THE ROMAN INVASIONS OF GERMANIA MAGNA

Trial and Error in Augustus' German Policy

James Mitchell

1

Tum diu Germania vincitur?

—Tac., Germ. 37

Tacitus' exasperated plea for a resolution to the prolonged and

apparently interminable conquest of Germania Magna underscores a

basic contradiction in the ideology of Augustan imperial strategy. The

belief that Augustus planned to limit the expansion of the Roman

empire to the territories acquired early in his principate, and that his

concept of imperialism was essentially pacific and liberative in nature,

was propagated not only by Augustan poets in lofty terms,1 but

affirmed by the Roman historians as well.2 The same assumption has

also informed modern scholarship, starting perhaps with Gibbon, who

affirmed that Augustus’ conquests were undertaken only to stabilize

the empire’s borders on the best line of defense.3 But the German

1 For example in Virgil’s famous pronouncement on the mission of empire:

tu regere imperio populos, Romanae, memento (hae tibi erunt artes), pacis imponere morem, parcere subiectis et debellare superbos.

Virg., Aen. vi. 851-3.

2 Suetonius says that Augustus did battle only out of necessity, and always in the interests of justice (Suet., Aug. 21.2). And Cassius Dio states outright that Augustus’ whole strategy was defensive (Dio, 53.10.4-5). Augustus himself says that he caused peace to be “restored” as far as the Elbe River (Aug., R.G. 26).3 “He [Augustus Caesar] bequeathed, as a valuable legacy to his successors, the advice of confining the empire within those limits which nature seemed to have placed as its permanent bulwarks and boundaries.” Edward Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, Vol. 1, 1776. David Womersley, ed. [London: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press, 1994], 31 .

2

policy realized by Augustus and his military commanders on the Rhine

demonstrates quite a different strategy, namely one of outright

conquest, with no regard at all for a pretended liberation of the

Germanic tribes, or for the erection of a permanent defense shield for

the northern empire.

In the past fifty years, a series of archaeological discoveries

made east of the Rhine provide evidence that the several invasions

into Germania Magna were undertaken to acquire new territory and

to integrate it into the Roman administrative structure.4 In this paper

we will first examine the progress of the Roman invasions beginning

with the first by Gaius Julius Caesar in 55 BCE and culminating with

that of Nero Claudius Germanicus in 16 CE, and we will review

several material culture discoveries in the lands east of the Rhine

River, emphasizing those found most recently at the excavated Roman

bases in Haltern on the River Lippe and in Waldgirmes (Hessia). We

will show that Augustus’ intentions were anything but defensive in

nature, and represented instead an ongoing if somewhat erratic

attempt at territorial aggrandizement.

1.

4 Although the term Germania Magna was not officially introduced until the establishment of the Rhine military zones of Germania Inferior and Germania Superior in the reign of Domitian, we will use it in this paper to designate territories inhabited by Germanic tribespeople between the Rhine and Elbe Rivers.

3

The appearance of Julius Caesar on the Rhine River in 55 BCE

suddenly promoted the unfamiliar Germanic peoples far to the north

of the Empire as an object of both military and imperial concern. In

Books Five and Six of De bello Gallico, Caesar recounts how he

traveled three times to the Rhine River, and how in 55 BCE he built a

bridge to cross it and again in 53 to engage Germanic tribes that had

either crossed into Gaul or looked likely to do so, or had rendered

support to rebellious groups there. Caesar also comments on the

physical and mental character of the people he calls Germani, and,

most importantly, he views the Rhine as a border dividing Germans

and Celts.5 Although this perception has been discounted by modern

archaeological study,6Caesar's observations doubtless helped

establish the concept of the Rhine River as a line of fortification

against potential invaders to the East, and indeed as a border marking

the extent of the Roman Empire in North Europe.7 This projection,

taken together with the obvious importance of the Rhine as an

5 Caes., B.G. 6.21-28. The origin of the exonym Germani is unknown, although Tacitus insists there was at one time an ancient tribe called by this name: "The name Germania is said to be a new and recent application: it was because the ones who first crossed the Rhine and expelled the Gauls, and are now called Tungri, were called Germani at that time" (Tac., Germ. 2). The Greek historian Posidonios, writing at the beginning of the first century BCE, also speaks of a different tribe known by the same name: Reinhard Wolters, Die Römer in Germanien [Munich: C.H. Beck, 2000], 16.6 It is quite clear that the Rhine was not an ethnic border; there is much material evidence indicating that Celtic and Germanic tribes lived on both sides of the Rhine, going back into the Late Iron Age. For a full discussion of "the inadequacy of Caesar's simplistic concept" see C. R. Whittaker, Frontiers of the Roman Empire: A Social and Economic Study [Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994], 73-78.7 "...Populi Romani imperium Rhenum finire...." Caes., B.G. 4.16.

