the senior marine commanders the surrender... · was given command of the 5th marines which he led...

The Senior Marine Commandershe three senior Marine commanders on Kyushuwere seasoned combat veterans and well versedin combined operations—qualities that enhanced

Marine Corps contributions to the complex occupationduties and relations with the U.S. Sixth Army.

Major General Harry Schmidt commanded VAmphibious Corps. Schmidt was 59, a native ofHoldrege, Nebraska, and a graduate of Nebraska StateNormal College. He was commissioned in 1909 and in1911 reported to Marine Barracks, Guam. Following aseries of short tours in the Philippines and at state-sideposts, he spent most of World War I on board ship.Interwar assignments included Quantico, Nicaragua,Headquarters Marine Corps, and China, where heserved as Chief of Staff of the 2d Marine Brigade.Returning to Headquarters in 1938, Schmidt first servedwith the Paymaster's Department and then as assistantto the Commandant. In 1943, he assumed command ofthe 4th Marine Division which he led during the Roi-Namur and Saipan Campaigns. Given the command ofthe V Amphibious Corps a year later, he led the unitduring the assault and capture of Tinian and Iwo Jima.For his accomplishment during the campaigns, Schmidtreceived three Distinguished Service Medals. Orderedback to the United States following occupational dutiesin Japan, he assumed command of the Marine Trainingand Replacement Command, San Diego. GeneralSchmidt died in 1968.

Major General LeRoy P. Hunt commanded the 2dMarine Division. Hunt was 53, a native of Newark,New Jersey, and a graduate of the University ofCalifornia. He was commissioned a second lieutenantin 1917 and served with great distinction with the 5th

MajGen Harry Schmidt

22

MajGen Leroy P. Hunt

Marines during World War I, receiving the Navy Crossand Distinguished Service Cross for repeated acts ofheroism. Postwar assignments were varied, rangingfrom sea duty to commanding officer of the WesternMail Guard Detachment and work with the WorkProjects Administration's Matanuska Colonization ven-ture in Alaska. Following a short tour in Iceland, he

MajGen Thomas E. Bourke

4,

¼

I

was given command of the 5th Marines which he led inthe seizure and defense of Guadalcanal. As the 2dMarine Division's assistant division commander heparticipated in mopping-up operations on Saipan andTinian and in the Okinawa Campaign. Appointed divi-sion commander, he led the division in the occupationof Japan and for a period was Commanding General, IArmy Corps. Returning to the United States, Huntassumed duties as Commanding General, Departmentof Pacific and then Commanding General, FMFLant.General Hunt died in 1968.

Major General Thomas E. Bourke commanded the5th Marine Division. Bourke was 49, a native ofRobinson, Maryland, and a graduate of St. JohnsCollege. He was commissioned in 1917 after service inthe Maryland National Guard along the Mexican bor-der. While enroute to Santo Domingo for his first tour,he and 50 recruits were diverted to St. Croix, becomingthe first U. S. troops to land on what had just become

the American Virgin Islands. Post-World War I toursincluded service at Quantico, Parris Island, San Diego,and Headquarters Marine Corps. He also served atPearl Harbo; was commanding officer of the LegationGuard in Managua, Nicaragua; saw sea duty on boardthe battleship West Virginia (BB 48); and commandedthe 10th Marines. Following the Guadalcanal andTarawa campaigns, General Bourke was assigned as theV Amphibious Corps artillery officer for the invasion ofSaipan. He next trained combined Army-Marineartillery units for the XXIV Army Corps, then preparingfor the Leyte operation. With Leyte secured, heassumed command of the 5th Marine Division whichwas planning for the invasion of Japan. After the war'ssudden end, the division landed at Sasebo, Kyushu,and assumed occupation duties. With disbandment ofthe 5th Marine Division, General Bourke becameDeputy Commander and Inspector General of FMFPac.General Bourke died in 1978.

Okinawa, distributed to variousNavy and Marine Corps activitiesin Japan, or shipped to Guam onthe carrier Point Cruz (CVE 119).Prior to being hoisted on board,the planes made the shore to shipmovement by Japanese bargeequipped with a crane and operat-ed by a Japanese crew. It wasreported with amazement that"not a single plane was scra-tched." A small number of obso-lete planes were stricken and theirparts salvaged. On 20 June, the737 remaining officers and men ofMAG-31, led by LieutenantColonel John P. Condon, boardedthe attack transport San Saba(APA-232) and sailed for SanDiego. The departure of MAG-31marked the end of Marine occupa-tion activities in northern Japan.

In the period immediately fol-lowing the conclusion of theLuzon Campaign, the U.S. SixthArmy, under the command ofGeneral Walter Krueger, wasengaged in planning and prepar-ing for the invasion of Kyushu, thesouthernmost Japanese homeisland. The operation envisionedan assault by three Army corps

and one Marine amphibiouscorps, totaling 11 Army and threeMarine divisions, under the com-mand of General Krueger. Aftermore than three years, the majorland, sea, and air components ofthe Central and Southwest Pacificforces were to merge in the initialground assault against Japanitself.

In early August, with thedestruction of Hiroshima and theSoviet Union's entry into the war,the possibility of an early surren-der increased. Although planningfor the invasion continued,General MacArthur directedKrueger to also plan and preparefor the occupation of Kyushu andwestern Honshu should theJapanese Government capitulate.General Krueger's initial plan forthe occupation called for VAmphibious Corps, commandedby Major General Harry Schmidt,to land the 2d and 5th MarineDivisions in the Sasebo-Nagasakiarea on 4 September. These land-ings were to be reinforced later bya 3d Marine Division seaborne oroverland movement to theFukuoka-Shimonoseki area. Maj-or General Innis P. Swift's I Corps,consisting of the 25th, 33d, 98th,and 6th Infantry Divisions, was to

23

land three days later in theWakayama area of western Hon-shu and establish control over theOsaka-Kyoto-Kobe area. The XCorps, composed of the 41st and24th Infantry Divisions and com-manded by Major GeneralFranklin C. Sibert, was scheduledto land in the Kure-Hiroshimaarea of western Honshu and onthe island of Shikoku on 3

October.On 14 August, the Sixth Army

assumed operational control of VAmphibious Corps. After receiv-ing official word of Japaneseacceptance of the surrenderdemands the following day, theCorps' three divisions wereinformed that they should be pre-pared for an occupational landingin early September, and that "allunits were to be combat loadedand alerted to the possibility ofappreciable resistance to the occu-pation." The Fifth Fleet, underAdmiral Raymond A. Spruance,would be responsible for collect-ing, transporting, and landing VCorps and other scattered ele-ments of Krueger's army. Becauseof the wide dispersion of assaultshipping and the magnitude of the

• minesweeping problem, the fleetcould not move major units to

vice chief locate a point under discussion.

their targets simultaneously andlanding dates would thereforehave to be postponed.

At the time of surrender therewere an estimated 20,000 alliedprisoners of war in Kyushu andwestern Honshu. Sixth Armyplanners contemplated that recov-ery teams composed of American,Australian, and Dutch representa-tives would accompany the occu-pational forces and immediatelyevacuate prisoners in their respec-tive zones. Following the surren-der, the Japanese virtually freed allAllied prisoners by turning theprison camps over to them andallowing them freedom of move-ment. Taking full advantage of thesituation, many former prisonersroamed the countryside at will,creating a situation that called foran immediate change in plans.

With the landing of the firstAmerican forces in Japan at theend of August, it became apparentthat the evacuation of all Alliedprisoners of war "must receivefirst priority as many of them were

in poor physical condition." Therevised Sixth Army plan allowedthe Eighth Army to extend itsevacuation program to the westand to evacuate prisoners throughOsaka to Tokyo until relieved byFifth Fleet and Sixth Army units.Prisoners on Shikoku were to beferried across the Inland Sea to themainland and then transported byrail through Osaka to Tokyo. TheFifth Fleet and Sixth Army imme-diately organized two evacuationforces consisting of suitable land-ing craft, hospital ships, trans-ports, Army contact teams, truckcompanies, and Navy medicalpersonnel. One force, under thecommand of Rear Admiral RalphS. Riggs, landed at Wakayama on11 September and by the 15th hadcompleted the processing of allprisoners in western Honshu, atotal of 2,575 men. The otherforce, commanded by RearAdmiral Frank G. Fahrion, landedat atom-bombed Nagasaki, afterFifth Fleet mine sweepers hadcleared the way, and by 22

24

September had evacuated all 9,000remaining prisoners on Kyushu.

Preliminary examination re-vealed that there were no seriousepidemics in the camps except fora few cases of typhoid and dysen-tery. Malnutrition was commonand the most serious cases ofberiberi and tuberculosis requiredimmediate hospitalization. Theinitial processing revealed manyinstances of brutality. However, asit was reported at the time, "closequestioning often disclosed thatthe prisoners had been guilty ofbreaking some petty but strictprison rule. A considerable num-ber of the older men stated thatthe camp treatment, althoughextremely rugged, was on thewhole not too bad. They expectedquick punishment when caughtfor infraction of rules and got it.All complained of the food, cloth-ing, housing, and lack of heatingfacilities." Except for a few strag-glers, the release, medical exami-nation, delousing, processing, andscreening of Allied prisoners ofwar in southern Japan was com-pleted on 23 September.

