] his equanimity and called out to Russian officers: ‘If it is war

you want, we can wish for nothing better, and we are ready’” (Vagts 1967). This was in direct

contradiction to Bismarck’s diplomatic efforts and unsanctioned by the ambassador causing

alarm and confusion that Bismarck himself had to calm.

As we approached the twentieth century, major changes were in place for the DA system. As the

world created more and more states, the need for military liaisons and cooperation became even

more critical. The information that MAs were able to collect about the composition, disposition

and strengths of allied and rival forces alike, provided insights for the decision makers that could

not be obtained through normal diplomatic channels. Tim Hadley wrote in his 2010 article

“Military Diplomacy in the Dual Alliance: German Military Attaché Reporting from Vienna,

1906-1914, of the important role Colonel Carl Graf von Kageneck played in the collection and

dissemination of information for the Germans and how his efforts afforded the Germans to have

an insight into Austrian military weakness. Hadley writes that “Freytag4 praised the German

military attaché…noting in particular Kageneck’s great wealth of detailed information on the

ally…attribute[ing] useful observations and insights on the Austrians to Kageneck” (Hadley

2010).

It is not clear whether all MAs were under the same marching orders as Kageneck, but what is

certain is that they all were required to observe and report. Kageneck was under the “reporting

obligations” (Hadley 2010) outlined in the Instruktion. This 1890 publication outlined the duties

that Kageneck and others like him were required to perform while serving abroad as German

attachés. He was to “to make himself familiar with the more important developments in the

army; to get into its mindset and institutions; to make observations on its personnel, materiel,

organization, regulations, training, and technical capabilities; and, so far as the relationships

permit, to seek contact with officers and follow the relevant military and civilian periodical

literature” (Hadley 2010). Hadley (2010) explains that Kageneck was an avid reader of Austrian

publications where he gleaned information on “significant changes, particularly in personnel,

training, and army organization”. Over half of all of his reporting came from “open source either

official or public” (Hadley 2010) information. His personal contacts made up another 48% of his

reporting with personal contacts that included the “chief of the Evidenzbureau, the minister of

war, and the chief of the Austrian army” (Hadley 2010). While not formally trained in the art of

relationship building, Kageneck seems to have acquired the necessary skills needed to be

successful as a military attaché. These same skills will be needed as the duties and

responsibilities of the MA expand into being key components of military and defense diplomacy.

The Defense Attaché System & the Foreign Area Officer Program

The diplomatic history of the U.S. is extensive and storied. Beginning with the nation’s first

diplomat Benjamin Franklin, who served as minister to France in the Revolutionary War and

continuing with the establishment of the first consular post in Bordeaux, France in March of

1778, (DiNicola 2010) U.S. diplomatic efforts have helped to shape our foreign policy and

solidify our international relations. While heavily civilian centric, the military cannot be

4 Noted Prussian general and one of Germany's most prominent military writers. A Great General Staff officer who had a significant voice within Falkenhayn's inner circle, Freytag served at War's outset as Prussian military representative at Austro-Hungarian Headquarters.

dismissed in its roles in aiding these efforts. The military has always been associated with

diplomatic post but mostly from a perspective of protection for personnel and property or

military observers. But in the late 1800’s:

…permanent military attaches [U.S.] could be found in Berlin; London; Paris; St. Petersburg, Russia; and Vienna, Austria; and by 1918, the U.S. had 24 Army attaches in 28 capitals and 15 Navy accredited to 18 seats of government. The first Air Corp attaché was assigned to Europe in 1927. By 1936, although war loomed in Europe, the attaché program had grown to a total of 464 military attaches overseas (DiNicola 2010).

Over the years, the ranks have continued to grow. As of 2005, the U.S. had just over 2,200 FAOs

in active operational capacities, while roughly 25 percent were still in training. All the services

plan to recruit and train more than 170 FAOs a year, with almost 1,100 new FAOs entering the

program by 2014 (Department of Defense 2005).

The question may be raised as to why the U.S. is increasing its number of FAOs so drastically.

