THE SELF-EXISTEIk~CE OF GOD: HAP.TSHORNE AND CLAs T)4EIS~4

Kenneth Surin*

The term 'process theology' refers to a twent ie th-century school of theological thought inspired by the wri t ings of A.N. Whitehead and developed, in the main, by Charles Hartshorne. I

God, according to process theology, is best characterized by the notion of 'process' or 'becoming'. While classical Christian theism regards God as a pure actual i ty (actus puz~as) who cannot be characterized in terms of categories that ar~o]v to the world of change, process theology views him as a being wi th both unchangeable (or nec&ssary) and changeable (or accidental) attr ibutes, z Process theology holds that i t is just these attr ibutes of change which enable us to regard God as a being who has a real relat ion to his creation, i.e. as a being who is 'religiously available' to his creatures. However, while the two theological tradit ions disagree over the issue of the divine possession of accidental attr ibutes, they nevertheless agree on the question of God having necessary, or metaphysical, attr ibutes. Thus, both tradit ions agree that C.od possesses the at t r ibute of aseit~ o r self-existence, This affinity apart, however, the development of process theo]oRy has been accompanied by a substantial and often polemical critique of classical Christian theism. Consequently, it would be interesting to compare and contrast the respective positions of these two theological tradit ions vis-a-vis the divine a t t r ibute of self-e~'~ence. This constitutes our purpose in this essay.

*Stowmarket) Suffolk) England,

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Any workable theist ic argument, which purports to prove that God exists necessarily, wi l l entail that God is self-existent~ because God could not exist necessarily unless he existed a s e (if he does exist). For~ otherwise, he would depend upon the existence of some other bein~ for his own existence, and i t would then be possible for that beinR to brin~ it about that God does not exist. So, to say that God is self-existent is to say that he does not depend on any other being(s) for his own existence. It is this at t r ibute, therefore~ which specif ically sets God apart from every other being. The notion that God is self-existent finds expression in the fol lowin~ statements, which are representative of the classical Christ ian theist tradit ion:

(A) God alone exists a se~ whereas all other creatures exist ab a//o.

(S) God exists a se because his essence and existence are identical.

(C) God exists a s e because he exists necessarily.

We shall consider each of these statements in turn. Our procedure wi l l be to see how theologians in the classical Christian t radi t ion ampl i fy and support these statements, and then to evaluate them in the l ight of the critic~ue of this t radi t ion developed by process theology, and by Hartshorne in part icular.

(A) 'God alone exists a se, whereas all other creatures exist a b a l i o . '

Ampli f icat ion of this statement is provided by A.L. eys in a volume called T h e Teach/nq o f the

CatholEc Church. To auote Reys: The supreme fact natural ly known to man is that the ul t imate real i ty is a self-subsistent being. We realise that there is some real i ty altoeether uncaused, which exists of i tself, havin~ and requiring no antecedent whatsoever. The ul t imate beinR has not become itself, or received existence as an event, i t simply is~ and has never been otherwise. 3

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In short, God is comple t e ly autonomous and does not depend uDon any external causes for his existence.

Hartshorne's own view is diametr ical ly opposed to the one exDressed in the above passage. ~le~ for instance, agrees that God in his abstract (or necessary) aspect is self-existent and autonomous, but maintains that in his concrete (or continEent) aspect God is created hy his creatures, in the sense that our actions can cause, and do cause, C.od to experience joy or sorrow. /ks Hartshorne says: "God orders the universe by taking into his own life all the currents of feelin~ in existence. "~ Unlike theists of the orthodox tradi t ion, Hartshorne does not think that this sort of dependence implies that God is imperfect. To quote him a~ain, this t ime on the subject of divine 0erfection:

' . . . let us define perfect ion as excellence such that r ivalry or superiority on the part of other individuals is impossible, but self-superinritv is not impossible. Or a~ain, let us say that the perfect is the 'self-surpassing surpasser of all'. (n% p.20).

This view a/lows Cod to be influenced by external forces, so lon~ as this influence is not taken to imply that these forces are capable of suroassin~ God. Accordin~ to the Hartshornean position, then, the classical Christian t radi t ion fails to make an important distinction between the form and the content of divine existence. In terms of the former, God's mode (or form) of existence is the mode of self-existence. However, in re~ard to the lat ter, God depends upon his creatures to a f fec t or shape the course of his experience: we, because we partake of the divine experience, help determine what course this divine experience takes, lules Lecluier, a precursor of modern panentheism whom Hartshorne is fond of invoking, makes this point when he says:

This universe compared to immensity is, I agree, but a Krain of san~ but this ~rain of sand has its form of existence, and the chan~es which fro on in i t heine as real as the things in which they

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occur, God, who sees thes% things change, changes also in beholding them.