4

essential avenue of communication, commerce and military transport

—and therewith its utility in assisting the suppression of possible

revolts in the north of Gaul—seems to have taken hold upon Roman

imperial planning, at least as a relevant possibility, as early as

Caesar's first entry into Germania Magna.

Nothing is known of further military developments along the

Rhine after Caesar's return to Rome and during the Civil War period

that followed, but in 39 or 38 BCE, Augustus appointed Marcus

Vipsanius Agrippa governor of Gaul.8 After putting down an uprising

of Aquitanians, Agrippa moved to the north to fight against the Suebi,

becoming the first Roman general to cross the Rhine after Caesar.9

There is a possibility that Agrippa may have relocated the Ubii to the

left bank at this time and established there the oppidum Ubiorum,

becoming later the Colonia Claudia Ara Agrippenensium (Cologne)

under Claudius.10 In any event what little is known of Agrippa's

activity on the Rhine tends to confirm its employment as a defensive

border on the frontier facing the German tribes, and Agrippa's major

contribution may have been the construction of a military road

stretching from Lugdunum (Lyon) to Cologne and running parallel to 8 Wolters, Römer, 24. Agrippa was summoned by Augustus back to Rome in 37 BCE to assume the consulship.9 Wolters, Römer, 25.10 J.D. Creighton and R.J.A. Wilson. "Introduction: Recent Research on Roman Germany," in Roman Germany: Studies in Cultural Interaction, International Roman Archaeology Conference Series, ed. John Creighton, Roger John Anthony Wilson and Dirk Krausse [Portsmouth, R.I.: Journal of Roman Archaeology L.L.C., 1999], 19-34. The long-standing supposition that Agrippa was the founder of Cologne no longer seems tenable; it seems to be based only on Strabo's statement that Agrippa re-settled the Ubii on the west side of the Rhine (see Strabo 4.3.4).

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the Rhine in its later phases, a clear indication of Rome's desire to

supply and fortify the northern defenses of Gaul some years before

any invasions were actually launched to the east.11

2.

The arrival of Nero Drusus Claudius (Drusus the Elder, Tiberius'

brother) in the Rhineland in 12 BCE marked a major change in Rome's

geopolitical strategy on the northern frontier. Appointed by his step-

father Augustus the year before to subdue uprisings in Gaul, Drusus

advanced to the north and launched what he might have considered a

pre-emptive strike against the Sugambri, who had threatened an

attack upon Gaul, and he laid waste most of their territory east of the

Rhine.12 Immediately thereafter, Drusus assembled a small navy of

military ships and advanced with his soldiers northward up the Rhine,

secured an alliance with the Frisians whose lands bordered the Rhine

estuary, sailed out into the North Sea and invaded the territory of the

Chauci, probably from the mouth of the River Ems.13 Here according

to Cassius Dio he ran into unexpected difficulties, since his ships were

stranded at low tide and he had to rely upon the Frisians for rescue.14

11 C.M. Wells, The German Policy of Augustus. An Examination of the Archaeological Evidence. [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972], 93. The road building project undertaken by Agrippa would eventually not only connect the Alpine region with the North Sea by land, but also the military bases of the along the Rhine with each other.12 Dio 54.32.13 Dio 54.32.14 Dio 54.32.

6

What is striking about Drusus' North Sea adventures is that they did

not serve any observable defensive purpose. After securing the mouth

of the Rhine, Drusus set forth with what must have been a sizeable

fleet of vessels to explore the sea coast, determine the estuaries of the

Ems and Weser Rivers, and engage militarily with the Chauci. More

evidence of Rome's intention to control the entrance to the North Sea

is provided by the construction of the Fossa Drusiana, a canal built to

facilitate the navy's egress into the sea.15

Returning to Rome for the winter, Drusus may have found ample

time for further consultation with Augustus about formulating a future

German strategy. Subsequent operations after 12 BCE represent a

change from what could yet be seen as a policy of fortifying the Rhine

defensively to a new plan of action which was to feature large-scale

expeditions, massive troop deployment and supply operations, and

outright territorial conquest into the heart of Germania Magna. Seen

from a broader and more accurate historical perspective, the military

operations initiated by Drusus in obvious consultation with Augustus

and the retaliatory acts that followed after the Varus defeat might be

more properly designated as an open war between Romans and the

Germanic tribes, lasting with occasional interruptions from Drusus'