One response would be due to the changing nature of global security but there is yet another

reason, it is the need to rely more heavily on information and intelligence through coordination

and relationships with militaries and authoritative figures in foreign countries in order to identify,

clarify and if possible prevent conflict before it begins. The unique skill sets of the FAO are well

suited to accomplish these tasks and are a vital component to U.S. defense diplomacy.

Today’s U.S. military attaché is a new breed of officer. Their roles in diplomacy have expanded

to support the strategic and operational needs of an interconnected security climate.

Globalization and technology has reduced the reach between one country and another. What is

communicated in private in an office in Vienna no longer takes a few days to reach Quebec.

Given the rapidity of an ever evolving global security climate, the interpersonal, social,

diplomatic and policy skills of the military attaché must be sharper than the skills required of

attachés from the past. As a result, attachés find themselves key and critical to the

implementation of defense diplomacy and the plan for how the U.S. wishes to assist its allies in

preventing conflicts in the future. The military attaché is a key component in ensuring that future

conflicts or potential crises are handled in a more controlled, information rich environment.

Their roles as soldier diplomats have expanded to include preventive diplomacy as well as

military diplomacy. It is through these expanded roles that the defense attaché system hopes to

usher in a new era where personal relationships are more important than governmental

bureaucracy.

A large portion of a MA’s time is spent developing relationships with host country nationals and

military leaders. Time spent in developing these “hard-won connections, might result in the

attaché being the first person to note changes in a nation’s military and its power structure”

(DiNicolo 2010). While MAs are no longer the princes, barons, lords and royalty of old, but

rather career military officers who have been trained specifically to work within the diplomatic

community, their general duties have not changed much since the 1600’s. These duties include

but are not limited to:

Overt information collectors of military and political military information.

Principal advisors to the U.S. Ambassador on matters concerning the host country’s

armed forces

Personal representatives of their respective Service’s Secretary and Chief-of –Staff, to the

host country’s military

In certain instances performs security assistance functions. (Thornblum and Grzella

2002).

Beyond these responsibilities the MA can be called upon to assist in moments of crises with

Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO) such as that which took place in Lebanon during

in 2006.

The French DA in Lebanon was the interface between the French Embassy, the authorities of other Western countries, Lebanese Army and French military staff as he implemented security and evacuation plans for the civilian community. In efforts to locate isolated individuals and bring them to safe gathering points, the attaché exercised direct command over French troops and other assets. He was also in charge of establishing logistical supply points for the United Nations Interim Forces in Lebanon (UNIFIL) and the French Embassy in Beirut in coordination with Lebanese staff (Defense Attachés 2007).

However, the tasks performed by the MA could not be possible had the attaché not been

prepared with “the social and professional competence and the intellectual curiosity” in all

aspects of the duties they would be required to perform. "The Defense Attaché System (DAS)

was established by DoD Directive C-5105.32, 12 December l964. The directive assigned...the

DAS as part of the DIA and it would consist of all military personnel accredited as Attachés or

assistant Attachés to foreign governments as well as other DoD personnel assigned to Attaché

posts" (Defense Intelligence Agency 1994). Although the DAS grew and improved over the

years its main purpose was to coordinate the efforts of the DATT in foreign embassies. But

before an officer could become a DATT they would first have to meet the qualification and

undergo the extensive educational curriculum headed by the FAO program.

Training

After a rigorous selection process the officer begins his career with 3-5 years of training and

preparation under the FAO Training Program. The program has improved over the years and

provides the military officer with the necessary skills and competencies need to succeed as either

a military attaché or security assistance officer. The selected officer receives training based upon

his regional concentration. They began with language training at the Defense Language Institute

in Monterey, CA. Here the FAO is put thought a rigorous language learning program with the

goals of having a working knowledge of the target language in reading, listening, and speaking.