.According_ to process theology, then, real experience of anything implies susceptibil ity to chan~es in that thin~: the subject of experience chan~es with its object. The classical Christian tradit ion, i t is thought, makes the unarffued for, and possibly mistaken, assum.Dtion that God's self-existence (logically or conceptually) precludes him from dependin~ upon his creatures. But if, as Hartshorne agrees, God creates and includes the universe in himself, then i f he depends upon the universe to af fect his experience, he is (in a sense) creatin~ and depending upon h imse l f . To prove that self-dependence, so conceived, is a mark of imperfection requires us to demonstrate the incoherence of the process theolo~ian's concept of God - only then can we conclude that Hartshorne is mistaken in asserting the compatabi l i ty of divine percection with 'process' or 'becoming'. So unti l process theism has been seriously evaluated as an alternative to classical Christian theism, there is no real case for asserting that classical Christian theists have adequately shown God to exist in the sense spescified in (A~. God does not, necessarily, have to be independent and autonomous in order to be self-existent. His aseity, i f the process theolo]cian is correct, does not entai l his complete independence from his creation, which, af ter all, is a part of himself (or so the process theist maintains).

(B) 'God ex i s t s a s e b e c a u s e his e s s e n c e and e x i s t e n c e a r e iden t ica l . '

The c la s s i ca l Chr i s t i an t h e i s t i c t r a d i t i o n m a i n t a i n s t h a t only in God's c a s e a r e e s s e n c e and e x i s t e n c e iden t i ca l . Where c r e a t u r e l y beinffs a r e c o n c e r n e d , w h a t w e a r e (our e s s e n c e s ) is not iden t i ca l wi th t h e f a c t t h a t we a re (our e x i s t e n c e s ) . T h e r e is nothinR i n t h e n a t u r e of a c r e a t u r e l y being t o m a k e it n e c e s s a r y t h a t t h a t heine should ex i s t . God ' s e x i s t e n c e in an

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inevitable existencey while al] other existences are cont ingent upon the existences of other beings.

There is a sl ight problem here for the Drocess theologian in ~eneraly and ~4artshorne in nart icular. On the one handy Hartshorne's espousal of the ontoloRical argument requires him to hold that in God's case essence and existence are identical, simply because the very basis of the argument involves the claim that C, od possesses an essence which contains the proper ty 'cannot fai l to exist ' or 'is necessarily existent ' . 6 " On the other handy Hartshorne says that Godts essence is composed of his necessary at t r ibutes, but also includes his accidental attributes= the divine essence comprises both sets of a t t r ibutes. 7 The question now is= why shouldn't divine existence he accidentaly i.e. continRen% in which case i t is d i f f i cu l t to see how God's essence and existence can be identical. Besides, there is somethin~ odd about sayin~ that God's essence - the set of his essent ia l at t r ibutes . can also include his accidental at t r ibutes. Surely, the notion of essence is bein~ misused in this context?

Hartshorney however, has a way of ~ettin~ round this problem. As he sees i t , existence is not all of a type: i t is both abst ract and concrete. Viewed as pure potent ia l i ty i t is abstrac% hut viewed as an actual i ty i t is concrete (DRy p.]##). So in place of the essence-existence dichotomy~ Nartshorne has an essence-existence-actual i ty t r ichotomy, and God's aspects can be detai led in terms of the fol lowin~ correspondin~ elements:

( I ) Essence - Abst rac t Aspect (2) Existence - Both Abst ract and Concrete Aspects (3) Ac tua l i t y - Concrete Aspect on/9

Abstract existence and essence are ident ical where God is concernedy whi le actual i ty (concrete existence) and essence are not. Consecluentlyy Hartshorne accepts s ta tement (g) in only a quali f ied

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sense, since God's e s sence and ex is tence a re ident ical only where his abs t r ac t ex is tence is concerned. At the same t ime, Hartshorne faces a problem which also besets the classical Christ ian theis t . This problem surrounds t he pu ta t ive ident i ty be tween essence and e x i s t e n c ~ in ~)articular, the c~uestion of providing a reasoned just if ication for upholding this ident i ty . A way must be found of resolvin~ this problem before Har tshorne (and the classical Chris t ian theis t ) can uphold this ident i ty in the case of God.