15 The Fossa Drusiana is reported in Suet., Claud. 1. Its exact whereabouts is unknown, one likely explanation being that it was built to connect the Zuiderzee with the Ijssel River, enabling Roman ships to cut a considerable amount of sailing time to gain the North Sea. For a review of the possibilities involved see B. Makaskel, and G.J. Maasl and D.G. van Smeerdijk, "The Age and Origin of the Gelderse IJssel," Netherlands Journal of Geosciences—Geologie en Mijnbouw 87, no. 4 (September 2008): 326-337.

7

arrival in 12 BCE to Germanicus' recall to Rome in 16 CE.16 Indeed

the whole chain of events does not appear to differ from most other

imperial attempts at annexation of territory and imposition of rule

anytime or anywhere else.

The operational bases of Drusus' campaigns against the

Germans were at Mainz on the middle Rhine, and at Vetera (Xanten),

Neuss and Nijmegen on the lower Rhine.17 Setting forth from Vetera,

Drusus' legions could navigate their way eastwards on the Lippe River

almost as far as the Weser River, and then march overland to the

Elbe. The more southerly route progressed eastwards through the

valley of the Lahn River, most likely overland, although the smallish

Lahn might have been used to expedite supplies.18 Together these two

routes into Germania Magna, coupled with the sea-routes from the

Rhine into the estuaries of the Ems and Weser Rivers on the North

Sea explored by Drusus personally in 12 BCE, were the principle

routes of invasion and were the same ones used in future campaigns

by Quinctilius Varus and Germanicus, attesting to Drusus'

considerable skills at military organization and planning. Indeed it is

16 As proposed also by Johann-Sebastian Kühlborn, "2000 Jahre Römer in Anreppen, Öffentlicher Festvortrag," in Rom auf dem Weg nach Germanien. Geostrategie, Vormarschstrassen und Logistik: Internationales Kolloquium in Delbrück-Anreppen vom 4. bis 6. November 2004, ed. Johann-Sebastian Kühlborn and Cornelia Halm [Mainz: von Zabern, 2008], 1. Kühlborn suggests that the war in Germania occurred in the following distinct phases: 1) the campaigns of Drusus (12-9 BCE), 2) those of Tiberius and Vinicius (Tiberius’ general), (1-5 BCE), 3) those of Varus (7-9 BCE) and 4) those of Germanicus (14-16 BCE) (ibid., 2).17 Maureen Carroll, Romans, Celts & Germans: The German Provinces of Rome [Stroud: Tempus, 2001], 34.18 Carroll, Romans, 34-35.

8

hard not to view Drusus as the master architect of the Germanic wars,

and had he not died on campaign in 9 BCE, perhaps the outcome

might have been altogether different for the Romans.

In 10 and 9 BCE, Drusus and his legions battled successfully

against several tribes, including the Usipeti, Sugambri, Chatti, Suebi,

and Cherusci.19 Dio does not report that Drusus ever lost a single

engagement despite much heavy fighting, and he indicates repeatedly

that Drusus employed slash-and-burn methods of warfare.20 He

crossed the Weser River and advanced as far as the Elbe without

interference, clearly as a show of Roman military force, before turning

back to the Rhine, but he died en route when he fell from his horse.21

His body was escorted back to Rome for burial with full military

honors by the young future emperor Tiberius, who initiated the next

phase in the Germanic wars after Augustus appointed him to succeed

Drusus as military commander in the Rhineland.22

3.

None of Tiberius' three campaigns in Germania Magna led to a

decisive military action, and his activities there are not described in 19 Dio 54.33, 55.1.20 Dio 55.1. Slash-and-burn was the customary technique used by the Romans, as consistently mentioned in the accounts of the raids undertaken later by Tiberius, Varus and Germanicus. The Romans were not interested in winning hearts and minds, and the barbarity of their methods would have been understood throughout the land.21 Suet., Claud. 1.22 Suet., Claud. 1 and Tib. 7; Dio 55.1,2.