The level of proficiency is elementary but the FAO is required to show proficiency yearly after

completing the training with an goal of being completely fluent. Sometime within this first phase

of training the officer will attend a FAO Entry/Orientation Course. This is a one week course

designed to introduce the officer and spouse to the program and provide some initial guidance

about future training, assignments, and what it means to be a FAO. This is a mandatory course in

order to be a fully qualified FAO. Following the language training that could last anywhere from

6 to 18 months depending on the difficulty of the language, the FAO is normally sent to conduct

in-regional training (IRT) or a graduate program.

IRT is a 12-month immersion program in their region of specialization designed to assist the

FAO in improving their language skills by practice and the learning of colloquial speech;

become familiar with the operations of an embassy and all of its offices; introduce the FAO to

the security assistance and defense attaché operations; and finally to travel the region in order to

gain a better appreciation of the people, culture, and to gain perspectives on the issues related to

the region. The FAO is required to write comprehensive reports on his activities while assigned

to IRT. In some instances, the soldier will have the opportunity to attend a foreign military or

civilian school further enhancing language and cultural appreciation as well as educational skills.

It is during IRT, that the FAO will begin to make those personal contacts that can be most useful

as a SAO of MA in the future.

The graduate school program is fully funded and aimed at making the FAO well-rounded in

matters of foreign policy, diplomacy, and security within a particular region. The studies are

closely monitored by the military and in most cases master’s thesis’s are approved first by the

military and then by the university. Once the FAO has graduated the training continues.

Depending on the officers first assignment as a FAO they may attend either the Joint Military

Attaché School (JMAS) and or the Defense Institute of Security Assistance Management

(DISAM). It is here that the officer begins to hone the skills of solder diplomat and learn the

intricacies of security assistance operations. Once complete, the officers are ready to tackle their

first assignment and become a vital part in the U.S. diplomacy apparatus. These years of training

are necessary to provide the FAO with the necessary tools to operate independently, sometimes

as the only military personnel in the country and to equip and prepare the officer for the duties

associated with promoting national interest, defending U.S. foreign policy, and to be a significant

building block in implementing diplomacy, development and defense as a guiding principles for

defense diplomacy.

Military Diplomacy, Defense Diplomacy & the Military Attaché

To better understand the doctrine of military and defense diplomacy and the importance of the

military attaché in implementing it we must first work from common definitions of diplomacy, to

include defense and military diplomacy. For this clarity we have chosen the definition provided

by K.A. Muthanna (2011). Here he defines diplomacy “as the conduct of international relations

by negotiation and engendering goodwill and mutual trust rather than by force, propaganda, or

recourse to law” (Muthanna 2011). We chose this definition because it embodies the very nature

of the relationships we strive to obtain, those of “engendering goodwill and mutual trust rather

than by force”. It is such relationships that are vital to the MA’s success in executing defense

diplomacy. It is true that historically militaries “are associated with achieving national aims and

objectives in international relations through the use of force (Muthanna 2011). However, there

are numerous instances of peaceful use of military to further a nation’s international relations.

This peaceful use of the military as a tool of national diplomacy led to the use of the term

“military diplomacy”. Thus military diplomacy could be defined as “the ‘peaceful’ use of

military in diplomacy, as a tool of national foreign policy” (Muthanna 2011).

Military Diplomacy

Military diplomacy can be conducted in various ways and under a series of programs and

initiatives with the primary objective of “cooperation” (DiNicolo 2010). Cooperation is essential

in the creation of relationships and trust need in achieving the goals of diplomacy. One of the

ways in which the MA assists in this endeavor is through the OSC. The OCS provides technical

and operational support to its host nation through the leadership of the FAO assigned to the host

country as an SAO. The SAO is not a military attaché as his duties and responsibilities are

different, but they are both FAO’s and part of the defense diplomacy team. An SAO can easily

move from their current duties to those of an MA. Under the FAO training program the two

military officers would have received the same initial training and have the same core

competencies. The greatest difference between the two is that the SAO is not an information

collector and does not warrant diplomatic status as the MA does. From a standpoint of defense

diplomacy this concept can often times be beneficial to the overall success of defense diplomacy.

MAs across the globe have fell victim to allegations, often falsely, of committing espionage and

declared “persona non grata”. The following are just a few examples of such.

