the shootdown of kal 007: accident or conspiracy?

8/8/2019 The Shootdown of KAL 007: Accident or Conspiracy?

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[rMajr Frederick C. Barth 88-0225"insights insto tomorrow"

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REPORT NUMBER 88-0225TITLE M- SHOOTDOXN OF KAL 007: ACCIDENT OR CONSPIRACY?AUTHOR(S) MAJ6R FRErDmicK c. BARTh, TJSAF

FACULTY ADVISOR MJOR JAMES KIPPET, ACSC/EDOSPONSOR LTC PAUL TRIBBLE, ACSC/EDN

Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment ofrequirements for graduation.

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGEAIR UNIVERSITYMAXWELL AFB, AL 36112-5542


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TM~ SHOOTDOWYN OF KAL 007: ACCIDENT OR CONSPIRACY?2 AR,FPedeick . MaorUSAF

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19 . ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and vlentify by block number)'~-The Soviet shootdown of Kore~an Air Lines flight 007 in September 1983 raisedmany disturbing questions. many theories were developed to explain whathappened and why. The book Shootdowri by R. W. Johnson proposed that theairli~ner was- part of a EJS sponsor-ed intelliqerice operation. This studyevaluates Johnson' s thesis an d logic an d ccrvares it to other investigations.The study concludes that flight 007 was not part of a US intelligence* ~gathering mission and that it strayed of f course as a result of a human

-~ error in navigation.

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PREFACEIn the wake of th e tragic downing of th e Korean Air Linesflight 007, charges and countercharges assigning guilt were madeby both superpowers. Many investigators came to believe that th eUnited States willfull.y used the civilian airliner as part of areconnaissance mission because of th e involvement of manysensitive military and civilian intelligence agencies. Shootdownby R. W. Johnson proposes such a conspiracy theory.Could such a theory be possible? Did th e US resort to suchrisks in the name of intelligence fo r national security? Couldone come to any conclusions without having access to classifieddata which might ultimately hold the truth of what happened?These were th e motivating questions that led to this study.It is an exercise in speculation and logic, based on the writingsof various investigators, Journalists and experts. However, the

ultimate truth of what happened may rest within classified filesor with the wreckage of flight 007 at the bottom of the sea.

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-ABOU THE AUTHORMajor Frederick C. Barth is a development engineeringofficer with a diverse background. His mont recent assignmentwas as an engineering division chief involved in the

construction, activation, and operation of the West Coast SpaceShuttle Launch Site at Vandenberg AFB, California. He alsosupported satellite programs scheduled for deployment frow,Vandenberg-launched Shuttle missions. When the West Coast LaunchSite program was cancelled, he led facility deactivation efforts.Prior to this activity, Major Barth worked on the staff of theCommander, Armament Division (AFSC) at Eglin APB, Florida.While there, he also served as an engineer in sLOport of remotelypiloted target aircraft programs. His earlter assignments wereas an aircraft maintenance officer with F-105 and F-4 equippedunits in TAC and USAFE. Major Barth received a B.S. degree inAerospace Engineering from Syracuse University and wascommissioned there through AFROTC in 1974. He will receive aMaster's of Political Science from Auburn University in 1988.

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TABLE OF CONTENT S =....... - .-Preface ...................... iiiAbout th e Author ......................... ..... iVExecutive Summary ........... . ............................ viCHAPTER ONE--INTRODUCTION .................... .. 1CHAPTER TWO--SYNOPSIS ............ .... ............ 2Overview ....... ................................ 2B c kg ro u n d . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Political Perspective ....................... 4The Four Hypotheses.................. ....... 5The Conspiracy Hypothesis ................... 7CHAPTER THREE--AUTHOR'S BACKGROUND AND REVIEWS

OF BOOK ...... ......... ................. 8Johnson's Background ........................ 8Johnson's Personal Perspective .............. 9Book Reviews-Other Perspectives ............ 10Summary .... ,........... . . . . . . . . .. 1

CHAPTER FOUR--CRITICAL ANALYSIS AND NEWEVIDPENCE* .......... &.. #sob.......:. 14Analysis ................................... 14An Alternat ive View.. . . ................... 18Additional R'esearch Evidence ............... 20

CHAPTER FIVE--SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION ............ 21BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................... ......... 23

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY APart of our College mission is distribution of thestudents' problem solving products to DoDSsponsors and other interested agencies toenhance insight into contemporary, defenserelated issues. While the College has accepted thisproduct as meeting academic requirements for

Sr graduation, the views and opinions expressed orimplied are solely those of the author and shouldnot be construed as carrying official sanction.

",oinsights into tomorrow"

REPORT NUMBER se-c:22sMAJOR FREDERICK 0::. BARTH, USAF

TITLE TH E SHOOTDOWN OF KAL 007: ACCIDENT OR CONSPIRACY?I. Ejrj.gz2L This paper analyze% th e main thesis of th e booc,:Shooctdown by R.* W. Johnson. Hi's thesis concludes that 11:Korean AirLines flight O07 was shot down while participating in a USsponsored reconnai ssance mlissi on.II. Prob em: The first task in this research was to identifyJohnson's logic as well as h is con,: lusions.. When this was done,insight into his wo:,rk from other points of view was ex,:amined bystudying reviews of his bocok. Finally, Johnscon's arguments werebalanced against alternative interpretat io~ns -=-f evidenc=e ais wellas new in fo r maticon.III. Data: Johnson's thesis that flight 00'7 was participatingas a passive probe in a US sponsored reconnaissanze mi ssiozn is adirec:t result of h is logic. He Io,:ks at th e eviden,:e to , supportor refute four theories. The first thec,:ry proposes that th eflight crew ,of 007 made an inno:cent navigational error. Thesecond is that th e Captain was short-cutting h is route in orderto save fuel. The third theory claims the Soviets used anele,:tronie- interference system to lead the airliner off coIurse.The f inal theory, whic h Jozhns:on believes, pr,::,p,,ses t hat f1l ight-.)07 willfully penetrated Soviet airspaze to assist in a USintelligenc:e gathering eff-,rt of the Soviet air defense system.His logic argues the conspiracy theory is moist souqnd, not bec0ause