It is a p r imary and pervas ive f ea tu re of near ly all accounts of religious exper i ence tha t God is a beinR who can be, and is, encoun te red as a persona/ (i.e. conc re t e ) being by human persons in the course of such exper ience . It is not being c la imed here t ha t God is, of necess i ty , to be encoun te red in exac t ly the same way tha t human persons are . l~ather, it is only bein~ c la imed t h a t people who have a religious dimension to the i r expe r i ence encounter some personal manifestation of the bein~ that is God. g But this mani festat ion is concrete, in the sense tha t i t is expevlenced as a real i ty: we can, in the course of such experience, indicate that i t was th is or that manifestat ion that impinged on our consciousness. For this reason, the a t t r ibu tes of deity which are more accessible in the context of such experience are not the so-cal led 'metaphysical ' at t r ibutes, but those which possess ohenomenal properties, and so can be descr ibed f rom a phenomenolo~ical perspect ive . At t r ibu tes which possess these proper t ies a r e those of God's love, his mercy , his providence, his sheer numinositv~ and so on. ~YPe do not exper ience his ase i ty , or immutabi l i ty , or omniscience, or necessar iness , in quite the same way. In fac t , it would, pr ima facie, seem very odd if someone c la imed to expe r i ence God in these t e rms . Such a person might have an exper ience of dei ty t ha t implied, or presupposedy God's possession of such a t t r ibutes , but this is cluite d i f f e r en t from claimin~ that we exper ience the presence of God in t e rms of

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these a t t r ibutes . The metaphysical a t t r ibu tes of God, then, are not as exoer ient ia l ly available as those of his a t t r ibu tes tha t can be described phenomenological ly.

This point is made by ~Villiam 3ames, in his cha rac te r i s t i ca l ly ebullient wav:

. . .even were we forced by a coerc ive lo~ic to believe them (i.e. God's metaphysical a t t r ibutes) we still should have to confess them to be des t i tu te of all intell igible s ignif icance. Take God's ase i ty for exampl~ his simplicity. . . his indivisibility...his ac tua l ized infinity. . , his se l f - suf f ic iency . . , candidly speaking, how do such qualit ies as these make any def in i te connec t ion with our life? And if they several ly call for no dis t inct ive adaptat ions of our conduct , what vital d i f f e r e nc e can it nossible make to a man's religion whe the r they be t rue or fa lse?

For my own part. . .I must frankly confess tha t even thouRh these a t t r ibu tes were faul t less ly deduced~ I cannot conceive of its bein~ of the smallest consequence to us religiously tha t any of them should be t rue . Pray, what specif ic ac t can I per form in order to adapt myself be t t e r to God's simnlici tv? ... r~id such a conglomera t ion of abs t rac t t e rms ~ive rea l ly the ~ist of our knowledge of deity~ schools of theology mil~ht indeed cont inue to flourish, but religion, vital reliaRion, would have taken its f l ight f rom this world. ~

In short, we are enjoined, indeed cons t ra ined (if we accep t the fo rce of 3ames' argument)y to accep t an exper ien t ia l ly-based concept ion of the divine essence. This requ i rement would he par t icu lar ly d i f f icul t to fulfil in the case of the ident i ty be tween God's essence and exis tence, because it is hard to see how God's abs t r ac t aspec t can be c h a r a c t e r i z e d in an

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experiential ly available way. Accordingly, the putative ident i ty between divine essence and existence must be re~arded as problematic, in which case i t cannot be said to provide a reliable basis for establishing that God exists a se, and this in turn requires us to be sceptical about fB).

(C) 'God exists a s e because he exists necessarily.'

Both Hartshorne and theists in the classical t radi t ion agree that the necessity of God's existence stems from the ident i ty of his essence and existence. In our discussion of (B) we found this identi ty to be problematic i t is eouaJly questionable, therefore, whether this ident i ty can establish God's self-existence in the way specified hy (C). But let us ignore this problem for the sake of argument, and concentrate on the other ramifications of adoptin~ (C). As we saw earl ieG God's aseity is entailed by his necessary existence, because to exist necessarily is not to have to depend on any other being for one's existence, i.e. i t is to exist a se. The crucial idea here is the one of necessary existence, for i t seems just as d i f f icu l t to interpret in an experiential ly available way as the putat ive ident i ty between divine essence and existence. The issue of the experiential availabi~ty of God's metaphysical attr ibutes is a thorny one for many theist philosophers, especially i f they adhere to the doctrine of the divine ineffabi l i ty. Thus, one such philosopher, H.P. Owen, says=

