the russian elite 2016 РОССИЙСКАЯ ЭЛИТА elite 2016... · 2016-07-05 · 35.7 45.9...
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THE RUSSIAN ELITE 2016 РОССИЙСКАЯ ЭЛИТА 2016PERSPECTIVES ON FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC POLICY
Version2.0
SURVEY METHODOLOGY
• 243 Moscow-based elites
• Seven sub-groups: high-ranking individuals in the executive branch, the legislative branch, private firms, state-owned enterprises, major media outlets, universities and large academic research institutes, and the armed forces and security agencies
• Face-to-face interviews lasting an average of 60 minutes
• Interviews conducted in February-March 2016
2016 SURVEY SPONSORSHIP AND DIRECTION
• Funded by Arthur Levitt Public Affairs Center at Hamilton College • Principal Investigator: Sharon Werning Rivera, Associate Professor of Government, Hamilton College • Co-Principal Investigators: • William Zimmerman, Emeritus Professor of Political Science and Emeritus Research
Professor, Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan • Eduard Ponarin, Director of the Laboratory for Comparative Social Research and
Professor of Sociology, National Research University Higher School of Economics in St. Petersburg
PREVIOUS SURVEYS
• Six previous surveys (1993, 1995, 1999, 2004, 2008, and 2012) directed by William Zimmerman at the University of Michigan
• Consistent methodology and replication of survey questions in all waves
ANALYSIS OF SURVEY RESULTS
• Conducted by students in Government 333: Topics in Survey Research, taught by Prof. Sharon Werning Rivera
James Bryan Brisa Camacho-Lovell Carlos Fineman Nora Klemmer Emma Raynor
Source:2016HamiltonCollegeLevittPoll–“TheRussianElite2016.”Note:Thegraphshowsthecombinedpercentagesofresponsesfor“verylikely”and“quitelikely”aswellasfor“unlikely”and“completelyunlikely.”QuestionWording:“Inyouropinion,whichofthefollowingsituationsisverylikely,quitelikely,unlikely,orcompletelyunlikelyinthenext10years?…ApartyormovementotherthanUnitedRussiawillcometopower…SomeoneotherthanVladimirPutinwillbecomepresident.”
Figure2.1ExpectationsRegardingVladimirPutinandUnitedRussia
17.7
79.0
3.3
18.9
79.4
1.60%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Likely Unlikely Hardtosay/Refusal
ThelikelihoodthatsomeoneotherthanVladimirPutinwillbecomepresidentinthenext10years
ThelikelihoodthatapartyormovementotherthanUnitedRussiawillcometopowerinthenext10years
Table2.1RussianElites’PartyAfHiliations
Source:2016HamiltonCollegeLevittPoll–“TheRussianElite2016.”Note:TheYiguresrepresentthepercentageoftotalrespondents.QuestionWording:“Areyouamemberofanypoliticalpartyormovement?1.Yes,2.No;[Ifyes]Ofwhichpartyareyouamember?;[Ifno]WhichpartyormovementbestreYlectsyourviews?”Thelattertwoareopen-endedquestions.
PoliticalParty/Movement Ofwhichpoliticalpartyareyouamember?
WhichpoliticalpartyormovementbestreHlectsyour
views?
UnitedRussia 35.4%(86) 22.2%(54)
AJustRussia 1.2%(3) 1.6%(4)
CommunistPartyoftheRF 2.5%(6) 0.8%(2)
LDPR 1.6%(4) 3.7%(9)
YoungRussia - 1.2%(3)
PatriotsofRussia 0.4%(1) 0.8%(2)
Yabloko 0.4%(1) 1.2%(3)
Parnas - 0.8(2)
PartyofPeaceandUnity - 0.4%(1)
HardtoSay/Refusal 0.4%(1) 25.1%(61)
Total%(n) 42%(102) 58%(141)
Figure2.2Elites’PreferredPoliticalSystem
Sources:2016HamiltonCollegeLevittPoll–“TheRussianElite2016”;“SurveyofRussianElites:1993-2012,”ICPSR,UniversityofMichigan.QuestionWording:“Whichpoliticalsystem,inyouropinion,YitsRussiabest?1.TheSovietsystemthatexistedinthecountrybeforeperestroika,2.TheSovietsystembutinamoredemocraticform,3.Thecurrentpoliticalsystem,4.AWestern-styledemocracy,5.HardtoSay,6.Refusal”
0%
5%
10%
15%
20%
25%
30%
35%
40%
45%
TheSovietsystemthatexistedinthecountrybeforeperestroika
TheSovietsystembutinamore
democraticform
Thecurrentpoliticalsystem
AWestern-styledemocracy
Hardtosay/refusal
2004
2008
2012
2016
Sources:2016HamiltonCollegeLevittPoll—“TheRussianElite2016”;“SurveyofRussianElites:1993-2012,”ICPSR,UniversityofMichigan.Note:“Don’tknow”responsesandrefusalsareexcludedfromtheanalysis.QuestionWording:“DoyouthinkthattheUSArepresentsathreattoRussia’snationalsecurity?”