9

any detail by the Roman historians. The first campaign occurred in 8

BCE and brought nothing more conclusive than a failed attempt to

negotiate a peace settlement with the Sugambri, who had settled into

lands near the major Roman encampments at Xanten and Neuss and

who had begun to trade with the legions stationed there.23 It seems

likely that Tiberius would have undertaken raids against the local

populations, but there is no evidence to confirm Velleius' assertion

that "after traversing every part of Germany in a victorious campaign,

without any loss of the army entrusted to him—for he made this one of

his chief concerns—he so subdued the country as to reduce it almost

to the status of a tributary province."24 Velleius emphasizes further

that in 6 BC there was left "nothing in Germania that remained to be

conquered except the tribe of the Marcomanni."25 Working together

with the Rhine commander Sentius Saturninus, Tiberius accordingly

organized an army of twelve legions to march against the

Marcomanni, but the plan failed when Tiberius and the legions were

diverted to Pannonia, where they were occupied for three years

putting down a local uprising.26

The apparent lack of full-scale offensive operations under

Tiberius during the period between the death of Drusus in 9 BCE and

23 Wolters, Römer, 36-37. A peace settlement was proposed by the Sugambri but rejected by the Romans after lengthy negotiation.24 Vell. 2.97.4. Cassius Dio reports that Tiberius was again in the Rhineland in 7 and 6 BC, but he does not mention any engagements (Dio 55.6,8).25 Vell. 2.108.1.26 Wolters, Römer, 39.

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the defeat of Varus in 9 CE could be interpreted as evidence that the

Romans may have by this time indeed regarded themselves as

masters of Germania Magna, and felt it ready now for

provincialization. Perhaps it is at this point that Augustus was ready

to make his pronouncement that Germaniam pacavi,27 and there is

nothing to contradict Velleius' suggestion that the country had been

subdued to the level of a tributary province. Due to their distant

location to the southeast, the Marcomanni posed no immediate threat

to the Rhine armies, and they would not emerge as enemies until the

170's in Pannonia, where they were eventually subdued by Marcus

Aurelius' forces.28 To the north, in the area between the Weser and

the Elbe Rivers, no source mentions that the Cherusci were perceived

as a threat to Roman security, so that in the ten years prefacing the

clades Variana, despite the absence of signed peace treaties with

individual tribes, there was perhaps little reason for the Romans to

think that provincialization might not effectively proceed as normal.

Such apparently was the intention of Quinctilius Varus, who left

Vetera in the spring of 9 CE, moved three legions and perhaps 2000

camp followers up the the Lippe river to a summer camp located on

the Weser River, in the heart of the Cheruscan homeland.29 It is clear

that Varus was not interested in annexing new territory, since

otherwise he would have pushed eastward or northward instead of 27 Aug., R.G. 26.28 The Marcomannic wars are recounted in Dio 72.29 Dio 56.18.5.

11

staying in one place for several weeks in the summer. Varus' activities

prompt the conclusion that Augustus viewed Germania Magna as

freshly conquered territory ready for the institution of Roman rule.

Cassius Dio says that Varus, taking seriously his duties as provincial

governor, immediately began to "handle the affairs" of the regional

inhabitants and began to "give orders," and also that he "levied money

from them as if they were subject nations."30 Velleius reports further

that Varus "came to look upon himself as a city praetor administering

justice in the forum."31 Although Varus' activities in the summer of 9

CE do not necessarily demonstrate an official shift in Roman policy

since there is no designation of the territory as a new provincia

Germania, or as a "tributary province" in the words of Velleius

Paterculus quoted above, it is nonetheless clear that Varus regarded it

as his job to administer it as such, functioning as a magistrate and

ordering the collection of taxes. His blindness to the effects of his own

policies upon the Cheruscans, and to the conspiracy that was being

plotted behind his back, brought destruction upon himself and his

entire army upon their return march to the Rhine. On July 9th in 9 CE

an unknown number of Cheruscan warriors commanded by Arminius

led Varus' forces into a deadly ambush in a forest near the Weser 30 Dio 56.18.3. Dio adds, “Besides issuing orders to them as if they were actually slaves of the Romans, he exacted money as he would from subject nations.”31 Vell. 2.118.1. At 117.4, Velleius says that Varus "entered the heart of Germany as though he were going among a people enjoying the blessings of peace, and sitting on his tribunal he wasted the time of a summer campaign in holding court and observing the proper details of legal procedure. " Florus also states that Varus acted as a tribunal, "...just as though he could restrain the violence of barbarians by the rod of a lictor and the proclamation of a herald." (Flor., Epi. 2.30.31).

12

River, and three Roman legions were struck down.32 The defeat was

not only one of the worst in Roman military history, but also marked

the turning point for imperial ambitions in Germania Magna.

4.