...God's necessity is bound ~o be incomprehensible. ~Ve cannot form any positive idea of it, for i t has no kind of parallel in f in i te experience. V'e can of fer f ini te analogies (inadeauate though they are) to many of God's attributes; but there is no analogy to his self-existence. Mere we can str ic t ly speak of him as 'the wholJy Other' who is 'absolutely unique', and who therefore constitutes an impenetrable mystery for f in i te minds. 10

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The ~eneral motive for adherine to the doctrine of the divine ineffabi l i ty is suDplied by the desire to se;)arate-off God from creaturely beings hv means of a via nega~va. This doctrine, however, is disastrous for the experiential avai labi l i ty of our concept of God. For, if (i) God's self-existence is entailed bv his necessary existence (as (C) claims), and (ii) his self-existence is incomprehensible, then (iii) i t follows that his necessary existence is in some sense incomprehensible. But if God's necessary existence is incomprehensible~ then we cannot9 on any reasonable Around% be2J.eve that 'God exists' is necessarily true, and this is a conclusion that many classical Christian theists would find d i f f icu l t to accept. So we must af f i rm, on behalf of Owen and such theists~ that God's existence is in some sense comprehensible. Anyone who accepts a theist ic argument for God's necessary existence~ and who accepts that God's aseity is entailed by his necessary existence, must also accept that Gods aseitv is comprehensible: i f not~ he must be prepared to accept that the theist ic argument in question is not comprehensible, since it is the basis of his belief in God's aseitv.

Hartshorne, whose other claim to fame is his resuscitation of the ontological ar~umen% ought to f ind this line of ar,~ument acceptable. Unfortunately this is not the case. For ~artshorne wants to say that God's self-existence is unknowable insofar as i t is an at t r ibute of his abstract pole (MVG9 pp.132-133). But if God's essence (what he is) is identical with his existence (that he is)~ as Hartshorne claims (at least in re~ard to God's abstract existence), then we must be able to make analol~ical extrapolations from God's concrete Dole to his abstract pole, and vice-versa, l ] However~ ~iven that God's concrete pole is comprehensible to us, i t follows that God's abstract pole is likewise comprehensible to us, assumin~ the viaSil ity of such analogical extrapolations. God's self-existence~ then, wil l be comprehensible to us~ contrary to what Hartshorne says. The implication~ drawn here~ that

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God's abstract aspect is knowable i f such extrapolations can be made, is one that Hartshorne can hardly accept. To do so would necessitate a substantial revision of his conception of the relat ion between the two aspects of deity, in either of the following two directions.

Given that God's abstract aspect is unknowable while his concrete aspect is knowable (as Hartshorne maintains), and that analogical inferences are possible from one pole to the other (as he a~ain maintains);, then, ei ther (a) God's abstract asl)ect must in principle be knowable (contrary to what Hartshorne says), or (b) God's concrete aspect must somehow be unknowable (again contrary to what Hartshorne says). Obviously, neither alternative is acceptable to Hartshorne. The problem, i t seems to me, is caused by the impl ic i t ly ant i thet ical way in which Hartshorne sets up his dual-aspect (dipolar) conception of deity. Thus, i f GodWs abstract aspect consists of a set E of (essential) properties, then his concrete aspect consists of a set ~ of properties that are the complements of those belonging to E. For example, i f the property ]s im mutable is entailed by E, then the complement of this property, ]s mutable, is entailed by E, and so on for the other divine attr ibutes. This has led some philosophe[~, to say that dipolar theism is sel f -contradictory." -z These philosophers may be over-hasty in makin~ this claim but the fact remains that Hartshorne must provide a more satisfactory account of the relation between the two poles of deity i f be is to explicate the notion of divine self-existence in terms of a formulation like (C).