While the Eighth Army extend-ed its hold over northern Japan,and the two evacuation forcesrounded up and processed Alliedprisoners, preparations for theSixth Army's occupation of west-ern Honshu, Shikoku, andKyushu continued. The occupa-tion area contained 55 percent ofthe total Japanese population,including half of the JapaneseArmy garrisoning the homeland,three of Japan's four major navalbases, all but two of its principalports, two-thirds of all Japanesecities with a population in excessof 100,000, and three of its fourmain transportation centers. Theisland of Kyushu, which was to belargely a Marine occupationresponsibility, supported a popu-lation of 10,000,000 spreadamongst its 15,000 square miles of

National Archives Photo 127-N-139194

In a conference held on board the Mt. McKinley prior to the landing, BGen WilliamW. Rogers, V Amphibious Corps Chief of Staff, left, stresses a point to his interpreter,Maj F. D. Wolf, as RAdm Keichi Ishii, Chief of Staff of Sasebo Naval Station and his

mountainous terrain. The south-ern and eastern parts of the islandwere chiefly agricultural areas,producing large quantities ofexportable rice and sweet pota-toes. The northwestern half of theisland contained almost all ofsouthwestern Japan's coal fields,the nation's greatest pig iron andsteel district, and many importantshipyards, in addition to a host ofother smaller industries.

On 1 September, Major GeneralHarry Schmidt opened his com-mand post on board the Mt.McKinley (AGC 7), flagship ofAmphibious Group 4, off Maui inthe Hawaiian Islands and sailed tojoin the 5th Division convoy,already enroute to Saipan. Theremainder of V Corps' troops,including several Army engineeraugmentation units, with theexception of rear echelons, contin-ued loading and, on 3 September,

Marines of the 8th Service Regimentcrowd the rail of their transport as its tiesup to the dock at Sasebo Naval Base.


departed Hawaii for Saipan onboard 17 LSTs. Schmidt's forcesalso carried more than 300 tons of"Military Government" or reliefsupplies consisting of rice, soybeans, fats and oils, salt, cannedfish, and medical equipment.

During the voyage to Saipanplanning for the occupation con-tinued in light of changes to theoriginal concept of operationsallowed by favorable reports ofJapanese compliance with surren-der terms in northern Japan andalterations in the troop list.However, every effort was madeto salvage as much as possible ofthe content of the Olympic plansfor the assault landing. On 5September, the 3d Marine Divisionwas deleted from the Corps' occu-pation force and the 32d InfantryDivision substituted. To guardagainst possible treachery on thepart of thousands of Japanesetroops on bypassed islands in theCentral Pacific, the Navy taskedthe 3d Division, then on Guam,with preparing for any such even-tuality. Meanwhile, the 2d MarineDivision and additional Corpsunits began loading in theMarianas. "Someone at higherheadquarters apparently made agross error," noted LieutenantColonel Jacob G. Goldberg, thedivision's logistics officer. "Forthe first time since the war beganwe were assigned enough ship-ping to lift the entire division, andby entire division I mean 100%personnel and equipment. VACwas very much surprised that wewere able to do this, and I freelyadmit it was a hell of a nervousstrain on me up until the last shipwas loaded."

Early on the morning of 13September, the various transportgroups rendezvoused at Saipan.The 2d Marine Division almostwas loaded and the 32d InfantryDivision on Luzon was preparingto move to staging areas at

25

Lingayen for loading on turn-around shipping of the 5th MarineDivision. Because of continuingindications that the landingswould be unopposed, the numberof air and fire support shipsassigned to accompany the trans-port groups was reduced.

The following day, GeneralSchmidt held a conference of hissubordinate commanders onboard the Mt. McKinley to clarifyplans for the operation. Hestressed "the importance of main-taining firm, just, and dignifiedrelations with the Japanese .

[and] responsibilities of comman-ders of all echelons in followingthe rules of land warfare and thedirectives of higher authority."

In view of the cooperative atti-tude of the Japanese thus far, per-mission was requested and grant-ed to send advance parties toNagasaki and Sasebo. Their mis-sions were "to facilitate smoothand orderly entry of U. S. forcesinto the Corps zone of responsibil-ity by making contact with keyJapanese civil and military author-ities; to execute advance spotchecks on compliance with demil-itarization orders; and to ascertainsuch facilities for reception of ourforces as condition and suitabilityof docks and harbors; adequacy ofsites selected by map-reconnais-sance for Corps installations; con-dition of airfields, roads, and com-munications."

The first party, led by ColonelWalter W. Wensinger, VAC opera-tions officer, and consisting of keyCorps and 2d Division staff offi-cers flew via Okinawa toNagasaki, arriving on 16 Septem-ber. A second party of similarcomposition, but with underwaterdemolition teams and 5th Divisionpersonnel attached, left for Saseboby high speed transport on 15th.After meeting with local officials,spot checking coastal defenses,and arranging for suitable bar-

racks, warehouse, and commandpost sites, Colonel Wensinger andhis staff proceeded by destroyer toSasebo where they made prelimi-nary arrangements for the 5thDivision's arrival. On 20 Septem-ber, the second reconnaissanceparty arrived at Sasebo where itwas met by Wensinger's party,and completed preparations forthe landing.

At dusk on 16 September,Transport Squadron 22 bearing theCorps headquarters and 5thMarine Division slipped out ofTanapag Harbor bound forSasebo. The landing ships carry-ing elements of the 2d MarineDivision left Saipan for Nagasakithe next day. During the eventfulvoyages, Marines receivedrefresher training in military disci-pline and courtesy and got theirinitial briefs on the Japanese peo-ple, customs, and geography.

Early on 22 September, thetransport squadron carrying Maj-or General Thomas E. Bourke's 5thMarine Division and corps head-quarters troops arrived off SaseboHarbor. They were met byColonel Wensinger and membersof the advance party together with

Japanese pilots who were to guidethe ships into their assignedberthing and docking areas. Theadvance party representativeswere transferred to their respec-tive unit command ships wherethey made their reports whichrequired changes in billetingplans, making it necessary that 3dBattalion, 26th Marines remainafloat. At 0859, after Japanesepilots had directed the transportsto safe berths in Sasebo's innerharbor, the 26th Marines, less the3d Battalion, landed on beaches atthe naval air station. Advancingrapidly inland, the Marinesmoved to areas tentatively select-ed at Saipan from aerial pho-tographs and verified by theadvance party. Unarmed Japanesenaval guards on base installations,arms, and stores were relievedand Japanese guides arranged forby the advance party directed theMarines to pre-selected billetingareas. Ships carrying other ele-ments of the division then movedto the Sasebo docks to begin gen-eral unloading. The shore party,reinforced by the 2d Battalion,28th Marines, was ashore by 1500and began cargo unloading opera-

26

tions which continued throughoutthe night.

The remainder of the 28thMarines, in division reserve,remained on board ship. The 1stBattalion, 27th Marines landed onthe docks in late afternoon andmoved out to occupy the regi-ment's assigned zone of responsi-bility. During the afternoon,Generals Bourke, Schmidt, andKrueger inspected the occupa-tion's progress with tours of thenaval station, city of Sasebo, andnaval air station. Before troopunloading was suspended atdusk, 1st and 2d Battalions, 13thMarines had landed on beaches inthe aircraft factory area; 5th TankBattalion had come ashore at theair station; and the assistant divi-sion commander and his staff hadestablished an advanced divisioncommand post at the SaseboFortress. The main division com-mand post remained afloat to con-trol unloading better. All unitsashore established guard postsand security patrols, but the divi-sion's first night in Japan wasuneventful.

Sasebo, the home of the thirdlargest naval base in Japan, was acity of more than 300,000 prior to29 June 1945. That day, the citysuffered its only B-29 raid of thewar which destroyed a large por-tion of the city's shopping andbusiness districts. The naval areawas largely undamaged. Morethan 60,000 were made homelessand approximately 1,000 peoplewere killed. The Marines sawvery few of the remaining 166,000inhabitants. "There wasn't adamn soul in town except thoseblack coated policemen," GeneralRay A. Robinson later noted, "andthere was one of those on everyintersection. There wasn't anotherperson in sight and it was veryeerie." The few policemen andnaval guards were described asbeing "acquiescent and docile

Department of Defense Photo (USMC) 140484

Marines move from the naval base into Sasebo. From Sasebo 5th Division would moveout into the countryside to ensure Japanese compliance with the surrender terms.