The final phase of military operations in the Germanic wars

began immediately after the defeat of Varus and concluded with three

major campaigns led by Nero Claudius Germanicus before his

withdrawal and return to Rome in 16 CE. In 10 CE Tiberius took

command of the Rhine legions, which he next augmented with two

more legions in addition to the three lost by Varus, making a total of

eight, which he then divided into two commands, protecting the lower

and upper Rhine.33 In the following year Tiberius conducted a series of

raids in the lands immediately across the Rhine, devastating and

32 See Dio 56.19-22, which gives the best account of the battle, the site of which has now been conclusively established at Kalkriese in North-Rhine Westphalia thanks to recent archaeological discoveries. But the question how many Cheruscans participated remains a subject of much debate, as does the actual course of the battle. Some military scholars argue that 5000 warriors might have been sufficient to defeat the Romans; others think that 20,000 would have been necessary, as for example Thomas Völling, Germanien an der Zeitenwende: Studien zum Kulturwandel beim Übergang von der vorrömischen Eisenzeit zur a lteren römischen Kaiserzeit in der Germania Magna. BAR International Series, 1360. [Oxford, England: Archaeopress, 2005], 248. Velleius says that Varus' soldiers were "slaughtered like cattle," (Vell. 2.119.2), and archaeological evidence tends to confirm this.

Strabo says that the Germans "carried on a guerilla warfare in swamps, in pathless forests, and in deserts; and they made the ignorant Romans believe to be far away what was really near at hand, and kept them in ignorance of the roads..." (Strabo 1.1.18), but it is not clear if he is referring specifically to the confrontation between the Cheruscans and Varus. 33 Wolters, Römer, 56.

13

laying waste to the countryside without engaging the enemy

directly.34 After one minor battle with the Bructerii in 12 CE, Tiberius

returned to Rome, having accomplished little more than beefing up

the Rhine defenses and carrying out brutal punitive actions against a

defenseless farming population.35 It appears that he had decided to

end all further attempts at conquest, having determined that it would

be preferable for Rome to abandon Germania Magna and leave the

tribes to resolve their internal disputes by fighting with each other.36

The decision thus taken was of course defensive in nature: the Rhine

was again to become de facto the boundary of the Empire, and the

several Roman camps and fortifications to the east, which we will

discuss in more detail below, were abandoned in short order.

Augustus then named Germanicus to succeed Tiberius—

honoring him in advance as "Imperator," a title which did not signify

that his mission was likely to prove defensive in nature.37 Germanicus

34 "They did not win any pitched battles, since no German forced engaged them, neither did they subdue any tribe" (Dio 56.25.2). Dio says in the same passage that Germanicus was fighting together with Tiberius at this time.35 Velleius puts a rather more positive spin on Tiberius' rapacity: "He thus made aggressive war upon the enemy when his father and his country would have been content to let him hold them in check; he penetrated into the heart of the country, opened up military roads, devastated fields, burned houses, routed those who came against him, and, without loss to the troops with which he had crossed, he returned, covered with glory, to winter quarters" (Vell. 2.120.2).36 Dio 56.24.5.37 Dio 56.17.1. Perhaps Augustus approved one last attempt at conquest, or, as Tacitus asserts, perhaps the Romans "fought to erase the disgrace of the loss of the army under Quinctilius Varus rather than from a desire to advance the bounds of empire or win some worthwhile prize" (Tac., Ann. 1.3). Tiberius may have been more inclined than Augustus to end the Germanic wars, based on his own personal experience and therefore perhaps his more realistic assessment regarding the advantages of annexing the territory into the Empire, which in turn may have led to his subsequent recall of Germanicus in 16 CE.