The thrust of our argument is that God's self-existence must in some sense be intelligible to us- we are constrained to characterize this attribute in experientially available terms. Interestingly enough, Hartshorne has an argument for God's self-existence wh ich attempts to meet this desideration. Hartshorne starts off this argument by defining God as a heinz who "can in the full sense be

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worshipped,,.t3 He then argues that a bein~ who is not sel f -ex is tent is not deservin~ of worship in the fu l l sense, and that God must therefore be sel f -existent i f he is to be worthy of our worship. This argument is problemat ic in two aspects. First~ J.N. Findlay, in his famous ' refutat ion ' of the ontological argument, accepts a similar def in i t ion but derives a radical ly d i f fe rent conclusion, viz. that God does not exist, let alone exist a se . l# He does this by ar~uin~ that i t is ( logical ly) impossible for any beinl~ to meet the specif icat ions of a bein~ who "can in the fu l l sense be worshipped". This leaves us wi th the problem of decidin~ who is r ight, which means that Hartshorne~s Var~ument f rom worship v wi l l reeuire an auxi l iary argument to adjudicate in the dispute between him and Findlayo Hopeful ly, i t w i l l resolve the issue in his favour. Even so the fac t wi l l remain that the 'argument f rom worship I cannot stand on i ts own. Second, i t does not look as i f our acts of worship real ly enable us to confer the a t t r i bu te o f sel f -existence on God. A f te r all, human beings have worshipped ent i t ies know~ not to be sel f -existent, l ike the sun and the moon. ' >

Accordin~ to dipolar the ism, God's se l f - ex i s t ence is an a t t r i bu t e of his abs t r ac t aspect: it does not belon~ to his c o n c r e t e aspect . For the remainder of this paper we will consider some of the implicat ions of this thesis . Underlyin~ this thesis is the dipolar theis t ' s presupposit ion tha t a to ta l ly se l f -ex i s t en t de i ty cannot r e l a t e and respond to his c rea t ion , since he cannot be a f f e c t e d by his c r e a t u r e s in any real way. There a re numerous s t a t e m e n t s f rom Hartshorne 's writ ings which asser t not only this, but also tha t we in some way add to, or aual ify, God's exis tence:

We a re not simply co -c rea to r s , with God, of the world, but in the last analysis co -c rea to r s , with him, of himself . (NT, p . I I3)

2"/

God is 'the world' understood9 the world is 'God' understood. ( M vc, p.339)

...we influence God by our exneriences but do not thereby deprive him of freedom in his response tous. (DR9 p.l/41)

We perpetually create content not only in ourselves but in God also. l~

In contrast to the point of view expressed in these statements9 here are some representative views of theists in the classical t radi t ion:

The relation between God and his creatures is a whol ly one-sided relat ion, in that while the creation del~ends absolutely upon God~ God in no sense depends upon his creation. God would be neither more nor less perfect i f the creation dissolved into u t te r nothingness. The absolute perfect ion of perfect beinR would st i l l exist. 17

If we admit any dependence of God upon the world~ the very basis of the arRuments by which we have been led to him is destroyed; a ' f i rst cause' who is not self-suff icient explains nothing. I 8

God Himse l f in His being for Himself is t he one being who s tands in need of nothin~ else. . , lq

.,,God stands beyond all the Rreat powers of nature and history and of national and s~)iritual l ife. 20

I t must be emphasised that Hartshorne's dipolar theism is not opposed to the above views in an absolute sense. He aRrees wi th th~se descriptions of what GodVs self-existence entailsy but insists at the same t ime that they apply or~/9 to the abstract pole of deity. God has other at tr ibutes which make him a vastly di f ferent beinR from the one depicted in the

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a b o v e c l a s s i ca l Chr i s t i an t h e i s t a ccoun t s . God~ accordinl~ to Har tshorne~ is not to be c h a r a c t e r i z e d p u r e l y in t e r m s of his a b s t r a c t a s t t r i h u t e s . Thus t h e God who is c o m p l e t e l y s e l f - s u f f i c i e n t and a u t o n o m o u s is a lso t h e God who is for us, who (accord in~ to Chr i s t i an i ty ) sen t his only b e g o t t e n Son to save us. He is t he God who has an inf in i te c o n c e r n fo r our sa lvat ion; t he one ,vho is, in ~Vhitehead's f a m o u s l~hrase~ " the ~ r e a t compan ion - t he f e l l ow-su f f e r e r~ who u n d e r s t a n d g ' . If we a c c e p t Ha r t sho rne ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i o n of the Chr i s t i an God~ then we mus t in s o m e min imal sense a c c e p t t h a t our c o n c e p t i o n of this being c a n n o t be the one ~iven by Hanson~ Mascall~ Ba r th and Bul tmann: th is bein~ mus t , in a way not as y e t snecif ied~ l~e ab l e t o invo lve h imse l f in t h e de s t i n i e s of his c r e a t u r e s , and he mus t possess a t t r i b u t e s c o n s o n a n t wi th t he v i ew t h a t he can be so involved . Nar tshorne~ the re fo re~ asks us to s ee God not only as an a b s o l u t e and in f in i t e beinl~ bu t a lso one who is s u p r e m e l y rela t ive~ who is bo th a b s t r a c t and c o n c r e t e . This no t ion o f a God who is bo th s u b j e c t i v e and ob jec t ive~ a b s t r a c t and concre te~ f inds express ion in t h e followin~ passage :