- - - ----r L'

____with little expression of emotionor show of interest."

The city was described asunbearable due to the stench ris-ing from refuse piled highthroughout. But as Bourke'sMarines began the arduous task ofcleaning up, Sasebo and the atti-tude of its inhabitants changed, asMarine Lieutenant Edwin L.Neville, Jr., later recalled:

Gradually young childrenwould appear as scouts to seewhat the American were upto. Tremendous propagandaby the Japanese governmentabout the treacherous Am-ericans who would kill, muti-late, torture and rape theJapanese population if theyever won the war hadinstilled fear in the Japanese,who were petrified. Whathappened blew away thesefears. The Marines gave thekids candy, chewing gum,food, whatever they hadinstantly at hand. Theyshowered them with loveand attention. The kids wentback and told their folks thatthese were the good guys.Gradually, the citizens of

Sasebo returned from thecountryside or from behindthe shutters of their housesthat still stood. . . . Moreover,many Japanese were starv-ing, and the Marines fedthem and gave them food toprepare at home. The changein attitude in a short periodof time was startling.On 23 September, as most of the

remaining elements of the 5thDivision landed and GeneralBourke set up his command postashore, sanitary squads preparedbilleting areas and patrols startedprobing the immediate country-side. Company C, 1st Battalion,27th Marines, was sent by amp-hibian trucks to Omura, about 22miles southeast of Sasebo, toestablish a security guard over theaircraft assembly facilities andrepair 2 training base "to preventfurther looting by Japs." Omura's5,000 by 4,000 foot, "cow-pasturevariety" airfield had been selectedas the base of Marine air opera-tions in southern Japan.

A reconnaissance party, led byColonel Daniel W. Torrey, com-manding officer of Marine AircraftGroup 22 (MAG-22), had landedand inspected the field on 12September, and the 600-manadvance echelon had flown infrom Chimu on Okinawa six dayslater. The echelon found a consid-erable number of enemy planesranging from beaten up"Willows," the Japanese version ofthe Boeing-Stearman Kaydettrainer, to combat aircraft consist-

National Archives Photo 127-N-135624Elements of the 1st Battalion, 27th Marines check their amphibious trucks followingthe six-and-a-half hour trip from Sasebo to secure Omura airfield. Later occupied byMAG-22, the airfield would become the main air base for southern Japan.

Two Marines of the 2d Battalion, 27th Marines, view the ruins of Sasebo while stand-ing guard on a hill overlooking the suburb of Tahjma.


27

-

--- —

t ;1flS-siL.r t'' -— r-

L

—S.;'-

4t:ing of "Jacks," "Georges," and"Zekes," all lacking just enoughparts to be inoperable. Twenty-one Corsairs of Marine FighterSquadron 113 reached Omura onthe 23d, after a two-day stop-overat Kanoya airfield on Kyushu dueto bad weather. The rest of thegroup's flight echelon, composed

of Marine Fighter Squadrons 314and 422 and Marine Night FighterSquadron 543, arrived before themonth was over. Each squadronwas assigned two hangars, one forstoring and servicing its planesand the other for quartering enlist-ed men and messing facilities.MAG-22's primary mission was

similar to that of MAG-31 atYokosuka—surveillance flights insupport of occupation operations.

As MAG-22 began flight opera-tions from Omura and the 5thDivision consolidated its hold onSasebo, the second major elementof Schmidt's amphibious corpslanded in Japan. The early arrivalof the ships of Transport Squadron12 at Saipan, coupled with effi-cient staging and loading, hadenabled planners to move the 2dMarine Division's landing dateforward three days. When reportswere received that the approachesto the originally selected landingbeaches were mined but thatNagasaki's harbor was clear, thedecision was made to land direct-ly into the harbor area. At 1300 on23 September, the 2d and 6thMarines, in full combat kit withfixed bayonets and full maga-zines, landed simultaneously onthe east and west sides of the har-bor. Nagasaski, as one Marineobserved, "can be described veryeasily: It is a filthy, stinking,wrecked hole, and the sooner weget out the better we'll all like it."


Marines of the 2d Division watch as a bulldozer clears an area for an LST to pull intoshore at Nagasaki on the second morning after the division arrived.

Fields of rubble greeted Marines as they made their way intocentral Nagasaki, site of the second atomic bom dropped on

Japan. The Nagasaki Medical Center was the only building leftstanding near ground zero.

Norman T. Hatch Collection, MCHC

28

——.4.

/-I)

Relieving the Marine detach-ments from the cruisers Biloxi (CL80) and Wichita (CA 45), whichhad been serving as securityguards for the prisoner of warevacuation operations, the tworegiments moved out swiftly tooccupy the city. Their secondobjective was to cordon off thearea devastated by the atomicbomb. As Lieutenant ColonelGeorge L. Cooper later recalled:"Ground zero appeared to havebeen a rather large sports stadium,and all of us were categoricallyordered to stay out of any placewithin pistol shot of this area. Theresult of this order was that every-body and his brother headeddirectly for ground zero as soon asthey could, and in no time at allhad picked the area clean of allmoveable objects." Later, ships.were brought alongside wharfsand docks to facilitate cargo han-dling, and unloading operationswere well under way by nightfall.A quiet calm ruled the city, augur-ing a peaceful occupation.

On 24 September, the rest ofMajor General LeRoy P. Hunt's 2dDivision landed. The 8th and 10th

Marines, the last of the division'sregiments to land, and MarineObservation Squadron (VMO) 2,passed through Nagasaki, movednortheast to Isahaya, and seizedcontrol of the area. Once it hadcompleted its movement intoNagasaki and Isahaya, the 2dMarine Division dispatched re-connaissance patrols to check theroad conditions from Isahayathrough Omuta to Kumamoto.The same day, the corps comman-der arrived from Sasebo bydestroyer to inspect the Nagasakiarea. General Schmidt had estab-lished his command post ashore atSasebo the previous day and takencommand of the two Marine divi-sions. The only other major alliedunit ashore on Kyushu, a rein-forced Army task force that wasoccupying Kanoya airfield in thesouthernmost part of the island,was transferred to GeneralSchmidt's command from the FarEastern Air Force on 1 October.This force, built around the 32dInfantry Division's 1St Battalion,127th Infantry, had flown intoKanoya on 3 September to securean intermediate airstrip for stag-

29

ing and refueling aircraft enroutefrom the Philippines and Okinawato Tokyo.

General Krueger, satisfied withthe progress of the occupation onKyushu, assumed command of allforces ashore at 1000 on 24September. The following day,Headquarters I Corps and the 33dInfantry Division, the first majorelements of Sixth Army's othercorps, arrived and began landingoperations at Wakayama. Head-quarters Sixth Army landed withMajor General Swift's troops andon the 27th opened at Kyoto. AtSasebo, Nagasaki, and Wakayama,there was ample evidence that theoccupation of southern Japanwould be bloodless.

Like the Marines and sailors ofGeneral Clement's command atYokosuka, those under the com-mand of General Schmidt expect-ed the worse. The only experiencemost had was in battle, duringwhich the Japanese often refusedto surrender and were annihilated.But like Clement's, Schmidt'sforces were amazed at what theyencountered. "We couldn't be-lieve the Japanese could previously

The 8th Marines, the last 2d Marine Division elements to land,passed through Nagasaki on 24 September and moved northeast

Norman T. Hatch Collection, MCHC

to Isahaya. Having seized control of the area the Marines raisethe Stars and Stripes.

•

30

Occupation duties included countrysidesurveillance patrols, supervising theinventory and destruction of ammuni-tion, weapons, and other war materiel,and keeping order, all to insure strictadherence to surrender terms.

When not on duty, Marines on Kyushueither "sacked out" in make-shift bar-racks, visited one of the many tea houseswhile on liberty in bombed-out Sasebo orNagasaki, organized basketball games, orattended a local Japanese wrestlingmatch.

31

fight so ferociously and then be socompletely subservient, without amurmur," Brigadier General Jo-seph L. Stewart later recalled. "Notonce did I see any Japanese whoacted or looked with disrespecttoward occupation forces . . . . Wewere overwhelmingly surprised bythe cooperative reception we hadfrom the Japanese."

The V Amphibious Corps zoneof occupation comprised the entireisland of Kyushu and YamaguchiPrefecture on the western tip ofHonshu. After the 2d and 5thMarine Divisions had landed,General Schmidt's general planwas for Major General Hunt's 2dMarine Division to expand southof the city of Nagasaki and assumecontrol of Nagasaki, Kumamoto,Miyazaki, and Kagoshima Pref-ectures. In the meantime, MajorGeneral Bourke's 5th MarineDivision was to expand east to theprefectures of Saga, Fukuoka,Oita, and Yamaguchi. Bourke'stroops were to be relieved in theFukuoka, Otia, and Yamaguchiareas with the arrival of sufficientelements of Major GeneralWilliam H. Gill's veteran 32dInfantry Division.

Preliminary plans for the occu-pation of Japan had contemplatedthe establishment of a formalallied military government, simi-lar to that in operation inGermany, coupled with the directsupervision of the disarmamentand demobilization of the Jap-anese Armed Forces. However,during the course of discussionswith enemy emissaries in Manila,radical modifications of theseplans were made "based on thefull cooperation of the Japaneseand [including] measures de-signed to avoid incidents whichmight result in renewed conflict."

Instead of instituting direct mil-

itary rule, occupation force com-manders were to supervise theexecution of the Supreme Com-mander for the Allied Powers'directives to the Japanese govern-ment, keeping in mind Mac-Arthur's policy of using, but notsupporting, the government.Enemy military forces were to bedisarmed and demobilized undertheir own supervision, and theprogressive occupation of as-signed areas by Allied troops wasto be accomplished as Japanesedemobilization was completed.The Japanese government and itsarmed forces were to shoulder thechief administrative and opera-tional burden of disarmament anddemobilization.