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"-CONTINUED

the evidence strongly supports it, but rather because theeidence does not support the other theories. Thus, one islogically left with the hypothesis that flight 007 was involvedin espionage.To critically analyze the validity of this theory andJohnson's logic, a five step process is undertaken. First, histhesis and logic are established. Next, Johnson's background andpersonal goals for his work are determined from his own words.Third, a new perspective can be gained by assessing some of thebook reviews that appeared in the press on Johnson's work.Fourth, a critical analysis is made on the central argument ofJohnson's hypothesis. Finally, alternative interpretations ofthe same evidence by another writer as well as additionalinformation are introduced to the analysis. From these fivesteps, a conclusion about Johnson's thesis and the truth offlight 007 can be made.The results of this process can be easily summarized. Thefirst step, already mentioned, shows Johnson's belief that flight001 was involved in a US reconnaissance mission because the

evidence refutes all th e other theories. In the second step,Johnson claims to be politically neutral and admits the evidencefor his case is totally circumstantial. The third step begins toestablish a common thread. Most reviewers find Johnsonpolitically biased against the Reagan Administration and overlyreliant on poor evidence. The fourth step compares Johnson'sinterpretation of evidence against an accidental navigationalerror to the interpretations of Murray Sayle and Seymour Hersh.Both of these investigative writers provide strong arguments forthe human error hypothesis. Finally, the alternativeinterpretations of the evidence by Hersh and new information onSoviet policy towards airspace violations by ACSC graduate MajorMartin Alvstad are introduced. This new data seriouslychallenges Johnson's reasoning for the conspiracy theory.IV . Conclusions: A summation of all the arguments and dataprovided lead to the conclusion that the crew of flight 007 madean innocent error in navigation. The tragedy and its aftermathwere the result of this error and the mistrust that existsbetween the Soviet Union ard the United States. The Soviets madea mistake by authorizin'; a shootdown before the target could bevisually identitied; they assumed it was a US militaryreconnaissance aircraft. The US administration reacted to theincident with incomplete intelligence data. Johnson's thesis and

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CONTINUED

logic are seriously contradicted because he has not consideredth e root cause of th e Incident: mistrust between th e superpowersallowed an innocent human error to result in tragedy.

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Chapter One

INTRODUCTIONOn 1 September 1983 at approximately 06:25 local time,Korean Air Lines (KAL) flight 007 was struck by an air-to-airmissile fired by a Soviet Sukhoi SU-15 fighter in Soviet airspaceabove Sakhalin Island. The Korean airline Boeing 747subsequently crashed into the sea near the southwestern tip ofSakhalin, taking th e lives of all 269 souls on board. It was th efifth worst air disaster in history (2:1).Shortly after the tragedy, many explanatory theories beganto surface. Most of the3e explored th e possibil i ty of human

mistake initiating a navigational error (12:165). Later,theories began to appear in the media linking the tragedy to a USconspiracy using a civilian airliner as part of an intelligencegathering mission. Some of these became published as books.

R. W. Johnson was the author of one such book', Shootdown.It is the result of exhaustive research on almobt all informationavailable from the public record. Johnson's cdnclusion was thatKAL 007 (it should be noted here that both fl ight designators,KAL 007 and KE007, are used in this paper) was a passive probewillfully violating Soviet airspace as part of a US sponsoredintelligence gathering mission.The purpose of this paper will be to answer the questions

that such a book poses. What really happened? Was Johnsoncorrect? Does he have a solid case fo r his theories? Are theiealternative interpretations of th e evidence? This paper willattempt to analyze Johnson's arguments and the logic central tohis belief. In addition, new evidence will be introduced to helpanswer the questions.TPo accomplish this goal, five steps will be taken. First , asynopsis of Johnson's thesis as presented in his boik will be

provided. Next, a brief background on Johnson will be offered toserve as a starting point fo r further analysis. Third, severalbook reviews of Johnson's work will be examined. Fourth, acritical analysis will be oEfered of a central argument toJohnson's thesis. Fifth, th e analysis will bt considered in thelight of additional evidence. When these task3 have beenaccomplished, the oricilnal questions can then be answered.

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Chapter Two

SYNOPSISThis synopsis highlights Johnson's thesis and logic. Itprovides the important information from th e book illustratingJohnson's rationale for his conclusion that KA L 007 was part of aUS reconnaissance mission. Understanding h is logic is essentialto th e purpose of this paper.

OverviewIn his book Shootdown, Johnson attempts to explain th etragedy of KAL 007 in two ways. First, he tries to address themanner in which KA L 007 came to be so far off course based onth e technical facts concerning th e route of flight as thesebecame available to th e media an d th e public. Secondly, he triesto establish th e political and diplomatic context in which thetragedy took place. This includes events 'both before and afterth e incident and looks within the Reagan Administration as wellas th e international situation. Johnson amasses his evidence bydrawing on all information available from th e public record(2:297). His stated purpose is to assess all the possibletheories by weighing all th e evidence and th e probabilities fo r

each (2:2). However, it is ult im ately the readers who mustdecide for themselves which theory to accept and why (2:2).Thus, armed with a mass of technical data, balanced against th epolitical background of th e time, Johnson has compiled evidenceto support or refute four hypotheses that have been proposed inth e wake of th e tragedy.

Two of these theories involve an innocent explanation andth e other two involve either US or Soviet culpability. The firsthypothesis puts KA L 007 on i,.s disastrous course by anavigational erroz caused by a misuse of equipment and aninattentive crew. The second hypothesis is that th e KA L pilot,Captain Chun Byong-in, was deliberately flying off course toconserve fuel, but not to commit or support any espionagemission. The titird hypothesis is that th e Soviet Union was usingsome type of electronic interference system that caused 007 tofly off course. The fourth and final hypothesis is that KL 007was a passive probe, willfully flying into Soviet airspace toactivate their air defense radar systems, in support of a US

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Intelligence gatherinq mission (2:243).It is Johnson's conviction that th e last hypothesis, th eintel l igence mission scenario, is the only one supported by th eevidence (2:276). Furthermore, he believes that th e sameevidence refutes thn possibility of th e other three theories(2:274). He also believes th e intelligence mission hypothesisgains auceptance because most of th e principal governmentsinvolved have refused to conduct an official inquiry (2:275).

Only the Soviet Union has conducted an investigation, whils th eUS , Japan and South Korea have not (2:275). But beforedescribing Johnson's hypothesis or th e other three, it isimportant to understand th e background to th e accident as Johnsonhas related it.Background

The backdrop to th e tragedy is th e entire region of thenorthwest Pacific, a highly important strategic area in th ebalance of power between th e US and th e Soviet Union (2:45). TheSoviets were quite active in building up theix military in th eregion, particularly their navy (2:45). The US had also recentlybegun a massive increase in defense spending under th e ReaganAdministration bolstering US and allied forces in the area(2:51). Confrontation between the superpowers in this region wasinevitable and in fact occurred quite routinely in the form of USand Soviet forces testing each others capabilities. This usual lyinvolved aircraft testing, or "tickling," the air defense systemsif he other side, occasionally with fatal results (2:51).The months before the tragedy were one of the lowest pointsin US and Soviet relations, although an apparent lull wasoccurring during th e summer of 1983 (2:62). The ReaganAdministration was in need of support at home to avoid having tomake unwanted consessions a t th e arms control negotiat ions(2:63). In addit ion, Congressional support for th e

Administrat ion 's arms programs, such as th e MX, was eroding(2:65). In Europe, allied support was also eroding for th edeployment of Pershing II and Ground Launched Cruise Misulies(GLCM) (2:64). Finally, President Reagan was concerned about thetotal support of the political Right which he felt was essentialfat his reelection in 1984 (2:75).Also during th e summer of 1983 a large Soviet phased arrayradar was discovered by a US reconnaissance satellite atAbalakova (also known as Krasnoyarsk) deep inside Siberia(2:70). This was significant because, depending on how the radarwould be used, it could be a violation of th e 1972 Anti-Ballistic M issile (ABM) Treaty (2:71). Alligations were made byth e US that th e Abalakova radar was a Treaty violation. This wav

to be handled by th e US-Soviet Standing Consultat ive Commission

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(SCC) in Geneva, not due to meet until sometime in the fall of1983 (2:73).