26.9
52.9
64.354.1
71.8
48.1
80.8
73.1
47.1
35.745.9
28.2
51.9
19.2
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
1993 1995 1999 2004 2008 2012 2016
Percent
Figure3.1Elites'PerceptionsoftheUnitedStatesasaThreat
No
Yes
Sources:2016HamiltonCollegeLevittPoll—“TheRussianElite2016”;“SurveyofRussianElites:1993-2012,”ICPSR,UniversityofMichigan.Note:Resultsshowpercentageofrespondentsratingthisthreatasa5,meaning“theutmostthreat”toRussiansecurity.“Don’tknow”responsesandrefusalsareexcludedfromtheanalysis.Thequestionabout“BorderconYlictsbetweenRussiaandcountriesoftheCIS”wasnotaskedin2008.QuestionWording:“WhichonthelistbelowaremostlikelytorepresenttheutmostthreattothesecurityofRussiaandwhichdonotconstituteanythreatatall?Evaluatethelevelofthreat,usingaYive-pointscale,where1denotestheabsenceofthreatand5theutmostthreat.1.ThegrowthofAmerica’smilitarymightvis-à-visRussia’s2.TheinabilityofRussiatoresolveitsinternalproblems3.Terrorism4.BorderconYlictsbetweenRussiaandcountriesoftheCIS5.GrowthofethnictensionsinRussiabetweenRussiansandothernationalities6.A‘color’revolution7.AninformationwaragainstRussiaconductedbytheWest”
0.0
10.0
20.0
30.0
40.0
50.0
60.0
1993 1995 1999 2004 2008 2012 2016
Percent
Figure3.2SelectedThreatstoRussianSecurity,
1993-2016
InabilitytoSolveDomesticProblems
GrowthofUSMilitary
BorderConYlicts:CIS
Table3.1ThreatsPerceivedasthe“Utmost"in2016
%(n)Inability to Solve Domestic Problems
Terrorism Growth of US Military
Border Conflicts: CIS
Ethnic Tensions
Information War Conducted by the West
“Color” Revolution
32.1% (78)
22.2% (54)
7.4% (18)
4.5% (11)
3.3% (8)
2.5% (6)
2.2% (5)
Sources:2016HamiltonCollegeLevittPoll—“TheRussianElite2016”;“SurveyofRussianElites:1993-2012,”ICPSR,UniversityofMichigan.Note:Resultsshowpercentageofrespondentsratingthisthreatasa5,meaning“theutmostthreat”toRussiansecurity.“Don’tknow”responsesandrefusalsareexcludedfromtheanalysis.QuestionWording:“WhichonthelistbelowaremostlikelytorepresenttheutmostthreattothesecurityofRussiaandwhichdonotconstituteanythreatatall?Evaluatethelevelofthreat,usingaYive-pointscale,where1denotestheabsenceofthreatand5theutmostthreat.1.ThegrowthofAmerica’smilitarymightvis-à-visRussia’s2.TheinabilityofRussiatoresolveitsinternalproblems3.Terrorism4.BorderconYlictsbetweenRussiaandcountriesoftheCIS5.GrowthofethnictensionsinRussiabetweenRussiansandothernationalities6.A‘color’revolution7.AninformationwaragainstRussiaconductedbytheWest”
Sources:2016HamiltonCollegeLevittPoll–“TheRussianElite2016”;“SurveyofRussianElites:1993-2012,”ICPSR,UniversityofMichigan.Note:Datafrom1999arenotincludedintheYigure.QuestionWording:“ForeachcountryorinternationalorganizationthatIwillname,pleasetellmehowfriendlyorhostile,inyouropinion,itistowardRussiatoday:veryfriendly,fairlyfriendly,neutral,fairlyhostile,orveryhostile?1.China,2.Ukraine,3.US,4.Estonia,5.Poland,6.Germany,7.EU,8.Japan,9.Georgia,10.UK?”(ResultspresentedfortheUSonly)
Figure4.1PerceivedHostilityoftheUS,1993-2016
3
0.6
4.2
55.5
35.6
17.8
3.7
23.3
0.4
29
40
48.1
25.3
30.8
11.1