The infantry regiment, and divi-sion artillery operating as infantry,was to be "the chief instrument ofdemilitarization and control. Theentire plan for the imposition ofthe terms of surrender was basedupon the presence of infantry reg-iments in all the prefectures with-in the Japanese homeland."Within the Sixth Army zone, occu-pational duties were fairly stan-darized. The division of responsi-bilities was based upon theboundaries of the prefectures sothat the existing Japanese govern-mental structure could be used.The Sixth Army assigned a num-ber of prefectures to each corpsproportionate to the number oftroops available. The corps, inturn, assigned a specific numberof prefectures to a division.Regiments, usually, were givenresponsibility for a single prefec-ture. In the 5th Marine Divisionzone of responsibility, however,the size of certain prefectures, thelarge civilian population, and thetactical necessities of troopdeployment combined to forcemodifications of the generalscheme of regimental responsibili-ty for a single prefecture.

The regiment's method of car-

32

rying out its occupational missionvaried little between zones andunits whether Army or Marine.As a corps extended its zone ofresponsibility, advance parties,composed of specialized staff offi-cers from higher headquarters andthe unit involved, were sent intoareas to be occupied. Liaison wasestablished with local Japanesecivil and military authorities whoprovided the parties with infor-mation on transportation and har-bor facilities, inventories of armsand supplies, and the location ofdumps and installations. Withthis information in hand, the regi-ment then moved into a bivouacarea in or near its zone of respon-sibility. Reconnaissance patrolsconsisting of an officer and a riflesquad were sent out to verify thelocation of reported militaryinstallations and check inventoriesof war materiel and also to searchfor any unreported facilities andmateriel caches. The regimentalcommander then divided his zoneinto battalion areas, and battalioncommanders could, in turn, assigntheir companies specific sectors ofresponsibility. Sanitation detailspreceded the troops into the areasto oversee the preparation of bar-racks and messing facilities, sincemany of the installations to beoccupied were in a deplorablecondition and insect-ridden.

The infantry company orartillery battery thus became theworking unit which actuallyaccomplished the destruction ortransfer of war materiel and thedemobilization of Japanese ArmedForces. Company commanderswere empowered to seize militaryinstallations within the companyzone and, using Japanese militarypersonnel not yet demobilizedand laborers obtained through thelocal Japanese Home Ministry rep-resentative, either destroy or turnover to the Home Ministry allmateriel within the installation.

All war materiel was divided intofive categories and was to be dis-posed of according to SCAPOrdnance and Technical Divisiondirectives. The categories were:that to be destroyed or scrapped,such as explosives and armamentsnot needed for souvenirs or train-ing purposes; that to be used forallied operations, such as tele-phones, radios, and vehicles; thatto be returned to the JapaneseHome Ministry, which encom-passed food, fuel, clothing, lum-ber, and medical supplies; that tobe issued as trophies; and that tobe shipped to the United States astrophies or training gear.

The hazardous job of disposingof explosive ordnance was to behandled by the Japanese with aminimum of American supervi-sion. Explosives were eitherburned in approved areas, sealedin place if stored in tunnels, ordumped at sea—the latter beingthe preferred method. Because ofthe large quanitity of ammunitionto be disposed of on Kyushu, bothdivisions would experience diffi-culties. Japanese shipping was notavailable in sufficient strength for

dumping the ammunition at seaand the large ammunition could.not be blown up as there were nosuitable areas in which to detonateit safely. Metal items declared sur-plus were to be rendered ineffec-tive, by Japanese labor, and turnedover to the Japanese as scrap forpeacetime civilian uses. Fooditems and other nonmilitarystocks were to be returned to theJapanese for the relief of the localcivilian population.

While local police were giventhe responsibility of maintaininglaw and order and enforcingSCAP democratization decrees,Allied forces were to maintain aconstant surveillance over Jap-anese methods of government.Intelligence and military govern-ment personnel, working with theoccupying troops, were taskedwith stamping out any hint of areturn to militarism, looking forevidence of evasion or avoidanceof the surrender terms, and detect-ing and suppressing movementsconsidered detrimental to theinterests of allied forces. Knownor suspected war criminals wereto be apprehended and sent to

33

Tokyo for processing and possiblearraignment before an allied tri-bunal.

In addition, occupation forceswere responsible for insuring thesmooth processing of hundreds ofthousands of military personneland civilians returning fromJapan's now defunct Empire.Repatriation centers would beestablished at Kagoshima, Harionear Sasebo, and Hakata nearFukuoka. Each incoming soldieror sailor would be sprayed withDDT, examined and inoculated fortyphus and smallpox, providedwith food, and transported to hisfinal destination in Japan. Bothline and medical personnel wereassigned to supervise theJapanese-run centers. At the sametime thousands of Korean andChinese prisoners and conscriptlaborers had to be collected andreturned to their homelands. Inthe repatriation operations,Japanese vessels and crews wouldbe used to the fullest extent possi-ble to conserve Allied manpowerand allow for an accelerated pro-gram of postwar demobilization.

This pattern of progressive


BGen Ray A. Robinson, center left, his staff and other Allied offi- Fukuoka zone of occupation. A geisha house was taken over tocers meet with local officials before assuming control of the provide headquarters and billeting space for Robinson's troops.

Oldest Marine on Kyushu

The strangest story to come out of the division'soccupation of Northern Kyushu concerned aMarine, but not a member of the 5th Division. He

was 82-year-old Edward Zillig, who served as a Marineat the turn of the century.

Born in Switzerland, Zihig immigrated to the UnitedStates when he was three years old. Having somethingof a wonderlust, he joined the Marine Corps in 1888 atPhiladelphia. As a member of the Marine detachmenton board Commodore George Dewey's flagship, theUSFS Olympia, he headed the 12-man reconnaissancepatrol which landed in Manila bearing the surrenderterms. The group was fired upon, seven were killed,and Zillig with four others returned to the ship. For

bravery in battle in the Philippines, he was awarded theManila Bay Medal, also known as the "Dewey Medal."

Out of the Marine Corps, he served briefly with theAmerican Company of the Shanghai Volunteer Corpsand then as a clerk with the Chinese revenue depart-ment. He moved to Japan in 1927, eventually settling inNagasaki where he worked as a watchmaker. "For myown protection, or so they told me," he said, theJapanese moved him to a concentration camp near thecity at the outbreak of the war.

In the camp when the atomic bomb was dropped, helater gave this description of the city's ruin: "Greaterdestruction was never wrought by man. The exampleof human defeat by human initiative was never soforcibly expressed as at Nagasaki. It was horrible, itwas bloody. Yet at the same time, it was good, it wasmagnificent. It was the magnificance of a nation, deter-mined to remain free, no matter what the cost." Withthe city destroyed, Zillig was sent to the village of Ogi,near Saga, where a three-man intelligence patrol fromthe 2d Battalion, 27th Marines, found him in earlyOctober 1945.

Edward Zihig had two requests—that his $60-a-month pension be restored and that he might again seea formal flag-raising and a full-dress Marine Corpsparade. His wish for a parade was fulfilled when hestood beside Lieutenant Colonel John W. A. Antonelli,2d Battalion's conunanding officer, at a late morningflag-raising in Saga.

The former Marine's pension was restored as soon asthe Veterans Administration received evidence ofZillig's existence, which Colonel Thomas A. Wornham,the commanding officer of the 27th Marines, personallydelivered to Washington. Unifortunately, Zillig did notlive long enough to see more than a few checks, for on9 March 1946 he committed suicide.

occupation was quickly estab-lished in V Amphibious Corps'zone of responsibility. During thelast days of September, both of theCorps' divisions concentrated onunloading at Sasebo and Nag-asaki, moving supplies intodumps, organizing billeting areas,securing local military installa-tions, and preparing elements forthe expansion eastward. In addi-tion to normal occupation duties,both divisions became saddledwith the job of unloading "a terrif-ic amount of shipping." As

Lieutenant Colonel Jacob Gold-berg wrote at the time: "we arebuilding up a mountain of sup-plies consisting of items we willnever be able to use and I can fore-see the day when we just leave itall for the Japs... . Everyone in thePacific is apparently getting rid oftheir excess materiel by shipping itto Japan, regardless of whetheranyone in Japan needs it. Oneword describes the sitation:SNAFU." Confirming Goldberg'sassessment, Major Norman Hatchlater noted that the Marines, after

34

days on C- and K-rations were get-ting "fed up with this, and occa-sionally a big refrigerator shipwould come in and everybodywould say,. . .' Now we'll get somefresh food,' but we'd find that thecold lockers were loaded withbarbed wire, ping pong balls,things of that nature. . . .What wewould do with barbed wire inJapan nobody had the slightestidea."

On 25 September, two daysafter landing at Sasebo, GeneralBourke's division began expand-

UNDARIES —-— -

Maximum Deployment of VAC on Kyushuas of 14 October 1945

0 5 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 RO Sc 00

SIATUTF MILSS

35

ing its assigned zone of occupa-tion and patrols were sent intooutlaying areas. The Marinesfound Japanese civilian and mili-tary personnel to be cooperative,but as they initially found in thecity, most women and children inrural areas appeared frightened.As the Japanese grew accustomedto the Marine presence and moreassured that they would not beharmed, their initial shyness andfear soon disappeared.