Poli t ical PerspectiveAccording to Johnson, all of these events are related. To

have some kind of proof that the Abalakova radar was a treatyviolation, in lieu of the slow moving SCC, would provide theReagan Administration th e kind of political leverage it needed toensure support (2:75). However, Johnson also states quiteplainly, "There is-it is important to say-no proof that theflight of 007 was connected with the (Abalakoval issue." (2:75)Another facton important to Johnson's hypothesis is the keyplayers In the Reagan Administration who were intimately involvedin US foreign policy and national security. These were WilliamClark, the National Security Advisor (NSA), and William Casey,head of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Prior to Reagan'sPresidency, William Clark had absolutely no experience to preparehim fo r responsible posit ions in foreign policy (2:85). His

extreme right-wing views led him to a key role in Reagan'scampaign for the California governorship, and later to anappointment to the California Supreme Court (2:85). In 1981,when current NSA Richard Allen had to resign over charges ofcorruption and misconduct, Reagan appointed Clark th e new Advisor(2:86). Friction developed between Clark and his former boss AlHaig, with the result of Clark using his influence to force Haigout of office (2:87). "With Haig went the last pretense to anyreal expertise in foreign affairs. US foreign policy was now inthe hands of a rancher who wore a Stetson and cowboy boots andcheerfully admitted he didn't know a thing about foreignaffairs." (2:87) Once in office, it was Clark's style to keepthe new Secretary of State, George Schultz (a boardroom executivefrom Bechtel Corporation), and others in the dark as to what hewas doing (2:88).

Added to this was the ne w head of the CIA, William Casey.Casey came to the Reagan Presidential campaign as its manager atthe suggestion of William Clark (2:86). Casey was a successfulbusinessman, a self-made millionaire, with experience in thewartime Office of Strategic Services (OSS) giving him abackground in clandestine operations (2:91). He also had areputation fo r being able to make extremely tough decisions underpressure, was a risk-taker, an d a r ight-wing hater of the"Eastern WASP Establishment." (2:91) When Casey became Reagan'sappointee as the head of the CIA, he did two things. First, het ightened security at th e Agency making it difficult for evenCongress to know what was happening (2:93). Second, he increasedth e number of CIA covert o-erations worldwide to perhaps 12 to14 (2:94). Clark and Casey, as portrayed by Johnson, were now

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responsible for the two US organizations most involved in th eevents surrounding th e last flight of KA L 007.

The Four HypothesesTo explain that last flight of KA L 007, Johnson evaluatesth e four hypotheses, each of which wil l be synopsized here. They

wil l be presented in th e same order Johnson uses: th e navigat ionerror hypothesis, th e fuelasaving hypothesis, th e electronicinterference hypothesis, and finally, th e surveil lance missionhypothesis which Johnson believes to be the explanation for theincident.The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO)considered several accident theories, but only two ser iously.One proposed that th e controlling Inertial Navigation System(INS) was misprogrammed at Anchorage, Alaska, with an erroneoustakeoff position of ten degrees too far to the east.Furthermore, the controlling INS had no normal interaction withthe other two INS's, The resulting ground track would be closeto the track plotted by Soviet radars (2:243). The other theory

had the INS correctly programmed, but the autopilot mode-selectorswitch was left in Magnetic Heading position rather than theINS mode. This would also result in a track similar to theSoviet radar data (2:243). Either scenario flew 007 north of theintended course, international airway Rorneo-20 (R-20). The ICAO,as well as other investigators who support an accident theory,discount the first scenario because there are too many technicalarguments against it (2:244). Johnson cites Australianjournalist Murray Sayle as the principal proponent for themagnetic heading mode hypothesis and quotes him often inexplaining the theory (2:244).In this scenario, the autopilot mode selector switch is leftin the magnetic heading mode instead of the INS heading mode.The aircraft would then have flown a magnetic heading of 246degrees throughout the flight, the first course flown aftertakeoff (2:244). This hypothesis requires several suppositions.It requires a good deal of crew inattentiveness to fail to catchthe wrong switch position and the subsequent differences innavigation. It requires a failure to check course with the firstand only radio navigation station (Very High Frequency OmniRange-VOR) at Bethel, Alaska. Flight 007 passed 12 wiles northof the Bnthel VOR on its 24 6 degree heading. It requires afailure to use weather radar in ground mapping mode, for theground terrain of Alaska and the Soviet coastline providedexcellent radar targets. A further requirement would be thefailure to monitor the emergency radio frequency of 121.5 MHz

(kega Hertz) over which Soviet fighters tried to contact 007.Johnson believes this theory requires too many suppositions and5


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has other technical flaws the evidence does not support (2:249).The next hypothesis, which has little acceptance, is thenotion that Captain Chun was short-cutting his route in order toconserve fuel. Based on the route of flight, this would havesaved about 6.2 tons of fuel worth $2500 (2:251). This theoryhas largely been discounted for several reasons. First of all,there is no evidence that any Korean Alt Lines flight has ever

tried this. Also, this particular route would be the last placea Captain would want to risk his flight and passengers for only$2500 in saved fuel (2:252). Therefore, this theory has beenvirtually abandoned.The third hypothesis, according to Johnson, proposes thatth e Soviets employed a sophisticated electronic interferencesystem to disrupt KAL 007's navigation. Some, mostly from theultra-conservative political right-wing of the US, believe thiswas done to Justify shooting th e aircraft down, perhaps toassassinate Congressman Larry McDonald, an ardent anti-Soviet(2:253). There is virtually no evidence that the Soviets everconsidered Congressman McDonald any kind of threat, nor is there

any evidence to suggest that they possess th e technology orcapability to produce such an electronic system (2:255).Johnson, as well as most serious investigators, do not give anycredence to this theory.This leaves the surveillance hypothesis, the one Johnsonsays is best supported by all th e evidence and th e one hebelieves. One must recall the US political situation mentionedearlier, th e discovery of th e new Soviet radar complex inSiberia, and th e need to know its intended function. TheAbalakova radar was not est im ated to be operat ional before 1988.

Therefore a thorough testing of the Soviet air defense systemmight reveal deficiencies th e new radar might neatly fill, thusproving it might be a treaty violation (2:258). To do this, anairspace intrusion more effective than the "tickling" done by RC -135a was needed (2:258). If a military aircraft performed thepenetration, it could be shot down or forced to land, anunacceptable proposition for the obvious reasons as well as thenegative propaganda (2:259). However, an airliner would solvethe problem. "If the Russians did catch up with it, they wouldsee it was an airliner and, clearly, nobody would wittingly shootdown an airliner .... If he was forced down, the Russians wouldsearch the plane, find nothing, and would quickly have to let thecrew and passengers go...." (SD:259) Johnson argues the KoreanCIA virtually controlled the Korean government and had deeprelations with Korean Air Lines (2:261). Because the CIA hadclose ties to the Korean CIA, KAL was the natural candidate forsuch a mission (2:261). Finally, the tw o men in the USgovernment with the responsibility for planning and initiatingsuch an operation would be th e high risk-takers, W illiam Clark

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and William Casey (2:262).