14

arrived at the Rhine by 13 CE and was much involved the year

following with putting down a rebellion among the Rhine legions

which broke out immediately after the death of Augustus.38

Germanicus did lead a major campaign in 14 CE, bridging the Rhine

and leading 12,000 legionaries eastwards who cut new roads through

the forests and followed orders to lay waste the fields and wipe out

the farming population within a radius of fifty miles.39 After a series of

skirmishes with local tribes who had been taken quite by surprise, the

legions returned to the Rhine for the winter.40

Whatever motivating factors served to effect two full-scale

invasions into Cheruscan territory in 15 and 16 CE, defensive

operations were obviously not among them, and it seems rather that

Germanicus intended no less than the creation of an imperial frontier

on the Elbe River.41 Since the established routes of invasion along the

Lippe River and across the Lahn Valley to the south had been shut

38 Wolters, Römer, 56-57. Tacitus describes the campaigns of Germanicus in considerable detail in Tac. Ann. 5-29. 39 Carroll, Romans, 60.40 Carroll, Romans, 60. It is clear that Germanicus' initial efforts were meant to mirror those employed earlier by Tiberius: to intimidate the population by force and to avoid major confrontations. Reports of the brutality of Germanicus' raids can hardly be ignored. Tacitus writes that he "spread devastation over an area of fifty miles with fire and the sword. Neither sex nor age aroused pity. Places secular and sacred were razed to the ground.... The soldiers cut down men half-asleep, unarmed, or wandering aimlessly about, without receiving a wound" (Tac., Ann., 1.51). The traumatic effects on the Germanic population is contemplated by Lothar Wierschowski, "Non sexus, non aetas miserationem attulit (Tac., Ann. 1.51.1)—´Nicht Alter, nicht Geschlecht brachten Erbarmen´— Zur Kriegsführung der Römer in Germanien 14-16 n. Chr.," in Rom, Germanien und das Reich Festschrift zu Ehren von Rainer Wiegels anlasslich seines 65. Geburts-tages, Band 18, ed. Wolfgang Spickermann and Rainer Wiegels [Sankt Katharinen: Scripta-Mercaturae-Verlag, 2005], 210-223. 41 Carroll, Romans, 61.

15

down by Tiberius, Germanicus relied upon the expansion of the Rhine

fleet —the classis Germanica— to transport his armies down the Ems

and Weser rivers after sailing into the North Sea from the Rhine. After

an overland expedition in early 15 BC to attack and divide the Chatti

and Bructeri, during which the Romans "were once again able to

indulge in a massacre of old men, women and children,"42 the legions

marched across the north of the country and almost lost a major

battle on the banks of the Weser to the Cherusci, again led by

Arminius. The legions retreated again to the Rhine, some by land and

others by ship; both returning contingents were severely afflicted by

early winter coastal storms.43

The campaign of 16 CE, no less ambitious but hardly more

productive than the year before, marked the conclusion of the

Germanic wars. Having learned from the tactical and logistical

difficulties he had encountered previously, Germanicus assembled his

fleet and moved it again to the Ems,44 and the legions then marched

from there to the Weser where they confronted Arminius and the

Chreusci for a second time on a plain called Idiovisto.45 The ensuing

battle was won by the Romans, but Arminius escaped, and the Roman 42 Carroll, Romans, 62.43 The ships embarked probably from the Ems River. It seems likely that Germanicus divided his forces because he did not have enough ships available for everyone, see Tac., Ann. 1.69-70.44 Tacitus says that 1000 ships were required for this invastion, and that Germanicus had six legions at his disposa1 (Tac., Ann. 2.6, 2.7). 45 A few kilometers east of Minden. The site of the battle at Idiovisto has not yet been located. A full account of Germanicus’ campaigns is given in Wilm Brepohl, Arminius gegen Germanicus: Der Germanicus-Feldzug im Jahre 16 n. Chr. und seine Hintergründe [Münster: Aschendorff, 2008].

16

advance was brought to a halt by subsequent Cheruscan

counterattacks and Germanicus' decision not to be caught again by

bad weather.46 But as in the year previous, the forces returned to the

Rhine by land and by sea, and again the ships were caught in a violent

storm on the North Sea and many were lost.47 Next, Germanicus was

recalled to Rome by Tiberius, who had apparently by this time

determined that a successful military conquest of Germania Magna

was not to be achieved by winning annual victories over an enemy

which returned to the battlefield each year to resume fighting when

the winter intermission was over. Despite Tacitus' frequent reports of

hostility or mistrust existing between Tiberius and Germanicus,48 the

decision taken was militarily sound, since there existed little reason to

believe that another summer of warfare would have ended hostilities,

and every reason to believe that a final victory could be only be

realized by a much greater outlay of money and manpower that Rome

was then willing to expend, and by a permanent occupation of the

entire region instead of prosecuting intermittent campaigns.49

5.

46 Tac., Ann. 2.19, 2.23.47 Tac., Ann. 2.24.48 Discussed at length by D.C.A. Shotter, "Tacitus, Tiberius and Germanicus," Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, 17, no. 2 (1968): 194-214.49 Carroll, Romans, 73.

17

Thus far we have reviewed only the military actions undertaken in

Germania Magna during the Augustan period, emphasizing their

offensive and defensive capabilities and aspects. Our knowledge of

these events is derived almost exclusively from the records left to us

by the Roman historians. And yet there is a body of material evidence

which can also be used to analyze the strategic intentions of the

Romans, based on archaeological analysis of the different

fortifications and bases and camps constructed not only along the

Rhine River but also to the east of it. Included in this research is the

recent discovery (1993) of a nascent Roman city, which existed in the

Lahn valley until the time of Varus' defeat in 9 CE.