During the next few days, allmain routes within the division'szone were covered even thoughmost were in poor repair, "somenot negotiable by anything butjeeps." As the expansion contin-ued, Japanese guards wererelieved at military installationsand storage areas; the inventory-ing of Japanese equipment wasbegun; liaison was establishedwith local military and civilianleaders; and Marine guards werestationed at post offices and cityhalls.

Within a week of landing, thedivision's zone of responsibilityagain was expanded to includeYagahara, Miyazaki, Arita, Takeo,Saishi, Sechihara, Imabuku, and anumber of other towns to the

north and west of Sasebo. On 29September, the division's zonewas enlarged further to includeFukuoka, the largest city onKyushu and administrative centerof the northwestern coal and steelregion. Since Fukuoka harbor waslittered with pressure minesdropped by American Air Forces,movement to the city was madeby rail and road instead of by shipfrom Sasebo. An advance billetingand reconnaissance party, headedby Colonel Walter Wensinger,reached Fukuoka on 27 Septemberand held preliminary meetingswith local civil and military offi-cials. Brigadier General Ray A.Robinson, the division's assistantcommander, was given commandof the Fukuoka region occupationforce which consisted of the 28thMarines reinforced with artilleryand engineers and augmented byArmy detachments. Lead ele-ments of Robinson's force beganarriving on the 30th, and by 5October the force had completedthe move from Sasebo. "All theway up [to Fukuoka]," as GeneralRobinson recalled later, "when westopped at a station, the equiva-lent of our Red Cross girls, theseJapanese women, would come

36

down with tea and cakes. They'dbeen our enemies . . . so wethought they were going to poisonus, so nobody took 'em!"

The Fukuoka Occupation Force,which was placed directly underGeneral Schmidt's command,immediately began sending recon-naissance parties followed bycompany and battalion-sizedforces into the major cities ofnorthern Kyushu. But because ofthe limited number of troopsavailable and the large area to becovered, Japanese guards were leftin charge of most military installa-tions, and effective control of thezone was maintained by motor-ized patrols.

To prevent possible outbreaksof mob violence, Marine guarddetachments were set up toadminister Chinese labor campsfound in the area, and JapaneseArmy supplies were requisitionedto feed and clothe the former pris-oners of war and laborers. Someof the supplies also were given tothe thousands of Koreans who hadgathered in temporary camps nearthe principal repatriation ports ofFukuoka and Senzaki in Yama-guchi Prefecture, where they wait-ed for ships to carry them back totheir homeland. The Marines, inaddition to supervising the load-ing out of the Koreans, checked onthe processing and discharge pro-cedures used to handle Japanesetroops returning with each incom-ing vessel. In addition, thebranches of the Bank of Chosenwere seized and closed in an effortto crush suspected illegal foreignexchange operations. Like theircounterparts in other areas ofKyushu, Robinson's occupationforce located and inventoried vastquantities of Japanese warmateriel for later disposition bythe 32d Infantry Division.

On 4 October, Robinson dis-patched Company K, 3d Battalion,28th Marines, across the Shim-

Units of the Army's 32d Infantry Division leave Sasebo for Fukuoka to relieve theFukuoka Occupation Force in northwestern Kyushu.

I

onoseki Straits into YamaguchiPrefecture, further expanding theforce's zone of control. Anotherreinforced company was sent twodays later to occupy Moji andYawata, on the Kyushu side of thestraits. On the 11th, a detachmentwas sent from Shimonoseki toYamaguchi; advance partiesreached the city of Oita on the12th; and on the 19th occupationforces were set up at Senzaki.

As General Robinson's forcetook control of Fukuoka andYamaguchi Prefectures and pene-trated Oita Prefecture, the 5thMarine Division expanded itshold on areas east and west ofSasebo. On 2 October, the divi-sion's reconnaissance companywas dispatched to Hirado Island.Moving overland to Hainoura byDUKWs, the amphibian truckswere used to "swim" the narrowchannel to Hirado. As elsewhere,they found the Japanese on theisland in full "compliance withsurrender terms." Other elementsof the 5th Division followed,destroying defenses, collectingmateriel, and reconnoitering thesmall islands of Gotto Retto, Kuro

Shima, Taka Shima, Tokoi Shima,and A Shima, west of Sasebo. On5 October, the division's zone ofresponsibility was extended toinclude Saga Prefecture and thecity of Kurume in the center of theisland. On the 9th, the 2d Battal-ion, 27th Marines, operating as anindependent occupation group,moved to Saga city. Two weekslater, the regiment, less the 1stBattalion, established its head-quarters in Kurume and assumedresponsibility for the central por-tion of the division zone, whichnow extended to the east to OitaPrefecture. For each of the divi-sion's movements, advance billet-ing and reconnaissance partieswere sent to the areas to contactlocal authorities and arrange forthe occupation. Since one of thegreatest problems was sanitation,sanitation squads accompaniedeach party in order to prepare bil-leting areas. Wherever possible,Japanese labor was used toimprove living conditions for thetroops. In addition, the mainte-nance of roads and bridges was aconstant problem since theisland's inadequate road network

quickly disintegrated under mili-tary traffic. The situation was fur-ther aggravated by heavy rainfalland the lack of suitable repairmaterials. Although roads werepassable only for jeeps, no attemptwas made to use motor transportbetween major cities except forspecial patrols. Therefore, themajor burden of supplying andtransporting the scattered ele-ments of the Marine amphibiouscorps fell to the Japanese rail sys-tem.

When it was decided to occupyOita Prefecture, the entire 180-miletrip from Sasebo to Oita city wasmade by rail. The occupationgroup, Company A, 5th TankBattalion, operating as infantrysince tanks could not be used onthe island's roads, set up in thecity on 13 October and conducteda reconnaissance of the surround-ing military installations usingmotorized patrols. The group'ssize severely limited its activitiesand therefore most inventorywork had to be carried out by theJapanese. under Marine supervi-sion. From Oita, elements of thecompany moved northwest alongthe coast to Beppu, noted for itshot springs, beaches, and shoreresorts. The tankers of CompanyA remained in the coastal prefec-ture until relieved by 32d Divisiontroops in early November.

By mid-October, elements of the5th Marine Division were dis-persed so as to permit almost com-plete control of the key areas in thenorthern portion of the VAmphibious Corps zone. The 2dand 3d Battalions, 27th Marinescontrolled the cities of Saga andKurume, the 26th Marines occu-pied Sasebo and the surroundingregion, and the 28th Marines con-trolled the eastern prefectures ofFukuoka, Oita, and Yamaguchi.The 13th Marines, occupying thearea to the south and east ofSasebo in Nagasaki and Saga

MajGen Schmidt greets Gen Walter Krueger, Commanding General, U.S. Sixth Army,during one of the latter's many visits to the Corps headquarters at Sasebo.

37

a-- -a— V

a

a

Prefectures, supervised the pro-cessing of Japanese repatriatesreturning from China and Korea,and handled the disposition of theweapons, equipment, and ammu-nition stored in naval depots nearSasebo and Kawatana. The 1stBattalion, 27th Marines, detachedfrom its regiment, was stationed inSasebo under division control andfurnished a portion of the city'sgarrison as well as detachmentswhich searched the islands off-shore. In addition to routine occu-pation duties, elements of the divi-sion conducted a number of coor-dinated surprise searches ofschools, temples, and shrines.Only a small number of unreport-ed swords, rifles, technical instru-ments, documents were seized inthe raids.

On 13 October, the 26th Marineswas alerted for transfer to thePalau Islands. While the regimentmade preparations to move toPeleliu to supervise the repatria-tion of Japanese troops from the

Western Carolines, the first ele-ments of the 32d Infantry Divisionbegan landing at Sasebo. The128th Infantry, followed by the126th Infantry and divisiontroops, moved through the portand boarded trains for Fukuoka,Kokura, and Shimonoseki, whereRobinson's occupation forceassumed temporary command ofthe two Army units. The 127thInfantry, less the 1st Battalion atKanoya airfield, landed on 18October, passed to the control ofthe 5th Marine Division, and onthe 19th relieved the 26th Marinesof its occupation duties in Sasebo.

On 24 October, Major GeneralSchmidt dissolved the FukuokaOccupation Force and 32dInfantry Division, now command-ed by Brigadier General Robert B.McBride, Jr., opened its commandpost in Fukuoka. A base com-mand, composed of the serviceelements that had been assignedto General Robinson's force, wasset up to support operations in

38

Northern Kyushu and continuedto function until 25 Novemberwhen it was disbanded and the32d Division assumed its duties.The division's three regimentalcombat teams, comprising in-fantry, artillery, and attached ser-vice troops, relieved the 28thMarines and 5th Tank Battalion:the 128th Infantry with the 1stBattalion at Shimonoseki, the 2dBattalion at Bofu, and the remain-der of the regiment at Yamaguchi,controlled Yamaguchi Prefecture;the 126th at Kokura patrolled eastand south through Fukuoka andOita Prefectures; and the 127th,after being relieved by the 28thMarines in the zone formerlyoccupied by the 26th Marines,occupied Fukuoka and the zone tothe north.