None but God...can be inf in i te ly oassive~ the endurer of all chan~e~ the adventurer through all novelty9 the companion through all vicissitudes. He is the auditor of all speech who should be heard because he has heard~ and who should chan~e our hearts because in every iota of our history we have chan~ed his. Unchangeably right and adequate is his manner of chan~in~ in and with all thin~s~ and unchangeably immortal are all changes~ once they have occurred~ in the never darkened expanse of his memory~ the treasure house of all fact and attained value. (MVA~ p.2~X)

If we accept the notion of deity portrayed in this passaRe, then we cannot agree with Mascall's contention that "a ~first cause' who is not

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self-suff icient explains nothinff". Implicit ~4ascall's position is the fo]lo~,ing argument:

in

( l ) God is a PB ( P e r f e c t Being). (2) A PB is an u n l i m i t e d be ing . (3) A be ing t h a t d e p e n d s on o t h e r be ings is a

l i m i t e d be ing , (/~) T h e r e f o r e God c a n n o t d e p e n d on o t h e r

beings. (19 2, 3)

It should be emphasised that Hartshorne does not say that any of ( l ) - (4) expl ic i t ly contradicts the other. Rather he says that a contradict ion can be deduced from (l) - (4) only i f we add the following premises to this argument:

(5) A PB is a loving bein~. (6) A loving being wil l depend on the beings

that i t loves.

(5) and (~), together with (I) , contradict (4), the conclusion of ~ascall 's impl ic i t argument. I t follows, accordin~ to Hartshorne, that a being can depend on other beinl~s and not be l imited as a consequence. Hartshorne's aim here is to show that the conception of God as a ]ovin~ being is not compatible with the conception of him ~ ac~L-us purus (a conceptio n that permeates ( l ) - (4)). ~l God, then, is not an ac~us purum he is a dependent, and hence a mutabl% being.

A t this point, the classical Christian theist can raise the following objection to the line of argument pursued by Hartshorne: i f God is a dependent being, how are we to d i f ferent iate him from other dependent (i.e. creaturely) beings? Hartshorne answers this question by way of a novel reinterpretat ion of the notion of God as Perfect Being. According to this reinterpretat ion, God s a Perfect BeinR, but only in the sense that he cannot be surnassed by any other being. ?? This allows the possibility that God can surpass h imse l f . Creaturely

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beings are in no sense necessary to God's existence; to this extent God is self-suff ic ient. Rut God depends on his creatures in order to surpass himself. However, the classical theist can persist with his objections by askin~ the .following question: why should God want to surpass himself? If he is (already) perfect, .why should he not rest content with his perfection? Hartshorne's answer is that God does not necessarily have to surpass himself - he is already unsurpassable by others, so whatever we do as his creatures we cannot detract from his self-suff iciency. Instead, God surpasses himself because his decision to do so is the outcome of an act of free choice. He does so, accordine to Hartshorne, because his bein~ perfect entails that he be receptive to change, and not static; that he be creative, and hence possess potential, which precludes him from beinR an aceua puz'u~ that he be responsive to his creatures, and not independent of them; that his omnipotence implies his power to chan~.e events~ and to chanl~e wi th such chans and so on. [n a word, a Perfect Bein~ cannot be static~ since its abi l i ty to respond to chan~ing events requires i t to be dynamic: the God who knows, loves9 wil ls, and creates, cannot be "the one bein~ who stands in need of nothing else". (13arth)

The classical theist t radi t ion, on Hartshorne's view~ adopts a theological metaphysics of static perfect ion as a result of the emphasis i t places on the idea that God is a transcendent real i ty. Thus transcendence is thought to necessitate a conception of deity as one who is mysterious, unicluely other, to ta l ly independent~ and wholly beyond the scope of human comprehension. Hartshorne, as was pointed out earl ier, does not ent i rely discard the notion of deity as transcendent real i ty. Rather he prefers to construe i t in terms of divine super-eminence or superiority~ which manifests i tself in the form of incomparability~ unrivaledness and uniaueness. A theological metaphysics of stat ic perfect ion is thought to engender a dualistic conception of