July 1955-Moscow expels three US military attachés for “inappropriate behavior” 

May1986-The US expels the South African military attaché in response to raids by South African forces into Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe

February 2006 - President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela expelled a U.S. Navy officer for allegedly passing secret information from the Venezuelan military to the Pentagon and warned he would throw out all U.S. military attaches if further espionage occurred

May 2008 - Russia has ordered the expulsion of two American military attachés working at the U.S. Embassy in Moscow, the State Department said Thursday

May 2011- The military attaché of Israel's embassy in Russia was expelled from the country for gathering intelligence there

It’s no secret that defense attachés are in the business of overt collection and reporting. It is for

this reason that some countries remain paranoid in communicating with them. This paranoia

coupled with the closeness with which the SAO works with host military authorities, in some

cases, facilitates communication and may allow the SAO to gain access that the DATT cannot.

Case in point:

In 1996, Venezuela captured a senior Revolutionary Armed Forces of Columbia (FARC) leader. The U.S. defense attaché wanted to talk to him but was not having much luck with the Venezuelan government. He asked [Laplante-the SAO] for help. Laplante was in a position [working relationship] where he could work [the details] out over the phone-not mentioning it was the attaché who wanted to see the [FARC leader]. Laplante is quoted as saying that “We didn’t work the intelligence like the attachés…Having others handle those functions helped in our access with the host nation”. (DiNicolo 2010)

This example demonstrates that the information gathered and relationships forged by the military

are integral in the strength of U.S. security cooperation abroad and a key factor to the U.S.

defense diplomacy.

Defense Diplomacy

The United Kingdom’s defense diplomacy mission is defined as “to provide forces to meet the

varied activities undertaken by the MOD [Ministry of Defense] to dispel hostility build and

maintain trust and assist in the development of democratically accountable armed forces, thereby

making a significant contribution to conflict prevention and resolution.” While the U.S. has yet

to officially define defense diplomacy it has issued its policy changes with regards to the national

security. The “3D’s” –diplomacy, development, and defense are now the cornerstones of U.S.

national security policy. Understanding that the individual agencies of DoD, DoS and USAID

could not continue at their current pace and remain productive, a shift in policy was formulated.

If a single definition could be used to describe the 3d’s policy it would look very similar to that

provided by the UK Defense Ministry. But for now the U.S. has outlined the policy in the terms

below:

Diplomacy, Development and Defense, the “3Ds” of U.S. national security, form a central framework for American strength and influence. Increasing the profile of diplomacy and development, alongside defense, is smart — mainly because the

cost of conflict is higher than ever before. Prevention, including greater attention to failed and failing States, is imperative.

The U.S. Government recognizes the importance of preventing and deterring conflict by working with and through partners and allies as well as through better collaboration between defense and civilian agencies and organizations. We have come to realize that the global challenges and opportunities of the future will demand a greater scale, more resources, and more strategic focus for our diplomacy and development efforts as key partners alongside defense. (United States Department of State 2010)

Anton du Plessis, (2008) discusses the nature of defense diplomacy in the context of India. In

his work he describes defense diplomacy as the “use of military personnel, including service

attaches, in support of conflict prevention and resolution. Among a number of activities this

includes providing assistance in development of democratically accountable armed forces”. His

explanation of the Indian system is clearly in the same direction as that of the U.S. FAOs are

heading. To support the initiatives of the “3d” doctrine, the FOA has been asked to help achieve

the goals of diplomacy by “the use of armed forces in operations other than war, building on

their trained expertise and discipline to achieve national and foreign objectives abroad” (Du

Plessis 2008). Today’s MA is fully trained to be able to conduct defense diplomacy by

participating in “exchange[s] of high-level defense related visit[s], dialogue[s] on security

challenges and port calls; and defense cooperation as those activities covered by training

exchanges, combined exercises, sourcing, development, production and marketing of defense

equipment and other forms of cooperation” (Ministry of Defense India 2003-04). All of these

tasks are more easily accomplished by FAO trained personnel due to the core competencies they

posses. MAs are well placed to “further country specific foreign policy objectives by managing

defense foreign relations and supporting the other diplomatic initiatives of government”