The 26th Marines began board-ing ship on 18 October and the fol-lowing day was detached from thedivision and returned to FMFPaccontrol. Before the transportsdeparted on 21st, orders were

A Marine guards returning Japanese troops brought to Kajikifrom Kita Daito Shima by hospital ship. Supervising the repa-


triation and demobilization of returning Japanese was a majortask of the Marines on Kyushu.

received from FMFPac designat-ing the 2d Battalion for disband-ment and the battalion returned toAinoura, the 5th Division Head-quarters' camp just outside ofSasebo. On 30 October, the 2dBattalion ended its Pacific serviceand passed out of existence, itsmen being transferred to otherunits.

As the Army's 32d InfantryDivision entered Fukuoka andOita Prefectures, Major GeneralHunt's 2d Marine Division gradu-ally expanded its hold on southernKyushu following an intensivereconnaissance effort. The 2d and6th Marines had moved into bil-lets in the vicinity of Nagasakiimmediately after landing withthe mission of surveillance anddisposition of enemy militarymateriel in the immediate coun-tryside and the many small nearbyislands. The 8th and 10th Marineshad gone directly from their trans-ports to barracks at Isahaya andbegan patrols of the peninsula tothe south and throughout theremainder of Nagasaki Prefecturein the 2d Division zone. Also con-struction began on an airstrip inthe atomic-bombed-out area ofNagasaki, capable of handling theplanes of Marine ObservationSquadron 2. Within days, thesquadron began air courier servicefrom "Atomic Field."

On 4 October, V AmphibiousCorps changed the occupationalboundary between the two Marinedivisions, shifting control ofOmura to General Hunt's com-mand. The 3d Battalion, 10thMarines, relieved the reinforcedcompany from 1st Battalion, 27thMarines, as the security detach-ment for the Marine air base andthe unit was returned to the 5thMarine Division. Shortly there-after, the 10th Marines assumedcontrol of the whole of the 8thMarines' area in Nagasaki Prefec-ture.

The corps expanded the 2dDivision zone of occupation on 5October to include the highlyindustrialized prefecture ofKumamoto in central Kyushu. Anadvance billeting, sanitation, andreconnaissance party travelled toKumamoto city to contact Jap-anese authorities and pave theway for the 8th Marines' assump-tion of control. By 18 October, allunits of the regiment were estab-lished in and around Kumamotoand began the process of invento-rying and disposing of Japanesewar material. Carrying out SCAPdirectives outlining measures torestore the civilian economy, theMarines, and accompanying mili-tary government teams, contactedlocal officials and assisted wherev-er possible in speeding the conver-sion of war industries to essentialpeacetime production.

The 2d Division gradually tookcontrol of the unoccupied portionof southern Kyushu during thenext month. Advance partiesheaded by senior field comman-ders contacted civil and militaryofficials in Kagoshima and Mi-yazaki Prefectures to insure com-pliance with surrender terms andadequate preparations for theInterrogating former Japanese pilots wasa task assigned to MAG-22 in addition toroutine surveillance and courier flights.

39

reception of division troops.Miyazaki Prefecture and theremaining portion of Kagoshimaeast of Kagoshima Wan wereassigned to the 2d Marines. Theremaining half of KagoshimaPrefecture was added to the 8thMarines' zone; later, the regimentwas also given responsibility forthe Osumi and Koshiki Islandgroups, which lay to the south andsouthwest of Kyushu.

On 29 October, the 1st Battalion,8th Marines, the first major ele-ment of the division to move tosouthernmost Kyushu, departedKumamoto for Kagoshima city bytruck convoy. The 3d Battalionfollowed several days later, occu-pying the inland city of Hitoyoshi.Once in place, the battalions beganthe now all-too-familiar routine ofreconnaissance, inspection, inven-tory, and disposition. The 2dBattalion, 2d Marines, assigned tothe eastern half of Kagoshima,found much of the preliminaryoccupation work completed. The1st Battalion, 127th Infantry, whichhad maintained a refueling andresupply point at Kanoya, hadbeen actively patrolling the areasince its arrival in earlySeptember. When 2d Battalion,loaded in four landing ships,arrived from Nagasaki on 27October, it was relatively easy toeffect the relief. The Marines land-ed at Takasu, port for Kanoya, andmoved by rail and road to the air-field. Three days later, the Marinebattalion assumed operationalcontrol of the Army Air Forcedetachment manning the emer-gency field, and the Army detach-ment returned to Sasebo to rejoinits parent command.

In early November, the 2dMarines' remaining two battalionsalso moved by sea from Sasebo toTakasu and thence by rail toMiyazaki Prefecture. The regi-mental headquarters and the 3dBattalion arrived at Kanoya on the

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L-A contingent of V Amphibious Corps troops loads on board a "Magic Carpet" at Sasebo for the trip home.

5th and moved to Miyakonojo,where they established the com-mand post and base of operations.The 1st Battalion sailed fromNagasaki on the 9th, arrived atKanoya the following day, andthen boarded trains for Miyazakicity on the east coast of Kyushu.By mid-November, with the occu-pation of Miyazaki, GeneralSchmidt's command had estab-lished effective control over itsassigned zone of responsibility.

By the end of November, VAmphibious Corps reported sub-stantial progress in its major occu-pation tasks. More than 700,000Japanese military and civiliansreturning from Korea and theSouth Pacific had been processedthrough the Corps' authorized

ports and separation centers atSasebo, Kagoshima-Kajiki, Fuku-oka, Shimonoseki, and Senzaki.Local commanders had shoul-dered the main burden of settingup the organization and machin-ery necessary to supervise theorderly, rapid, and sanitary pro-cessing for further movement byship and rail of the incomingJapanese repatriates. In addition,more than 273,000 Koreans,Chinese, Okinawans, and otherdisplaced persons had been sentback to their homelands. Whilethe incoming Japanese presentedlittle problem, the outgoingChinese, Koreans, and Formosansdid. Eager for freedom and natu-rally resentful of their virtualenslavement under the Japanese,

40

they caused frequent disturbancesand riots which had to be quelledby corps troops. In addition, theirprevious "animal-like living con-ditions made them a sanitarymenace wherever assembled."

Only about 20,000 JapaneseArmy and Navy personnelremained on duty, all employed indemobilization, repatriation,minesweeping, and similar super-vised occupational activities.While initial feelings were mixed,a good rapport soon developedbetween the Marines and theirJapanese counterparts. "We wereoperating off LSTs [in theTsushima Islands] during the dayand blowing up guns and destroy-ing ammunition, and I particular-ly remember the Japanese who did

1,1 fl,l% Ut UW.

the job," Lieutenant EdwinNeville later recalled. "After onespectacular blow-up, they pulledout bottles of potato whiskey.That is all the booze they had, butthey shared them with theAmericans. They did not havemuch to look forward to exceptmustering out, but that was okay,and we were okay." On 1

December, in accordance withSCAP directives, the remainingJapanese military forces weretransferred to civilian status undernewly created government min-istries and bureaus.

The need for large numbers ofcombat troops in Japan steadilylessened as the occupation woreon, and it became increasinglyobvious that the Japanese intend-ed to offer no resistance. The firstmajor Marine unit to fulfill its mis-sion in southern Japan and returnto the United States was MAG-22.

On 14 October, Admiral Spru-ance, acting for CinCPac, queriedthe Fifth Fighter Command as towhether the Marine aircraft groupwas still needed to support theSasebo area occupation forces. Onthe 26th, the Army replied thatMAG-22 was no longer needed,and it was returned to operationalcontrol of the Navy. The group'sservice squadron and heavyequipment which had just arrivedfrom Okinawa were kept on boardship, and on 2 November, Air-FMFPac directed that the unitreturn to the United States. Thegroup's 72 Corsairs were flown tothe naval aircraft replacementpool on Okinawa, the pilotsreturning to Kyushu by transportplane. On 10 November, a majori-ty of the group's personnel board-ed the SS Sea Sturgeon at anchor inSasebo Harbor. Included were 485low-point officers and enlistedmen being transferred to MAG-31at Yokosuka as replacements forthose eligible for rotation or dis-charge. The transport weighed

anchor on the 12th and sailed forYokosuka, skirting the southerntip of the island instead of headingthrough Shimonoseki Straitswhich was still heavily mined.Upon arrival, the group spent thenext several days at anchor inTokyo Bay taking on fuel and pro-visions. "The one bright spot wasa liberty party to the Tokyo areaon 17 November," reportedColonel Elliott E. Bard, the group'snew commanding officer. "At0800 approximately 450 of theGroup's personnel went over theside and down the ladder into awaiting LSM for the two-hour tripto Tokyo. Time there was passedsightseeing, buying souvenirs,lunching at the Imperial Hotel,and visiting the non-restricted sec-tion of the Imperial grounds sur-rounding Hirohito's palace. Allagreed that the day was wellspent." On 20 November, afterpicking up MAG-31's 598returnees at Yokosuka and morethan 800 Army troops atYokohama, MAG-22 sailed for theUnited States. The Marine AirBase at Omura remained in opera-tion, but its aircraft strength con-sisted mainly of Marine Obser-

What most Marines looked forward toafter more than three years at war.

41

vation Squadron 2's light liaisonand observation planes whichflew courier, reconnaissance, med-ical evacuation, and, more impor-tantly, daily mail flights. Al-though a third Marine air basewas planned at Iwakuni to sup-port operations in the Iwakuni-Hiroshima-Kure area, it was notestablished and the transportsquadrons of MAG-21 slated tooccupy the base were reassignedto Guam and Yokosuka.