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real i ty. On the one hand, we have the t ranscendent component of this real i ty , which is what theologians standardly refer to ','.'hen they speak of God. On the other hand, we have the Lntza-mundane (or immanent) component of this real i ty, i.e. the realm of creation. To preserve the alleged ' inf in i te qualitative' di f ference between the two realms, classical theists usually resort to the strateRy of characterizing the two realms in terms of mutual ly exclusive properties. In this way a dichotomous conception of rea l i ty is set up. The theoret ical instrument of this strategy is the ~a negat~va, accordin~ to which the properties we ascribe to the transcendent realm (God) must be understood in terms of the negat ions of the properties we standardly ascribe to the immanent realm (God's creation). Or as Vladimir Lossky puts it:

The negative way of the knowledge of God is an ascendant undertakin~ of the mind that proAressivelv el iminates all positive attr ibutes of the obiect i t wishes to attain, in order to culminate f inal ly in a kind of apprehension by supreme i~norance of Him who cannot be an obiect of knowled~e... i t is an intel lectual experience of the mind's fai lure when confronted wi th somethin~ beyond the conceivable. In fact, consciousness of the fai lure of human understanding, constitutes an element common to all that we can call apophas~s, or negative theology, whether this ar)oDhasis remains within the l imits of intellection, simoly declaring the radical lack of correspondence between our mind and the real i ty i t wishes to attaint or whether i t wishes to surpass the l imi ts of understanding, imDartinE to the i~norance of what God is in ~4is inaccessible nature the va!ue Of a mystical knowledee superior to the intel lect . . . 23

Thus, negative theology nromotes a tendency to conceive of real i ty in dualistic terms: if a dual

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belonp.s to one of the two realms~ then its counterpart is excluded from this realm, and must corresDondinRly be]on~ to the other realm. Nartshorne is OPPosed tO this tendency~ and to negative theology ~enerally. This opposition is ref lected in his Princinle of r~iDolaritv, the fundamental principle of his nhilosonhical theology. This principle, while acknowled~in~ the distinctness of the two realms, nevertheless holds that real i ty can only be rendered intel l i~ible by an attenuated dualism, i.e. a dipolar metaphysics. ?~

The t ime has now come for us to summarize our conclusions. The main conclusion we have arr ived a t is t ha t al though both dipolar and c lass ical (monopolar) theism hold God to be se l f -ex is ten t , they d isagree on the c ruc ia l issue of what God's possession of this a t t r i b u t e implies. Thus, classical rl, hristian the i s t s maintain t ha t his se l f -ex i s t ence entai ls t ha t he is an ut ter ly transcendent9 absolute and independent being. Nartshorne~ and process theists in Reneral, however~ take the ODposinR view that divine self-existence is compatible wi th God's hein~ dependent upon his creatures - self-existence is a property of God's abstract aspect, and his dependence upon his creatures can be manifested in terms of his concrete aspect. This, of course, places the onus of Hartshorne's conception of this at t r ibute on the relat ion between God's abstract and concrete aspects. This relat ion we have found to be problematic. r any acceptance of Hartshorne's conception of this at t r ibute must be predicated on the assumption that a satisfactory account of the relat ion between the two aspects of dei ty wi l l be forthcoming. Aut unti l i t can be shown that such an account wi l l not be forthcomin~ because of some radical incoherence in process theism, we have no reason for denyine that Nartshorne's (and process theology's) conception of this at t r ibute is at least as plausible as the one to be found in a representative group of classical Ohristian theists.

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Footnotes

I. ~or ~X/hitehead, see his Re2igion in the Making, Cambridge ~tniversi ty Press, 19~2~: Process ann R e a l i t ~ Cambridge l!niversi tv Press, ]g?9: and A d v e n t u r e s o f Idea~ C'ambridlze t Tniversity Press, 1933. Hartshorne 's works will he listed as this essay develops. ~ ~eneral conspect~s of process theology, f rom the standpoint of its adherents , is to be found in r~ l%rown, Q.I=.. 3ames and G. Reeves (eds.), Proces s Philosopbv and Chris t ian Thought , I%obbs-Merrill, Ntew York, 1971. In this essay we shall re~ard Har tshorne as the s tandard represen ta t ive of process theology, and all our cluotations on its behalf will be taken from his writings.