6.5
16.1
29.1
52.7
33.8
62.1
3
7.8
2.2
17.8
6.3
25.9
3
0
2.8
0.4
1.7
0.4
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70
1993
1995
2004
2008
2012
2016
Percent
HardtoSay
VeryHostile
FairlyHostile
Neutral
FairlyFriendlyVeryFriendly
Sources:2016HamiltonCollegeLevittPoll–“TheRussianElite2016”;“SurveyofRussianElites:1993-2012,”ICPSR,UniversityofMichigan.Note:Inthe2012survey,“Noneoftheabove”wasnotanoption.QuestionWording:“Russia,beingoneofthemostpowerfulactorsininternationalpolitics,developsrelationshipswithallotheractorsinworldpolitics.However,ifyouhadtochoose,withwhichofthesewouldyouprefertoformacoalition?”“1.China2.EU3.US4.NoneoftheAbove5.HardtoSay6.Refusal.”
Figure 4.2 Russia’s Potential Coalition Partners
32.9
37.9
8.310.0 10.8
23.5
26.3
7.0
33.7
9.1
0.40
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
China EU US NoneoftheAbove
HardtoSay Refusal
Percent
2012
2016
Sources:2016HamiltonCollegeLevittPoll—“TheRussianElite2016”;“SurveyofRussianElites:1993-2012,”ICPSR,UniversityofMichigan.Note:“Don’tknow”responsesandrefusalsareexcludedfromtheanalysis.QuestionWording:“TherearevariousopinionsaboutthenationalinterestsofRussia.Whichofthetwoassertionsbelowareclosertoyourpointofview?1.ThenationalinterestsofRussiashouldbelimited,forthemostpart,toitsexistingterritory;2.ThenationalinterestsofRussiaforthemostpartextendbeyonditsexistingterritory.”
Figure5.1ScopeofRussia’sNationalInterests
22.8 20.0 17.7
28.1 36.0
56.6
17.7
77.2 80.0 82.3
71.9 64.0
43.4
82.3
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1993 1995 1999 2004 2008 2012 2016
ThenationalinterestsofRussiashouldbelimited,forthemostpart,toitsexistingterritory
ThenationalinterestsofRussiaforthemostpartextendbeyonditsexistingterritory
Figure5.2WhatDeterminesaState’sRoleintheWorld?
Sources:2016HamiltonCollegeLevittPoll—“TheRussianElite2016”;“SurveyofRussianElites:1993-2012,”ICPSR,UniversityofMichigan.Note:“Don’tknow”responsesandrefusalsareexcludedfromtheanalysis.QuestionWording:“Iwillreadyoutwostatementsabouttheroleofmilitaryforceininternationalrelations.Whichoftheseisclosertoyouropinion?1.Militaryforcewillalwaysultimatelydecideeverythingininternationalrelations;2.Theeconomicandnotmilitarypotentialofacountrydeterminestheplaceandroleofacountryintheworldtoday.”
87.0 82.777.1
72.8 68.364.2
47.1
13.017.3 22.9
27.2 31.735.8
52.9
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
1993 1995 1999 2004 2008 2012 2016
TheeconomicandnotmilitarypotentialofacountrydeterminestheplaceandroleofacountryintheworldtodayMilitaryforcewillalwaysultimatelydecideeverythingininternationalrelations
Table5.1WhatDeterminesaState’sRoleintheWorld?
GenerationalDifferences
Source:2016HamiltonCollegeLevittPoll—“TheRussianElite2016.”QuestionWording:“Iwillreadyoutwostatementsabouttheroleofmilitaryforceininternationalrelations.Whichoftheseisclosertoyouropinion?1.Militaryforcewillalwaysultimatelydecideeverythingininternationalrelations;2.Theeconomicandnotmilitarypotentialofacountrydeterminestheplaceandroleofacountryintheworldtoday.”