The Conspiracy TheoryOnce th e mission was put in motion, many of th e incidentssurrounding KAL 007's last flight can be explained. At Anchorage,some cargo was off-loaded and more fuel was taken on fo r th e

extra speed antd maneuvering that may *be needed later (2:262).The apparent rendezvous with an RC-135 off the coast of Kamchatkawas an attempt to confuse the Russians and lead them to believe007 was another RC-135 (2:263). KAL 007 proceded on its way,giving false position reports, and ultimately overflying th esensitive Soviet military bases on the Kamchatca peninsula andSakhalin Island, triggering a massive Soviet air-intercepteffort(2:264). Once intercepted over Sakhalin, Captain Chunbroke with his probable orders to land in the Soviet Union ifpicked up by fighters. Instead, he took a chance that he couldevade the Soviet Jets and make it to international airspace(2:265). Such an aggressive tactic would not be outside CaptainChun's experience, since he was trained as a fighter pilot in theKorean Air Force and had a reputation as being bold, aggressive,and willing to take risks (2:6). It was the last risk theCaptain ever took, for the Soviets did not realize 007 was anairliner and shot it down (2:265).

What followed in the aftermath of th e tragedy was also quiteconsistent with Johnson's hypothesis. The US, needing to hideits guilt, had to cover up its involvement and put the Soviets onthe defensive, while at the same time reaping th e most from thepropaganda opportunity. "With really blitzkrieg news-managementtactics, one could even news-manage and package the deaths of 269people in a politically effective way-the greatest news-management challenge the Reagan Administration had ever faced."(2:267) For William Clark, the outcome was to weigh heavily onhis conscience, and he quickly sought release by resigning andtaking on the Secretary of the Interior Job when James Watt hadto go (2:268). Unlike the 269 victims of the tragedy, thetheories and hypotheses about what happened and why lingered on .

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Chapter ThreeAUTHOR'S BACKGROUND AND REVIEWS OF BOOK

This chapter will attempt to establish Johnson's backgroundexpertise, political bias (if any), methods of reseach and logic.This will be done by first examining what Johnson says ofhimself and his efforts in his book. Next, reviews of th e bookwill be studied to obtain th e same information, but from th e viewpoint of others. This information will serve as the startingpoint for th e analysisJohnson's-Background

The first step in analyzing th e KAL 007 tragedy as Johnsonsees it is to try and learn something about the author himself.How he uses information and reports it, an well as his logic, mayhave as much importance as what he says in his book. To do this,one must look at what Johnson says of himself as he sets abouthis task of investigating the event. In addition, one mustexamine th e critiques of Johnson's book from several of th ereviews that came out on th e work. From these, a rough pictureof Johnson and his effort begins to emerge.Shootdown is an in-depth work. Johnson has done anexhaustive amount of research, looking at almost every piece ofevidence available in th e public record (9t473). Other

information comes from "unnamed and unidentified Intelligencesources." (7:111) The factual data and second-hand informationthrough which Johnson must work have both technical and politicalImplications and have led most investigators, including Johnson,to either an accidental theory or a conspiratorial theory(9:472). Johnson's book looks at both types and results in theexamination ,if our hypotheses (10:67). Before exploring thesehypotheses, he first task is to determine Johnson's area ofexpertise in order to gain an insight as to where his personalstrength l ies to deal with this mass of data.All that can be discerned about Johnson comes from thebiographical information provided by th e book jacket and from his

reviewers. Quoting directly fzom th e book jacket, "R. W. Johnsonis a Fellow in Politics at Oxford University, in England. He is afrequent contributor to such topical publications asTh

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Gurj3, New Statesman, and The Listener. His previous booksinclude African Perspectives, How Long Will South AfricaSuriv.veZ, The Lona March of the French Left,, and The Polit ics ofRecession." Several reviews repeat this same data; theconclusions drawn by them from Johnson's biographical informationwill be discussed later. Now, what Johnson says of his owninvestigation should be addressed.

Johnsonls Personal PerspectiveAt th e outset, in his book's Forward, Johnson establisheshis intent to investigate from a neutral, politically unbiasedpoint of view. "1 wished to avoid as far as possible th e

accusation of poli t ical bias (in th e end an impossible task, ofcourse)." (2:xiv) He felt there were too many unansweredquestions in th e Reagan administration account of what happenedand he was dissatisfied with that explanation (2:xiii). Hewanted to explore all the other possibilities those unansweredquestions implied, including th e Soviet version of th e events(2:xiii). This version contends that KAL 00,7 was participatingin some kind of US sponsored reconnaissance mission (2:xili).But Johnson wants mainly "to la y out all th e evidence that existsto date so that th e world can make up its own mind." (2:xiv)Finally, he states his political neutrality b saying "..,I am,in any case, not a joiner-I am not a member of any polit icalparty or group. I was happy to stay that way." (2:xiv) Insummation, Johnson has established his starting point as beingpolitically unbiased, unprejuidiced by preconceived notions, andseeking only truth from th e evidence available (2:xiv).

Finally though, it is important to note Johnson's reasoningfo r his conviction that the reconnaissance mission hypothesis isthe only one which makes sense. Johnson admits that hishypothesis of a reconnaissance mission scenario is a hypothesisbecause it is based solely on circumstantial evidence-there is no"smoking gun." (2:274) 3ut more important is his stated logicfo r his thesis.

And, most of all, th e hypothesis gains its strengthnot just from th e way it fits-or can be made tofit-a very large number of disparate facts, but bythe sheer inadequacies of all other possible hypothe-sea. That is, even if one did not consider the sur-veillance hypothesis on its own merits, one would beimpelled +owards it by the simple elimination of pos-sible alternatives (2:274),

In short, Johnson's thecry works because none of th e other onescan be made to fit the facts. This will be discussed later.

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Book Reviews-Other PerspectivesNow that Johnson's position has been established, the nextstep is to examine some of th e many reviews that appeared afterthe release of his book. Some of these compare Johnson's work toother books on th e incident. Some come from what must beconsidered biased viewpoints, such as The New American (5:20).Still, a common thread begins to emerge after going through th ereviews.Some reviews, though rather limited in the depth of thereview, get right to the point. Publisher's Weekly, for example,praises Johnson's method of replaying the events as if hisreconnaissance theory were true; "...most readers will likelyagree that it is the only one that makes sense." (10:67) Thebook review section of the Library Journal finds Johnson"acknowledging that the evidence remains incomplete," but, "heconcludes that KAL 007 was most likely on a US directedintelligence mission.... " This is related to similar conclusionsof one other book and contrary to another. Finally, this reviewconcludes with "Readers will find more detail...than in earlieranalyses as well as an accusation of Reagan Administration

dishonesty on the matter. A readable and useful contribution tothe debate. Recommended for most libraries." (10:60) The reviewin oLis t finds Johnson's hypothehis of the reconnaissancemission as "not definitive." (3:1582)Philip Windsor, reviewing fo r the Times Literary Supplement,was not totally convinced by Johnson's argument, but saw merit inthe more political aspects of what Johnson was saying. Forexample,What does emerge about the Reagan White House duringthe President's first Administration certa'nly sug-gests that it was possible for a conspiracy to bemounted at the higher levels of the CIA or theNational Security Council or both. The pictute isone of cynicism, Ignorance and a self-righteousbrutality, all held together by the winsome bonhomieof a leader who delegated virtually all his reponsi-bilities and whose attention span on a good day wasremarkably limited (13:669).