2. In referrinl~ to 'classical Christ ian theism' we do not mean to imply tha t t he r e is a common body of doct r ine tha t unites the theologians of this t radi t ion. Never the less , the r ep re sen ta t ive theologians of this t radi t ion assent to the proposition tha t God is t h e omnipotent , omniscient , moral ly p e r f e c t c r e a t o r of the universe, wh% in addition, Dossesses one or more of the followin~ metaphys ica l a t t r ibu tes - se l f -exis tence , necessary ex i s t ence ( somet imes re~arded as the logical consectuence of se l f -exis tence) , infinity, unity~ e t e rn i ty , immutabi l i ty , impassibili ty and simplici ty. It is the common assent to this proposition which links theologians of such cont ras t in~ views as, say, Aquinas and Pascal, or Calvin and Teilhard de Chardin.

3. 'The One God', in The Teachincl of the Catholic Church, New York, ~acmi l lan , 1956, vol. l, D.79.

~. The Divine Re la t i v i t y : A Soc ia l Concep t ion o f God, N~ew Haven, Conn: Yale f tniversitv Press~ 19#8, p. xviii. ~ e r e i n a f t e r r e fe r r ed to as DR.

5. La R e c h e r c h e d%ne p r e m i e r e ver i tY , r>.lt~7: excerp t s in C. Nar tshorne and W.L. Deese (eds.), Phi losophers Speak o f God, Chica~o l lniversitv Press, 1953. ~ v e m p h a s e s .

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5. This claim is examined more ful ly in my unpublished Ph.1~. thesis, The Abst ract God, Birmingham ! Iniversitv, 1975.

7. DR, D.87. See also Man's Vision of God, l-lamDden, Corm: Archon, lq6~t~, DD.r ]07, 132, 2~#f f . Hereinafter referred to as MVG.

g. I t should be noted here that we are talkin~ of the religious experience of theists, i.e. believers in a deity, because i t is perfect ly possible to have experiences that can be described as 'relil~ious' and st i l l not believe in a deitv.

9. The Varieties of Religious Experience~ London, Lon~mans, 1959, r)p./435-zr

]0. Concepts o f Deity, London: ~acmil lan, 1971, p.16.

I I. Hartshorne suggests a way in which such extrapolations can be made in MVG, D.239.

] 2. See for instanmce Owen, pp. ci t . , DP.~? ff . 13. A Natural Theoloqq for our Time, La Salle,

Illinois, Open Court, 19~:7, p./~. ~ereinafter referred to as NT.

I/4. 'Can God's Fxistence be r~isproved?', M/n~ 57 (19Ida), pp. ] 08 -118 .

15. On this point see Ninian Smart, The Concept o f Woz~hAl~ London, Macmillan, 1977.

lG. 'The God of l~elil~ion and the God of Philosophy' in G.N.A. Vesev (ed~, Talk o f God, London, ~4 acmillan, 19Gq, D. 157-I ~7. f4ereinafter referred to as o, R.

17. Prebendary Hanson, quoted in F.L. ~ascall, //e Who~% London, Lonl~mans Green, ]9a5, pD.95-9r

I~. ~ascal], OD. t i t . , D.q~;. 19. Karl l%arth, Church Doqmatics, l:dinbur~h:

~'.&T. Clark, 19"~6-, vol. I!, D.~58. 20. Rudolf Bultmann, Faith an4 Existence, London,

l=ontana, 1973, p.20G. 21. Wor more on this incompatibi l i ty see GR and ~.

~arley, The Transcendence OF GoB, Philadelphia, ~restminster Press, IgG0, D. ] 3 I.

22. See MVG, D./~6~; NT~ DO.18 ff, 71, and I79. 23. In the Image and Likeness of God, London and

(qxford, ~owbrays, 1975, p.l 3.

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~ar tshorne ' s c r i t ique of unmodified dualism paral lels in some respec ts the cr i t ique ~iven by philosophers in the non-dualist Vedanta t radi t ion. Professor .1.ohn ~ ick has drawn mv a t ten t ion , in conversa t ion, to cer ta in a f f in i t ies tha t exist be tween ~ar t shorne ' s metaphys ics and the thous of Sankara~ the fo remos t DhilosoDher in the t radi t ion of non-dualist Vedanta. However , it must be borne in mind tha t ~ankara c r i t i c ized dualism from the DersDective of an abso lu te monist~ whereas l-lartshorne is a lways a qualified dualist: he never abolishes the dis t inct ion be tween the two realms of reat i tv . On Sankara% absolu te monism see ~ .C . Zaehner , Concordant Discord: the Interdependence of Faiths, (~xford l lniversity Dress, 1970, DD.93, q~, 157and 15~.

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