The redeployment of MAG-22began the gradual drawdown ofexcess occupation forces onKyushu. On 12 November, SixthArmy was informed by VAmphibious Corps that the 5thMarine Division would bereleased from its duties andreturned to the United States inDecember. By early 1946, the 2dMarine Division would be theonly major Marine unit remainingon occupation duty in southernJapan.

By late November, only about10 percent of the Marines inGeneral Schmidt's command hadbeen returned to the United States,although more than 15,000 menwere eligible for discharge or rota-tion. The divisions were underorders to maintain their strengthat 90 percent of personnelallowances, which severely cur-tailed the number of men whocould be released. Replacementswere almost nonexistent. The 2dDivision, for example, hadreceived only 45 officers and 130men during the first two monthsof the occupation as replacementsfor the approximately 8,000 offi-cers and men who were entitled tobe released from active duty. Tosolve this problem, V AmphibiousCorps ordered an interchange ofpersonnel between the 2d and 5thMarine Divisions. The exchange

was to be carried out by battal-ions, beginning with the separatebattalions, followed by battalionswithin regiments, and concludingwith clerical personnel in the divi-sion headquarters.

Those men of the 2d Divisioneligible for discharge under cur-rent directives and those having24 or more months overseaswould be transferred to units ofthe 5th Division, while men notyet eligible for discharge or rota-tion would move from the 5th tothe 2d Division and Corps troops.Almost half of the 2d Division and80 percent of the 5th Division, inall about 18,000 Marines andcorpsmen, were slated for transfer.At the same time the personnelexchanges were taking place, ele-ments of the 2d and 32d Divisionswould occupy the 5th Divisionzone of responsibility so that theoccupation missions of surveil-lance, disposition of materiel, andrepatriation could continue with-out interruption.

On 24 November, control ofSaga and Fukuoka Prefecturespassed to the 2d and 32dDivisions, respectively. In the firstof a series of troop movements,the 2d Battalion, 6th Marinesboarded trains for Saga to takeover the duties and exchange per-sonnel with the 2d Battalion, 27thMarines. The 6th and 10thMarines occupied other areas ofthe 5th Division zone, relievingunits of the 13th, 27th, and 28thMarines and effecting the neces-sary personnel transfers. The 2dand 8th Marines sent theirreturnees to Sasebo, the 5thDivision's port of embarkation,and joined new men from the Sth'sinfantry regiments, as did the sep-arate battalions and divisiontroops.

The 5th Division began loadingout as soon as ships became avail-able at Sasebo, and on 5 December,the first transports, carrying men

of the 27th Marines, departed forthe United States. The divisiongradually reduced its zone ofresponsibility and on 8 December,the 2d Division relieved the 5th ofall its remaining occupationduties. Eleven days later, sevenlanding ships with the last ele-ments of the 5th Division on boarddeparted Sasebo.

The Marines of the 5th Divisionhad accomplished much duringtheir few months of occupationduty. Within the division's zone,the remaining Japanese armedforces were almost completelydemobilized; a majority of the mil-itary facilities razed; a large per-centage of ordnance, aircraft, andweapons destroyed; and warmateriel and equipment in useablecondition turned over to theJapanese Home Ministry for con-version to peacetime use. In addi-tion, the Marines had begun thetask of reconstruction by clearingdebris, reinforcing roads andbridges, and establishing rudi-mentary clean water, sewage, andcommunications systems. Al-though most enjoyed their stayand left with a greater apprecia-tion of Japanese customs and cul-ture, all looked forward to theirreturn home.

Beginning on 20 December,with the arrival at San Diego of thefirst troopships carrying the 27thMarines, a steady stream of divi-sion officers and men passedthrough reassignment and dis-charge centers at Camp Pendleton.Those men to be shipped else-where for discharge were put ontheir way as rapidly as possible,and those to be reassigned quicklymoved out to their new jobs or tofurloughs. Those to be dischargedwere assigned to the separationbattalion—which had a highlystreamlined discharge process:

He hears lectures on thefavorable aspects and the pit-falls of civilian life, has his

42

uniform pressed and all dec-orations and insignia added.A physical examination istaken and he has an opportu-nity to file a disability claimwith the Veterans Admin-istration with the help of RedCross field assistants. TheU.S. Employment Servicealso informs him of theprospects of a job. In themeantime, his records arebeing examined, completedand closed out. At the end offive days, he and his recordsmeet for the final pay-off andhe receives his discharge.The process returned more than

200 Marines per day to civilianlife. During January, most of thecomponent elements of the divi-sion were skeletonized and thendisbanded. On 5 February 1946,the Headquarters Battalion fol-lowed suit, and the 5th MarineDivision, after two years of ser-vice, passed into history.

On the same date that the 2dMarine Division took over theduties of the 5th, V AmphibiousCorps received a dispatch direc-tive from Sixth Army stating thatthe corps would be relieved of alloccupation duties and missionswhen the Eighth Army relievedthe Sixth on 31 December. Withreorganization of U.S. ArmyForces, Pacific, and subsequentplans to reduce American militarystrength to only those units con-sidered essential to a peacetimeestablishment, Eighth Army wasdesignated to assume commandof all allied occupation troops inJapan. I Corps, headquartered ini-tially at Osaka and then at Kyoto,would take over V AmphibiousCorps' area and troops.

Major General Schmidt's com-mand spent most of its remainingtime in Japan conducting routinereconnaissance and surveillancepatrols, disposing of an increasingamount of war materiel, supervis-

ing the transfer of low-point mento 2d Division units, and prepar-ing to turn over its area to I Corps.On 31 December, I Corps relievedV Amphibious Corps of all occu-pational operations in Japan, andcorps troops began loading out thefollowing day, some units forreturn to the United States andothers for duty with Marine sup-ply activities on Guam. On 8January, the last elements of theMarine amphibious corps, includ-ing General Schmidt's headquar-ters, left Sasebo for San Diego. On15 February 1946, the V Amphib-ious Corps was disbanded.

With the departure of VAmphibious Corps, the 2d MarineDivision became responsible forthe whole of what had been thecorps zone and moved its head-quarters from the Nagasaki area toSasebo. In addition to the SixthArmy, the 32d Infantry Division, aformer Michigan WisconsinNational Guard unit, also wasslated for deactivation early in1946. In preparation for takingover the 32d Division duties inYamaguchi, Fukuoka, and OitaPrefectures, the 2d Divisionmoved the 6th Marines north intothe Army zone and increased thesize of the areas assigned to itsother regiments. On 31 January,when Major General Hunt's divi-sion formally relieved the 32dDivision, the zones of responsibil-ity assigned to each of the divi-sion's regiments were: 2d Marines,headquartered at Miyazaki, Oitaand Miyazaki Prefectures; 6thMarines, at Fukuoka, Yamaguchi,Fukuoka, and Oita Prefectures; 8thMarines, whose command postwas at Kumamoto, Kumamotoand Kagoshima Prefectures; 10thMarines, Nagasaki Prefecture.Areas that had been covered bybattalions were now assigned tocompanies and detachments.

In early February, when MajorGeneral Roscoe B. Woodruff,

Commanding General, I Corps,returned to the United States ontemporary assignment, MajorGeneral Hunt, as the region'ssenior division commander,assumed command of the Corps, aposition he held until GeneralWoodruff's return on 5 April. Thecorps zone of responsibilityunderwent one more change dur-ing this period. On 4 February,advance elements of the BritishCommonwealth Occupation Forcebegan moving into HiroshimaPrefecture and formally took con-trol from the 24th InfantryDivision on 7 March. Later inMarch, the British force relievedthe 6th Marines in YamaguchiPrefecture, therefore reducing the2d Marine Division zone to theisland of Kyushu.