As for Johnson's reasoning, Windsor wrote "Nobody can argue fromthe negative to the positive, and declare that Just because somany things look so very odd, a historical conspiracy was indeedafoot. But the least one can say in that R. W. Johnson'shypothesis holds water better than most .... " (13:669) Windsorhas perceived Johnson to have a distinct political tone and heappeared to concur with it. However, other reviewers who alsonoted this political tone did not find it agreeable.


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James J. Drummey in his review fo r The New American is, tosay the least, somewhat biased in his critique of Johnson's book.Phrases like "the Kremlin killers" tend to indicate Mr. Drummeyis not without some prejudice of his own (5:21). Still, hecomments on the political tone of Johnson's book similar to thereview of Windsor's, albeit from a different perspective.

That R. W. Johnson, a fellow in politics at OxfordUniversity in England, is impelled toward the spymission hypothesis comes as no surprise in light ofthe vitriol he heaps on any American perceived to beanti-Communist. He rails against 'Senate ultra-con-servatives and Pentagon hawks'; says that PresidentReagan's lack of knowledge about foreign policy com-pares with that of Warren Harding; assails th e 'ex-treme right wing views' of former National SecurityAdvisor William Clark, CIA Director William Casey,and Assistant Defense Secretary Richard Perle; andattempts to smear Larry McDonald, one of th e 269victims of th e Korean airliner massacre, by allegingthat his congression,A district in Georgia contained'a flourishing chapter of the Klu Klux Klan.' (5:20)Other reviewers find th e same tone.

John L. Kellsher, writing fo r th e US Naval InstituteProcedings, finds Johnson's credibility questionable because ofhis polit ical observations (7:110). "It is not to osurprising...that Johnson's conclusion indicts 007 as anintelligence collection mission sponsored by th e United States.Providing sinister undercurrents fo r otherwise normal events, heleaves th e reader no possibil i ty for reaching any otherconclusion." (7:.10) In addition, Kelleher points out thatJohnson made no effort to investigate the Soviet allegations (asother authors such as Seymour Hersh have done) that 007 wasengaged in a US reconnaissance mission, but rather "demands thatthe United States prove its innocence." (7:110) Subsequentreviews begin to mention, in addition to the political overtonesof Johnson, problems with his technical arguments.

Marilyn Young and Michael Launer, writing for commonkgiea,find Johnson's research somewhat suspect because, as Johnsonhimself admits, his material comes "almost exclusively from thepublic record, which means he relies on secondary sourcesl apractice some have labeled 'scrapbook scholarship' ." (9:473)They also see his theory as an attempt to vindicate an earlierallegation made by Johnson in th e December 1983 issue ofThe Guardian. This theory proposes that 007 was a deliberateattempt by "the CIA to provoke a violent Soviet reaction,"necessary for Justifying the deployment of Pershing II and cruisemissiles in Europe (9:472). "Shotdown represents his attempt to

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assemble proofs demonstrating U.S. culpability. In addition, thebook posits a scenario in which such a drastic and dangerouscourse of action might make political sense. We are convinced,however, that Johnson has no solid evidence for his belief."(9:472) Their belief rests on th e technical flaws they see inJohnson's use (or misuse, according to Young and Launer) ofsources (9:472). "Throughout th e book Johnson misuses sources,particularly when discussing th e primary reason, in his mind, forexecuting such a sp y mission in the first place: a new radarinstallation deep within Siberia." (9:472) The radar referred tois the Abalakova (Krasnoyarsk) instal lat ion. Johnson'shypothesis contends that KAL 007, acting as a passive probe,would provide some intelligence data on th e radar (9:472). Youngand Launer refer to one of Johnson's own sources. This wasPhilip 3. Klass, who was then the Senior Avionics Editor forAviation Week and Space Technology. "Klass indicates that KAL'sf l ight could not possibly have been detected by either this newradar installation under construction or a similar one inoperation in Kamchatka because such equipment is designed toignore th e presence of aircraft." (9:472) They go on to quoteKlass, "I 've never read a book so filled with errors." (9:473)in addition, they attribute a similar assessment of Johnson'sanalysis of airline procedures to Harold Swing, a senior 747pilot as "wrong in many respects." (9:473) Other reviewersprovide more insight into Johnson's polit ical themes.

Joel Brinkley, reviewing fo r the Hew York Times, was notpersuaded by Johnson's logid because of th e monumental conspiracyit requires and th e overt political tone. The following quotesums up his review.

Mr. Johnson's larger thesis is not so easy to accept,particularly since such a cynical conspiracy wouldrequire th e contrivance of so large a number of people,from several countries that, by now, someone most

certainly would have come forward. Beyond that, Mr.Johnson's presentation is flawed on several points,not th e least of which is his str ident tone. Hetreats th e major figures in th e Reagan Administra-tion with disdain bordering on contempt. He hasscoured th e world's press to find th e most visceral,mudslinging descriptive quotations fo r each, andseveral times he declares one or more of them to beliars...This heavy-handed approach weakens th e cred-ibility of th e rest (4:21).

The last review examined extends the thread by seeing th e sameproblem in Johnson's work, but with a different twist.While Douglas B. Feaver, writing fo r th e Manchester GuardianWeekly, sees Johnson discrediting his argument, the reason is

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because of Johnson's disinformation (6:18) rather than hispolitical tone. Fox example, "Johnson asserts that the NationalTransportation Safety Board was ordered off the case by the StateDepartment. I know from my own reporting at the time of theaccident and from rechecking since that (this] is garbage."(6:18) Treaty requirements dictated, according to Feaver, theprimary responsibility fo r the investigation rested with theSoviets or the Koreans, bu t clearly not with the United States.Johnson calls Clark's quick departure after the shootdown fromthe National Security Advisor position to the relatively quietpost of secretary of the Interior highly suspicious. Feaverpoints out, "Reporters covering th e White House at the time knowthat the exhausted Clark had been looking fo r a way out longbefore the shootdown and the opportunity presented itself whenformer Interior Secretary James Watt put his foot in his mouthonce too often." (6:18) Finally, in using the InternationalCivil Aviation Organization's report on the accident as itrelates to the possibility of a navigation error due tomisprogramming the inertial navigation system, Johnson limits th equote. The report actually says that such errors "assumes aconsiderable degree of lack of attentiveness on the part of th eentire flight crew but not to a degree unknown in internationalcivil aviation." (6:s8) Johnson did not include the informationafter "flight crew," leaver says of this, "The effort is to makeimpossible something that has happened many times, amisprogrammed computer guiding a carelessly monitored flight.Just that scenario is the generally accepted explanation amongnon-conspirany theorists." (6:18)

Before exploring any of th e hypotheses, one must evaluatethe preceding. The relevant information that one can distillfrom the reviews of Johnsor's book is that which is mentionedconsistently by reviewers. First, Johnson's expertise, as hisbiographical information details, is as a professor of politicsat a major academic institution. He informs his readers in hisbook's Foward that he relies on others fo r technical expertise(2:xv). Johnson claims political neutrality, but many of th ereviews regard his work as politically biased against the ReaganAdministration. His use of sources has been questioned, as itrelies solely on what even Johnson admits is circumstantialevidence. Finally, there is Johnson's logic. He believes hishypothesis of a surveillance-intelligence mission is th eexplanation fo r the tragedy, not so much because the evidencesupports it so well, but because the evidence does not supportthe other hypotheses. The next step in this analysis, then, isto examine the evidence to see whether it supports any of theother hypotheses.