≤1950 76.9 (10) 23.1 (3)1951-1960 52.8 (28) 45.3 (24)1961-1970 54.5 (54) 45.5 (45)≥1971 44.7 (34) 52.6 (40)
Military Economic Force Potential
Year of Birth % (n) % (n)
Table6.1WastheAnnexationofCrimeainViolation
ofInternationalLaw?
Source:2016HamiltonCollegeLevittPoll–“TheRussianElite2016.”QuestionWording:“DoyouagreethatinannexingCrimea,Russiaviolatedpost-warandpost-Sovietinternationalagreementsandinternationallaw?”
Response %Definitelyyes 3.3Probablyyes 7.4Probablyno 26.7Definitelyno 61.7Hardtosay/refusal 0.8
Table6.2WhatLedtotheConHlictinUkraine?
SelectedResponses
Source:2016HamiltonCollegeLevittPoll–“TheRussianElite2016.”Note:Respondentscouldselectallresponsesthatapply.Onlytheresponsesmostrelevanttothisanalysisaredisplayed.QuestionWording:“Inyouropinion,whatledtothecrisisinUkraine?1.AttemptsbytheUSAtofomentanother‘color’revolutioninUkraine.2.ThecorruptregimeofformerUkrainianpresidentYanukovych.3.ThehopesofregularUkrainiansthatassociationwiththeEuropeanUnionwouldsolvefundamentalproblemsinthecountry.4.ThepersistentactionsoftheEuropeanUniontobringUkraineintoitssphereofinYluence.5.TheUkrainianopposition,havingresortedtoarmedmethodsofprotestonthestreets.6.AttemptsbyYanukovychtostraddleRussiaandtheEuropeanUnion.7.AttemptsbyRussiato‘buy’Yanukovych’sloyalty.”
Table6.3PerspectivesontheSyrianConHlict
Source:2016HamiltonCollegeLevittPoll–“TheRussianElite2016.”QuestionWording:“WhichofthefollowingstatementsareclosesttoyourpositionontheinternationalmilitaryoperationsinSyria?”
Response % It’s an intervention in the internal affairs of the state
27.6
It’s a necessary step to stop the violence and human rights violations
63.0
Hard to say/refusal 9.5
Figure6.1RussianGovernment’sGoalsforParticipatingintheSyrianConHlict
Sources:2016HamiltonCollegeLevittPoll–“TheRussianElite2016”;"SyriaandthePlaneCrashinEgypt."LevadaCenter.23November2015.Availableat:http://www.levada.ru/eng/syria-plane-crash-egypt.Note:Respondentscouldselectallresponsesthatapply.OnlyfouraredisplayedintheYigure.QuestionWording:“Inyouropinion,whataretheRussiangovernment’sgoalsforparticipatingintheSyrianconYlict?1.AttemptingtoneutralizeandeliminatethespreadofmilitaryactivitiesbyIslamicradicalsandterroriststoRussia.2.ProtectingthegovernmentofBasharal-AssadinordertopreventaseriesofUS-inspired‘colorrevolutions’aroundtheworld.3.DefendingtheeconomicinterestsofRussiancompaniesintheMiddleEast.4.SupportingBasharal-Assad’sregimeandhisstruggleagainsttheopposition,insofarasheisworriedaboutmassiveanti-governmentprotests.5.AttemptingtobreakupthecoalitionofWesterncountriesinordertoeliminatethethreatofthecompleteisolationofRussiaandthefurthertighteningofsanctions.6.AttemptingtodistracttheRussianpopulationfromtheeconomiccrisisandtheauthorities’inabilitytodealwiththedecliningqualityoflife,corruption,andgovernmentalincompetence.7.IdonotunderstandwhyRussiaisparticipatinginthiswar.”
76%
5% 4%7%
49%
11%5%
15%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
EliminatingthespreadofmilitaryactivitiesbyIslamicradicalsto
Russia
SupportingBasharal-Assad’sregime
AttemptingtodistracttheRussianpopulationfromtheeconomic
crisis
IdonotunderstandwhyRussiais
participatinginthiswar
Elites
MassPublic
THANKYOU!
Fullresultsavailableatwww.hamilton.edu/RussianPoll2016.
QuestionsandcommentscanbesenttoProf.SharonRiveraatsrivera@hamilton.edu.