Except for the movement of the2d Marines' command post fromMiyazaki to Oita, the constantshifting of units was largely overand the division could concentrateon routine occupation missionsand on reinstituting regular train-ing schedules. In late February, inorder to reduce the division topeacetime strength, infantry regi-ments were instructed to relieverespective third battalions, andthe artillery regiment the last let-tered battery of each battalion, ofoccupation duties. The battalionsand batteries were assembled atAinoura, moved to Sasebo andboarded transports for the UnitedStates where the units would bedisbanded. The remaining unitswere assembled in battalion-sizedcamps which served as centers forthe daily reconnaissance, surveil-lance, and intelligence patrols. Asoccupational duties permitted,training in basic military subjects,firing of individual and crew-served weapons, and exercises incombat tactics filled increasingamounts of the Marines' time. Anextensive air courier service, oper-ating from Omura, linked the scat-

43

tered battalions and enabled thedivision and regimental comman-ders to maintain effective controlof their units. Other than fieldingspecial unarmed election patrolsduring national elections in April,most of the disposition work hadbeen completed and the flow ofJapanese repatriates had slowed,and the Marines settled into aweekly routine of patrols, training,and liberty

Soon after General Huntreturned from Kyoto, word wasreceived from Eighth Army thatthe 2d Division would be returnedto the United States and the 24thInfantry Division would move toKyushu and take over the Marinezone. Preparations for the move-ment got underway before the endof April, as reconnaissance partiesof the relieving Army regimentsarrived to check their future billet-ing areas. General Hunt plannedto relieve the outlying units firstand then gradually draw theminto Sasebo until the last unit haddeparted. On 24 May, the 19thInfantry Regiment, under opera-tional control of the 2d Division,relieved the 2d Marines andassumed responsibility for Oitaand Miyazaki Prefectures. Theregiment left Sasebo on 13 Junebound for Norfolk; the 8thMarines was relieved by the 21stInfantry and followed two dayslater; and the 10th Marines depart-ed on the 23d. On 15 June, as allscheduled courier flights endedand Marine Air Base, Omura, wassecured, Major General Huntturned over responsibility for theisland of Kyushu to the 24thDivision and the 19th and 21stInfantry Regiments reverted tocontrol of 24th Division. GeneralHunt and the Division headquar-ters boarded the Rutland (APA192) and departed Sasebo on the24th. Before leaving, however, thedivision transferred more than2,300 men to the "China Draft" as

replacements for the 1st MarineDivision. The 6th Marines, slatedto sail for the West Coast, and ser-vice troops and unit rear echelonsneeded to load out heavy equip-ment, remained behind. By mid-August, the 2d Marine Divisionhad completed its move fromJapan and settled in at CampLejeune, North Carolina. Howwell the division had done its jobwas attested to by I Corps' com-manding general, Major GeneralWoodruff: "Today the 2d MarineDivision comes to the end of itslong trail from Guadalcanal toJapan. Its achievement in battleand in occupation: 'Well done.'The cooperation and assistance ofyour splendid Division will begreatly missed."

The first Marines to set foot inJapan after the war landed atYokosuka expecting to meet thesame implacable foe they hadencountered in years of bitterfighting across the Pacific. Insteadthey were confronted by a docilepeople anxious to cooperate. As a

result of their acceptance of defeat,General MacArthur found itunnecessary to institute completemilitary rule. His program ofdemilitarization and democratiza-tion was implemented throughthe Emperor and the machinery ofthe Japanese Government, whichdisarmed and demobilized thecountry's military forces andreformed and modernized thepolitical and economic structurewithout incident.

While the Marines on Kyushustood by as observers and police-men during many phases of theoccupation, they were direct par-ticipants in others. They super-vised the repatriation of thou-sands of foreign civilians and pris-oners of war and handled theflood of returning Japanese.Using local labor, they collected,inventoried, and disposed of thevast amounts of munitions andother war materiel that had beenstockpiled on Kyushu in anticipa-tion of the Allied invasion. Inaddition, they used their own men

44

and equipment to repair war dam-age and to assist in reestablish-ment the Japanese economy.

Within three months after land-ing on Kyushu, V AmphibiousCorps had established effectivecontrol over the entire island andits ten million people. By thebeginning of 1946, the tasks ofrepatriation and disposition hadprogressed to such an extent thatresponsibility for the whole islandcould be assumed by one division.The occupation not only exposedthe Marines to a different cultureand its customs, but also providedthem experience not gained fromtheir normal peacetime routine oftraining and guard duty. Faced byheavy responsibilities, Marines atall levels quickly learned to bekind but firm in handling theextremely delicate political, cul-tural, and economic problemswhich confronted them daily."Their general conduct," asGeneral MacArthur recalled, "wasbeyond criticism.. .They were trulyambassadors of good will."


Japan's air might is finally destroyed. More than 200 planes, including bombers and Zeros, are set afire at Omura Air Base.

This pamphlet is based heavily upon the offi-cial Marine Corps histories: The United StatesMarines in the Occupation of Japan, by Henry I.Shaw, Jr. (Washington: HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC,1969); Benis M. Frank and Henry I. Shaw, Jr.,Victory and Occupation, vol V, History of U.S.Marine Corps Operations in World War II(Washington: HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1968); andKenneth W. Condit and Edwin T. Turnbladh,Hold High the Torch: A History of the 4th Marines(Washington: HistBr, G-3 Div, HQMC, 1960).Among other official histories consulted, themost useful were Reports of General MacArthur:Japanese Operations in the Southwest Pacific Areaand Reports of General MacArthur: MacArthur inJapan: The Occupation: Military Phase (Washing-ton: GPO, 1966).

Primary documents on the Marine participa-tion in the occupation of Japan are held by theWashington National Records Center, Suitland,Maryland. Although division, regiment, aircraftgroup, battalion, and squadron War Diaries pro-vide monthly summaries and day-by-dayaccounts, the best overviews are to be found inthe After Action or Operational Reports of TaskGroup 31.3 (Task Group Able and Fleet LandingForce); V Amphibious Corps; U. S. Eighth Army;U.S. Sixth Army; U.S. Fifth Fleet; 2d MarineDivision; and 5th Marine Division. The MarineCorps Oral History Collection contains numer-ous interviews with occupation veterans, amongthem Samuel G. Taxis; Fred D. Beans; James P.Berkeley; Norman T. Hatch; Ray A. Robinson;Joseph L. Stewart; Thomas A. Wornham; andJohn C. Munn. The Historical Center also holdsa number of important personal papers collec-tions, the most helpful of which were those ofJames P. Berkeley; Joseph A. Bruder; Thomas E.Watson; Norman T. Hatch; and Raymond L.Doyle.

Among other volumes used or consultedwere: FAdm William F Halsey and LCdr J. BryanIII, Admiral Halsey's Story (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1947); RAdm Benton W. Decker and EdwinaN. Decker, Return of the Black Ships (New York:Vantage Press, 1978); Robert L. Eichelberger, OurJungle Road to Tokyo (New York: The Viking Press,1950); VAdm Emmet P. Forrestel, AdmiralRaymond A. Spruance, USN (Washington: GPO,1966); Samuel Eliot Morrison, History of UnitedStates Operations in World War Ii: Victory in thePacific, 1945 (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.,1960); John R. Skates, The Invasion of Japan:Alternative to the Bomb (Columbia: University ofSouth Carolina Press, 1994); Richard W.Johnston, Follow Me! The Story of the SecondMarine Division in World War II (New York:Random House, 1948); Howard M. Conner, TheSpearhead: The World War II History of the 5thMarine Division (Washington: Infantry JournalPress, 1950); Bevan G. Cass, History of the SixthMarine Division (Washington: Infantry JournalPress, 1948); William P. Banning, ed., HeritageYears: Second Marine Division CommemorativeAnthology, 1940-1949 (Paducah: Turner Publish-ing Co., 1988); 2dLt Ernest B. Furgurson, Jr.,USMCR, "The 4th Marines: A History,"(Unpublished manuscript, 1955); Tom Tompkins,Yokos u/ca: Base of Empire (Novato: Presidio Press,1981); Sgt Robert T. Scott, USMC, Occupation ofJa pan: Marine Aircraft Group Thirty-One(Yokosuka, 1946); and William F. Nimmo, ed.,The Occupation of Japan: The Grass Roots: TheProceedings of the Eighth Symposium Sponsored byThe General Douglas MacArthur Foundation, 7-8November 1991 (Norfolk: General DouglasMacArthur Foundation, 1992).

Charles R. Smith has been with the Historyand Museums Division since July 1971. A

California native, he is a graduate of theUniversity of California, Santa Barbara;received his master's degree in history fromSan Diego State University; and has doneadditional graduate work at GeorgetownUniversity. He served in Vietnam with the101st Airborne Division (Airmobile) in 1968and 1969, first as an artilleryman and then asa historian. He has written and edited several

works on the early history of the Marine Corps, among them Marines in theRevolution: A History of the Continental Marines in the American Revolution, 1775-1783. He is also the author of U.S. Marines in Vietnam: High Mobility andStanddown, 1969; co-author of U.S. Marines in Vietnam: The Defining Year, 1968in the official chronologies of the Marine Corps in the Vietnam War; and theauthor of Angels From the Sea: Relief Operations in Bangladesh, 1991, the first vol-ume in the division's series on Marine Corps humanitarian relief operations.

For sale by the U.S. Government Printing OfficeSuperintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: SSOP, Washington, DC 20402-9328

ISRN n-i A-n4QtTh-7

WORLD WAR II

THIS PAMPHLET HISTORY, one in a series devoted to U.S. Marines inthe World War II era, is published for the education and training of Marinesby the History and Museums Division, Headquarters, U.S. Marine Corps,Washington, D.C., as part of the U.S. Department of Defense observance ofthe 50th anniversary of victory in that war.

WORLD WAR II COMMEMORATIVE SERIESDIRECTOR EMERITUS OF MARINE CORPS HISTORY AND MUSEUMS

Brigadier General Edwin H. Simmons, USMC (Ret)GENERAL EDITOR,

WORLD WAR II COMIVIEMORATI17E SERIESBenis M. Frank

CARTOGRAPHIC CONSULTANTGeorge C. MacGillivray

EDITING AND DESIGN SECTION, HISTORY AND MUSEUMS DIVISiONRobert E. Struder, Senior Editor; W. Stephen Hill, Visual Information Specialist;

Catherine A. Kerns, Composition Services Technician

Marine Corps Historical CenterBuilding 58, Washington Navy Yard

Washington, D.C. 20374-5040

1997

PCN 19000314200