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Chapter PourCRITICAL ANALYSIS AND NEW EVIDENCE

This analysis procedes in tw o ways. First, Johnson'sargument against th e human error theory will be closely examinedand compared with the case made by another investigative writerMurray Sayle. Next, the alternative views of author SeymourHersh and new evidence will be introduced to lead towards a morecomplete inmight on the tragedy.Anayi

To examine the evidence and how it may explain the fate ofKAL 007, this analysis will accept th e arguments made by Johnsonand others that two of th e theories are unsupportable. Thispaper# therefore, will not address the hypotheses for a fuel-saving explanation or the Soviet use of electronic Interference.Instead, it will examine Johnson's argument against thepossibility of a navigation error balanced against th e case putby Murray Sayle that just such an error could well have causedth e tragic sequence of events. Sayle's arguments were documentedin th e 26 September 1985 issue of th e New York Review of Books,although it should be noted that his article was not a bookreview. The analysis will then consider interpretations of theevidence by other investigators.Both Johnson and Sayle deal with a navigational error causedby incorrectly positioning the autopilot mode selector switch.Neither one belives an accident based on misprogramming the INSwith a 10 degree error to the east in latitude can account forthe estimated ground tracks, although the ICAO report says thatthis is plausible (11:52). It is also important to note thatJohnmon does not deny it was possible for the crew to incorrectlyposition the autopilot mode selector switch (2:244). As astartLng point, both considar the autopilot mode selector switchmistakenly left in the magnetic heading mode.Johnson's primary argument against this hypothesis is that

Sayle's 246 degree magnetic heading track Is different from theICAO plot, based on simulations done with Boeing, the aircraftmanufacturer, and Litton, builder of the INS used on KAL 007(2:245). The ICAO simulntion of the 246 degree magnetic heading

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puts 007 6.5 miles north of th e Bethel VOR when it was observedon radar to be 12 miles north and too far to the south ofSakhalin Island to be consistent with the Soviet radar track(2:245). Sayle's track is closer to the Soviet radar version, orfurther north than the ICAO simulation (11:47).Sayle's argument fo r his hypothesis begins with a point thatmust be considered. He points out that those who argue for aconspiracy thiory where th e US is guilty of falsifying andwithholding information do not consider th e Soviets equallycapable of th e same thing. "To rely on a Soviet radar trace,derived from unspecified equipment, in order to support aconclusion that KE 007 changed course shortly before it was shotdown, and therefore, as th e Soviets charge, was on a ?pyingmission, strikes me as incautious, to say th e least." (11,51)Sayle's track was developed with th e cooperation of th e BritishCivil Aviation Authority (CAA). The differences between thistrack arid that plotted by th e ICAO are, according to Sayle,attributable to the different estimates of the winds aloft madeby the CA A (vs. the ICAO) (31:53). The map was rechecked by theCAA at Sayle's request and considered is to be consistent with

th e CAA view on th e incident: " .... KU 007, th e CAA believes, wasinadvertently flown to disaster in magnetic heading mode, a viewit conveyed to ICAO." (1153)Johnson's next maJor crit3cism of th e navigational errorhypothesis concerns Sayle's accounting of how the INS alertlights would be illuminated when passing th e preprogrammed

waypoints. Waypoints are predetermined navigational positions oflatitude and longitude along th e correct course and programmedinto th e INS before takeoff. If the INS controlled th e autopilotit would fly 007 directly to these points. These alert lightswill .lluminate even if the INS is not controlling the autopilot .Furthermore, they will come on even if th e aircraft does not flyover the waypoint but passes abeam (passes at an angle of 90degrees) and within a range of 200 miles. As Johnson points out,KAL 007 was 365 miles off course when it was shot down and thisleaves some doubt as to whether th e alert lights could haveilluminated at waypoints towards the area of th e shootdown(2:246). Johnson concludes also that had th e crew checked th eINS when the lights illuminated, they would have seen th edistance to the waypoint was not zero, as it should be if theypassed directly overhead (2:246).

First of all, Johnson's own technical advisor on this point,Robert Allardyce (Johnson identifies him only as a veteran USpilot and navigator on page 14 of his book) has found that asimilar INS made by Delco has, in Johnson'3 words, "...no knownl imit in distance 'abeam' at which th e alert l ight will fail toilluminate. This may, of course, not be true of the Litton IN Scarried by 007-but it quite probably is." (2:319)

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Sayle, in arguing his case, quotes page 2 of the ICAOreport, whicn states "...with the INS system activated althoughnot controlling the flight navigation, th e crew would have beenprovided with regular indications of IWS waypoint passages at ornear the flight plan estimates for such passages and could,therefore, have been under the impression they were navigating inthe INS mode." (11:57) Sayle also checked with the American AirLines Pilots Association (ALPA). Captain John O'Brien, theSafety Officer for American ALPA and a former Pan American pilot,explained

We understand that the 28 program of the LittonTTN-72R-28 (the same type INS used on KAL 0071 il-luminates the alert lights on a time and distancebasis, as long as the INS system is running, evenif the INS system is not in fact steering the air-craft. In the case of KE 007, when the track ac-tually followed by the aircraft ran roughly in th esame direction as the preprogrammed flight plan, th ealert lights would have come on when the true way-points were more or less abeam, not because theywere abeam but because the calculated time hadelapsed. KE 007's crew could thus have been misledinto thinking that they were actually at the way-points (11:57).

Sayle's final point on this matter concerni the INS readout whenthe lights illuminate and how the crew may have interpreted this.He says that every position report required of 007 was made by the,copilot, according to the US and Japanese air traffic controlvoice tapes, and that he would give an arrival time at th ewaypoint and an estimated time to the next waypoint (11:56). TheINS provides the time and distance to the next waypoint when thealert light goes out (11:56). Therefore, the copilut would bechecking the INS readout when the light went out ant did notnotice the readout when the light came on (11:56). According toSayle, this view is also held by the ICAO and the British CAA(11:56).