It has been shown that the Roman military bases in Augustan

Germany have a special significance in that none have been

discovered from the same period anywhere else in the entire Roman

Empire.50 Those along the Rhine River are the oldest and most highly

developed, having in some cases over time enlarged into full-scale

towns and cities (Cologne, Xanten, Neuss, Bonn). But the dates when

these legionary bases were first established remains obscure, and

although it is convenient to conceive of them as an element of

Agrippa's Rhine defense policies, it is not until the start of Drusus'

campaigns in 12 BCE that we begin to find concrete evidence about

50 Siegmar von Schnurbein, "The Organization of the Fortresses in Augustan Germany," in Roman Fortresses and Their Legions, ed. Richard J. Brewer and George C. Boon, [London: Society of Anti-quaries of London, 2000], 29. Schnurbein also mentions that the fortresses were built on hills, usually adjacent to German rivers.

18

the dates of their origin.51 Six legionary bases in the Augustan period

are known from archaeological evidence to have been built on the

Middle and Lower Rhine: four of these (Vechten, Vetera, Neuss and

Mainz) date from the period of Drusus' campaigns or shortly

thereafter; Nijmegen is probably late Augustan, while Cologne was

apparently established at some unknown point before 9 BCE.52

In addition, Drusus ordered many bases and camps to the east.

These may be best understood in terms of his three-pronged strategy

for the invasion of Germania Magna, which indeed became the basis

for all subsequent military incursions after his death. Two of these

were naval routes, requiring a fleet of attack ships, each vessel

carrying up to fifty legionaries, and a sizeable number of supply boats

following behind.53 As we have seen, the successful construction of a

North Sea naval fleet by Drusus, who was also the first Roman

commander to explore the northern estuaries of the German rivers,

prompted similar attacks into German territory by Tiberius and

Germanicus. Given the distances and the logistics involved, it is of

course impossible to think of these operations as defensive in nature.

Equally attractive for Roman commanders was the second

invasion route, which involved sending troop ships from the Rhine 51 C.M. Wells, The German Policy of Augustus, [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976], 93..52 Wells, Policy, 95.53 Archaeological discoveries, and analysis of fecal remains from military burials, confirm that land supply routes for the legions in Germany extended as far south as the Mediterranean. For a description of Roman naval operations on the Rhine see Heinrich Konen, Classis Germanica. Die römische Rheinflotte im 1.-3. Jahrhundert n. Chr. [Sankt Katharinen: Scripta Mercaturae Verlag. 2001].

19

base at Vetera eastwards up the Lippe River almost as far as the

Weser, from which point the soldiers could march forward to engage

with the Cheruscans and Chatti. Again it was Drusus who initiated

this route of invasion, and who also built a series of smaller fortified

camps along the Lippe from 11 BCE,54 before a very large, permanent

base sufficient to sustain an entire legion was built in successive

phases after 7 BCE on the Lippe at Haltern. Located fifty-seven

kilometers east of the Rhine, it was most certainly intended as a major

operational base for campaigns along the Lippe to the Weser—

constructed to serve an occupying army, not marching forces.55 It

contained a praetorium, tribune's hall, and a barrowed Roman

graveyard, and it exhibits evidence of vicus formation underway

around its perimeters.56 It also featured a boatyard where recent

excavations have shown that military attack ships—not supply ships—

were housed in boatsheds along the riverfront.57 The establishment of

a permanent, large-scale military base this far up the Lippe could not

have served any constructive defensive purpose, since invading forces

54 Carroll, Romans, 34.55 Carroll, Romans, 36.56 The residents included Roman civilians, women and children: cf. Wolters, Römer, 47. See also Wells, Policy, 191-192.57 The large number of officers' quarters at Haltern suggests that it might have been planned as a military administrative headquarters for annexed Germanic territory: see Carroll, Romans, 36. Carroll believes that the presence of civilian settlements suggests that the Romans considered the region to have been sufficiently pacified and safe enough to allow this kind of settlement, which was certainly uncharacteristic of all other transrhenan forts.