(Muthanna 2011). Murthanna also writes:

While the aims and objectives of nations participating in military diplomacy or cooperation could differ the crux is that they work together to develop an environment of peace and trust. Contact at all levels would serve to create a better understanding of respective positions. It would also reduce animosity and enable a more conducive approach towards problem solving and inter-operability. Participation in exchanges, visits, seminars, conferences etc, and presentations of papers at these events educate the participants and provide decision makers with necessary inputs for astute decision making (Muthanna 2011).

The Military Attaché

As the U.S. finds itself still to some degree, occupied by two global conflicts, and as a key player

in other hotspots around the world, the military has advised the government and its allies to find

more peaceful means of negotiation. This is no small request coming from a force that is

designed to fight wars. But the advice of the military has historically been welcomed council to

our civilian leadership. Generally speaking there are three “sources of wartime advice given by

the military” (Craig and George 1995).

The first comes from the commander of the theater in which the war is being fought. This usually stresses the importance of that particular theater and the need to support the effort there and indicates a belief in eventual success in that theater. It is often optimistic. The second comes from the heads of the individual services, which are normally located in the nation’s capital. These officers tend to focus more on the role of their service in the war and in the postwar world, and they try to increase its budget and power in relation to the other services. The third is from the senior military advisers to the nation’s leadership, often a number of military officers detached from their services to serve in a joint staff for planning purposes. These advisers tend to be closer to the overall political realities of the war and less influenced by parochial considerations. Because of its more objective view, this last group carries great weight in war-termination calculations (Craig and George 1995).

However with the shift to a doctrine of defense diplomacy, there is now room for a fourth source

of advice for which leadership can draw from. The military attaché has extensive experiences

and insight into the policies, political climates, civilian sentiment and military readiness from

living and working within the country, as well as personal insights from vetted and authoritative

sources that neither theater commanders, nor heads of individual services, nor senior military

advisers are able to ascertain. A prime example can be taken from the events that took place in

during the civil unrest in Bosnia beginning in 1992. Although there was not a defense attaché in

Bosnia at the time, there were military attachés in nearby Belgrade that were able to gather

critical information and insight about the situation and sent reports that advised the leadership

with an accuracy that could not have been obtained from other advisors and sources.

…This report demonstrates the unique military intelligence value of attaché reporting on the ground. At the time of the siege, the United States had no trained military intelligence personnel in Sarajevo and no U.S. defense attaché representation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. As a result, the duties and responsibilities

with respect to Sarajevo fell to the USDAO [United States Defense Attaché Office] in Belgrade. While open-source reporting on the events was abundant, dispatches from the USDAO staff provided an eyewitness account and expert analysis from a defense intelligence perspective that could not be obtained elsewhere. Moreover, reports such as these served to underline the urgency of the crisis in the Balkans and helped spur the creation of the Director of Central Intelligence Interagency Balkan Task Force, consisting of DIA, CIA, NSA, and Joint Chiefs of Staff officials, in June 1992. The task force would ultimately play a huge role in U.S. decision making regarding the Balkans. This report provides an excellent example of the unique and invaluable contributions of DIA’s defense attachés (Defense Intelligence Agency 2011).

While arguable that the information received was not acted upon in a timely enough manner to

save the lives of hundreds maybe thousands of Bosnians from genocide committed by the Serbs

against the Muslims in Bosnia, it is apparent that the significance of the military attaché was far

greater than just as a soldier diplomat. These roles will continue to be greater for MAs as we

advance the doctrine of defense diplomacy and “3D”.