Another charge made by Johnson against the navigationalerroL hypothesis is the unexplained maneuvers Just before theaircraft was shot down. These include a turn to the northwestover Sakhalin, evidenced by the Soviet radat track and,according to Johnson, the Japanese radar tapes (2:246). Anothermaneuver, )r lack of maneuver, Johnson points out is the failureof flight 007 to climb to 35,000 feet as requested of Japaneseair traffic control. Johnson ackr-wledges the ICAO attributesthe effect of slant range to account for differences between theSoviet and Japanese radar traces of the turn over Sakhalin(2:247), bu t makes no mention of this in his charge about th efailure to climb.

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Part of Sayle's reasoning about these events goes back tothe earlier argument of relying solely on the radar data supplied"by th e Soviets. As fo r th e radar information provided by th eJapanese government from their Self Defense Agency, there haibeen much controversey due in large part, according to Sayle, tothe lack of knowledge by the general press about radar (11:57).To assist Sayle in considering this matter, he was advised by Dr.Eli Brookner, a consulting scientist to th e Raytheon Company ondefense radars. Dr. Brookner considered th e Japanese radar datahighly unreliable because of the distances Involved. Wakkanai,on th e north coast of Hokkaido, was th e closest station at 160nautical miles (NM) to th e position of KAL 007 at 0312 local time(11:S7). Dr. Brookner based his opinion in part on th eRadar Handbook edited by Dr. Merrill I. Skolnik of th e NavalResearch Laboratory, Washington, which provided estimates ofheight error in relation to slant ranges. At 200 NM th e expectederror is given as between 4000 and 8000 feet (11:58). TheWakkanai radar site, at 160 N14, could not have improved theaccuracy enough to determine if fl ight 007 actually climbed 2000feet or not, and thus corroborate th e Soviet data. As fo r th eturn over Sakhalin, Sayle goes on to say "We know that when KE007appeared on the Japanese radar screen, it was beyond accurateradar tracking range, as th e radar textbook and th e Japanese SelfDefense Agency both say." (11:58) Because of th e long rangereliability problem of th e Japanese radar data, one is left soleywith th e Soviot radar track data. Another possibility will bediscussed later.

Johnson's final criticisms of Sayle's hypothesis coverseverel smaller arguments. He claims that Sayle's case requiresthat th e crew could not have used th e 747's weather radar in th eground mapping mode despite th e fact that, according to Johnson,this is a standard practice fo r KAL and other airl ines flying th eR-20 route (2:246). As Johnson has pointed out, the Kamchatkacoast provides an excellent radar target. Along th e same lines,Johnson claims that Sayle suggests there was no reason for thecrew to monitor the emergency frequency of 121.5 MHz, over whichthe Soviets supposedly tried to contact KAL 007 (2:246). Also,when th e Soviet fighter fired warning shots (tracer shells),flight 007 failed to respond. Johnson also claims th e crew didnot use the Shemya VOR to check its position (2:246). Finally,Johnson discounts Sayle's theory because he fails to mention th ecomputerized fl ight plan, upon which Cap~ain Chun allegedly madenotations corresponding to the route actually flown by 007.

Sayle does address some of these arguments. Saylc agreesthat the crew could have used the 747's weather radar In theground mapping mode, but questions whether or not they wereactually required to do this (11:55). He referred again to th eAmerican ALPA, particularly to th e Public Affairs Officer .7ohnMazor and the Safety Officer, Captain John O'Brier. Neither

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individual endorsed th e "requirement" to use weather radar inmapping mode, although since th e accident this is probably astandard precaution (11:55). Sayle does not specificallyaccount fo r the other minor criticisms leveled by Johnson, butone can speculate or turn to other analyses of th e incident.

&0_l1_tjrnatIve ViewIn addition to Sayle's speculation, writer Seymour Hersh hasmade an in-depth investigation into th e tragedy providinganother point of view. In his book The Taroet Is Destoved hehas addressed many of th e same issues Sayle and others havestudied. Hersh concluded that th e crew of 007 made anavigational error in th e same innocent manner as Sayle'shypothesis (1:199-205). However, Hersh believes th e error wasmade by neglecting to enter all waypoints into the INS during aninflight reprogramming, resulting in th e fatal turn over Sakhalin(1:225-226). In addition, Hersh made several importantconclusions about th e incident based on his research which aredecidedly different from Johnson's. The initial intelligence

that reached th e White House was incomplete, yet th e ReaganAdministration over-reacted and used th e incident fo r politicaladvantage because of their mistrust of the Soviets (1:249-250).When more complete intelligence data and analysis becameavailable, th e Administration did not change its rhetoric, but"looked th e other way" (1:249-250). In this manner Hershbelieves th e US Administration made a serious mistake. TheSoyiets also made serious errors in th e intercept of 007 (1:239).Primarily, they failed to positively identify th e aircraft beforeauthorizing the shootdo.in (1:236-237). The incident resulted ina significant reorganization of their Far East Air Defense Forcn(1:236). Thus, some of Hersh's conclusions support Sayle'shypothesis and answer Johnson's criticisms of it.

Other criticism s can be answered by speculation and more ofHersh's reasonings. Sayle makes no mention of 007's failure tomonitor the emergency frequency of 121.5 MHz, but to guard thischannel is considered universally standard in airline andmilitary aviation. Johnson reports that the Soviets had tried tocontact 107 over this frequency (2:246). Speculating, one canassume KAL 007 most likely did set up one of its radios to guardthis frequency, but a malfunction occurred preventing 007 fromreceiving th e Soviet warnings. Even Johnson documents the factthat during the fl ight from New York, )071s point of origin, oneof the VHF radios was written up for problems, although it wasreported in good working order in Anchorage (2:4). Concerningthe failure to respond to the Soviet SU-15's tracer fire, onemust rely on the Soviet version of events. The SU-15 pilot,Major Kasmin, claims he fired tracers "right by his nose." (2:22)Johnson reports Kasmin was 2000 meters behind 007 when he fired

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and that th e tracers maintain their brilliance for almost 3000meters so that th e crew must have been able to see them (2:246).But Johnson also reports th e visibility was poor due to mult iplecloud layers and little moonlight (2:186). Speculating again,this could have made it harder to see th e tracer fire.Furthermore, just before Major Kasmin f ired, KA L 007 requestedand was given authorization by Japanese air traffic control toclimb to 35,000 feet . Hersh claims at th e time Kasmin f ired, th eaircraft was nose high initiating its climb and th e crew'sattention was inside th e cockpit flying on instruments (1:284).This could also explain why th e crew had not seen Kasmin'sf ighter earlier when he flew nearby to attract their attention(2:22).

There remains but two final criticisms by Johnson againstth e navigat ional error hypothesis. First, he has said thatflight 007 did not use th e Shemya VOR, a standard practice onR-20, and thereby failed to see its true position was off course.This can be argued in two ways, both speculat ive. To begin with,there is no evidence that 007 failed to. use th e Shemya VOR. Theheading information could have been misunderstood or ignored.Also, th e crew may not have even bothered to use it. Johnson'sinterpretation of what is standard and normal practice hat beenchallenged before (concerning th e use of weather radar for groundmapping); he may have th e same problem on this matter. Second,th e question of Captain-Chun's notes on th e computerized flightplan-for 007's route (which was left behind in VAL's Anchoragedispatch office) must be answered. Johnson has speculated thesenotat ions to correspond to timas for entering and leaving Sovietairspace (2:31). Nowhere did he indicate that th e ICAO or anyoneelse believed these notes significant. Hersh considered th e samedata and concluded that Captain Chun was exercising hisprerogative to revise th e flight plan for fuel efficiency (1:196).