20

could have easily avoided it by marching around it to get to the

Roman bases on the Rhine.58

The third route of invasion planned by Drusus was located

farther to the south, originating at base on the Middle Rhine base at

Mainz, opposite the Main River and extending east through the valley

of the Lahn River, from which a geographically unproblematic path

could be pursued overland as far as the Elbe. At a place on the Lahn

called Waldgirmes, about 80 km from the Rhine, a Roman city was

built, whose construction dates from 4 BCE and which was shut down

in 9 CE.59 Lacking military architecture of any kind, the city is the only

site in Germania Magna surrounded by a stone wall, and the array of

public buildings included a forum with two basilica halls.60 The forum

was serviced by lead water pipes and a well.61 Large numbers of

artifacts have been recovered from the site, including parts of a gold-

gilt equestrian statue, and fragments of Germanic ceramics indicate

trade with the neighboring population.62 Despite its relatively brief

58 There were several smaller camps and bases leading up the Lippe from the Rhine, showing that the advance to the east occurred in successive stages:59 Armin Becker and Gabriele Rasbach, “’Stadte in Germanien,’ Der Fundplatz Waldgirmes,“ in Die Varusschlacht: Wendepunkt der Geschichte?, ed. Rainer Wiegels, [Stuttgart: Theiss Verlag, 2007], 102-116. The dating of Waldgirmes is confirmed by the carbon dating of wood construction elements, and by the discovery of Roman coinage from no later than 9 CE.60 Becker, Stadte, 105. The absence of militaria and weapons found on the site is seen as further indication that Waldgirmes was not planned as a military base. A full list of all the artifacts recovered at the site with descriptions is available in G. Rasbach, "Die Spätaugusteische Siedlung in Lahnau-Waldgirmes—Zusammenfassende Bemerkungen zum Stand der Fundauswertung." BAR International Series (Supplementary) 1084 (1999): 433-440.61 Becker, Stadte, 103.62 Heinz Günter Horn, "Was ist wahr an Varus? Eine Frage ohne klare Antworten," in Von Anfang an: Archaologie in Nordrhein-Westfalen, Begleitbuch zur Germanisches Landesausstellung: Von Anfang an—Archaologie in Nordrhein-Westfalen, Köln,

21

history as a city, the archaeological discoveries at Waldgirmes provide

almost irrefutable evidence that the Romans in the period before

Varus’ defeat had considered Germania Magna as sufficiently

“pacified” to embark on the path of provincialization.

Conclusions

For almost thirty years, from 12 BCE to 16 CE, the Romans

attempted to subject Germania Magna and incorporate it into their

empire as a province. The wars were fought in three distinct phases,

the first being the initial invasions and the establishment of military

bases east of the Rhine undertaken by Drusus in 12– 9 BCE. A period

of stabilization and the first steps toward provincialization ensued

under the command of Tiberius: these came to an abrupt halt with the

disastrous defeat of Varus’ three legions in 9 CE by the Cheruscans

led by Arminius. A third phase followed in which Tiberius ordered the

deconstruction of Roman settlements east of the Rhine, following

which his nephew Germanicus enacted a final denouement to the wars

by successfully but inconclusively attacking the Cheruscans and their

allies near the Weser River in 15 and 16 CE. This in summary is the

record left to us by the Roman historians, which demonstrates that

regardless of frontier strategies enacted elsewhere in the Empire,

Römisch- Museum 13. Marz bis 28. August 2005, Herne, Westfälisches Museum für Archäologie, Landesmuseum 22. September 2005 bis 5. Februar 2006, Schriften zur Boden-Denkmalpflege in Nordrhein-Westfalen, ed. Heinz Günter Horn, [Mainz: von Zabern, 2005], 115.

22

Augustus intended nothing less than the annexation of Germania

Magna into the empire followed by its eventual provincialization, an

obvious contradiction to the oft-repeated assertion that his grand

imperial design opposed the aggrandizement of new territory into the

Roman Empire.

A series of material culture discoveries, many of them very

recent, also confirm the offensive nature of the Roman invasions into

Germania Magna. These discoveries include the excavation of Roman

camps along the Lippe River, revealing a permanent military garrison

at Haltern which harbored attack ships; the discovery of the Varus

battlefield at Kalkriese; and the excavation of a Roman town or city at

Waldgirmes, showing that the Romans did indeed set forth to

provincialize the transrhenan lands. In 16 CE, the dreams of imperial

conquest had passed, but interest in tracking the course and the sites

of the Roman campaigns remains undiminished. It now seems likely

that a new series of archaeological revelations will emerge from the

search for Varus’ summer camp along the Weser, and for the sites of

the battles between the armies of Arminius and Germanicus at

Idiovisto.

23

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