Conclusion

The title of Military Attaché has always held a certain prestige among the diplomatic elite. Not

every military officer sent abroad is considered an attaché. The officer must be “accredited and

accorded full diplomatic status to include diplomatic immunity” (Shea 2005). Their ever

expanding role in diplomacy is not longer characterized solely by “protocol, alcohol, and

cholesterol (Shea 2005)5, but also defined by their abilities to “read the tea leafs”. The MA armed

with their intellectual acumen, extensive military expertise, mastery of language and adeptness in

cultivating enduring relationships has been placed in a position to greatly enhance the

capabilities of our defense diplomacy efforts. They serve as force multipliers for service Chiefs

of Staff and Combatant Commanders in their endeavors to analyze and process information in a

timely manner in order to be able to take informed measures in averting crises. Over the

centuries, military officers have proven to be effective in collecting open source information and

disseminating crucial advice to both their respective countries and their host nations. The ability

to see the importance in day to day activities and to have an acute understanding to the nuances

of host country activities has made the military attaché an invaluable resource in helping leaders

5 A historical phrase used to describe the large number of social events associated with the requirement for military attaches to build relationships and network of contacts.

to make decisions about foreign policies. Such abilities have been relied upon to shape the

current doctrine of defense diplomacy.

Today, U.S. MA’s are highly trained, well educated, and groomed in the fine arts of diplomacy.

They are key components in the implementation of U.S. defense and military diplomacy.

Through the use of personal relationships, the U.S. expects to be able to create bonds and

alliances not only through arms sales and soldier exchanges, but also through one on one

personal relationships that provide a sense of mutual responsibility and reciprocity in the free

exchanges of information. These exchanges and relationships are designed to open the doors for

dialogue where they may or may not have been open previously. Indeed, personal relationships

are not the glue that holds our policy together, but as indicated previously in this research,

personal relationships have been essential in creating an atmosphere for capacity building and

professional bonds, which have the capability to provide information that otherwise, would be

unobtainable. We can look back to the German cavalry captain, Carl Marquart Victor Graf von

Kageneck who served as the German military attaché to Vienna, Austria (as a Colonel) from

1906 and 1914 (Hadley 2010). Although today’s MAs normally do not come from royalty as did

Kageneck (Hadley 2010) MAs should aspire to gain the accessibility, and achieve the success

that Kageneck was able to accomplish.

The most important characteristic of diplomatic as well as military reporting is the quality of its source. One or two reports per month from an authoritative source were worth more than scores of press clippings from local newspapers. Kageneck’s reporting record demonstrates an instinctive grasp of this principle: he let official and semi-official organs speak for governmental pronouncements; used the press judiciously, primarily for its transcriptions of lengthy but relevant parliamentary statements or significant interviews; and focused his efforts on contacts with human sources. He leveraged his not insignificant status to get access to high-level sources in the War Ministry, the Austrian general staff, and its intelligence service, the Evidenzbureau (Hadley 2010).

The ability to gain the confidence of an “authoritative” source or to create an atmosphere

conducive to establishing a “quality” source that is open to the exchange information is a

difficult task without certain tools, skills, and access. Kageneck’s success is a result of these

attributes. Kageneck had traveled and lived extensively throughout Europe. He spoke French, the

diplomatic language of the time and he had “…links to the Austrian and Holy Roman empires

that were centuries old” (Hadley 2010). As such, his abilities to communicate in the sources

language, his solid command of the current situation as well as the historical context linked to

the current situation and the confidence that accompanies years of training, made Kageneck a

diplomatic success. These same attributes is what the Defense Attaché System has designed for

the modern MA through the rigid selection process, extensive education and language training,

and regional specialization. The expected results will be quantifiable and measurable. Over the

next few decades, we will be able to determine if the number of crises, conflicts, and wars are

significantly reduced. We will be able to determine if the U.S. investment in defense and military

diplomacy as a means to advert crises will yield results without the use of force. The success of

the MA relationships will be determined by the extent of which our foreign policy objectives and

international relations are progressed. Failure would mean more “knee-jerk” reactionary military

actions to force our policies. Success would emerge as a part of an integrated information system

where detailed information is obtained well in advance of crises and diplomacy will be given a

chance to work without plumes of smoke instigated by conflict. And the Military Attaché will be

at the heart of this debate.

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