This, th'n, is Johnson's argument against the navigationalerror hypothesis and the case for it as presented by Sayle andHersh. Sayle In particular has sound explanations backed up byexpert test im onials . Hersh's conclusions are equally based onfactual data, analysis by experts, and many interviews withindividuals from th e US intelligence community (1:xi; 7:110).Neither relied on the information available in th e public media.What is important is that each criticism by Johnson has analternative explanation based on fact or plausible speculat ion.Next, one must consider Johnson's logic for believing in aconspiracy theory.

His belief in an intended surveil lance mission rests on th elogic that the evidence does not support th e other theories.Therefore, KAL 007 was involved in a conscious act of espionage.Yet this paper has shown th e evidence soundly supports anaccidental navigat ional error. However, there is even more

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evidence available that casts serious doubt on the possibility ofthe intended surveillance mission hypothesis.Johnson's theory that KAL 007 was an intentional part of aUS sponsored spy mission rests on a major premise: "Nobody wouldwittingly shootdown an airliner." (2:259) If the Soviets managedto intercept the "passive bait" airliner, they would force itdown, not shoot it down. This, Johnson believes, was th e mindset

of th e American intelligence community planning th e mission(2:259-260). If th e airliner was forced down, the Soviets wouldsearch it, th e passengers, and crew. Finding nothing, they wouldhave to release them as they had with KAL 902 in 1978 (2:260).It is this incident that makes a conspiracy theory highlyunlikely.On 20 April 1976, Korean Air Lines flight 902 enroute fromParis to Seoul was shot at, hit and forced to land by Sovietfighters. Flight 902 had committed a navigational rroo an-,;strayed into Soviet territory over th e Kola Peninsula. j'wopassengers were killed and 13 injured (1:3). The US intelligencecommunity carefully studied the event.US intelligence analysts learned two significant things fromthe incident. First, the accident happened in an area where theUS flies reconnaissance missions with RC-135 aircraft, althoughin international airspace (1:9). And secondly, th e Sovietsassumed th e airliner was one of these reconnaissance flightsdespite th e visual identifications madeby th e fighters (1:14),.Author Hersh obtained this information from interviews with USintelligence analysts who said that the Soviet authoritiesconsidered th e airline markings to be a deception (1:14). Such aSoviet reaction to airspace violations is nothing new.

Additional Research EvidenceThe Soviets have a long history of shooting down or forcing

down any aircraft which enters Soviet airspace. Major MartinAlvatad has documented in his 1987 ACSC research project 32incidents since 1946 where Soviet fighters have fired upon,forced down, or shot down aircraft violating their airspace. Hisconclusion based on this is clear: Soviet policy will always beto force down any violating aircraft or shoot it down if it failsto respond (14:18, 25). This long history of Sovietpredictability is alto undoubtedly known to th e US intelligencecommunity. Clearly then, it is highly unlikely fo r th e US tohave considered Johnson's scenario.

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Chapter Five

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONThe question of whether or not KAL 007 was a passive probein a US sponsored intelligence mission as postulated by Johnsoncan now be addressed. All the data presented in this paper mustbe considered so that conclusions can be drawn. It has beenshown that Johnson's case is tainted by polit ical bias. Hissources have been considered by reviewers and even Johnsonhimself to be circumstantial. His technical arguments against anavigational error are not as strong as the arguments fo r such anaccident. This seriously undermines the logic fo r his case.Other investigators examining the same data have drawn muchdifferent conclusions. Finally, in light of additional evidence

on Soviet behavior towards airspace violations, there issufficient reason to doubt th e plausibility of Johnson'sconspiracy theory.It is evident that the tragic hequence of events leading tothe destruction of Kal 007 and the loss of 269 lives beqan withan innocent human error. Crew Lhattention failed to catch th eerror until it was too late. It is possible Captain Chunrealized his desperate position over Sakhalin and attempted agamble. Being a former fighter pilot, he may have thought he

could evade an interception by flying over Sakhalin to thenorthwest rather than turning away from it (another possibleexplanation of the turn). He must not have realized how closethe Eighters were, otherwise he would not have tried. Th eSoviets were determined to stop the aircraft whether or not itcould be identified. The unfortunate outcome was inevitablegiven the Soviet mindset. Thus, KAL 007 was not involved in a USreconnaissance mission. It flew over Soviet territory because ofan accidental error in navigation.

But this paper does not attempt to answer all the questionsthat still remain. Did the Soviets believe flight 007 was areconnaissance aircraft, an airliner, or just an unidentifiedintruder? Did the US have the Information to know what washappening and thus be able to warn KAL 0077 If so, why didn'tthey? Was the initial US response to the incident justified?These are some of the serious questions that will only beanswered by more research.

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Can anything be learned from the tragedy? Hopefully thereare lessons that have been learned by both th e Soviets and th eUS . Both nations need to ensure their mistrust will never againendanger innocent l ives in much a way. At th e very least,this in their obligation to th e 269 victims who perished alongwith KAL 007.

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.. BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Hersh, Seymour. "The Target Is Destroyed". New York:Random House, Inc., 1986.2. Johnson, R. W. Shoot9.wn. New York: Viking PenguinInc., 1986.

Articles and Periodicals3. Booklist, July 1986, p. 1582.4. Brinkley, Joel. "On the Track of 007." New York Times BookRevie, 20 July 1986, p. 21.5. Drummey, James. "What Really Happened to Flight 007?" ThbnNew American, 15 September 1986, pp. 20-21.6. Feaver, Douglas. "The Mystery of KAL 007." Manchest.g,Guardian Weekly, 15 July 1986, p. 18 .7. Kelleher, John L., ILt, USAP. "Book Reviews." _Institute Procedings, June 1987, pp. 110-111.8. Kuhulman, James R. "Book Reviews." Library Journal., 15

June 1986, p. 60 .9. Launer, Michael and Marilyn Young. "Books: 007-Conspiracy orAccident?" C~mmonweal, 12 September 1986, pp. 472-473.1U. "Nonfiction." Publisher's Weekly, 2 May 1986, p. 67 .11. Sayle, Murray and David Pearson. "The Fate of KE007: AnExchange." New York Review of Books, 26 September1985, pp. 47-59.12 . Stein, Kenneth. "Human Factors Analyzed In 007 NavigationError." Aviation Week and Space Technology, 3October 1983, pp. 165-167.13 . Windsor, Philip. "Evidence of a Conspiracy." TimesLiterary Supplement, 20 June 1986, p. 669.

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CONTINUEDUnoublished Materials

14. Alvstad, Martin C., Major, USAF. "Red Terror in th e Sky:Soviet Aerial Aggression, 1946-1986." UnpublishedStudent Report 87-0095, Air Command and Staft College,Air University, Maxwell APB, Alabamba, 1987.

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the shootdown of kal 007: accident or conspiracy?

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